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Abstract			
This	research	presents	an	analysis	of	Shanghai's	two	separate,	parallel	but	simultaneously	co-
existing	 institutional	 environments,	 one	 operating	 under	 control	 of	 the	 Chinese	 central	
government,	and	the	other	under	an	extraterritorial	system	defined	by	foreign	(mainly	British,	
American,	and	French)	political	and	legal	conceptualisations.	This	institutionally	dichotomic	
condition	characterised	Shanghai	for	over	one	hundred	years,	from	the	mid-nineteenth	to	mid-
twentieth	centuries,	throughout	the	course	of	amid	tumultuous	political	upheaval	shaping	the	
domestic	political	landscape.	The	nature	of	these	parallel	institutional	environments	in	large	
part	reflected	the	period's	political	events;	the	era's	political	turmoil,	via	their	impact	on	the	
nature	 of	 institutional	 protections	 on	 private	 property,	 contract,	 and	 investor	 rights,	
concomitantly	 helped	 determine	 Shanghai's	 economic	 development,	 including	 the	
development	of	the	city's	financial	markets		
	
While	 China's	 broader	 domestic	 institutional	 framework	 over	 this	 period	 has	 received	
considerable	 attention	 in	 the	 literature,	 there	 exists	 debate	 regarding	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
strength	 and	 efficacy	 of	 the	 domestic	 institutional	 environment,	 particularly	 in	 regard	 to	
issues	pertaining	 to	state	capacity	and	protection	of	private	property	rights.	This	debate	is	
reflective	of	similar	debate	within	Chinese	economic	history,	one	that	has	portrayed	China's	
late-imperial	and	republican	economic	growth	as	signified	mostly	by	failure,	yet	with	recent	
revisionist	work	 providing	 intriguing	 empirical	 evidence	 suggesting	 considerably	 stronger	
economic	growth	to	have	occurred	throughout	the	period.	In	a	parallel	manifestation,	a	robust	
revisionist	 literature	 has	 presented	 an	 effective	 challenge	 to	 the	 standard	 conventional	
literature	 has	 tended	 to	 view	 the	 domestic	 institutional	 environment	 over	 the	 period	 as	
inherently	weak	and	ineffective.		
	
In	this	research	project,	we	utilise	Shanghai's	unique	dualistic	institutional	setting	over	this	
period	to	help	address	this	debate	in	the	literature.	Specifically,	we	identify	how	differences	
between	 these	 two	 institutional	 frameworks	 impacted	 economic	 actors'	 behaviour,	with	 a	
particular	 emphasis	 on	 the	 revealed	 preferences	 displayed	 by	 investors	 acting	 within	
Shanghai's	 early	 financial	 markets.	 To	 undertake	 our	 analysis,	 we	 construct	 an	 original	
dataset	based	on	archival	records	of	bond	and	equity	prices	that	traded	on	Shanghai's	early	
stock	 exchanges.	 The	 market	 pricing	 and	 trading	 activity	 associated	 with	 similarly	
constructed	 financial	 instruments,	 differing	 primarily	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 issuer	 –whether	 a	
domestic	 or	extraterritorial	 entity–	 reflect	 the	differing	perceptions	 that	 contemporaneous	
investors	ascribed	to	the	broader	institutional	environments.	
	
This	 economic	 and	 financial	 historical	 research	 project	 therefore	 utilises	 analysis	 of	
contemporaneous	investor	perceptions	to	examine	not	only	Shanghai's	early	financial	markets,	
but	also	 to	draw	broader	conclusions	regarding	Shanghai's	dual	 institutional	environment	
from	a	 comparative	perspective,	 as	well	 as	 providing	a	new	viewpoint	 on	a	 long-standing	
debate	in	the	literature	regarding	the	efficacy	and	strength	of	China's	domestic	institutional	
foundations	over	the	late-imperial	and	early	republican	time	period.	
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Part	I.	
Introduction,	Theory,	and	Debate					
The	 introductory	material	 in	Part	I	provide	the	historical	and	 theoretical	 framework	to	be	
utilised	in	this	research	study.	Specifically,	Chapter	One	provides	a	brief	introduction	to	the	
historical	setting	that	serves	as	the	focus	of	the	study,	that	being	China	during	the	late-imperial	
and	early	republican	time	frame.	In	particular,	some	of	the	unique	historical	and	institutional	
features	of	Shanghai,	the	primary	area	our	research	centres	upon,	are	introduced,	as	are	some	
of	the	unique	features	defining	the	city's	early	financial	markets.	Of	particular	emphasis	is	how	
while	 Shanghai's	 institutional	 environments	 were	 uniquely	 dualistic,	 the	 city	 and	 its	
population	of	economic	actors	were	singular	in	nature.	Furthermore,	 the	primary	research	
goals	 and	methodological	 approach	 to	 be	 employed	 in	 this	 dissertation	are	presented	and	
explicated.	
	
Chapter	Two	lays	out	the	overall	theoretical	background	that	shapes	and	drives	the	analytical	
approach	 employed	 throughout	 this	 research	 study.	 Focussing	 on	 the	 contributions	 of	 the	
Austrian	school	of	economics	that	helps	to	centre	our	methodological	approach	and	unit	of	
analysis	 to	 that	 of	 the	 individual,	 we	 seek	 to	 emphasise	 the	 fundamental	 role	 that	 the	
incentives,	motivations	and	actions	of	individuals	play	in	shaping	and	determining	economic	
outcomes.	 Building	 on	 this	 foundation,	we	 discuss	 how	 private	 property	 rights	 impact	 the	
incentives,	motivations	 and	actions	 of	 individuals,	 thereby	underscoring	 the	 importance	 of	
institutional	constructs	that	serve	to	either	increase	or	decrease	the	security	of	property	rights.	
Finally,	we	introduce	the	Violence	Trap	and	related	theoretical	concepts	that	will	be	employed	
in	our	analysis	of	the	domestic	and	extraterritorial	institutional	environments	that	defined	the	
late-imperial	and	early	republican	time	period.	
	
Finally,	Chapter	Three	provides	a	general	outline	of	 the	 important	debate	 in	 the	 literature	
regarding	the	nature	of	domestic	state	capacity	and	the	attendant	institutional	environment	
that	prevailed	over	the	course	of	the	late-Qing	through	republican	time	period.	In	general,	this	
debate	highlights	two	rather	differing	visions	of	China's	domestic	institutional	environment	
over	 this	period,	with	 the	conventional	 literature	 typically	 suggesting	domestic	institutions	
were	persistently	weak,	and	that	efforts	to	construct	stronger,	more	capable	institutions	were	
continually	 sabotaged	 by	 historical	 legacies,	 cultural	 shortcomings,	 and	 war;	 whereas	
conversely,	 a	 robust	 revisionist	 literature	 bolstered	 by	 new	 evidences	 maintains	 many	
domestic	institutions	were	in	fact	much	stronger	and	capable	than	the	traditional	mainstream	
view	 suggests.	 It	 is	 to	 this	 debate	 that	 this	 dissertation	 attempts	 to	 provide	 a	 substantial	
contribution	 through	 the	 employment	 of	 a	 novel	 new	 comparative	 data-driven	 approach	
allowing	the	actions	of	contemporaneous	actors	themselves	to	reveal	their	perceptions	of	the	
domestic	institutional	environment.	
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Chapter	One.	
Introduction:	Shanghai	as	an	institutionally	bifurcated	but	singularly	Chinese	city			"The	rise	and	fall	of	Shanghai	means	the	birth	or	death	of	the	whole	nation."		 	–	Jiang	Jieshi	(Chiang	Kai-shek),	1937					The	focus	of	this	research	dissertation	centres	on	analysis	of	the	nature	of	China's	domestic	institutional	constructs	shaping	private	property	and	contract	rights	over	the	late-imperial	and	republican	period,	with	particular	attention	paid	to	Shanghai's	bifurcated	institutional	environment.	The	city's	unique,	dualistic	political	structure	created	two	separate,	parallel	but	 simultaneously	 co-existing	 institutional	 environments,	 one	 domestic	 and	 one	extraterritorial.	 The	dichotomous	 institutional	 environment	 that	 characterised	Shanghai	for	over	one	hundred	years,	from	the	mid-nineteenth	to	mid-twentieth	centuries,	provides	a	useful	construct	 to	conduct	a	comparative	analysis	 to	better	understand	China's	larger	institutional	 environment.	 Specifically,	 this	 research	 project	 utilises	 observation	 of	 the	behaviour	of	contemporaneous	economic	agents	acting	within	and	across	the	Shanghai's	unique	dualistic	institutional	structure	as	indicative	of	their	revealed	preferences	to	draw	broader	conclusions	regarding	their	perceptions	of	the	relative	strength	and	efficacy	of	the	city's	differing	institutional	environments,	providing	a	new	viewpoint	on	the	debate	in	the	literature	 regarding	 the	 strength	 and	 efficacy	 of	 China's	 late-imperial	 and	 republican	domestic	institutional	environment.				1.1.			Late-Imperial	to	Republican	Shanghai:	A	Divided,	but	uniquely	Chinese,	City		While	 the	 time	 and	 place	 on	 which	 this	 research	 dissertation	 centres	 its	 focus	 is	 late-imperial	and	republican	Shanghai,	to	be	clear,	the	beginnings	of	the	city's	history	are	not	to	be	found,	as	is	frequently	presented	in	the	literature,	with	the	arrival	of	Western	merchants	that	occurred	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	signing	of	the	Treaty	of	Nanjing.	Yet	the	city's	past	 is	 too	 frequently	truncated	as	such,	with	 the	majority	of	 the	English	 language	historiography	on	modern	Shanghai	 frequently	opening	with	a	suggestion	 that	Shanghai	was	nothing	 but	 a	 "sleepy	 fishing	 village"	 prior	 to	 the	 arrival	 of	 Europeans	 in	 the	mid-nineteenth	century.			1.1.1.		Mischaracterised	Historical	Antecedents		While	the	exact	origins	of	this	oft-repeated	trope	are	unclear,	references	to	pre-treaty	port	Shanghai	as	but	a	"sleepy	fishing	village"	are	replete	in	much	of	the	early	English-language	literature	 regarding	 the	 city's	 history	 (McFarlane	1881,	Wright	1908,	Pott	 1928,	Tawny	1932),	with	the	1935	edition	of	the	All	about	Shanghai	and	Environs	guidebook	continuing	to	expound	the	by-then	standard	image	of	a	Shanghai	that	barely	existed	until	the	Treaty	of	Nanjing	changed	 its	 fortunes:	 "Less	 than	a	century	ago	Shanghai	was	 little	more	 than	an	anchorage	 for	 junks,	 with	 a	 few	 villages	 scattered	 along	 the	 low,	 muddy	 banks	 of	 the	river.	...There	is	nothing	of	outstanding	importance	to	relate	about	Shanghai	from	the	dawn	of	the	17th	century	down	to	1843,	when	it	was	opened	to	foreign	trade"	(1935:	1-2).			
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	The	 image	of	 a	 Shanghai	unimportant	until	 the	 arrival	 of	western	 traders	has	persisted	through	to	the	present,	finding	its	way	into	popular	conceptualisations	of	the	city's	history.	Lewis	(2001:	21),	writing	in	the	financial	periodical	Fortune	at	the	start	of	the	millennium,	extolling	Shanghai's	potential	economic	growth,	begins	his	piece	by	noting,	"Hong	Kong	and	Shanghai	were	both	sleepy	 fishing	villages	until	 the	British	 took	 them	over	 in	1842	and	turned	 them	 into	 dynamic	 trading	 centers."	 Leading	 English-language	 newspapers	 also	continue	 to	propagate	 this	 image:	 "Shanghai	was	 still	 a	 sleepy	 fishing	 village...	 until	 the	arrival	of	large	numbers	of	British	soldiers	and	traders	in	the	1830s	and	1840s—followed	by	the	French	and	later	the	Japanese—[after	which]	the	city	began	to	expand"	(LA	Times	27	February	2005).	The	domestic	Chinese	press	has	been	equally	guilty	in	the	spreading	of	this	trope,	as	a	recent	article	in	the	China	Daily,	a	newspaper	published	by	China's	state-owned	Xinhua	news	agency,	illustrates:	"Following	the	end	of	the	First	Opium	War	in	1842	and	the	signing	of	the	Treaty	of	Nanking	on	Aug	29	that	year,	Shanghai	was	opened	up	to	British	merchants	and	subsequently	those	from	other	Western	nations	such	as	France,	Germany	and	the	United	States.	The	resulting	influx	of	foreigners	provided	the	city	with	an	infusion	of	different	cultures	and	had	also	quickly	transformed	it	from	a	sleepy	fishing	village	into	a	hub	for	maritime	trade"	(China	Daily	20	January	2017).		The	suggestion	in	the	literature	that	Shanghai	was	made	"modern"	as	a	result	of	Western	influence	in	the	post-Opium	War	period	is	also	widespread	in	both	English-	and	Chinese-language	 the	 literature.	 Wang	 (1991:39)	 implies	 that	 the	 foreign	 influence	 of	 the	extraterritorial	settlements	served	as	a	modernising	force,	while	Zhu	(1994:20)	claims	it	was	 European	 influence	 that	 brought	 about	 Shanghai's	 ascent	 and	 the	 arrival	 of	"modernity"	into	China.	Lee	(1999)	identifies	it	to	have	been	in	Shanghai	where	"Chinese	modernity	began."	Yan	(2015:	1-2)	similarly	suggests,	"The	mid-19th	century	undeniably	marks	 the	 beginnings	 of	modern	 China...	with	 the	opening	 of	 treaty	 ports	 following	 the	ratification	of	the	Treaty	of	Nanjing."			However,	actual	historical	data	belie	the	outdated	yet	persistent	view	of	Shanghai	as	of	little	import	prior	to	its	designation	as	a	treaty	port.	The	city	was	already	mentioned	in	original	dynastic	records	as	far	back	as	249	B.C.E.	(		1999a:	5).	Although	not	located	along	the	main	 economic	 thoroughfare	 dominated	 by	 the	 Grand	 Canal	waterway,	 by	 the	 eleventh	century,	Shanghai's	prominence	had	grown	such	that	the	Song	imperial	court	designated	it	a	market	town	with	an	official	customs	station	(Smith	1900:	91).	In	1288	under	the	Yuan,	Shanghai	officially	was	designated	as	,	or	county-tier	city	(de	Jesus	1909:	xi).	During	the	Ming,	in	1544	Shanghai's	status	was	again	raised	to	that	of	a	"walled	city",	with	a	seven-gated	 city	 wall	 seven	 metres	 in	 height	 and	 five	 kilometres	 in	 circumference;	 the	 wall,	originally	designed	as	protection	from	marauding	activities	of	Japanese	pirates,	remained	standing	until	the	fall	of	the	Qing	empire	(HKDP	1912:	327,	All	about	Shanghai	1935:	2).		Shanghai's	littoral	location,	as	well	as	its	connection	to	the	Yangzi,	played	important	in	its	role	as	an	international	transportation	hub.	Significant	coastal	trade	from	northern	regions	subsequently	repackaged	and	sent	by	smaller	boats	via	inland	rivers	to	Suzhou	for	further	distribution	to	the	interior	areas	along	the	Yangzi	(		1999a:	25-27).	Already	by	1800	Shanghai	had	become	one	of	China's	twenty	largest	cities	(Richardson	1996:	417);	by	mid-century,	 the	 city	 encompassed	 an	 area	 of	 approximately	 two	 hundred	 hectares	with	 a	population	between	three	to	five	hundred	thousand	(de	Jesus	1909:	xxvii).	Feng	(2004)'s	research	based	on	archival	records	of	property	sales	within	Shanghai	during	the	Qing	era	indicates	a	significant	increase	in	the	frequency	of	property	transactions	and	values	taking	place	already	in	the	early	nineteenth	century,	well	before	the	city	became	a	treaty	port,	in	response	to	the	city's	economic	growth	and	concurrent	inflow	of	merchants.		
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Thus,	Shanghai	had	an	established	historical	and	economic	foundation	spanning	nearly	six	hundred	 years	 before	 the	 Nanjing	 Treaty.	Multiple	 contemporaneous	 reports,	 including	those	by	foreigners	visiting	the	area,	conclusively	support	this	view.	H.	Hamilton	Lindsay,	for	instance,	an	English	merchant	and	East	India	Company	official,	visited	Shanghai	in	June	of	1832.	According	to	his	published	report,	the	city	had	"commodious	wharves,	and	large	warehouses	occupy	the	banks	of	 the	 [Huangpu]	river...	 [with]	shops	 filled	with	wares	of	every	description	exhibited	in	them	for	sale"	(Lindsay	1833:	172).	Impressed	by	the	scale	of	trading	activity	occurring	in	the	port,	Lindsay	continues	his	description,	noting	"Shanghae	[Shanghai]	is	the	seaport	of	the	Yang-tse-keang	[Yangzi	River],	and	the	principal	emporium	of	eastern	Asia,	the	native	trade	of	it	greatly	exceeding	even	that	of	Canton.	On	our	first	day	of	arrival	I	was	so	much	struck	with	the	vast	quantity	of	junks	entering	the	river...	upwards	of	400	 junks,	varying	 in	size	 from	100	to	400	tons,	passed	Woo	Sung,	and	proceeded	to	Shanghae...	Many	 of	 these	were	 from	 Formosa,	 Canton,	 the	 Eastern	Archipelago,	 Cochin	China,	and	Siam"	(209-210).			A	similar	account	is	provided	by	Fortune	(1845:	101),	a	British	botanist	who	documented	his	visit	to	Shanghai	 just	a	 few	weeks	after	 its	designation	as	an	open	treaty	port	on	17	November	1843.	He	describes	a	vibrant	and	dynamic	commercial	economy:	"Shanghae	is	by	far	the	most	important	station	for	foreign	trade	on	the	coast	of	China...	No	other	town	with	which	I	am	acquainted	possesses	such	advantages:	it	is	the	great	gate—the	principal	entrance,	in	fact—to	the	Chinese	empire.	In	going	up	the	river	towards	the	town,	a	forest	of	masts	meets	the	eye,	and	shows	at	once	it	is	a	place	of	vast	native	trade.	Junks	come	here	from	all	parts	of	the	coast,	not	only	from	the	southern	provinces,	but	also	from	Shantung	[Shandong]	and	Peechelee	[Beizhili	region]:	there	are	also	a	considerable	number	annually	from	Singapore	and	the	Malay	Islands.	The	convenience	of	inland	transit	is	also	unrivalled	in	any	part	of	the	world."	
 Given	the	domestic	city's	continual	growth,	 its	twisting	network	of	streets	bursting	with	economic	activity	became	evermore	cramped.	An	early	English-language	newspaper,	 the	
Shanghai	Mercury,	provides	a	stereotypical	western	account:	"Shanghai	City	is	shunned	by	the	foreigners	who	have	settled	here...	they	find	there	is	nothing	attractive	in	it,	but	many	things	repulsive—narrow	streets,	and	dirty	stagnant	pools	and	creeks"	(McFarlane	1881:	28).	Clark	(1894:	11-25),	who	similarly	suffers	from	what	Capen	(1913:	434)	identifies	as	typical	 of	western	 attitudes	on	China	 that	 "unconsciously	 and	automatically	 assumes	 an	attitude	of	proud	superiority	to	 the	Chinese",	 is	nonetheless	considerably	more	positive,	describing	a	thriving	commercial	city,	full	of	vibrant	markets,	tea	shops,	temples,	and	parks,	and	thus	corresponding	to	earlier,	pre-treaty	port	descriptions	such	as	provided	by	Fortune	(1845).			1.1.2.		Extraterritorial	Shanghai:	A	City	within	a	City		As	the	contemporaneous	accounts	cited	above	suggest,	the	conventional	historical	narrative	becomes	more	accurate	when	reversed;	that	is,	rather	than	the	arrival	of	foreign	merchants	signifying	the	origin	of	commercial	activity	in	Shanghai	after	its	designation	as	a	treaty	port,	instead,	the	very	reason	Shanghai	was	attractive	to	the	Treaty	of	Nanjing	negotiators	was	because	it	was	already	a	dynamic	centre	of	commerce	and	trade.	While	the	"sleepy	village"	misconception	 remains	 persistent,	 recent	 scholarship	 is	 beginning	 to	 present	 a	 more	accurate	 picture	 of	 pre-treaty	 port	 Shanghai	 as	 a	 significant	 eighteenth	 century	 trading	centre—Johnson	(1993),	using	primary	sources	including	county	gazetteers	and	Maritime	Customs	reports,	represents	an	early	contribution.	Hayes	(2008),	Fogel	(2010)	and	Bickers	(2012),	each	utilising	slightly	different	source	materials,	provide	additional	support.		
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The	view	of	Shanghai	as	economically	unimportant	prior	to	the	Treaty	of	Nanjing	is	rightly	criticised.	 However,	 recognition	 that	 an	 oversized	 importance	 has	 been	 ascribed	 to	 the	influx	of	western	 influence	 and	the	 creation	of	 the	 city's	 foreign	 settlements	 should	not	justify	 a	discounting	of	 the	 import	 to	 the	 economic	history	of	 Shanghai	 of	 these	 events.	Indeed,	our	particular	focus	on	the	post-Treaty	of	Nanjing	time	frame	is	due	to	the	way	in	which	Shanghai's	resultant	economic	history	was	fundamentally	shaped	by	the	presence	of	geographically	 and	 economically	 large	 and	 politically	 powerful	 quasi-sovereign	 extra-territorial	settlements	located	in	the	centre	of	the	city.		The	presence	of	extraterritorial	settlements	implied	more	than	simply	physical	land	area	not	under	the	direct	control	of	domestic	Chinese	governments.	Nor	does	their	importance	to	the	city's	economic	history	derive	solely	from	their	role	facilitating	the	importation	of	technology,	commercial	goods,	and	foreign	direct	investment.	Instead,	the	significance	of	these	 extraterritorial	 settlements	 derived	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 within	 their	 physical	boundaries	there	existed	a	separate	and	distinct	institutional	system	based	on	 imported	legal	enforcement	mechanisms,	creating	very	different	private	property	and	contract	rights	constructs	than	that	which	existed	throughout	domestic	Shanghai,	whose	own	institutional	regime	was	determined	by	the	larger	political	construct	of	domestic	China.		Thus,	while	much	of	the	interest	that	Shanghai	has	attracted	in	the	academic	literature	has	primarily	been	driven	by	its	role	as	an	economic	powerhouse	and	political	flashpoint,	our	focus	 is	 centred	 on	 Shanghai	 because	 of	 the	 unique	 dualistic	 nature	 of	 its	 institutional	structure.	Specifically,	Shanghai's	setting	allows	for	the	juxtaposition	between	two	parallel	institutional	environments	that	operated	concurrently	within	the	same	geographical	space,	within	the	same	historical	time	frame.	Thus,	the	Shanghai	of	this	period	provides	a	unique	opportunity	to	consider	the	impacts	of	institutional	variation	on	economic	outcomes.			1.1.3.		Domestic	and	Extraterritorial	Shanghai:	A	Chinese	City		The	literature	concerning	the	extraterritorial	settlements	often	depict	them	as	enclaves	of	western	modernity	and	commercialism	(Tai	et	al.	1991,	Wang	1991,	Zhu	1994,	Lee	1999,	Thomas	2001),	physically	separated	from	the	Chinese	section	of	the	city	by	a	city	wall,	and	likewise	symbolically	segregated	by	the	military	might	of	western	warships	docked	along	the	Huangpu	River.	Taylor	(2002:	128)	claims	the	bund	to	have	signified	"essentially	a	social	system	 of	 western	 creation."	 In	 certain	 ways,	 the	 settlements	 did	 reflect	 its	 residents'	characterisation	of	the	system	as	one	of	 imperium	in	imperio—a	part	of	Shanghai	within	which	institutions	such	as	legal	systems,	government	regulations,	and	property	relations	between	economic	actors	and	the	governing	body	were	defined	quite	differently	than	those	existing	within	the	domestic	sections	of	the	city	and	greater	China.	From	the	mid-nineteenth	century	until	the	end	of	1941,	these	extraterritorial	self-governing	municipal	governments	ran	parallel	to	those	on	the	domestic	side,	operating	under	relative	autonomy,	maintaining	their	 own	 judicial	 systems,	 police	 protection,	 postal	 services,	 taxation	 structures,	 and	legislative	bodies.	Under	the	settlements'	unique	institutional	frameworks,	private	property	rights	relations	were	organised	under	western	law,	defining	the	underlying	legal	basis	upon	which	commercial	dealings	within	the	extraterritorial	settlements	took	place,	affecting	the	nature	of	the	development	of	business	forms	such	as	modern	banks,	joint-stock	companies	and	financial	markets.	Over	the	course	of	the	same	time	period,	multiple	domestic	national	governments	administrated	the	domestic-controlled	sections	of	the	municipality,	utilising	quite	 different	 sets	 of	 legal	 and	 enforcement	 mechanisms,	 and	 operating	 under	 quite	different	 conceptualisations	 of	 property	 rights	 relations.	 The	 differing	 institutional	environments	that	defined	the	domestic	economic	space	impacted	the	way	in	which	parallel	domestically-incorporated	 business	 forms,	 including	 banks,	 joint-stock	 companies,	 and	financial	markets,	operated	and	were	utilised	by	private	economic	agents.	
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Yet,	the	definitiveness	of	the	division	between	foreign	and	domestic	Shanghai	was	far	less	clear	 in	 actuality	 than	 the	 symbolism	 of	 old	 stone	 city	 walls	 and	 gunboats	 suggest.	 As	depicted	in	Figure	1.1a,	while	early	on	it	was	the	domestic	section	of	Shanghai—referred	to	as	 "Nan-shi",	 and	 labelled	 on	 the	 map	 as	 "Chinese	 Town"—that	 was	 separated	 and	surrounded	by	a	city	wall,	the	subsequent	growth	of	the	domestic	city	led	to	it	being	the	extraterritorial-controlled	areas	of	the	city	that	were	surrounded,	as	shown	in	Figure	1.1b.		Figures	1.1a	and	1.1b.		Maps	of	Shanghai,	c.	1880	and	1933,	respectively		
 
 Sources:	McCulloch	(1880);	General	Staff	No.	3956	U.S.	Army	War	Office	1935	 	
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By	the	start	of	the	twentieth	century,	the	majority	of	the	city	walls	surrounding	the	Nan-shi	section	 of	 the	 domestic	 city	 had	 been	 dismantled.	 The	 breakdown	 of	 physical	 barriers	existing	between	extraterritorial	and	domestic	Shanghai	paralleled	symbolic	breakdowns	in	terms	of	the	livelihoods	and	movement	of	the	city's	residents.	Despite	foreign-constituted	legal	 and	 political	 systems,	 the	 extraterritorial	 settlements	 were	 neither	 exclusively	"foreign",	nor	did	they	exist	outside	of	a	broader	Chinese	Shanghai.	The	domestic	city	grew	not	only	to	surround	the	extraterritorial	settlements,	but	to	also	become	incorporated	into	the	fabric	of	the	settlements	themselves.	Only	shortly	after	their	founding,	the	populations	of	the	extraterritorial	settlements	came	to	be	comprised	predominantly	of	domestic	Chinese	residents	who	chose	 to	settle	within	 their	boundaries.	 Indeed,	 the	settlements'	domestic	and	foreign	populations	were	of	vastly	different	scales.	In	fact,	at	no	time	after	the	1880s	did	the	International	Settlement's	non-Chinese	population	ever	exceed	more	than	four	per	cent	 of	 its	 Chinese	 population.	 For	 instance,	 in	 1890,	 the	 domestic	 Chinese	 population	residing	within	the	English	Settlement	totalled	168,129	persons,	with	the	corresponding	foreign	population	 at	 just	3821;	similar	 figures	 for	 the	 International	 Settlement	 in	1937	were	1,178,880	and	39,750	persons,	respectively	(SMC	1895:	20-21;	SMC	1937:	118).			Given	the	settlements'	role	as	a	nexus	that	drove	much	of	the	city's	fantastic	growth,	it	is	common	for	the	literature	on	late-imperial	and	republican	China	to	suggest	that	Shanghai's	growth	was	a	consequence	of	the	glory	of	"Western	capitalism"	imposed	on	China	in	the	wake	of	the	Treaty	of	Nanjing	(Thomas	2001).	Yet	this	tired	trope	employed	in	the	telling	of	Shanghai's	 resultant	 economic	 history	 misses	 far	 too	 much	 of	 the	 true	 picture.	 The	undeniable	 importance	 of	 the	 extraterritorial	 settlements	 to	 the	 economic	 vitality	 of	Shanghai	 does	 not,	 in	 turn,	 support	 of	 the	 triumphalist	 myth	 that	 Shanghai's	 economic	dynamism	was	primarily	due	to	the	arrival	of	western	merchants	operating	independently	in	their	enclaves	of	"Western	capitalism".	Instead,	it	was	domestic	Chinese	economic	agents	who	were	 equally	 responsible	 for	 the	 growth	and	development	of	modern	 capitalism	 in	Shanghai.	While	domestic	and	extraterritorial	Shanghai	were	defined	by	sharply	different	institutional	landscapes,	the	population	of	the	economic	agents	inhabiting	both	institutional	environments	was	primarily	Chinese,	as	per	Figure	1.2.		The	economic	dynamism	of	Shanghai	was	due	in	large	part	to	the	entrepreneurial	activities	of	 domestic	 Chinese;	 their	 successes	 in	 turn	 drew	 additional	 foreign	 and	 domestic	entrepreneurs	 and	 investors,	 creating	 a	 virtuous	 self-enforcing	 cycle	 leading	 to	 greater	economic	growth,	commercial	activity,	and	attraction	of	capital.	Much	of	the	money,	human	capital	and	entrepreneurial	drive	behind	the	investment	that	took	place	under	the	umbrella	of	 the	 private	 property	 rights	 regime	 of	 the	 institutional	 environment	 of	 Shanghai's	extraterritorial	 settlements	 was	 provided	 by	 domestic	 Chinese	 economic	 actors.	 Such	dynamics	 began	 early	 in	 the	 settlements'	 histories;	 as	 reported	 in	 the	 1895	 Shanghai	Municipal	Council	Annual	Report,	significant	amounts	of	both	financial	and	human	capital	flowed	into	the	International	Settlement	from	domestic	China:	"Since	the	Census	was	taken	a	large	addition	has	been	made	to	the	Native	population,	a	great	many	wealthy	Chinamen	having	invested	in	land	and	houses	and	migrated	here	from	different	parts	along	with	their	wives	and	families,	whilst	the	numerous	filatures	and	projected	cotton	mills	are	attracting	numbers	of	the	working	classes"	(SMC	1895:	21).		The	dynamic	growth	of	the	city	continued	to	attract	domestic	migration	from	all	over	the	country.	Given	the	perception	of	the	extraterritorial	settlements	as	oases	of	relative	peace	in	a	politically	turbulent	domestic	landscape,	some	came	to	escape	the	ravages	of	civil	wars.	As	a	centre	of	economic	dynamism,	others	came	to	seek	their	fortunes.	Others	desired	to	take	advantage	of	perceived	economic	and	civil	protections	offered	by	the	extraterritorial	institutional	environment.	As	a	popular	newspaper	expressed	at	the	time:	
,,	or,	"People	from	all	corners	of	the	country	were	drawn	to	[Shanghai]	like	rivers	flowing	to	the	ocean;	merchants	make	their	trips	despite	the	distance"	(ShunPao	
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27	October	1883).§	As	a	result	of	these	inflows,	by	the	turn	of	the	century,	Shanghai	had	already	become	the	most	populous	city	in	China.	From	a	population	of	less	than	five	hundred	thousand	in	the	1850s,	the	city	had	grown	to	nearly	two	and	a	half	million	by	1919,	and	by	1937	had	become	the	world's	fifth-most	populous	city,	home	to	over	three	and	a	half	million	residents	(SMC	1938:141,	SHTS	1999:	16).	These	immigrants	helped	mould	the	city	into	the	economic	powerhouse	it	became,	as	they	interacted	with,	were	transformed	by,	and	helped	transform	the	economic	dynamics	of	the	extraterritorial	settlements,	and	the	entire	city.			Figure	1.2.		Population	Composition	of	the	International	Settlement,	1865–1940		
		Sources:	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	Annual	Reports	and	Census	Reports,	various	years.			________________________________________________________________________________________________________	
 §	Fogel	(2010:	318)	claims	the	perceived	safety	of	the	settlements	helped	drive	culture	into	Shanghai:	"[Taiping]	rebels...	attacked	the	major	centers	of	Chinese	culture	in	the	lower	Yangzi	region—Suzhou,	Hangzhou,	and	Yangzhou.	Chinese	of	cultural	prominence...	frequently	made	their	way	to	Shanghai.	The	presence	of	...the	foreign	concessions...	meant	that	not	only	did	Shanghai's	population	soar,	but	as	a	center	of	cultural	production	it	rapidly	outstripped	the	rest	of	the	country.	Thus,	Shanghai	was	ironically	the	cultural	and	intellectual	beneficiary	of	the	rest	of	the	lower	Yangzi's	catastrophe.	The	native	culture	 it	would	produce	in	 the	aftermath	of	 the	Taiping	Rebellion	was	a	 rich	amalgam	of	regional	Chinese	cultures,	increasingly	over	time	with	influence	from	westerners	and	Japanese."	
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1.1.4.		Domestic	and	Extraterritorial	Shanghai:														Dual	Institutional	Environments,	Dual	Financial	Markets		Late-imperial	and	early	republican	Shanghai	is	to	be	rightly	described	as	a	uniquely	Chinese	city.	Much	of	the	city's	uniqueness,	however,	was	also	due	to	the	existence	of	the	foreign-run	extraterritorial	system	that	operated	with	the	centre	of	this	thriving	Chinese	metropolis.	As	a	result,	Shanghai	was	home	to	a	unique,	dualistic	institutional	environment	structure—one	defined	partly	by	domestic	legal	and	political	enforcement	mechanisms,	and	partly	by	extraterritorial	legal	and	political	enforcement	mechanisms.	Shanghai's	two,	synchronously	co-existing	 parallel	 institutional	 structures,	 one	 domestic	 and	 one	 extraterritorial,	were	created	by	 two	sovereign	powers	differing	 in	governmental	 form	and	 legal	system,	with	both	 institutional	 environments,	 existing	 within	 essentially	 the	 same	 overlapping	geographic	space,	subject	to	the	same	economic	and	demographic	forces,	across	the	same	exact	 timeframe.	 Thus,	 although	 separated	 institutionally,	 domestic	 and	 extraterritorial	Shanghai	 represented	 the	 same	 singular	 economic	 entity,	 with	 few	 physical	 barriers	separating	 these	parallel	 environments,	 and	with	a	 single	set	 of	 economic	actors	 free	 to	move	 between	 and	 conduct	 business	within	 and	 across	 the	 different	 areas,	 and	 able	 to	purchase	the	same	set	of	products	and	financial	instruments	priced	in	the	same	currencies.		Meanwhile,	 from	 an	 economic	 and	 financial	 standpoint,	 Shanghai	 also	 is	 unique	 in	 the	Chinese	setting	over	this	period.	The	great	increases	in	trade	both	created	a	demand	for	and	helped	attract	tremendous	amounts	of	capital	into	Shanghai,	spurring	the	development	of	a	robust	 financial	 economy.	 The	 creation	 of	 domestic	 modern	 banks	 and	 domestically-registered	 joint	 stock	 companies,	 the	 country's	 first	 government	bond	 issuance,	 its	 first	municipal	bond	issuance,	and	the	opening	of	domestic	stock	markets,	all	took	place	during	this	 period,	 with	 Shanghai	 serving	 as	 the	 nation's	 financial	 epicentre.	 The	 increasing	complexity	of	the	domestic	financial	system	saw	foreign	and	extraterritorial-based	financial	intermediaries,	 including	modern	banks	and	investment	and	insurance	firms,	play	a	vital	role	in	financing	the	early	near-exponential	expansion	of	the	city's	trade	flows.	In	addition,	over	time,	capital	markets	developed	within	the	city,	although	their	growth	was	uneven	and	sporadic.	 At	 differing	 times,	 however,	 there	 existed	 active	 trading	 in	 Chinese	 central	government	 domestic	 sovereign	 debt	 instruments,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 extraterritorial	 and	domestic	municipal	government	debt	offerings.	So,	too,	was	there	trading	in	private	debt	and	equity	securities,	issued	both	domestic-	and	extraterritorial-registered	firms.			The	dualistic	nature	of	the	underlying	institutional	frameworks	that	characterised	Shanghai	was	also	paralleled	by	a	similar	bifurcation	of	the	city's	financial	markets.	To	begin	with,	there	existed	the	domestically-operated	markets	that	traded	primarily	in	domestic-issued	debt	 and	 equity	 instruments.	 In	 addition,	 there	 were	 extraterritorial-operated	 markets	which	traded	primarily	in	the	sovereign	bond	offerings	of	extraterritorial	municipalities,	as	well	as	in	private	bond	and	equity	shares	issued	by	extraterritorial-registered	corporations.			Yet	 although	bifurcated,	 both	 sets	 of	 Shanghai's	 early	 financial	markets	were	ultimately	uniquely	Chinese	insofar	as	they	were	supported	in	large	part	by	domestic	Chinese	investor	participation	and	capital	that	flowed	into	the	city's	financial	markets	from	all	parts	of	the	country.	This	 observation	 is	 key	 to	our	methodological	 approach	 in	studying	 Shanghai's	early	 financial	 markets	 and	 deriving	 implications	 about	 the	 larger	 institutional	environments	in	which	these	parallel	financial	markets	operated.	Thus,	it	is	a	singular	set	of	economic	actors—Shanghai's	participatory	investor	class—whose	revealed	preferences	across	domestic-	and	extraterritorial-issued	financial	instruments	we	are	able	to	analyse.	By	holding	constant	economic,	geographic,	temporal,	and	investor	idiosyncrasies	across	the	differing	 financial	 markets,	 observed	 differences	 in	 the	 relative	 demand	 for	 differing	instruments	can	more	confidently	be	attributed	to	being	driven	by	differences	between	the	institutional	environments	under	which	the	instruments	were	issued.	
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1.2.		Research	Goals	and	Rationale		The	above	discussion	has	outlined	several	broad	observations.	First,	that	late	imperial	and	early	 republican	 Shanghai	 was	 home	 to	 a	 unique,	 dualistic	 institutional	 environment	structure—one	defined	partly	by	domestic	legal	and	political	enforcement	mechanisms,	and	partly	 by	 extraterritorial	 legal	 and	 political	 enforcement	mechanisms.	 Second,	 Shanghai	was	 bifurcated	not	 only	 in	 regard	 to	 its	 institutional	 structure,	 but	 also	 in	 regard	 to	 its	financial	markets,	with	parallel	 bond	and	equity	markets	 operating	 concurrently	within	Shanghai	during	the	time	period—a	domestic	bond	market	that	primarily	traded	domestic	government	 bonds	 (including	 national	 and	 municipal	 government	 bonds),	 and	 an	extraterritorial-operated	 bond	 market	 on	 which	 extraterritorial	 municipal	 government	bonds	traded.	These	two	sets	of	bond	markets	traded	securities	whose	valuations	and	risk	perceptions	 reflected	 the	 differences	 between	 the	 separate	 institutional	 systems	within	which	they	operated.	We	utilise	these	unique	features	of	Shanghai's	late-imperial	through	early-republican	institutional	environments	and	financial	markets	to	address	our	research	goals,	look	to	contribute	to	the	literature	in	several	dimensions.			1.2.1.		Addressing	Important	Debates	in	Chinese	Economic	History	Literature		The	main	research	goal	of	this	study	is	to	address	a	significant	debate	within	the	Chinese	economic	historical	 literature	 involving	the	overall	 strength	and	efficacy	of	the	domestic	late-imperial	and	republican	private	property	rights	institutions.	The	current	mainstream	view	 typically	 advanced	 in	 the	 literature	 depicts	 domestic	 institutions	 to	 have	 been	relatively	poor	and	ineffectual	at	providing	economic	agents	effective	protections	on	private	property	rights.	Such	poor	 institutions	are	generally	attributed	to	Chinese	governments'	weak	 state	 capacity	 over	 this	 period.	 For	 instance,	 the	 state's	 institutional	weakness	 is	considered	responsible	for	late-Qing	fiscal	insolvency	(Ma	2013,	Johnson	&	Koyama	2017),	Beiyang	 republican-era	 political	 failure	 (Fairbank	 et	 al.	 1965,	 Strauss	 1997),	 and	 the	Guomindang	 government's	 excessive	 corruption	 and	 economic	 failures	 (Paauw	 1952,	Eastman	1972,	Xu	1997).	Overall,	 the	common	themes	emphasised	within	 the	 literature	suggest	 a	 domestic	 institutional	 private	 property	 rights	 environment	 that	 was	unaccommodating	for	economic	and	financial	development.			Evidence	 indicating	 a	 weak	 domestic	 institutional	 framework	 appears	 easy	 to	 identify.	Starting	in	the	late-Qing,	the	domestic	Chinese	state	proved	unable	to	command	an	internal	monopoly	 over	 coercive	 force,	 experiencing	 excessive	 levels	 of	 social	 strife,	 including	numerous	 internal	 rebellions,	 warlord	 activities,	 and	 external	 military	 invasions.	 Other	indicators	of	China's	institutional	environment	also	seem	symbolic	of	weak-capacity	states,	such	as	a	high	degree	of	corruption,	bureaucratic	malfeasance,	and	an	inability	to	manage	fiscal	matters.	Additionally,	the	country's	weak	economic	performance	over	this	period—especially	when	viewed	 in	comparison	 to	neighbouring	 Japan,	a	country	 that	began	at	a	similar	 level	 of	 development	 in	 the	mid-nineteenth	 century	 only	 to	 definitively	 surpass	China	by	 the	 start	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century—is	 also	 considered	 important	 supplemental	evidence	of	China's	poor	institutional	domestic	environment.	On	the	surface,	therefore,	it	appears	that	China	lacked	the	type	of	effective	and	complementary	institutional	framework	that	could	have	provided	strong	protections	on	private	property	and	contract	rights.		Yet	 for	 all	 of	 the	 seeming	 weight	 of	 the	 evidence	 of	 a	 poor	 domestic	 institutional	environment,	there	are	arguments	that	support	contrarian	viewpoints.	To	begin	with,	some	of		the		mainstream		literature		is		based		upon		untenable		theoretical		assumptions,		employing	arguments	that	represent	simple	extensions	of	those	applied	to	earlier	periods	of	Chinese	economic	history	contending	China's	 failure	 to	undergo	an	 industrial	 revolution	was	the	result	of	a	cultural	heritage	antithetical	towards	commerce	(Weber	1905,	Wittfogel	1957).	
 11 
Further,	recent	revisionist	scholarship	also	directly	challenges	the	traditional	depiction	of	weak	Chinese	institutions,	arguing	instead	that	many	domestic	institutions	were	strong	and	effective.	One	branch	of	this	revisionist	literature,	found	particularly	in	works	by	Strauss	(1998,	2008),	Boecking	(2011b,	2017),	Harris	(2012,	2018),	and	van	de	Ven	(2014),	argues	that	in	spite	of	considerable	political	strife	defining	the	period,	the	existence	of	sufficiently	capable	bureaucratic	institutions	allowed	state	actors	to	achieve	many	of	their	policy	goals.	These	 authors	 focus	 on	 specific	 organisational	 structures	 within	 the	 broader	 domestic	Chinese	 state	 apparatus—such	 as	 the	 Chinese	 Maritime	 Customs	 Service,	 the	 Salt	Inspectorate,	and	the	Chinese	Postal	Office—to	argue	that	the	domestic	state,	at	least	during	certain	sub-periods	of	the	time	frame,	was	capable	of	creating	and	sustaining	robust	and	effective	 bureaucratic	 organisations	 that	 could	define,	 plan,	 and	 realise	 definitive	 goals.	Similarly,	Bian	(2005a,	2005b)	argues	that	the	scope	of	late-republican	economic	planning,	leading	 to	 an	 increasing	percentage	of	 economic	output	produced	by	 large	 state-owned	enterprises,	 implies	 the	 existence	 of	 an	 effective	 and	 competent	 economic	 planning	apparatus	 given	 the	 required	 large-scale	 organisational	 capacity	 necessary	 to	 direct	economic	resources	towards	employment	in	state	enterprises.		As	suggested,	therefore,	there	exists	a	significant	divide	in	the	literature	between	scholars	advocating	 the	 traditional	 view	 of	 weak	 domestic	 late-imperial	 and	 republican	 era	institutional	quality,	versus	those	revisionist	scholars	who	point	to	examples	of	strong	and	effective	 institutions	 operating	 throughout	 the	 period.	 The	 debate	 is	 characterised	 by	 a	definite	 lack	 of	 clarity,	 as	 both	 sides	 have	 been	 able	 to	marshal	 significant	 amounts	 of	contemporaneous	evidences	in	support	of	their	respective	positions.	Given	the	theoretical	importance	of	the	role	institutions	play	in	determining	economic	and	political	outcomes,	this	debate	regarding	the	domestic	institutional	environment	is	not	trivial.	Yet	what	might	appear	to	be	a	clear-cut	question—did	China	during	this	important	historical	period	possess	weak	or	strong	institutions—remains	unresolved	in	the	literature.	Therefore,	this	research	project's	primary	goal	is	to	help	resolve	the	debate	in	the	literature	regarding	the	nature	of	the	strength	and	capacity	of	the	domestic	institutional	environment	over	the	late-imperial	and	republican	time	period.		Finally,	subsumed	within	this	larger	debate	is	a	related,	similarly-framed	theme	frequently	found	within	 the	 literature	on	Shanghai's	domestic	 institutional	environment,	defined	in	large	part	by	the	broader	national	environment,	contrasted	against	the	city's	extraterritorial	institutional	framework,	defined	by	western	legal	and	political	structures.	On	this	issue,	the	literature	 an	 implied	 assumption	 that	 western-based	 institutions	 necessarily	 provide	strong	protections	of	private	property	rights,	and	hence	most	discussions	that	consider	the	city's	dual	institutional	environments	seemingly	assume,	parti	pris,	that	western	property	rights	institutions	were	more	secure	and	better	defined	(Kirby	1995,	Bowen	&	Rose	1998,	Goetzmann	et	al.	2007).	Thus,	we	look	to	address	this	epistemological	fallacy	by	providing	a	comparative,	data-based	analysis	of	Shanghai's	extraterritorial	institutional	environment	with	that	of	domestic	Shanghai's	institutional	environment.		In	 regard	 to	 the	 extraterritorial	 institutional	 environment,	 to	 our	 knowledge,	 while	 a	number	 of	 important	 historical	 researches	 have	 been	 conducted	 considering	 specific	extraterritorial	institutions	(Bickers	1998,	1999;	Hershatter	1999,	Ruskola	2003;	Jackson	2012,	2017;	Whewell	2015),	the	extant	literature	has	yet	to	produce	a	detailed	examination	of	the	extraterritorial	institutional	framework	from	an	economic	historical	or	institutional	analysis	 standpoint.	 Our	 research,	 relying	 on	 a	 host	 of	 archival	 and	 contemporaneous	sources	 to	provide	a	 level	of	detail	on	 the	workings	of	 the	 International	Settlement	 that	shaped	 the	 institutional	 environment	 and	 resulting	 economic	 outcomes,	 therefore	contributes	to	expanding	the	depth	of	analysis	available	on	extraterritorial	private	property,	contract	and	investor	rights	institutions.	
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1.2.1.1.		Detailed	and	Encompassing	in	Scope	Analysis		To	begin	with,	we	provide	a	highly	detailed	yet	encompassing	in	scope	qualitative	analysis	of	 China's	 domestic	 institutional	 environment,	 utilising	 contemporaneous	 source	documentation	and	complementary	contemporary	researches.	There	have	been	a	multitude	of	detailed	studies	on	specific	aspects	of	late-imperial	and	republican	institutions.	Paauw	(1952)	conducts	an	in-depth	study	of	 the	Guomindang	Ministry	of	Finance,	analysing	 its	budgeting	and	internal	control	mechanisms,	in	regard	to	how	efficiently	they	channelled	fiscal	resources	to	areas	identified	by	state	actors	as	most	important.	Mann	(1984)	looks	at	the	way	the	state	tax	system	interacted	with	business	associations,	noting	a	distinctive	shift	in	state	actor	behaviour	occurred	with	the	start	of	the	republican	period.	Wakeman	(1988,	1995a,)	analyses	the	effectiveness	and	growth	of	domestic	policing	institutions	during	the	period,	with	a	particular	emphasis	on	the	Guomindang	era.	van	de	Ven	(1997)	considers	the	organisation	 and	 operation	 of	 the	 military	 under	 the	 late-Qing	 and	 later	 republican	governments,	arguing	fiscal	pressures	led	to	an	increasingly	decentralised	military	power	structure,	 and	 ultimately	 brought	 about	 the	 so-called	 warlord	 period.	 Strauss	 (1998)	considers	in	detail	several	bureaucratic	institutions	under	the	Guomindang,	including	the	Ministry	of	Finance,	the	Salt	Inspectorate,	and	the	Maritime	Customs	Service,	arguing	that	each	 of	 them	 displayed	 a	 high	 level	 of	 capacity	 in	 setting	 and	 achieving	 policy	 goals,	attributing	 such	 success	 to	 their	 ability	 to	 set	 their	 own	 internal	 hiring	 and	 promotion	policies,	 and	 to	 insure	 an	 overall	 degree	 of	 bureaucratic	 insulation;	 Strauss	 (2008)	reiterates	 much	 of	 these	 same	 arguments	 albeit	 more	 singularly	 focussed	 on	 the	 Salt	Inspectorate.	 Crossley	 (2010:	47)	provides	a	discussion	of	 the	 government	bureaucratic	structures	devoted	to	generating	population	measures,	presenting	the	rationales	that	led	local	officials	 to	either	under-estimate	or	 inflate	actual	population	 figures.	Harris	 (2012,	2018)	studies	the	operation	of	the	Chinese	Post	Office	(née	the	Imperial	Post	Office	at	its	founding	under	the	late-Qing).	Harris	argues	the	broad	set	of	services	offered	by	the	Post	Office,	including	money	orders,	life	insurance,	and	postal	savings	accounts,	combined	with	the	ubiquity	of	its	offices	throughout	rural	China,	helped	serve	a	broader	role	as	a	symbol	of	state	presence	and	authority.	The	focus	of	both	van	de	Ven	(2014)	and	Boecking	(2017)	is	upon	the	Maritime	Customs	Service,	providing	a	historical	analysis	of	its	myriad	of	roles	as	tax	collector,	tariff	enforcer,	and	guaranteeing	collateral	for	both	overseas	and	internal	government	bond	payments.	Thai	(2016),	and	in	a	more	limited	study	Boecking	(2011b),	also	consider	the	operation	of	the	Maritime	Customs	Service,	as	well	as	the	domestic	judicial	system,	but	their	focus	of	these	institutions	in	this	regard	is	solely	on	the	enforcement	and	prosecution	 of	 anti-smuggling	 directives.	 A	 similar	 set	 of	 studies	 are	 more	 specifically	centred	on	the	domestic	state	institutions	in	regard	to	regime	structure.	Much	of	this	work	focussing	on	the	specific	nature	of	the	Guomindang	state	structure	as	it	pertained	to	state-civil	relations,	most	notably	those	by	Eastman	(1974,	1979,	1984),	Coble	(1980),	Geisert	(1982,	1985),	Kubo	(1982),	Fewsmith	(1984),	Wright	(1991)	and	Fung	(2000).		The	works	cited	represent	only	some	of	the	numerous	quality	detailed	studies	on	specific	features	of	 the	domestic	 institutional	environment.	Overall,	 the	 findings	of	 these	studies	reflect	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 domestic	 institutional	 environment,	 with	 varying	 offered	opinions	 and	 conclusions	 regarding	 the	 level	 of	 institutional	 quality	 as	 reflected	 by	 the	specific	 institution	 under	 consideration	 and	 evidence	 assembled.	 Conversely,	 however,	there	 also	 exists	 a	 large	 literature	 that	 is	much	broader	 in	 scope.	The	majority	 of	 these	researches	 delivering	 conclusions	 about	 the	 overall	 quality	 of	 the	 late-imperial	 and	republican	institutional	environment	make	sweeping	generalisations	absent	 the	detailed	historical	analysis	of	contrasting	evidences	and	observations	of	the	inherent	complexities	(Shiue	&	Keller	2007,	Congleton	2011,	Chen	et	 al.	2014,	 Sng	2014,	Ma	2016,	 Johnson	&	Koyama	2017,	Ma	&	Rubin	2017,	Ko	et	al.	2018,	Koyama	et	al.	2018).	Thus,	our	provision	of	a	broad	overview	that	is	nonetheless	highly	detailed	in	its	analysis	strives	to	clarify	some	of	the	complexities	contributing	to	the	debate	on	domestic	institutional	quality.		
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	1.2.1.2.		Analytic	Strategy	and	Methodology:	Application	of	Theory		Second,	we	believe	an	important	contribution	of	our	approach	comes	in	our	application	of	a	powerful	 set	 of	 theoretical	 frameworks	 employed	 to	analyse	China's	 late-imperial	 and	republican	domestic	institutional	environments.	The	institutional	frameworks	defining	rule	of	law,	or	private	property,	contract	and	investor	rights,	are	inherently	multidimensional	concepts	 (Haggard	 &	 Tiede	 2011).	 In	 this	 respect,	 we	 seek	 to	 reframe	 the	 debate	 over	whether	China's	institutional	framework	was	"weak"	or	"strong"	by	contesting	the	validity	of	the	underlying	question	as	overly	reductionist.	Institutional	environments	are	shaped	by	a	 complex	 web	 of	 interrelated	 social,	 economic	 and	 political	 forces	 that	 are	 not	 easily	summarised	as	"strong"	or	"weak",	or	"good"	or	"bad".	What	we	argue	for	instead	is	the	need	to	view	the	broad	institutional	frameworks	defining	private	property	rights	as	inherently	subjective,	based	on	perception.	As	such,	 the	 fundamental	 issue	becomes	how	economic	agents	 perceive	 the	 degree	 of	 protections	 on	 their	 property.	 There	 exist	 no	 objective	measures	of	the	level	of	private	property	rights,	nor	are	there	objectively	"good"	or	"bad"	institutional	constructs,	per	se;	the	same	constructs	might	well	generate	different	results	in	terms	of	the	actual	behavioural	responses	from	economic	agents	depending	on	how	such	constructs	 are	 perceived	 by	 the	 agents	 themselves.	 Thus,	 what	 is	 of	 relevance	 in	determining	 the	 human	 action	 of	 economic	 agents—and	 hence	 determining	 economic	outcomes—is	the	way	in	which	agents	perceive	their	private	property	rights	environment,	and	 the	 expected	 stability	 of	 that	 environment.	 As	 such,	 our	 focus	 remains	 on	 agents'	perceptions	of	private	property	rights,	as	well	as	what	might	have	led	to	changes	in	their	perceptions	over	time.	To	this	end,	we	continually	seek	to	keep	the	frame	of	analysis	on	the	individual—that	 is,	 how	 were	 the	 entrepreneurial	 and	 investment	 decisions	 made	 by	individual	 economic	 agents,	 domestic	 and	 foreign,	 affected	 by	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 private	property	 rights	 environments	 within	 which	 they	 acted;	 and,	 are	 we	 able	 to	 identify	consistent	 patterns	 of	 behaviour	 amongst	 these	 actors	 based	 on	 observable	 differences	existing	between	the	domestic	and	extraterritorial	institutional	environments?			We	utilise	several	specific	 theoretical	concepts	to	provide	a	more	structured	and	cogent	analysis	of	these	institutional	environments	and	resultant	economic	and	financial	outcomes.	The	concept	of	state	capacity,	first	advanced	by	Migdal	(1988)	and	Davidheiser	(1992),	and	summarised	 recently	 by	 Johnson	 &	 Koyama	 (2017),	 stresses	 the	 importance	 for	 state	bureaucratic	structures	to	be	able	to	successfully	implement	the	policies	desired	by	state	actors.	Note	we	do	not,	as	is	found	in	some	parts	of	the	state	capacity	literature	(Caplan	2014,	2018),	advance	the	view	that	state	capacity	is	necessarily	positive	or	negative—self-interested	 state	 actors	 in	 charge	of	 effective	 state	bureaucratic	 structures	might	well	 be	more	 able	 to	 exploit	 private	 actors	 than	 those	 in	 control	 of	 states	 unable	 to	 effectively	implement	extractive	policies.	However,	regardless	of	questions	regarding	whether	or	how	state	 power	 should	 be	 employed,	 the	 ability	 for	 state	 actors	 to	 utilise	 state	 power	 is	nonetheless	 highly	 relevant,	 given	 their	 ability	 to	 affect	 agent	 behaviour	 and	 shape	economic	outcomes.	As	we	do	in	regard	to	the	concept	of	property	rights,	so	too	do	we	argue	for	 a	 multifarious	 conception	 of	 state	 capacity—China's	 domestic	 state	 administrative	capacity	 to	 implement	 policies	 varied	 across	 time,	 across	 specific	 bureaucratic	organisations,	and	across	policies	themselves,	based	on	the	authority	possessed	over	and	incentives	 structures	 driving	 the	 specific	 private	 or	 state	 actors	 upon	whom	 successful	implementation	of	policy	was	dependent.		Additionally,	we	also	rely	heavily	on	the	theoretic	framework	developed	by	Weingast	and	his	co-authors	(North	et	al.	2009,	2013;	Weingast	2010,	2017;	Cox	et	al.	2017;	Levi	et	al.	2017)	regarding	what	they	describe	as	the	"violence	trap",	as	well	as	our	extension	of	a	"low	credibility	 trap".	 Both	 of	 these	 theoretical	 constructs	 provide	 insight	 on	 the	 kinds	 of	behaviours	state	actors	are	apt	to	undertake	in	environments	defined	by	high	levels	of	civil	
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strife	and	warfare,	and	hence	are	particularly	relevant	in	understanding	much	of	the	actions	of	 the	 domestic	 Chinese	 state	 behaviour.	While	 operationalisation	 of	 measures	 of	 state	capacity	(Hanson	&	Sigman	2013)	and	the	Violence	Trap	(Cox	et	al.	2017)	is	challenging,	the	exercise	 nonetheless	 helps	 provides	 structure	 to	 the	 interpretation	 and	 analysis	 of	 the	seemingly	conflicting	set	of	evidences	regarding	the	relative	strength	or	weakness	of	the	relevant	domestic	and	extraterritorial	 institutional	 environments,	 that	we	believe,	 along	with	the	additional	historical	patterns	uncovered	through	our	analysis,	provides	important	new	insights	that	should	advance	the	debate.				1.2.1.3.		Analytic	Strategy	and	Methodology:	Utilisation	of	Shanghai's	Unique	Institutional			Framework		Finally,	another	important	contribution	comes	from	our	adoption	of	a	novel	methodological	approach	to	addressing	the	open	issue	in	the	literature	regarding	the	relative	strength	or	weakness	of	the	domestic	and	extraterritorial	institutional	environments.	The	conventional	approach	in	historical	and	economic	history	research	primarily	involves	scholars	looking	back	at	relevant	aspects	of	historical	events	and	conditions,	producing	analysis	based	on	the	weight	of	such	evidences.	Certainly,	great	value	comes	 from	the	study	of	original	source	documents;	 indeed,	 we	 employ	 this	 approach	 ourselves	 in	 conducting	 our	 detailed	qualitative	analysis	of	the	national	domestic	and	municipal	domestic	and	extraterritorial	institutional	environments,	recognising	the	undertaking	of	this	kind	of	evidentiary-based	historical	scholarship	to	be	an	important	part	of	the	exercise	of	obtaining	an	understanding	of	how	institutional	environments	shape	economic	and	financial	outcomes.			However,	our	contention	is	that	any	analysis	of	the	historical	record	is	inherently	subject	to	selectivity	 and	 interpretational	 issues,	 open	 to	 confirmation	 bias	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	researcher.	Given	the	complexity	of	historical	realities,	conflicting	results	and	explanations	are	 easily	 obtainable	 by	 different	 researchers	 considering	 the	 same	 time	 period,	institutional	setting,	and	historical	facts,	with	individual	researchers	likely	able	to	identify	a	robust	set	of	evidences	 to	support	her	or	his	 line	of	argumentation.	This	has	certainly	proven	 to	 be	 the	 case	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 late-imperial	 and	 republican	 era	 institutional	quality,	leading	to	the	aforementioned	scholarly	debate.	Our	own	exercise	in	employing	the	more	 conventional,	 backwards-looking	 analysis	 of	 the	 domestic	 and	 extraterritorial	institutional	 environments	 also	 produces	 results	 that,	 while	 suggestive,	 cannot	 be	considered	definitive,	with	support	for	both	positions	in	the	debate	identifiable	within	the	historical	evidence.	Given	the	multifaceted	nature	of	concepts	such	as	institutional	quality	and	 private	 property	 rights,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 conflicting	 signals	 make	 difficult	declarations	of	domestic	or	extraterritorial	institutions	as	either	definitively	weak	or	strong.		Therefore,	we	argue	for	a	change	in	the	temporal	framework	from	which	much	of	economic	history	and	historical	research	is	undertaken;	that	is,	rather	than	rely	on	the	interpretations	and	 opinions	 of	 the	 researcher,	 located	 temporally	 in	 the	 current	 time	 frame,	 looking	backwards	at	a	given	historical	time	frame,	a	more	appropriate	and	robust	methodology	is	to	attempt	to	locate	the	temporal	framework	to	the	timeframe	of	the	period	under	study	itself,	 by	 relying	 on	 techniques	 to	 capture	 the	 opinions,	 perceptions	 and	 revealed	preferences	of	the	actual	contemporaneous	economic	actors	who	existed,	and	interacted,	and	conducted	business	within	that	prior	time	frame.			Hence,	 to	 resolve	 the	 debate	 in	 the	 literature	 regarding	 issues	 of	 domestic	 institutional	quality,	 and	 differing	 levels	 of	 domestic	 and	 extraterritorial	 institutional	 efficacy	 and	strength,	we	attempt	to	discover	the	contemporaneous	perceptions	of	the	economic	agents	who	operated	in	those	institutional	environments.	The	salient	issue	obviously	becomes	how	
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to	 accurately	 identify	 the	 opinions,	 perceptions	 and	 revealed	 preferences	 of	contemporaneous	actors.	Markets	represent	a	powerful	means	 to	capture	 the	 individual	decision-making	 of	 economic	 agents,	 as	market	 prices	 represent	 the	 sum	 of	 all	 market	participants'	 individual	 pricing	 decisions	 in	 the	 aggregate,	 with	 Hayek	 (1945:	 524)	highlighting	the	role	of	"the	price	system	as...	a	mechanism	for	communicating	information."	We	note	that	recent	critiques	of	Hayekian	price	theory	(Bronk	2013,	Bowles	et	al.	2017)	arguing	 price	 signals	 can	 provide	 "incorrect"	 information	 due	 to	 systemic	 biases	 from	informational	asymmetries,	market	power,	or	other	distortions,	whether	or	not	valid,	do	not	affect	the	underlying	argument	that	prices	reflect	market	participants'	preferences	and	expectations.	Of	course,	in	practice,	as	most	economic	historians	will	readily	attest,	much	of	the	economic	history	research	exercise	involves	the	elusive	search	for	data	on	market	prices.	Hence	the	rationale	for	the	expenditure	of	the	great	effort	that	went	into	the	construction	of	our	database	of	financial	indications	on	Shanghai's	early	financial	markets.			Indeed,	much	of	the	reason	Shanghai	proves	so	interesting	and	valuable	as	a	research	focus	is	 because	 its	 unique,	 dualistic	 institutional	 environment	 and	 parallel	 financial	 market	structure	allows	exploration	of	these	issues	in	a	novel	approach.	To	begin	with,	as	described	above,	 we	 are	 able	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 Shanghai's	 unique	 political	 and	 institutional	bifurcation	 that	 allow	 for	 the	 utilisation	 of	 analytic	 techniques	 that	 can	 exploit	 the	informational	power	of	market	prices	to	capture	investors'	relative	perceptions	of	domestic	and	extraterritorial	institutional	quality.	Specifically,	the	parallel	institutional	frameworks	of	Shanghai—one	domestic	Chinese,	one	extraterritorial—combined	with	our	construction	of	 a	 dataset	 of	 parallel	 bond	 prices—both	 national	 and	 municipal	 domestic	 and	extraterritorial—allow	us	to	conduct	a	"natural	experiment"	to	calculate	comparative	yields	across	different	sovereign	debt	issuers	to	assess	differences	in	the	levels	of	institutional,	sovereign-specific	risk	assigned	by	domestic	investors.		
 Shanghai's	 two,	synchronously	co-existing	parallel	 institutional	structures,	one	domestic	and	one	extraterritorial,	were	created	by	two	sovereign	powers	differing	in	governmental	form	 and	 legal	 system.	 There	 are	 several	 important	 advantages	 from	 a	methodological	standpoint	that	we	can	exploit	in	our	research	study.	To	begin	with,	we	first	make	note	of	the	fact	that	the	domestic	institutional	environment	as	existed	in	domestically-controlled	Shanghai	 represents	 a	 powerful	 proxy	 for	 the	 broader	 domestic	 Chinese	 institutional	environment	 about	 which	 so	 much	 debate	 exists	 in	 the	 literature.	 Hence,	 coming	 to	conclusions	about	the	quality	of	Shanghai's	domestic	institutional	environment	allows	us	to	apply	 the	 same	 general	 conclusions	 to	 the	 broader	 domestic	 Chinese	 institutional	environment.		Second,	 it	proves	highly	useful	 that	both	municipalities,	 and	 therefore	both	 institutional	environments,	existed	within	essentially	the	same	overlapping	geographic	space,	and	were	subject	 to	 the	 same	 economic	 and	 demographic	 forces	 across	 the	 timeframe.	 Although	separated	 institutionally,	 domestic	 and	 extraterritorial	 Shanghai	 represented	 the	 same	singular	 economic	 entity.	 Few	 physical	 barriers	 separated	 these	 parallel	 environments,	with	economic	actors	free	to	move	between	and	conduct	business	within	and	across	the	different	areas.	The	same	commodities	and	financial	instruments	were	available	to	the	same	set	 of	 savers	 and	 investors,	 and	 were	 priced	 in	 the	 same	 currencies.	 In	 fact,	 from	 an	economic	sense,	concepts	of	 "domestic"	and	"extraterritorial"	were	 frequently	blurred—one	 of	 the	 domestic-registered	 stock	 exchanges	 was	 physically	 located	 within	 the	International	 Settlement,	 as	were	 the	 headquarters	 of	 some	 domestic-registered	 banks;	securities	of	extraterritorial	issuers	were	sometimes	sold	on	domestic-operated	exchanges,	and	 conversely	 some	 domestic	municipal	 bonds	 traded	 on	 the	 extraterritorial-operated	stock	exchange.			
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Third,	however,	 for	all	 the	cointegration	of	economic	activity,	and	while	 the	same	set	of	investors	could	purchase	and	trade	the	same	set	of	financial	 instruments	available	in	the	market,	 there	 did	 exist	 one	 clear,	 bright-line	 distinction,	 that	 being	 the	 institutional	environments	 of	 the	 two	 sections	 of	 the	 city,	 domestic	 and	 extraterritorial.	 Similarly,	therefore,	 this	 institutional	 distinction	 was	 represented	 by	 separate	 government	 bonds	issued	 by	 domestic	 and	 extraterritorial	 sovereign	 entities.	 Bonds	 issued	 by	 differing	governmental	 entities	 represented	 property	 rights	 to	 the	 expected	 future	 cash	 flows	promised	by	the	differing	governmental	entities.	Hence,	the	prices	of	those	bonds	contain	information	on	the	subjective,	interrelated	valuations	investors	placed	on	such	rights,	based	on	 the	 subjective	 confidence	 of	 the	 strength	 of	 institutional	 constructs	 that	 credibly	committed	these	governmental	entities	to	honour	their	promises	to	repay.			Analysing	differences	in	the	choice	behaviour	of	the	same	set	of	individualistic,	atomised	investors	as	measured	by	trading	activity	and	pricing	behaviour	of	these	simultaneously-trading	bonds	issued	by	municipalities	occupying	the	same	space	and	time,	differentiated	primarily	only	by	considerably	dissimilar	institutional	environments,	allows	us	to	identify	economic	 agents'	 revealed	 preferences	 for	 the	 bond	 issuances	 of	 the	 respective	municipalities,	and	ascribing	the	observed	differentials	to	differences	in	contemporaneous	investor	perceptions	of	the	relative	strength	and	efficacy	of	private	property	and	contract	rights	mechanisms	 defined	 by	 the	 institutional	 environments	 defined	 by	 the	 respective	domestic	and	extraterritorial	governments.			The	advantage	of	our	methodological	approach	to	addressing	this	debate	in	the	literature	via	the	utilisation	of	the	informational	power	of	market	prices	is	that	the	results	from	our	analysis	can	be	 interpreted	as	providing	a	more	definitive	resolution	 to	the	open	debate	regarding	 late-imperial	 and	 republican	 era	 domestic	 and	 extraterritorial	 institutional	quality.	Admittedly,	 such	 results	 are	 relativistic	 and	 comparative	 in	 context—we	cannot	make	claims	as	to	a	singualr	objective	measure	of	domestic	and	extraterritorial	institutional	quality,	per	se,	only	rather	describe	relative	perceptions	of	these	environments,	over	time	and	between	one	another,	as	indicated	by	the	revealed	perceptions	of	those	acting	within	these	institutional	constructs.			Nonetheless,	we	find	this	methodology	represents	a	more	satisfying	approach	to	conducting	economic	 history.	 The	 results	 presented	 from	 the	 comparative	 yield	 analysis	 do	 not	represent	our	opinion,	or	 the	viewpoints	of	 traditional	mainstream	scholarships	such	as	Paauw	or	Fairbank	or	Perkins,	or	of	revisionist	scholars	such	as	Strauss,	van	de	Ven,	or	Boecking,	 gained	 from	 looking	 backwards	 at	 historical	 materials	 and	 then	 rendering	judgement	from	temporally	afar.	Instead,	these	results	represent	the	combined	opinions	of	the	actual	economic	actors	of	the	day—captured	not	from	a	few	selective	quotes	from	a	few	selected	writers	of	the	time,	susceptible	as	those	are	to	reflect	political	pressures	or	ulterior	motives,	 but	 rather—based	 upon	 the	 combined	 contemporaneous	 assessments	 of	multitudes	of	 dispersed	market	participants	whose	 actions	 generated	pricing	behaviour	reflective	of	their	collective	perceptions	and	expectations	of	institutional	quality.					1.2.1.4.		Rationality	and	the	Non-binary	Approach	to	Institutional	Forms		Although	 we	 actively	 contrast	 the	 two	 institutional	 settings,	 one	 domestic	 and	 one	extraterritorial,	 in	 accord	 with	 the	 concept	 of	 multidimensionality	 of	 institutions	 that	inherently	defy	a	simplistic	"good"	or	"bad"	characterisation,	we	are	equally	actively	not	presupposing	 either	 to	 be	 "superior"	 to	 the	 other,	per	 se.	 Indeed,	we	 reject	 this	 kind	 of	implicit	ordering	of	institutional	environments	on	several	grounds.			
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	To	 begin	 with,	 as	 Wong	 (2004:	 87-88)	 notes,	 this	 approach	 comes	 from	 "an	 older	scholarship	 that	 finds	 in	 the	European	historical	developments	 the	pattern	 according	 to	which	to	evaluate	others	and	assumes	that	deviations	from	European	institutions	had	to	lead	 to	different	 and	 inferior	 results."	 Further,	 our	 appreciation	 is	 for	 how	 institutional	environments	organically	develop	over	time	as	an	instrument	to	enable	individuals	in	social	arrangements	overcome	 issues	such	as	collective	action	problems,	deal	with	uncertainty	and	computational	limitations,	or	resolve	market	and	 informational	 impediments.	These	are	humanistic	goals—protection	of	personage	and	property,	and	the	ability	to	provide	for	oneself—not	culturally	defined.			There	exist	many	institutional	environment	arrangements	that	afford	sufficient	protections	of	property	rights,	and	we	are	clear	in	avoiding	venerating	institutional	environments	that	mimic	what	are	perceived	to	be	"western"	institutional	arrangements	designed	to	protect	property	rights	as	an	inherent	standard	at	 the	expense	of	alternative	structures	that	are	more	suitable	for	providing	similar	protections	in	different	historical	and	cultural	settings.	Lu	 (1999)	 emphasises	 the	danger	of	 reductionism	 that	 comes	 from	 falling	 into	what	he	refers	to	as	"binarism"	that	focuses	on	the	differences	between	"Chinese"	versus	"Western"	aspects	of	Shanghainese	life,	with	his	work	showing	a	multi-faceted	approach	partaken	by	Shanghai's	domestic	Chinese	residents,	encompassing	both	modern	and	traditional	aspects	of	 native	 and	 imported	 customs,	 products	 and	 social	 mores.	 We	 strive	 to	 avoid	 such	trappings.	Thus	the	tired	tropes	of	Asian	cultural	impediments	or	European	exceptionalism	proffered	by	Marx	(1859),	Weber	(1905),	or	Clark	(2005)	are	firmly	rejected	as	offering	a	false	dichotomy	between	"similar	to	the	west"	or	"not	similar	to	the	west	(and	therefore	in	need	of	some	reform)."			Yet	 while	 human	 cultural	 forms	 impress	 in	 their	 complexity,	 variety	 and	 uniqueness,	equally	 true	 is	 a	 shared	 universality	 of	 common	 responses	 and	 drive	 for	 survival	 and	improvement	 for	 themselves	 and	 their	 offspring.	 Rather	 than	 looking	 to	 impose	 value	judgements	from	the	analysis	on	the	differences	in	institutional	arrangements	as	structured,	our	concern	is	solely	to	analyse	the	behaviour	responses	of	investors	operating	within	the	contrasting	institutional	environments,	so	as	to	help	us	understand	their	contemporaneous	perceptions	of	differentials	in	institutional	quality,	especially	in	regard	to	private	property	rights	 protections.	 Our	 contention	 is	 that	 residents	 of	 Shanghai	 made	 their	 economic	decisions	 in	response	 to	rational	economic	 incentives,	 incentives	 that	were	 in	 large	part	shaped	by	a	binary	institutional	environment	that	impacted	economic	decision-making	on	issues	such	as	the	valuations	of	 financial	contracts,	 the	 level	of	certainty	 investors	could	assign	to	commercial	projects,	or	the	ability	of	lenders	to	collect	on	their	capital	outlays.		Finally,	we	 note	 that	while	 our	 conclusions	 are	 heavily	 reliant	 on	 analysis	 of	 price	 and	volume	data	of	traded	securities,	the	role	of	theoretical	constructs	backing	these	analyses	proves	equally	important.	Huang	(1998:	188)	argues	convincingly	against	purely	theorist-based	work,	as	it	too	readily	devolves	into	"ideologically	driven	scholarship",	that	too	easily	glosses	over	the	complexities	and	outliers	that	true	empiricism	identifies.	Our	intention	is	for	this	work	to	represent	a	useful	amalgam	of	both	theoretical	and	empirical	techniques;	while	 utilising	 the	 epistemological	 tools	 of	 Austrian	 economic	 theory—especially	 the	praxeological	 approach	 of	 logical	 theorising	 regarding	 the	 way	 in	 which	 human	 actors	respond	to	incentives	that	are	shaped	by	institutional	environments—the	focus	remains	on	using	empirical	data	to	allow	the	period's	contemporaneous	actors	themselves	to	tell	their	own	story,	 in	ways	 that	recognise	and	explore	 the	complexities	and	 inconsistencies	 that	define	human	action,	and	therefore	social	and	economic	outcomes.				
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1.2.2.		Describing	the	Financial	History	of	Shanghai's	Early	Capital	Markets		A	secondary	research	goal	of	this	study	 is	 to	provide	 the	 literature	with	a	more	detailed	understanding	 of	 the	 dynamics	 of	 Shanghai's	 early	 financial	 markets.	 Although	 ample	studies	of	early	financial	markets	in	early-industrialising	economies	exist,	fewer	systematic	studies	have	been	undertaken	on	the	experiences	of	later-industrialising	economies,	such	as	 China.	 While	 certain	 aspects	 of	 Shanghai's	 pre-war	 financial	 system	 have	 been	considered	in	the	literature,	particularly	the	banking	sector	(King	1987,	Cheng	2003,	Ji	2003,	Peng	2007),	much	less	financial	history	research	has	been	done	on	its	early	capital	markets.	That	which	heretofore	has	been	undertaken	typically	lacks	a	comprehensive,	detailed	data-based	approach.	This	research	project	seeks	to	fill	that	void	through	analysis	utilising	our	construction	of	 a	novel	dataset	 of	 bond	prices,	 traded	volumes,	 and	associated	 financial	indicators	on	Shanghai's	capital	markets	during	the	late	imperial	and	republican	time	frame.		For	the	vast	majority	of	the	period	under	study,	Shanghai	clearly	served	as	China's	financial	centre.	A	primary	reason	for	this	was	the	amount	of	capital	flowing	into	the	area—by	the	early	 twentieth	 century,	 nearly	 half	 of	 foreign	 capital	 invested	 into	 China	 was	 done	 so	specifically	into	Shanghai	and	the	closely	surrounding	Yangzi	Delta	region	(Remer	1933:	137).	While	the	banking	sector	was	an	important	component	of	the	city's	financial	system,	increasingly	over	time	so	too	were	its	capital	markets.	Indeed,	by	the	start	of	the	1940s,	Shanghai	was	home	to	thriving	capital	markets,	with	daily	volumes	in	the	millions	of	locally-issued	financial	instruments	changing	hands.	These	markets	were	driven	not	only	by	local	money,	but	also	attracted	considerable	inflows	of	capital	from	other	parts	of	the	country	seeking	the	greater	security	and	higher	returns	that	Shanghai's	financial	markets	afforded.		To	 provide	 an	 in-depth	 analysis	 of	 the	 operation	 of	 Shanghai's	 early	 multiple	 capital	markets,	 this	 project	 constructs	 a	 thorough	 and	 extensive	 novel	 dataset	 not	 previously	presented	 in	 the	 existing	 Chinese	 financial	 history	 literature.	 Detailed	 data	 relating	 to	China's	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	domestic	and	extraterritorial	bond	markets	are	difficult	to	find,	and	as	of	yet	no	systematically	assembled	computerised	data	system	exists	allowing	researchers	to	easily	access	and	analyse	trading	records	from	this	early	period.	Prior	studies	in	the	early	financial	markets	of	Shanghai	have	primarily	been	qualitative	in	nature;	those	that	have	sought	to	utilise	financial	data	have	been	much	limited	in	scope,	and	contained	errors	in	their	factual	references.	This	project	presents	over	fifty	years	of	weekly	market	 price	 and	 volume	 traded	 data	 on	 bond	 issuances	 of	 China's	 domestic	 national	governments.			In	addition,	for	the	first	time	in	the	literature,	we	also	are	able	to	present	a	nearly	extant	set	of	Shanghai's	municipal	governments'	bond	price	series;	when	available,	also	included	are	trading	activity	data	on	the	volumes	and	values	of	bonds	traded	on	the	city's	domestic-	and	extraterritorial-operated	exchanges.	Multiple	and	parallel	municipal	bond	data	sets	were	constructed,	 one	 comprising	price	 and	 volume	 data	 of	 offerings	 issued	 by	 the	 domestic	municipal	governments,	and	one	comprised	of	similar	data	by	the	International	Settlement	extraterritorial	municipal	 government.	Accordingly,	 the	 scale	 and	 scope	of	 the	 collected	time	series	allows	for	a	deeper	and	more	robust	analysis	of	the	performance	and	activity	of	Shanghai's	early	financial	markets	than	previously	presented	in	the	literature.		The	 data	 and	 information	 used	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 these	novel	 data	 sets	were	 hand-collected	 and	 manually-entered	 utilising	 original	 archival	 sources,	 as	 well	 as	contemporaneous	English-	and	Chinese-language	newspapers	and	 financial	publications.	Care	has	been	taken	to	ensure	a	high	level	of	data	quality,	with	a	second	set	of	data	entry	performed	independently,	and	subsequent	data	matching	analysis	performed.	Furthermore,	a	 data	 quality	 exercise	 was	 undertaken	 to	 identify	 and	 record	 instances	 of	 typological	mistakes	entered	in	the	original	data	sources	themselves.	
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	1.3.		Structure	of	the	Dissertation		After	this	introductory	chapter,	Part	I	continues	with	Chapter	Two	providing	the	underlying	theoretical	basis	used	in	the	analysis	of	property	rights	institutions	in	subsequent	chapters.	In	particular,	we	consider	the	theoretical	role	the	state	plays	in	shaping	private	property	rights	protections	in	the	Lockean	liberal	tradition.	A	discussion	of	the	ways	in	which	private	property,	 contract	 and	 investor	 rights	 impact	 the	 development	 of	 financial	 markets	 is	provided,	using	political	economics	conceptual	frameworks	provided	by	the	state	capacity,	credible	 commitment,	 and	 violence	 trap	 literatures.	 Chapter	 Three	 follows	 with	 the	presentation	 of	 the	 robust	 debate	 that	 exists	 in	 the	 literature	 regarding	 the	 nature	 of	domestic	institutional	state	capacity	and	institutional	quality.		In	Part	II,	we	look	to	start	to	contribute	to	the	debate	by	providing	a	detailed	and	Austrian-based	assessment	of	the	domestic	institutional	framework	that	defined	China's	late	imperial	and	republic	era.	Given	that	private	property	rights	are	multidimensional	in	nature,	their	description	inherently	belie	measurement	by	a	single	indicator.	Analysing	private	property	rights	is	an	inherently	different	exercise	than,	for	instance,	analysing	a	country's	national	income.	Putting	aside	the	practical	measurement	problems	facing	the	calculation	of	Gross	Domestic	Product—and	there	admittedly	exist	many	(Oi	1996,	Gordon	1999,	Coyle	2014)—the	 idea	of	 capturing	 a	 single	number	 that	 represents	 the	 value	of	 all	 the	products	 and	services	produce	in	a	given	country	over	a	given	time	appears	conceptually	satisfying	and	parsimonious.	However,	no	such	parallel	indicator	exists	for	the	more	ethereal	concept	of	"private	property	rights",	or	"institutional	quality".	Measuring	the	strength	of	such	concepts	therefore	 requires	 a	 more	 diffuse	 approach.	 As	 such,	 we	 attempt	 to	 develop	 a	 broad	understanding	of	the	complex	matrix	of	myriad	interacting	and	overlapping	institutional	constructs	that	shaped	the	domestic	private	property	rights	regime,	including	rule	of	law,	legal	system	efficacy,	credible	commitment	mechanisms,	monopoly	over	coercive	force,	and	other	concepts	that	are	themselves	often	as	difficult	to	measure	as	are	property	rights.			We	this	take	a	qualitative	and	historical	approach	to	analyse	various	aspects	of	late	imperial	and	 republican	 era	 domestic	 state	 capacity	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 broader	 institutional	environment.	 Chapter	Four	 considers	 issues	 related	 to	 state	 structure	 and	 legal	system,	Chapter	Five	discusses	the	varying	nature	of	state	bureaucratic	capacity,	and	Chapter	Six	considers	 the	 level	 of	 perceived	 effectiveness	 of	 state	power	 in	 the	 establishment	 of	 an	internal	monopoly	 on	 coercive	 force	 through	 the	 attempted	 harnessing	 of	 bureaucratic,	administrative	and	policing	tools	designed	to	protect	and	defend	private	individuals	from	infringements	upon	their	property	from	nonstate	actors.	Overall,	analysis	focusses	upon	the	level	of	state	capacity	domestic	governments	displayed	 in	creating	credible	commitment	mechanisms	designed	to	protect	private	economic	agents'	private	property	from	theft	or	destruction	by	other	nonstate	actors,	while	simultaneously	limiting	opportunities	for	the	expropriation	 of	 private	 assets	 by	 state	 actors.	 Chapter	 Seven	 presents	 a	 summarising	analysis	by	applying	the	theoretical	concepts	developed	within	the	Violence	Trap	literature,	as	well	as	our	extension	of	the	framework,	to	help	understand	the	incentives	operating	on	state	actors	that	helped	to	define	the	nature	of	the	period's	institutional	environment.		Part	 III	 is	centred	upon	a	more	 focussed	description	of	 the	unique	dualistic	 institutional	environment	 that	 defined	 late-imperial	 and	 early	 republican	 Shanghai.	 Chapter	 Eight	provides	a	brief	consideration	of	domestic	Shanghai's	private	property	and	contract	rights	institutional	structure,	operating	as	it	did	under	the	broader	institutional,	legal	and	political	structures	 that	 defined	 the	 national	 domestic	 environment.	 Chapter	 Nine	 provides	 a	corresponding	comparative	qualitative	assessment	of	private	property	and	contract	rights	and	 overall	 institutional	 quality	 as	 concurrently	 existing	 in	 Shanghai's	 International	Settlement,	defined	as	it	was	by	a	unique	set	of	extraterritorial	political	and	legal	systems.		
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Next,	 Part	 IV	 seeks	 to	 add	 to	 the	 debate	 in	 the	 literature	 regarding	 China's	 domestic	institutional	late-imperial	and	early	republican	environment	by	providing	a	new	analysis	technique	 not	 hitherto	 fore	 employed	 in	 the	 literature	 to	 date.	 Recognising	 that	 the	institutional	setting	of	domestically-control	sections	of	Shanghai	is	reflective	of	the	overall	domestic	 institutional	 environment	of	China,	we	 are	 able	 to	 leverage	 Shanghai's	 unique	dualistic	 institutional	 environment,	 along	with	 the	 similarly	dualistic	nature	of	 financial	instruments	 that	 traded	 on	 the	 city's	 capital	 markets,	 to	 capture	 the	 contemporaneous	economic	actors'	aggregate	perceptions	of	the	relative	institutional	quality	of	the	respective	domestic	and	extraterritorial	institutional	environments.			Specifically,	Chapter	Ten	presents	a	review	of	the	experience	of	domestic	shareholders	in	regard	to	 two	of	 the	premier	domestically-operated	private	 joint-stock	corporations,	 the	Bank	 of	 China	 and	 the	 China	 Merchants	 Steamship	 Navigation	 Company.	 Particular	attention	 is	 paid	 to	 an	 analysis	 of	 relationship	 between	 private	 shareholders	 and	government	involvement	in	the	management	and	eventual	expropriation	of	these	private	firms.	 Chapter	 Eleven	 takes	 a	 differing	 approach,	 providing	 an	 in-depth	 look	 at	 the	development	 of	 the	 government	 bond	markets	 in	 Shanghai,	 primarily	 focussing	 on	 the	trading	of	 domestic	national	and	 local	municipal	 bonds.	The	 issuance	of	 bonds	by	 three	separate	 types	 of	 sovereign	 entities—the	 domestic	 Chinese	 national	 government,	 the	domestic	Shanghai	municipal	authority,	and	the	extraterritorial	governments	of	Shanghai—are	analysed.	To	do	so,	a	comprehensive	dataset	of	bond	prices	and	volumes	traded	of	bond	issuances	by	the	relevant	sovereign	entities	is	constructed,	supplemented	with	qualitative	descriptions	to	further	explicate	the	general	demand	dynamics	for	these	bond	issuances	by	market	 participants.	 Using	 a	 comparative	 approach,	 we	 contrast	 differences	 in	 the	development	and	investor	demand	 for	domestic	and	extraterritorial	municipal	bonds,	as	provided	 by	 analysis	 of	 the	 separate	 historiographies	 and	 the	 price	 and	 volume	 traded	series	that	pertain	to	particular	bonds	issued	by	the	three	sets	of	sovereign	entities.	Thus	this	chapter	provides	a	more	quantitative	approach	to	measuring	the	perception	of	private	property	protection	held	by	contemporaneous	economic	agents	that	serves	to	complement	the	more	qualitative	analysis	presented	in	Parts	II	and	III.			Part	V	comprises	Chapter	Twelve,	which	summarises	the	primary	themes	and	conclusions	developed	in	the	dissertation,	as	well	as	containing	the	bibliography	and	several	appendices	that	present	the	massive	equity	and	bond	pricing	data	sets	collected	in	the	course	of	this	research	project.	Finally,	here	we	will	also	make	a	brief	note	on	a	formatting	issue	regarding	the	use	of	Chinese	words	and	names,	and	the	associated	romanisation	thereof.	In	general,	we	 attempt	 to	 eschew	 the	 use	 romanisation	where	 possible,	 such	 that	 many	words	 or	phrases	are	presented	 simply	by	 their	 original	Chinese	 characters,	 as	well	 as	 translated	English	meaning.	Hence,	for	instance,	we	refer	to	simply	the	1904	Qing	Company	Law	(

),	as	opposed	to	using	a	romanisation	of	the	phrasing,	such	as	gongsilü.	However,	in	regard	to	individuals'	names,	or	in	instances	where	an	exact	English	translation	is	difficult,	such	as	with	the	concept	of	guandu	shangban	( ),	the	modern	pinyin	system	of	romanisation	is	employed.	Given,	however,	that	the	research	topic	deals	with	a	time	frame	during	which	several	alternative	systems	of	romanisation	were	common,	reference	is	made	to	such	earlier	spellings	where	it	serves	to	assist	in	identification;	for	instance,	such	as	in	reference	to	the	Jiang	Jieshi,	who	is	frequently	referred	to	in	western	literature	as	Chiang	Kai-shek,	or	with	the	city	of	Guangzhou	being	historically	referred	to	as	Canton.	For	such	cases,	at	the	first	presentation	of	the	name	or	place,	the	pinyin	spelling	is	used	with	the	alterative	historical	Romanisation	provided	in	brackets.	Note	further	that	alternative	romanised	spellings	are	also	used	when	quoted	as	such	from	an	original	historical	document.	Similarly,	the	original	published	names	of	sources	such	as	newspapers	or	periodicals	are	retained	to	reflect	their	spelling	as	printed	at	the	time	of	their	publication;	hence,	for	example,	the	Chinese-language	newspaper	,	 is	 transliterated	 in	 the	manner	 it	was	contemporaneously	printed	on	 its	heading	as	Shun	Pao,	rather	than	the	more	recent	rendering	in	pinyin	of	Shenbao.	
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Chapter	Two.				
Institutions	and	Finance:	Smithian	and	Austrian	Approaches			2.1.		Economic	Theory:	Smithian	and	Austrian	Approaches		At	 its	 core,	 economics	 is	 a	 study	 of	 human	 behaviour.	 Early	 economists	 such	 as	 Adam	Smith	(1759,	1776)	and	Carl	Menger	(1871)	emphasise	that	aggregate	economic	outcomes	are	 generated	 by	 the	 summation	 of	 individual	 economic	 agents	 acting	 upon	 their	individual	preferences.	Entities	such	as	states,	governments,	economies	and	societies	do	not	themselves	undertake	actions,	only	individuals	do.†	 	As	Hashimoto	(2003:5)	notes	in	this	 regard,	 "whenever	 anything	 is	 desired	 or	 has	 a	purpose,	 it	 is	 always	 in	 the	 end	 an	individual,	not	a	group.	Something	such	as	the	‘purpose	of	society’	does	not	exist	at	all.	All	that	exists	are	 the	purposes	of	each	 individual."	That	economic	outcomes	are	 inherently	consequent	from	individual	human	behaviour	proves	fundamental	for	several	reasons.		First,	 this	approach	underscores	 that	the	unit-of-analysis	 in	economics	should	be	on	 the	individual.	 The	 individual	 as	 decision-maker	 implies	 that	 the	 incentives	 that	 drive	individual	decision-making	are	central	to	understanding	human	behaviour	and,	therefore,	economic	 outcomes.	 Since	 individual	 economic	 agents	 respond	 to	 incentives,	 when	incentive	 structures	 undergo	 change,	 so	 too	 will	 human	 economic	 behaviour.	 Thus,	economics	 is	 not	 simply	 the	 study	 of,	 for	 instance,	 the	 amount	 of	 accumulated	 capital;	rather,	 it	 is	 the	 study	of	 the	 actions	of	 individual	 actors	making	 investment	decisions	 in	response	 to	 incentives	defined	by	 their	economic	environment,	which	determines	 in	 the	aggregate	how	capital	is	accumulated,	and	the	utilisation	of	that	capital.		Second,	 an	 equally	 important	 implication	 of	 economic	 outcomes	 deriving	 from	 human	action	comes	from	the	nature	of	the	humans	undertaking	action.	Mises	(1949)	focuses	on	what	 he	 calls	 praxeology—purposeful	 human	 action—which	 emphasises	 the	 role	 of	economic	 actors	 as	 rational,	 self-interested	 individuals	 who	 attempt	 to	 maximise	 their	overall	utility	when	interacting	in	economic	and	social	environments.	Economic	actors	can	recognise	and	foresee	risks,	act	in	accordance,	plan	ahead,	and	most	importantly,	respond	to	 incentives.	However,	 individuals'	 preferences	 shaping	 their	human	action	 are	neither	homogeneous	 nor	 necessarily	 stable	 over	 time.	 Thus,	 while	 incentive	 structures	 help	shape	 human	 behaviour,	 they	 do	 not	 drive	 all	 humans	 to	 all	 act	 in	 the	 same	 manner.	Further,	the	concept	of	"rationality"	by	economic	actors	does	not,	in	this	context,	assume	perfect	knowledge,	or	perfect	capability	or	foresight.	Unlike	formal	rational	choice	models	requiring	 economic	 agents	 to	 correctly	 compute	 Bayesian	 probabilities	 or	 constrained	optimisation	 over	 their	 choice	 sets,	 for	 Mises,	 human	 economic	 agents	 undertaking	decision-making	are	capable,	but	imperfect.			Third,	that	economics	is	the	outcome	of	human	behaviour	implies	it	is	therefore	inherently	related	to	the	concept	of	methodological	subjectivism.	There	exist	no	"true"	or	"objective"	qualities	 of	 economic	 value	 that	 drive	 individual	 decision-making	 and	 hence	 aggregate	market	behaviour;	rather,	the	subjective	perception	of	those	qualities	drive	behaviour.	As	Mises	(1949:95)	remarks,	"The	ultimate	ends	of	human	action	are	not	open	to	examination	from	any	absolute	standard...	they	are	purely	subjective,	they	differ	with	various	people	and		_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________		
†	Throughout	our	analysis,	we	attempt	to	maintain	the	focus	on	the	individual	and	strive	to	avoid	mistakes	of	hypostatisation	by	assigning	actions	to	abstract	entities	such	as	states	or	governments;	however,	we	occasionally	relax	this	rule	to	advance	perspicuity.	Such	stylistic	choices	should	not,	however,	distract	from	the	fact	that	when	referring	to,	 for	 instance,	"the	domestic	Chinese	state",	we	 are	 in	 actuality	 referencing	 a	 collective	 entity	 comprised	 of	 individuals,	 each	 acting	 in	accordance	with	their	own	subjective	and	individual	interests	and	abilities	to	affect	policy.	
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with	the	same	people	at	various	moments	in	their	lives."	Kirzner	(1992:	64)	expands	by	noting	 that,	 "the	 actions	 of	 individuals	 are	 to	 be	 understood	 only	 by	 reference	 to	 the	knowledge,	beliefs,	perception	and	expectations	of	these	individuals."	Thus,	the	perception	of	reality	drives	individual	and	hence	economic	behaviour.	For	instance,	as	we	consider	in	detail	 in	Part	 IV,	 the	willingness	of	 domestic	Chinese	 investors	 to	hold	bonds	 issued	by	various	governments	during	the	late-Qing	and	republican	period	was	determined	by	these	investors'	subjective	perceptions	as	to	the	viability	and	commitment	of	the	bond	issuers	to	honour	 the	 implicit	 financial	contracts	defining	 the	nature	of	repayment	responsibilities	the	bonds	represented.		Fourth,	while	individuals	vary	in	terms	of	the	structure	of	their	preference	profiles,	there	is	 nonetheless	 a	 universality	 that	 defines	 human	 economic	 behaviour.	 Our	 approach	throughout	this	research	is	founded	on	the	concept	that	human	behaviour	is	universal	in	nature.	 Fundamentally,	 all	 humans,	whether	 they	be	nineteenth	 century	 Shanghai-based	merchants,	investors,	or	government	officials—or	individuals	of	any	other	time	period	or	societal	 group—act	 to	 forward	 their	 self-interest,	 and	 respond	 to	 incentives	 to	 achieve	goals	 defined	 by	 their	 self-interest.	 Thus,	 we	 find	 the	 differing	 behaviours	 amongst	different	 sets	 of	 economic	 actors	 in	 regard	 to	 investment	 and	 capital-raising	 strategies	were	not	due	to	any	particular	weaknesses	or	exceptionalism	that	defined	Shanghai's	late-imperial	and	republican	Chinese	entrepreneurs	and	investors,	compared	to	those	of	their	foreign	 counterparts,	 but	 rather	 the	 result	 of	 individual	 rational	 responses	 to	particular	incentive	structures	shaped	by	the	institutional	environments	within	which	they	operated.				2.2.		Institutional	Economics:	Smithian	and	Austrian	Foundations		This	view	of	the	universality	of	human	nature,	of	human	instinct	and	intelligence,	and	of	the	ability	to	learn	and	respond	to	economic	incentives,	differs,	however,	with	a	formulaic	Ricardian	conceptualisation	of	an	absolutist	universality	of	economic	laws	that	took	hold	by	the	nineteenth	century—that	markets,	prices	and	economic	actors	behave	similarly	in	all	places	across	all	times.	Such	an	approach	mistakenly	discards	Smith's	earlier	emphasis	on	institutional	setting.	While	Smith	(1776:	I,2)	indeed	argues	economics	is	the	analysis	of	exchange	(the	"propensity	to	truck,	barter	and	exchange"),	he	stresses	equal	importance	to	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 institutions	 within	 which	 exchange	 takes	 place.	 Smith	 (1776:	 IV)	emphasises	European	merchants'	propensity	 to	conduct	 trade	priced	 in	varying	bank	or	sovereign	currencies	to	be	driven	by	the	differing	banking	and	legal	regulations	practised	in	Europe	 and	London.	 In	 response	 to	 this	Ricardian	oversight,	Menger	 (1871)	seeks	 to	reintroduce	 Smith's	approach	and	move	 economic	 analysis	away	 from	an	 institutionally	antiseptic	 theory.	Menger	 stresses	 that	different	 economic	 responses	 and	 outcomes	 are	obtained	under	different	settings—while	economic	actors	always	act	to	further	their	self-interest,	 the	 same	 actor	when	 operating	within	 different	 environments,	 facing	different	legal	structures	or	social	norms,	might	well	engage	in	very	different	behaviours.			Mises'	conceptualisation	of	homo	economicus	as	capable	but	fallible	provides	rationale	for	employing	an	institutional	approach	to	economic	analysis.	Such	an	approach	is	furthered	by	Simon	(1955,	1972)'s	research	on	the	limitations	of	human	economic	analytic	ability,	and	Talib	(2001)'s	emphasis	that	not	only	is	accurately	ascertaining	uncertainty	difficult	but	 often	 impossible	 given	 the	 existence	 of	 unknown	 (unknowable)	 factors.	 That	individual	 decision-makers—albeit	 operating	 under	 the	 logic	 of	 economic	 reasoning—nonetheless	 face	 difficulty	 dealing	 with	 uncertainty	 and	 limited	 information	 in	 fact	explains	why	institutions	play	a	role	writ	large	in	the	economic	sphere;	that	is,	institutions	are	of	primary	importance	for	the	very	reason	that	they	serve	to	ameliorate,	 in	different	ways,	the	economic	impacts	of	human	limitations.	
 23 
That	 different	 institutional	 environments	 ameliorate	 economic	 agents'	 limitations	 in	different	 ways	 implies	 differing	 economic	 outcomes	 are	 to	 be	 realised	 under	 differing	institutional	 environments.	 Coase	 (1937,	 1960)'s	work	 on	 the	 relevance	 of	 transactions	costs	 on	 economic	 outcomes	 emphasises	 that	 differing	 organisational	 forms	 lead	 to	differing	impacts	of	transactions	costs.	Coase	stresses	that	while	many	institutional	forms	are	designed	to	overcome	specific	exchange	problems,	institutions	designed	to	ameliorate	certain	limitations	can	simultaneously	serve	to	generate	other	forms	of	limitations.				2.3.		Institutional	Focus	of	Modern	Economics:		"Institutions	Matter"		The	contributions	of	Samuelson	(1947)	has	 led	economic	 theory	 to	become	 increasingly	reliant	on	mathematical	models	that	abstract	from	human	fallibility	and	transactions	costs,	and	 assume	 economic	 agents	 possess	 stable,	 known	 (knowable),	 and	 transitive	preferences	that	allow	formulaic	calculations	of	optimal	action	over	an	available	choice	set.	Such	calculations	allow	economists	to	identify	an	optimised	market	equilibrium.		In	response,	Buchanan	(1964)	talks	purposely	about	market	processes;	that	is,	the	market	as	 "becoming".	 This	 view	 accords	with	 the	 Austrian	 conceptualisation	 of	 the	market	 as	continually	 agitating	 and	 in	 constant	 flux,	 as	 opposed	 to,	 resting	 at	 the	 optimised	equilibrium	point.	While	under	an	idealised	institutional	environment	wherein	which,	to	use	Kirsner	 (1992)'s	 terminology,	 the	underlying	 factors	of	preferences,	 technology	 and	productive	assets	perfectly	align	with	induced	factors	of	prices,	profits,	and	the	structure	of	the	ownership	of	productive	assets,	a	stable	market	equilibrium	could	be	achieved,	as	Mises,	 Kirzner	 and	 Buchanan	 stress,	 the	 underlying	 conditions	 are,	 in	 fact,	 constantly	changing.	 Given	 the	 instability	 of	 individual	 preferences	 and	 the	 rate	 of	 technological	change,	markets	rarely	reach	equilibrium	before	changes	on	both	the	supply	and	demand	side	 occur,	 inducing	 new	 entrepreneurial	 activity.	 Thus,	 the	 neoclassical	 focus	 on	optimisation	 is	not	 incorrect,	but	rather	misguided,	as	optimisation	 is	a	static	 issue,	and	instead	the	production	and	demand	side	of	markets	are	always	in	flux.		It	 is	 from	 this	 standpoint	 that	 Buchanan	 emphasises	 the	 importance	 of	 moving	 the	discussion	 away	 from	 a	 focus	 upon	 optimisation	 choice	 behaviour	 in	 equilibrium	outcomes,	 and	back	 to	 the	 Smithian	 and	Austrian	 tradition	 focussing	both	upon	market	processes	 of	 economic	 exchange,	 and	 upon	 the	 institutions	 within	 which	 economic	exchange	 takes	 place.	 If	 given	 a	 specified	 amount	 of	 inputs	 all	 markets	 inexorably	 all	moved	to	the	same	equilibrium	point,	then	calculating	that	equilibrium	outcome	would	be	a	 rote	 but	 important	 task	 for	 economists	 to	 undertake.	 But	 as	 market	 processes	 are	continually	 in	 flux,	 and	 as	 there	 is	 no	 single	 equilibrium	 outcome,	 markets	 continually	initiate	 movement	 towards	 an	 equilibrium	 outcome	 only	 to	 have	 the	 process	 start	 yet	again	once	the	underlying	conditions	change.	Thus,	understanding	the	rules	under	which	market	participants	can	act,	and	that	determine	how	human	capital	and	physical	capital	interact,	 proves	 more	 fundamental	 to	 understanding	 dynamic	 market	 processes,	 than	calculating	 an	 equilibrium	outcome	 that	will	 likely	never	be	 achieved	as	 the	underlying	conditions	will	change	faster	than	the	equilibrium	condition	can	be	met.			Subsequently,	one	of	the	most	important	developments	in	the	field	of	economics	over	the	past	half-century	has	 come	 from	economists	 re-introducing	 the	 role	of	 institutions	back	into	economic	analysis.	Drawing	on	 the	earlier	work	of	Smith,	Menger,	Mises	and	Coase,	Demsetz	 (1967),	 North	 &	 Thomas	 (1973),	 North	 (1981,	 1990)	 and	Williamson	 (1981)	formally	incorporate	how	differing	 institutional	 forms	determine	economic	outcomes	by	shaping	 the	 rules	 under	which	 economic	 activity	occurs,	 the	 incentive	 structures	 facing	individual	decision-makers,	and	 in	helping	 to	ameliorate	problems	of	exchange	owing	to	transactions	costs	and	human	limitations	in	information	acquisition	and	processing.	Thus,	as	Williamson	(1996:	3)	famously	declares,	"institutions	matter"	at	the	most	fundamental	
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level	to	all	forms	of	economic	transactions	and	relationships.	By	establishing	the	incentive	structures	 that	 shape	 economic	 exchange,	 the	 institutional	 framework	 within	 which	economic	agents	operate	delineates	the	nature	of	their	decision-making.		North	(1994:	360)	claims,	"Institutions	are	the	humanly-devised	constraints	that	structure	human	interaction.	They	are	made	up	of	formal	constraints	(e.g.,	rules,	laws,	constitutions),	informal	constraints	(e.g.,	norms	of	behaviour,	conventions,	self-imposed	codes	of	conduct),	and	 their	 enforcement	 characteristics."	 North's	 definition	 represents	 just	 one	 of	 many	definitions	in	the	literature.	As	Calvert	(1995:	73-74)	is	correct	to	note,	"[T]here	is,	strictly	speaking,	no	separate	animal	that	we	can	identify	as	an	institution.	There	is	only	rational	behavior,	conditioned	on	expectations	about	the	behavior	and	reactions	of	others.	When	these	expectations	about	others'	behavior	take	on	a	particularly	clear	and	concrete	form	across	individuals,	when	they	apply	to	situations	that	recur	over	a	long	period	of	time,	and	especially	 when	 they	 involve	 highly	 variegated	 and	 specific	 expectations	 about	 the	different	roles	of	different	actors	in	determining	what	actions	others	should	take,	we	often	collect	 these	 expectations	 and	 strategies	 under	 the	 heading	 institution."	 This	 concept	 of	institutions	 implies	 a	 large	 variety	 of	 social	 structures	 that	 shape	 the	 way	 in	 which	economic	actors	behave	by	both	encouraging	and	discouraging	various	decisions	due	 to	the	relative	return	they	impose	on	such	decisions.			As	noted	in	the	definition	cited	by	Calvert,	our	assumption	is	that	economic	agents	behave	"rationally."	However,	 the	concept	of	 rationality	within	economics	has	become	muddied,	especially	given	 the	 emphasis	 on	 "perfectly	 rational"	 actors	who	are	 endowed	 in	 formal	economic	models	with	perfect	foresight,	perfect	knowledge	and	stable	preferences.	To	be	clear,	we	eschew	such	unrealistic	assumptions	on	economic	agents,	but	keep	the	focus	on	the	individual	actors	who	we	view—in	the	tradition	of	Mises,	supported	by	Simon—to	be	rational,	 but	human;	 that	 is,	while	potentially	 fallible	 in	 their	 abilities,	 they	nonetheless	can	rationally	respond	to	incentives	and	anticipate	the	future	actions	of	other	actors.			Thelen	 (1999)	 defines	 this	 approach	 as	 "rational	 choice	 institutionalism",	 where	 the	fundamental	 methodological	 foundation	 rests	 on	 how	 individuals	 respond	 to	 incentive	systems.	 Economic	 agents,	 acting	 rationally	 to	 maximise	 their	 personal	 welfare,	 and	utilising	 the	 power	 at	 their	 disposal	 (which	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 unequally	 distributed	 across	society),	 attempt	 to	 create	 and	 maintain	 institutions	 that	 benefit	 themselves;	 such	institutions	 might	 or	 might	 not	 be	 socially	 efficient.	 However,	 once	 institutions	 are	established,	 they	 tend	 to	 remain	 because	 they	 typically	 bestow	 benefits	 unequally,	 and	hence	serve	to	replicate	the	existing	power	structure.	As	Acemoglu	et	al.	(2005:	427)	note,	under	 such	 a	 conceptualisation,	 "equilibrium	 institutions	will	 not	 [necessarily]	 be	 those	that	maximize	the	size	of	the	overall	pie,	but	[rather]	the	slice	of	the	pie	taken	by	powerful	groups."	Thus,	 institutional	 change	 typically	 results	 only	due	 to	 a	 change	 in	 the	 relative	power	of	groups	benefiting	from	an	existing	institutional	framework.		In	 our	 he	 degree	 to	 which	 institutional	 structures	 promoting	 private	 property	 rights	within	late-Qing	and	republican	Shanghai	is	likewise	related	to	the	ways	in	which	various	sociopolitical	groups	were	able	to	control	and	benefit	from	the	nature	of	property	rights	relations	 over	 the	 period.	 This	 period	 was	 defined	 by	 significant	 social	 and	 political	transformations,	with	concomitant	economic	impacts.	An	increase	in	economic	access	by	foreign	 merchants,	 for	 instance,	 helped	 bring	 about	 changes	 in	 the	 relative	 power	 of	economic	actors	in	China.	The	dynamics	these	changes	unleashed	help	underscore	the	fact	that	while	 it	 is	 true	 that	 institutions	work	 to	 constrain	 and	 shape	 individual	 economic	actor	 behaviour,	 agents'	 behaviours	 can	 also	 drive	 institutional	 change.	 The	 growing	power	of	the	merchant	class	and	the	"Shanghai	capitalists"	helped	to	further	momentum	for	 improved	 protection	 of	 private	 property	 rights,	 including	 those	 impacting	 financial	contracts	and	shareholders.		
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	2.4.		Private	Property	Rights		As	 implied	 above,	 institutions	 encompass	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 social	 structures,	 affecting	behaviours	of	 economic	 agents	 in	ways	 that	 significantly	 impact	 economic	outcomes.	Of	the	 many	 types	 of	 institutions,	 however,	 those	 pertaining	 to	 the	 protection	 of	 private	property	rights	are	of	primary	importance	 in	promoting	commercial	activity.	 Indeed,	 for	Mises	(1927:19),	classical	liberalism	can	be	condensed	into	a	single	axiom:	private	property.		Private	property	rights	fundamentally	shape	economic	activity	because	they	impact	how	economic	 agents	perceive	 the	 threat	 of	 expropriation	of	 their	private	output.	Given	 that	costly	effort	is	required	to	produce	economic	output,	the	fundamental	production	question	facing	 economic	 agents	 involves	 calculating	 expected	 return	 on	 investment;	 that	 is,	whether	expenditure	of	costly	effort	is	worthwhile.	As	investment	represents	deferment	of	current	 period	 consumption	 for	 returns	 in	 future	 periods,	 agents'	 current	 perceptions	regarding	 the	potential	expropriation	of	their	 future	returns	 is	central	 to	 the	decision	to	engage	in	costly	investment.	Relatedly,	therefore,	to	be	perceived	secure,	property	rights	must	be	viewed	as	stable	and	not	easily	subject	to	arbitrary	change.	In	the	absence	of	such	stability,	calculation	of	long-term	investments	becomes	difficult,	and	investment	is	skewed	away	from	high-return	long-run	projects	towards	the	short-run	(Elster	&	Slagstad	1988).		For	any	given	investment	opportunity,	associated	expected	variance	of	return,	and	agent	risk	profile,	positive	expected	returns	make	economic	agents	more	likely	to	undertake	the	costly	investment	necessary	to	engage	in	productive	activities.	Potential	expropriation	of	realised	 output	 affects	 the	 calculus	 of	 the	 investment	 decision	 by	 adding	 an	 additional	layer	 of	 risk	 to	 expected	 return.	 The	 greater	 the	 perceived	 threat	 of	 expropriation,	 the	lower	are	expected	returns	on	a	given	investment,	and	hence	the	less	likely	is	an	agent	to	undertake	 costly	 investment	activity.	When	 societal	 institutional	arrangements	 are	 such	that	 economic	 agents	 perceive	 output	 as	 likely	 to	 be	 expropriated,	 expected	 returns	 of	many	possible	investments	can	turn	negative,	 implying	costly	investment	is	less	likely	to	be	 undertaken.	 Note	 this	 effect	 is	 considerably	more	 pronounced	 in	 a	 dynamic	 setting,	since	total	returns	are	dependent	upon	the	reinvestment	of	capital	earned	from	the	initial	investment.	 Given	 this	 compounding	 effect,	 a	weak	 property	 rights	 environment,	 under	which	 potential	 output	 faces	 a	perceived	 high	 threat	 of	 expropriation,	 economic	 output	over	 the	 long	 term	 can	 be	 significantly	 impacted.	 Numerous	 studies	 have	 attempted	 to	empirically	link	the	level	of	property	rights	protections	with	levels	of	long-term	economic	growth	(Kaufman	et	al.	1999,	Johnson	et	al.	2002,	Acemoglu	et	al.	2005).				2.5.		Private	Property	Rights:		Enforcement	Mechanisms		Given	 that	 private	 property	 rights	 are	 so	 fundamental	 to	 economic	 activity,	 how	 are	societies	 structured	 so	 as	 to	 ensure	 the	 protection	 of	 secure	 property	 rights?	 How	 can	private	 agents	 protect	 their	 property,	 both	 in	 the	 current	 and	 future	 periods,	 if	 other	private	agents,	unbound	by	constraint,	can	employ	force	to	take	the	property	of	others?	As	Alchian	 &	 Demsetz	 (1973)	make	 clear,	 fear	 of	 expropriation	 by	 private	 concerns	 is	 an	important	 factor	 in	 agents'	 investment	 decisions,	 helping	 drive	 individuals	 to	 band	together	 to	 create	 institutions	 that	 will	 allow	 protection	 from	 others	 arbitrarily	 taking	property	by	brute	force.	In	general,	the	state	has	been	viewed	as	the	primary	institutional	structure	that	can	create	secure	property	rights.	In	particular,	as	the	complexity	and	size	of	 society	 increases,	 issues	 of	 scale	 and	 scope	 imply	 government	 institutions	 to	 be	 the	most	appropriate	instruments	(North	&	Thomas	1973).			
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		2.5.1.		The	State	as	Protector	of	Private	Property	Rights		For	Hobbes	(1651),	 the	absence	of	a	strong	state	(i.e.,	anarchy,	or	 the	"State	of	Nature")	was	defined	by	a	"war	of	all	against	all,"	with	private	actors	using	 force	and	violence	 to	take	what	they	wanted	from	others,	and	where	life	was	"solitary,	poor,	nasty,	brutish	and	short."	Given	the	severity	of	the	State	of	Nature	under	which	agents	lack	the	ability	to	have	any	protection	of	property	or	life,	the	state	is	necessary	as	the	solution.			In	 a	 slightly	 different	 vein,	 for	 Olson	 (1993)	 anarchy	 is	 defined	 by	 the	 prevalence	 of	"roving	bandits,"	his	analogy	for	private	actors	unbound	by	law	who	take	what	they	want	from	 others	 by	 force.	 Such	 conditions	 obviously	 greatly	 dis-incentivises	 agents	 from	expending	costly	effort,	since	investment	returns	are	likely	be	expropriated	by	such	roving	bandits	 who	 might	 appear	 at	 any	 moment.	 Therefore,	 a	 formal	 state	 apparatus	 is	necessary	to	afford	protection	to	individual	actors	from	predation	by	roving	bandits.	For	Hobbes	and	Olson,	therefore,	the	brutality	of	the	State	of	Nature	justifies	any	political	rule	that	can	institute	order	and	vanquish	roving	banditry.		Locke	(1690)	arrives	at	the	necessity	of	the	state	to	secure	property	rights	from	a	different	approach.	 His	 Second	 Treatise	 on	 Government	 provides	 the	 theoretical	 rationale	 for	 the	origin,	 and	 the	 limiting	 extent,	 of	 legitimate	political	 power.	 Locke	 explicitly	 rejects	 the	Hobbesian	view	that	to	escape	the	conditions	of	the	State	of	Nature	we	must	accept	forms	of	political	rule	based	on	the	application	of	violence.	Instead,	Locke	bases	his	argument	on	the	underlying	classical	 liberal	concept	of	humans	as	 free	and	equal	by	nature,	claiming	that	it	is	the	application	of	the	free	will	of	humans	to	accept	and	recognise	the	application	of	 political	 authority	 over	 them	 as	 legitimate;	 that	 is,	 citizens	 have	 the	 right	 to	 actively	chose	 and	 accept—in	 Locke's	 terminology,	 to	 consent—to	 political	 authority	 that	 can	govern	and	limit	their	behaviour.			For	Locke,	the	only	reason	that	humans	who	are	free	and	equal	by	nature	would	agree	to	be	constrained	by	political	authority	is	if	that	authority	serves	to	protect	and	secure	their	freedom.	 Thus,	 at	 its	 core,	 the	 very	 reason	 for	 government	 is	 to	 secure	 and	 protect	individuals'	freedom	from	others	seeking	to	impose	their	will	through	the	use	or	threat	of	violence.	 Consequent	 to	 this	 reasoning	 is	 that	 a	 primary	 role	 of	 political	 authority	 is	 to	prevent	the	taking	of	individuals'	private	property.			Adam	Smith	(1776:	V,3),	further	underscores	the	justification	for	the	application	of	state	power	 to	secure	private	property	rights,	 for	without	 it,	neither	commerce	nor	economic	growth	 can	 occur."	 Commerce	 and	manufactures	 can	 seldom	 flourish	 long	 in	 any	 state	which	does	not	enjoy	a	regular	administration	of	 justice,	 in	which	the	people	do	not	feel	themselves	secure	in	the	possession	of	their	property,	in	which	the	faith	of	contracts	is	not	supported	by	law,	and	in	which	the	authority	of	the	state	is	not	supposed	to	be	regularly	employed	in	enforcing	the	payment	of	debts	from	all	those	who	are	able	to	pay.	Commerce	and	manufactures,	in	short,	can	seldom	flourish	in	any	state	in	which	there	is	not	a	certain	degree	of	confidence	in	the	justice	of	government."			Thus,	the	power	of	the	state—through	the	application	of	institutions	such	as	the	police,	the	military,	 the	 legislative	 and	 judicial	 systems,	 the	 regulatory	bureaucracy—serves	 a	 vital	role	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 protection	 of	 private	 property	 rights	 by	 preventing	 other	 private	actors	(i.e.,	roving	bandits)	from	trespass	against	the	holders	of	private	property.					
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2.5.2.		The	State	as	a	Threat	to	Private	Property	Rights		The	fundamental	necessity	of	the	state	in	order	to	ensure	protection	of	private	property	from	unjust	taking	by	private	actors	would	seem,	therefore,	to	be	unequivocal.	However,	a	paradox	 arises—a	 state	 strong	 enough	 to	 protect	 agents'	 private	 property	 rights	 from	non-state	forces	is	also	itself	strong	enough	to	violate	those	same	agents'	property	rights.	Olson	 (1993)	 continues	 his	 use	 of	 analogy	 by	 describing	 governments	 as	 potential	"stationary	bandits."	While	government	can	provide	protection	from	roving	bandits,	it	can	easily	in	turn	act	as	a	stationary	bandit,	equally	adept	at	expropriation	of	private	property.	In	this	sense,	 in	the	terminology	of	Frye	&	Shleifer	(1997),	the	state	can	use	its	power	to	act	as	a	"grabbing	hand."	Smith	(1776:	II)	recognises	this	much	earlier,	noting	"where	men	are	continually	afraid	of	the	violence	of	their	superiors,	they	frequently	bury	and	conceal	a	great	part	of	 their	stock,	 in	order	 to	have	 it	always	at	hand	to	carry	with	 them	to	some	place	of	safety,	in	case	of	their	being	threatened	with	any	of	those	disasters	to	which	they	consider	themselves	as	at	all	times	exposed."			Expropriation	undertaken	by	 the	government,	via	outright	seizure	or	excessive	 taxation,	leads	 to	higher	 transactions	 costs,	 lower	 incentives	 to	 invest,	 and	hence	 lower	 levels	 of	potential	economic	output.	Thus,	it	becomes	equally	clear	that	the	state	itself	can	serve	as	an	 equally	dangerous	 threat	 to	private	property	 rights	 as	 can	private	 agents.	Or,	 to	use	Olson's	analogy,	banditry	(the	undesired	taking	of	private	individuals'	property)	can	be	of	either	 the	roving	or	stationary	kind;	 i.e,	 citizens	must	be	protected	by	 the	state,	and	yet	also	from	the	state.		Yet	 Hobbes	 and	 Olson	 argue	 that	 government-as-stationary-bandit	 is	 nevertheless	preferable	 to	 the	 presence	 of	 roving	 bandits,	 given	 that	 stationarity	 implies	 political	leaders	possess	long-term	interests	in	promoting	long-term	growth.	Rational	leaders	can	recognise	 that	 taking	 a	 non-absolute	 proportion	 of	 economic	 output	 encourages	 future	economic	output,	hence	creating	a	continual	stream	of	income.	Roving	bandits,	conversely,	operating	under	a	more	immediate	time	horizon,	are	thus	apt	to	simply	take	everything	of	value	and	leave,	having	destroyed	future	economic	productivity.		Locke	 (1690:	 II,3,222),	 however,	 provides	 particularly	 strong	 counsel	 that	 the	 abuse	 of	power	by	the	state	through	stationary	banditry	implies	invalidation	of	the	very	reason	for	the	 existence	 of	 government	 itself:	 "The	 Reason	 why	 Men	 enter	 into	 Society,	 is	 the	preservation	of	their	Property;	and	the	end	why	they	chuse	and	authorize	a	Legislative,	is,	that	there	may	be	Laws	made,	and	Rules	set	as	Guards	and	Fences	to	the	Properties	of	all	the	Members	of	the	Society,	to	limit	the	Power,	and	moderate	the	Dominion	of	every	Part	and	Member	of	the	Society.	For	since	it	can	never	be	supposed	to	be	the	Will	of	the	Society,	that	 the	 Legislative	 should	 have	 a	 Power	 to	 destroy	 that,	 which	 every	 one	 designs	 to	secure,	 by	 entering	 into	 Society,	 and	 for	which	 the	 People	 submitted	 themselves	 to	 the	Legislators	 of	 their	 own	making;	whenever	 the	Legislators	 endeavour	 to	 take	away,	 and	
destroy	 the	Property	of	 the	People,	 or	 to	 reduce	 them	 to	 Slavery	under	Arbitrary	Power,	they	 put	 themselves	 into	 a	 state	 of	 War	 with	 the	 People."	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 Higgs	(2002:361)	 strongly	 renounces	 the	 position	 that	 violence	 potentially	 perpetrated	 by	private	 agents	 under	 anarchy	 is	 by	definition	 inherently	worse	 or	 greater	 in	 scale	 than	violence	potentially	perpetrated	upon	citizens	at	the	hands	of	their	own	governments.			It	 is	 from	this	reasoning	that	the	classical	 liberal	perspective	continually	emphasises	the	dangers	of	government	over-reach,	and	hence	its	advocacy	for	a	minimalist	state.	Further,	Buchanan	&	Tullock	 (1962),	 articulating	 the	 contribution	of	 the	public	 choice	 approach,	demonstrate	that	the	danger	of	governmental	over-reach	is	not	accidental,		but	inherent	in			
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	the	structure	of	government	itself.	As	government	is	populated	by	human	actors	who,	like	all	human	actors,	are	motivated	by	personal	interest,	state	actors	are	subject	to	the	flaws,	vices,	 desires	 and	weaknesses	 that	 define	 all	 human	actors.	 Thus,	 just	 as	private	 actors	seek	to	increase	their	access	to	wealth,	prestige,	and	power,	so	too	do	government	actors,	who	given	their	position	are	able	to	use	 the	levers	of	 the	authority	of	the	state	to	do	so.	Thus	comes	Madison	(1788)'s	observation	in	Federalist	Paper	Number	48	that	"power	is	of	an	encroaching	nature."				2.5.3.		State	Power	and	Credible	Commitment		That	 state	 actors,	 with	 the	 access	 and	 control	 over	 the	 levers	 of	 state	 authority,	 are	particularly	well-suited	to	engage	in	behaviours	that	violate	individuals'	private	property	rights,	 suggests	 expropriatory	 behaviour	 towards	private	 property,	 in	 line	with	 Olson's	stationary	bandits	or	Frye	&	Shleifer's	grabbing	hand	conceptualisations,	to	be	the	norm	rather	 than	 the	 exception.	 Indeed,	 this	 has	 been	 the	 defining	 characteristic	 of	 the	application	of	state	power	throughout	the	course	of	history,	with	state	authority	employed	primarily	as	an	extractive	tool	of	private	wealth.	That	such	conditions	saw	little	in	terms	of	sustained	 expansive	 economic	 growth	 is	 in	 line	with	 Smith's	 observations	 that	 citizens	must	enjoy	"confidence	in	the	justice	of	government"	if	commerce	is	to	flourish.	Economic	agents,	 recognising	 the	 power	 of	 the	 state	 to	 easily	 violate	 their	 property	 rights	 and	expropriate	 their	 ex-post	 output,	 ex-ante	 under-invest	 in	 costly	 effort,	 leading	 to	 the	underproduction	of	economic	output.		Given	 the	 government's	 ability	 to	 expropriate	 private	 property,	 an	 inherent	 problem	facing	state	actors	is	how	to	create	amongst	citizens	confidence	in	the	security	of	private	property	rights	so	as	to	spur	investment	and	hence	economic	growth.	The	solution	lies	in	creating	 observable	 effective	 constraints	 on	 expropriatory	 behaviours	 of	 state	 agents.	Doing	so,	however,	is	difficult—even	if	the	state	leadership	makes	ex-ante	promises	not	to	expropriate	 private	 agents'	 property,	 given	 both	 the	 incentive	 structure	 of	 state	 actors,	and	the	state's	control	over	the	coercive	power	of	force	enabling	those	in	control	to	easily	break	 promises	 ex-post,	 rational	 agents	 have	 little	 reason	 to	 place	 trust	 in	 such	 stated	promises.	As	a	result,	 the	state	must	 fashion	effective	credible	commitment	mechanisms	that	 can	 help	 bind	 itself	 to	 honour	 the	 promise	 not	 to	 violate	 agents'	 private	 property	rights.	Credible	commitment	refers	to	actions	taken	by	state	actors	that	increase	the	costs	of	 breaking	 their	 promise,	 thus	 decreasing	 the	 potential	 gains	 of	 not	 honouring	 the	promise,	and	thereby	increasing	private	economic	agents'	confidence	in	the	reliability	of	the	promise	(Schelling	1960,	North	&	Weingast	1989,	Elster	2008,	Boettke	2009).			Written	constitutions	that	proscribe	limits	on	government	power	and	forbid	the	use	of	the	military	by	political	elites	to	maintain	power	can	serve	as	important	signalling	devices,	but	functionally,	 constitutions	 themselves	 are	 no	more	 than	 words	 on	 a	 piece	 of	 paper.	 In	certain	settings,	therefore,	such	as	authoritarian	regimes,	constitutions	can	be	interpreted	as	documents	 "without	 any	 function	 other	 than	 to	 give	 the	 illusion	 of	 legitimacy	 to	 the	regime"	(Ginsburg	&	Simpser	2014:1).	Effective	institutional	constraints	on	the	unchecked	and	 arbitrary	 employment	 of	 power	 are	 required	 in	 order	 to	 create	 genuine	 credible	legitimacy	as	to	the	limits	on	governmental	power	delineated	in	written	constitutions.	In	practice,	 however,	 given	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 effectively	 constrain	 the	 power	 of	 the	 state,	multiple	institutional	constraints	are	necessary,	as	the	costs	facing	state	actors	wishing	to	break	ex-ante	 promises	 to	protect	private	property	 rights	 increase	 as	do	 the	number	of	existing	overlapping	credible	commitment	mechanisms.			
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Perhaps	 the	most	 significant	 credible	 commitment	 device	 comes	 from	 a	 representative	government	 structure.	 Under	 representative	 government	 structures,	 the	 behaviours	 of	state	actors	are	limited	given	that	if	they	implement	unpopular	policies,	or	are	viewed	to	be	 violating	 accepted	 protections	 on	 private	 property	 rights,	 such	 state	 actors	 can	 be	peacefully	removed	from	power	via	an	agreed	electoral	process.	In	a	well-known	example	highlighted	 by	 North	 &	 Weingast	 (1989),	 the	 British	 crown	 transferred	 the	 power	 of	taxation	from	itself	to	Parliament,	and	faced	costly	consequences	were	it	to	try	to	revoke	such	 power.	 In	 extraterritorial	 Shanghai,	 a	 governing	 representative	 council	 was	 held	accountable	for	its	fiscal	decision-making	by	taxpayers	who	elected	the	council	members.	Representative	 government	 based	 on	 the	 ability	 of	 citizens	 to	 remove	 representatives	from	power	contrast	significantly	with	autocratic	government	forms.	As	Olson	(2000:	27)	notes,	"the	promises	of	an	autocrat	are	never	completely	credible."	With	the	full	power	of	state	authority	at	their	disposal,	and	limited	ability	for	non-state	actors	to	effect	change	on	those	 in	 power,	 it	 is	 typically	 less	 costly	 for	 authoritarian	 regimes	 to	 backtrack	 on	promises	to	protect	private	property	rights.			In	general,	the	greater	dispersal	of	constraining	power	throughout	society,	the	greater	are	the	 costs	 to	 state	 actors	attempting	 to	 violate	private	property	 rights,	 and	 therefore	 the	more	 credible	 are	 the	 commitments	 to	 uphold	 such	 rights.	 Open	 societies	 where	 free	associations	 of	 civic	 groups	 are	 possible	 serve	 as	 an	 additional	 safeguard	 against	 the	potential	 for	arbitrary	expropriations	by	state	actors	(Weingast	1997,	Raiser	1999).	The	ability	for	such	groups	to	pressure	the	behaviour	of	state	actors,	either	via	lobbying	efforts	or	organised	political	action,	helps	align	public	will	with	government	policies,	and	increase	the	accountability	of	state	actors	who	might	otherwise	seek	to	violate	property	rights.	†		Another	important	institutional	credible	commitment	mechanism	is	by	way	of	the	creation	of	 an	 independent	 judicial	 system.	 Independent	 courts	 serve	not	 only	 to	protect	private	property	 by	 settling	 property	 disagreements	 between	 private	 agents	 (civil	 law)	 or	enforcing	 limit	 of	 trespass	 by	 agents	 to	 others'	 property	 (criminal	 law),	 but	 equally	important,	 they	 can	 serve	 to	 affect	 limits	 on	 state	 actors.	 Note	 that	 both	 the	 limits	 and	potency	 of	 credible	 commitment	 mechanisms	 are	 exemplified	 in	 the	 case	 of	 an	independent	 judiciary.	 Ultimately,	 a	 powerful	 executive,	 with	 control	 over	 internal	military	force,	can	disregard	court	rulings.	Yet,	ignoring	the	rulings	of	the	judicial	system	imposes	costs	on	the	executive,	as	such	actions	are	likely	to	be	viewed	to	be	a	breaking	of	the	 social	 contract,	 and	 increase	 the	 risk	 of	 disobedience	 by	 the	military,	 anger	 of	 civil	society	groups,	and	even	possible	overthrow	from	power.	Conversely,	in	those	states	that	lack	 independent	 judiciaries,	 including	 authoritarian	 regimes,	 state	 actors	 are	 less	constrained	to	adhere	to	the	rule	of	law,	undermining	much	of	the	value	of	holding	private	property.	Milton	Friedman,	 in	assessing	 the	 failure	of	mass	privatisation	programmes	 in	post-communist	 Russia,	 remarks,	 "the	 rule	 of	 law	 is	 probably	 more	 basic	 than	privatization.	Privatization	is	meaningless	if	you	don't	have	the	rule	of	law.	What	does	it	mean	to	privatize	if	you	do	not	have	security	of	property,	if	you	can't	use	your	property	as	you	want	to?"	(Friedman	2002:	18).	___________________________________________________________________________________________________		
†	 A	caveat	here	is	necessary.	Public	participation	in	the	political	process	can	create	both	positive	and	negative	consequences	for	the	protection	of	private	property	rights.	Concern	is	raised	by	those	regarding	the	dangers	of	a	"tyranny	of	a	majority"	which	advocates	implementation	of	redistributive	policies	at	the	expense	of	the	property	rights	of	those	holding	significant	amounts	of	capital	(Becker	1983).	However,	 the	 reasoning	behind	 this	argumentation	 is	potentially	problematic,	 as	 it	denies	the	ability	of	strategic	foresight	by	those	in	the	majority,	implying	they	would	non-rationally	back	policies	 that	 capture	 a	 larger	 piece	 of	 a	 smaller	 pie	 in	 the	 immediate	 period,	 at	 the	 expense	 of	retaining	commitment	to	policies	protecting	property	rights	that	generate	significantly	larger	pies	in	 future	 periods.	 The	 argument	 is	 admittedly	 complicated,	 however,	 by	 Fernandez	 &	 Rodrik	(1991)'s	 contention	 that	 uncertainty	 as	 to	 accrual	 of	 gains	 to	 any	 particular	 individual	 under	policies	that	lead	to	greater	overall	growth	can	work	to	limit	support	for	such	policies.	
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	2.5.4.		State	Capacity	and	the	Violence	Trap		Epstein	 (1994,	 2000)	 presents	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	 classical	 liberal	 idea	 that	 limited	governance	structures	and	economic	freedom	are	sufficient	for	modern	sustained	growth.	Epstein's	 thesis	 is	 that	 while	 Smithian	 growth	 and	 market	 integration	 are	 indeed	fundamental	to	long-term	economic	growth,	this	growth	process	can	be	choked	off	when	states	lack	the	capacity	to	implement	policies	that	will	promote	market	development	and	integration.	 As	 Epstein	 (1994:	 7)	 writes,	 "although	 an	 autocratic	 government...	 will	 be	unable	 to	 provide	 the	 necessary	 commitment	 to	 existing	 property	 rights,	 and	 will	therefore	tend	more	or	less	deliberately	to	stifle	opportunities	for	growth,	it	by	no	means	follows	that	free	(in	the	sense	of	Liberal	democratic)	institutions	will	produce	an	efficient	or	 indeed	 superior	 degree	 of	 commitment."	 Specifically,	 representative	 government	structures	also	face	potential	inability	to	implement	credible	commitment	mechanisms,	as	self-interested	interest	groups	who	can	capture	the	reins	of	state	authority	might	renege	on	past	promises,	much	as	might	a	self-interested	autocratic	ruler	(1994:	13).			The	key	 for	Epstein	 is	 the	underlying	strength	of	 the	state	 institutional	structure—weak	states	 are	 those	 easily	 captured	 by	 particular	 interests,	 whereas	 strong	 states	 can	withstand	 the	 pressures	 applied	 by	 self-interested	 groups,	 maintaining	 the	 underlying	institutional	 framework	 that	 defines	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 game.	 Epstein	 argues	 there	 is	 a	minimum	level	of	state	power	necessary	to	overcome	fragmentation	of	authority	that	can	otherwise	lead	to	sub-sovereign	state	actors	able	to	extract	rents	and	privileges	from	the	central	 state	 in	 return	 for	 their	 support,	 with	 associated	 barriers	 to	 trade	 effectively	disrupting	 free	 entry	 and	 the	 integration	 of	 markets	 necessary	 for	 sustained	 growth:	"Prisoner's	 dilemmas	 caused	 by	 decentralised	 rent-seeking,	 and	 co-ordination	 failures	caused	 by	 jurisdictional	 fragmentation,	 posed	 the	most	 significant	 constraint	 on	 pre-modern	 growth"	 (2000:	 169).	 Thus,	 "[effective,	 capable]	 State	 formation	 was	 a	 major	cause—possibly	 the	 major	 driving	 force—of	 market	 integration	 and	 Smithian	 growth	before	the	nineteenth	century"	(2000:	52).		Subsequent	research	has	 further	developed	the	"state	capacity"	 literature	(Migdal	1988,	Davidheiser	1992,	 Acemoglu	2005,	 Besley	&	 Persson	 2009,	 Acemoglu	 et	al.	 2016),	with	Johnson	&	Koyama	(2017:2)	defining	state	capacity	as	"the	ability	of	a	state	to	collect	taxes,	enforce	law	and	order,	and	provide	public	goods."	Much	of	the	literature	has	focussed	on	state	 capacity	 as	 comprising	 two	 components:	 fiscal	 capacity,	 defined	 by	 the	 ability	 to	raise	tax	revenues,	and	legal	capacity,	the	ability	to	enforce	its	legal	authority	across	the	entirety	of	its	territory.	While	such	an	approach	to	state	capacity	is	certainly	useful	given	that	fiscal	capacity	and	legal	capacity	are	vital	abilities	necessary	for	a	state	structure	to	effectively	 function,	 a	 broader	 conception	 of	 state	 capacity	 is	 appropriate.	 Beyond	 the	ability	to	effectively	raise	tax	revenue	and	impose	legal	authority,	state	capacity	relates	to	issues	 of	 institutional	 efficacy—whether	 the	 state	 possesses	 effective	 institutional	 and	bureaucratic	 structures	 to	 formulate	 and	 implement	 policies.	 This	 certainly	 includes	sufficient	 funding	 mechanisms,	 but	 also	 an	 appropriate	 bureaucratic	 framework	 and	decision-making	 structure	 appropriately	 robust	 so	 as	 to	 be	 able	 to	 formulate	 and	implement	the	desired	policies	of	state	actors,	as	well	as	sufficiently	insulated	so	as	not	to	fall	capture	to	actors	intent	on	warping	the	system	to	primarily	serve	their	interests	at	the	expense	of	pre-existing	commitments	to	protection	of	private	property.	Designing	efficient	bureaucracies	 as	 opposed	 to	 simply	 large	 ones	 is	 not	 easily	 accomplished.	 Given	 the	incentives	 of	 state	 actors,	 there	 is	 continual	 pressure	 to	 expand	 resources	 flowing	 to	government.	Further,	the	larger	the	state	apparatus,	the	more	opportunity	and	ability	for	state	 actors	 to	 utilise	 state	 power	 to	 extract	 resources	 from	 the	 private	 economy	 for	personal	gain.			
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	2.5.4.1.		Monopoly	on	Violence			Given	 its	 role	 in	providing	protection	of	 private	property	 rights,	and	hence	 even	 liberty	itself,	 state	 capacity	 in	 regard	 to	 the	 ability	 to	 impose	 and	 maintain	 a	 monopoly	 on	violence	 within	 its	 territory	 is	 fundamental.	 Under	 either	 Hobbesian	 or	 Lockean	conceptualisations	 of	 the	 state,	 the	 ability	 to	 eliminate	 the	 presence	 of	 Olson's	 "roving	bandits"	 to	 create	 a	 safe	 atmosphere	 for	 private	 agents	 to	 conduct	 business	 and	 own	property	 is	 paramount.	 To	 do	 so,	 as	Migdal	 (1988:	 18)	 notes,	 sovereigns	must	 "hold	 a	monopoly	 over	 the	 principal	 means	 of	 coercion	 in	 their	 societies	 by	 maintaining	 firm	control	 over	 standing	 armies	 and	 police	 forces	 while	 eliminating	 nonstate	 controlled	armies	militias	and	gangs."	A	state	that	cannot	keep	out	externally-waged	war,	that	cannot	provide	for	the	absence	of	civil	war,	and	that	allows	non-state	actors	to	arbitrarily	impose	violence	within	state	borders,	fails	in	this	primary	function.		As	 recently	highlighted	 in	Weingast	 (2017),	 the	primary	 importance	of	 state	 capacity	 in	creating	security	was	well-recognised	by	the	earliest	economic	philosophers,	with	Smith	(1776)'s	Book	Three	 emphasising	that	early	modern	growth	 in	Europe	could	only	occur	once	 sovereign	 monarchs	 grew	 powerful	 enough	 to	 limit	 the	 ability	 of	 sub-sovereign	nobility	 from	using	 the	 threat	 of	waging	violence	 to	 extract	 rents,	 hence	 stifling	 growth	(thus,	Epstein's	thesis	represents	a	partial	extension	of	Smith's	earlier	observations).	More	recent	 work	 by	 Barry	Weingast	 and	 his	 co-authors	 (North	 et	 al.	 2009,	 2013;	Weingast	2010,	2017;	Cox	et	al.	2015;	Levi	et	al.	2017)	explicitly	argues	that	modern	economics	has	under-accounted	for	the	importance	of	violence	as	fundamental	to	the	ability	for	countries	to	undertake	policies	necessary	for	sustained	economic	growth.	Their	work	finds	political	violence	 to	 be	 endemic	 to	 poor	 countries,	 observing	 that	 from	 1840	 through	 2004,	 on	average,	violent	regime	change	occurred	every	seven	years	for	the	bottom	fifty	per	cent	of	countries	ranked	by	gross	domestic	product,	compared	to	only	every	sixty	years	 for	 the	top	decile	of	countries.			Thus,	for	most	states,	the	actuality	of	serious,	existential	political	violence	is	the	norm,	not	the	 exception.	 Creating	 the	 sufficient	 level	 of	 state	 capacity	 sufficient	 to	 maintain	 an	internal	monopoly	on	the	ability	to	conduct	violence,	and	limit	the	dispersion	of	the	ability	to	 commit	 violence	 amongst	 multiple	 actors	 within	 the	 state,	 in	 practise	 proves	 to	 be	extremely	difficult	for	most	state	institutional	structures.			The	impact	of	such	frequent	and	endemic	episodes	of	internal	violence	is	severe.	To	begin	with,	 for	 states	 with	 weak	 state	 capacity	 unable	 to	 prevent	 the	 destructive	 actions	 of	"roving	bandits"	represented	by	corrupt	state	police	or	military	forces,	internal	rebels	and	militarist	leaders,	thieves	and	organised	crime	members,	or	foreign	military	forces,	levels	of	 domestic	 investment	 and	 entrepreneurial	 activity	 are	 considerably	 circumscribed.	Given	that	realised	output	achieved	by	costly	investment	undertaken	by	private	domestic	entrepreneurs	 face	 either	 expropriation	 by	 force	 from	 non-state	 actors,	 or	 destruction	from	 military	 actions,	 implies	 the	 inclination	 to	 invest	 capital	 is	 severely	 depressed.	Furthermore,	 potential	 investors	who	might	 consider	 financing	domestic	 entrepreneurs	must	likewise	factor	in	the	expected	probability	not	only	of	the	potential	economic	success	or	failure	of	an	entrepreneurial	venture,	but	also	the	expected	probability	that	the	gains	of	an	entrepreneurial	venture	could	be	expropriated	or	destroyed	by	such	"roving	banditry"	or	 in	 the	process	of	 state	military	 response.	Thus,	 in	 states	with	high	 levels	 of	 expected	violence,	 such	 additional	 risk	 can	 serve	 to	 drive	 the	 expected	 return	 of	many	 potential	economic	investment	opportunities	negative,	thus	depressing	realised	economic	output.			
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Given	the	immense	negative	economic	and	political	consequences	owing	to	violence,	Cox	
et	al.	(2015)	describe	a	vicious	cycle,	or	violence	trap,	that	limits	policy	options	of	political	leaders	 in	 states	 incapable	 of	 imposing	 a	monopoly	 on	 coercive	 force.	 Political	 leaders,	wishing	 to	 maintain	 their	 rule,	 recognise	 the	 possibility	 of	 overthrow	 given	 that	competitors	possess	significant	access	to	coercive	force.	As	negative	impacts	of	sustained	political	violence	are	severe,	 leaders	seek	strategies	 to	ameliorate	outbreaks	of	violence.	Such	strategies	centre	on	creating	rents	that	can	be	distributed	to	potential	competitors	to	induce	 support	 for	 the	 leadership	 and	 remaining	 invested	 in	 the	 current	 order.	 These	rents-creation	 strategies,	 while	 potentially	 reducing	 the	 incidence	 of	 violence	 within	society,	are	in	general	antithetical	to	economic	growth.	Yet	abandoning	these	rent-creation	strategies	would	weaken	 the	 (already	 limited)	 support	 for	 the	 regime	 and	 increase	 the	likelihood	of	political	 violence.	Hence,	 leaders	of	 states	with	weak	 capacity	 to	 enforce	 a	monopoly	 on	 coercive	 force	 can	 find	 themselves	 "trapped"	 into	 maintaining	 policies	leading	to	poor	economic	outcomes.					2.5.4.2.		Violence,	Existential	Threats	and	Credible	Commitment		Our	 previous	 discussions	 highlighted	 the	 importance	 of	 sovereign	 entities	 creating	institutional	 credible	 commitment	 mechanisms	 which	 bind	 state	 behaviour	 into	honouring	ex-ante	promises	to	protect	private	property	and	contract	rights.	The	key	is	in	the	 perceptions	 of	 private	 economic	 agents—it	 is	 essential	 for	 agents	 to	 believe	 that	property	 and	 contract	 rights	 institutions	 are	 effective	 and	 that	 commitment	 devices	locking	 state	behaviour	 into	honouring	private	property	 and	 contract	 rights	protections	are	 credible.	 Under	 such	 conditions,	 it	 becomes	 rational	 for	 agents	 to	 undertake	 costly	investment	efforts	necessary	to	produce	economic	surplus,	as	well	as	for	investors	to	hold	financial	instruments,	fostering	capital	market	development.		Here	we	 advance	 a	 slight	 extension	 of	 the	 violence	 trap	 thesis	 of	Weingast	 and	 his	 co-authors.	Specifically,	we	contend	that	states	characterised	by	such	weak	state	capacity	so	as	to	be	unable	to	prevent	systematic	and	episodic	internal	and	external	violence,	and	thus	facing	 existential	 threats	 of	 regime	 change	 by	 force,	 are	 severely	 constrained	 in	 their	ability	to	implement	credible	commitment	mechanisms	to	honour	prior	claims	on	private	property	rights	protections.	The	reason	for	such	constraints	is	simple—ex-ante	promises	made	by	states	facing	existential	threats	are	inherently	not	credible.		Similar	to	the	violence	trap	argument	made	by	Weingast	and	his	co-authors,	the	situation	for	 states	 facing	 serious	 existential	 threats	 place	 state	 decision-makers	 in	 a	 "catch-22"	position	 in	 regard	 to	 honouring	 protections	 on	 private	 property	 rights.	 To	 begin	 with,	states	facing	existential	threats	force	state	actors	to	consider	a	wider	range	of	behaviours	in	 order	 to	 prevent	 loss	 of	 power.	 State	 actors	 are	 more	 willing	 to	 undertake	 drastic	actions	 to	 prevent	 overthrow	 of	 the	 state,	 such	 as	 the	 declaration	 of	 military	 law,	 the	suspension	of	civil	liberties,	or	engaging	in	onerous	taxation	or	outright	expropriation	of	private	 economic	output	 in	 support	 of	military	 efforts.	The	 immediacy	of	 the	 existential	threat	means	state	actors	place	less	weight	on	policy	choices	that	would	contribute	to	the	long-term	 development	 of	 the	 broader	 economy	 or	 financial	 markets—such	 as	maintaining	 strong	 commitment	 to	protection	of	 private	property	 and	 contract	 rights—and	 more	 weight	 on	 gaining	 access	 in	 the	 immediate	 to	 resources	 to	 prevent	 the	overthrow	 of	 the	 regime.	 State	 actors	 are	more	 willing	 to	 undertake	 drastic	 actions	 in	violation	 of	 previous	 credible	 commitments	 to	 honour	 private	 property	 rights	 because	even	if	costs	to	violating	credible	commitments	are	large,	costs	for	state	actors	to	the	fall	of	the	state	are	likely	to	be	even	greater.			
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Second,	no	matter	what	actions	undertaken	by	the	state,	however	extreme	or	limited	they	may	be,	 rational	private	 agents	 are	 likely	 to	 view	 existing	 institutional	 commitments	 to	protect	private	property	rights	as	relatively	hollow.	Private	agents,	aware	of	the	existential	threats	facing	the	state,	recognise	that	under	a	situation	of	duress,	state	actors	are	more	willing	 to	 undertake	 drastic	 actions	 to	 increase	 the	 chance	 of	 state	 survival,	 including	actions	 that	 violate	 previously	 credible	 commitments	 in	 order	 to	 accomplish	 the	 short-term	goal	of	staying	in	power;	hence,	private	actors	are	more	likely	to	discount	attempts	at	credible	commitment.	Thus,	even	governments	whose	 leadership	authentically	holds	the	intention	 of	 protecting	 private	 property	 rights	 in	 general	will,	 in	 the	 face	 of	 otherwise	collapse	of	the	regime,	be	perceived	as	likely	to	engage	in	expropriation	in	order	to	secure	emergency	funds	necessary	to	pay	for	defence	of	the	regime.		For	governments	to	make	credible	their	commitments	to	protect	private	property	rights,	they	need	to	be	seen	as	justifiably	not	willing	to	suffer	costs	associated	with	breaking	the	commitments	 they	have	made;	under	such	conditions,	however,	 rational	actors	perceive	state	actors	as	willing	to	suffer	such	costs.	For	instance,	while	the	sovereign	has	the	ability	to	default	on	its	bond	payments,	recognition	by	state	actors	that	such	action	will	 lead	to	future	 increased	 borrowing	 costs	 serves	 as	 a	 deterrent	 to	 default;	 it	 is	 the	 widespread	recognition	 of	 that	 deterrent	 helps	 make	 the	 sovereign's	 commitment	 to	 repay	 more	credible.	However,	if	the	state	is	faced	with	existential	threats,	the	power	of	the	deterrent	is	marginalised—the	priority	of	state	actors	is	first	and	foremost	to	remain	in	power;	only	after	that	immediate	and	primary	goal	is	secured	will	subordinated	goals,	such	as	attaining	favourable	 cost	 of	 capital	 in	 the	 future,	 be	 considered,	 given	 that	were	 the	 state	 to	 fall,	future	concerns	such	as	borrowing	funds	in	the	future	are	by	definition	made	moot.		A	 third	 fundamental	 problem	 preventing	 states	 of	 such	 weak	 capacity	 as	 to	 be	 under	continual	 existential	 threat	 of	 violent	 regime	 change	 to	 effectively	 implement	 credible	commitment	mechanisms	is	that	the	very	existence	of	an	existential	threat	implies	rational	private	actors	will	be	inclined	to	discount	credible	commitment	attempts	by	the	state—no	matter	the	actual	set	of	actions	state	actors	undertake.	Whatever	commitments	the	state	apparatus	creates	 to	honour	protections	on	private	property	rights,	a	serious	existential	threat	 implies	the	existing	state	apparatus	might	well	become	 incapacitated	or	removed	altogether.	Thus,	even	if	the	state	actors,	 in	the	face	of	an	existential	threat,	were	able	to	guarantee	that	state	policies	would	never	violate	commitments	to	protect	private	property	rights,	and	even	if	private	actors	perceived	the	state's	credible	commitment	mechanisms	as	incontrovertible	and	remained	confident	that	state	actors	would	not	violate	any	prior-committed	promises	to	uphold	private	property	rights,	rational	private	actors	would	still	be	inclined	to	discount	the	state's	attempts	at	credible	commitment	under	circumstances	where	 the	 current	 state	 apparatus	 is	 facing	 a	 high	 probability	 of	 violent	 loss	 of	 power,	given	that	the	regime	that	might	replace	the	current	regime	may	well	not	be	committed	in	same	way	to	protect	private	property	rights	as	the	ousted	regime.	(For	instance,	however	well	 or	poorly	 the	Guomindang	 regime	provided	protections	on	private	property	 rights,	the	incoming	communist	regime	in	1949	provided	considerably	less	such	protections).		Further,	 for	 the	 class	 of	weak-capacity	 states	 described,	 any	 actions	 undertaken	 by	 the	state	that	violate	prior	commitments,	no	matter	whether	circumscribed	or	extreme,	serves	to	validate	the	perception	amongst	private	actors	that	state	actors	are	willing	to	accept	the	costs	 of	 breaking	 commitments,	 as	 those	 costs	 are	 lower	 than	 the	 cost	 of	 loss	of	 power	were	 the	 existential	 threat	 to	 be	 realised.	 Therefore,	 the	 ability	 to	 generate	 functional	commitment	 mechanisms	 to	 be	 perceived	 as	 credible	 by	 private	 economic	 agents	 is	further	 limited.	Not	only	do	exigent	circumstances	help	propel	state	actors	 to	undertake	actions	likely	to	include	violations	of	prior	commitments	to	protect	private	property	rights,	but	 forward-looking	 rational	 agents	will	 anticipate	 such	 violations,	making	 attempts	 by	the	state	to	commit	to	protect	private	property	rights	as	unable	to	be	perceived	as	credible.	
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This	condition,	too,	exists	no	matter	what	actions	the	state	takes	in	actualisation—it	is	the	recognition	of	the	likely	potential	that	the	state	will	undertake	such	violations	that	drive	private	actors'	perceptions,	not	simply	the	realised	actions	of	the	state.	Further,	given	that	private	 actors	 anticipate	 the	 state	will	 violate	 commitments	 to	honour	private	property	rights,	 state	 actors	 in	 turn	 anticipate	 such	 anticipation	 by	 private	 actors.	 As	 a	 result,	 a	vicious	circle,	or	"low	credibility	trap",	is	created	that	locks	the	state	into	an	action	set	that	severely	undermines	its	ability	to	credibly	commit	to	protect	private	property	rights.	The	dynamics	of	the	trap	are	self-reinforcing:	facing	serious	existential	threats,	 incentives	on	state	 actors	 to	 honour	 prior	 commitments	 to	 protect	 private	 property	 rights	 are	considerably	reduced,	given	that	private	actors	will	react	similarly	whether	state	actions	uphold	or	violate	commitments.	This	condition	therefore	increases	the	likelihood	that	the	state	will	 in	 fact	 violate	 its	prior	 commitments.	Recognition	by	private	 actors	 that	 state	actors	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 violate	 prior	 commitments	 under	 such	 conditions	 creates	secondary	effects	that	further	strengthen	the	overall	dynamics	of	this	trap.		Finally,	the	simultaneous	consideration	by	private	actors	that	loss	of	power	by	the	current	regime	might	well	 lead	 to	 the	 repudiation	of	 existing	prior	 commitments	only	serves	 to	reinforce	both	the	perceptions	of	private	actors	that	state	commitments	are	not	credible,	and	 the	 respondent	 incentives	 on	 state	 actors	 to	 violate	 prior	 commitments.	 This	reinforces	the	structure	of	the	trap	that	limits	the	ability	of	a	weak	capacity	state	incapable	of	enforcing	a	monopoly	on	 internal	violence	 to	credibly	commit,	and	likewise	 increases	the	likelihood	of	expropriation	of	private	assets.				2.6.		Contract	Rights			Contract	rights	represent	an	important	subset	of	private	property	rights	protections.	The	structure	of	 institutions	providing	the	protection	of	private	property	and	contract	rights	are	 fundamental	 to	 the	 operation	 of	 markets.	 North	 (1990:	 54)	 argues	 the	 specific	mechanisms	 that	 impact	 the	 enforceability	 of	 contracts	 are	 essential	 to	 commercial	activity.	 Indeed,	 he	 goes	 so	 far	 as	 to	 claim	 that	 "[the	 lack	 of]	 effective,	 low-cost	enforcement	 of	 contracts	 is	 the	 most	 important	 source	 of	 both	 historical	 and	contemporary	under-development	in	developing	economies."			All	forms	of	commercial	exchange	are	inherently	imbued	with	transactions	costs,	with	the	most	significant	owing	to	asymmetries	present	in	the	information	sets	each	side	brings	to	the	 exchange.	 Particular	 institutional	 exchange	 forms	 and	 information	mechanisms	 (for	instance,	 well-functioning	 markets	 with	 publically	 known	 prices)	 can	 work	 to	 mitigate	such	asymmetries,	thus	shaping	the	nature	of	exchange	(Aron	2000).		Contracts	 are	 designed	 to	 overcome	 transactions	 costs	 in	 regard	 to	 incentive	 problems	caused	by	informational	asymmetries,	particularly	in	regard	to	principal-agent	problems.	Incentive	problems	occur	when	a	rights-controlling	agent	(the	principal)	seeks	to	delegate	a	task	to	another	agent.	However,	once	control	has	been	given	to	the	agent,	the	agent	can	gain	 access	 to	 information	not	 available	 to	 the	principal	 (for	 instance,	 the	manager	of	 a	firm	will	have	significantly	more	information	on	the	operation	and	resource	allocation	of	the	 firm	 than	 will	 outsiders,	 including	 the	 principal).	 Effective	 contracts	 can	 help	overcome	 some	of	 the	problems	associated	with	 asymmetric	 information,	depending	on	the	 efficacy	 of	 enforcement	 frameworks	 that	 bind	 agents	 to	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 contract.	Hence,	 the	 institutional	 framework	 determines	 the	 nature	 and	 efficacy	 of	 contract	enforcement	mechanisms,	and	helps	to	determine	the	effectiveness	of	these	mechanisms	in	overcoming	problems	of	hidden	and	asymmetric	information.	Jensen	&	Meckling	(1976:	311)	emphasise	the	importance	of	these	mechanisms	when	noting,	"The	police	powers	of	
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the	 state	 are	 used	 to	 enforce	 performance	 of	 contracts	 or	 to	 enforce	 the	 collection	 of	damages	 for	 non-performance.	 The	 courts	 adjudicate	 contracts	 between	 contracting	parties	and	establish	precedents...	All	of	these	government	activities	affect	both	the	kinds	of	contracts	executed	and	the	extent	to	which	contracting	is	relied	upon."		Problems	relating	to	differing	principal-agent	incentives	and	informational	asymmetry	are	particularly	relevant	in	regard	to	corporate	governance	issues,	where	the	principal	is	the	owner	of	a	company	(i.e.,	a	shareholder),	and	 the	agent	 is	a	manager	of	 the	 firm.	Under	institutional	settings	defined	by	weak	contract	enforcement,	 it	becomes	more	difficult	to	overcome	 the	 agency	 problems	 inherent	 in	 the	 principal-agent	 relationship	 and,	 hence,	less	efficient	for	companies	to	utilise	joint-stock	corporate	forms,	or	for	investors	to	enter	into	contractual	relationships	via	shareholding.	Agency	costs	also	increase	the	cost	of	debt	issuance,	 as	 bondholders	 wish	 to	 impose	 costly	 restrictions	 on	 firms	 when	 significant	concerns	 over	 agency	 problems	 exist	 (Jensen	 &	 Meckling	 1976).	 The	 impact	 of	 such	agency	 costs	 will	 be	 underscored	 throughout	 our	 examination	 of	 Shanghai's	 early	 debt	markets,	especially	in	regard	to	their	payout	structures.		Many	forms	of	potential	exchange	are	characterised	by	a	lack	of	simultaneous	exchange.	In	such	 instances,	 the	 potential	 risks	 of	 one	 side	 of	 the	 exchange	 reneging	 on	 previously	agreed-to	 exchange	 conditions	 are	 high.	 In	 response,	 economic	 actors	 will	 attempt	 to	reduce	 risk	 via	 various	 institutional	 arrangements	 to	 increase	 profitable	 exchange	opportunities.	 Economic	 historians	 have	 identified	 many	 situations	 where	 economic	agents	 designed	 uniquely	 appropriate	 institutional	 arrangements	 to	 overcome	 high	transactions	 costs	 so	 as	 to	 facilitate	 trade	 outside	 of	 formalised,	 government-enforced	private	property	rights	and	contract	enforcement.	Greif	(1993,	2011)	for	instance	shows	that	 even	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 government-enforced	 contract	 protection,	 nomadic	 Jewish	Maghribi	traders	were	able	to	construct	effective	self-enforcing	relationships	that	allowed	trade	to	take	place	over	time	and	distance.		However,	for	markets	to	be	able	to	deepen	and	exchange	to	take	place	amongst	individuals	who	 are	 not	 related	 to	 one	 another	 by	 communal	 relationships—which	 by	 nature	 are	bounded	 in	size—non-simultaneous	 exchange	 requires	parties	 to	be	 able	 to	 ensure	 that	agents	 are	 likely	 to	 honour	 future	 commitments.	Whether	 formally	 or	 informally,	 such	commitments	 can	 be	 conceptualised	 as	 contracts.	 Settings	 requiring	 contracts	 imply	transactions	 costs,	 such	 as	 identifying	 reputable	 agents,	 to	 be	 high.	 Hence,	 institutional	arrangements	 that	 encourage	 agents	 to	 uphold	 their	 contractual	 commitments	 reduce	transactions	costs	 for	exchange,	 increasing	 the	degree	and	scope	of	commercial	 activity.	Such	arrangements	are	particularly	important	for	financial	transactions	that	can	allow	for	agents	to	undertake	the	sort	of	long-term,	higher-return	investment	projects	modelled	by	Bencivenga	&	Smith	(1995).			2.6.1.		Contract	Rights	and	Financial	Instruments		The	 importance	 of	 private	 property	 rights	 protection	 and	 contract	 enforcement	 is	particularly	 relevant	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 development	 and	 use	 of	 financial	 instruments.	Financial	 instruments	 are	 in	 fact	 contracts—they	 represent	 an	 agreement	 between	 two	parties,	whether	principal	and	agent,	as	in	equity	shares,	or	claimant	and	recipient,	as	with	bondholder	and	issuer.	The	economic	value	of	financial	instruments	is	derived	not	simply	from	 the	 expected	 cash	 flows	 designated	 within	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 contract;	 of	 equal	importance	 are	 the	 rights	 these	 contracts	 afford	 their	 holders.	 As	 La	 Porta	 et	 al.	(1998:1114)	note,	"Shareholders	receive	dividends	because	they	can	vote	out	the	directors	who	do	not	pay	 them,	 and	 creditors	 are	paid	because	they	have	 the	power	 to	repossess	collateral.	Without	these	rights,	investors	would	not	be	able	to	get	paid."		
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However,	 a	 financial	 contract—a	 share	 of	 stock,	 or	 a	 bond—is	 represented	 by	 nothing	more	than	words	written	on	a	piece	of	paper.	Ultimately,	any	economic	value	assigned	to	the	 stock	 or	 bond	 comes	 only	 from	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 owner	 of	 that	 piece	 of	 paper	 to	actually	 enforce	 the	 contract	 it	 represents.	 Hence,	 the	 nature	 and	 efficacy	 of	 contract	enforcement	mechanisms	is	fundamental	to	the	perceived	value	of	financial	instruments,	and	thus	to	the	overall	development	and	functioning	of	financial	markets.			Recent	research	in	financial	contracting	focuses	on	the	ways	in	which	such	contracts	are	inherently	 incomplete;	 that	 is,	 they	are	unable	 to	define	many	decisions	 that	need	 to	be	made	in	future	periods,	as	these	decisions	are	inherently	unknowable	or	indeterminate	at	the	 time	 of	 contracting.	 Therefore,	 financial	 contracts	 serve	 as	 tools	 that	 shape	 the	methodology	determining	how	these	decisions	will	be	made.	Relevant	literature	has	thus	focussed	on	the	nature	of	the	decision	rights	endowed	under	varying	financial	contracting	formulations	(Aghion	&	Bolton	1992;	Hart	1995,	2001).		As	 with	 all	 economic	 exchange,	 each	 side	 in	 financial	 contracting	 faces	 trade-offs	(Grossman	 &	 Hart	 1986,	 Bolton	 2014).	 Financial	 contracts	 require	 wealth-constrained	entrepreneurs	to	give	up	control	and	decision	rights	in	return	for	access	to	financing.	The	form	 of	 financing,	 equity	 or	 debt,	 reflect	 different	 sets	 of	 decision	 rights.	 Equity	shareholders	 typically	 have	 voting	 rights	 and	 can	 demand	 changes	 to	 management	practices	and	make-up,	and	can	attempt	to	extract	profits	out	of	the	firm	through	influence	over	dividend	decisions.	Bondholders,	conversely,	do	not	initially	gain	decision	rights;	as	long	 as	 scheduled	 payments	 are	made,	 bondholders	 have	 no	 control	 over	management	decision-making.	 From	 the	 entrepreneur's	 standpoint,	 therefore,	 she	 prefers	 debt	financing,	 given	 she	 receives	 capital	 while	 retaining	 full	 decision	 rights.	 Greater	 debt	obligations,	 however,	 increases	 the	 risk	 of	 default;	 once	 a	 default	 takes	 place,	 firm	management	lose	all	decision-making	control	and	assets	can	be	seized	by	creditors.	Hence,	debt	and	equity	pose	different	sets	of	risks	and	trade-offs	for	either	side	in	both	forms	of	contracting	 relationships.	 The	 efficacy	 of	 contract	 enforcement	 determines	 the	 relative	and	 absolute	 costs	 and	 benefits	 of	 equity	 or	 debt	 financing	 (Jensen	 &	Meckling	 1976).	Differing	property	rights	regimes	can	generate	higher	or	lower	absolute	levels	and	forms	of	financial	contracting.		In	 instances	 where	 a	 government	 is	 the	 bond	 issuer,	 the	 contract	 that	 governs	 the	borrower-lender	relationship	similarly	defines	both	parties'	rights;	however,	the	nature	of	government	power	limits	lenders	from	exercising	certain	decision	rights,	even	in	the	case	of	default.	While	bondholders	can	turn	to	the	courts	to	enforce	repayment,	their	position	is	 disadvantaged	 given	 the	 court	 system	 is	 a	 government	 institution	 and	 judges	 are	technically	government	officials,	underscoring	the	importance	of	the	strength	of	credible	commitment	 institutional	 mechanisms	 relating	 to	 judicial	 independence,	 as	 such	independence	 helps	 determine	 the	 actualisation	 of	 the	 potential	 conflict	 of	 interest	between	the	courts	and	the	broader	state	apparatus.		The	importance	of	additional	enforcement	mechanisms	is	therefore	important	to	fostering	repayment.	Such	mechanisms	are	typically	centred	around	reputational	concerns,	and	the	implied	 threat	 of	 withholding	 future	 lending—if	 the	 sovereign	 reneges	 on	 the	 current	bond	contract,	lenders	are	less	likely	to	enter	into	a	similar	contract	in	the	future	(Gulati	&	Triantis	2007:984).	The	efficacy	of	such	enforcement	mechanisms	is	therefore	dependent	on	 the	 sovereign	possessing	a	 long-term	outlook	under	 the	 anticipation	of	necessitating	future	borrowing.			Thus,	 when	 governments	 face	 existential	 threats	 such	 that	 their	 outlook	 skews	 to	 the	short-term,	or	in	cases	where	the	state	is	able	to	force	lenders	to	supply	funds,	the	ability	of	 reputation	 to	 serve	 as	 an	 effective	 enforcement	 mechanism	 is	 weakened.	 As	 later	
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discussed,	 domestic	 Chinese	 governments	 frequently	 faced	 existential	 threats,	 and	 at	times	possessed	sufficient	power	to	require	private	agents	to	purchase	government	bonds;	further,	 the	 formal	 court	 system	 was	 far	 from	 independent.	 As	 such,	 both	 legal	 and	reputational	 enforcement	 mechanisms	 were	 sufficiently	 weak	 to	 allow	 for	 recurrent	incidences	of	government	default	on	bond	obligations.					2.6.2.		Contract	Rights	and	Financial	Instruments:	Empirical	Support		Weak	 enforcement	 mechanisms	 of	 the	 contracts	 representing	 financial	 instruments,	 or	poor	institutional	protections	allowing	a	predatory	state	or	private	actor	to	expropriate	or	destroy	productive	assets	to	which	financial	instruments	give	claim,	will	theoretically	lead	an	 economy	 to	under-produce	 financial	 instruments.	North	&	Weingast	 (1989)	describe	how	 the	 power-sharing	 arrangement	 emerging	 out	 of	 Britain's	 Glorious	 Revolution	created	 an	 institutional	 framework	 incentivising	 the	 monarchy	 to	 respect	 the	 private	property	 rights	 of	 the	 commercial	 class.	 Prior	 to	 the	Revolution,	 the	 crown	 consistently	imposed	onerous	taxes	and	had	the	power	to	compel	members	of	the	commercial	class	to	purchase	 government	 debt,	 on	which	 the	 crown	would	 consistently	 default.	 Lacking	 an	independent	judiciary,	the	poor	contract	rights	environment	implied	the	commercial	class	were	 unwilling	 holders	 of	 government	 debt,	 as	 evidenced	 by	 the	 state	 using	 coercive	power	 to	 force	 the	 purchase	 of	 its	 debentures.	 The	 lack	 of	 inherent	 investor	 demand,	however,	meant	secondary	bond	markets	were	essentially	absent,	as	there	was	little	in	the	way	of	secondary	trading	of	perceived	high-risk,	low-return	government	debt	instruments.			After	 the	 Glorious	 Revolution,	 the	 power	 dynamics	 between	 the	 state	 and	 investors	changed—the	 creation	 of	 a	 more	 powerful	 parliament,	 which	 had	 authority	 over	 the	crown's	 taxation,	 revenue	 and	 spending	 decisions,	 served	 as	 a	 powerful	 credible	commitment	mechanism	on	the	crown	to	protect	the	rights	of	bondholders.	The	key	to	the	efficacy	of	the	credible	commitment	mechanism	was	its	self-enforcing	nature.	One	the	one	hand,	 in	 line	 with	 Olson	 (1993)'s	 stationary	 bandits	 argument,	 the	monarchy	 now	 had	positive	 incentives	 to	 respect	 private	 property	 rights,	 as	 it	 received	 benefits	 by	way	 of	increased	 and	 stable	 tax	 revenues	 from	 policies	 encouraging	 economic	 activity.	Simultaneously,	the	monarchy	faced	serious	negative	consequences	were	it	to	not	honour	its	promise	 to	protect	private	property	 rights—given	 that	 the	 regime	had	 recently	been	overthrown	 by	 an	 increasingly	 powerful	 commercial	 class,	 the	 threat	 of	 subsequent	overthrow	was	all	 the	more	credible,	hence	providing	an	effective	check	on	 the	crown's	behaviour	to	honour	its	commitments.		North	&	Weingast	cite	two	main	pieces	of	evidence.	The	first	was	the	fall	in	cost	of	capital	to	 the	 British	 government	 once	 the	 credible	 commitment	 mechanism	 was	 created—interest	rates	paid	by	the	crown	fell	post-1688,	and	trended	lower	over	the	next	several	decades.	The	second	was	the	monarchy's	improved	ability	to	obtain	financing,	evidenced	by	the	concomitant	massive	increases	in	government	borrowing.	Hence,	the	government's	ability	to	credibly	commit	to	protect	property	rights	led	to	improvement	in	public	finances.		Numerous	 subsequent	 studies	 have	 followed	 North	 &	 Weingast's	 methodological	framework.	 Fratianni	 &	 Spinelli	 (2006:	 262)	 find	 commitment	 mechanisms	 similar	 to	those	operating	in	post-Glorious	Revolution	Britain	to	be	in	place	in	the	Italian	city-states	of	Florence,	Genoa	and	Venice	in	the	fourteenth	century:	"republican	political	institutions	and	the	rule	of	law…	gave	[the	cities]	legitimacy	and	credibility	to	issue	large	amounts	of	long-term	and	marketable	debt."	Fratianni	&	Spinelli's	research	indicates	that	the	different	institutional	arrangements	operating	in	the	three	city-states	led	to	different	commitment	mechanisms,	 generating	 differing	 levels	 of	 protection	 of	 property	 rights,	 as	 well	 as	differences	in	the	resultant	credit	available	to	the	borrowing	governments.	
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	Stasavage	 (2002)	 presents	 an	 important	 possible	 critique	 of	 North	&	Weingast,	 finding	that	 while	 interest	 rates	 fell	 immediately	 after	 the	 Glorious	 Revolution,	 they	 exhibited	much	 volatility	 thereafter.	 His	 analysis	 shows	 the	 fluctuations	 appear	 to	 be	 strongly	correlated	with	the	political	party	in	power.	Importantly,	however,	his	data	confirm	that	although	 there	was	 variability	 in	 interest	 rates	paid	 by	 the	 British	 crown	 following	 the	Glorious	 Revolution,	 the	 overall	 trend	was	 consistently	 downward.	 Hence,	 while	 other	factors	 are	 undoubtedly	 salient	 in	 respect	 to	 impacts	 on	 sovereign	 borrowing	 costs,	improvement	 in	credible	commitment	mechanisms	regarding	 the	protection	of	property	rights	seems	to	provide	an	unequivocal	positive	effect.			Saiegh	(2013),	utilising	data	from	nineteenth	century	Argentina,	complements	Stasavage	in	 his	 finding	 that	 credible	 commitment	 is	most	 readily	derived	when	 property	 owners	have	 some	 control	 over	 political	 power	 institutions.	 Thus,	 the	 property	 holders	 who	gained	power	over	 the	monarchy	 in	 late	seventeenth	century	Britain,	or	 those	who	took	control	of	the	post-colonial	government	nineteenth	century	Argentina,	effectively	imposed	limits	 on	 state	authorities'	abilities	 and	 incentives	 to	 violate	 expressed	 commitments	 to	protect	the	property	rights	of	property	holders.		Sussman	&	Yafeh	(2006)	utilise	sovereign	borrowing	costs	to	critique	North	&	Weingast's	findings,	focussing	on	the	role	played	by	market	participants'	perceptions	of	the	credibility	of	private	property	rights	protection	mechanisms.	Using	a	VAR	analysis	to	study	interest	rates	 in	 Britain	 after	 the	 Glorious	 Revolution,	 their	 results	 indicate	 that	 while	 interest	rates	on	British	sovereign	debt	fell	immediately,	differentials	between	Britain	and	Holland	did	not	fall	appreciably	until	the	late	1720s.	They	argue	that	the	slower	process	to	reduce	the	 difference	 in	 interest	 rates	 between	 Holland	 and	 Britain	 indicated	 that	 foreign	investors	were	less	convinced	that	the	new	credible-commitment	arrangement	in	place	in	Britain	 implied	 the	 risk	 of	 default	 had	 fallen	 substantially.	 British	 interest	 rates	 were	impacted	not	 only	by	 "the	perception	of	property	rights	by	 local	 investors,	 but	 also	 the	perception	 of	 Britain's	 creditworthiness	 by	 foreign	 investors"	 (908).	 However,	 while	presenting	their	analysis	as	a	critique,	Sussman	&	Yafeh's	findings	do	not	undermine	the	underlying	North	&	Weingast	argument	that	within	Britain,	the	post-Glorious	Revolution	institutional	 framework	 generated	 a	 property	 rights	 environment	 that	 saw	 a	 fall	 in	sovereign	capital	costs.			Overall,	the	theoretical	arguments	advanced	by	North	&	Weingast	(1989)	are	compelling.	As	described	throughout	this	chapter,	the	argument	that	stronger	institutional	protections	on	 private	 property,	 contract	 and	 investor	 rights	 should	 incentivise	 private	 economic	agents	to	more	readily	be	willing	 to	hold	and	trade	 financial	 instruments	is	based	on	an	older,	 well-constructed	 set	 of	 Austrian	 and	 institutional	 theoretical	 supports.	 This	research	 dissertation	 similarly	 considers	 the	 relationship	 between	 institutional	 quality	shaping	private	 property,	 contract	 and	 investor	 rights,	 and	 the	willingness	 of	 economic	actors	to	hold	financial	instruments.			The	empirical	testing	methodology	of	North	&	Weingast,	as	well	as	the	research	that	has	followed	in	their	path,	is	based	on	observing	differences	in	investor	behaviour	prior	to	and	after	 the	 introduction	 of	 an	 event	 viewed	 as	 changing	 the	 private	 property	 rights	environment	 of	 the	 setting	 under	 study;	 if	 investor	 behaviour	 is	 positively	 (negatively)	affected	due	to	a	strengthening	(weakening)	of	the	property	rights	environment,	support	for	 the	underlying	theory	 is	bolstered.	However,	as	 the	some	of	 the	critiques	of	North	&	Weingast	 suggest,	 other	 factors	 might	 have	 also	 occurred	 over	 the	 time	 frame	 under	consideration,	and	hence	observed	changes	in	investor	behaviours	can	also	be	ascribed	to	these	alterative	political	or	economic	factors.		
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Our	research	project	seeks	to	alleviate	this	methodological	issue	facing	studies	that	utilise	the	 approach	 taken	 by	 North	 &	 Weingast,	 by	 taking	 advantage	 of	 late-imperial	 and	republican	 Shanghai's	 unique	 dualistic	 institutional	 framework.	 The	 city's	 parallel	institutional	 environments	 and	 financial	 markets	 existed	 concurrently,	 in	 the	 same	geographical	 location,	 affected	 by	 the	 same	 economic	 trends,	 using	 the	 same	 set	 of	currencies,	with	financial	markets	that	traded	similar	sets	of	financial	instruments	that	the	same	underlying	set	of	investors	could	choose	between	to	place	their	capital—yet,	these	issuances	 fell	 into	 two	 major	 classes	 based	 on	 the	 issuer	 entity,	 whether	 domestic	 or	extraterritorial.	 The	 differing	 issuing	 entities	 operated	 under	 the	 differing	 institutional	environments,	 shaped	 by	 differences	 in	 the	 degree	 of	 exhibited	 state	 capacity	 of	 the	sovereign	 political	 structures,	 domestic	 and	 extraterritorial,	 defining	 the	 respective	institutional	environments	 to	create	effective	legal	systems,	protections	on	property	and	contract	 rights,	 and	 enforce	 a	monopoly	 on	 internal	 violence,	 allowing	 for	 the	 effective	functioning	 of	 market	 processes,	 including	 the	 development	 of	 financial	 markets.	 Thus,	Shanghai	during	this	period	affords	the	opportunity	to	simultaneously	consider	the	way	in	which	 institutional	 differences	work	 to	 impact	 the	decision-making	of	 investors	and	 the	functioning	 of	 financial	 markets,	 allowing	 for	 simultaneous	 comparison	 of	 investor	behaviour	across	stronger	and	weaker	institutional	environments.		Finally,	similar	to	the	research	approach	undertaken	by	Sussman	&	Yafeh	(2006),	we	too	focus	 on	 the	 investment	 choice	 behaviour	 of	 contemporaneous	 market	 participants	 to	elucidate	their	contemporaneous	perceptions	of	the	credibility	of	private	property	rights	protection	mechanisms	 that	 existed	 at	 the	 time.	 Given	 that	 contemporaneous	 investors	could	choose	 to	hold	 financial	 instruments	of	either	domestic	or	 extraterritorial	 issuers,	observing	their	revealed	preferences	between	these	instruments	helps	shed	light	on	their	perceptions	 as	 to	 the	 underlying	 private	 property	 and	 contract	 rights	 institutional	frameworks	that	implicitly	defined	the	differing	values	of	holding	financial	instruments	of	the	differing	issuers.			
	 40 
Chapter	Three.	
Outlining	the	Debate	in	the	Literature			3.1		 Debate	Regarding	the	Late-Qing	and	Republican	Domestic	Institutional	Environment:	Conventional	Wisdom	and	Revisionist	Critiques		An	important	goal	of	this	study	is	to	help	resolve	a	significant	debate	that	exists	within	the	Chinese	economic	history	literature	regarding	views	on	the	overall	strength	and	efficacy	of	the	 domestic	 late-Qing	 and	 republican	 state	 capacity	 and	 its	 institutional	 environment.	Given	the	importance	that	employing	an	institutional	approach	to	economic	history	analysis	has	gained	over	the	past	several	decades,	the	literature	on	this	time	period	has	begun	to	more	explicitly	consider	the	economic	impacts	that	the	institutional	environment	had	upon	the	economic	dynamics	shaping	this	turbulent	period	of	Chinese	economic	history.		
	
	3.1.1.			Debating	Late-Qing	and	Early-Republican	Economic	Growth	
	Much	of	the	origins	of	the	debate	on	domestic	state	capacity	and	institutional	efficacy	stem	in	part	from	a	larger,	older	debate	regarding	the	nature	of	China's	economic	growth	path	during	the	century	that	followed	the	First	Opium	War.	That	Chinese	economic	growth	over	this	 time	 period	 was	 sub-optimal	 appears	 on	 the	 surface	 obvious,	 especially	 when	compared	 in	 relation	 to	 that	 of	 its	 neighbour	 Japan;	 whereas	 both	 of	 these	 East	 Asian	countries	began	the	mid-nineteenth	century	at	approximately	similar	stages	of	economic	development,	 over	 the	 course	 of	 a	 century,	 Japan	 significantly	 outpaced	 China	 both	economically	 and	militarily,	 pulling	 even	 in	many	regards	 to	 the	western	powers,	while	China	remained	mired	in	economic,	political	and	military	chaos.			Given	such	prima	facia	evidence,	it	was	long-assumed	that	Chinese	economic	growth	over	this	period	was	best	 characterised	 in	 terms	of	wasted	potential,	 one	 in	which	 economic	stagnation	 predominated,	 with	 levels	 of	 agricultural	 productivity	 growth	 unable	 to	overcome	rising	population	growth	(Ou	1946,	1947;	Liu	&	Yeh	1965,	Skinner	1965,	Perkins	1975,	 Ash	 1976),	 and	 minimal	 industrialisation	 (Paauw	 1952,	 Yeh	 1977).	 However,	revisionist	scholarship	has	argued	voraciously	that,	at	least	over	part	of	the	time	period	and	in	certain	regions,	measures	suggest	Chinese	pre-war	economic	growth	should	rather	be	characterised	as	robust,	with	substantial	economic	growth	occurring	in	the	rural	economy	(Brandt	1989,	Rawski	1989),	the	manufacturing	and	transportation	sectors	(Rawski	1989,	Ma	2008,	Shi	et	al.	2014),	the	banking	and	credit	markets	sectors	(Ji	2003,	Ma	2016,	Chen	
et	al.	2018).	Both	Brandt	and	Rawski,	for	instance,	find	agricultural	productivity	outpaced	population	growth	over	the	first	four	decades	of	the	twentieth	century.			Responses	 to	 these	 interpretations	 have	 been	 mixed,	 with	 critiques	 suggesting	 the	revisionist	 growth	 figures	 are	 overly	 optimistic	 and	 dependent	 on	 compounding	 heroic	assumptions	 and	 mischaracterisations	 of	 the	 degree	 of	 market	 efficiency	 the	 Chinese	economy	exhibited	over	 this	period	(Huang	1990,	Esherick	1991,	Li	1991,	Sicular	1991,	Bramall	1992,	Eng	1992,	Little	1992,	Wong	1992,	Ma	2004,	Du	&	Li	2011,	Du	2013).	Wong	(1992:	602)	 criticises	Brandt's	 reliance	on	 "mutually	 reinforcing	assumptions,"	 claiming	"undocumented	assumptions	[are	used]	to	support	claims	tautologically	derived	from	the	assumption";	 Little	 (1992:	 427)	 and	 Esherick	 (1991:	 502)	 provide	 nearly	 identical	criticisms	of	Brandt's	data	assumptions.	Regarding	market	efficiency,	mixed	evidence	has	been	 produced,	 usually	 using	 co-integration	 analysis	 on	 rice	 price	 data.	 Shiue	 &	 Keller	(2007)	and	Cheung	(2008)	show	regional	rice	markets	to	be	relatively	integrated	during	the	 late-Qing,	 while	 Li	 (2007:196)'s	 data	 conversely	 suggest	 interregional	 market	integration	fell	substantially	beginning	at	the	start	of	the	nineteenth	century.	
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Pre-war	Chinese	economic	growth	remains	a	complex	and	contested	topic	in	the	literature,	with	 Brandt	 (1997:	 286)	 noting	 that	 there	 is	 more	 consensus	 regarding	 the	 economic	growth	trajectory	and	institutional	fabric	of	the	state	apparatus	for	nearly	the	entirety	of	the	Qing	period	compared	to	that	on	the	four	decades	following	the	Sino-Japanese	War	of	1895.	Ma	(2008)	attempts	to	address	such	differing	views	by	returning	to	Skinner	(1985)'s	regionalism	 argument	 by	 suggesting	 that	 starkly	 different	 economic	 realities	 existed	between	the	modernising	littoral	centres	of	the	Lower-Yangzi	delta,	and	the	agricultural-based	 economy	 characterising	 the	 rest	 of	 China.	 Utilising	 provincial-based	 survey	 data	collected	 in	 the	 1930s,	Ma	 estimates	 economic	 output	 for	 the	 Lower-Yangzi	 region.	 His	results	show	a	dichotomous	development	experience	in	China	over	this	time	frame,	with	the	Lower-Yangzi	region	exhibiting	national	income	per	capita	levels	over	one	and	a	half	times	the	national	average	for	China,	and	economic	growth	rates	double.			3.1.2.			Domestic	Institutional	Environment:	Weak	State	Capacity,	Weak	Institutions	
	The	debate	regarding	China's	economic	growth	over	this	time	frame	has	spurred	a	parallel	debate	 in	 the	 literature	 in	 regard	 to	 the	 overall	 efficacy	 and	 strength	 of	 the	 domestic	institutional	environment	during	the	same	period.	In	general,	the	mainstream	view	of	the	domestic	 Chinese	 institutional	 and	 private	 property	 rights	 environment	 over	 this	 time	frame	has	been	that	it	was	relatively	poor.	The	late-Qing	has	been	consistently	characterised	in	the	literature	as	exemplifying	a	"weak	state"	(Fairbank	et	al.	1960,	Miller	2000,	Ma	2013,	Johnson	&	Koyama	2017),	as	have	its	republican	successors	throughout	its	iterations	of	the	Beiyang	(Sheridan	1975,	Strauss	1997)	and	the	Guomindang	(Paauw	1952,	Eastman	1992,	Myers	2000).	Yet	similar	to	the	debate	regarding	the	era's	economic	growth,	so	too	has	a	revisionist	 literature	put	 forth	a	sharply	differing	 image	of	domestic	state	 institutions	as	considerably	more	capable	and	effective	than	the	traditional	mainstream	approach	suggests.	Whilst	this	revisionist	challenge	has	produced	more	prolifically	in	recent	years,	debate	in	the	literature	regarding	the	extent	and	quality	of	state-building	efforts,	particularly	during	the	Guomindang	period,	go	back	to	Eastman	(1974)'s	"autonomy	model"	of	the	Guomindang	state	 as	 an	 authoritarian	 institution	 beholden	 to	 few	 powerful	 decision-makers.	 While	subsequent	research	by	Coble	(1980)	and	Fung	(2000)	add	support	to	Eastman's	arguments,	Fewsmith	 (1984,	 1985)	 challenges	 such	 conceptualisations	 of	 the	 Guomindang	 state	 by	envisioning	 a	 more	 ostensibly	 corporatist	 state	 structure.	 Geisert	 (1982,	 1984,	 1986)	regards	Guomindang	Party	 as	becoming	 increasingly	beholden	 to	 conservative	 elements	within	the	Party	structure,	and	thus	less	inclined	to	undertake	radical	policy	manoeuvres	that	could	upset	landed	elites.	Overall,	the	complexity	of	the	institutional	landscape	during	various	domestic	 governments,	 and	use	of	 different	 conceptualisations	 and	measures	of	domestic	 institutional	 strength	 and	 state	 capacity,	 have	 prevented	 the	 formation	 of	meaningful	consensus	in	the	literature	regarding	the	nature	of	the	domestic	institutional	environment	over	this	important	time	frame.			3.1.2.1.			Domestic	Institutional	Environment:	Perceptions	on	the	Early	and	Mid-Qing			While	 an	 important	 debate	 exists	 regarding	 late-imperial	 and	 republican	 period	institutional	quality,	the	literature	has	generally	painted	the	early-	and	mid-Qing	state	as	fundamentally	different	in	terms	of	institutional	and	state	capacity.	For	instance,	the	early	and	middle	period	Qing	state	is	typically	described	as	at	worst	benign,	playing	only	a	classic	
laissez-faire	role	of	a	limited	state	apparatus	that	did	not	impose	too	many	obstructions	on	commercial	activities.	The	laissez-faire	governments	of	the	Ming	and	early	Qing,	defined	by	low	 levels	 of	 taxation	 and	 concomitant	 small	 fiscal	 expenditures,	 exhibited	 little	 direct	active	role	in	the	economy	(Wang	1973:	79-83,	Deng	2003,	Zhang	2014:	182),	with	Miller	(2000:	23)	noting	that	"Taxes	on	commerce	were	insignificant	until	the	institution	of	the	
lijin	(likin)	in	the	mid-nineteenth-century."		
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	An	 older	 western	 scholarship	 views	 Confucianism's	 dominance	 over	 classical	 Chinese	culture	as	preventing	social	change	and	economic	development.	Specifically,	Weber	(1905	[1930])'s	glorification	of	western	culture	and	"European	exceptionalism"—along	with	his	implicit	 assumption	 viewing	 non-European	 social	 forms	 as	 thereby	 inherently	 flawed—identifies	 Confucianism's	 negative	 attitude	 towards	 the	 merchant	 class	 as	 a	 sufficient	impediment	to	successful	economic	development,	and	an	important	driver	of	Chinese	state	policy	 that	 was	 antithetical	 towards	 commerce.	 If	 Rowe	 (1993)'s	 documentation	 of	explicitly	market-oriented	policies	implemented	by	Qing	officials	did	not	manage	to	sweep	away	such	outdated	Weberian	tropes,	certainly	changes	in	the	current	economic	landscape	serve	to	refute	these	long-held	views:	"Successful	development	in	East	Asia,	especially	in	places	under	the	influence	of	Chinese	culture,	such	as	Hong	Kong,	Singapore,	and	Taiwan,	surprised	 many	 observers.	 During	 the	 1950s	 and	 1960s,	 development	 experts	 were	pessimistic	about	the	economic	future	of	these	areas;	sociologists,	under	Weber's	influence,	expected	development	to	occur	only	with	the	import	of	Western	'Protestant'	values	and	the	removal	of	'traditional'	cultural	obstructions	to	development;	and	sinologists	continued	to	discuss	 Confucianism	 as	 a	 factor	 in	 China's	 failure	 to	 change	 and	 modernize	 in	 recent	centuries"	(Jochim	1992:137).	Nonetheless,	the	Weberian	viewpoint	remains,	as	does	the	antiquated	but	still	influential	"oriental	despot"	concept	advanced	by	Weber	and	Wittfogel	(1957),	or	Fairbank	(1969)'s	more-recent	"foreign	impact,	Chinese	reaction"	thesis	driving	an	 image	 of	 a	 static	 Chinese	 society	 and	 economy	 that	 was	 only	 spurred	 into	 (muted,	unsuccessful)	dynamism	after	its	interaction	with	western	powers.		Chang	 (1962)'s	 study	 on	 landed	 elites,	 however,	 indicates	 economic	 interests	 trumped	some	of	Confucianism's	anti-merchant	themes,	given	 that	landlords	during	 the	Ming	and	Qing	 earned	 up	 to	 twenty	 per	 cent	 of	 income	 from	 commercial	 activities,	 signifying	 a	declining	 antagonism	 towards	 commerce	 than	 might	 have	 previously	 existed.	 Metzger	(1966)	also	stresses	the	early	Qing	government	was	not	particularly	"anti-commerce"	in	its	policies.	His	study	of	archival	Qing	records	show	officials	were	clearly	aware	that	promotion	of	commercial	activity	was	important,	as	it	generated	tax	revenue:	"[T]here	was	frequent	official	concern	about	retaining	a	margin	of	profit	for	the	merchants	(indeed	there	was	an	old	principle	that	a	10%	profit	was	moral).	This	concern	must	have	been	particularly	alive	in	the	lower	Yangtze,	where,	as	the	remarks	of	Hsu	Kuangch'i,	Pao	Shih-ch'en,	and	others	show,	it	was	widely	recognized	that	commerce	was	the	basis	of	the	tax-paying	capacities	of	prefectures	 such	 as	 Soochow	 and	 Sungkiang.	 If	 cotton	 and	 silk	 cloth	 could	 not	 be	successfully	marketed	there,	both	the	ti-ting	and	the	grain	tribute	were	endangered.	In	the	salt	monopoly	also,	although	policy	varied	from	zone	to	zone,	there	was	widespread	official	recognition	 of	 the	 dependence	 on	 merchant	 capital,	 which	 on	 the	 whole	 could	 most	definitely	 not	 be	 coercively	 enlisted.	 The	 pervasive	 worry	 was	 that	 'shangjen	 pu	 ch'ien	(merchants	 would	 not	 come	 forward).'	 If	 salt	 officials	 brought	 about	 this	 unfortunate	situation,	they	were	to	be	fined	a	year's	salary	when	the	cause	was	their	inefficiency	and	demoted	by	one	chi	(sub-grade)	and	transferred	to	another	post	when	the	cause	was	their	oppressing	 and	 squeezing	 of	 the	 salt	 merchants.	 ...Besides	 solicitude	 over	 Yangtze	commerce	 and	salt	 investments,	many	officials	 realized	 that	 customs	 revenue	depended	partly	 on	 their	 not	 harassing	 merchants	 and	 laid	 particular	 stress	 on	 the	 smooth	maintenance	of	the	grain	trade"	(Metzger	1966:	4).			This	 theme	 painting	many	 of	 the	 institutions	 of	 the	 early	 and	mid-Qing	 as	 capable	 and	effective	 appears	 frequently	 in	 the	 literature.	 For	 instance,	 in	 regard	 to	 the	 role	 of	 the	administrative	and	bureaucratic	capacity,	Wang	&	Adams	(2011)	argue	that	the	Qing	rulers,	as	foreign	rulers	of	a	nomadic	Manchu	tribal	origin	viewed	as	distinct	from	the	majority	of	ethnic	 Chinese,	 relied	 on	 differing	 sets	 of	 complex	 bureaucratic	 strategies	 to	 maintain	control	over	 the	vast	Chinese	empire.	These	strategies	depended	on	the	 installation	of	a	powerful	 administrative	 state	 apparatus,	 quite	 different	 in	 nature	 from	 the	 more	
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decentralised	power	structure	the	Manchus	had	traditionally	employed	during	their	prior	periods	of	nomadic	self-rule.	Such	strategies	included	using	multiple	layers	of	officials	with	differing	 interests	 to	 collect	and	monitor	 tax	 the	 taxation	of	 salt	monopolies	 and	 textile	commerce	and	otherwise	attempt	to	overcome	inherent	principal-agent	problems	between	the	ruling	Manchu	elite	and	the	more	entrenched	Chinese	 local	 level	bureaucracy.	Thus,	imply	Wang	&	Adams,	 at	 least	 early	 in	 its	 rule,	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 bureaucratic	 and	administrative	 capacity,	 the	Qing	 exhibited	 characteristics	 of	 a	 strong	 and	 sophisticated	state	capacity.		The	same	is	suggested	of	early-	through	mid-Qing	military	capabilities.	Miller	(2000:	22-23)	notes	that	at	the	height	of	Qing	rule,	the	state	possessed	military	power	indicative	of	classic	monopoly	on	coercive	force.	The	government	controlled	a	standing	army	of	over	200,000	elite	troops	and	an	additional	600,000	soldiers,	forces	sufficient	to	not	only	quickly	quell	any	rebellions	but	also	to	expand	Qing	territory	to	the	south	by	the	pacification	of	Tibet	as	a	vassal	state,	as	well	as	soundly	push	back	military	incursions	from	the	northern	Mongolian	empire.	Overall,	the	Qing	state	is	depicted	as	functioning	quite	effectively	and	efficiently,	with	 small	 tax	 receipts	 apparently	not	 an	 impediment.	Wang	 (1973),	 based	 on	 archival	imperial	records,	gives	a	detailed	account	of	the	system	of	land	taxation	that	provided	the	great	 majority	 of	 incoming	 revenues,	 supplemented	 by	 taxes	 on	 state-monopolised	commodities	 (primarily	 salt,	 alcohol	 and	 tobacco),	 that	proved	 sufficient	 to	 support	 the	expenditure	needs	of	the	Qing	state	apparatus	up	through	the	mid-nineteenth	century.			3.1.2.2.			Domestic	Institutional	Environment:	Declining	Quality	Starting	in	Late-Qing			Quite	conversely,	however,	areas	of	institutional	strength	of	the	Qing	state	at	earlier	periods	are	identified	in	the	traditional	mainstream	literature	as	areas	of	weakness	starting	in	the	late-Qing.	Indeed,	the	mainstream	view	identifies	a	variety	of	ways	in	which	the	domestic	state	displayed	weak	state	capacity	starting	with	late-Qing,	with	a	multitude	of	causes	given	for	this	weakness.	To	begin	with,	the	late	Qing	state	is	characterised	as	being	too	small	in	scale	and	having	access	over	too	little	fiscal	resources.	Kiser	&	Tong	(1992:310-312)	focus	on	the	weak	fiscal	base	of	the	Qing—as	a	percentage	of	aggregate	agricultural	output,	they	find	tax	receipts	fell	from	approximately	ten	per	cent	under	the	Ming,	to	only	two	per	cent	by	the	end	of	the	Qing,	with	total	output	remaining	more	or	less	stable.	Thus,	it	is	argued,	the	Qing	state	lacked	fiscal	resources	to	conduct	much	of	the	basic,	 fundamental	roles	of	effective	governing,	 including	maintaining	sufficient	military	defence	of	the	country	from	internal	and	external	threats.	Kuhn	(1970)	provides	a	description	of	the	beginning	of	the	weakening	of	the	military	capacity	of	 the	Qing	state	with	the	success	of	 the	White	Lotus	Rebellion	forced	the	empire	in	the	early	nineteenth	century	to	turn	to	support	from	local	elites	to	raise	sufficient	monies	and	militia	support	to	finally	quell	the	uprising.	The	Qing	state's	 lack	 of	 capacity	 to	 deal	 with	 military	 issues	 was	 further	 proved	 in	 relation	 to	subsequent	 interactions	with	western	powers,	as	losses	 to	 the	British	and	French	 in	the	1840s	soon	proved.	This	was	then	 followed	by	 the	 inability	of	 the	Qing	to	put	down	the	Taiping	Rebellion,	furthering	the	need	for	the	central	state	to	cede	more	power	to	the	local	elites	 in	 return	 for	 resources	 to	 fight	 the	uprisings,	 leading	 to	 a	weakened	 central	 state	(Kuhn	1986).	As	local	elites	gain	in	power,	they	were	able	to	effectively	capture	more	tax	revenues,	leading	to	a	cycle	of	continuing	underfunding	of	the	central	state	that	became	ever	more	reliant	on	the	local	powers.		Further,	areas	of	administrative	capacity	cited	as	a	strength	of	 the	early-Qing	state—for	example,	 China's	 traditional	 civil	 service	 examination	 system	 and	 attendant	 official	appointment	methodology,	 that,	 while	 imperfect,	 was	 designed	 to	 limit	 corruption	 and	promote	qualified	candidates	to	officialdom—is	frequently	identified	under	the	late-Qing	as	symbolic	of	an	ineffective	state.	With	increasing	needs	for	revenue,	it	is	claimed,	the	Qing	
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government	turned	away	from	a	meritocratic	based	appointment	system	and	towards	the	sale	of	official	titles.	Moreover,	the	civil	service	bureaucracy	during	this	period	is	viewed	as	hopelessly	anachronistic,	unable	to	respond	to	changes	occurring	within	society	as	well	as	the	pressures	imposed	from	external	contact	and	threats	from	western	powers,	as	the	focus	of	 the	 exams	on	Confucian	 thought	and	ancient	 literature	 seemed	ever-more	 abstracted	from	the	realities	of	modern	global	political	expediencies	(Elman	2000,	2013).			3.1.2.3.			Domestic	Institutional	Environment:	Chaos	under	the	Beiyang			The	traditional	literature	presents	a	similarly	bleak	view	on	the	institutional	capabilities	of	the	early	republican	Beiyang	government.	Issues	with	fiscal	capacity	are	seen	to	continue	from	the	end	of	the	Qing	into	the	start	of	the	republic.	Strauss	(1997)	notes	that	problems	plaguing	the	late-Qing	state	in	capturing	tax	revenues	collected	locally	worsen	during	the	Beiyang	 period,	with	 provinces	 only	 beginning	 to	 remit	 local	 tax	 receipts	 to	 the	 central	government	in	1914,	three	years	after	the	fall	of	the	Qing	government.	However,	the	death	of	 President	 Yuan	 Shikai	 saw	an	 end	 to	 tax	 receipts	 submitted	 to	 the	 capital,	 becoming	completely	dependent	on	the	small	excess	of	salt	and	customs	revenues	owed	to	foreign	creditors,	as	well	as	additional	substantial	debt	financing,	to	continue	its	existence.	Strauss	cites	the	inability	of	the	Beiyang	regime	to	induce	provincial	officials	to	remit	taxes	to	the	central	government	as	indicative	of	low	state	capacity	and	weak	institutions.	Similarly,	van	de	Ven	(1997)	argues	that	the	development	of	the	so-called	warlord	era	is	directly	due	to	the	fact	that	the	Beiyang	central	government	had	fewer	financial	resources	than	many	of	the	provincial	governments	whose	leadership	was	controlled	by	local	military	leaders.		The	 overall	 state	 structure,	 of	 an	 authoritarian,	 non-representative	 military-controlled	government,	 is	 also	 viewed	 as	 contributing	 to	 the	 weak	 institutional	 environment,	especially	 in	 regard	 to	protection	of	 private	property	 rights	 on	private	 actors.	After	 the	overthrow	 of	 the	 Qing,	 for	 a	 brief	 moment	 the	 country	 was	 ruled	 by	 an	 elected	representative	government	structure	under	the	moniker	the	Republic	of	China;	while	the	moniker	remained,	and	hence	the	term	"republican	China"	utilised	to	distinguish	the	change	from	authoritarian	imperial	rule,	the	subsequent	seizure	of	the	presidency	by	Yuan	Shikai	in	late	1911,	and	successive	dissolution	of	the	National	Assembly	and	provincial	assemblies	created	 once	 again	 an	 authoritarian	 state	 structure.	 After	 Yuan's	 death,	 the	 National	Assembly	was	reconstituted	in	the	1920s,	but	its	membership	was	primarily	determined	by	the	relative	power	of	differing	factions	of	local	military	leaders,	or	warlords,	with	multiple	constitutions	continuously	drafted	designed	to	legitimise	their	rule	(Ch'ien	1950:	69-75).			Perhaps	the	most	significant	and	defining	feature	of	the	Beiyang	period	identified	in	much	of	the	literature	as	an	emblematic	and	contributing	factor	of	the	period's	low	state	capacity	and	 overall	 poor	 institutional	 environment	 was	 the	 high	 degree	 of	 social	 disorder,	symbolised	 by	 the	 state's	 lack	 of	 ability	 to	maintain	 a	monopoly	 on	 violence.	Works	 by	Sheridan	(1966,	1975),	Ch'en	(1968),	and	Ch'i	(1976)	in	particular	provide	extensive	detail	on	the	warlord	era.	In	the	context	of	early	republican	China,	warlords	were	competing	local	military	leaders	who	used	their	armies	to	secure	control	over	geographic	areas	that	could	be	 as	 large	 as	 provinces.	 Most	 of	 the	 period	was	 characterised	 by	 military	 skirmishes	between	these	leaders	as	they	each	sought	to	expand	their	power	bases.	The	scale	of	the	fighting	was	 considerable;	 as	Ch'en	 (1968:	563)	 relays,	 "In	 a	period	of	merely	16	years	(1912–28),	over	1300	warlords	had	fought	more	than	140	provincial	and	interprovincial	wars."	Most	of	the	literature	sees	the	activities	of	these	warlords	and	associated	civil	strife	as	contributing	to	poor	economic	growth,	with	Li	(1991:97)	noting	that	an	optimistic	view	of	republican-era	economic	growth	"is	difficult	to	reconcile	with	the	record	of	warlordism,	banditry,	famine,	and	migration"	that	dominated	the	era.		
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Further,	the	chaos	created	by	political	and	social	strife	is	generally	viewed	as	undermining	attempts	to	construct	a	more	effective	bureaucratic	structure.	While	 the	state	apparatus	grew	substantially	in	size	and	new	bureaucratic	departments	designed	to	facilitate	the	state	building	process	were	created,	most	lacked	sufficient	efficacy	 to	 implement	policy	goals.	Strauss	(1997:333)	argues	that	under	late-Qing	and	Republican	governments,	"central	state	capacity	was	extremely	limited	with	respect	to	the	key	issues	of	taxation	and	personnel,	and	the	 project	 of	 building	 civilian	 institutions	 was	 consistently	 undercut	 by	 the	 twin	phenomenon	of	internal	division	and	external	military	pressure."	Strauss	also	specifically	cites	an	inability	of	the	early	republican	state	to	replace	the	older	civil	service	system	based	on	traditional	Confucian-thought	with	a	modern	and	effective	civil	service:	"	Although	all	Republican	 regimes	 repeatedly	 professed	 their	 desire	 to	 recruit	 talent	 through	 the	institution	of	modern	civil	service	examinations	to	create	a	technically	competent	and	pro-active	government,	the	short-term	pressures	to	provide	patronage	and	buy	off	recalcitrant	subordinates	and	would-be	allies	repeatedly	stymied	the	re-institutionalization	of	norms	of	objectivity	and	impartiality,	however	attractive	they	remained	in	principle"	(334).			3.1.2.4.	Domestic	Institutional	Environment:	Guomindang—Increasing	Authoritarianism			The	ascension	of	the	Guomindang	did	not	substantially	alter	many	of	the	institutional	and	state	capacity	characteristics	from	the	Beiyang	era.	To	begin	with,	the	structure	of	the	state	remained	that	of	an	authoritarian	military	dictatorship.	Eastman	(1974),	Coble	(1980),	and	Fung	(2000),	 for	 instance,	advance	 the	concept	of	a	relatively	autonomous	authoritarian	domestic	state	that	could	unilaterally	take	actions	to	progress	the	interests	of	powerful	state	actors,	 frequently	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 private	 actors,	 even	 those	 possessing	 considerable	economic	 import.	 In	 this	regard,	Coble	systematically	outlines	a	plethora	of	examples	 to	support	his	argument	that	urban	commercial	elites	proved	unable	to	prevent	the	domestic	state	 from	 consistently	 violating	 their	 interests	 and	 private	 property	 rights,	 let	 alone	effectively	 shape	 government	 policy-making	 processes.	 As	 Fung	 states,	 "A	 dictatorship	tolerates	no	opposition,	guarantees	no	rights,	curbs	civil	liberties,	silences	its	critics,	and	relies	 on	 coercion	 to	 impose	 its	 will	 on	 the	 populace.	 The	 GMD	 dictatorship	 was	 no	exception"	 (43).	 Wakeman	 (1997),	 following	 upon	 earlier,	 similar	 depictions	 of	 the	Guomindang	state	as	exemplifying	fascist	tendencies	(Tien	1972;	Eastman	1974,	1984b),	characterises	the	Guomindang	as	embodying	a	kind	of	"Confucian	Fascism."	His	research	describes	 the	 operations	 of	 several	 fascist-style	 organisations,	 including	 the	 Lixingshe	Society,	the	Fuxingshe	Society	and	the	Lanyishe	Society,	all	designed	to	enforce	the	power	of	the	Guomindang	Party	and	intimidate	those	outside	the	party	structure	who	sought	to	oppose	 its	single-party	rule.	Contemporaneous	critiques	depict	the	military's	dominance	over	the	political	system,	with	an	editorial	in	the	Jen	Min	Jih	Pao	(1931:	21)	opining,	"in	all	civilised	countries	the	military	in	active	service	are	subordinate	to	the	civilian	authorities.	No	 military	 officer	 may	 interfere	 with	 politics	 lest	 the	 Army	 should	 become	 a	 menace	instead	of	a	support	to	the	State.	China	again	seems	to	be	the	only	exception	to	the	rule.	It	is	now	the	most	militaristic	country	in	the	world.	It	is	the	only	country	where	the	democratic	forces	 are	without	 any	 protection,	 are	 subject	 to	 arbitrary	 persecution.	 One	 of	 the	 first	essentials	 is	 therefore	 the	 separation	 of	 military	 power	 from	 political	 authority.	 Our	generals	must	choose	whether	to	remain	plain	military	commanders	or	plain	Mr.	So-and-so.	Any	general	on	accepting	political	office	must	relinquish	his	military	affiliations."		Beyond	issues	of	state	structure,	much	of	the	mainstream	assessment	consistently	presents	the	bureaucratic	capacity	of	the	Guomindang	republican	state	as	relatively	weak.	Similar	to	the	previous	two	regimes	of	the	late-Qing	and	the	Beiyang,	the	Guomindang	government's	continual	 fiscal	 shortfalls	 were	 viewed	 as	 debilitating.	 Paauw	 (1952)	 chronicles	 the	Guomindang's	continual	budgetary	issues,	as	continual	fiscal	shortfalls	were	forced	to	be	covered	by	huge	flotations	of	high	interest	rate	government	debt	issuances.	The	majority	of	
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government	 spending	was	devoted	 to	military	 expenditures	 (Paauw	 1952,	 Young	1971,	Feuerwerker	1983).	As	under	the	Beiyang	period,	the	Guomindang	central	government	had	but	de	 facto	 control	 over	but	 a	 fraction	of	 the	 entire	 country,	 exercising	weak	authority	outside	 of	 a	 small	 area	 close	 to	 the	 capital,	 exhibiting	 sustained	 difficulty	 to	 exercise	 a	monopoly	on	force—characteristics	exemplifying	those	of	the	classic	weak-capacity	state.	Nonstate	actors	such	as	local	warlords,	Communist	rebels,	and	Japanese	military	forces	all	controlled	parts	of	the	country,	with	the	government	unable	to	prevent	military	battles	and	destruction	from	taking	place	by	these	nonstate	forces.	The	impact	of	this	continuing	civil	strife	 is	 also	 viewed	 as	 affecting	 effective	 implementation	 of	 desired	 policies	 by	 the	Guomindang	 state,	 such	 as	policies	 that	would	have	helped	entrepreneurs;	 according	 to	Wright	(1991:	670),	"Within	China,	residual	warlordism	and	Japanese	aggression	prevented	the	government	extending	 its	sovereignty	across	 the	whole	country,	while	 its	weak	hold	over	the	rural	sector	forced	it	into	dependence	on	revenues	from	modern	industry	and	trade.	The	government	wanted	to	help	the	capitalists,	but	in	the	end	did	not	have	the	power	to	do	so."	Social	strife	also	included	large	increases	in	organised	criminal	activity,	especially	given	that	 the	 weakness	 of	 the	 Guomindang	 state	 led	 the	 party	 to	 frequently	 enlisted	 these	criminal	organisations	to	assist	the	party	in	defeating	its	political	or	military	enemies,	such	as	communists	or	the	Japanese.	Within	the	city	of	Shanghai,	for	instance,	the	level	of	social	strife	was	high,	evidenced	by	numerous	incidences	of	murders,	extortions	and	corruption	(Martin	1989,	1991,1995;	Arbor	1995;	Hershatter	1999;	Wakeman	1995a).		Paauw	(1952:	8)	is	particularly	critical	of	the	Ministry	of	Finance	under	the	Guomindang	for	its	inability	to	act	independently	from	Party	dictates:	"funds	appropriated	for	one	purpose	were,	at	the	volition	of	the	Ministry	of	Finance,	used	for	other	purposes.	This	type	of	tight	Party	control	of	expenditures	was	symptomatic	of	the	general	domination	of	political	and	economic	life	by	the	small	clique	of	Kuomintang	elite."	Eastman	(1984a:	225),	in	his	study	of	 the	 government	 during	 the	 Second	 Sino-Japanese	 War,	 is	 equally	 critical	 of	 the	Guomindang	 administrative	 state,	 emphasising	 the	 prevalence	 of	 fractionalisation,	"corruption	 and	 ineffectiveness…	 and	 pervasive	 incompetence"	 that	 characterised	 state	institutions.	Eastman	(1991:	130-131)	later	finds	that	even	modest	successes	such	as	the	migration	of	physical	capital	out	of	the	Yangzi	into	the	interior	after	the	start	the	Japanese	offensive	 on	 Shanghai	 in	 August	 1937	 was	 defined	 by	 incompetence	 and	 corruption;	ultimately,	 "instead	 of	 standing	 as	 a	 monument	 to	 Chinese	 patriotism,	 the	 industrial	migration	betrayed	a	distressing	degree	of	self-serving,"	as	it	was	conducted	to	benefit	a	few	well-connected	 industrialists	at	 the	expense	of	 the	majority	of	private	 industrialists,	who	chose	 instead	the	shelter	provided	by	the	 International	Settlement	when	they	were	able.	Myers	(2000:	60)	recognises	the	increasing	state	planning	structures	instituted	by	the	Guomindang,	but	finds	them	lacking	competency,	calling,	for	instance,	the	major	economic	planning	apparatus	created	in	1935,	the	National	Resources	Commission,	"a	bureaucratic	monstrosity	 of	 planners	 and	 technicians	who	wasted	 vast	 resources	 building	 inefficient	state-owned	 and	 state–managed	 factories."	 For	 Sheehan	 (2010:	 197),	 China's	 weak	bureaucratic	capacity	was	reflected	in	its	inability	to	utilise	tariffs	as	an	effective	nonviolent	strategy	against	Japanese	aggression,	with	"poor	implementation	and	enforcement"	leading	to	social	dissatisfaction	at	the	weakness	of	government	response.		Overall,	the	general	depiction	in	the	literature	suggest	an	institutional	weakness	reflected	by	the	degree	of	an	overall	lack	of	respect	for	protection	on	private	property	rights	by	the	government,	combined	with	interference	in	the	economy.	Hou.(1965),	in	compiling	detailed	statistics	regarding	the	level,	composition	and	determinants	of	foreign	direct	investment	in	late-19th	century	China,	argues	that	the	observed	inconsistent	levels	of	foreign	investment	into	 China	 was	 partly	 attributable	 to	 a	 poor	 government	 policy	 environment	 that	 was	inimical	to	private	business,	as	well	as	overall	institutional	weaknesses,	especially	in	regard	to	 government	 interference	 in	 the	 economic	 and	 outright	 corruption,	 that	 led	much	 of	foreign	borrowing	to	be	funnelled	into	non-productive	assets	(30,	227-228).	
	 47 
Feurerwerker	(1958)	describes	the	ways	in	which	government	officials	under	the	late-Qing	and	early	republican	era	utilised	the	guandu	shangban	system	to	attempt	to	control	private	enterprise	activities	in	ways	that	benefited	state	actors	at	the	expense	of	merchants	and	private	 investors.	 Mann	 (1984:	 615;	 630)	 is	 particularly	 critical	 of	 the	 state's	 role	 in	suppressing	 entrepreneurial	 activity	 during	 both	 the	 Beiyang	 and	 Guomindang	periods,	arguing	 that	 "Republican	 state	 policy	 imposed	 new	 critical	 constraints	 on	 the	entrepreneurial	 activities...	 Beginning	 as	 early	 as	 1914	 with	 the	 Yuan	 Shikai	 regime	 in	Beijing,	and	continuing	through	the	Nanjing	government	of	Jiang	Jieshi,	the	state	raised	the	cost	of	brokerage	 licenses,	 stiffened	procedures	 for	checking	and	renewing	licenses,	and	allowed	local	governments	to	increase	revenues	from	brokerage	taxes	by	farming	out	the	tax	quotas	at	auction.	These	programs	to	tax	and	regulate	imposed	significant	new	limits	on	the	brokers'	abilities	to	engage	in	entrepreneurial	activities.	County-level	magistrates	eager	for	revenue	invoked	state	policies	to	fill	their	treasuries	and	also	to	line	their	pockets."			Bian	(2005b:	101-102)	makes	note	of	the	extreme	regulation	to	which	private	and	state-owned	firms	were	subject,	citing	for	example	detailed	directives	to	ordnance	enterprises	regarding	 intricate	 accounting	 methodologies	 produced	 by	 the	 Bureau	 of	 Ordnance,	 a	division	under	 the	Ministry	of	Military	Administration.	Outright	nationalisation	of	many	private	businesses	also	occurred,	including	major	domestic	banks	and	some	of	the	largest	manufacturing	concerns.	Private	ventures	that	did	not	become	nationalised	were	coerced	into	holding	government	debt	or	providing	compulsory	donations,	such	as	in	the	case	of	Rong	Zongjing,	who	in	1927	was	forced	in	his	role	as	head	of	the	Chinese	Cotton	Mill	Owners	Association	to	buy	500,000	yuan	of	unwanted	government	bonds.	The	contemporaneous	observation	by	Issacs	(1938:	209)	is	indicative	of	the	impact	that	the	intrusive	state	played	in	affecting	business	activity:	"The	plight	of	the	Chinese	merchant	in	and	about	Shanghai	is	pitiable.	At	the	mercy	of	General	Chiang	Kai-Shek's	dictatorship,	the	merchants	do	not	know	what	the	next	day	will	bring—confiscations,	compulsory	loans,	exile,	or	possible	execution."	Both	Eastman	(1974:	239-243)	and	Coble	(1980:	32-35;	268-269)	echo	this	sentiment	of	the	 Guomindang	 state	 as	 an	 active	 and	destructively	 expropriative	 force	 on	 the	 private	property	rights	of	the	business	community.				3.1.3.			Domestic	Institutional	Environment:	Revisionist	Views		While	much	of	the	literature	paints	a	domestic	institutional	environment	defined	by	weak	state	 capacity,	 generating	 a	 poor	 institutional	 environment,	 with	 weak	 protections	 on	private	property	rights,	an	important	set	of	contributions	by	revisionist	scholars	offers	a	more	 nuanced—and	 sometimes	 starkly	 differing—view	 of	 the	 domestic	 institutional	landscape.	 While	 much	 of	 this	 revisionist	 scholarship	 focuses	 on	 issues	 pertaining	 to	bureaucratic	 state	 capacity,	 some	 considers	 more	 fundamental	 issues	 regarding	 state	structure	and	its	impact	on	the	nature	of	state-private	relations,	with	much	of	the	attention	skewed	towards	the	Guomindang	period.	Chang	(1979,	1985)	pushes	back	against	the	some	of	 the	 mainstream	 depictions	 of	 the	 Guomindang	 regime	 as	 being	 ostensibly	 fascist	 in	nature,	 as	 argues	 Eastman	 (1974)	 later	 Wakeman	 (1997).	 Viewing	 such	 depictions	 as	problematically	 Marxist	 in	 origin	 and	 employed	 too	 readily	 as	 an	 "attempt	 to	 impart	meaning	 to	 the	 obscure	 sequence	 of	 events	 by	 exploiting	 project	 terms:	 consigning	 the	sequence	to	some	familiar	category."	In	this	regard,	referring	to	the	Guomindang	state	as	"fascist"	obscures	more	than	it	illuminates:	"Thus	a	fragmentary	collection	of	behaviors	and	events	seems	to	take	on	substance...	Such	categories	are	familiar,	and	serve	as	mnemonic	and	didactic	aids.	They	are	conceptual	boxes	into	which	otherwise	disjointed	sequences	can	be	 stored	 for	 recall	 and	 interpretive	 conveniences.	 These	 mnemonic	 and	 didactic	conveniences	 often	 fail,	 however,	 to	 provide	 credible	 explanatory	 yield	 and	 theoretic	purchase	on	events.	They	merely	give	the	illusion	of	understanding"	(Chang	1985:	6).		
	 48 
	Fewsmith	 (1984,	 1985)	 represents	 an	 early	 challenge	 to	 the	 mainstream	 view	 of	 an	authoritarian	Guomindang	state	that	monolithically	dominated	civil	society	unchallenged,	typically	 advanced	by	 scholars	such	 as	Eastman	 (1974,	 1984b),	 Coble	 (1980),	 and	Fung	(2000).	 Alternatively,	 Fewsmith	 argues	 a	more	 accurate	 interpretation	 of	 the	 domestic	state's	relationship	with	private	economic	actors	occurred	along	corporatist	lines,	as	certain	privileged	 commercial	 elites	 were	 granted	 limited	 access	 to	 policy	 decision-making	 in	return	 for	 their	 support	 of	 the	 political	 regime.	 Although	 presenting	 a	 compelling	theoretical	 argument,	 Fewsmith's	 evidence	 of	 the	 1930	 reorganisation	 of	 the	 Shanghai	Chamber	of	Commerce	has	been	criticised	for	both	its	longitudinal	and	temporal	paucity	(Eastman	 1984b).	 Another	 critique	 of	 the	 mainstream	 Eastman	 and	 Coble	 depiction	 is	provided	 by	 Geisert	 (1982,	 1984,	 1986),	who	 characterises	 the	 authoritarian	 regime	as	possessing	considerably	less	autonomy	in	terms	of	control	over	societal	groups,	suggesting	instead	a	more	"pluralistic"	model	of	state-civil	 relations,	where	numerous	private	actor	interest	groups	were	able	to	exert	influence	on	state	decision-making	authority	and	policy	construction	in	ways	to	advance	their	private	interests.	Thus,	argues	Geisert,	albeit	lacking	consistent	 access	 and	 influence	 over	 state	 policy-making,	 economically	 powerful	 or	coordinated	nonstate	actors	could	occasionally	influence	state	actor	behaviour	and	enforce	limited	 accountability	 upon	 state	 actors.	 Kubo	 (1981)	 Similarly,	 in	 his	 study	 of	 cotton	producers	and	textile	manufacturers,	Bush	(1982)	cites	 instances	of	powerful	producers	utilising	personal	relationships	to	affect	official	policy	decisions	in	their	favour,	which	he	also	claims	supports	a	more	pluralistic	conception	of	the	Guomindang	state.	In	response,	Eastman	 (1974)	 stresses	 in	 arguing	 that	 the	 power	 dynamics	 of	 the	 Guomindang	authoritarian	state	can	be	thought	of	as	one	characterised	by	autonomy	does	not	require	a	total	lack	of	influences	exerted	on	state	decision-makers	by	nonstate	actors;	importantly,	however,	 as	 generally	 Geisert	 (1984)	 concedes,	 such	 influences	were	 of	 a	 personalised,	individualistic	and	irregular	nature,	implying	"those	influences	were	insufficient	to	impose	accountability	upon	the	regime	or	to	prevent	those	within	the	regime	from	ruling	with	the	primary	intent	of	enhancing	their	power,	prestige,	and	wealth."		Other	 significant	 areas	 of	 revisionist	 scholarship	 focus	 on	 domestic	 state	 bureaucratic	capacity,	claiming	the	mainstream	literature's	depictions	of	an	ineffectual	and	corrupt	state	bureaucracy	seriously	mischaracterise	its	nature.	To	begin	with,	the	size	of	the	domestic	state	apparatus	grew	considerably	over	 the	course	of	 the	 time	period,	a	signal	 for	many	indicative	of	increasing	state	capacity	(Bian	2005a).	However,	whether	such	increases	in	the	 size	 of	 government	 implied	 increasing	 capacity,	 potential	 for	 greater	 bureaucratic	inefficiency,	or	an	ability	for	state	actors	to	expropriate	private	economic	gains,	remains	an	open	question	in	the	literature.	For	many,	however,	the	increase	in	the	state	bureaucracy	was	accompanied	by	an	increase	in	the	effectiveness	of	domestic	government	bureaucratic	capacity,	at	least	for	part	of	the	time	frame.	Li	(2007)	concentrates	on	the	Qing	government's	ability	to	respond	to	food	crises,	with	a	sophisticated	famine	relief	avoidance	planning	and	food	distribution	system,	that	existed	well	through	the	end	its	imperial	rule.			Breard	 (2006)	 focusses	 on	 the	 impacts	 of	 the	 Self-Strengthening	Movement,	 which	 the	literature	has	 traditionally	viewed	as	a	 failure	given	 the	 fact	that	 the	Qing	state	 failed	 to	industrialise	or	militarise	as	effectively	as	its	neighbour	 Japan.	For	Breard,	however,	 the	movement	 succeeded	 in	 increasing	 the	 degree	 of	 human	 capital	within	 the	 government	bureaucratic	apparatus	via	its	programmes	sending	researchers	to	study	abroad,	delivering	long-term	effects.	In	contrast	to	Strauss	(1997),	Breard	also	sees	significant	improvements	in	 organised	 bureaucratic	 capability	 during	 the	 Qing.	 For	 instance,	 she	 emphasises	 the	depth	of	institutional	reform	that	took	place	in	the	government	in	regard	to	improving	the	collection,	 record-keeping,	 and	 utilisation	 of	 statistical	 data.	 New	 bureaucratic	organisations	within	the	government	were	created	that,	she	argues,	improved	the	ability	of	the	state	to	analyse	data	and	then	formulate	policy	based	on	these	data,	as	well	as	monitor	
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the	 success	of	 implemented	policies	 and	adjust	accordingly:	 "The	Statistical	Bureau	was	created	in	August	1907,	followed	two	months	later	by	the	establishment	of	Statistical	Offices	at	 all	 the	Ministries	 in	 the	 capital,	 and	 Information	 Bureaus	 at	 the	 provincial	 level.	 The	
Commission	to	Draw	up	Regulations,	in	a	memorial	to	the	throne,	described	the	mission	of	the	Statistical	Bureau,	responsible	for	centralizing	statistical	information	communicated	by	the	statistical	offices	of	the	Ministries	and	the	provincial	bureaus:	As	to	statistics,	they	are	a	method	with	which	to	examine	our	fiscal	administration	and	fathom	our	national	strength	so	that	comparisons	can	be	made	and	appropriate	policies	developed.	Therefore,	the	state	of	 the	Empire	has	 to	be	analysed	 internally,	and	 the	 competition	of	 the	world	has	 to	be	observed	 externally.	 The	 Boards	 and	 Ministries	 at	 the	 Capital	 and	 the	 provinces	 shall	establish	 detailed	 tables	 on	 their	 domain	 of	 activity	 and	 submit	 these	 regularly	 for	consultation.	Our	office	will	synthesize	all	the	tables	for	the	purpose	of	estimation	of	the	actual	state	of	the	Empire"	(Breard	2006:	7).		A	domestic	state	considerably	more	bureaucratically	capable	than	typically	portrayed	in	the	mainstream	 literature	 is	 also	 suggested	 by	 numerous	 other	 scholars.	 Recent	 research	produced	 by	 Chang	 (2013),	 van	 de	 Ven	 (2014),	 and	 Boecking	 (2017)	 on	 the	 Imperial	Maritime	Customs	Service	(which	after	the	fall	of	the	Qing	was	subsequently	renamed	the	Chinese	Maritime	Customs	Service),	are	representative	of	some	of	 the	more	enthusiastic	efforts	in	the	revisionist	literature.	Certainly,	by	seeming	all	measures	and	descriptions,	the	Maritime	Customs	Service	consistently	displayed	a	relatively	high	level	of	competence	in	regard	to	its	primary	roles	in	assessing,	collecting	and	allocating	customs	revenue,	and	was	able	to	do	so	within	the	constructs	of	highly	chaotic	political	environments,	while	mostly	successfully	 deflecting	 pressures	 applied	 by	 competing	 government	 factions	 seeking	control	over	customs	receipts.	Su	&	Barber	(1936:	115)	reflect	this	view	when	stating,	"The	customs	 service	 has	 been	 one	 of	 the	 few	 stable	 factors	 in	 a	 land	 retarded	 by	 foreign	interference,	 administrative	 changes,	 and	 chaotic	 military	 rule.	 Reaching	 into	 all	 21	provinces,	 the	customs	have	provided	a	dependable	source	of	revenue	 for	many	 foreign	loans	and	indemnity	obligations	secured	on	these	returns	and	left	a	substantial	surplus	for	the	ordinary	necessities	of	government."	Chang	focuses	on	the	Customs	Service	from	the	framework	 of	 the	 late	 Qing	 state,	 arguing	 that	 Qing	 Court	 officials	 purposely	 delegated	authority	from	the	centre	to	indirectly-controlled	governor-generals,	viewing	the	Maritime	Customs	as	a	form	of	a	governor-general	decentralised	power	structure	(12).	For	Chang,	the	autonomy	of	the	Maritime	Customs,	rather	than	a	sign	of	weakness	of	the	central	state,	was	reflective	of	a	conscious	attempt	by	the	those	within	the	Court	to	create	decentralised	and	flexible	 structures	 such	 as	 governor-generals	 and	 the	 Maritime	 Customs	 that	 could	undertake	modernisation	strategies	outside	of,	and	thereby	preserving,	the	traditional	state	bureaucracy.	The	success	of	the	Maritime	Customs	under	the	late-Qing,	therefore,	should	be	viewed	as	a	success	of	Qing	administrative	capacity.			For	van	de	Ven,	the	Customs	Service	exemplifies	an	effective,	capable	and	efficient	domestic	state	bureaucratic	organisation,	and	one	that	played	a	particularly	positive	role	in	regard	to	the	 fiscal	 health	 of	 the	 state,	 providing	 a	 steady	 stream	 of	 revenue	 to	 various	 central	domestic	governments	from	the	late	1860s	through	the	end	of	1941.	van	de	Ven	finds	the	Customs	Service	to	have	exhibited	its	most	sweeping	role	in	this	regard	during	the	Beiyang	period,	when	it	assumed	responsibility	over	not	only	revenue	collection	but	also	general	oversight	 of	 all	 central	 government	 bond	 issuances.	 While	 such	 direct	 control	 was	circumscribed	with	the	ascendency	of	the	Guomindang	after	1927,	the	import	of	the	Service	remained,	given	it	provided	over	half	of	government	revenues.	Boecking's	focus	is	on	the	narrower	 time	 frame	 of	 the	 Customs	 Service	 administration	 under	 the	 Guomindang	government,	during	which	the	domestic	government	reclaimed	much	of	the	control	over	the	Service,	reducing	in	part	its	former	bureaucratic	autonomy	it	exercised	during	the	late-Qing	 and	 Beiyang	 periods.	 Overall,	 however,	 Boecking	 arrives	 at	 similar	 conclusions	 to	those	of	van	de	Ven,	viewing	the	Service's	provision	of	vital	revenue	via	tariff	collection	as	
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indicative	of	strong	domestic	bureaucratic	state	capacity.	To	begin	with,	he	characterises	the	 Guomindang's	 successful	 negotiations	 with	 foreign	 treaty	 powers	 in	 restoring	 the	power	 to	 set	 tariff	 rates	 as	 "the	 Nationalist	 government's	 first	 major	 foreign-policy	achievement"	(62).	It	is	in	this	regard	that	Boecking	approach	is	clearly	revisionist,	arguing	in	his	introduction	that	his	work	"analyzes	the	relationship	between	the	Maritime	Customs	and	the	Guomindang	only	to	the	extent	that	it	is	relevant	to	a	revisionist	argument	about	the	 success	 of	 Nationalist	 tariff	 policy	 in	 terms	 of	 revenue	 extraction	 and	 midterm	sustainability"	(19).	In	particular,	Boecking	actively	seeks	to	challenge	the	mainstream	view	that	 blames	 the	 Guomindang's	 loss	 to	 Communist	 rebels	 in	 the	 Chinese	 Civil	 War	 on	bureaucratic	corruption	and	incompetence,	arguing	instead	that	it	was	only	due	to	the	fall	of	the	Nanjing	government	to	the	Japanese	military	in	1937,	with	the	resultant	loss	of	access	to	Maritime	Customs	tariff	revenues,	that	forced	the	later	Guomindang	government	to	turn	to	 the	kind	of	 "rapacious"	 tax	 extraction	policies	 so	heavily	 criticised	by	Paauw	 (1952),	Eastman	(1974),	Coble	(1980),	and	others.			The	arguments	by	Chang,	van	de	Ven,	Boecking,	and	others,	including	Strauss	(1998)	cited	below,	 claiming	 the	 Maritime	 Customs	 Service	 provides	 convincing	 evidence	 of	 strong	domestic	 state	 capacity	 is	 somewhat	 circumscribed,	 however,	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 albeit	technically	 a	 domestic	 government	 organisation	 under	 the	 purview	 of	 the	 Chinese	authorities,	 the	Customs	Service	was	 thoroughly	unique	 in	 that	 it	 operated	with	 a	 large	degree	of	autonomy	from	direct	control	by	domestic	state	officials,	with	the	Customs	Service	senior	management	headed	primarily	by	western	diplomats	and	personnel	throughout	its	existence	(up	until	its	seizure	by	the	Japanese	military	in	1941).	While	Chang	provides	an	important	refocus	of	research	on	the	Customs	Service	onto	the	role	of	the	organisation's	Chinese	 staff,	 and	 the	 essential	 and	 significant	ways	 in	which	 they	 helped	 to	 shape	 the	direction	 of	 the	 Service,	 especially	 in	 its	 later	 years,	 that	 the	 leadership	 of	 the	 Customs	Service	 remained	 in	 foreign	 control	 through	 the	 end	 of	 its	 effective	 organisational	independence	in	1941	attests	to	its	unique	bureaucratic	position	as	at	most	only	a	quasi-domestic	Chinese	state	organisation.		Beyond	these	specific	studies	on	 the	Maritime	Customs	Service,	other	research	similarly	paints	 a	 considerably	 more	 positive	 picture	 on	 the	 fiscal	 condition	 of	 the	 domestic	Guomindang	state.	Young	(1971)	and	Boecking	(2011b,	2017)	describe	the	efforts	of	the	domestic	state	in	greatly	expanding	its	fiscal	capacity,	especially	under	the	Guomindang,	as	well	as	 in	 terms	of	 the	 creation	of	new	departments	dedicated	 to	 raising	 capital	 for	 the	central	government	by	way	of	issuing	of	domestic	government	bonds.	While	not	ostensibly	revisionist	in	nature,	similar	descriptions	of	previous	government	efforts	under	the	Qing	and	 Beiyang	 period	 by	 Qian	 (1955)	 and	 Pan	 (2007,	 2008)	 emphasise	 the	 considerable	bureaucratic	machinery	created	that	supported	this	new	source	of	revenue	that	proved	vital	to	 the	 fiscal	 health	 of	 domestic	 central	 governments.	 Much	 of	 the	 growth	 of	 domestic	government	bond	issuance	machinery	was	accompanied	by	growth	in	the	financial	system	that	supported	the	bonds	and	associated	bond	markets,	and	part	of	the	revisionist	literature	focuses	on	the	growth	of	this	sector	as	indicative	of	the	domestic	state's	institutional	health.	Ma	(2012:15)	for	instance	claims	that	"The	success	of	the	[Guomindang	Ministry	of	Finance-directed]	1935	monetary	reform...	was	a	powerful	testimonial	to	the	remarkable	progress	achieved	in	the	Chinese	monetary	and	banking	system	in	during	the	1920s	and	1930s."		Strauss	(1998),	while	in	previous	work	critical	of	the	bureaucratic	capacity	of	the	late-Qing	and	 Beiyang	 governments,	 also	 provides	 a	 strongly	 revisionist	 presentation	 of	Guomindang-period	 state	 capacity.	While	 conceding	 that	 important	 aspects	 of	 domestic	state	 capacity	 under	 the	 Guomindang	 were	 poor,	 Strauss	 identifies	 in	 particular	 three	national-level	 Guomindang	 administrative	 units—the	 Sino-Foreign	 Salt	 Inspectorate	(which	similar	to	the	Maritime	Customs	Service,	operated	under	foreign	management),	the	Ministry	 of	 Finance,	 and	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs—as	 exhibiting	 relatively	 high	
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degrees	of	state	capacity,	as	evidenced	by	their	effectiveness	in	implementing	policy	goals,	doing	so	by	 engaging	 in	 administrative	 strategies	such	 as	 a	 focus	on	 impersonal	norms,	objective	 goal	 orientation,	 and	 organisational	 insulation.	 In	 support	 of	 Strauss'	 claims	regarding	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs,	work	by	Thai	(2015:26-28)	finds	that	by	the	1930s	the	 Ministry	 was	 able	 to	 effectively	 utilise	 the	 organs	 of	 international	 law	 to	 present	sophisticated	 legal	 reasoning	 to	 substantiate	 China's	 assertions	 of	 maritime	 territorial	rights,	with	such	efforts	achieving	at	least	partial	success	in	obliging	the	acceptance	from	various	nations,	including	the	United	States,	of	Chinese	claims	of	sovereign	rights	within	a	twelve-mile	zone	from	its	coastline.			Other	revisionist	research	focuses	directly	on	the	role	of	the	state	in	the	economic	sphere,	suggesting	that	the	state	in	this	regard	acted	with	much	greater	capability	and	caused	much	less	 damage	 than	 often	 suggested	within	 the	mainstream	 literature.	Myers	 (1982:	280)	describes	 policies	 under	 the	 Qing	 that	 supported	 the	 deepening	 of	 market	 processes:	"households	increasingly	contracted	with	each	other	to	exchange	resources	of	all	kinds	of	procedures	based	on	what	I	have	termed	customary	law,	[and]	the	imperial	state	looked	upon	 this	 activity	 with	 approval—even	 consenting	 to	 adjudicate	 violations	 of	 contracts	between	private	parties—these	private	contracts	served	as	an	effective	device	for	greatly	reducing	transactions	costs."	Bush	(1982)	finds	the	claims	made	by	Coble	(1980)	and	others	citing	examples	of	expropriatory	behaviours	on	the	part	of	Guomindang	state	actors,	such	as	 coercive	 techniques	 to	 force	private	 agents	 to	undertake	bond	purchases,	 as	 "greatly	exaggerated"	in	terms	of	their	frequency	or	consequence.	Chui	(2008),	meanwhile,	argues	the	government	programs	such	as	the	broker	entitlement	system	(),	or	some	of	the	limitations	placed	on	the	price	control	system,	provide	evidence	that	the	government	was	not	completely	disinterested	in	protecting	merchants'	property	rights.	Especially	during	the	Guomindang	era,	entire	governmental	ministries	devoted	to	economic	planning	focussed	on	 implementing	 economic	 growth	 policies,	 such	 as	 encouraging	 industrial	 innovation,	were	 created	 and	 expanded.	 Bian	 (2005a:	 37)	 claims	 that	 a	 sophisticated	 bureaucracy	devoted	to	centralised	economic	planning	developed	under	the	Guomindang	government,	especially	after	the	start	of	the	1937	phase	of	the	Second	Sino-Japanese	War.	Ma	(2016:	12-13)	argues	that	the	development	of	domestic	bond	markets	during	the	Guomindang	was	due	 to	 significant	 improvements	 in	 institutional	 commitment	 mechanisms	 that	 helped	convince	investors	the	safety	of	government	bonds,	and	leading	to	a	sea	change	in	terms	of	the	ability	of	the	state	to	raise	capital	from	financial	markets:	"This	marked	perhaps	the	first	time	in	Chinese	history	that	the	Chinese	government	could	tap	into	the	wealth	of	Chinese	elites	or	even	average	people	for	borrowing	without	the	usual	coercion	and	predation."'		Finally,	while	the	majority	of	the	literature	finds	the	domestic	state's	inability	to	maintain	a	monopoly	 on	 coercive	 force	 within	 its	 borders	 serves	 as	 an	 indictment	 on	 the	 level	 of	domestic	state	capacity,	and	evidence	of	a	poor	institutional	environment,	some	argue	the	social	 strife	 facing	 the	 state	 provided	 several	 benefits	 that	 ultimately	 improved	 state	capacity	and	institutional	strength.	These	arguments	follow	from	the	strain	within	the	state	capacity	literature	that	views	the	role	of	externally-imposed	violence	in	the	form	of	war	as	one	of	the	primary	drivers	of	more	efficient	resource	mobilisation	leading	to	an	increase	in	state	capacity.	Thus,	the	development	of	Self-Strengthening	Movement	projects	such	as	the	Jiangnan	Arsenal	are	frequently	traced	to	early	defeats	to	foreign	powers,	and	further	in	providing	inducements	for	state	actors	to	increase	industrialisation	efforts,	as	well	as	the	state's	bureaucratic	and	fiscal	capacity	(van	de	Ven	1996,	1997).	Others	cite	the	importance	of	the	constant	military	hostilities	defining	the	republican	period	as	vital	in	contributing	to	improvements	 in	 military	 capacity,	 as	 well	 as	 leading	 to	 state	 ownership	 of	 arms	 and	munitions	 enterprises	which	 further	 contributed	 to	 levels	 of	 industrialisation	 (Waldron	1991,	1993;	Bian	2005b).			
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		3.1.4.			Domestic	Institutional	Environment:	Contested	Viewpoints	
	As	the	foregoing	discussion	has	demonstrated,	differing	viewpoints	and	sources	of	evidence	can	be	found	throughout	the	literature	regarding	the	nature	of	the	late-Qing	and	republican	domestic	 state	 capacity	 and	 institutional	 environments,	 with	 some	 indicating	 definitive	strength,	 or	 undergoing	 a	 strengthening	 process,	 while	 other	 developments	 were	concomitantly	taking	place	that	suggest	a	contrasting	story.			While	objective	measures	make	clear	the	growth	of	the	domestic	state,	with	creation	of	new	governmental	 departments,	whether	 these	 factors	 led	 to	positive	outcomes	 in	 regard	 to	stronger	 private	 property,	 contract	 or	 investor	 rights	 in	 ways	 that	 could	 encourage	economic	activity	is	contested.	Researches	by	Paauw	(1952),	Eastman	(1974,	1984a,	1991),	Coble	(1980),	Feuerwerker	(1983),	and	Myers	(2000),	amongst	others,	present	convincing	arguments	 indicating	 a	 weak	 domestic	 state	 institutional	 environment,	 lacking	 in	 state	capacity	with	poor	tax-raising	ability	and	a	deteriorating	fiscal	situation.	Strauss	(1998),	Ma	(2012),	van	de	Ven	(2014),	and	Boecking	(2017),	meanwhile,	attempt	to	highlight	examples	of	positive	state	capacity	and	effective	 institutions	capable	of	 implementing	policy	goals.	Meanwhile,	works	such	as	Kubo	(1981),	Fewsmith	(1985),	Bian	(2005a,	2005b)	and	Ma	(2016)	provide	arguments	supportive	of	both	viewpoints—a	strengthening	of	bureaucratic	capacity	 that	 in	 turn	 is	 seemingly	 utilised	 by	 the	 state	 to	 engage	 in	 a	 greater	degree	 of	expropriation	and	ultimate	state	control	of	private	civil	space.		Given	such	differing	views	of	the	domestic	state	presented	in	the	literature,	it	is	logical	to	ask,	therefore,	which	viewpoint	is	correct—do	the	analyses	by	pessimists	or	by	optimists	more	accurately	reflect	the	domestic	institutional	environment?	Confusingly,	there	appears	to	 exist	 strong	 evidences	 supportive	of	 both	viewpoints.	 Yet	 this	 seeming	 inconsistency	underscores	 the	 fact	 that	 concepts	 such	 as	 "institutional	 quality"	 and	 "private	 property	rights	institutions"	are	inherently	complex	and	multidimensional.	Thus,	different	scholars	have	been	able	to	identify	different	evidences	that	support	particular	viewpoints	as	to	the	nature	 of	 China's	 pre-war	 domestic	 institutional	 environment	 as	 one	 of	 strength	 or	weakness,	leading	to	significantly	differing	portrayals	within	the	literature.	For	instance,	at	the	same	time	that	we	observe	the	expanding	role	of	the	domestic	state	across	society	and	within	the	economic	sphere,	and	a	growing	scope	and	capacity	of	some	state	bureaucratic	systems	and	formal	legal	institutions—all	of	which	could	in	theory	help	to	strengthen	some	important	features	of	private	property	rights	mechanisms—we	can	also	observe	examples	of	the	state	use	its	power	to	extract	economic	assets	from	private	economic	actors,	as	well	as	find	other	forms	of	state	capacity	disintegrating,	especially	those	designed	to	enforce	the	internal	 monopoly	 over	 coercive	 force,	 thus	 unable	 to	 prevent	 nonstate	 internal	 and	external	agents	from	expropriating	or	destroying	private	economic	agents'	property.		Understanding	 such	 complexity,	 therefore,	 allows	 us	 to	 rationalise	 the	 seeming	inconsistency	 between	 competing	 viewpoints	 of	 domestic	 private	 property	 rights	institutions,	 both	 over	 time	 and	within	 the	 same	 time	 frame,	 as	 multiple	 indicators	 of	property	rights	protections—for	example,	the	application	of	rule	of	law,	expanded	funding	for	the	formal	court	system,	effective	administration	of	customs	duties,	private	companies	forcibly	 taken	 over	 by	 the	 state,	 private	 banks	 forced	 to	 purchase	 government	 bonds,	destruction	of	economic	assets	by	internal	and	external	military	clashes—simultaneously	suggested	differing	 and	 conflicting	 conclusions	 as	 to	 the	 overall	 nature	 of	 the	 domestic	institutional	environment.			
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Problematically,	however,	for	all	of	the	recent	explicit	focus	in	the	literature	on	the	impacts	that	the	domestic	Chinese	institutional	environment	had	on	the	period's	realised	economic	outcomes,	 there	 still	 remains	 a	 relative	 lack	 of	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 the	 institutional	environment	as	perceived	by	the	relevant	contemporaneous	economic	actors	themselves.	Further,	and	similarly	problematic,	while	there	exists	an	important	debate	regarding	the	strength	of	the	domestic	institutional	environment	over	the	late-Qing	and	republican	time	frame,	 nonetheless	 much	 of	 the	 related	 literature	 on	 differing	 aspects	 of	 the	 period's	economic	history	far	too	readily	ignores	much	of	the	complexity	and	nuances	that	drive	this	debate.	 Instead,	 it	 is	 frequently	 the	 case	 that	 this	 related	 literature	 simply	 begins	 the	analysis	based	on	a	general	implicit	assumption,	typically	that	suggested	by	the	dominant	viewpoint,	of	a	late-imperial	and	republican	China	that	was	defined	by	weak	domestic	state	capacity	and	a	poor	institutional	environment	with	relatively	poor	private	property	rights	protections.	 Subsequent	 analysis	 of	 economic	 outcomes	 or	 corporate	 and	 financial	behaviours—such	as	the	inability	of	republican	China	to	exhibit	sustained	industrialisation,	the	 inability	to	successfully	 incorporate	 foreign	 technology,	or	 the	scarcity	of	 joint-stock	enterprises—is	then	based	upon	such	implicit	and	prior	assumptions.		This	is	particularly	true	of	the	literature	referring	to	the	nature	of	corporate	governance	of	Chinese	 firms	 (Kirby	 1995,	 Bowen	 &	 Rose	 1998,	 Koll	 2000,	 Goetzmann	 &	 Koll	 2005,	Goetzmann	 et	 al.	 2007,	 Liu	 2010,	Wang	 2013),	 or	 the	 literature	 seeking	 to	 explain	 the	economic	impact	of	the	domestic	state's	weak	capacity	(Congleton	2011,	Ma	2013,	Johnson	&	Koyama	2017,	Koyama	et	al.	2018).	Each	of	the	latter	papers,	for	instance,	openly	starts	with	 the	 explicit	 supposition	 that	 the	 late-Qing	 state	possessed	weak	 state	 capacity	and	institutions,	followed	the	exposition	of	a	model	that	seeks	to	explain	why	states	such	as	the	late	Qing	might	find	it	optimal	to	exhibit	certain	characteristics,	as	well	as	a	discussion	of	the	 attendant	 problems	 resulting	 from	 such	 weakness	 in	 state	 capacity	 and	 poor	institutions.	 However,	 serious	 epistemological	 dangers	 result	 from	 ascribing	 economic	outcomes	 to	 institutional	 features,	 when	 much	 of	 those	 institutional	 features	 are	themselves	based	on	assumptions.		We	seek	to	overcome	these	two	problematic	features	of	the	literature.	First,	in	looking	to	address	 the	 debate	 in	 the	 literature	 regarding	 the	 relative	 strength	 or	weakness	 of	 the	domestic	institutional	environment,	we	recognise	from	the	onset	that	the	reason	the	debate	exists	 is	an	outcome	of	 the	 inherent	multidimensionality	 of	 institutional	 constructs	 that	allow	for	conflicting	and	contrasting	signals	regarding	their	efficacy	and	ability	to	protect	private	property	rights.	Given	that	neither	institutional	quality	nor	private	property	rights	are	binary	variables—neither	simply	"weak"	or	"strong"—we	take	an	explicitly	relativist	approach	 in	 our	 analysis.	 As	 noted,	 Shanghai's	 unique	 institutional	 environment	 is	particularly	 useful	 in	 this	 regard	 given	 that	 there	 were	 two	 simultaneously-operating	parallel	 institutional	 environments,	 one	 domestic	 and	 one	 extraterritorial,	 that	 we	 can	utilise	in	conducting	a	comparative	analysis.		Second,	 in	 looking	 to	 establish	 a	 general	 understanding	 regarding	 the	 overall	 nature	 of	domestic	and	extraterritorial	institutional	quality,	we	do	so	expressly	from	the	perspective	of	 the	 contemporaneous	 economic	 agents	 who	 acted	 within	 these	 institutional	environments.	Our	argument	is	that	given	the	complexity	of	the	institutional	environment,	attempts	 to	discern	 its	 overall	 strength	 is	 likely	difficult	 if	 relying	solely	on	present-day	interpretations	of	historical	evidences,	such	as	trying	to	judge	the	severity	and	importance	of	 policies	 that	 might	 be	 expected	 to	 either	 increase	 or	 violate	 protections	 on	 private	property	 rights.	 Rather,	 it	 becomes	more	 appropriate	 to	 attempt	 to	 identify	 the	way	 in	which	contemporaneous	economic	actors	perceived	the	strength	and	quality	of	institutional	protections	on	private	property	rights	Conclusions	as	 to	 the	 impacts	of	differing	private	property	rights	environments	could	then	be	drawn	after	establishing	the	contemporaneous	perceived	quality	of	these	environments.	
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Part	II.	
China's	Late-Imperial	and	Republican-Era	Domestic	Institutional	Environment			
Chapter	Two	emphasised	the	importance	of	state	power	in	preventing	Olson	(1993)'s	"roving	
bandits"	from	appropriating	or	destroying	economic	agents'	private	property.	Yet,	as	Smith	
(1776)	notes,	a	paradox	arises—a	state	strong	enough	to	protect	economic	agents'	private	
property	rights	from	non-state	forces	is	also	strong	enough	to	itself	violate	those	same	agents'	
property	 rights;	 or,	using	 the	 terminology	of	 Frye	&	 Shleifer	 (1997),	 to	 act	 as	 a	 "grabbing	
hand."	Economic	agents,	 recognising	 the	power	 of	 the	 state	 to	 violate	 property	 rights	 and	
expropriate	 their	 ex-post	 output,	 under-invest	 in	 ex-ante	 costly	 efforts.	 This	 leads	 to	 the	
underproduction	of	 economic	 output,	 and	underdeveloped	 financial	markets.	However,	 the	
state	can	overcome	this	paradox	by	creating	effective	credible	commitment	mechanisms	by	
binding	itself	to	honour	promises	not	to	violate	agents'	private	property	rights.		
	
In	Part	II,	we	attempt	to	move	from	the	theoretical	to	the	specific	by	taking	a	detailed	economic	
historical	analysis	of	domestic	 state	actions	 that	contributed	 to	 the	 formation	of	economic	
agents'	perceptions	of	 institutional	protections	on	property	and	contract	rights	as	effective	
and	commitment	devices	credible,	which	defined	the	state-private	agent	relationship	in	ways	
that	either	allowed	private	economic	activity	to	flourish,	or	to	be	constricted	by	government	
action.	
	
Specifically,	 the	 material	 comprising	 Part	 II	 is	 designed	 to	 present	 a	 detailed	 qualitative	
analysis	 of	 the	domestic	 institutional	 environment,	 based	on	 contemporaneous	documents,	
and	 supplemented	by	 the	 rich	assemblage	 from	 the	 economic	history	 literature	 that	 helps	
shape	 the	 on-going	debate	 on	 late-imperial	 and	 republican	domestic	 institutions.	Chapters	
Four,	Five	and	Six,	in	successive	order,	discuss	the	primary	facets	of	state	capacity	in	regard	to	
creating	credible	commitment	mechanisms	and	institutional	protections	on	private	property	
and	contracts,	 that	comprise	 (i)	 the	nature	of	effective	political,	 legal,	and	 judicial	 systems	
which	impact	the	state's	“reaching	hand”	and	prevent	government	expropriation	of	individual	
private	property;	(ii)	the	efficacy	of	state	bureaucratic	capacity	that	defines	the	ability	of	state	
actors	 to	 enforce	 their	 desired	 policies,	 focussing	 in	 particular	 on	 the	 design	 and	
implementation	of	fiscal	policies;	and	(iii)	the	ability	of	the	state	to	enforce	a	monopoly	on	
internal	violence,	and	the	related	impacts	that	prevalent	and	persistent	social	violence	has	on	
the	 ability	 of	 the	 domestic	 state	 to	 create	 credible	 commitment	 mechanisms	 to	 empower	
private	economic	actors.	
	
In	this	regard,	the	theoretic	concepts	presented	in	Chapter	Two	associated	with	the	Violence	
Trap	(Cox	et	al.	2017)	and	our	"low	credibility	trap"	extension	prove	useful	in	analysing	much	
of	domestic	Chinese	state	actors'	behaviour.	The	analysis	presented	in	Chapter	Seven	looks	to	
synthesis	 the	 implications	 of	 these	 theoretical	 concepts	 and	 apply	 them	 to	 develop	 an	
understanding	of	the	incentives	and	motivations	behind	the	actions	of	private	and	state	actors	
throughout	the	time	period.	
	
	As	 domestic	 state	 capacity	 to	 deal	with	political	 strife	 and	warfare	 fluctuated,	 and	as	 the	
immediacy	 of	 existential	 threats	 fluctuated,	 the	 domestic	 state's	 actions	 signalling	
commitment	 to	 property	 rights	 protection—versus	 "grabbing	 hand"	 behaviour—also	
fluctuated.	Moreover,	the	multidimensionality	of	institutional	constructs	means	state	policies	
affecting	economic	agents'	perceptions	of	private	property	rights	protections	were	frequently	
conflicting.	 Contradictory	 state	 actions	 that	 included	 economic	 policies	 such	 as	 taxation,	
regulations,	or	even	expropriation	of	private	assets,	as	well	as	polices	shaping	the	openness	of	
civil	society	such	as	educational	policy,	media	censorship,	shaped	the	complex	nature	of	the	
determinants	of	domestic	institutional	quality.	
	 	
	 55 
Chapter	Four.			
State	 Capacity:	 Protecting	 Private	 Property	 and	 Contract	 Rights	 via	 Effective	
Institutions	—	Political	and	Legal	Systems			The	political	economics	concept	of	"state	capacity"	refers	to	the	ability	for	state	actors	to	set	and	accomplish	policy	goals,	including	the	creation	and	maintenance	of	measures	that	serve	as	 credible	 commitment	 mechanisms	 that	 in	 large	 part	 determine	 the	 nature	 of	 the	institutional	 environment	 which	 in	 turn	 accords	 private	 property	 and	 contract	 rights	protections.	The	following	chapter	presents	a	qualitative	consideration	of	the	late-imperial	and	republican	domestic	institutional	quality,	using	a	state	capacity	approach,	focussing	on	the	way	in	which	the	state	structure	and	legal	systems	operated	to	impact	contemporaneous	actors'	perceptions	of	the	strength	of	the	domestic	institutional	environment.				4.1.		Credible	Commitment	Mechanisms:	State	Structure		As	presented	in	Chapter	Two,	because	the	power	of	the	state	apparatus	is	such	so	as	to	allow	state	 actors	 to	 renege	on	prior	promises	 to	not	 violate	private	property	 rights,	 credible	commitment	mechanisms	that	bind	governments	in	ways	that	raise	the	costs	of	reneging	are	 important	because	 they	 serve	 to	 increase	 the	 perception	 amongst	private	 economic	actors	as	to	the	security	of	their	property	rights,	thus	incentivising	costly	private	investment	and	economic	production.	Concrete	examples	of	credible	commitment	mechanisms	can	take	on	many	forms,	from	written	constitutions	defining	specific	limits—which	by	themselves	can	prove	relatively	weak,	given	they	are	but	words	on	pieces	of	paper—to	ceding	power	to	other	bodies	that	would	require	force	or	other	costly	measures	to	retake	such	power,	an	example	of	which	was	discussed	by	North	&	Weingast	(1989),	when	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Glorious	Revolution	the	monarchy	in	Britain	ceded	fiscal	authority	solely	to	the	Parliament.		Representative	government	structures	 that	provide	property	owners	with	a	voice	 in	the	governance	process	can	help	lead	to	greater	protections	on	property	(although	tyranny	of	a	 privileged,	 propertied	 minority	 remains	 a	 danger),	 especially	 when	 representatives'	authority	 is	 sufficient	 to	 check	 executive	 power.	 Representative	 governance	 that	 is	supported	by	 free	and	open	elections	can	make	 it	costly	 for	state	actors	to	deviate	 from	prior-agreed	 to	 protections	 on	 property	 rights,	 given	 the	 electorate	 can	 hold	 them	accountable	(although	tyranny	of	the	majority	at	the	expense	of	property	holders	remains	a	danger),	thus	helping	to	make	state	actors'	commitments	more	credible.		Overall,	we	argue	that	consideration	of	the	late-Qing	and	republican	period	provides	little	in	the	way	of	evidence	of	effective	credible	commitment	mechanisms	employed	in	terms	of	state	 structure.	Throughout	 the	 entirety	of	 the	period,	 notwithstanding	 the	 "republican"	epithet	 employed	 in	 the	 post-imperial	 era,	 the	 domestic	 state	 structure	 remained	 an	authoritarian	regime.	At	no	time	were	spending	and	revenue	functions	effectively	separated	from	the	executive	power,	except,	as	to	be	discussed,	in	limited	instances	such	as	by	way	of	the	Chinese	Maritime	Customs,	a	foreign-administered	institution	over	which	the	domestic	state	 executive	 branch	 continually	 sought	 to	 retake	 control.	 While	 at	 various	 times	legislative	bodies	existed,	 their	role	was	much	more	"advisory"	 than	providing	property	owners	or	electors	with	an	actual	role	in	the	decision-making	process	or	its	oversight	on	the	implementation	 of	 taxation	 and	 other	 commercial	 policies.	 Further,	 while	 the	 formal	structure	of	the	legal	system	continually	developed	over	the	course	of	the	period,	at	no	time	did	 the	 judiciary	 provide	 actual	 independent	 authority	 over	 executive	 state	 power,	therefore	 lacking	 ability	 to	 provide	 limits	 on	 potentially	 expropriative	 or	 extra-legal	behaviour	of	state	actors.	In	sum,	therefore,	it	appears	difficult	to	identify	the	existence	of	many	credible	commitment	institutional	devices	provided	by	the	state's	political	structure.	
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	Discussions	 of	 state	 capacity	 and	 state	 actors	 admittedly	 represent	 a	 gross	 over-simplification	of	the	complexity	of	actual	governance	situations;	this	is	particularly	true	in	a	country	as	large	as	China.	The	"state"	of	 late-imperial	and	republican	China	was	by	no	means	a	monolithic	structure;	comprised	of	many	thousands	of	individual	actors,	each	was	imbued	by	the	system	with	varying	degrees	of	autonomy	over	their	action	choice	sets.	The	conditions	defining	these	actors	and	their	choice	sets	changed	considerably	over	time;	that	was	true	not	only	as	differing	regimes	came	to	power,	but	even	within	the	same	general	regime,	as	different	power	dynamics	emerged.	Further,	concepts	of	state	capacity	can	falsely	imply	 a	 monolithic	 degree	 of	 capacity,	 whereas	 in	 reality	 there	 can	 exist	 considerable	variation	 amongst	 aspects	 of	 state	 capacity,	 such	 as	 tax	 collection,	 economic	 policy	formation,	or	enforcing	a	monopoly	of	violence.	Additionally,	as	Perry	(1994)	and	Remick	(2002)	emphasise,	regional	variation	matters,	as	state	capacity	and	state-society	relations	are	neither	constant	nor	uniform	within	states	at	the	national	level.	The	degree	to	which	regional	 variation	 in	 state	 capacity	 differed	 is	 particularly	 important	 given	 the	 lack	 of	centralisation	of	political	authority	possessed	by	Chinese	national	governments	throughout	our	period	of	study.			
Historiography	of	the	Domestic	Chinese	State	Structure		Administratively,	the	Qing	state	applied	a	four	level	hierarchy	under	the	central	government	over	 the	 eighteen	 provinces	 comprising	 China	 proper:	 the	 provincial	 level	 sheng	 (),	followed	by	the	circuit	level	dao	(<),	the	prefecture	level	fu	(),	and	the	county	level	xian	(1).	At	the	dao	 level	sat	 the	daotai	(<5),	and	below	them	were	 the	 local	magistrates	 in	charge	of	xian.	Throughout	the	Qing	period,	Shanghai	was	at	the	lowest	administrative	level	and	was	a	county	reporting	to	Songjiang	fu	(!%),	Susong	Tai	Dao	(6!<),	which	in	turn	reported	to	Jiangsu	Province.	The	local	magistrate	was	the	direct	government	interface	with	the	public,	serving	as	the	local	executive	head,	responsible	for	the	maintenance	of	peace	and	order,	also	acting	as	the	local	judge,	the	prosecutor,	and	responsible	for	delegating	authority	of	 the	 collection	 of	 tax	 revenue	 (Wang	 1890).	 Appointed	 by	 the	 emperor,	 the	 local	magistrate	was	expected	to	serve	for	no	more	than	three	years	before	being	transferred	to	other	posts.	In	Shanghai,	where	the	office	of	the	dao	was	located,	the	daotai	was	in	effect	in	direct	control	of	the	local	magistrate,	and	was	often	referred	to	as	the	"Shanghai	daotai"	(Leung	1991).			The	success	of	the	Wuchang	Uprising	and	subsequent	Xinhai	Revolution	of	1911	brought	about	an	end	to	the	nearly	three	hundred-year	reign	of	the	Qing,	and	two	thousand	years	of	an	 imperial	 system	 of	 government	 for	China.	 The	 seventeen	 provinces	 under	 control	 of	supporters	 of	 the	 rebellion	 centred	 their	 new	 republican	 government	 in	 Nanjing,	 with	legislative	powers	enshrined	in	a	new	constitution	given	to	an	indirectly-elected	national	body,	and	the	executive	branch	led	by	a	president,	inaugurated	to	be	Sun	Zhongshan	(Sun	Yatsen).	Early	effectual	weakness	and	inability	to	force	complete	capitulation	on	the	part	of	the	remaining	provinces	still	loyal	to	the	Qing	Court	led	the	new	government	to	turn	to	Yuan	Shikai,	 the	 Qing	 Prime	 Minister	 and	 military	 commander,	 to	 assume	 the	 country's	presidency	contingent	upon	a	peaceful	abdication	by	the	Qing	monarchy,	which	occurred	in	early	 1912.	 Before	 transfer	 of	 power	 to	 a	 Yuan	 presidency,	 however,	 the	 provision	government	 ratified	 the	 Provisional	 Constitution	 in	 March	 of	 1912,	 changing	 the	government	structure	to	a	parliamentary	form—its	electorate	still	comprised	of	provincial	legislatures	or	leadership—with	executive	control	centred	mostly	with	a	prime-minister,	and	the	president's	role	mostly	titular.	With	Sun's	Guomindang	Party	winning	a	majority	in	the	first	election	in	early	1913,	it	selected	Song	Jiaoren	()	Prime	Minister-elect,	and	drafted	a	new	constitution	which	was	 to	 further	weaken	 the	power	of	 the	president	by	making	the	prime	minister	responsible	to	parliament	alone,	and	not	the	president.		
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	Yuan's	 response	 to	 the	 parliament's	 actions	was	 swift.	With	 his	 power	 base	 comprised	primarily	 of	military	 commanders	 centred	 in	 the	 north	of	 the	 country,	 Yuan	moved	 the	capital	back	to	Beijing,	leading	to	the	formation	of	the	so-called	Beiyang	government	((
).	The	transference	of	power	from	Nanjing	to	Beijing	also	led	to	a	substantial	weakening	of	the	power	of	the	legislative.	In	March	of	1913,	Prime	Minster-elect	Song	was	assassinated,	with	most	observers	at	the	time	understanding	it	to	have	been	sanctioned,	if	not	ordered,	by	Yuan	(Spence	1990:	281).	With	little	patience	for	dealing	with	attempted	negotiations	with	 other	 branches	 of	 government—as	 McNair	 (1930:	 214)	 contends,	 "Yuan	 was	 the	proponent	 of	 a	 centralized	 government	 with	 a	 powerful	 executive	 and	 a	 weak,	 or	 no,	parliament"—	Yuan	demanded	parliament	change	the	new	constitutional	draft	to	give	the	president	greater	powers.	After	refusal	on	the	part	of	the	legislature,	in	November	of	1913,	with	the	backing	of	loyal	military	supporters,	Yuan	outlawed	the	Guomindang	Party,	had	its	members	 arrested,	 and	 ordered	 a	 restructuring	 of	 the	 legislature.	 Beholden	 to	 Yuan,	 a	newly-constituted	parliament	ratified	in	1914	the	Constitutional	Compact,	which	gave	Yuan	his	desired	power,	with	a	weak	legislature	whose	actions	could	be	vetoed	by	the	president;	or	 as	Hu	 (1917)	 describes,	 little	 more	 than	 a	 rubber	 stamp	 institution.	 However,	 Yuan	ignored	even	this	constitution	and	issued	rulings	in	the	absence	of	a	parliament;	by	the	next	year,	he	advocated	the	"monarchical	movement"	that	brought	an	end	to	the	republic	and	Yuan	declaring	himself	emperor,	an	experiment	that	ended	quickly	once	Yuan	died	in	office	in	1916.		While	Reid	 (1916:25)	and	others	 appear	quick	 to	 absolve	Yuan	of	 responsibility	 for	his	assumption	of	the	role	of	emperor,	finding	it	was	"in	the	misdeeds	of	his	friends,	who	cast	liberty	to	the	winds,	and	grasped	at	glory,	but	[Yuan]	has	been	made	to	suffer",	it	is	clear	the	first	years	after	the	end	of	the	authoritarian	rule	of	the	Qing	monarchy	brought	about	an	authoritarian	version	of	a	so-called	republican	government.	Whether	emperor	in	name	or	not,	 Yuan	 used	 his	 control	 over	 the	 military	 to	 exert	 dictatorial	 power	 over	 the	 state	apparatus.	 His	 reign	 was	 defined	 by	 an	 acute	 lack	 of	 rule	 of	 law,	 including	 political	assassinations	opponents,	such	as	Song,	or	Chen	Qimei	(=4)	who	had	controlled	Shanghai	after	 the	1911	Xinhai	Revolution	 (Chang	&	Chang	2010:	197);	 the	 execution	of	 political	enemies	without	trial;	the	removal	of	the	elected	governor	of	Hefei	without	due	process;	and	entering	into	the	100	million	yuan	Reorganization	Loan	without	the	participation	or	approval	 of	 the	 legislature	 (Sheridan	 1975:	 49).	 Thus,	 the	 first	 attempts	 at	 republican	governance	were	simply	an	extension	of	the	lack	of	democratic	accountability	of	the	Qing	rule.	 An	 authoritarian	 executive,	 with	military	 power	 dominant	 to	 political	 control,	 are	characteristics	of	"limited	access"	governments	(North	et	al.	2009,	Weingast	2010,	Cox	et	al.	2017),	and	characteristics	of	the	governance	structure	that	repeated	itself	throughout	the	rest	of	the	republican	era.		The	death	of	Yuan	brought	forth	a	series	of	new	ascendants	to	the	presidency,	each	with	similar	autocratic	powers,	but	none	strong	enough	to	maintain	control,	as	the	country	fell	into	the	political	disarray	of	the	so-called	warlord	period,	as	local	military	commanders	vied	for	power.	The	eventual	end	of	the	Beiyang	regime	was	accomplished	by	violent	overthrow	by	way	of	the	Northern	Expedition,	a	military	campaign	led	by	General	Jiang	Jieshi	(Chang	Kaishek).	Jiang	subsequently	moved	the	country's	capital	back	to	Nanjing	and	instituted	a	new	era	of	nominal	republican	rule,	yet	one	under	single-party	rule	of	 the	Guomindang.	Jiang,	 in	 power	 throughout	 the	 period,	 wielded	 near-dictatorial	 powers	 as	 supreme	"generalissimo",	as	the	legislative	body,	the	Legislative	Yuan,	provided	no	actual	check	on	the	 power	 of	 Jiang	 and	 the	 executive	 branch.	 Jiang,	 like	 Yuan	 Shikai,	 justified	 this	concentration	of	power	in	his	office	as	necessary	due	to	political	expediencies	owing	to	civil	war	with	communists	and	warlords,	as	well	as	external	threats	represented	by	Japan	and	the	Soviet	Union.			
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Jiang	 also	 cited	 the	 need	 for	 authoritarian	 power	 as	 part	 of	 the	 plan	 laid	 out	 by	 Sun	Zhongshan,	promoted	by	the	Party	as	the	philosophical	leader	of	the	1911	Revolution.	In	
Fundamentals	of	National	Reconstruction	for	the	Guomindang	Government,	written	in	1924,	Sun	proposed	a	Leninist	conceptualisation	of	successive	stages	of	governance	to	take	place	as	the	Chinese	populace	became	"ready"	for	such	 implementations.	Sun	laid	out	a	three-stage	 transformation	 of	 governance:	 military	 (:  ),	 tutelage	 ( 7  ),	 and	 eventually	constitutional	().	Sun	argued	that	after	the	Guomindang	used	military	force	to	achieve	unification	 of	 the	 country,	 the	 country	would	 enter	 a	 tutelage	 period,	 during	which	 the	central	 government	 was	 to	 "educate"	 citizens	 in	 understanding	 democracy,	 and	 assist	provinces	to	achieve	self-governance.	According	to	Sun,	after	a	"sufficient"	amount	of	time,	and	constitutional	governments	were	instituted	in	half	the	provinces,	the	promulgation	of	a	 true	 constitution	 could	 take	 place,	 with	 a	 national	 republican	 government	 based	 on	indirect	 election	 of	 representatives	 from	 provincial	 legislatures.	 As	 such,	 Jiang's	government	 frequently	 referenced	 their	 rule	 as	 part	 of	 a	 necessary	 "tutelage	 period",	sometimes	more	 generously	 translated	 as	 the	 "educative	 period".	 In	 either	 reading,	 the	terminology	 was	 symbolic	 of	 a	 patronising,	 self-serving	 approach	 to	 governance	 that	reflected	the	incentives	of	those	in	power	to	formulate	a	rational	for	remaining	in	power	indefinitely.	Mises	(1944:44)	refers	to	such	conceptualisations	of	the	state's	role	as	one	of	‘etatism’,	noting	"Etatism	assigns	to	the	state	the	task	of	guiding	the	citizens	and	of	holding	them	in	tutelage.	It	aims	at	restricting	the	individual's	freedom	to	act."	It	is	telling	that	over	the	entirety	of	the	prewar	period,	only	a	few	provinces,	including	Hunan	and	Guangdong	in	1922,	managed	to	ratify	formal	provincial	constitutions	(Jiang	&	Zhu	2010,	To	2016).	Thus,	there	 appeared	 little	 desire	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 Jiang	 government	 to	 support	moves	 that	threatened	its	absolutist	control	of	the	so-called	tutelage	stage.		The	general	incentive	for	state	actors	in	control	of	the	state	to	seek	to	increase	their	power	is	typically	only	deterred	by	the	need	to	create	credible	commitment	mechanisms	to	induce	private	 actors	 to	 engage	 in	 productive	 activities	 and	 for	 investors	 to	 provide	 capital	resources	to	the	state.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	Two,	serious	existential	threats	can	change	the	 calculus,	 making	 credible	 commitment	 unlikely.	 The	 inability	 of	 the	 domestic	 state	under	the	Guomindang	to	maintain	a	monopoly	on	violence	and	reduce	the	severity	of	the	existential	 threats	 from	 internal	 and	 external	 military	 forces	 decreased	 incentives	 to	undertake	 the	 steps	 necessary	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 credible	 commitment,	 with	 state	leadership	under	Jiang	focussing	instead	on	using	authoritarian	power	to	marshal	resources	in	support	of	the	military.		State	structure	remained	authoritarian	in	form,	operating	under	one-party	rule.	Under	the	Leninist	approach	outlined	by	Sun,	the	Guomindang	Party	would	rule	the	country	under	the	guiding	principle	that	the	Party	had	the	best	interest	of	the	country	(>&).	The	judiciary	pointedly	lacked	in	independence	from	the	Guomindang	Party.	Likewise	lacking	any	actual	authority,	the	Legislative	Yuan	served,	using	Sun's	terminology,	as	a	"consultative	body",	primarily	providing	a	rubber	stamp	of	the	executive	branch's	orders.	As	T'ang	(1931:	9)	observes,	"[The	Legislative	Yuan's]	purpose	is	to	let	the	Government	know	what	the	people	think,"	and	nothing	more.	Paauw	(1952:	7-8)	underscores	the	titular	nature	of	legislative	authority	 over	 government	 expenditures,	 noting	 "When	 budgets	 were	 actually	 passed	before	the	deadline,	they	were	openly	defied	by	the	Executive	branch	of	the	government...	The	Ministry	of	Finance,	which	was	directly	under	the	authority	of	the	Executive	Yuan,	did	not	follow	the	dictates	of	the	promulgated	budget	in	its	employment	of	revenues	for	specific	purposes...	This	type	of	tight	Party	control	of	expenditures	was	symptomatic	of	the	general	domination	of	political	and	economic	life	by	the	small	clique	of	Kuomintang	elite."	In	the	few	 instances	 that	 legislators	 sought	 to	defy	 Jiang,	 such	 as	did	Legislature	President	Hu	Hanmin	 in	 1931,	 Jiang	 had	 them	 arrested	 and	 removed	 from	 power.	 The	 solidifying	 of	authoritarian	state	political	structure	coincided	with	a	continually	expanded	role	of	state	control	over	an	ever-widening	set	of	private	economic	and	social	behaviours.	
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4.2.			Credible	Commitment	Mechanisms:	Legal	and	Judicial	System	
	Legal	systems	serve	as	important	institutional	constructs	that	help	provide	the	framework	for	 overall	 protection	 of	 private	 property	 rights	 by	 enforcing	 limits	 on	 and	 providing	punishments	 to	 violations	 of	 individual	 property	 rights	 by	 other	 private	 actors	 from	behaviours	such	as	theft	or	personal	violence,	and	promoting	trust	in	commercial	dealings	via	the	enforcement	of	contracts	and	other	matters	of	commercial	 law.	Further,	effective	and	 independent	 legal	 systems	 can	 also	 serve	 to	 protect	 private	 property	 rights	 by	enforcing	limits	on	the	ability	of	state	actors	to	violate	previously-agreed	to	limits	on	state	actions;	i.e.,	to	serve	as	credible	commitment	mechanisms.		Throughout	the	late-imperial	to	early-republican	era,	China's	legal	system	exhibited	at	best	a	chequered	record	in	serving	as	an	effectual	credible	commitment	mechanism.	To	begin	with,	at	no	time	was	the	judiciary	ever	effectively	independent;	instead,	it	was	beholden	to	and	served	to	reinforce	the	authoritarian	state	structure	described	in	Section	3.1.	Therefore,	rather	 than	serving	as	a	 limit	on	 the	state	 to	violate	property	rights,	 it	 simply	served	to	validate	 such	 violations.	 Further,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 legal	 system	 in	 promoting	 commercial	relations	is	a	contested	concept	in	the	literature,	with	some	viewing	the	legal	system	of	the	middle	and	late	imperial	periods	as	able	to	facilitate	commercial	activity,	while	others—including	many	contemporaneous	actors—finding	the	lack	of	formal	codified	commercial	and	civil	law	structures	an	inherent	obstacle	to	the	development	of	more	impersonal	and	complex	 commercial	 behaviours.	 The	 republican	 period,	 however,	 saw	 continual	development	 of	more	 formalistic	 representations	of	 commercial	 law,	 as	well	 as	 greater	judicial	and	associated	legal	system	skeletal	structure,	improving	the	potential	for	greater	use	 of	 impersonal	 commercial	 structures,	 such	 as	 financial	 contracts,	 between	 private	economic	actors.			4.2.1.		Historical	Antecedents	of	China's	Commercial	Legal	Environment		By	the	time	of	the	Qing	rule,	China	had	already	developed	an	extensive	and	formally	codified	legal	system	over	the	course	of	many	centuries,	with	the	Great	Qing	Legal	Code	())	representing	an	extension	and	refinement	of	earlier	dynastical	codes.	Made	up	of	thirty-one	books	divided	into	seven	divisions,	the	Qing	Code	sought	to	be	comprehensive	in	its	scope	of	application,	but	 its	 focus	was	primarily	on	military	and	criminal	 laws.	When	property	rights	were	explicitly	addressed	in	the	Code,	they	primarily	focussed	on	state,	as	opposed	to	private,	property	rights	protection,	with	specified	rules	and	punishments	designed	to	prevent	misappropriation	of	government	property	rights.	When	lay	citizenry	were	accused	of	violations	against	state	authority,	they	were	brought	before	local	government	officials	known	as	magistrates,	who	utilised	their	authority	as	an	enforcement	mechanism,	ensuring	the	laws	were	upheld,	the	accused	judged,	and	punishments	enacted.	Recent	scholarship	utilising	archival	Qing	legal	documents	has	detailed	the	extensive	case	record	regarding	the	administration	 and	 prosecution	 of	 the	 criminal	 laws	 designed	 to	 enforce	 and	 prevent	infringement	on	 state	 authority,	 such	 as	by	 forgery	of	 official	 seals	 or	 impersonation	of	government	administrators	(Edwards	2003,	Wang	2005,	McNicholas	2008,	Zhang	2009).		On	the	surface,	such	codification	of	state	property	rights	appears	to	stand	in	contrast	to	a	lack	 of	 attention	 to	 private	 property	 rights.	 Chinese	 law	 as	 a	whole	 had	 little	 apparent	explicitly	codified	civil	law	until	as	late	as	the	enactment	of	the	Civil	Code	in	the	1930s.	Given	the	Qing	Legal	Code's	near-exclusive	focus	on	criminal	matters,	Chinese	economic	and	legal	historians	have	traditionally	viewed	China's	lack	of	codified	civil	law	to	be	indicative	of	a	legal	environment	providing	poor	protection	of	private	property	rights	and	unconducive	to	contract	 enforcement	 (Jones	 1983:	 135,	 Fairbank	1992:	 185-186,	 Kirby	 1995:	44,	 Chan	2012:	 324),	 with	 Jones,	 for	 instance,	 specifically	 claiming	 the	 Qing	 Code	 failed	 to	
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substantively	 address	 issues	 pertinent	 to	 corporate	 regulation	 or	 dispute	 resolution.	 Fa	(1980:	 27)	 notes	 the	 "most	 civil	 matters	were	 regulated	 by	 ethical	 custom	 rather	 than	formal	 law,	 the	 scarcity	 of	 civil	 provisions	and	a	near	 absence	of	 commercial	 law	 in	 the	traditional	codes	made	Chinese	 law	 incompatible	with	 [commercial]	needs."	Overall,	 the	dominant	 view	 in	 the	mainstream	 literature	 has	 been	 straightforward—China	 had	 only	criminal	law	but	no	civil	law	traditions.			More	 recent	 scholarship	 has	 presented	 a	 strong	 revisionist	 challenge	 regarding	 early	Chinese	legal	thought	vis-à-vis	commercial	law	and	private	property	rights.	Scholars	such	as	Huang	(1996,	2010),	Osborne	(2004),	Chui	(2008),	and	Ng	(2015)	emphasise	that	China	did	in	fact	possess	a	legal	tradition	of	commercial	 law,	albeit	one	constructed	differently	than	that	found	in	western	legal	traditions.	These	scholars	argue	that	much	of	the	traditional	scholarship	has	been	conducted	from	a	Eurocentric	standpoint,	overly	concerned	with	an	application	 of	 western	 legal	 terminology	 and	 rigid	 labelling	 of	 "criminal"	 versus	 "civil"	concepts	that	do	not	apply	to	traditional	Chinese	law.	Having	undertaken	detailed	reviews	of	 Ming	 and	 Qing	 legal	 records,	 these	 scholars	 have	 identified	 transcribed	 records	 by	government	officials	that	describe	a	legal	tradition	actively	used	by	the	Chinese	merchant	class	and	citizenry	that	provided	the	enforcement	mechanisms	supporting	the	widespread	use	of	commercial	contracts.		The	 revisionist	 literature	partly	 argues	 that	although	 rules	 involving	 contracts	were	not	always	codified,	the	concept	that	rules	have	to	be	written	down	to	exist	is	incorrect,	given	that	 customs,	 traditions	 and	 other	 forms	 exist	 that	 can	 create	 contract	 enforcement	mechanisms	 (Hadfield	 &	 Weingast	 2012).	 Local	 guilds	 and	 merchant	 associations	 also	exerted	 their	 own	 power	 and	 enforced	 protection	 of	 contract	 terms	 or	 standardised	business	practises,	much	like	the	way	Greif	(1989)	noted	for	Maghribi	traders.	Huang	(2010)	contends	that	a	kind	of	"private	law"	and	enforcement	system	existed	that	was	promulgated	via	local	customs.	In	areas	such	as	marriage	agreements,	familial	successions,	and	land	sales,	this	organically	developed	private	law	was	abided	by	common	citizens	and	administered	by	community	leaders	and	local	magistrates.	Writing	in	1844	(2000),	Wang	Youhuai	(*"),	a	legal	 scholar	on	 the	Qing	Code,	 provides	 support	 to	 these	modern	 interpretations	 in	his	reliance	 on	 contracts	 and	 accepted	 custom	 in	 analysing	 the	 correctness	 of	 magisterial	rulings.		The	state	legal	apparatus,	in	general,	was	not	utilised	above	the	local	level.	As	Huang	(1996:	6)	notes,	 civil	matters—including	disputes	 over	 land,	 debt,	 inheritance,	 and	marriage—were	considered	"minor	issues"	(xishi)	in	early	Qing.	Such	minor	issues	were	"supposed	to	be	dealt	with	mainly	by	 society	 [and	not	 the	 government]	 itself"	 (105-106).	The	 central	government	typically	assumed	a	"centralised	minimalist"	approach	and	left	civil	disputes	to	local	 communities.	 Disputes	 regarding	 commercial	 matters	 were	 mainly	 and	 firstly	addressed	 via	 community	 or	 kinship-based	 mediation,	 with	 the	 participation	 of	 local	authorities	operating	as	society	mediation	where	necessary	(Huang	2010:	63).	The	formal	state	was	largely	uninvolved	in	the	process.		Jenigan	 (1904:270),	writing	 in	 the	 late	Qing,	 also	 stresses	 the	way	 in	which	 commercial	interests	were	protected	not	so	much	by	codified	laws	but	by	customs	and	practises	that	were	 self-enforcing:	 "The	 essentially	 democratic	 nature	 of	 the	 Chinese	 state	 is	 chiefly	evident	 in	 the	 operation	 of	 its	 commercial	 institutions	 which	 sometimes	 transcend,	 or	rather,	usurp	the	law-making	functions	of	the	government.	The	power	of	their	guilds	and	associations	is	often	sufficient	to	set	the	imperial	authority	at	defiance...	The	sanctity	of	a	Chinese	 merchant's	 word	 is	 already	 pretty	 well	 known	 abroad,	 but	 it	 is	 interesting	 to	observe	that	this	business	probity	is	due	to	no	lofty	morality	but	the	firm	conviction	that	transactions	can	never	be	profitable	 in	 the	 long	run	unless	credit	 is	kept	 inviolable;	and	credit	is	of	course	based	on	honest	dealing."	
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		Ng	 (2015)	 further	 stresses	 the	 importance	of	 custom	as	 an	 effective	 tool	 in	 creating	 an	implicit	 legal	 structure	 supporting	 commercial	 development.	 His	 research	 critically	examines	 early	 archival	 documents	 relating	 to	 British	 1864	 Bankruptcy	 Ordinance	 and	finds	that	its	introduction,	along	with	other	aspects	of	British	legal	framework,	was	not,	as	typically	conceived,	purely	beneficial	to	the	development	of	the	colony's	legal	foundation,	as	there	had	existed	a	robust	set	of	established	business	mores	that	had	facilitated	economic	activity	prior	to	the	imposition	of	a	British	colonial	legal	system.			Scholars	such	as	Huang	(1996,	2010),	Allee	(2004)	and	Chui	(2008)	argue	further	that	the	Chinese	 legal	 system	did	possess	more	 formal	mechanisms	 for	dispute	 resolution	when	contract	 disputes	 could	 not	 be	 resolved	 via	 guild	 rules	 and	 local	 customs	 alone,	 citing	primarily	examples	of	commercial	 lawsuits	recorded	 in	the	archival	Ming	and	Qing	legal	records.	Allee,	for	instance,	considers	contracts	from	Taiwan	involving	land	sales,	finding	that	 the	 government	magistrates	 took	 contracts	 seriously	 in	 their	 decisions,	 while	 also	considering	the	believability	of	the	produced	contract	that	a	litigant	put	forward	to	support	their	case.	One	such	case	Alle	 (2004:	163)	cites	 involved	a	magistrate	who	performed	a	detailed	 physical	 inspection	 of	 a	 contract	 and	 determined	 it	 to	 be	 a	 forgery	 because,	although	the	litigants	in	question	claimed	the	contract	was	a	century	old,	"the	ink	was	still	fresh	and	clear;	the	seal	has	all	its	lines."		Overall,	the	revisionist	literature	concerning	the	degree	of	commercial	law	contained	within	Chinese	legal	traditions	hinges	on	the	point	of	emphasis,	and	the	importance	of	codification	of	rules	in	enforcing	contracts,	versus	the	efficacy	of	custom	and	moral	suasion.	To	begin	with,	while	litigants	could	access	the	legal	system	to	attempt	to	protect	their	property	rights,	there	 appears	 to	 have	 been	 a	 lack	 of	 associated	 enforcement	 to	 provide	more	 effective	protection	 to	 property	 holders.	 Alford	 (1995:16)	 notes	 an	 instance	 where	 a	 group	 of	Shanghai	 silk	 producers	 in	 1856	 turned	 to	 local	 magistrates	 to	 afford	 protection	 from	imitators,	citing	evidence	in	the	historical	record	of	the	magistrates	finding	in	favour	of	the	producers	 and	 ordering	 the	 imitators	 to	 cease	 their	 counterfeit	 production	 activities:	"There	appears	to	have	been	massive	counterfeiting	of	well-known	brand	names	and	marks,	as	well	as	extensive	attempts	to	imitate	secret	manufacturing	processes...	Help	was	sought	from	 local	 officials,	 not	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 any	 code	 provision	 specifically	 outlawing	 such	imitating,	but	instead	by	imploring	these	'father-mother'	figures	to	prevent	unfairness	and	deception...	Such	appeals,	however,	do	not	appear	to	have	been	large	in	number,	even	taking	account	of	the	anecdotal	nature	of	the	evidence	available."	More	important	is	his	finding	that	such	appeals	by	merchants	for	commercial	issues	such	as	trademark	provision	proved	relatively	 fruitless:	 "Nor	 do	 they	 appear	 often	 to	 have	 been	 successful	 in	 bringing	 the	objectionable	 activity	 to	 an	 end",	 hence	 suggesting	 a	 reason	 perhaps	 for	 his	 previous	observation	 of	 their	 paucity	 in	 the	 record.	 Indeed,	 the	 offending	 parties	 continued	 to	produce	counterfeit	goods,	being	sued	multiple	times	by	the	owner	of	the	trademark	and	repeatedly	being	ordered	to	stop	the	infringement	each	time,	but	apparently	to	no	avail,	suggesting	a	lack	of	enforcement	mechanisms	accompanying	commercial	law.			Second,	it	is	noteworthy	that	magistrates'	rulings	were	based	on	their	own	judgements;	that	is,	with	few	relevant	codified	legal	regulations	to	enforce,	magistrates	were	obliged	to	act	out	of	their	own	sense	of	ensuring	fairness.	Certainly,	tradition	is	the	foundation	upon	which	all	law	rests	(Hadfield	&	Weingast	2012).	Accordingly,	Ocko	&	Gilmartin	(2009:58-63)	argue	that	well-established	 societal	moralistic	norms,	 based	 in	 large	part	 on	Confucian	values,	helped	to	constrain	the	application	of	the	law	and	by	definition	create	an	implicit	rule	of	law	as	exercised	by	"moral	men"	under	the	Qing.	Ocko	&	Gilmartin's	position,	however,	rests	upon	the	argument	that	such	applied	"rule	of	law"	depended	upon	"the	personal	assertion	of	 imperial	 authority"	 by	 the	 emperor	 himself	 (62).	 That	 ultimate	 decision-making	
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authority	rested	upon	one	man's	personal	views,	even	constrained	by	tradition	though	it	may	be,	 as	 opposed	to	 a	 canon	of	 established	 law	stretches	 to	 a	good	extent	 the	 classic	framing	of	what	constitutes	rule	of	law.	As	Fa	(1980:10)	argues,	imperial	law	was	based	on	the	rule	of	(wise	and	ethical)	men,	rather	than	rule	of	law.	Hence,	contend	Shiga	(1988)	and	Bourgon	(2002),	dispute	resolution	for	civil	matters	relied	more	on	the	individual	moral	decisions	of	local	magistrates,	thereby	lacking	consistency.	For	Zhang	(2009),	civil	litigation	as	 conducted	 under	 the	 Qing	 was	 conflicting.	 While	 admittedly	 allowing	 for	 multiple	interpretations	 and	 instances	where	 private	 property	 rights	were	 indeed	 addressed,	 as	identified	 in	 the	 existence	 of	 examples	 cited	 by	 revisionist	 scholars,	 the	 lack	 of	 formal	codified	legal	structures	protecting	private	property	rights	implies	the	legal	system	lacked	an	 overall	 degree	 of	 decision-making	 consistency	 that	 could	 sufficiently	 decrease	uncertainty	 for	 economic	 actors	 when	 constructing	 contracts,	 thus	 limiting	 the	development	 of	 more	 complex	 contract	 forms,	 especially	 those	 defining	 financial	instruments,	which	were	conspicuously	absent	in	the	Chinese	economic	landscape	until	the	late-imperial	 period.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 legal	 institutional	 framework	 that	 did	 exist	 was	sufficient	 to	 support	 the	 development	proto-joint-stock	 corporate	 forms	with	 dispersed	ownership	 structures	 run	 by	 managers	 who	 were	 not	 direct	 owners	 of	 the	 firm,	 as	explicated	 in	 research	 on	merchant	 groups	 in	 Furong,	 Hunan	 (Zelin	 1988)	 and	 Zizong,	Sichuan	 (Zelin	 2005a),	 and	 Shanxi	 bankers	 who	 paid	managers	 partly	 with	 non-voting	ownership	shares	as	an	early	form	of	stock	option	compensation	structure	to	help	overcome	the	principal-agent	problem	and	increase	 interest	alignment	between	bank	management	and	ownership	(Morck	&	Yang	2011).			In	 general,	 the	 revisionist	 scholarship	 contributes	 important	 evidence	 pertinent	 to	constructing	 a	 more	 complete	 and	 nuanced	 view	 of	 the	 development	 of	 institutions	providing	 protections	 on	 private	 property	 and	 contract	 rights,	 such	 as	 guild-	 and	magistrate-mediated	dispute	resolution	forums,	in	the	period	prior	to	the	late	Qing.	While	actual	levels	of	contract	protection	and	commercial	law	application	remains	open	to	debate,	it	is	clear	that	commercial	instruments	such	as	contracts	and	systems	for	business	dispute	resolution	 were	 not	 "foreign"	 concepts	 to	 Chinese	 merchants	 and	 officials	 that	 were	introduced	or	had	to	be	"imposed"	by	the	arrival	of	westerners.	Rather,	the	legal	reforms	that	took	place	in	the	late	Qing	and	early	republican	period	built	upon	foundations	of	a	legal	tradition	that	had	already	developed	by	way	of	nascent	organic	processes	that	supported	contract	enforcement	mechanisms,	while	albeit	somewhat	limited	in	terms	of	their	ability	to	handle	impersonal	business	relations,	provided	a	basis	for	relatively	robust	commercial	activity.			The	existence	of	such	strong	institutional	foundations	in	the	period	prior	to	the	late-Qing	and	early	republican	 time	 frame	are	 important	to	note,	especially	 in	 light	of	subsequent	failures	we	describe	below	that	define	the	later	period's	legal	institutional	framework	in	the	area	of	providing	effective	legal	protection	mechanisms	for	private	property	and	contract	rights	and	commercial	activity.	Such	failures	therefore	cannot	simply	be	ascribed	to	a	lack	of	 legal	 traditions,	as	has	 frequently	been	done	 in	the	 traditional	literature	(Wang	1993,	Chen	 1997:	 8-15,	 Yang	2003:	 133,	Wu	 2011:	553-554).	 Instead,	 the	 causes	 lie	with	 the	successive	administration	of	the	 legal	system	by	a	state	apparatus	that	was	preoccupied	with	its	own	survival	amidst	civil	and	external	strife,	and	thus	continually	undertook	actions	that	 undermined	 the	 intent	 of	 those	 legal	 reforms	 designed	 to	 create	 effective	 legal	protections	on	private	property	and	provide	for	contract	enforcement.	Most	notably,	lack	of	judiciary	independence	undermined	any	ability	of	the	judiciary	machinery	from	providing	realistic	 or	 effective	 limits	 on	 state	power,	 thus	 failing	 in	 their	 role	 to	 serve	 as	 credible	commitment	mechanisms.				
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	4.2.2.		 China's	 Domestic	 Legal	 Framework:	 Private	 Property	 Rights	 Protections	 and	Contract	Enforcement	Mechanisms,	1853–1941	
		The	main	focus	of	our	discussion	of	the	development	of	China's	legal	system	over	this	time	period	 is	 on	 the	 those	 features	 most	 relating	 to	 the	 creation	 and	 maintenance	 of	 a	framework	 enabling	 overall	 protections	 of	 private	 property	 and	 contract	 rights.	 In	particular,	we	note	how	the	evolutions	of	the	system	impacted	the	legal	system's	ability	to	allow	 economic	 agents	 to	 enforce	 contracts	 and	 provide	 protections	 for	 contract	 forms	relating	to	financial	instruments.	We	are	primarily	concerned	with	the	efficiency	of	the	legal	system	in	its	application;	while	chronicling	changes	in	the	codification	of	laws	pertaining	to	the	protection	of	property	rights	can	be	useful	in	indicating	a	potential	baseline	on	which	formulistic	 and	 standardised	 legal	 reasoning	 can	 occur,	 of	 far	 greater	 salience	 is	 a	consideration	of	the	efficacy	of	mechanisms	designed	to	allow	for	the	actual	enforcement	of	such	codified	rules	and	regulations.				4.2.2.1.		Legal	Development	under	the	Qing		The	 defeat	 in	 the	 Opium	War	 brought	 about	 in	 large	 part	 by	 the	 British	 Navy's	 use	 of	advanced	warships	and	weaponry	prompted	the	realisation	amongst	some	Qing	officials	that	China	must	achieve	 technological	 equivalence	with	 the	western	powers	 in	order	 to	meet	the	unprecedented	threat	their	militaries	represented.	It	was	not	a	coincidence	that	Shanghai	 became	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 early	 industrialisation	 movement	 led	 by	 a	 few	government	 reformers,	 known	 as	 the	 "Self-Strengthening	 movement."	 The	 three	 most	prominent	 Qing	 official	 patrons	 of	 the	movement,	 Zeng	 Guofan,	 Li	 Hongzhang,	 and	 Zuo	Zhongtang	all	counted	Shanghai	within	their	jurisdiction	at	one	time	or	another.	Zeng	and	Zuo	both	served	stints	as	 the	Viceroy	of	Liangjiang	 (%2,)	covering	 Jiangxi,	Anhui	and	Jiangsu	Provinces,	while	Li	was	the	Governor	()	of	Jiangsu,	with	his	role	in	quelling	of	Taiping	Rebellion	in	Shanghai	contributing	greatly	to	the	high	regard	the	Court	held	him	and	his	attendant	rise	through	the	imperial	bureaucracy.			The	government-led	industrialisation	movement,	however,	was	not	intended	to	implement	significant	 institutional	 changes	 or	 cause	 fundamental	 change	 in	 the	 state-business	relationship.	Instead	the	stated	goal	was	to	use	the	foreign	skills	to	strengthen	the	state's	power	 via	 the	 use	 of	 Western	 technology—in	 other	 words,	 to	 institute	 an	 industrial	revolution	 without	 instituting	 concomitant	 substantial	 changes	 in	 existing	 institutional	structures.	Yet	many	of	the	country's	merchants	and	reformers	argued	that	technological	transfer	alone	was	 insufficient	 to	unleash	 the	kind	of	 economic	growth	that	could	allow	China	to	compete	with	the	foreign	powers	and	its	swiftly-industrialising	neighbour	Japan,	and	 began	 calling	 for	more	 explicit	 and	 codified	protections	 on	property	 and	 contracts.		Reformers	included	Qing	officials	such	as	Xue	Fucheng,	who	in	his	1893	essay	"On	the	Lack	of	Competence	of	China's	Companies"	partly	ascribed	poor	corporate	governance	to	a	lack	of	legal	structure	that	could	allow	investors	to	enforce	better	governance	practises	within	companies	(Xue	1893:	480-481).	Zheng	Guanying,	a	well-known	comprador	in	Shanghai,	who	was	later	appointed	to	be	a	director	of	China	Merchants'	Steam	Navigation	Company	by	Li	Hongzhang,	was	particularly	strident	in	his	call	for	legal	reform	and	the	need	for	the	development	 of	 civil	 and	 commercial	 law	 provisions:	 "[without	 a	 commercial	 code],	businessmen	cannot	obtain	effective	dispute	resolution.	Local	officials	may	act	arbitrarily	and	fail	to	provide	justice.	Without	a	commercial	code...	business	cannot	prosper"	(Zheng	1894:	607,	translated).		
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Partly	 in	 response	 to	 such	 calls	 for	more	 substantive	 institutional	 changes,	 efforts	were	taken	by	the	Qing	Court	to	institute	legal	reforms.	In	May	1903,	as	part	of	the	New	Systems	Reform,	 the	 Qing	 court	 appointed	 a	 Law	 Codification	 Commission	 ('03)	 to	 carry	forward	legal	reform.	The	reform	took	a	two-pronged	approach:	First,	revision	of	the	old	Great	 Qing	 Legal	 Code	 to	 respond	 to	western	 criticism	 regarding	 the	 cruelty	 of	 certain	punishment	provisions;	and	second,	enacting	new	codes	in	line	with	western	legal	mores	in	the	area	of	civil	and	commercial	law.		As	part	of	the	first	effort,	between	1902	to	1907,	police	and	prison	reforms	were	carried	out,	and	by	1910,	the	new	"Current	Criminal	Code"	was	issued,	supplanting	that	part	of	old	Qing	Code	with	respect	to	criminal	laws.	In	regard	to	the	second	effort,	three	prominent	legal	scholars	were	selected	by	the	Imperial	government	to	begin	drafting	a	new	Commercial	Code	($))	(Tang	1937:1).	In	1904,	a	nine-article	Customs	 and	Usages	 of	Merchants	 (;)	 and	 Company	 Code	 ()	was	 published,	mostly	adapting	 those	as	 found	 in	 the	codes	of	 Japan	and	Germany	(Hung	1932:	10-11).	Subsequent	additions	and	revisions	were	enacted	to	laws	in	the	area	of	commercial	matters,	including	 Temporary	 Regulations	 for	 Trademark	 Registration	 (#8	 /. )	 and	Bankruptcy	laws	(-+')	which	were	promulgated	by	1906	(Hung	1932:11).	Regulations	for	specific	industries	or	organizations,	such	as	mining,	railways,	and	trade	associations,	were	also	enacted.	Drafts	of	codes	on	criminal	and	civil	procedural	laws,	civil	laws,	as	well	as	a	new	criminal	code	were	completed	between	1910-1912,	and	a	draft	for	a	full	civil	code	was	under	work	although	it	was	never	promulgated	due	to	strong	conservative	resistance	(Chen	1999:	19-21).	Treat	(1911:	156-157)	suggests	that	much	of	this	resistance	came	from	local	officials	whose	 interests	were	 threatened	 by	 proposed	 changes	 in	 the	way	 things	were	traditionally	 handled	 or	 decided,	which	 tended	 to	 be	more	 discretionary	 and	 therefore	increased	their	power	by	giving	them	veto	rights	unless	appeased	by	some	form	of	payment	or	other	 tribute.	The	 fact	 that	promulgation	 and	 implementation	of	 central	 government	legislation	 could	 be	 deterred	 by	 the	 resistance	 of	 local	 officials	 also	 underscores	 the	relatively	weak	position	of	the	central	government	compared	to	sub-national	level	powers.		While	on	paper	significant	reforms	were	 instituted,	many	merchants	remained	unhappy	with	the	reforms,	which	Zhu	(1993:	107)	partly	owing	to	a	lack	of	mechanisms	to	implement	and	enforce	the	paper	laws.	Specifically,	while	there	were	specific	efforts	and	regulations	made	at	the	national	level	that	looked	to	encourage	private	economic	activity,	in	practice,	these	were	constantly	undermined	at	the	local	level	by	government	officials	intent	on	using	their	access	to	state	power	to	extract	wealth	from	private	actors.	Zhu	quotes	a	Hubei-based	merchant	who	discussed	the	difficulties	he	experienced	in	dealing	with	local-level	officials:	"government	 officials	 at	 the	 prefecture-level,	 county-level	 and	 town-level—and	 even	sometimes	their	associates	and	relatives—	would	trouble	my	business	activities	by	asking	for	money	or	favours.	If	I	do	not	satisfy	their	requests,	then	they	use	their	political	power	to	block	my	access	to	bidding	for	government	contracts,	or	to	receive	permission	to	undertake	a	new	business	activity,	or	they	will	ignore	their	responsibilities	as	objective	arbitrators	in	regard	to	my	relations	with	other	private	businesses"	(107,	translated).			It	was	 in	 the	enforcement	of	 laws	ostensibly	designed	to	protect	private	property	rights	where	 the	 weakness	 of	 the	 reform	 effort	 became	 most	 apparent,	 as	 the	 lack	 of	 an	independent	judiciary	prevented	placing	tangible	limits	state	actors	who	violated	private	property	 rights.	While	numerous	 judicial	 reformers,	 notably	 Shen	 Jiaben,	argued	 for	 the	necessity	 of	 the	 "abolition	 of	 the	 traditional	 practice	 in	 which	 administrative	 officials	exercise	judicial	powers...	[lacking]	non-interference	from	other	government	authorities"	(cited	in	Xu	1997:	3).	Whatever	the	limited	protection	the	existing	judicial	framework	did	offer	was	further	circumscribed	by	the	lack	of	capacity	to	deal	with	an	increasingly	complex	commercial	landscape	that	accompanied	the	development	of	industrial	enterprise.	As	Hsiao	(1967),	Crossley	(2010:	46),	Bouye	(2014),	To	(2016:	37)	and	others	relate,	the	supporting	judicial	 framework	 proved	 increasing	 inadequate,	 having	 failed	 to	 expand	 in	 line	 with	substantial	population	growth	experienced	under	the	Qing;	Zelin	(2005b)	estimates	there	could	be	as	high	as	only	one	magistrate	per	every	300,000	citizens.	
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	Moreover,	the	structure	of	the	Qing	legal	system	itself	presented	limits	on	the	ability	of	the	judicial	system	to	provide	independent	credible	commitment	mechanisms	on	the	exercise	of	executive	power.	Although	serving	as	arbitrators	of	the	law,	magistrates	fundamentally	served	as	part	of	the	executive	role	of	the	government.	As	Fa	(1980:	21)	notes,	magistrates	were	government	officials	concerned	with	administrative	matters	that	reached	far	beyond	the	 interpretation	of	 legal	doctrines.	 "As	the	 judicial	system	was	not	separated	 from	the	executive	 branch	 of	 government	 in	 traditional	 China,	 the	magistrates	 had	 to	 perform	 a	variety	 of	 administrative	 functions	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 administration	 of	 justice.	 Those	included	tax	collection,	maintenance	of	social	order,	education,	social	welfare,	granaries,	and	supervision	of	local	public	work.	Hence,	magistrates	were	not	primarily	legal	officers,	but	administrative	officers	of	the	government."	Fa	continues	by	noting	that	given	the	type	of	knowledge	required	to	pass	the	civil	service	examination	system,	magistrates	"lacked	the	necessary	legal	knowledge	and	training."		The	 lack	of	 judicial	 independence	and	 legal	bureaucratic	capacity	 implied	weak	credible	commitment	mechanisms	 to	 limit	 the	 power	 of	 an	 authoritative	 state,	which	 negatively	impacted	 the	 development	 path	 of	 private	 enterprise	 during	 the	 late	 Qing	 period.	 For	instance,	 the	 successful	 profitability	 of	 a	 private	 venture	 frequently	 led	 to	 government	takeover	 the	 company	as	a	way	 to	 capture	 its	profits.	The	 lack	of	an	 independent	 court	system	 meant	 such	 abuses	 of	 government	 power	 could	 occur	 unchecked.	 Numerous	examples	abound.	In	1905,	after	the	completion	of	an	official	government	field	report	on	mining	 production	 in	 Guangdong	 showed	 that	 the	 privately-owned	 Qujiang	 Baochang	Coalmine	Company	was	generating	large	profits,	state	officials	issued	orders	that	brought	it	under	government	management	several	years	later	(Gong	1999:	262).			Zhu	(1993)	cites	multiple	similar	examples	of	government	expropriation	that	took	place	in	various	provinces,	including	an	instance	where	Hunan	officials	dispensed	with	the	standard	rationalisations	of	"national	industrial	development"	and	openly	admitted	their	behaviour	was	 purely	 financially	 motivated,	 stating	 their	 decision	 to	 nationalise	 private	 mining	companies	was	undertaken	"to	improve	the	future	outlook	of	the	financial	difficulties	facing	the	 province"	 (107);	 that	 is,	 to	 capture	 privately-generated	wealth	 to	 address	 spending	deficits	 created	 by	 public	 officials.	 Such	 blatant	 instances	 of	 violations	 of	 the	 recently-promulgated	commercial	laws	led	merchants	to	perceive	the	laws	as	ultimately	ineffective	given	the	lack	of	associated	mechanisms,	such	as	effective	judicial	safeguards,	that	would	have	been	able	to	provide	a	shield	from	the	leviathan	nature	of	the	expropriatory	state.	Zhu	finds	expressions	of	such	perceptions	in	his	research	of	Hubei's	archival	resources,	relaying	the	sentiments	of	a	leading	prominent	Hankow	merchant	who	complained	that	"without	sufficient	 enforcement	 mechanisms	 behind	 commercial	 law	 to	 prevent	 government	interference	 in	 private	matters,	 successful	 industrialisation	 will	 never	 take	 place"	 (Zhu	1993:	103).		Thus,	 despite	 a	 multitude	 of	 legislative	 efforts	 centred	 on	 formal	 codification	 of	 legal	precepts,	Qing	legal	reforms	largely	failed	to	bring	about	significant	improvements	in	the	nature	 of	 private	 property	 rights;	 as	 per	 Huang	 (2001:29),	 there	 was	 "little	 actually	accomplished	in	civil	and	judicial	reform."	Adherence	to	new	reforms	was	weakened	and	sometimes	 counteracted	 by	 state	 actors'	 behaviour,	 with	 few	 credible	 commitment	mechanisms	supporting	codified	laws.	With	both	government	officials	and	private	actors	suppressing	private	information	as	a	strategy	to	tie	the	grabbing	hands	of	an	absolutist	state	(Ma	 2014),	 the	 ability	 of	 officials	 to	 gain	 information	 needed	 to	 formulate	 effective	protections	on	private	property	rights	was	limited	(Sng	2014).				
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4.2.2.2.		Legal	Development	under	the	Beiyang	Government			With	the	fall	of	the	Qing	and	following	the	short-lived	Transitional	Guomindang	regime,	the	Beiyang	government	came	to	power	with	an	absence	of	an	established	legal	code	of	its	own,	and	hence	Qing	laws	continued	to	be	applied.	However,	legal	reform	was	a	stated	priority	for	the	new	republican	government—aside	from	providing	a	new	legal	framework	for	China,	having	 a	developed	modern	 legal	 system	was	 viewed	 as	 a	way	 to	 persuade	 the	 foreign	powers	to	relinquish	their	rights	of	extraterritoriality	and	for	the	government	to	reclaim	sovereignty,	and	more	importantly,	gain	legitimacy	in	the	eyes	of	the	public.			From	 1912	 to	 1927,	 dozens	 of	 codified	 laws	 and	 ordinances	 were	 issued,	 including	 an	amended	criminal	code,	 litigation	procedure	laws,	civil	dispute	arbitration	laws,	security	and	police	laws,	and	a	press	law.	Attention	was	devoted	to	the	development	of	commercial	laws,	designed	to	decrease	ambiguity	within	 the	code	and	 increase	specificity,	with	new	codes	 enacted	 to	 cover	 areas	 including	 trade,	 mining,	 finance,	 agriculture,	 commercial	societies	 and	 utilisation	 of	 foreign	 funds.	 For	 example,	 while	 the	 Qing	 reform	 period	produced	a	Shangren	tongli	(Customs	and	Usages	of	Merchants)	law	that	had	contained	nine	clauses,	 the	subsequent	Beiyang	legal	reform	expanded	the	 law	to	 include	seventy-three	clauses.	Likewise,	the	late-Qing	Code	contained	a	total	of	121	clauses	related	to	company	regulations;	 these	 were	 combined	 and	 modified	 to	 produce	 the	 Beiyang	 government's	
Gongsi	Tiaoli	(Company	Regulations),	whose	251	clauses	laid	out	rules	regarding	corporate	credit	and	investors'	rights.	By	July	1914,	the	Company	Registration	Rules	and	Commercial	Registration	Rules	laid	out	a	formalised	corporate	registration	system.		Laws	dealing	with	specific	industries	were	also	issued;	for	instance,	new	mining	rules	in	1914	provided	specific	provisions	on	ownership	of	mining	rights,	reduced	mining	taxes,	and	regulated	 the	 size	of	mining	 areas.	New	 laws	were	promulgated	governing	 chambers	of	commerce	and	commercial	associations,	as	well	as	a	whole	series	of	financial	regulations,	such	as	the	December	1914	Securities	Exchange	Law	(9
')	allowing	the	formation	of	private	securities	exchanges	to	trade	government	bonds	and	private	securities.	Following	these	laws,	the	Beijing	Stock	Exchange	was	formed	in	1918,	with	the	Shanghai	Security	and	Goods	Exchange	and	the	China	Merchants	Securities	Exchange	opening	in	Shanghai	in	1920	and	1921,	respectively.	The	1914	Company	Regulations	also	contained	clauses	designed	to	create	a	standardised	national	set	of	accounting	rules	(Peng	&	Brown	2017:	179).			Overall,	 the	Beiyang	government's	 legislative	 efforts	 represented	 a	more	 extensive	 legal	reform	process	than	that	undertaken	during	the	Qing.	The	degree	to	which	they	increased	or	decreased	protections	on	private	property	rights,	however,	is	at	best	mixed;	as	discussed	in	 Chapter	 Seven,	 the	 application	 of	 security	 and	 police	 laws	was	 used	 to	 supress	 free	expression	and	justify	the	expropriation	of	private	property	and	constrain	citizen	freedoms.	Other	 laws	 impacted	 commercial	 behaviour.	 For	 example,	 the	 new	 Company	 Code	 was	associated	 with	 an	 increase	 of	 industrial	 corporations	 formed	 under	 the	 new	 process.	According	to	the	government	registry,	from	1903	to	1908,	two	hundred	sixty-five	industrial	companies	were	registered;	an	additional	seven	hundred	ninety-four	were	registered	from	1912	 to	 1921	 (Feurerwerker	 1958:4;	 Li	 &	 Li	 2011:	 338).	 Nonetheless,	 many	 areas	 of	commercial	matters	remained	unaddressed	by	the	new	legal	codes,	prompting	the	Supreme	Court	to	issue	a	ruling	that	judges	should,	in	the	absence	of	express	legal	provisions,	rely	upon	"custom,	and	principles	of	reason	and	right"	(Wu	1928:	239).			While	the	breadth	of	legal	reform	was	aggressive,	political	instability	and	an	attendant	lack	of	bureaucratic	capacity	begat	mixed	success	in	regard	to	implementation	of	the	new	laws.	Of	those	laws	implemented,	however,	many	reflected	the	trend	of	an	increasing	role	of	the	state	in	private	agents'	daily	lives,	and	in	regard	to	economic	matters	in	particular.	The	state	became	more	 actively	 involved	 in	monitoring	 and	controlling	what	had	previously	been	
	 67 
considered	private	matters,	or	at	the	least,	not	the	concern	of	the	national	government.	The	enactment	 of	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 Law,	 for	 instance,	 explicitly	 required	 Chinese	merchants	in	all	major	cities	to	form	business	associations	(shanghui),	and	specified	their	organisational	structure,	the	leadership	of	which	was	intended	to	not	only	help	inform	the	business	community	about	new	government	laws,	but	also	help	to	enforce	their	compliance.			In	 addition,	 business	 associations	 were	 required	 to	 collect	 information	 about	 the	 local	business	community	and	pass	such	information	along	to	local	government	officials.	The	role	of	such	legislation,	therefore,	served	far	more	as	a	potential	threat	to	the	maintenance	of	private	property	rights,	than	as	potential	enhancement,	in	that	it	indicates	an	example	of	a	top-down	approach	from	central	bureaucrats	seemingly	less	interested	in	simply	providing	a	secure	set	of	rules	to	the	business	community,	and	more	interested	in	generating	tools	of	control.	Note	 that	as	 these	regulations	mandating	registration	of	business	activities	took	place	 in	an	environment	defined	by	 instances	of	government	expropriation	of	profitable	companies,	as	described	above.	Hence,	private	business	owners	and	investors	might	have	well	been	apt	to	see	many	of	these	attempts	at	information	gathering	and	monitoring	by	the	state	as	potentially	leading	to	infringements	on	property	rights.		In	1921,	the	government	undertook	an	internationally-coordinated	attempt	to	negotiate	a	revocation	of	extraterritoriality,	with	negotiations	taking	place	in	Washington	D.C.	at	the	so-called	Washington	 Conference.	 The	 ultimately	 unsuccessful	 Chinese	 delegation's	 efforts	were	considerably	weakened	by	the	fact	that	the	country	was	in	the	midst	of	civil	war.	The	meeting	did	produce,	however,	an	agreement	by	Western	powers,	led	by	the	U.S.,	to	form	a	commission	to	evaluate	China’s	judicial	system	and	the	methods	of	juridical	administration	to	"assist	and	further	the	efforts	of	the	Chinese	Government	to	effect	such	legislation	and	judicial	reforms	as	would	warrant	the	several	Powers	in	relinquishing,	either	progressively	or	 otherwise,	 their	 respective	 rights	 of	 extraterritoriality"	 (Resolution	 of	 Washington	Conference	1921).	The	start	of	work	by	 the	commission	was	delayed	 for	over	 two	year,	however,	by	the	continuance	of	large-scale	civil	war,	causing	the	Beijing-based	government	to	repeatedly	request	delays	to	the	arrival	of	the	commission	(Mah	1924:	676).		The	 Commission	 conducted	 extensive	 investigations,	 and	 by	1926,	 a	 final	 Report	 of	 the	Commission	 on	 Extraterritoriality	 in	 China	 [RCEC]	 was	 produced.	 The	 Commission's	findings	were	not	all	negative.	As	Tang	(1937:	2-3)	notes,	the	Report	commended	the	quality	of	commercial	law	produced	by	the	Law	Codification	Commission	('03)	of	the	late	Qing	and	Republican	era.	However,	as	the	report	made	clear,	 it	was	not	the	laws	produced	as	much	as	the	lack	of	consistency	of	their	enforcement,	as	well	as	the	lack	of	adherence	to	the	appropriate	enactment	process	of	the	laws,	that	was	troubling.			First,	it	was	noted	that	since	the	establishment	of	the	Republic	in	1912,	three	constitutions	(the	Provisional	Constitution	of	1912,	Constitutional	Compact	of	1914,	and	Constitution	of	1923)	had	been	declared	to	be	in	force,	and	then	yet	then	quickly	disregarded	by	political	actors.	Further,	few	of	the	new	laws	had	been	actually	confirmed	by	the	legislative	body	in	the	method	prescribed	 in	 the	 constitutions;	 instead,	 laws	were	 typically	 simply	directly	mandated	by	orders	of	the	President	or	the	Ministry	of	Justice,	neither	of	which	had	any	legal	 or	 constitutional	 authority	 to	 enact	 law.	 The	 parliament,	 ostensibly	 the	 legislative	branch	of	the	government,	was	"ephemeral	in	nature	and	having	contributed	but	little	to	the	legislation	of	the	country"	(RCEC	1926:	62).	Further,	the	Commission	found	that	laws	"have	been	declared	to	be	law	by	the	Central	Government	at	Peking	but	such	laws	are	not	universally	applied	in	all	parts	of	China,"	attributing	this	to	two	causes:	"the	open	refusal	of	certain	 parts	 of	 China	 to	 recognize	 the	 Central	 Government,	 and	 the	 promulgation	 of	subsidiary	 legislation	 by	 provincial	 and	 other	 power	 authorities	 without	 constitutional	authority".	In	general,	"the	reins	of	government	have	fallen	into	the	hands	of	the	military	leaders	 who,	 by	 virtue	 of	 their	 powerful	 position,	 can	 assume	 at	 will	 administrative,	legislative	and	judicial	functions,	thus	tending	to	obliterate	the	line	of	demarcation	between	the	executive,	legislative,	and	judicial	branches	of	the	government"	(RCEC	1926:	97-98).	
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Moreover,	the	Report	found	that	the	Treasury	had	been	depleted	to	such	an	extent	that	the	government	had	trouble	making	salary	payments	to	the	judicial	and	police	officials,	which	increased	the	chance	of	corruption,	and	it	was	""interference	with	the	departments	of	civil	government	by	the	military	leaders"	that	the	Report	identified	as	one	of	"the	chief	factors	preventing	 the	effective	administration	of	 justice"	 (RCEC	1926:	90-91).	The	Report	cited	eleven	specific	examples	that	took	place	around	the	time	of	the	investigation	to	illustrate	the	lack	of	due	process	and	enforcement	of	law.	These	included	actions	such	as	the	arrest	and	summary	execution	without	trial	of	the	chief	justice	of	the	high	court	of	Shandong	on	the	order	of	 the	military	governor	based	on	the	charge	being	 in	communication	with	an	opposing	military	faction;	execution	of	an	editor	of	the	Beijing-based	Chinese	newspaper	
Chingpao	by	military	authorities	on	account	of	editorial	writings	alleged	to	be	propaganda	against	the	military;	the	arrest	and	shooting	of	a	local	official	in	charge	of	salt	tax	collection	in	Chengdu	for	reason	that	he	had	incurred	the	governor's	displeasure	in	connection	with	the	 handling	 of	 the	 salt	 tax	 funds;	 a	 military-issued	 order	 to	 "behead"	 anyone	 who	speculated	in	an	issue	of	military	notes	in	circulation	in	Beijing;	and	the	execution	of	five	men	 at	 Mukden	 without	 trial	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 large	 crowd	 after	 being	 accused	 of	speculating	in	the	paper-note	issue	of	the	Fengtian	authorities	(RCEC	1926:	90-96).		The	instances	cited	in	the	report	were	reflective	of	a	legal	system	unable	to	enforce	the	rule	of	law	through	its	enforcement	mechanisms,	given	the	disconnect	between	codified	law	and	actual	enforcement.	Executions	without	trial	and	political	assassinations	were	prohibited	under	the	existing	Beiyang	legal	system,	as	were	takings	of	private	property	by	government	actors.	The	persistence	and	frequency	of	such	extra-legal	incidents	were	indicative	of	the	nature	of	the	authoritarian	Beiyang	state.	So,	too,	was	the	lack	of	an	independent	judiciary	that	could	serve	to	properly	enforce	codified	law	or	serve	as	an	effective	check	on	arbitrary	exercise	of	executive	power.	As	contemporaneous	legal	analyses	by	Tyau	(1912:	143-145)	and	Mah	(1924:	692-694)	note,	the	extensive	number	of	new	courts	established	failed	to	be	accompanied	 by	 impartial	 and	 effectual	 judges	who	 could	 administer	 the	 law.	 This	was	symbolic	of	the	lack	of	credible	commitment	mechanisms,	leaving	private	actors	seemingly	unconvinced	 that	 objective	 legal	 protections	 existed,	 as	 opposed	 to	 arbitrary	 "law"	exercised	by	 those	possessing	 state	power.	The	 conclusions	drawn	by	 the	Report	 of	 the	Commission	on	Extraterritoriality	reflected	such	assessments	of	the	Beiyang	legal	system,	claiming	"it	is	well	within	the	range	of	moderation	to	state	that	in	China	at	the	present	time	there	is	no	effective	security	against	arbitrary	action	by	the	military	authorities	with	respect	to	life,	liberty,	or	property"	(RCEC	1926:	97-98).			4.2.2.3.		Legal	Development	under	the	Guomindang	Government			From	1928	onwards,	reforming	the	Chinese	legal	system	by	establishing	a	western-styled	legal	and	penal	system	was	one	of	the	stated	top	priorities	of	the	Guomindang	Party	agenda.	The	newly	formed	Legislative	Yuan	was	tasked	with	the	responsibility	for	enacting	the	kind	of	comprehensive	legal	reform	first	broached	by	the	Law	Codification	Committee	formed	in	late	 Qing,	 with	 a	 new	 Commission	 of	 Codification	 of	 Law	 formed	 in	 1927.	 Overall,	 the	Commission	helped	to	produce	an	estimated	4,369	laws	and	regulations	that	were	enacted	from	1927	to	October	1936	(Yu	1993:	32),	including	the	Civil	Code	(1929),	Company	Law	(1929),	Insurance	Law	(1929),	Maritime	Law	(1929),	Negotiable	Instruments	Law	(1929),	the	 Code	 of	 Civil	 Procedures	 (1935),	 Bankruptcy	 Law	 (1935),	 the	 Code	 of	 Criminal	Procedures	(1935),	and	Trademark	Law	(1936)	(Fa	1980:	34).			However,	the	codification	of	laws	was	less	problematic	in	regard	to	the	fulfilment	of	legal	reform,	than	was	the	actual	implementation	of	said	laws.	Considerable	attention	has	been	paid	 in	 the	 literature	on	 the	 legal	 aspects	 of	Guomindang	 state-building	 efforts,	 and	 the	intensity	with	which	the	state	created	new	laws	and	legal	regulations	on	a	wide	variety	of	
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matters.	 Paauw	 (1957:	216)	discusses	 the	 fanfare	 and	public	proclamation	 given	 to	 the	passage	of	Land	Laws,	designed	to	realise	Sun	Zhongshan's	advocacy	of	equalisation	of	land	ownership,	but	which	were	not	 implemented	after	 their	enactment.	Rawski	(1989:	141)	discusses	the	lack	of	implementation	in	regard	to	a	set	of	enacted	legislation	designed	to	enforce	 women's	 rights	 in	 the	 workplace,	 in	 educational	 opportunities,	 and	 within	 the	political	process,	none	of	which	were	meaningfully	actualised.			Judicial	reform	was	considered	an	issue	of	concern,	especially	in	the	area	of	civil	law,	given	the	 historical	 lack	 of	 codification	 in	 the	 area.	 The	 principal	 author	 of	 the	 Guomindang	Constitution,	Wu	(1928:	239)	discusses	at	length	in	his	1928	treatise	on	Chinese	law	Judicial	
Essays	and	Studies	that	the	Supreme	Court	of	China	had	put	forth	the	way	in	which	civil	law	decisions	 were	 to	 be	 made:	 "civil	 cases	 are	 to	 be	 decided	 first	 according	 to	 express	provisions	of	law;	in	the	absence	of	express	provisions	of	law,	according	to	custom;	and	in	the	absence	of	custom,	according	to	the	principles	of	reason	and	right."	As	he	further	notes,	express	 provisions	 of	 law	 should	 serve	 as	 the	 "primary	 source"	 for	 decisions	 making;	however,	 given	 the	 general	 absence	 of	 civil	 code,	 there	 had	 been	 no	 such	 procedure	 as	"express	provisions"	under	the	Qing	and	the	Beiyang	Republic.	Hung	(1932:	7-8),	writing	a	few	 years	 after	 Wu,	 expresses	 nearly	 the	 same	 arguments,	 and	 indeed	 cites	 the	 same	Supreme	Court	decision,	arguing	further	that	the	absence	of	codified	civil	law	meant	that	legal	 opinions	 themselves	 carried	 extra	 weight:	 "In	 the	 view	 of	 the	 limited	 amount	 of	express	provisions	and	 the	 strict	 limit	 on	 the	application	of	 custom,	 the	precedents	 laid	down	by	the	Supreme	Court	thus	have	occupied	a	place	of	importance	in	the	field	of	law."	Hence,	the	judicial	reform	process	was	viewed	as	tied	to	the	codification	of	civil	law	itself.			In	addition	to	codifying	laws,	the	government	also	initiated	judicial	reforms	to	replace	the	magistrate	courts	with	a	new	formal	court	system	to	enforce	the	newly	promulgated	codes,	with	the	1931	Organic	Law	establishing	the	Judicial	Yuan	responsible	for	the	interpretation	of	the	law	(Ch'ien	1950:	132-133).	From	1926	to	1937,	the	number	of	courts	grew	from	139	to	457	(Xu	1997:	26).	In	his	review	of	judicial	reforms	undertaken	by	the	Guomindang	Party,	Tang	(1937:	7-10)	discusses	the	impact	of	the	Law	of	Judicial	Organisation,	enacted	in	July	1935,	noting	that	within	the	course	of	one	year	(July	1935	through	September	1936),	over	155	new	"modern"	courts	had	been	established	(replacing	the	older	"official-magistrate"	style	courts	 that	had	existed	since	 the	Qing	 in	most	 localities),	bringing	 the	 total	 to	395	modern	 courts	 in	China	 at	 the	 time.	 Such	 a	 figure,	 however,	 represented	 a	 considerable	shortfall	in	coverage,	as	over	1,400	localities	lacked	funds	to	establish	modern	courts,	nor	did	it	include	the	three	provinces	that	at	the	time	were	under	the	control	of	the	Communist	Party,	nor	Manchuria	under	control	of	the	Japanese	puppet	regime.	Efforts	introduced	in	1937	organised	"judicial	offices"	in	localities	lacking	modern	courts	to	work	with	the	local	magistrates	and	help	standardise	the	application	of	law	(Tang	1937:16).	By	1937,	with	the	passage	of	the	Six	Codes	and	creation	of	a	judicial	system	modelled	on	European	systems,	China	achieved	a	relatively	extensive	system	of	codified	law.	On	paper	at	least,	Guomindang	government	efforts	succeeded	in	building	a	more	comprehensive	legal	framework	than	had	previously	existed	in	China,	particularly	in	the	areas	of	private	civil	and	commercial	law.		According	 to	the	negotiations	surrounding	the	Treaty	of	Nanjing	and	subsequent	similar	treaties,	the	claimed	justification	by	western	powers	for	the	imposition	of	extraterritoriality	had	been	that	the	existing	Chinese	legal	system	was	inadequate.	Of	particular	concern	was	the	 issue	of	 judicial	 independence,	with	additional	wording	 in	 the	Commercial	Treaty	of	1902	 noting	 that	 Britain	would	 have	 no	 objection	 to	 ending	 extraterritoriality	 once	 the	Chinese	 judges	 "have	 attained	 similar	 legal	 qualifications	 and	 a	 similar	 independent	position	to	those	of	British	Judges."	While	the	ultimate	sincerity	of	such	words	might	well	be	 considered	 doubtful,	 the	 emphasis	 on	 judicial	 independence	 was	 a	 stated	 primary	concern	 of	 the	 treaty	 nations	 for	 most	 of	 the	 extraterritorial	 period.	 As	 such,	 judicial	independence	was	a	consistently	expressed	important	goal	of	Guomindang	legal	reformers.	
	 70 
	However,	 in	 terms	 of	 actual	 application	 of	 law,	 much	 of	 the	 arbitrariness—including	uncertainty	 regarding	 the	potential	 for	 government	 expropriation	of	 private	property—that	 plagued	 the	 Qing	 and	 Beiyang	 legal	 systems	 prevailed.	 While	 the	 Guomindang	government	made	 progress	 in	 building	 the	 physical	machinery	 of	 a	 judicial	 system,	 the	result	was	far	from	the	expressed	goal	of	an	"independent	judiciary"	that	could	provide	a	check	on	the	power	of	the	government	by	preventing	the	executive	branch,	imbued	with	authoritarian	power,	from	undertaking	expropriatory	actions.			Two	primary	reasons	contributed	to	the	failure	of	the	creation	of	an	effective	independent	judiciary	 that	 could	 help	 credibly	 check	 the	 power	 of	 the	 state.	 First,	 the	 Guomindang	government	 never	 obtained	 sufficient	 levels	 of	 administrative	 competence,	 or	 financial	capacity,	 to	 allow	 implementation	 of	 comprehensive	 judicial	 reform.	 As	 noted,	 funding	constraints	on	the	Ministry	of	Justice	led	it	unable	to	establish	a	planned	one	thousand	three	hundred	sixty-seven	county	courts	by	1937,	with	instead	less	than	four	hundred	created.	With	nearly	half	the	government	budget	going	towards	military	expenditures,	 there	was	little	funding	available	to	go	towards	"peripheral"	projects	such	as	judicial	reform.		Second,	 the	 inability	 of	 the	 judiciary	 to	 serve	 as	a	check	on	government	power	was	not	unintentional—the	Guomindang	Party	leadership	lacked	appropriate	incentives	to	create	credible	commitment	mechanisms	that	could	have	served	as	actual	 limits	on	 the	Party's	power.	While	 some	 legal	 reformers	 perhaps	 had	a	 desire	 to	 create	 a	 truly	 independent	judiciary,	 the	Party	 leadership	 through	 its	 actions	 indicated	 a	much	greater	 concern	 for	ensuring	that	the	judiciary	functioned	so	as	to	explicitly	advance	Party	goals.	Zheng	Ju,	who	served	as	Chief	Justice	of	the	Supreme	Court	under	the	Guomindang,	argued	that	all	judges	must	be	Party	members,	and	moreover	must	accept	and	apply	the	Party's	"Three	Principles	of	 the	 People"	 in	 their	 decisions	 (Zheng	 1934).	 While	 such	 a	 conceptualisation	 of	 the	judiciary's	 role—to	 serve	 to	 advance	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 particular	 Party	 in	 control	 of	executive	power—is	antithetical	to	the	functioning	of	a	truly	independent	judiciary,	judicial	independence	remained	the	touted	goal.	Ironically,	"partyising"	the	judiciary	(>')	was	openly	discussed	by	Party	leadership	as	an	important	(if	inherently	inconsistent)	technique	to	develop	an	"independent"	judiciary.	Guomindang	Party	official	Xu	Qian	argued	that	the	Beiyang	policy	of	prohibiting	judges	from	being	members	of	a	political	party	was	misguided,	as	"the	judicial	apparatus	must	be	controlled	by	the	political"	(quoted	in	Xu	1997:9-10).			The	 "Partyising	 the	 judiciary"	 strategy	 was	 implemented	 in	 part	 by	 appointing	 only	Guomindang	 party	members	 to	 judicial	 posts.	 In	May	 1927,	 at	 the	 inaugural	 ceremony	appointing	the	Chief	Justice	of	the	Provisional	Court	in	Shanghai's	International	Settlement,	Chen	Dezheng,	the	head	of	the	Propaganda	Department	of	the	Guomindang	party	municipal	headquarters,	delivered	a	speech	urging	the	new	Chief	Justice	to	"uphold	the	doctrine	and	the	 traditions	 of	 the	 Kuomintang	 in	 the	 administration	 of	 justice	 according	 to	 the	 law"	(NCDN	17	May	1927:	12).	The	irony	of	the	message	did	not	go	unnoticed	at	the	time.	The	editor	of	the	North	China	Daily	News	observed:	"We	fail	to	see	how	Mr	Loo	[the	new	Justice]	can	honestly	use	a	 law	court	 to	 forward	the	 interests	of	 the	Party	and	at	 the	same	time	administer	justice"	(NCDN	19	May	1927:	6).	Indeed,	Justice	Lu	apparently	did	find	such	a	proposition	problematic,	as	he	was	dismissed	from	the	position	after	but	five	months	after	failing	 to	observe	a	command	 from	the	Guomindang	military	 to	order	 the	extradition	of	several	 Communist	 Party	 members	 who	 had	 been	 arrested	 within	 the	 International	Settlement,	since	Chinese	police	lacked	jurisdiction	over	arrests	within	the	Settlement.	His	replacement,	Justice	He,	was	appointed	in	no	small	part	given	his	assurance	to	"abide	by	the	decisions	of	the	party	and	do	the	best	to	carry	out	party	principles"	(Xu	1997:12).				
	 71 
	Yet,	indicative	of	the	multidimensional	nature	of	the	property	rights	environment,	it	is	also	possible	to	identify	examples	where	the	judicial	system	served	as	a	constraining	force	on	the	 unconstrained	 exercise	 of	 executive	 state	 power,	 even	 under	 an	 authoritarian	Guomindang	state.	For	instance,	Thai	(2015:34-35),	in	an	examination	of	the	Guomindang	legal	 system	 and	 its	 enforcement	 of	 antismuggling	 provisions,	 identifies	 the	 case	 a	Shandong	merchant	accused	of	sugar	smuggling	in	1934,	and	 in	 the	process	beaten	by	a	state-employed	customs	agent,	and	his	goods	seized	by	the	customs	authorities.	Bringing	a	complaint	against	the	customs	agency	in	district	court,	it	was	ruled	in	his	favour	that	the	raiding	customs	agents	themselves	had	violated	the	Criminal	Code	by	inflicting	bodily	hard	against	 the	merchant—notably,	 this	 ruling,	 Thai	 notes,	 was	 upheld	 when	 the	 case	 was	appealed	to	higher	courts.	The	accused	merchant,	however,	was	successfully	convicted	by	court	 under	 antismuggling	 codes	 based	 on	 the	 charges	 by	 the	 customs	 agents.	 Higher	provincial	 courts	 upheld	 the	 conviction	 upon	 appeal;	 nonetheless,	 in	 1942,	 the	Administrative	Court	overturned	the	conviction,	citing	 insufficient	evidence	provided	by	the	customs	agents,	after	rejecting	submitted	testimony	that	was	later	attested	to	have	been	coerced	 by	 the	 police.	 Although	 the	 process	 took	 eight	 years	 to	 reach	 conclusion,	 the	recounting	of	 this	 court	 case	provides	 evidence	of	 a	 legal	 system	capable	of	 functioning	utilising	 standardised	 legal	 process	 norms	 of	 appeals	 and	 citations	 of	 evidentiary	procedures,	and	arriving	at	a	judgement	that	represented	a	repudiation	of	the	state's	right	to	wantonly	employ	state-sanctioned	violence	and	expropriation	without	proper	adherence	to	proscribed	legal	rules.	More	important,	it	provides	insight	into	the	potential	for	the	legal	system	 to	 operate	 with	 an	 important	 degree	 of	 independence,	 and	 to	 utilise	 such	independence	to	serve	in	ways	that	could	be	viewed	by	rational	agents	as	credibly	placing	boundaries	on	the	ability	of	state	actors	to	utilise	the	coercive	power	of	the	state	without	respect	to	rule	of	law	and	private	agents'	private	property.		While	 the	 prior	 example	 indicates	 the	 potential	 of	 the	 legal	 system,	 important	 caveats	temper	an	overly	positive	portrayal	of	the	legal	system	as	it	existed	under	the	Guomindang.	To	begin	with,	while	in	this	particular	case,	the	particular	presiding	judges	chose	to	apply	legal	precepts	in	achieving	their	finding	that	effectively	admonished	the	state,	the	fact	that	the	military	authorities	in	control	of	the	executive	could	order	the	removal	of	sitting	judges	operated	to	create	an	 incentive	 framework	on	 judges	 that	worked	against	such	 findings,	inherently	limiting	the	actual	independence	of	the	judicial	system.	Further,	as	Thai	(2015:	28-32)	notes,	 the	case	also	reveals	how	state	actors	 increasingly	 turned	 to	criminalising	previously-legitimate	customary	commercial	practices,	in	order	to	offset	weakness	in	the	bureaucratic	 capacity	 of	 the	 state	 to	 effectively	 implement	new	 regulatory	 enforcement	mechanisms,	which	Thai	characterises	as	one	of	‘overcriminalisation’,	implying	the	use	of	criminal	law	to	attempt	to	handle	regulatory	matters.	More	important,	the	case	becomes	interesting	to	highlight	insofar	as	it	represents	an	exception	to	the	normal	functioning	of	the	adjudicative	process,	as	opposed	to	signifying	a	common	example.	As	Thai	stresses,	the	overall	legal	system,	at	least	in	terms	of	antismuggling	prosecutions,	was	characterised	by	administrative	failure,	severe	enough	so	as	to	disallow	the	uniform	application	of	 justice.	The	number	of	outstanding	cases	far	outstripped	district	courts'	 infrastructural	capacity,	with	too	few	magistrates	to	arbitrate	cases,	and	overwhelmed	prison	systems,	leading	to	what	Thai	refers	to	as	a	systemic	"uneven	application	of	justice";	some	suspected	smugglers	were	 held	 incarcerated	without	 trial	 for	 periods	 of	 time	 greater	 than	 they	 would	 have	served	 had	 they	 been	 justly	 convicted	 of	 the	 accused	 crime,	while	 the	 accused	 in	 other	locales	often	were	quickly	released	without	being	formally	charged,	as	local	officials	were	disincentivised	 to	 pay	 the	 costs	 associated	with	 jailing	 and	 feeding	 inmates	 accused	 of	activities	designated	illegal	by	central	government	mandates	(32-34),	symbolising	a	justice	system	ultimately	defined	by	arbitrariness.		
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Beyond	 the	 lack	of	 judicial	 independence	 that	 constrained	 the	ability	 of	 the	 courts	 from	providing	credible	limits	on	governmental	power	in	regard	to	private	actors,	ineffective	or	corrupt	policing	further	contributed	to	the	perception	amongst	the	populace	that	an	overall	lack	of	rule	of	law	pervaded	society.	It	was	open	knowledge	that	there	existed	agreements	between	Guomindang	political	leaders	and	organised	crime	associations	which	permitted	these	associations	 to	conduct	 illegal	activities	such	as	drug	smuggling,	bribery	and	even	murder	in	return	for	support	of	Guomindang	political	objectives,	such	as	engaging	in	anti-communist	 or	 anti-Japanese	 purges	 or	 assisting	 in	 the	 assassinations	 of	 those	 whom	powerful	state	actors	considered	enemies	(Martin	1991,	Wakeman	1995a).	As	Woodhead	(1931)	 reports,	 corruption	 pervaded	 the	 legal	 enforcement	 system,	 including	 in	 its	supposed	 attempts	 to	 control	 opium	 smuggling.	 "The	 Opium	 Suppression	 Bureau,	 a	government	affair,	has	been	 functioning	 in	a	manner	peculiarly	its	own	 for	 the	past	 two	years.	At	times	a	guard	of	soldiers	and	men	bearing	what	are	said	to	be	the	credentials	of	the	O.S.B	approach	opium	runners	on	ships	and	receive	consignments	of	opium	for	which	they	pay	‘transportation	charges.’	At	other	times	a	great	show	of	a	seizure	is	made	but	those	‘in	the	know’	usually	hear	afterwards	that	the	consignment	was	the	property	of	some	small	man	not	in	the	Ring	and	that	the	drug	was	returned	to	him	on	payment	of	‘squeeze.’	"			The	common	knowledge	of	the	inability	or	unwillingness	by	government	actors	to	respect	the	rule	of	law	contributed	to	the	undermining	of	the	perceived	validity	of	the	entire	legal	system.	That	disrespect	of	rule	of	law	over	political	expediency	resided	at	the	top	of	state	leadership	 was	 exemplified	 by	 the	 interference	 the	 Smuggling	 Prevention	 Office	consistently	ran	into	from	government	officials	interested	in	protecting	the	ability	of	the	Party's	 ally,	 the	 Green	 Gang	 criminal	 organisation,	 to	 conduct	 its	 opium	 trade.	 In	 one	instance,	the	Smuggling	Prevention	Office	determined	that	members	of	Jiang's	own	inner	circle,	 including	 Jiang's	 brother-in-law,	 helped	 run	 a	 smuggling	 ring;	 in	 response,	 Jiang	ordered	 the	 case	 dismissed,	 and	 fired	 the	 director	 of	 the	 Smuggling	 Prevention	 Office,	defiantly	replacing	him	with	Du	Yuesheng,	the	leader	of	the	Green	Gang	(Wakeman	2003:	325-327;	Taylor	2014:	40).	That	 Jiang	had	 the	power	 to	have	 a	 criminal	 case	dismissed	underscores	the	complete	lack	of	judicial	independence	that	defined	the	legal	system.		The	environment	of	disregard	for	the	rule	of	law	continued	past	the	start	of	the	1937	Sino-Japanese	War	and	through	1941.	With	the	attack	on	Pearl	Harbour	and	the	United	States'	entry	 into	 the	 Pacific	 War,	 the	 majority	 of	 allied	 powers	 exercised	 a	 voluntary	relinquishment	 of	 extraterritoriality.	 Internal	 discussions	 of	 consular	 officials	 suggest	continuing	 concern	 over	 China's	 judicial	 system.	 The	 US	 Ambassador	 to	 China,	 upon	learning	 of	 the	 State	 Department's	 plans	 to	 abolish	 extraterritoriality,	 stated:	 "The	unsatisfactory	Chinese	police,	 judicial	and	prison	systems	have	not	 improved	during	 the	past	decade;	they	have,	in	fact,	suffered	in	retrograde;	and	unfortunately,	a	system	of	both	government	 and	 Party	 secret	 services	 has	 spread	 throughout	 the	 country	 and	 gained	extensive	 power	 and	 domination	 which	 seriously	 threatens	 the	 enjoyment	 of	 "four	freedoms"	 not	 only	 by	 Chinese	 people	 but	 by	 foreigners	 in	 this	 country"	 (FRUS	 1942.	711.933/374).	 In	 sum,	whatever	 advances	 that	 the	Guomindang	 state	made	 in	 terms	of	creating	 a	 more	 comprehensive	 judicial	 machinery	 and	 sophisticated	 legal	 system	 was	consistently	undermined	by	 the	 subsequent	disregard	 for	 that	 legal	 system	by	 the	 state	authority	structure	that	was	supposedly	implementing	it.		
	 73 
Chapter	Five.			
State	 Capacity:	 Protecting	 Private	 Property	 and	 Contract	 Rights	 via	 Effective	
Institutions	—	Bureaucratic	Capacity				Prior	 to	 the	 late-Qing	 period,	 it	 is	 arguable	 that	 the	 Chinese	 state	 apparatus	 exhibited	considerable	bureaucratic	capability—it	possessed	agency	to	institute	relatively	effective	tax	 collection	 schemes	 and	 conduct	 decennial	 population	 censuses,	 a	 civil	 service	appointment	 system	 based	 on	 a	 centuries-tested	 examination	 selection	 methodology,	currency	minting	procedures	to	ensure	standardisation	across	the	empire,	and	a	codified	legal	 system	 which	 revisionist	 literature	 has	 argued	 was	 well	 capable	 of	 adjudicating	criminal	justice	and	supporting	the	use	of	commercial	contracts.			The	 late-Qing	 period,	 however,	 brought	 forth	 new	 fiscal	 and	 political	 pressures	 that	severely	tested	the	administrative	state	bureaucracy's	capabilities.	The	challenges	the	late-Qing	 state	 faced	 were	 numerous	 and	 varied—external	 wars	 and	 internal	 rebellions,	economic	growth	dynamics	including	proto-industrialisation	and	foreign	trade	conducted	on	foreign	powers'	terms,	introduction	of	new	production	and	military	technologies,	and	increased	power	of	the	merchant	class	with	an	associated	increase	in	demands	for	greater	commercial	regulations	and	rights.	Perhaps	most	important	was	the	associated	substantial	increase	in	a	perceived	need	for	greater	financing	to	utilise	state	tools	to	address	many	of	these	 stressors,	 particularly	 to	meet	 the	 costs	 of	 fighting	multiple	 internal	 and	 external	military	ventures.	The	late-Qing	leadership	found	it	difficult	to	transform	the	low-tax	and	small	 fiscal	 footprint	 that	 defined	 earlier	 periods	 of	 the	 Qing	 into	 a	 state	 capable	 of	significantly	 increasing	 tax	 revenues	 to	 support	 greatly	 increased	 expenditures.	 In	particular,	the	state	initially	lacked	the	administrative	capacity	and	infrastructure	to	meet	these	 new	 needs.	 Domestic	 central	 governments	 succeeding	 the	 late-Qing	 also	 proved	overall	unable	to	successfully	meet	the	financing	needs	their	leaderships	continually	sought.		As	a	precursor	 to	the	 following	analysis	of	 the	 fiscal	issues	and	responses	 facing	China's	domestic	governments	over	the	late-Qing	and	republican	period,	we	want	to	be	careful	to	avoid	any	normative	suggestion	that	the	state	apparatus	should	have	expanded	in	order	to	successfully	address	the	issues	state	actors	perceived	as	requiring	serious	attention.	Indeed,	it	is	unlikely	the	entirety	of	the	set	of	potential	solutions	to	the	pertinent	issues	were	state-driven,	 or	 required	 larger	 expenditures.	While	 possible	 to	 argue	 that	 some	 increase	 in	expenditures	 was	 necessary	 to	 provide	 defence	 of	 the	 state	 against	 continued	 military	threats	by	 the	 foreign	powers	and	 Japan,	and	perhaps	to	address	in	military	 fashion	 the	Taiping,	Ning,	Miao,	Dungan	and	other	internal	rebellions,	even	in	this	respect	other	forms	of	 conflict-resolution	 strategies	 could	 have	 been	 employed	 that	 might	 have	 better	addressed	the	concerns	behind	the	external	and	rebellious	antagonists,	thereby	co-opting	them,	or,	more	radically,	contested	areas	could	have	been	ceded	greater	autonomy.		The	 analysis	 that	 follows,	 however,	 is	 less	 concerned	about	potential	 optimal	 strategies	state	actors	could	have	chosen,	as	opposed	to	analysing	the	actual	strategies	undertaken,	and	the	ability	of	the	state	bureaucracy	to	successfully	achieve	desired	goals.	Further,	we	focus	 less	 on	whether	 domestic	 institutions	might	 be	 considered	 strong	 in	 the	 sense	 of	simple	 functionality,	 as	 opposed	 to	 on	 the	 ability	 to	 limit	 violations	 of	 private	 property	rights.	The	historical	record	suggests	that	overall,	the	strategies	employed	centred	on	top-down	solutions,	 associated	with	attempts	 to	 increase	 the	 size	and	 functions	of	 the	 state	bureaucracy.	Thus,	for	instance,	in	regard	to	economic	issues,	state	actors	sought	to	direct	the	 nature	 of	 state-commerce	 relations	 and	 control	 the	 investment	 and	 managerial	decisions	of	private	entrepreneurs;	likewise,	on	a	broader	scale,	there	was	a	continual	trend	by	the	state	actors	to	control	ever-greater	portions	of	civil	society.	
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5.1.		Measuring	Bureaucratic	Capacity—Fiscal	Issues		State	capacity	is	most	frequently	operationalised	in	the	literature	along	two	vectors—tax	revenues,	 and	 infrastructural	 power	 (Ottervik	 2013,	 Acemoglu	 et	 al.	 2015:	 2365);	 as	Johnson	&	Koyama	(2017:	2)	state,	 "State	capacity	can	be	 thought	of	as	comprising	 two	components.	First,	a	high	capacity	state	must	be	able	to	enforce	its	rules	across	the	entirety	of	the	territory	it	claims	to	rule	(legal	capacity).	Second,	it	has	to	be	able	to	garner	enough	tax	revenues	from	the	economy	to	implement	its	policies	(fiscal	capacity)."	Remick	(2002:	404)	argues	it	is	the	tax	collection	function	to	be	of	primary	importance:	"Tax	and	public	finance	administration	is	the	key	internal	state	function.	Without	effective	means	to	extract	revenues	 or	 to	 allocate	 the	 revenues	 as	 desired,	 states	 can	 not	 perform	 their	 other	functions."	Views	on	the	importance	of	tax	collections	as	fundamental	to	conceptualisations	of	 state	 capacity	 owe	 their	 intellectual	 antecedents	 to	 arguments	 Schumpeter	 (1918)	presents	that	stress	the	very	nature	and	origin	of	the	state	was	defined	by	its	taxation	ability	and	functionality,	as	from	a	historical	perspective,	while	both	taxation	and	other	aspects	of	state	functions	developed	organically	and	proved	to	be	self-reinforcing,	the	development	of	other	 state	 functions	were	dependent	upon	 the	 state	 first	 developing	sufficient	 taxation	capability.	This	self-enforcing	aspect	is	noted	by	Strauss	(2008:216):	"tax	is	unusual	because	it	is	simultaneously	a	key	enabler	of	other	aspects	of	state-building...	and	a	reflective	(crude)	indicator	of	the	state's	institutional	capacity."	Akanbi	(2018)	presents	empirical	support	for	such	 dynamics,	 finding	 bi-directional	 causality,	 with	 "both	 tax	 capacity	 and	 institution	shocks	have	positive...	long-run	impacts	on	institutions	and	tax	capacity,	respectively"	(23).		In	 response	 to	 the	 aforementioned	 challenges	 presented	 by	 an	 evolving	 socio-political	landscape,	domestic	state	leadership	created	new	bureaucratic	offices	and	roles	to	increase	state	capacity,	many	of	which	centred	around	and	were	dependent	upon	increasing	state	fiscal	capacity.	These	efforts	included	methods	to	raise	revenue,	from	both	taxation	policies	and	by	way	of	issuing	of	government	bonds,	as	well	as	bureaucratic	structures	designed	to	direct	expenditures	towards	policy	formation	and	implementation	in	line	with	state	policy	goals.	 As	 a	 result,	 new	 governmental	 ministries,	 departments	 and	 commissions	 were	created,	centred	on	economic	planning	and	encouraging	industrial	innovation,	although	the	focus	of	most	remained	related	to	military	spending.			Yet	it	was	in	the	area	of	taxation	and	revenue	collection	that	the	domestic	state	possessed	particularly	weak	 capacity.	As	 Strauss	 (1997:	333)	notes,	 during	both	 the	 late	Qing	 and	Republican	periods,	"central	state	capacity	was	extremely	limited	with	respect	to	the	key	issues	of	taxation	and	personnel."	While	the	state	apparatus	grew	substantially	in	size	and	new	 bureaucratic	 departments	 designed	 to	 facilitate	 the	 state	 building	 process	 were	created,	many	of	them	lacked	the	efficacy	to	allow	implementation	of	policy	goals.	Much	of	the	 issues	 surrounding	 the	 state's	 inability	 to	 successfully	 implement	 the	 policies	 its	decision	makers	 so	desired	appear	 to	have	been	 fiscal	 in	nature,	with	 the	 state	 facing	a	continual	series	of	budget	deficits.		The	first	pertinent	issue	this	chapter	considers	is	an	analysis	of	domestic	state	fiscal	state	capacity.	In	general,	there	are	three	main	components	of	fiscal	capacity:	revenue	sources	via	tax	collection,	revenue	sources	from	loans,	and	control	mechanisms	over	expenditures.	As	 issues	 pertaining	 to	 loans	 as	 represented	 by	 bond	 issuances	 will	 be	 addressed	 in	extensive	detail	in	Part	IV	of	the	dissertation,	we	focus	the	majority	of	our	analysis	on	the	state's	 ability	 to	 successfully	 raise	 capital	 via	 its	 taxation	 policies,	 and	 the	 bureaucratic	structure	 that	 were	 designed	 to	 support	 and	 facilitate	 the	 implementation	 of	 taxation	policies,	 and	 determined	 the	 effectiveness	 and	 efficiency	 of	 the	 tax	 collection	 process.	Subsequently,	we	look	at	the	bureaucratic	fiscal	structures	and	capability	of	governmental	offices	designed	to	control	and	achieve	policy	goals	via	governmental	expenditures.		
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5.1.1.			Fiscal	Revenues—Tax	Collection		While	Deng	(2015:	328)	suggests	the	low	levels	of	tax	collection	reflected	factors	that	were	related	 to	 a	 cultural-political	 ideological	mindset	 amongst	 state	 actors,	 claiming	 "Heavy	taxation	remained	politically	taboo	from	the	Song	through	the	Qing,	other	more	structural	factors	appear	to	point	to	low	fiscal	capacity	playing	a	more	salient	role,	at	least	by	the	late-Qing	period.	In	regard	to	revenue	from	tax	collection,	the	national-level	domestic	state	did	not	 effectively	 address	 its	 ineffective	 tax	 collection	 scheme	 over	 multiple	 successive	national	 governments,	 from	 late-imperial	 times	 onwards,	 owing	 in	 general	 to	 two	main	factors.	First,	part	of	the	reason	was	circular	in	nature.	As	new	stressors	created	increased	financial	burdens,	increased	financing	was	necessitated;	without	bureaucratic	capacity	to	increase	 funds,	 the	 state	 lacked	 resources	 to	 reform	 or	 improve	 the	 bureaucracy;	 yet	without	reforming	the	bureaucracy,	the	state	could	not	bring	about	improvements	in	the	bureaucratic	efficiency	of	 tax	extraction.	Under	such	conditions,	Qing	and	later	domestic	government	actors	found	themselves	caught	in	a	circular	trap	that	severely	limited	their	ability	to	undertake	meaningful	reform.		Second,	the	central	state's	inability	to	manage	tax	collection	was	primarily	due	to	a	poorly	designed	and	administered	tax	collection	methodology.	By	late	Qing,	aside	from	Maritime	Customs	duties,	most	major	 taxes	 such	 as	 lijin,	 salt	monopoly,	 and	 land	 tax	were	under	provincial	 and	 local	 administration.	 These	 indirect	 taxes	 were	 officially	 to	 be	 collected	locally	but	then	transferred	in	full	to	the	national	central	government.	In	practise,	however,	this	 system	 generated	 adverse	 incentives,	 with	 local	 tax	 collectors	 possessing	 both	opportunity	and	ability	to	engage	in	massive	corruption.	Although	Strauss	(1997)	and	Kung	&	Ma	(2014)	maintain	that	the	Qing	civil	service	examination	system	provides	an	example	of	a	"good"	institution	(and	one	that	also	helped	to	indoctrinate	individuals	studying	the	Confucian	texts	to	act	as	"good	men"),	thus	limiting	the	amount	of	corruption	in	the	civil	service	administration,	detailed	analysis	of	archival	records	suggests	that	by	the	late-Qing,	corruption	was	already	a	significant	problem.	Much	of	this	evidence	is	provided	by	research	based	on	an	exhaustive	study	of	over	2247	volumes	comprising	nearly	150,000	pages	of	archival	documents	contained	in	The	Veritable	Records	of	the	Qing	Emperors	of	the	period	1798	to	1911	(Yang	1959,	Lau	&	Lee	1979).	Based	on	these	and	additional	data	estimates,	Ni	&	Van	(2006)	estimate	 that	by	the	1870s,	money	gained	by	officials	via	unsanctioned	rent-extraction	 from	 land	 owners	 averaged	 between	 fourteen	 to	 twenty	 per	 cent	 of	government	officials'	sanctioned	salaries.	Beyond	the	fact	that	punishments	appear	to	have	been	non-commiserate	with	the	benefits	accruing	 from	undertaking	 lucrative	corruption	behaviours,	moreover	only	a	small	fraction	of	officials	were	caught,	making	the	expected	value	of	corrupt	activity	highly	positive.			As	outsiders	who	rotated	 their	posts	every	 three	years	as	they	worked	their	way	up	 the	hierarchy	of	the	national	civil	service	administration	system,	appointed	magistrates	relied	upon	local	county	clerks	and	other	staff,	as	well	as	in	some	cases	local	gentry	who	served	as	nonstate	 benefactors	 to	 local	 officials.	 These	 local	 officials	 were	 able	 to	 exploit	 their	knowledge	of	local	conditions	to	extract	extraordinary	taxes	from	citizenry,	frequently	by	way	of	manipulating	original	tax	documents	that	were	passed	along	to	the	magistrate	to	sign	and	send	to	higher	officials,	 showing	 lower	receipt	of	 taxes	received,	allowing	 local	officials	to	pocket	the	difference	(Yang	1959,	Lau	&	Lee	1979,	Zelin	1984).	In	other	instances,	magistrates	would	participate	in	corrupt	activity	with	lower	officials,	even	passing	along	some	of	their	received	corrupt	income	to	higher	officials	as	gifts,	important	since	provincial-level	officials	were	responsible	for	monitoring	and	reviewing	magistrates'	performance	at	the	 end	 of	 their	 three	 years	 in	 a	 given	 locale	 (Ch'u	 1962,	 Watt	 1977).	 Following	 the	suppression	of	the	Boxers'	Rebellion,	the	Court	made	attempts	to	unify	currency	issuance	and	to	exert	more	control	over	local	governments'	borrowing	and	revenue	reporting;	the	impacts	of	such	policy	changes	however	were	relatively	ineffective,	as	the	local	magistrates	still	controlled	the	administration	and	collection	processes	(Ichiko	1980:	403).		
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	The	end	of	the	Qing	government	brought	some	limited	changes	in	tax	collection.	Regulations	to	 increase	 the	 percentage	 of	 collected	 tax	 revenues	 reaching	 the	 Beiyang	 central	government	saw	some	 initial	success	under	 the	military	authority	 imposed	by	President	Yuan	Shikai,	with	the	amounts	received	in	central	coffers	increasing	up	to	four	times	from	the	late	Qing	from	certain	taxes	such	as	the	salt	gabelle,	while	effective	tax	rates	remained	nearly	constant	(Gale	1930:	250).	Legislation	 in	1914	()	provided	 language	centralising	the	control	of	various	taxes,	including	land,	salt	gabelle	monopoly,	transit,	and	
lijin,	 while	 reserving	 the	 right	 to	 apply	 additional	 taxes	 on	 	 	 land,	 livestock,	 and	 other	categories	to	local	authorities.	The	start	of	the	warlord	period,	however,	further	increased	the	relative	power	of	provincial	and	local	state	actors	at	the	expense	of	central	state	actors,	ultimately	frustrating	attempted	tax	reform.	Given	that	such	tax	centralisation	laws	were	designed	to	diminish	the	financial	power	and	resources	of	local	authorities,	these	efforts	met	 considerable	 resistance	on	 the	 local	 level,	 and	 the	 laws,	while	 ratified,	 over	 time	 in	practise	were	not	enforced	(T'ing	1994).		Further,	 those	 taxes	 that	 were	 successfully	 enacted	 under	 the	 Beiyang	 central	 regime	appear	 indicative	 of	 fairly	 weak	 state	 bureaucratic	 capacity.	 For	 instance,	 while	 the	government	 succeeded	 in	 enacting	 the	 country's	 first	 business	 tax	 in	 1914,	 the	 tax's	calculation	 methodology	 was	 purposely	 unsophisticated	 in	 design,	 so	 as	 to	 minimise	administrative	 strain	 on	 the	 tax	 collection	 bureaucratic	 system.	 As	 announced	 by	 the	Ministry	of	Finance,	thirteen	categories	of	industries	were	designated	as	subject	to	taxation,	such	 as	 fur,	 pharmaceuticals,	 petroleum,	 retail	 services,	 and	 clothing	 manufacturing	companies.	Assessed	taxes,	however,	were	prescribed	at	a	fixed	amount	based	solely	on	the	industry	 type	(Shun	Pao	14	 July	1914).	While	such	a	simplified	 taxing	methodology	was	thusly	easy	to	administer,	requiring	less	administrative	capability	on	the	part	of	the	central	tax	collection	authorities,	the	system	was	limited	in	the	amount	of	revenue	it	could	raise,	as	anything	 other	 than	 a	 low	 fixed	 amount	 would	 have	 represented	 a	 prohibitively	 high	effective	tax	rate	for	smaller-revenue	or	poorer	performing	firms.			More	 aggressive	 attempts	 to	 centralise	 fiscal	 and	 tax	 control	 took	 place	 under	 the	Guomindang	 Government.	 In	 June	 1925,	 Liao	 Zhongkai,	 Minister	 of	 Finance	 of	 the	Guangdong-based	Guomindang	Government,	issued	the	"Order	to	Unify	Revenue	Collection	Agencies",	proclaiming	that	"all	revenue	must	be	collected	and	managed	by	legal	organs.	No	civil	or	military	officials	may	intervene	under	whatever	pretext	in	tax	collection	or	without	authorisation	retain	funds.	Those	who	disobey	shall	be	regarded	as	criminals	and	dealt	with	under	military	law"	(van	de	Ven	2003:	90).	Liao	was	assassinated	several	months	later,	but	Song	 Ziwen,	 who	 took	 over	 as	 the	 Finance	 Minister,	 continued	 with	 reform	 attempts.	Writing	 at	 the	 time,	 Song	 laid	 out	 the	 difficulties	 the	 reform	 process	 faced:	 inability	 to	correctly	assess	land	taxes	given	the	widespread	destruction	of	land	tax	records	resulting	from	the	continual	civil	strife,	lack	of	modernised	accounting	or	central	budgeting	systems,	and	the	imposition	of	a	variety	of	unauthorised	taxes	by	local	militias	(Song	1926).		The	goal	under	Song's	efforts	at	the	Ministry	was	to	reduce	local	militarists'	power	to	extract	taxes,	depriving	them	of	their	financial	independence,	and	consolidating	taxing	authority	in	the	 hands	 of	 the	 central	 government.	 The	 Ministry's	 efforts,	 however,	 proved	 mostly	unsuccessful.	To	begin	with,	for	much	of	the	Guomindang	period,	the	central	government	had	effective	control	over	only	a	few	provinces	centred	around	Jiangsu,	Zhejiang,	and	Anhui.	Southern	provinces	such	as	Guangdong	were	under	the	control	of	other	military	factions	until	1933,	while	the	Communist	Party	controlled	parts	of	the	Northwest,	including	Shaanxi	and	Gansu,	and	in	1931	Manchuria	fell	under	control	of	the	Japanese	Imperial	Army.	Hence	tax	 remittance	 revenue	 from	 these	 provinces	 was	 essentially	 absent.	 Even	 in	 those	provinces	loyal	to	the	Guomindang	government,	the	amount	of	local	tax	revenue	collected	and	transferred	to	Nanjing	remained	circumscribed.	As	Remick	(2002)	stresses	in	her	study	
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of	Hebei's	tax	administration	policies,	the	bureaucratic	structure	was	inefficient	in	terms	of	tax	 extraction:	 "Hebei	 counties	 were	 never	 able	 to	 centralize	 funds	 as	 effectively	 or	 to	reform	the	land	tax.	Hebei	province	was	completely	at	the	mercy	of	the	county	governments	in	 tax	 collection,	 compromising	 the	 tax	 collection	 capacity	 of	 the	 Hebei	 provincial	government	and	therefore	of	the	central	Guomindang	government."		Second,	the	Ministry's	attempts	to	concentrate	taxing	authority	with	central	authorities	at	the	expense	of	local	governments	met	with	only	limited	success.	While	lijin,	a	tax	heavily	disliked	by	domestic	merchants,	was	substantially	diminished	and	officially	abolished	 in	1931,	 the	 central	government	was	never	 able	 to	 either	 fully	prohibit	 local	 governments	from	applying	similar	taxes,	or	to	replace	it	with	taxes	that	flowed	more	consistently	to	the	centre.	Local	and	regional	provincial	governments	maintained	effective	administration	and	collection	of	the	land	tax	until	1941—by	the	time	land	tax	was	centralised,	the	Guomindang	had	already	 lost	much	 of	 the	 country	 to	 the	 Japanese	 (Liu	 2016).	 Further,	 bureaucratic	capacity	 issues	undermined	reforms	to	 increase	centrally-administrated	 tax	policies.	For	instance,	 when	 the	 Guomindang	 initially	 secured	 power	 in	 1927,	 a	 series	 of	 intended	reforms	on	business	taxes	were	proposed	to	replace	the	flat	fee	system	propagated	under	the	Beiyang	 regime	with	 a	 system	of	progressive	 tax	 rates	applied	 to	 either	 companies'	capital	size	or	earned	revenues,	based	upon	industrial	category	(Second	Historical	Archives	1994:426).	However,	the	scheme	was	determined	to	be	too	complicated	for	the	central	tax	authorities	 to	 implement,	 especially	 given	 the	 lack	 of	 standardisation	 in	 then-operating	accounting	standards	left	the	system	open	to	falsification	without	substantive	oversight	(Ke	2015).	As	a	result,	the	Ministry	of	Finance	decided	to	leave	business	tax	revenue	collection	to	local	governments.	In	June	1931,	when	the	Ministry	implemented	a	substantial	tax	reform,	a	new	set	of	Business	Tax	Regulations	was	officially	issued	based	on	the	1927	proposal,	even	adding	to	its	complexity	by	demarcating	three	classifications	on	which	tax	rate	calculations	would	be	applied—revenues,	profits,	or	capital	size—again	to	be	dependent	on	a	company's	industry	category.	Crucially,	however,	although	the	methodology	had	changed,	the	business	tax	 remained	 locally-administered	and	 collected;	 further,	 the	 added	 layer	of	 complexity,	based	on	profits,	proved	too	complicated	for	tax	authorities	to	monitor,	and	in	June	1934	a	new	business	tax	reorganisation	was	enacted,	leaving	only	two	classifications	on	which	tax	rates	were	to	be	applied,	revenues	and	capital	size	(Second	Historical	Archives	1994:	428).			The	 continuing	 inability	 for	 domestic	 central	 governments	 to	 protect	 private	 economic	actors	from	unauthorised	arbitrary	and	excessive	takings	via	the	tax	collection	system	by	state	and	quasi-state	(warlord)	actors	at	the	local	level	led	to	a	multitude	of	related	issues	that	impacted	the	fiscal	capacity	of	the	government	and	re-enforcing	impacts	on	the	ability	of	the	government	to	reform	the	tax	collection	system	or	increase	its	tax	revenue	receipts.	To	 begin	 with,	 without	 employing	 an	 effective	 strategy	 to	 end	 corruption,	 the	 central	government's	policy	set	was	partially	constrained	into	the	levying	low	formal	rates,	given	that	 corruption	 behaviour	 on	 the	 part	 of	 local	 authorities	 created	 significantly	 higher	effective	tax	rates.	In	fact,	both	Ma	&	Rubin	(2017)	and	Ko	et	al.	(2018)	suggest	that	poor	supervising	technology	available	to	central	state	actors	over	local	tax	collectors—given	the	size	and	scale	of	the	Chinese	state—and	the	nature	of	external	threats	on	the	Chinese	state	implied	a	low	level	of	official	tax	rates	from	the	centre	to	be	more	optimal	than	higher	tax	rates.	This	arrangement,	however,	ultimately	led	to	a	weakening	of	state	fiscal	resources	and	thereby	state	capacity	over	time	which	became	particularly	acute	when	the	Qing	and	subsequent	 domestic	 regimes	 faced	 the	 confluence	 of	 military	 and	 societal	 challenges	beginning	 in	 the	 mid-nineteenth	 century	 and	 continuing	 over	 the	 following	 century.	Alternatively,	Dincecco	(2009)	suggests	central	states	are	constrained	into	low	levels	of	tax	extraction	since	local	elites	will	oppose	tax	reforms	that	favour	the	centre	given	incentives	to	free-ride	off	the	tax	contributions	of	other	locales.	While	Dincecco's	research	focuses	on	state	 capacity	 development	 in	 premodern	 Europe,	 much	 of	 the	 same	 taxing	 constraint	dynamics	also	played	a	role	in	late-imperial	China.	
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	Second,	 the	 lack	 of	 authority	 over	 local	 tax	 collection	 abuses	 also	 led	 to	 continual	 and	substantial	increases	in	the	number	and	scope	of	taxes	imposed	at	the	local	level	over	time,	thus	 increasing	 total	effective	 total	 tax	rates	on	private	actors.	One	 issue	came	 from	the	imposition	 of	 so-called	 "additional"	 taxes,	 a	 practice	 begun	 in	 the	 late-Qing	 period	 as	 a	response	to	meet	greater	remittance	requirements	from	central	government	imposed	on	provinces	as	a	way	to	raise	monies	for	indemnity	payments	(Liu	2016).	Additional	taxes	were	 taxes	 levied	on	 top	of	 a	 given	 tax.	Once	 created,	 these	 taxes	became	a	permanent	feature	of	the	local	tax	landscape,	leading	to	onerous	total	tax	rates,	especially	on	the	rural	populace.	Although	there	existed	regulations	that	additional	taxes	could	not	exceed	more	than	thirty	per	cent	of	the	stated	regular	tax,	in	many	areas	the	additional	tax	amounted	to	over	one	hundred	per	cent	of	the	regular	tax	(Wu	1937).	Both	the	Beiyang	and	Guomindang	government	attempted	 to	limit	 the	problems	associated	with	the	multitude	of	additional	taxes,	each	instituting	a	tax	rationalisation	reform	that	combined	all	prior	additional	taxes	into	a	new,	higher	regular	 tax.	The	results,	however,	were	predictable;	 in	each	 instance,	within	several	years	of	the	new	"permanent"	regular	tax,	new	additional	taxes	again	began	to	be	imposed	on	top	of	these	now-higher	rates.			Further,	not	only	did	local	tax	rates	increase,	but	so	did	the	number	and	variety	of	taxes	imposed.	Bernhardt	(1992:2008)	finds	the	assessment	of	additional	levies	and	surcharges	on	land	taxes	in	Jiangsu	rose	drastically	rise	under	the	Guomindang,	while	Bianco	(1995)	describes	the	sixfold	increase	in	effective	land	taxes	in	Anhui	in	1932;	after	locals	resisted,	military	force	was	enlisted	to	compel	payment.	A	Zhejiang	provincial	survey	(Commission	
for	Agrarian	Restoration	1935:	8)	conducted	in	1933	found	the	number	of	"auxillary"	taxes	assessed	 in	many	counties	to	have	been	as	high	as	 twenty.	Chen	(1936:	74-75)	cites	the	plethora	of	taxes	 local	 individuals	were	 forced	 to	pay,	noting	"The	numerous	 taxes	 [are]	imposed	by	both	provincial	and	district	governments,	such	as	sales	and	transit	taxes	on	oil,	on	 hemp,	 on	 hide,	 on	 fish,	 on	 fruit,	 on	 cow,	 on	 ox,	 on	 pig,	 on	 sausages	 and	 on	 dried	mushrooms";	 after	 1932,	 additional	 bureaucratic	 structures	 led	 to	 additional	 taxes:	 "a	family	tax,	a	land	sur-tax,	a	vegetable-weighing	tax,	a	tax	for	the	watchmen	on	Sha-tien	[an	agricultural	 land	 area	 frequently	 owned	 by	 local	 governments],	 and	 sometimes	 also	 an	export	tax	on	fish	and	shrimps.	(This	"export"	tax	is,	of	course,	a	unilateral	local	transit	tax	and	has	nothing	to	do	with	the	ultimate	destination	of	the	commodity)."	Chen	continues	by	noting	that	the	local	government	administrative	unit	known	as	qu	[ku]	(	)	itself	accessed	an	additional	extensive	array	of	taxes,	including	"licence	and	sales	taxes	on	gambling	and	on	 opium	 smoking,	 assessments	 on	 temples	 and	monasteries,	 licence	 taxes	 on	 religious	feasts,	wedding	ceremonies,	and	on	pig	butcherings,	transfer	taxes	on	land	sales	and	land	mortgages.	Widows	are	permitted	to	marry	again	only	after	paying	a	fee	of	6	Yuan,	and	this	fee	also	goes	to	support	the	Ku	bureau.	In	Yuh-nan,	the	sur-taxes	added	to	the	existing	fees	for	pig	and	ox	butchering	and	the	new	taxes	on	the	"export"	of	chickens,	ducks,	fish,	firs	and	pines,	usually	suffice	to	maintain	the	Ku	bureaus	in	general;	but	the	bureau	of	the	6th	Ku,	with	a	monthly	budget	of	660	Yuan,	is	being	financed	particularly	by	a	sur-tax	in	grain	on	every	mow	of	cultivated	land	 in	 that	sub-district.	Some	of	 the	Ku	bureaus	 in	Kwangtung	have	a	monthly	budget	of	over	1,000	Yuan;	that	of	Kwang-hai-ku	in	the	district	of	Tai-shan,	which	takes	0.40	Yuan	per	picul	from	the	"export"	of	salted	fish	to	supply	90	per	cent	of	its	funds,	has	an	expenditure	of	2,000	Yuan	a	month...	at	the	periodical	village	markets,	0.02	or	0.03	Yuan	is	levied	for	every	100	eggs."		Chen's	description	is	further	supported	by	a	recent	analysis	by	Gu	(2015)	on	local	taxes	in	Hebei	during	the	Guomindang	era.	Gu	enumerates	over	three	hundred	highly	specific	types	of	taxes	that	were	imposed	on	nearly	any	imaginable	type	of	economic	or	productive	activity,	included	among	them:	a	tax	on	goods	made	from	leather;	a	"measuring	tax"	if	a	product	sold	in	the	market	necessitates	the	need	for	scale	or	ruler	to	be	employed;	a	tax	for	each	chicken	one	kills;	 a	specific	 tax	on	 the	 rope	used	 tie	up	pigs;	 a	 tax	 applicable	on	 soup	pots.	The	
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expanding	multitude	of	taxes	also	dovetailed	with	the	practice	of	additional	tax	imposition,	with	Wu	(1937)	describing	cases	where	additional	 taxes	were	 imposed	on	 taxes	 for	 the	number	of	sheep	owned,	the	amount	of	leather	produced,	or	the	number	of	structures	build	on	one's	property;	in	Jiangsu,	for	instance,	he	found	there	to	be	over	105	different	types	of	additional	taxes	imposed.	The	number	and	specificity	of	such	taxes	underscores	the	way	in	which	state	power	via	taxing	authorities	penetrated	through	the	very	micro	levels	of	civil	and	economic	society	by	this	time.			Yet,	 while	 indicative	 of	 the	 intrusion	 of	 state	 actors	 into	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	 economic	landscape,	it	must	be	simultaneously	noted	that	the	majority	of	these	taxes—especially	at	the	local	level—were	imposed	outside	of	the	scope	of	central	government	bureaucratic	tax	administration.	 Further,	 as	 Chen	 (1936:73-74)	 emphasises,	 the	 practice	 of	 tax-farming,	wherein	which	local	or	provincial	governments	would	farm	out	the	collection	responsibility	to	nonstate	tax	collectors,	enabled	a	collection	system	that	was	ripe	with	abuse:	"	tax	farmer	who,	once	the	Government	has	accepted	his	bid,	thereby	monopolizes	the	collection.	The	actual	sums	collected	by	these	agents	are	several	times,	sometimes	as	much	as	ten	times,	what	the	Government	receives.	This	almost	un-believable	statement	has	been	verified	in	a	number	of	instances."	 	Finally,	the	lack	of	central	government	authority	over	local	militia	and	warlords	meant	no	matter	how	well-administered	 the	official	 central	or	 local	 governments'	 tax	policies	 and	collection	schemes,	local	warlords	could	demand	extraordinary	taxes	on	the	populace.	This	was	done	with	regularity,	especially	in	the	rural	areas	and	small	towns	(Chen	1926:	14).	Several	instances	related	by	Wu	(1937)	indicate	local	warlords	often	demanded	(arbitrarily)	assessed	 taxes	be	paid	 in	advance,	sometimes	multiple	 times	a	year,	 the	result	of	which	being	that	in	certain	locales,	after	several	years	of	such	forced	payments,	such	tax	collections	had	been	paid	in	advance	by	twenty	years	or	longer.		Somewhat	ironically,	all	of	these	issues	were	occurring	while	some	aspects	of	institutional	state	capacity	at	the	national	level	appeared	to	improve.	Both	Strauss	(1998)	and	Yin	(2013)	point	to	evidence	that	indicate	noticeable	improvement	in	tax	collection	methods	over	the	course	of	the	Guomindang	period,	reflective	in	part	of	larger	and	more	authoritative	central	bureaucratic	 institutional	 structures.	 However,	 the	 considerable	 differentials	 between	official	and	effective	 tax	rates	saw	central	state	tax	revenues	rise	only	slightly,	while	 the	problems	discussed	above	in	regard	to	excessive	tax	extraction	at	the	local	level	remained	(Thornton	 1999).	 The	 continual	disconnect	 between	 central	 government	 tax	 policy	 and	local	 level	 tax	 administration	 and	 collection	 led	 to	 a	 continually	 increasing	 tax	 load	 on	private	actors,	with	concomitant	worsening	perceptions	of	private	property	rights,	yet	the	central	state	facing	continual	fiscal	shortfalls.	The	frequency	of	tax	refusals	by	peasants	and	merchants	in	response	to	increases	of	rates	or	types	of	taxes	grew	more	frequent	over	the	period,	sometimes	turning	violent	or	leading	to	massive	strikes	(Ku	1978).			Meanwhile,	on	paper,	even	by	the	Guomindang	period,	official	tax	rates	imposed	on	private	businesses	and	producers	were	not	particularly	onerous,	at	least	not	at	the	national	level.	For	instance,	in	1934	official	business	tax	rates	averaged	from	one-half	to	two	per	cent	of	either	capital	size	or	business	revenues	(Ke	2013).	Thus,	the	fundamental	issue	centred	on	differences	between	formal	and	informal	tax	rates—that	is,	between	what	was	ultimately	received	by	 the	national	government,	and	what	was	siphoned	away	at	 the	 local	 level	by	warlords	or	local	government	officials	acting	with	impunity	given	they	were	not	effectively	constrained	by	either	sufficient	monitoring	or	control	mechanisms	that	could	 limit	 their	arbitrary	exercise	of	state	or	quasi-state	power.	Liu	(2016)	estimates	only	a	quarter	to	a	third	of	collected	taxes	reached	the	central	government,	with	the	rest	captured	by	local	state	actors.			
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Finally,	of	significant	import	not	yet	mentioned	is	that	all	of	these	increases	in	tax	rates	and	changes	 in	 collection	 methods	 occurring	 under	 the	 Guomindang	 took	 place	 in	 an	environment	that	was	perceived	to	have	been	more	fiscally	favourable,	all	things	equal,	than	the	situation	facing	the	Qing	and	Beiyang	domestic	governments.	In	the	wake	of	the	Opium	War	and	subsequent	military	losses	to	Britain,	the	Qing	government	had	ceded	the	right	to	set	tariff	and	import	tax	duties	on	foreign	imported	goods,	agreeing	under	the	1858	Treaty	of	Tianjin,	Article	XXI,	to	a	tariff	rate	on	imported	foreign	good	fixed	at	five	per	cent	(Wright	1938).	It	was	not	until	seventy	years	later	on	25	July	1928,	with	the	completion	of	a	process	beginning	with	earlier	negotiations	started	with	the	Beiyang	government	and	nine	foreign	treaty	powers	at	the	Chinese	Customs	Tariffs	Conference	in	October	of	1925	(Finch	1926:	124),	that	the	Sino-American	Tariff	Treaty	between	the	Guomindang	and	the	United	States	was	consummated,	granting	the	domestic	government	full	authority	over	tariff	policies	and	duties	fee	structures,	once	other	major	treaty	powers	joined	as	signatories	(Japan	was	the	lone	 exception,	 not	 negotiating	 a	 comparable	 settlement	 until	 two	 years	 later.)	 The	Guomindang	regime	wasted	no	time	in	exercising	its	ability	to	increase	tariffs,	and	over	the	proceeding	decade,	average	tariff	rates	increased	more	than	fivefold,	to	twenty-seven	per	cent	(Hsiao	1974:	75).	Such	increases	in	tariff	rates	yielded	increases	in	tariff	duty	revenues,	albeit	 only	 slightly	 more	 than	 trebling	 over	 the	 same	 ensuing	 decade,	 as	 opposed	 to	experiencing	a	similar	fivefold	increase	(Hsiao	1974:	84,	Ji	2003:	1972).	While	part	of	the	difference	between	percentage	increases	in	tariff	rates	and	tariff	received	revenues	could	surely	be	due	to	welfare	losses	due	to	increased	trade	barriers	that	tariffs	represent§,	as	with	other	forms	of	tax	collection,	corruption	and	bureaucratic	inefficiency	also	played	a	significant	role;	Keller	et	al.	(2011:	860)	cite	a	Chinese	Maritime	Customs	official	estimating	in	1931	such	losses	amounted	to	approximately	twenty-five	per	cent	of	total	tariff	revenues.	Nonetheless,	 such	 increases	 in	 received	 tariff	 revenues	 were	 significant—as	 Boecking	(2017:1)	notes,	by	the	start	of	1930,	tariff	duties	accounted	for	the	largest	share	and	"single	most	important	source"	of	Guomindang	central	government	revenue	prior	to	its	fall	in	1937.		In	many	 regards,	 the	 lack	of	 ability	 of	 the	 central	governments	 to	 effectively	 implement	widescale	reforms	to	rationalise	the	tax	collection	systems	is	in	itself	indicative	of	a	lack	in	bureaucratic	 state	 capacity.	 Central	 bureaucratic	power	was	 insufficient	 to	 enforce	 local	representatives'	adherence	to	official	policy	directives	that	mandated	full	transference	of	collected	taxes	to	the	centre	and	forbid	corrupt	behaviours	such	as	levying	unofficial	taxes	on	citizenry	let	alone	sanctioning	keeping	collected	taxes	for	personal	use.	As	Paauw	(1952:	7)	notes	in	his	study	of	Guomindang-period	fiscal	issues,	the	government's	ability	to	collect	sufficient	levels	of	tax	revenue	was	constrained	both	by	bureaucratic	inefficiencies	and	by	its	 decision	 in	 in	 1928	 to	 forgo	 its	 claims	 on	 land	 tax—the	 traditional	 base	 for	 central	government	 tax	revenue	 from	historical	 times—and	allow	land	 taxes	to	be	administered	and	retained	solely	at	the	provincial	level.	As	a	result,	"[t]he	central	government	was	forced		________________________________________________________________________________________________________	
§	For	the	most	part,	we	put	aside	for	this	discussion	the	economic	wisdom	of	 imposing	tariffs	on	imports	as	an	effective	growth	strategy.	This	is	an	issue	well-debated	in	the	literature.	While	both	classical	and	standard	neoclassical	static	trade	theory	suggest	barriers	to	trade	such	as	tariffs	reduce	aggregate	economic	output	(Smith	1776:	IV,2,	Boudreaux	2002;	and	Jones	1961,	Krugman	&	Obstfeld	1994,	 respectively),	 Buchanan	 &	 Yoon	 (2002)	 present	 a	 compelling	 theoretical	 critique	 of	 both	approaches.	Further,	more	dynamic	approaches	taken	by	those	such	as	Krugman	(1987)'s	learning-by-doing	proposition,	and	the	implications	of	discriminatingly-applied	tariffs	on	selective	industries	under	the	assumptions	of	Grossman	&	Helpman	(1991)'s	endogenous	growth	models,	suggest	there	are	possible	growth-enhancing	features	of	tariff	application.	Such	contested	theoretical	constructs	are	 reflected	 in	an	associated	conflicting	array	of	empirical	 results,	 represented	notably	by	what	Clemens	&	Williamson	(2001)	label	a	"tariff-growth"	paradox	with	higher	tariff	rates	associated	with	both	higher	and	lower	economic	growth	rates	across	countries,	differing	by	time	frame;	Rodriguez	&	Rodrik	(2001)	similarly	highlights	the	lack	of	conclusive	evidence	in	the	empirical	data,	finding	no	significant	relationship	between	tariff	rates	and	national	 income,	for	several	measures	tariffs	and	trade	protections.	Keller	et	al.	(2012)	explore	this	issue	in	the	Chinese	context	during	this	period.	
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to	rely	on	 the	 taxation	of	salt	and	manufactured	goods	 for	a	great	part	of	 its	disposable	income.	Because	of	the	continuance	of	atavistic	collection	systems	in	these	areas	of	taxation,	however,	 costs	 of	 collection	 were	 extremely	 high.	 In	 some	 cases	 20	 per	 cent	 of	 gross	revenues	 was	 allocated	 to	 the	 support	 of	 the	 collection	 system.	 The	 inability	 of	 the	government	to	reduce	these	costs	and	its	unwillingness	to	reach	out	to	the	field	of	taxation	of	agricultural	returns	made	it	impossible	to	produce	tax	revenues	equivalent	to	the	levels	of	total	expenditures."	Several	motivations	were	behind	the	Guomindang's	move	to	forgo	the	central	state's	historic	right	to	the	land	tax.	First,	the	government	lacked	bureaucratic	capability	in	managing	a	widely-dispersed	and	atomised	tax	system	to	be	collected	at	the	local	village	level	in	predominantly	rural	settings;	as	discussed	directly	below	in	regard	to	the	collection	of	salt	monopoly	taxes,	corruption	amongst	local	tax	officials	was	extensive.	Chen	(1936:74)'s	research	indicates	local	tax	collectors	captured	upwards	of	ten	times	the	amount	actually	reaching	the	central	state	tax	administration	on	central	government	taxes	accessed	locally;	as	he	notes,	while	such	figures	might	logically	be	met	with	scepticism,	were	consistently	verified	across	multiple	data	sources.	Focussing	collection	efforts	on	the	more	concentrated	industrial	sector	could	be	viewed	as	a	more	tractable	exercise,	albeit	one	with	growth-stifling	implications	(Paauw	1957:	217).	Moreover,	however,	this	decision	might	be	better	 understood	 in	 light	 of	 the	 "violence	 trap"	 postulate,	 advanced	 below—facing	powerful	rivals	with	access	to	 local	military	power	 that	could	 threaten	 the	power	of	 the	central	state,	Guomindang	central	leadership	strategically	chose	to	grant	these	provincial-level	actors	benefits	in	the	form	of	full	access	to	the	land	tax,	as	a	way	to	receive	political	support	in	return,	decreasing	expected	likelihood	of	military	conflict	with	such	rivals.			5.1.1.1.			Salt	Monopoly	Tax	Collection	Analysis		Gale	(1930:	241)	partially	confirms	these	contentions	in	his	discussion	of	the	salt	gabelle	tax.	To	begin	with,	he	notes	 that	by	1909,	 there	existed	 large	discrepancies	between	the	amount	 of	 salt	 tax	 estimated	 collected	 and	 that	 received	 by	 the	 central	 government:	"Estimates	as	to	the	annual	gross	collections	varied	from	forty-eight	to	sixty-four	millions	of	taels	of	silver.	Only	the	net	amount	remitted	to	the	Central	Government	was	agreed	upon	by	various	authorities	to	be	in	the	neighborhood	of	thirteen	million	taels."			The	situation	changed	rather	drastically,	however,	after	 the	 terms	of	 the	Reorganisation	Loan	Agreement	of	1913	required	 the	creation	of	the	Central	Salt	Administration.	While	technically	a	bureau	of	the	Ministry	of	Finance,	it	was	organised	under	joint	control	of	the	Ministry	and	foreign	administrators	appointed	by	foreign	bankers	to	represent	the	interests	of	foreign	bondholders.	The	Chinese-appointed	Chief	Inspector	was	paralleled	by	a	foreign	associate	of	equal	level,	and	likewise	at	the	provincial	level	dual	Chinese	and	foreign	District	Inspectors	were	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 collection	 of	 salt	 tax	 revenue.	 Substantial	 increases	 in	received	salt	tax	revenues	occurred.	As	Gale	(1930:	250)	reports,	"The	amount	of	thirteen	million	taels	(silver	dollars	twenty	million,	approximately)	generally	agreed	upon	as	the	net	sum	obtained	by	the	Central	Government,	prior	to	the	reorganization,	now	swelled	rapidly	to	 $60,409,676	 in	 1914,	 and	 by	 1922	 reached	 as	 high	 as	 $85,789,049."	 This	 fourfold	increase	in	net	revenues	was	achieved,	Gale	stresses,	not	via	increases	in	tax	rates,	which	were	held	basically	even,	but	rather	as	a	result	of	better	administration.			The	benefits	 of	 the	 system	accrued	not	 solely	 to	 foreign	bondholders	dependent	on	 the	regular	and	sufficient	collection	of	salt	gabelle	revenues	as	the	income-generating	vehicle	for	 their	 investment—the	 central	 government	 treasury	 received	 the	 positive	 remaining	balance	after	the	Reorganisation	Loan	bond	obligations	were	paid,	and	thus	represented	funds	available	to	central	state	actors	to	allocate	as	they	pleased.	These	balances	proved	considerable;	whereas	in	1913,	there	existed	no	surplus,	by	the	following	year	the	surplus	amounted	to	over	thirty-one	million	yuan,	and	by	1922	it	reached	seventy-eight	million.		
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The	 significant	 contrast	 between	 the	 success	 the	 foreign-assisted	 salt	 monopoly	 tax	administration	had	dealing	with	corruption,	compared	to	that	of	the	solely	domestically-administered	tax	extraction	system,	as	attested	to	by	the	threefold	increase	that	occurred	in	the	first	year	of	joint	foreign-domestic	salt	tax	administration	operations,	is	remarkable.	Such	drastic	changes	in	tax	extraction	efficacy	under	the	joint	administration	system	begs	the	question—why	was	it	that	such	high	levels	of	corruption	by	local	tax	collectors	were	observed	under	domestic	administration	of	tax	collection,	but	relatively	so	little	under	the	foreign-assisted	administration?		To	begin	with,	 it	 is	clear	that	the	answer	lies	not	with	any	inherent	incompetence	in	the	potential	organisational	capabilities	of	central-level	tax	bureaucrats.	Central	tax	collectors	were	well-aware	that	vast	amounts	of	collected	revenues	were	not	being	forwarded	to	the	centre,	with	Gale	(1930:	241)	noting	 the	state	 treasury	had	made	multiple,	 if	 somewhat	high-variance,	estimates	of	the	size	of	such	differentials.	Thus,	those	within	the	central	state	tax	administration	well	understood	that	improving	tax	collection	efficiency	by	reducing	the	incidence	of	corruption	would	portend	a	much	greater	rate	of	collected	tax	revenues	flowing	into	 the	 central	 treasury	 from	 the	 local	 level.	 Further,	 these	 central	 administrators	 had	access	the	institutional	knowledge	necessary	to	design	a	system	to	limit	corruption	so	as	to	address	 such	 discrepancies.	 As	 Gale	 (1930:250)	 observes,	 the	 reform	 instituted	 by	 the	foreign-assisted	 Central	 Tax	 Administration	 essentially	 reflected	 the	 return	 to	 tax	administrative	procedures	that	had	been	in	existence	in	China	for	centuries;	specifically,	the	reforms	reflected	 the	"restoration	of	 the	T'ang	 [methodology]".	Domestic	administrators	did	not	require	the	assistance	of	foreign	advisors	to	arrive	at	such	an	ingenious	solution,	for	the	"new"	procedures	implemented	under	the	auspices	of	the	Central	Salt	Administration	were	already	well	known.	Hence,	we	require	an	alternative	reason	to	explain	the	observed	difference	in	corruption	within	the	system	than	a	lack	of	wisdom	or	ability	on	the	part	of	domestic	administrators	to	design	a	system	less	susceptible	to	such	behaviours.			Similarly,	no	inherent	fundamental	flaw	existed	within	in	the	corps	of	domestic	local-level	officials	 who	 served	 as	 the	 system's	 tax	 collectors.	 Even	 under	 "foreign"-assisted	administration,	 the	 actual	 number	 of	 foreign	 staff	 was	 marginal	 compared	 to	 the	 total	number	of	local	bureaucratic	staff	involved	in	the	collection	of	tax.	The	appointed	foreign	District	Inspectorates	and	their	foreign	support	staff	were	not	involved	in	the	minutiae	of	tax	 collection	 at	 the	 local-level	 in	 the	 scores	of	 towns	and	 cities	where	 tax	was	actually	collected.	Nor	did	the	creation	of	the	Central	Tax	Administration	involve	the	dismissal	of	the	original	 local-level	 tax	 collectors	 who	 had	 been	 involved	 in	 imposing	 heavy	 taxes	 and	extortion	on	salt	merchants	prior	to	1913's	reorganisation	(Zelin	2004:	242).	It	becomes	apparent	that	the	same	local	tax	collectors	who	had	been	so	heavily	engaged	in	corrupt	tax	collection	practises	under	domestic	administration	of	the	salt	monopoly	tax	system	quickly	became	more	competent	and	moral	in	the	execution	of	their	duties	under	foreign-assisted	administration.			Given	 no	 inherent	 lack	 of	 incompetence	 or	wisdom	 on	 the	 part	 of	 domestic	 central	 tax	administrators	or	local	tax	collectors,	we	are	still	faced	with	the	question	as	to	what	drove	the	sharp	change	in	corrupt	behaviour—why	could	foreign	administration	lead	to	changes	in	the	interests	and	incentives	shaping	domestic	local	tax	officials'	behaviours	that	domestic	central	state	tax	administrators	were	unable	to	induce?		The	 answer	 revolves	 around	a	 change	 in	 the	 power	 dynamics	defining	 the	 relationship	between	administrators	and	tax	collectors	that	changed	the	weight	of	consequences	that	central	 authorities'	 oversight	 ability	 could	 induce	 from	 local	 tax	 collectors.	 Under	 the	system	existing	prior	to	the	creation	of	the	Central	Salt	Administration,	oversight	of	salt	tax	collection	occurred	primarily	at	the	provincial	level—provincial	administrators,	headed	by	a	 provincial	 salt	 commissioner	 who	 ultimately	 answered	 to	 the	 authority	 of	 provincial	
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governors.	Thus,	the	incentives	of	such	a	provincial	oversight	system	did	not	align	with	the	incentives	of	central	tax	administrators;	provincial	administrators	necessarily	were	more	interested	in	greater	amounts	of	collected	tax	revenues	remaining	within	the	province	than	flowing	upward	to	the	central	government.	The	new	system	brought	with	it	a	bureaucratic	change	 where	 rather	 than	 a	 provincial	 salt	 commissioner	 responsible	 to	 the	 provincial	governor,	control	was	now	in	the	hands	of	District	Inspectorates,	who	were	responsible	to	the	central	Chief	Inspectorates.	This	change	in	the	chain	in	command	provided	a	different	set	of	incentives	behind	those	responsible	for	conducting	oversight	activities.		The	answer	to	our	first	question	however	presents	two	related	questions—one,	why	is	it	that	 local	 tax	 collectors	 responded	 to	 the	 pressure	 of	 oversight	 by	 the	 foreign-administrators?	 And,	 two,	 if	 simply	 changing	 the	 oversight	 dynamic	 from	 provincially-determined	to	direct	central	administration	could	have	brought	such	significant	increases	in	the	amount	of	tax	revenues	flowing	into	the	central	treasury,	why	is	it	that	central	salt	monopoly	tax	administrators	did	not	undertake	such	changes	earlier?		The	answer	 to	 these	 two	questions	 is	related	 to	 the	 issue	of	political	power;	 that	 is,	 the	authority	to	enforce	oversight,	and	to	force	changes	in	the	tax	administration	system.	The	presence	 of	 foreign	 administrators	 changed	 existing	 power	 dynamics.	 The	 authority	 of	foreign	administrators	was	backed	by	the	implicit	power	of	"gunboat	diplomacy",	power	that	had	been	explicitly	displayed	just	over	a	decade	earlier	in	the	form	of	the	Eight-Nation	Alliance	 military	 forces	 which	 overwhelmed	 China's	 military.	 As	 a	 result,	 foreign	administrators	were	perceived	as	fully	possessing	the	power	to	enforce	oversight,	and	more	fundamentally,	to	force	bureaucratic	changes	to	tax	administration	operation	that	brought	the	 oversight	 process	 from	 provincial	 control	 to	 central	 control.	 Thus,	when	 seeking	 to	understand	 why	 it	 was	 that	 central	 tax	 administrators	 had	 not	 already	 implemented	reforms	 to	 reassume	 control	 over	 the	 oversight	 process	 of	 local	 tax	 collection	 from	 the	provinces,	the	lack	of	power	possessed	by	the	central	government	vis-a-vis	the	provinces	proves	highly	salient.	This	can	be	evidenced	by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	administration	of	other	taxes	during	the	Beiyang	period	were	not	reorganised	along	the	lines	of	the	salt	tax	system,	employing	central	as	opposed	to	provincial	oversight,	even	after	the	establishment	of	the	Central	 Salt	 Administration	 clearly	 demonstrated	 that	 direct	 central	 oversight	 could	produce	greatly	higher	rates	of	the	locally-collected	tax	revenues	received	by	the	central	government's	treasury.	Unlike	the	appointed	foreign	administrators	who	had	the	implicit	backing	of	 foreign	military	 to	back	 their	demands	 to	wrest	 control	 of	 salt	 tax	 collection	administration	 from	 the	 provinces,	 domestic	 administrators	 were	 backed	 only	 by	 the	relatively	weak	power	of	the	central	state,	whose	military	power	compared	to	the	that	of	the	provinces	was	at	best	equal.	As	Ni	&	Van	(2006)	and	Liu	(2016)	note,	provincial	and	local	administrators	received	great	personal	benefit	from	the	way	the	domestic	tax	system	operated.	As	 such,	 they	 had	 no	 incentive	 to	 change	 the	 system;	without	 power	 to	 force	changes	to	the	existing	system,	it	was	not	possible	to	induce	fundamental	changes.		This	issue	of	the	lack	of	power	by	the	central	government	to	enforce	a	monopoly	on	violence	in	relation	to	other	dispersed	sources	of	potential	violence	recalls	the	argument	put	forth	by	 Weingast	 and	 his	 co-authors	 that	 state	 actors	 in	 such	 weakened	 positions	 look	 to	undertake	actions	that	decrease	the	possibility	of	violence	when	the	expected	return	from	fighting	is	negative	(North	et	al.	2009,	2013;	Cox	et	al.	2017).	In	this	instance,	central	state	actors	were	likely	to	have	perceived	the	expected	return	on	attempting	to	force	provinces	to	 give	up	 control	 over	 tax	 collection	 administration—and	with	 it	 the	 ability	 to	 retain	 a	majority	of	those	collected	taxes—to	be	lower	than	the	expected	costs	that	resulted	from	fighting	the	provinces	on	this	issue,	risking	outright	revolt	on	the	part	of	the	provinces	and	a	high	chance	of	the	loss	of	power	by	central	state	actors.	As	later	discussed	in	Section	3.3	of	 this	chapter,	 the	 frequent	occurrence	of	such	revolts	and	 loss	of	power	 that	occurred	throughout	the	warlord	era	indicates	these	risks	were	imminent	and	realistic.	
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	Finally,	an	important	coda	to	the	Central	Salt	Administration	account	is	that	the	period	of	bureaucratic	competence	with	a	high	percentage	of	locally-collected	tax	revenues	flowing	to	the	central	state	treasury	began	to	unravel	as	the	warlord	period	advanced,	and	the	level	of	central	government	control	over	the	provinces	diminished	further.	The	high	of	eighty-six	million	yuan	collected	and	remitted	to	the	central	treasury	in	1922	fell	to	under	nine	million	by	1926,	as	provinces	resumed	local	control	over	the	taxation	on	salt,	expelling	or	ignoring	District	 Inspectorates.	 These	 events	 underscore	 the	 costs	 of	 societal-level	 violence	 as	related	to	the	issue	of	state	capacity.	However	effective	and	efficient	the	reorganised	Salt	Administration	bureaucratic	structure	had	become,	the	ability	of	the	structure	to	function	was	undermined	by	 the	near-complete	breakdown	of	 an	 internal	monopoly	on	violence	exercised	by	the	central	state.				5.1.1.2.		The	Lijin	Tax	System		
Lijin,	 a	 tax	 on	 traded	 goods	 that	 appeared	 in	 the	 late-Qing	 and	 survived	 well	 into	 the	Guomindang	 years,	 is	 illustrative	 of	 the	 undulating	 level	 of	 the	 central	 state's	 ability	 to	collect	tax	revenues	from	private	actors	in	a	rationalised	manner.	The	decision	by	the	Qing	court	 officials	 to	 cede	 administration	 of	 lijin	 and	 other	 transit	 taxes	 to	 local	 provinces	created	 a	 taxation	 structure	 susceptible	 to	 arbitrariness	 and	 corruption,	 and	 led	 to	 lijin	becoming	a	severe	imposition	on	the	private	property	rights	of	domestic	Chinese	merchants.	In	addition,	the	exemption	from	the	tax	of	most	foreign	merchants	that	was	granted	under	the	 late	 nineteenth	 century's	 "unequal	 treaties"	 agreements,	 resulted	 in	 lijin	 taxes	 only	applying	to	goods	traded	by	Chinese	merchants,	creating	an	unequal	playing	field	as	well	as	contributing	to	additionally	pernicious	conditions	for	domestic	economic	development.		Up	through	the	mid-Qing	era,	the	Court	had	maintained	a	relatively	light	tax	burden	on	the	population.	 From	 the	 start	 of	 the	 Qing,	 the	 government	 had	 assessed	 taxes	 based	 on	population	(")—every	household	paid	taxes	based	on	its	number	of	male	adults.	In	1712,	in	an	effort	to	lessen	the	burden	on	the	poor,	Emperor	Kangxi	converted	the	tax	system	to	a	land-based	tax	and	announced	a	promise	to	"not	increase	taxes	despite	population	increase"	(,	).	Subsequent	Qing	emperors	abided	by	this	promise	for	almost	140	years	(Qing	shenzu	shilu	1712:	249;	Zhang	1787:19/502).		Prior	to	1851,	the	main	sources	of	government	revenue	came	from	three	categories:	land	and	 crop	 taxes,	 customs	 duties,	 and	 salt	 monopoly	 taxes,	 with	 land	 and	 crop	 taxes	comprising	 the	 majority	 of	 government	 revenue.	 Scholars	 generally	 agree	 that	 the	 tax	burden	 was	 rather	 light—from	 the	 eighteenth	 through	 the	 mid-nineteenth	 centuries,	imperial	 taxes	 comprised	no	more	 than	approximately	 two	 to	 four	per	 cent	 of	 the	 total	agricultural	output;	such	rates	were	considerably	lower	than	the	ten	per	cent	or	more	found	in	Meiji	 Japan	 and	 European	 feudal	 states	 (Wang	 1973,	 Huang	 1985:	 278-81).	 Records	indicate	 that	 in	 1821,	 the	 government	 collected	 a	 total	 of	 about	 45	million	 taels	 in	 tax	revenue,	 of	 which	 land	 and	 crop	 tax	 constituted	 33,348,034	 taels,	 salt	 franchise	 tax	7,475,879	taels,	and	customs	duty	4,352,208	taels	(Luo	1936:	4).		However,	by	late-Qing	the	state	 often	 faced	 budget	 deficits,	 with	 collected	 taxes	 insufficient	 to	 cover	 annual	government	expenses.	While	the	Court	supplemented	state	income	by	sale	of	official	titles	or	imperial	favours,	new	revenue	sources	were	desired.		One	of	 the	more	destructive	 forms	 of	 tax	 employed	under	 the	 late-Qing	was	 a	 series	 of	"transit	taxes"	levied	on	the	internal	shipment	of	goods.	Of	these	transit	taxes,	the	lijin	(likin	
!;	 or	)	 proved	 to	 be	 perhaps	 the	most	 onerous.	 Initiated	 in	 1853	 as	 a	 voluntary	donation	by	local	merchants	at	the	exhortation	of	a	lower	Yangzi	government	official,	Lei	Yixian	(#),	it	was	designed	to	support	military	expenses	to	quell	a	local	outbreak	of	the	Taiping	 Rebellion	 (Liu	 2007:	 45).	 The	 tax	 was	 intended	 to	 be	 modest;	 	 refers	 "one	
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thousandths	of	a	tael",	and		refers	to	"donation"	or	"tithe";	hence,	it	implied	a	tax	rate	of	one-tenth	per	 cent	 (Mann	1987:75	argues	 that	 the	original	 intended	amount	of	 the	 tax,	regardless	the	technical	meaning	of ,	was	one	per	cent	surcharge,	although	this	matter	still	faces	some	debate).	At	Lei’s	urging,	merchants	and	shop	owners	were	urged	to	donate	one-tenth	per	cent	of	the	value	of	their	goods	in	transit	or	in	the	shop	to	the	local	military	fund	initiative.	Lei,	in	his	submission	to	the	emperor	Xianfeng,	extolled	the	advantage	of	lijin:	in	his	view,	the	small	percentage	charge	would	not	impose	material	burden	on	the	populace,	yet	could	significantly	to	raise	much-needed	funds	for	the	government.	Xianfeng	endorsed	the	practise,	and	as	the	concurrent	Taiping,	Du	Wenxiu	and	Dungan	rebellions	continued	to	drag	on,	in	1861	the	emperor	requested	officials	in	other	regions	to	adopt	the	same	policy.			While	Lei	had	initially	envisioned	 lijin	a	temporary	measure	to	be	discontinued	after	the	rebellion	ended,	as	frequently	occurs	in	public	finance,	the	introduction	of	a	new	revenue	stream	is	not	readily	relinquished	by	government	actors.	Whereas	lijin	was	initially	treated	as	 a	 "voluntary	 donation"	 and	 not	 a	 formal	 government	 tax—with	 collection	 originally	conducted	by	designated	local	business	leaders	as	opposed	to	state	tax	officials—the	state's	need	for	revenue	coupled	with	the	relatively	easy	access	to	the	revenue	quickly	led	to	lijin	evolving	from	voluntary	donation,	based	on	the	power	of	moral	suasion	and	social	pressure,	to	being	replaced	by	a	mandatory	payment	obligation	backed	by	the	authority	of	the	state.		A	crucial	factor	regarding	the	lijin	tax	was	its	administration—specifically,	that	provinces	controlled	the	collection	methods.	The	implication	of	this	approach	was	a	great	complexity	and	duplication	of	taxation	on	traded	commodities.	Goods	were	taxed	multiple	times	and	in	multiple	ways—at	the	place	of	production,	in	transit,	and	at	the	market	(Luo	1936:	55-57).	As	such,	effective	 tax	rates	were	considerably	higher	 than	the	originally-envisioned	one-tenth	per	cent.	In	addition,	lijin	represented	only	one	of	a	host	of	transit	taxes	that	came	to	be	imposed	on	internal	trade.	Anhui,	Jiangxi,	Hunan	and	Zhili	imposed	"destination	tax"	(loti	
shui);	other	provinces	levied	differing	forms	of	transit	taxes:	boat	tax,	coast	tax,	canal	use	tax,	"gate"	(entrance)	tax,	distance	( )	tax,	and	provincial	tax	(Muhse	1935:240).	
	
Lijin	 collection	was	 especially	heavy	 in	 the	 littoral	Yangzi	 regions	where	 commerce	was	most	developed.	Jiangsu	province	alone	accounted	for	more	than	twenty	per	cent	of	all	lijin	revenue	 from	 1869	 to	 1908;	 while	 this	 fell	 to	 fourteen	 per	 cent	 by	 the	 early	 1920s,	 it	remained	the	largest	contributor	(Luo	1936:	464-467).	Jiangsu,	Anhui,	Hubei,	Guangxi	and	Gansu	adopted	a	checkpoint	collection	system,	with	local	tax	authorities	setting	up	multiple	checkpoints	along	transport	routes	where	lijin	was	required	to	be	paid	at	each.	In	1880,	a	letter	to	the	Qing	Court	indicated	that	from	Yangzhou	to	Huaian	(two	Jiangsu	cities	about	150	 kilometres	 apart),	 there	 were	 no	 less	 than	 eight	 lijin	 checkpoints;	 from	 Suzhou	 to	Kunshan,	a	distance	of	about	30	kilometres,	there	were	four	checkpoints	(Luo	1936:	61).	Moreover,	while	lijin	taxes	were	prescribed	to	not	total	more	than	five	per	cent	within	any	single	province,	in	practise	such	limits	were	not	adhered	to	by	local	officials,	and	depending	on	the	distance	and	place	of	transit,	goods	could	potentially	be	subject	to	as	high	as	twenty	per	cent	cumulative	lijin	rates,	and	averaged	from	ten	to	fifteen	per	cent	(RSA	126:	886).			In	 contrast	 to	 the	 experience	 of	 domestic	 Chinese	 merchants,	 foreign	 merchants	 were	exempt	from	paying	the	lijin	tax,	owing	to	a	provision	in	the	Treaty	of	Nanjing	of	1842.		In	addition	to	requiring	China	to	pay	the	British	an	indemnity,	cede	the	territory	of	Hong	Kong,	and	 extend	 extraterritoriality	 to	 British	 citizens,	 the	 treaty	 compelled:	 "His	Majesty	 the	Emperor	of	China	agrees	to	establish	at	all	the	ports	which	are,	by	the	2nd	Article	of	this	Treaty,	to	be	thrown	open	for	the	resort	of	British	merchants,	a	fair	and	regular	tariff	of	export	 and	 import	 customs	 and	 other	 dues,	 which	 tariff	 shall	 be	 publicly	 notified	 and	promulgated	for	general	information;	and	the	Emperor	further	engages,	that	when	British	merchandise	shall	have	once	paid	at	any	of	the	said	ports	the	regulated	customs	and	dues,	agreeable	to	the	tariff	to	be	hereafter	fixed,	such	merchandise	may	be	conveyed	by	Chinese	
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merchants	to	any	province	or	city	in	the	interior	of	the	Empire	of	China,	on	paying	a	further	amount	as	transit	duties,	which	shall	not	exceed	___[unspecified	in	Treaty]	per	cent	on	the	tariff	value	of	such	goods"	(Article	X,	Treaty	of	Nanking	and	Declaration	Respecting	Transit	Duties	1842-1843,	Kew	National	Archives:	FO	1080/341).			The	Declaration	on	Transit	Duties,	signed	26	June	1843,	further	elaborated	on	the	transit	duty,	with	the	final	tariff	rate	set	at	five	per	cent	ad	valorem	in	1858,	with	transit	duty	an	additional	half	of	the	tariff	duty,	2.5	per	cent.	Much	of	the	subsequent	Treaty	of	Tientsin,	signed	on	26	June	1858,	was	also	concerned	with	tariff	and	customs	dues,	with	thirteen	of	the	 fifty-six	articles	directly	addressing	this	 issue	(Articles	XXV–XXXI;	XLI,–XLVI).	Article	XLIII,	for	instance,	provided	custom	duties	dispute	resolution	methods	and	provided	rights	to	 British	 citizens	 to	 protect	 themselves	 from	 arbitrary	 tax	 extraction	 by	 local	 officials.	These	and	subsequent	treaty	provisions	were	soon	extended	to	apply	to	traders	of	other	European	nations.	As	a	result,	western	merchants	were	not	subjected	to	lijin	and	some	of	the	other	transit	taxes	that	domestic	merchants	faced	when	shipping	goods.	The	consistent	fixed	 tariff	 rate	 and	 one-time	 transit	 tax	 provided	 relative	 transit	 cost	 predictability	 to	foreign	merchants.			The	disparate	experience	regarding	transit	taxes	facing	foreign	and	Chinese	merchants	was	considerable.	A	1926	report	commissioned	by	the	US	Department	of	Commerce	on	political	and	conditions	within	China	describes	the	transit	tax	situation	by	noting	that	while,	"likin	is	generally	 recognised	 as	 one	 of	 the	 serious	 detriments	 to	 trade	 development	 in	 China,	comparatively	 few	 foreign	merchants	 have	 ever	 been	 conscious	 of	 it...	 It	 is	 the	 Chinese	merchant	who	 loads	the	goods	on	to	 freight	car,	 steamer,	 junk	mule	pack,	and	contrives	them	as	best	he	may	through	the	barriers,	enduring	at	each	succeeding	one	new	charges	and	new	vexations	that	may	bring	him	to	the	end	of	his	journey	faced	with	a	heavy	loss"	(RSA	1926:	888).			However,	while	in	practice	foreign	and	domestic	merchants	faced	different	transit	tax	costs,	the	observed	differentials	should	not	be	ascribed	to	an	implementation	of	imperialist	power,	forced	upon	the	Chinese	state	by	 foreign	powers.	Designed	to	provide	predictability	and	standardisation	 in	tax	costs,	no	 treaty	provision	language	required	 foreign	merchants	 to	receive	 preferential	 tax	 rates	 vis-a-vis	 domestic	 merchants.	 The	 wording	 negotiated	 by	British	representatives	at	the	Treaty	of	Tientsin,	for	instance,	clearly	intended	the	exclusion	from	 additional	 inland	 tax	 obligations	 contained	 within	 Article	 XXVII	 to	 apply	 to	 all	merchants	shipping	goods	intended	for	export,	regardless	nationality—foreign	or	domestic	(Hertslet	1908).	In	practice,	however,	local	tax	authorities	refused	to	exempt	Chinese	traders	from	the	tax	(Wright	1920:92-93;109).	Hence,	the	greater	tax	burden	on	domestic	merchants	is	 indicative	 of	 a	 Chinese	 state	 overtaxing	 domestic	 commercial	 activities.	While	 treaty	provisions	 provided	 foreign	 merchants	 protection	 of	 their	 property	 rights;	 domestic	merchants,	conversely,	 lacking	 the	backing	of	 foreign	gunboats	as	a	balance	 to	domestic	state	power,	were	consequently	not	afforded	the	same	protections.		The	differential	impact	of	multiple	 layers	of	transit	 taxation	on	domestic	merchants	was	considerable.	The	1926	China	Handbook	describes	several	examples	of	ways	that	the	same	goods	shipped	from	overseas	by	foreign	merchants	could	be	sold	more	cheaply	on	the	market	than	domestically-produced	 goods,	 simply	 due	 to	 transit	 tax	differentials:	 "timber	 from	abroad	paid	5	per	cent,	while	timber	from	Kweichow	[Guizhou]	province	moving	to	Hankow	or	Shanghai	had	to	pay	a	total	of	17	per	cent	in	inland	charges;	Hangcho	silk,	shipped	to	Peking	by	native	merchants	paid	a	total	of	18	per	cent,	while	the	foreign	trader	could	ship	the	same	silk	via	Tientsin	under	the	protection	of	a	transit	pass	for	21/2	per	cent"	(208).		Chinese	and	foreign	merchants	responded	to	the	incentives	of	the	institutional	arrangement	of	the	imposed	tax	structure	and	its	unequal	application	across	foreign	and	domestic	market	
	 87 
participants	accordingly.	Already	as	early	as	the	late	1850s,	Chinese	tea	merchants	often	transported	their	shipments	via	foreign	merchants,	such	as	the	British	firms	Dent	&	Co.,	and	Jardine,	 in	 order	 to	 circumvent	 the	 lijin	 system	 (Hao	 1986:	 266).	 Indeed,	 some	 foreign	merchants	 sold	 to	 domestic	 merchants	 the	 use	 of	 their	 passport	 or	 identity	 (Zheng	1893:533),	or	specialised	in	helping	Chinese	ship-owners	obtain	British	registry	(Dennett	1963:	583-584).	Chinese	merchants	also	tried	to	disguise	their	business	as	western	in	order	to	utilise	the	transit	tax	privilege	accorded	to	their	western	counterparts.	Reports	of	Chinese	vessels	flying	foreign,	especially	British,	flags	were	common,	with	Jardine	representatives	describing	 the	practise	and	attributed	the	reason	to	 the	Chinese	ship-owners	seeking	 to	avoid	the	extraction	and	harassment	from	local	Chinese	officials	or	from	pirates	(JMA	Letter	to	 Thomas	Dick,	 27	 April	 1869).	 In	 1882,	 the	 British	 consular	 report	 recorded	 Chinese	merchants	taking	advantage	"of	the	provisions	of	the	British	treaty…by	employing	a	foreign	merchant	as	his	agent	 to	bring	down	the	 goods	 [from	upper	Yangzi]	 and	pay	 the	duties	[instead	 of	 lijin]	 on	 them"	 (British	 Parliamentary	 Papers,	 Chinkiang	 1882:	 3).	 Such	arrangements	 did	 not	 always	 end	 well	 for	 the	 domestic	 merchant;	 Zheng	 (1893:	 534)	describes	cases	where	Chinese	merchants	suffered	 losses	after	entrusting	 their	goods	 to	foreign	merchants,	either	due	to	fraud	or	financial	distress	on	the	part	of	the	latter.	In	such	cases	the	Chinese	merchant	had	little	recourse	given	that	their	agreement	with	the	foreign	merchant	was	undertaken	to	circumvent	lijin	taxes	required	by	domestic	authorities.		Thus,	the	primary	problematic	feature	of	the	lijin	tax	system	was	owing	to	the	nature	of	its	administration.	Although	originally	sanctioned	by	the	central	government's	imperial	court,	it	was	administered	by	local	provincial	governments,	with	decisions	on	the	specific	rates	to	be	levied,	the	number	of	times	goods	might	be	taxed,	and	the	methods	of	collection	all	left	to	local	authorities.	The	ceding	of	authority	of	lijin	and	other	transit	taxes	to	local	provinces	created	an	incentive	structure	that	encouraged	the	entrenchment	of	the	transit	tax	system,	and	a	coordination	problem	amongst	tax-imposing	localities.			To	begin	with,	that	local	authorities	were	fully	responsible	for	the	application	and	oversight	of	the	transit	taxes	opened	the	doors	to	high	degree	of	arbitrariness	in	its	application,	and	to	abuses	of	power.	The	aforementioned	1926	US	Department	of	Commerce	report	further	states	that	 "In	 four	cases	in	Kiangsi	 [Jiangxi]	the	same	kind	of	goods	paid	over	 the	same	route	to	Shanghai	in	one	instance	a	total	of	2.2	per	cent,	in	another	3.7	per	cent,	in	a	third	3.9	per	cent,	and	in	the	fourth	7.5	per	cent"	(RSA	1926:	886).	Likewise,	embezzlement	and	abuse	by	local	officials	became	widespread.	As	early	as	1875,	reports	in	the	local	newspaper	
North	 China	 Herald	 (19	 June	 1875:	 233)	 were	 calling	 attention	 to	 the	 plethora	 of	 tax	collection	 offices	 set	 up	 to	 patrol	 boundaries	 of	 Shanghai's	 extraterritorial	 settlements,	designed	to	capture	revenues	on	goods	leaving	the	tax-exempt	settlements	to	the	domestic	interior.	Some	of	these	tax-collection	offices	were	run	by	government	officials,	while	others	by	 private	 merchant	 associations;	 both	 however,	 reportedly	 operated	 by	 accepting	"squeeze"	(bribery).	Bell	&	Woodward	(1912:	87)	note	 that	 it	was	commonplace	 for	 the	official	tax	rate	to	be	"practically	ignored	by	both	officials	and	traders,	by	the	former	in	order	to	allow	for	'squeeze',	and	by	the	latter	in	order	to	pay	an	enhanced	rate	(which	would	have	been	imposed	in	any	case)	on	a	lesser	amount	of	goods	than	is	actually	being	cleared."	As	Zheng	(1893:	534)	notes,	such	a	situation	disadvantaged	law-abiding	domestic	merchants	while	rewarding	ones	willing	to	engage	in	bribery	and	corruption.	Chen	(1914:	102-104)	describes	numerous	abuses	by	the	tax	officials	at	the	expense	of	the	merchants,	including	that	administrators	would	pocket	the	transit	fees	for	themselves,	hence	leading	to	official	records	 of	 lijin	 collection	 amounts	 to	 heavily	 undercount	 the	 true	 amounts	 paid	 by	merchants.	Luo	(1936),	too,	presents	dozens	of	recorded	instances	of	fraud	practices	and	extraction.	Collectors	frequently	demanded	small	bribes	in	order	for	them	to	issue	receipts	or	release	goods.	In	provinces	where	regulations	decreed	lijin	on	a	shipment	of	goods	was	to	be	paid	only	once,	the	merchant	was	supposed	to	be	able	to	show	a	receipt	indicating	prior	payment	of	 lijin	 at	 the	other	 collection	points	 to	prove	 that	 lijin	 had	already	paid.	
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However,	 it	was	not	uncommon	 for	 the	officials	 at	 the	next	 collection	point	 to	 claim	an	insufficient	 amount	 was	 paid	 at	 the	 previous	 collection	 point,	 and	 demand	 additional	payments	(Muhse	1935:	239,	Luo	1936:	128-131).	Thus,	domestic	merchants	were	subject	to	 the	 whim	 of	 local	 collection	 officials,	 for	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 the	 release	 and	 avoid	impounding	 of	 their	 goods,	 payment	 had	 to	 be	made,	 especially	 since	 there	 existed	 no	formal	procedural	system	for	merchants	wishing	to	dispute	the	imposition	of	a	given	tax	fee.			That	the	localities	collected	and	kept	the	tax	proceeds	directly	indicated	the	degree	to	which	the	 central	 government	 lacked	 the	 power	 to	 exert	 control	 over	 the	 provinces	 in	 their	manner	 application	 of	 these	 taxes.	 By	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 century,	 the	 lijin	 tax	 had	 become	further	entrenched	as	it	accounted	for	the	vast	majority	of	provincial	government	revenue;	given	that	Qing,	Beiyang	and	Guomindang	governments	were	all	heavily	fiscally	strained,	they	 were	 loathe	 to	 dismantle	 the	 system	without	 possessing	 a	 replacement	 stream	 of	income	(Bird	1899:	537,	RSA	1926:	885).			Kang	Youwei	(),	a	leading	late-Qing	reformer,	writes	in	1904	of	the	way	in	which	the	central	 government	had	 lost	 control	 over	 the	provinces	 via	 fiscal	 decentralisation:	 "The	power	 of	 financial	 control	 is	 now	 vested	 not	with	 the	 central	 government	 but	with	 the	provincial	authorities.	When	the	[national	government's]	Board	of	Revenue	needs	money,	it	asks	the	provinces	to	apportion	among	themselves	without	bothering	with	the	methods	of	fund-raising...	The	Board	of	Revenue	exerts	no	direct	[financial]	control	over	the	nation...	It	 is	 so	obvious	 that	provincial	authorities	 exert	 financial	 control	 to	 the	utmost	 and	 the	Board	of	Revenue	is	utterly	powerless"	(quoted	in	Ho	1959:	66).			Soon	after	the	establishment	of	the	Republic	in	1912,	there	were	immediate	efforts	to	create	a	more	uniform	tax	system,	with	intention	to	either	abandon	or	significantly	simplify	the	
lijin	system,	which	was	increasingly	recognised	as	an	obstacle	to	greater	interprovincial	and	international	trade.	As	Robinson	(1913:451)	relays,	"One	of	the	chief	obstacles	to	trade	in	China	is	the	almost	absolute	lack	of	anything	resembling	order	in	the	assessment	of	taxes	and	liken	or	customs	duties.	In	many	instances	goods	in	transit	are	subjected	to	repeated	assessment	en	route	from	province	to	province	and	sometimes	from	town	to	town,	in	order	to	furnish	‘squeeze’	for	the	officials."	Although	the	author	optimistically	reports	that	based	on	 "receipt	 of	 recent	 personal	 communications	 from	 high	 authorities...	 a	 change	 for	 the	better	is	confidently	looked	for	in	the	near	future,"	his	optimism	proved	unjustified,	or	at	the	least,	the	private	information	upon	which	he	based	his	assessment	was	flawed.		Conflicts	 of	 interest	 between	 central	 and	 local	 governments	 remained	 a	 perpetually	unresolved	 issue.	 Bloch	 (1939:133)	 reports	 that	 much	 of	 the	 Guomindang	 central	government's	fiscal	issues	were	exacerbated	by	its	weaknesses	in	administrative	authority,	explicating	the	range	of	ways	local	officials	extracted	property	from	private	economic	actors:	"local	authorities	levied	a	multitude	of	different	assessments	on	urban	rent,	on	pawnshops,	on	butchers,	etc,	many	of	these	levies	taking	the	form	of	lump	sum	contributions	of	all	the	firms	in	one	line	of	business	individually	assessed	by	the	guilds	or	chambers	of	commerce	themselves.	Moreover,	in	some	provinces,	internal	customs	levies	continued;	and,	actually,	illegal	revenue	from	the	taxation	of	opium,	gambling	and	vice	(officially	suppressed)	often	played	a	major	role	in	the	budgets,	not	to	mention	the	rich	source	of	monetary	inflation	to	which	quite	a	few	of	China's	provincial	satraps	resorted	even	as	late	as	1937."		Thus	the	system	was	entrenched	even	while	the	central	government	wished	to	dismantle	it.	At	the	Chinese	Customs	Conferences	held	in	Beijing	in	1925	and	1927,	foreign	government	representatives	repeatedly	suggested	for	the	removal	of	the	lijin	system,	to	which	central	government	representatives	agreed,	but	were	unable	to	implement	(Muhse	1935:	241).	The	Guomindang	Party	also	attempted	to	abolish	the	lijin	in	1926	over	the	limited	territory	it	controlled	at	the	time,	but	proved	unsuccessful.	Even	after	the	Party	secured	control	of	the	
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central	government	after	the	Northern	Expedition,	a	proclamation	to	abolish	the	lijin	system	on	10	October	1930	failed	to	actualise	(Coons	1934:	79).	It	was	only	after	land	tax	revenues	were	 allocated	 directly	 to	 the	 provinces	 to	 serve	 as	 replacement	 for	 lijin	 that	 a	 second	mandate	by	the	Guomindang	Party	on	31	January	1932	proved	slightly	more	successful	in	ending	the	practice.	Nonetheless,	writing	nearly	three	years	later,	Muhse	(1935:	242)	notes	that	several	outlying	provinces	such	as	Sichuan	were	still	employing	the	lijin.			Of	 far	 greater	 importance	 was	 the	 fact	 that	 while	 the	 lijin	 was	 eventually	 nominally	abolished,	it	was	soon	replaced	by	numerous	other	transit	taxes	that	remained	in	effect	far	longer.	 An	 editorial	 by	 the	 Jen	 Min	 Jih	 Pao	 newspaper	 entitled	 "Is	 Likin	 Abolished?"	answered	its	own	query	strongly	in	the	negative,	noting	that	the	‘Special	Consumption	Tax’	and	‘Consolidated	Tax‘	that	replaced	the	lijin,	and	whose	combined	scope	covered	twenty-four	 broad	 categories	 of	 commodities,	 simply	 represented	 the	 same	 as	 that	which	 they	replaced:	"is	there	really	any	difference	as	to	their	[the	old	lijin	and	new	taxes']	scope?	Is	there	any	commodity	which	does	not	fall	under	one	or	the	other	of	the	24	headings	to	which	the	Consolidated	and	Special	Consumption	Taxes	apply?"	Going	further,	the	article	laid	out	in	detail	that	the	fact	that	the	new	taxes	were	to	be	collected	in	the	same	manner	as	the	old	
lijin	had	been	that	there	was	to	be	no	difference	in	the	application	of	the	new	taxes	with	that	of	the	original:	"In	Regulations	Governing	the	Collection	of	the	Special	Consumption	Tax	it	is	stated	in	Chapter	II,	Article	7:	‘The	tax	offices	shall	be	established	at	places	where	the	goods	are	produced,	manufactured	or	concentrated.’	 In	Regulations	Governing	 the	 Inspection	of	
goods	subject	to	the	Special	Consumption	Tax	it	is	stipulated	in	Article	2:	‘(1)	When	goods	are	in	a	centre	convenient	for	inspection,	the	tax	office	shall	send	its	inspectors	to	inspect	directly	 the	 quantity	 in	 stock	 and	 sold,	 and	 to	 determine	 the	 amount	 of	 the	 necessary	taxation.	 (2)	When	 goods	 are	 scattered	 in	 various	 places	 not	 convenient	 for	 inspection,	branch	offices	shall	be	established	at	the	main	routes	through	which	goods	are	transported,	where	the	goods	shall	be	examined	according	to	the	bills	of	lading.	(3)	Goods	transported	on	 rivers	 and	 their	 tributaries,	which	 are	 not	 convenient	 for	 direct	 inspection,	 shall	 be	subject	to	inspection	by	inspectors	on	boats	possessed	by	the	tax	offices.’	In	other	words,	the	Special	Consumption	Tax	will	be	collected	at	the	same	points	where	likin	was	(and	still	is)	collected,	causing	the	same	inconvenience	and	trouble	to	merchants	as	its	predecessor	likin,	the	same	delays	releasing	goods	under	inspection,	and	creating	the	same	opportunities	for	exaction	and	extortion.	And	against	administrative	negligence	and	misbehaviour,	 the	poor	merchant	has	no	effective	remedy.	…with	legal	costs	and	lawyers’	fees	so	high,	and	the	machinery	of	the	law	inefficient	and	undependable,	who	would	care	to	settle	disputes	by	recourse	to	administrative	law?"	(Peoples	Tribune	1931:	23).			It	is	noteworthy	that	the	final	sentence	of	the	cited	editorial	conveys	concern	not	only	on	issues	relating	to	the	unjust	application	of	taxes	on	commercial	activity,	but	also	speaks	to	the	lack	of	protection	afforded	private	economic	actors	from	an	independent	application	of	the	law	against	the	overreach	of	state	power.	If	anything,	the	creation	of	new	taxes	simply	added	to	the	existing	lijin	taxes,	which	continued	to	be	applied	sporadically.	As	noted	by	a	report	in	the	31	December	1933	issue	of	the	North-China	Daily	News,	high	transit	taxes	in	the	form	of	a	modified	lijin,	and	the	lo	ti	shui	destination	tax,	were	in	heavy	use	in	Shaanxi	province	at	the	time,	depressing	local	trade.	Xu	(1935:53)	reports	that	as	of	December	1934,	interprovincial	transit	of	a	shipment	of	sugar	between	Zigong	and	Chongqing	was	levied	twenty	unique	transit	taxes	as	it	made	the	journey	across	nine	counties.			Oddly,	the	view	of	the	lijin	as	a	relatively	benign	tax	system	is	sometimes	advanced	in	the	literature,	here	exemplified	by	Perkins	(1967:482):	"But	the	tax	was	not	excessive	if	one	abstracts	from	foreign	competition	and	arbitrary	administration...Much	of	the	burden	could	be	readily	passed	on	to	the	consumer.		Seldom	was	the	tax	administered	so	harshly	that	it	destroyed	 commerce	 in	 an	 area	 altogether...	 Generally	 the	 transport	 costs	 entailed	 in	avoiding	a	tax	station	were	much	higher	than	the	tax."		
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Conversely,	we	argue	the	opposite—that	lijin	and	other	transit	taxes	represented	a	severe	imposition	on	the	private	property	rights	of	domestic	Chinese	merchants.	To	begin	with,	the	
lijin	tax	system	symbolise	an	example	of	the	disruptive	presence	of	the	state	in	commercial	affairs,	exemplifying	aspects	of	both	facets	of	the	way	in	which	the	domestic	Chinese	state	contributed	 to	 a	 relatively	weak	private	property	rights	 environment.	On	 the	one	hand,	these	transit	taxes	were	symbolic	of	the	role	of	the	"state-as-leviathan"	framework,	as	the	imposition	 and	 expansion	 of	 such	 taxes	 represented	 the	 "grabbing	 hand"	 of	 the	 state,	especially	 in	 so	 far	 as	 it	 took	 from	 the	 sector	of	 the	 economy	 that	was	most	 successful,	thereby	undermining	economic	growth.	At	the	same	time,	the	way	in	which	these	taxes	were	administered	 is	equally	 illustrative	of	 the	relatively	weak	power	 the	central	government	possessed	 to	 prevent	 other	 actors	 (in	 this	 instance,	 local	 authorities	 invested	 with	 the	trappings	of	local	state	power)	from	infringing	on	the	private	property	rights	of	merchants.	As	described,	 it	was	 in	 fact	well	 recognised	 by	 numerous	 contemporary	 actors	 that	 the	existence	of	transit	taxes	was	harmful	to	trade	and	economic	growth;	these	actors	included	many	within	the	central	government.	However,	given	the	fiscal	autonomy	possessed	by	the	provinces—as	Wu	 (1935:190)	 comments	 at	 the	 time,	 "Most	 provinces	 have	 their	 own	treasuries	and	their	own	provincial	banks"—combined	moreover	with	the	implied	threat	of	locally-based	military	 power	 backing	many	 local	 provincial	 leaders,	 the	 various	 central	authorities	continually	lacked	the	power	to	coerce	the	provinces	into	ending	these	taxes.		Second,	it	is	instructive	to	note	that	once	introduced,	the	effective	tax	burden	on	domestic	merchants	ballooned	 from	one-tenth	of	a	per	 cent,	 up	 to	 ten	 to	 twenty	per	 cent.	Such	 a	system	 represented	 a	 tremendous	 disincentive	 on	 (inland)	 trade	 activity,	 which	 had	previously	served	as	one	of	the	main	drivers	of	commercial	growth	for	the	Chinese	economy	over	 the	 preceding	 century.	 Third,	 relatedly,	 these	 disincentives	 were	 applied	discriminatorily	on	domestic	merchants,	as	they	suffered	a	tax	burden	of	which	businesses	operating	under	extraterritoriality	were	exempt.		This	not	only	economically	disadvantaged	domestic	economic	agents,	but	also	created	resentment	towards	both	the	government	and	foreign	business,	especially	since	many	 local	tax	officials	would	seek	 to	recoup	 fees	 they	might	 otherwise	 have	 charged	 foreign	 merchants	 by	 levying	 higher	 rates	 on	 domestic	traders	 (Muhse	 1935:238).	 In	 general,	 the	 system	 placed	 domestic	 business	 at	 a	tremendous	disadvantage,	 increasing	 their	cost	of	 production	and	transit,	as	well	as	 the	amount	of	time	attending	to	administrative	and	rent-seeking	activities.	Fourth,	it	was	the	administrative	process	of	 the	 tax's	application	 that	exacted	 the	most	negative	 impact	on	commercial	 activity.	 The	 arbitrary	 nature	 of	 its	 administration	 generated	 additional	business	 uncertainty	 for	 the	 domestic	merchant.	 Arbitrary	 tax	 rates	 are	 arguably	more	disruptive	to	economic	activity	than	consistently-applied	high	taxes.		The	system	also	led	to	an	 increase	 in	 corruption,	 as	 bribery	 and	 abuse	 became	 widespread.	 Both	 factors	represented	 a	 deterioration	 in	 the	 overall	 private	 property	 rights	 framework	 in	 which	domestic	economic	agents	conducted	their	economic	activity.		It	 is	 hardly	 reassuring	 to	note	 that	 "seldom	was	 the	 tax	 administered	 so	harshly	 that	 it	destroyed	 trade	 altogether";	 indeed,	 as	 argued	 above,	 the	 tax	 was	 applied	 to	 the	most	commercially	active	and	vibrant	section	of	the	economy	and	country;	the	question	is	not	whether	 trade	 was	 completely	 stifled,	 but	 rather,	 what	might	 it	 have	 been	 if	 not	 for	 a	discriminatorily-applied	onerous	tax	burden.	Further,	the	secondary	and	tertiary	effects	of	the	tax	scheme	were	likely	extremely	high.	Trade	flows	create	multiplier	effects	throughout	the	economy—indeed,	one	of	the	reasons	the	size	of	the	financial	sector	in	Shanghai	was	so	large	was	because	of	the	amount	of	trade	flow	through	it	owing	to	its	treaty	port	status,	since	 trade	 flows	require	capital	moving	 in	and	out	 in	support	of	 the	 flow	of	goods.	The	development	of	 financial	services	 leads	 to	 easier	 capital	 supply	 and	hence	 lower	 capital	costs,	which	other	business	ventures	could	have	accessed.	The	suppression	of	trade	activity	throughout	China	due	to	the	imposition	of	lijin	created	disincentives	for	trade	and	thereby	depressed	financial	development,	hurting	overall	economic	growth	opportunities.		
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Additionally,	beyond	the	impacts	of	paying	arbitrarily	higher	tax	rates	compared	to	foreign	merchants,	 rent-seeking	 behaviour	 was	 encouraged	 amongst	 domestic	 merchants.	 As	indicated	above,	considerable	time	and	effort	was	spent	on	efforts	to	avoid	the	tax,	or	to	bribe	or	coerce	tax	officials	to	lower	the	effective	tax	rate;	all	these	efforts,	therefore,	went	towards	non-productive	activities.	Hence,	rather	than	creating	beneficial	conditions	within	which	private	economic	agents	and	entrepreneurs	could	most-readily	identify	and	respond	to	economic	opportunities,	the	unequally-applied	lijin	tax	system	represented	an	example	in	which	state	agents—starting	with	the	Qing	and	continuing	through	the	1930s—impinged	heavily	upon	the	private	property	rights	for	domestic	economic	agents.			The	detrimental	effects	of	the	lijin	and	other	transit	taxes	were	well-recognised	by	contem-poraneous	observers.	Zheng	(1893:534)	in	his	Words	of	Caution	treatise	directly	labels	the	
lijin	tax	system	extremely	disruptive	to	commerce,	and	argues	for	its	outright	abolishment.	Bird	(1899:	537)	notes	transit	taxes	"effectively	hamper	trade".	Chen	(1914:	103)	decries	the	practice	of	goods	subjected	to	repeated	taxation,	as	well	as	the	interference	with	trade	owing	 to	 increased	 uncertainty	 for	merchants.	 Nonetheless,	weak	 central	 state	 capacity	enabled	this	economically	harmful	tax	system	to	remain	in	place	through	the	mid-1930s.		Note	that	this	situation	is	reflective	of	the	type	of	behaviour	expected	under	the	Violence	Trap	framework,	as	to	be	explored	later	in	more	detail.	Emblematic	of	a	weak	state	capacity	that	was	unable	to	enforce	control	over	local	players	who	possess	their	own	power	base	that	 included	military	might,	central	state	actors	were	 incentivised	 to	mollify	local	elites	with	favours.	Since	fighting	these	local	elites	was	costly,	even	when	there	were	indications	that	central	state	actors	desired	to	end	the	 lijin	policy,	 its	accounting	for	such	significant	amounts	of	local	provincial	revenue,	meant	local	elites	and	provincial	rulers	would	strongly	resist,	and	in	ways	that	could	include	the	power	of	violence	to	resist.				5.1.2.		Fiscal	Expenditures		While	the	state	faced	a	multitude	of	difficulties	raising	sufficient	capital,	ultimately,	it	was	state	actors'	inability	to	control	expenditures	in	line	with	the	constraints	imposed	by	limited	revenues	 that	 drove	 the	 country's	 mounting	 fiscal	 problems.	 Earlier	 periods	 of	 Qing	governance	are	typically	described	as	laissez-faire	and	low-expenditure	in	nature.	The	shift	towards	 greatly	 increased	 expenditures	 during	 the	 late-Qing	 was	 driven	 primarily	 by	increases	in	military	spending,	and	subsequent	increases	in	the	size	of	state	administration.	In	 spite	 of	 continued	 expressed	 commitments	 to	 increasing	 investment	 in	 economic	development	and	social	welfare	goals,	in	practise,	the	domestic	Chinese	governments	in	the	post-Opium	War	 time	 frame	 spent	 essentially	 the	 same	 percentage	 of	 their	 budgets	 on	socioeconomic	 programs	 as	 it	 had	 in	 the	 prior.	 Instead,	 military	 and	 related	 spending	continued	to	dominate	the	budgets	of	the	successive	domestic	Chinese	governments.		Spending	 on	 actual	military	 outlays	was	 significant	 under	 the	 late-Qing,	 as	 the	 costs	 of	controlling	 the	Taiping,	White	Lotus,	Small	Swords,	Nian,	Miao,	Du	Wenxiu,	Dungan,	and	other	concurrent	internal	rebellions	of	the	second	half	of	the	nineteenth	century	quickly	drained	existing	military	resources	and	required	extensive	fiscal	outlays	to	raise	additional	military	forces.	Over	the	same	time	period,	the	Qing	faced	multiple	external	wars,	including	successive	Opium	Wars,	the	Sino-Japanese	War	in	1895,	and	the	war	instigated	by	the	Eight-Nation	 Alliance	 in	 response	 to	 the	 Boxer	 Uprising.	 The	 financial	 costs	 of	 fighting	 these	internal	rebellions	and	external	wars	were	huge,	to	say	nothing	of	the	cost	to	human	life	and	destruction	of	human	capital	potential	and	stocks	of	physical	capital.	 It	 is	estimated	 that	monetary	costs	of	the	internal	rebellions	totalled	eight	hundred	and	fifty	million	taels,	while	the	external	wars	added	another	one	to	two	hundred	million	taels	(Liu	2016).	From	1850	through	the	turn	of	the	century,	therefore,	this	nearly	one	billion	in	military	outlays	added	an	additional	two	hundred	million	taels	in	annual	expenditures	to	the	fiscal	budget.	
	 92 
	Yet,	just	as	important	as	the	costs	of	waging	actual	battle	were	the	resultant	costs	borne	by	the	Chinese	government	in	the	form	of	indemnities	imposed	by	victorious	foreign	powers	in	the	aftermath	of	Qing	losses.	For	instance,	the	Treaty	of	Tianjin	that	concluded	the	Second	Opium	War	 in	1858	 imposed	 fees	of	 four	million	 taels	and	 two	million	 taels	accruing	 to	Britain	 and	 France,	 respectively.	 Subsequent	 Qing	 losses	 were	 far	 more	 costly;	 Japan	imposed	an	indemnity	of	230	million	taels	in	the	wake	of	the	Sino-Japanese	War,	and	the	Boxer	Rebellion	indemnity	totalled	450	million	taels	(Ning	2015:	23).	Thus,	another	nearly	800	million	taels	could	be	included	in	military-related	costs,	bringing	total	such	costs	up	to	approximately	1.8	billion	taels.			Such	military	and	indemnity-related	costs	represented	considerable	percentages	of	annual	Qing	 government	 outlays.	 The	 First	 Opium	War	 alone,	 at	 a	 cost	 of	 thirty	 million	 taels,	represented	nearly	two-thirds	of	annual	government	revenues	in	the	mid-1850s.	Adding	in	the	costs	incurred	from	rebellions	and	later	wars	and	indemnities,	it	is	not	surprising	the	Qing	 government	 found	 itself	 in	 deficit	 for	 basically	 eight	 out	 of	 every	 ten	 years	 of	 its	remaining	 time	 in	 power	 Even	 as	 revenues	 climbed	 over	 subsequent	 decades	 to	 reach	approximately	two	hundred	million	taels	annually,	with	combined	military	and	indemnity	costs	averaging	nearly	the	same,	the	government	was	forced	to	turn	to	debt	financing.	With	the	source	of	such	financing	to	repay	indemnities	coming	primarily	via	foreign	borrowing,	the	 ancillary	 impacts	 of	 such	 fiscal	 conditions	 were	 significant.	 Given	 the	 size	 of	 the	indemnities	and	subsequent	borrowings,	Chinese	governments	were	strapped	into	paying	out	large	amounts	of	debt	service	as	a	result	of	these	wars	and	indemnities.	As	late	as	1935,	slightly	more	 than	one-third	of	debt	service	went	 to	 foreign	bondholders	and	 indemnity	payees	(MOF	1935:	5).			As	 indicated	 in	 Figure	 5.1a,	 government	 spending	 consistently	 outstripped	 ordinary	revenues.	Initially,	beyond	the	first	years	of	the	new	government,	deficits	under	Yuan	Shikai	and	 immediately	 afterward	 remained	 relatively	 small,	 within	 ten	 per	 cent	 of	 ordinary	revenues.	By	the	later	stage	of	the	Beiyang	period,	expenditures	began	to	increase	while	real	income	 slightly	dipped,	widening	 the	 size	 of	 deficits	 incurred.	 The	 start	 of	 Guomindang	period	saw	deficits	widen	further.	Although	by	the	early	1930s	the	government	had	begun	running	smaller	deficits,	they	grew	considerably	in	the	ensuing	years,	especially	after	the	outbreak	of	war	in	1937,	culminating	in	the	fall	of	the	Nanjing	government	and	its	retreat	to	 Chongqing;	 the	 area	 on	 the	 chart	 for	 the	 years	1938	 through	 1941	 is	 shaded,	 as	 the	spending	and	revenue	data	apply	to	the	Chongqing	Republican	government	only.		Given	the	scale	of	inflation	during	the	late	1930s,	we	also	present	equivalent	data	in	Figure	5.1b,	with	revenue	and	expenditure	figures	adjusted	for	inflation.	This	view	allows	us	to	observe	that	spending	levels	in	real	dollars	increased	prior	to	the	outbreak	of	war	in	1937.	Spending	as	a	percentage	of	revenues	grew	exceedingly	high	as	the	war	progressed	and	the	economy	 within	 the	 Guomindang-controlled	 areas	 deteriorated	 further	 under	 heavy	government	 intervention	 within	 the	 economy,	 whilst	 spending	 levels	 remained	 high.	 A	continual	trend	toward	greater	levels	of	deficit	financing	occurred	over	the	entirety	of	the	early-Republican	 period,	 as	 evidenced	 from	 our	 calculations	 of	 average	 ratio	 of	expenditures	to	ordinary	revenues,	which	at	125	per	cent	over	1913	to	1926	climbed	to	175	per	cent	over	1927	to	1937,	before	rising	drastically	to	508	per	cent	from	1938	to	1941.		Not	unlike	the	budgets	of	the	late-Qing,	Republican	governments	were	likewise	dominated	by	military	expenditures,	which	accounted	for	much	of	the	observed	increases	in	budgetary	outlays.	This	was	certainly	true	in	the	period	following	the	death	of	Yuan	Shikai,	as	the	given		military	clique	in	control	of	the	central	government	during	a	particular	time	period	would	strive	to	keep	control	over	the	country	by	alternatively	placating	and	then	fighting	its	rivals.		
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Figure	5.1a.		Central	Government	Fiscal	Position,	current	yuan,	1913–1941		
	Source:	Expenditure	and	Revenue	data	from	Yang	(1985)			Figure	5.1b.		Central	Government	Fiscal	Position,	yuan,	inflation-adjusted,	1913–1941		
	Sources:	Expenditure	and	Revenue	data	from	Yang	(1985);	inflation	adjustments	based	on	price	index	constructed	from	He	(1927)	and	Shanghai	Economic	Research	Institute	(1958).		
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This	was	 equally	 true	of	 the	period's	Guangdong-based	 rival	Guomindang	government's	budget,	with	the	military	receiving	the	lion's	share	of	government	outlays.	Pan	(2003)	finds	that	 the	 majority	 of	 internal	 debt	 issuances	 by	 both	 the	 Beiyang	 and	 southern-based	Guomindang	governments	went	into	non-productive	uses,	primarily	military	expenditures,	as	opposed	to	creating	opportunities	for	entrepreneurial	or	economic	development.		Even	reformers	in	the	Guomindang	government	who	sought	to	contain	military	spending	so	as	to	focus	greater	resources	on	outlays	that	could	set	the	stage	for	economic	growth	felt	constrained	by	the	circumstances	they	faced,	surrounded	as	they	were	by	credible	military	threats;	as	Chen	(2000)	notes,	although	Chen	Jiongming,	the	military	leader	of	Guangdong,	continually	expressed	a	desire	to	reduce	military	spending	and	 focus	more	resources	on	economic	development,	he	did	not,	given	that	while	"Chen	had	recognized	that	the	reform	of	Guangdong	depended	on	his	drastically	reducing	military	spending...	Chen	understood	that	his	power	depended	on	a	strong	Guangdong	Army	under	his	control."	Chen	argued	with	other	Guomindang	leaders,	including	the	nominal	leader	Sun	Zhongshan,	to	limit	military	expenditures	and	focus	more	on	social	spending,	but	was	eventually	ousted	from	power	by	Sun	and	Jiang	Jieshi	in	1924,	and	forced	to	flee	overseas,	with	Jiang	amassing	forces	and	increasing	expenditures	in	support	of	his	subsequent	Northern	Expedition	offensive.		The	success	of	the	Northern	Expedition,	however,	did	not	lead	to	a	subsequent	reduction	in	government	 budgeting	 concentrated	 on	 military	 expenditures.	 Officially,	 based	 on	 the	breakdown	 from	 the	 budgets	 approved	 by	 the	 Legislative	 Yuan,	 from	 1927-1936,	 the	proportion	of	the	national	budget	allocated	towards	military	spending	averaged	over	forty	per	cent	for	the	decade,	as	can	be	observed	in	Figure	5.2;	as	indicated	in	the	figure,	military	expenditures	took	up	at	least	forty	per	cent	of	the	budget	in	every	year	except	1935,	for	which	the	percentage	was	thirty-six.	Data	for	1927	can	be	considered	outliers;	to	begin	with,	total	revenues	and	expenditures	were	considerably	lower	than	in	other	years,	as	they	reflect	solely	the	areas	of	the	country	that	the	Guomindang	controlled	during	the	course	of	the	year,	much	 of	 which	 was	 time	 prior	 to	 the	 final	 resolution	 of	 the	 Northern	 Expedition.	Furthermore,	 the	 Guomindang	 government	 serviced	 almost	 none	 of	 the	 country's	outstanding	 debts	 that	 totalled	 nearly	 two	 billion	 yuan	 (nor,	 for	 that	 matter,	 did	 the	disintegrating	Beiyang),	hence	decreasing	outlays	considerably.	In	fact,	nearly	the	entirety	of	 the	 budget	 for	 this	 year	 was	 nearly	 entirely	 consumed	 by	 military	 expenditures,	representing	ninety-two	per	cent	of	total	spending.		As	 skewed	 towards	military	 spending	 the	official	budgetary	 figures	appear	 to	 show,	 the	detailed	 study	of	actual	 budgetary	outlays	 conducted	by	Paauw	(1952)	 finds	 the	official	figures	to	understate	the	actual	levels	of	military	spending	during	the	latter	prewar	years	of	the	Guomindang	era	by	ten	per	cent	or	more.	Paauw's	comparative	auditing	research	based	on	publications	obtained	from	the	Ministry	of	Finance,	the	Directorate-General	of	Budgets,	Accounts	and	Statistics,	and	the	public	finance	yearbook,	indicate	that	much	of	the	spending	allocated	into	the	"other"	designation	in	the	latter	three	years	was	actually	funnelled	into	military	spending,	categorised	differently	for	political	reasons	(Paauw	1952:	8-9,	20-22).	The	 situation	 became	 even	 more	 skewed	 after	 1937—years	 for	 which,	 as	 observed	 in	Figures	5.1a	and	5.1b,	expenditures	outpaced	revenues	by	a	factor	of	five—when	protracted	wars	against	Japan	and	the	Communist	Party	saw	military	spending	consume	upwards	of	seventy	to	eighty	per	cent	of	the	national	budget.		As	Figure	5.2	also	makes	clear,	service	on	existing	debt	also	dominated	government	outlays.	With	the	exception	of	1927,	unusual	for	the	reasons	noted	above,	debt	service	payments	represented	approximately	one-third	of	annual	expenditures	over	the	Guomindang	pre-war	period.	That	so	much	of	spending	went	towards	debt	service	was	obviously	problematic,	given	 that	 an	 inherently	unsustainable	 fiscal	situation	was	 implied	by	 the	 government's	inability	to	pay	down	the	debt,	combined	with	the	government's	inability	to	obtain	sufficient	
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Figure	5.2.		Government	Expenditures	by	category,	fiscal	years	1927–1936		
	Source:	Constructed	from	data	provided	in	Paauw	(1952)				ordinary	 revenues	 requiring	much	of	 current	period	borrowing	 to	 go	 towards	servicing	debts	 acquired	 in	prior	 periods	 (Paauw	 1952:	17).	 Song	 Ziwen	 himself	 recognised	 this,	noting	in	June	1932	that	the	government	was	following	a	"disastrous"	strategy	of	a	"vicious	circle	of	meeting	deficits	with	short-term	loans"	(China	Weekly	Review	18	June	1932).	
	Given	that	besides	 its	use	 to	pay	down	existing	debt,	 the	remaining	majority	of	current-period	 borrowing	 went	 towards	military	 spending,	 the	 per	 cent	 of	 combined	 spending	directed	 towards	 military	 and	 debt	 service—which	 for	 the	 years	 1928	 through	 1933	averaged	78,	and	officially	67	for	1934	through	1936	(albeit	adjusting	upwards	ten	per	cent,	as	Paauw	(1952)'s	research	suggests,	brings	the	figure	in	line	with	prior	years)—further	demonstrates	 the	 dominance	 of	 military	 spending.	 In	 essence,	 therefore,	 over	 three-quarters	 of	 the	 pre-war	 Guomindang	 government	 budget	was	military	 in	 nature.	While	specific	 data	 on	 the	 allocation	 of	 Beiyang	 period	 budgets	 are	 not	 available,	 they	 are	estimated	to	be	proportionately	similar	(Feuerwerker	1983,	Strauss	1997).		Several	 important	 implications	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 domestic	 institutional	 environment	flow	from	the	dominance	of	expenditures	going	towards	military	purposes.	First,	the	high	levels	of	military	spending	were	a	direct	outcome	of	the	fact	that	domestic	state	governance	structure	was	that	of	an	authoritarian	military	regime,	with	the	major	leadership	of	the	state	dominated	by	members	of	the	military.	Hence,	it	was	in	the	interest	of	those	state	actors	in	control	of	 the	budgetary	and	expenditure	process	 to	continually	 funnel	 funds	 into	 those	areas	 that	 directly	 benefitted	 themselves.	 This	 included	 not	 only	 directing	 funds	 into	sections	 of	 the	 government	 by	 which	 their	 growth	 could	 increase	 controlling	 actors'	prestige	and	power	within	the	government	bureaucratic	apparatus,	but	further	allowed	in	many	 cases	 for	 the	 personal	 enrichment	 of	 state	 leadership	 through	 extra-legal	 means.	Noting	the	use	of	"loose	accounting"	procedures	that	labelled	budgeted	expenditures	into	unspecified	categories	such	as	"unallocated",	"advances",	or	"temporary	disbursements"—representing	in	some	years	upwards	of	ten	per	cent	of	total	expenditures—Paauw	(1952:	12)	 observes	 these	 practises	 allowed	 for	 "considerable	 leakage	 of	 Nationalist	 financial	resources	to	provide	for	the	amassing	of	fortunes	by	government	officials."		
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	Recent	research	by	Wang	(2016),	using	materials	at	the	Hoover	Institute's	archives	of	the	Guomindang	economist	Zhang	Jiaxuan	(Chang	Kia-ngua),	uncovered	important	evidence	of	the	scale	of	the	amount	of	personal	wealth	accumulated	by	the	Guomindang	leadership.	A	report	 conducted	 by	 Japanese	 secret	 intelligence	 services	 in	 October	 of	 1939	 on	 the	personal	wealth	of	the	Guomindang	leadership	held	in	the	foreign	banks	of	the	Shanghai	foreign	 settlements	 found	 the	 combined	 balances	 of	 the	 top	 four	 members	 of	 the	Guomindang	leadership—Jiang	Jieshi,	Song	Ziwei,	Kong	Xiangxi,	Chen	Lifu—alone	totalled	6.1	billion	yuan	(this	figure	includes	monies	held	jointly	by	their	close	relatives,	mainly	that	of	Song	Meiling,	Song	Yuling,	and	Song	Ziliang).	To	place	this	amount	in	proper	context,	one	can	observe	 that	 the	size	of	 the	government	revenue	 in	1939	approximated	715	million	yuan	 (Wang	 1985),	 roughly	 equivalent	 to	 twelve	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 amount	 the	 top	Guomindang	leadership	had	absconded	into	the	accounts	of	Shanghai's	foreign	banks.			Thus,	 authoritarian	 military	 power	 structures	 enabled	 corruption	 to	 become	 systemic,	consistently	directing	state	resources	to	personally	benefit	privileged	actors	with	access	to	the	 military	 leadership.	 That	 widespread	 corruption	 was	 so	 prevalent	 was	 commonly	recognised,	 undermining	 trust	 in	 political	 institutions.	 A	 litany	 of	 contemporaneous	academics,	 journalists,	 politicians,	 and	 businesspersons	 constantly	 commented	 on	 and	were	 "repelled	 by	 the	 corruption,	 inefficiency,	 and	 repression	 of	 the	 Guomindang	government"	 (Speer	 1947:	 160).	 Similarly,	 Eastman	 (1984a:	 225),	 in	 his	 study	 of	 the	government	 during	 the	 Sino-Japanese	 War,	 criticises	 its	 administrative	 functioning	 by	emphasising	 the	 prevalence	 of	 "corruption	 and	 ineffectiveness…	 and	 pervasive	incompetence"	that	characterised	state	institutions.		Second,	with	the	overwhelming	percentage	of	government	expenditures	being	utilised	for	military	purposes,	little	was	available	for	investment	in	the	development	of	institutions	and	associated	 credible	 commitment	 mechanisms	 able	 to	 provide	 protect-ions	 on	 private	property	 rights	 and	 contracts,	 and	 therefore	 create	 a	more	 hospitable	 environment	 for	organic	entrepreneurial	activity.	For	instance,	the	circumscribed	plans	for	the	replacement	of	the	magistrate-style	court	system	that	still	operated	in	places	throughout	the	country	so	as	to	increase	the	efficacy	of	the	legal	system	and	protection	of	contracts	owed	in	part	to	the	military-dominated	budget	allocation.	The	low	levels	spent	on	institution-building,	social	welfare,	 or	 civil	 expenditures	 under	 the	 Guomindang	 simply	 continued	 a	 trend	 that	predated	the	Republican	era.	For	instance,	by	the	end	of	the	Qing,	just	two	per	cent	of	the	1911	central	government	budget	went	towards	public	services	such	as	health,	education,	or	welfare	 expenditures	 (Liu	 2016).	 Further,	 by	 the	 time	 of	 the	 Guomindang,	much	 of	 the	spending	labelled	"civil	expenditures"	or	"social	welfare"	included	funding	that	supported	the	administrative	organs	of	the	state.	Thus,	even	bureaucratic	inefficiencies	can	mistakenly	be	perceived	as	contributing	to	funding	civil	society	programs;	for	instance,	in	years	1934	onwards,	 costs	 associated	 with	 tax	 collection	 began	 to	 be	 included	 under	 the	 "civil	expenditures"	category,	a	change	accounting	for	almost	one-third	of	observed	increases	in	civil	expenditures	occurring	after	this	accounting	change	took	place	(Paauw	1952:	11).			Third,	the	scale	and	concentration	of	government	expenditures	around	military	purposes	impacted	the	development	of	the	economy,	primarily	by	crowding	out	funding	for	private	industry,	as	well	as	cannibalising	available	productive	resources.	In	the	late-Qing	period,	for	instance,	 Generals	 Li	 Hongzhang	 and	 Zuo	 Zhongtang	 helped	 direct	 large	 amounts	 of	financial	and	productive	resources	into	two	large	government-owned	military	enterprises,	the	 Jiangnan	 Arsenal	 and	 Fuzhou	 Navy	 Yard.	 These	 state-owned,	 centrally-controlled,	government	 official-managed	 ventures	 each	 ended	 in	 financial	 and	 operational	 failure,	defined	by	massive	cost	overruns,	underachievement	of	production	goals,	and	low-quality	output,	 as	 highlighted	 by	 the	 poor	 performance	 of	 their	 manufactures	 during	 their	deployment	in	the	Sino-Japanese	War	of	1895	(Pong	1987).		
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	By	 the	 start	 of	 the	 Guomindang	 period,	 the	 military's	 central	 role	 in	 the	 government	bureaucratic	 administration	 and	 economic	 planning	 apparatus	 had	 become	 more	formalised.	In	1928,	for	instance,	the	Bureau	of	Armaments	was	created,	taking	an	active	role	 in	managing	 the	munitions	 industry,	consolidating	and	coordinating	 the	production	activities	 of	 ostensibly	private	 existing	weaponry	 and	ammunitions	 factories,	 as	well	 as	establishing	new	government-owned	 firms.	The	degree	of	 government	 involvement	was	extensive,	with	Bian	(2002:	85)	finding	the	central	government	to	have	established	over	one	hundred	 fifty	military-related	 heavy	 industry	 and	munitions	 enterprises	 from	 the	mid-1930s	onwards.	Ultimately,	 the	goal	of	 these	state-led	development	efforts	was	 to	direct	economic	 resources	 to	 serve	 the	 interests	 of	 the	military	 leadership	of	 the	Guomindang	Party.	As	a	 Jen	Min	 Jih	Pao	editorial	 opined	 in	1931,	 "The	 reason	why	China’s	 industrial	economy	is	in	such	a	deplorable	state	is	not	that	there	is	no	capital	in	China	(there	is	some	200	million	ounces	of	silver	 lying	 idle	 in	 the	 vaults	 of	 the	 Shanghai	 banks),	 but	 that	 the	Nanking	Government	has	used	 every	 available	 cent	 in	 the	Government	Treasury	 for	 the	purchase	of	arms	and	the	recruitment	of	new	troops"	(People's	Tribune	1931:	27).		Military	involvement	in	all	aspects	of	state	economic	planning	was	led	in	large	part	by	the	National	Resources	Commission,	a	government	department	established	in	1935	after	it	had	been	 reorganised	out	 of	 the	National	Defence	Planning	Commission,	 clearly	denoting	 its	focus.	Even	the	National	Economic	Reconstruction	Campaign,	also	begun	in	1935	at	the	Fifth	National	Party	Congress,	had	as	its	stated	goal	to	"promote	economic	development	during	peace	time	but	to	prepare	for	economic	mobilization	at	a	time	of	war"	(Bian	2005b:	119).	Economic	development	was	to	be	centred	around	militaristic	goals.	While	some	voices	in	the	government—such	as	Wang	Jingwei	and	Chen	Gongbo—argued	for	a	more	civilian-	and	less	military-based	approach	to	economic	development	efforts,	their	political	power	was	circumscribed,	given	that	as	civilians,	they	lacked	control	over	the	Party,	which	at	that	time	was	dominated	by	the	military	(Zanasi	2006:	25-27).		Overall,	the	involvement	of	the	military	in	economic	planning—and,	over	time,	in	terms	of	its	 ownership	of	an	 increasing	 share	of	productive	 resources—led	 to	 a	distortion	 in	 the	private	economy	away	 from	focussing	production	on	meeting	consumer	demand,	 to	one	designed	to	meet	the	demands	of	government	actors,	particularly	the	military	leadership	of	the	 Guomindang.	 This	 also	 led	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 rent-seeking	 activities	 amongst	 private	entrepreneurs,	 further	 shifting	attention	 and	 resources	 away	 from	productive	 activities.	Paying	attention	to	the	directives	of	government	economic	planning	bureaucrats	became	paramount	 for	 entrepreneurs,	 as	 it	 was	 the	 government	 which	 controlled	 access	 to	productive	 and—through	 its	 increasing	 control	 over	 the	 banking	 sector—financial	resources.	As	Ting	(1935)	notes,	loans	to	government	entities	to	finance	state	expenditures	consumed	ever-larger	proportions	of	 banks'	 loan	portfolios,	 at	 the	 expense	of	 financing	private	 commercial	 activities.	 This	 became	 especially	 true	 once	 the	Ministry	 of	 Finance	assumed	outright	control	over	the	banking	industry	in	1935.		As	a	result,	obtaining	access	to	limited	financial	resources	required	membership	in	a	group	of	privileged	firms	willing	to	acquiesce	to	the	state's	developmental	and	policy	goals,	which	included	shifting	production	into	military-related	efforts.	For	instance,	given	government	spending	levels	on	purchase	of	battlefield	provisions,	textile	companies	began	focussing	on	the	manufacture	of	clothing	designed	for	soldiers,	with	less	effort	directed	towards	meeting	the	needs	of	civilian	customers	(Paauw	1952:15,	Wang	2017).	Rent-seeking	behaviour	was	also	 encouraged—given	the	ad	hoc	 nature	of	 the	overlapping	 and	arbitrarily-prescribed	system	of	transit	taxes,	whether	 lijin	up	through	the	mid-1930s,	or	its	differently-named	albeit	similarly-structured	successors,		it	was	important	for	manufacturers	and	shippers	to		
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expend	efforts	to	attempt	to	reduce	transportation	costs.	As	Wright	(1984:	158)	describes	in	regard	to	the	coal	mining	industry,	relationships	with	state	authorities	were	crucial	for	the	success	of	mining	enterprises,	not	only	so	as	to	be	granted	monopoly	production	rights,	but	especially	 to	obtain	reductions	 in	 transit	 taxes,	which	could	be	considerable—in	the	Qing	period,	reductions	were	on	the	order	of	sixfold	less	than	the	official	rate;	by	the	1920s,	that	differential	 had	 increased	 to	 tenfold	 or	 greater.	 As	 such,	 businesspersons	 focussed	much	of	their	time	not	on	private	entrepreneurial	activity,	but	rather	on	the	development	of	political	connections	that	could	provide	large	cost	savings.	Given	the	systemic	corruption	that	characterised	state	officialdom	in	general,	it	is	not	unsurprising	that	state-commerce	relationships	 were	 dominated	 by	 bribes	 that	 accompanied	 rent-seeking	 behaviour,	including	to	military	officials	who	dominated	the	state	bureaucracy	elite	(Marshall	1976).				5.2.		Measuring	Bureaucratic	Capacity	—	Infrastructural	Power		While	raising	and	channelling	money	are	two	of	the	most	vital	 indicators	of	bureaucratic	capacity,	state	capacity	bureaucratic	capacity	also	encompasses	other	aspects	that	include	planning	apparatuses	and	delivery	of	specific	services	and	provision	of	public	goods.	For	Mann	(1986:	113)	this	formulation	of	state	capacity	is	determined	via	manifestation	of	state	"infrastructural	power":	the	ability	"to	implement	logistically	political	decisions."	Acemoglu	
et	al.	(2015)	refer	to	a	similar	conception	of	state	capacity	by	focussing	on	the	actions	of	state	functionaries	and	agencies.	For	instance,	as	indicated	in	the	prior	section,	work	by	Bian	(2005a,	2005b)	and	others	focusses	on	the	extensive	nature	of	bureaucratic	organisational	resources	devoted	to	economic	planning	and	directing	various	productive	assets	towards	uses	in	the	economy	that	government	policy-makers	placed	the	highest	priority.		For	all	the	effort	in	state	planning,	however,	much	of	the	bureaucracy	was	characterised	not	only	 by,	 as	 previously	 discussed,	 corruption,	 but	 also	 by	 government	 administrative	inefficiency	and	ineffectiveness.	The	domestic	bureaucracy	repeatedly	faced	challenges	in	effectively	 marshalling	 resources	 to	 achieve	 desired	 policy	 goals.	 Already	 noted	 were	difficulties	in	implementing	desired	tax	policies,	or	successfully	conducting	military	actions.	Hanwell	(1938:	96)	calls	attention	to	the	reputed	inefficiency	of	the	central	government,	noting	 it	to	be	"notorious	 for	 its	paper	plans.	Mountains	of	paper	 [are]	consumed	 in	 the	publication	of	plans	never	put	into	effect."	Myers	(2000:	60)	recognises	the	increasing	state	planning	 structures	 instituted	 by	 the	 Guomindang,	 but	 finds	 them	 lacking	 competency,	labelling	 the	 National	 Resources	 Commission,	 the	 major	 economic	 planning	 apparatus	created	in	1935,	"a	bureaucratic	monstrosity	of	planners	and	technicians	who	wasted	vast	resources	building	inefficient	state-owned	and	state–managed	factories."	Eastman	(1990:12)	relays	a	description	by	a	contemporaneous	official	 in	a	provincial	agency	describing	 the	thirty-seven	separate	processing	steps	a	document	had	to	go	through	once	received	by	the	office,	the	result	of	which	frequently	ending	with	such	documents	becoming	lost.		In	general,	the	bloated	bureaucracy	and	high	levels	of	corruption,	coinciding	with	increased	state	authority	over	private	actors,	meant	state	actors	had	both	the	power	and	opportunity	to	continually	extract	greater	resources	from	private	actors.	Thornton	(2007:	102)	sums	up	the	 fiscally-inefficient	while	 expropriating	 leviathan	nature	of	 the	Guomindang	 state,	 by	noting,	"The	ponderous	increases	that	funded	the	new	militias,	new	schools,	and	new	public	facilities	proposed	by	modernizing	state-makers	 in	Nanjing	all	 too	 frequently	 translated	into	dramatic	increases	in	taxpayer	burdens	without	commensurate	improvements	in	the	quality	of	life...	The	continuing	expansion	of	often	overlapping	state	and	party	agencies	was	funded	by	increases	in	miscellaneous	fees	and	levies,	which	in	turn	required	an	increasing	number	of	tax	collectors	and	state	agents	to	calculate,	levy,	and	administer	them."		
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5.2.1.		Revisionist	Views	on	Domestic	State	Bureaucratic	Capacity			The	descriptions	provided	above	of	 state	bureaucratic	 capacity	underscore	many	of	 the	difficulties	 that	 domestic	 Chinese	 central	 governments	 had	 in	 overcoming	 the	 serious	challenges	that	defined	much	of	the	late	imperial	and	republican	time	periods.	As	evidenced	by	 the	 litany	of	narratives	above,	 it	 is	possible	 to	paint	a	 fairly	dim	portrait	of	domestic	governments'	abilities	in	implementing	successful	strategies	to	raise	capital	resources	or	conduct	centralised	planning	and	policy	realisation,	saddled	as	 it	was	by	corruption	and	bureaucratic	 inefficiencies	 that	 affected	multiple	departments	and	agencies,	affecting	 its	ability	to	effectively	exercise	infrastructural	power	(Wu	1937;	Hanwell	1938;	Paauw	1952;	Yang	1959;	Coble	1979,	1980;	Lau	&	Lee	1979;	Eastman	1984a,	1990;	Myers	2000;	Gu	2015;	Wu	2015,	amongst	others	cited	in	the	preceding	section).			However,	we	should	be	cautious	in	painting	a	broad	brush	characterising	domestic	state	bureaucratic	capacity,	as	much	of	the	revisionist	literature	on	domestic	state	capacity	and	institutional	quality	provide	a	different	set	of	examples,	focussing	on	the	actions	of	state	functionaries	and	agencies	 that	portray	a	narrative	much	more	positive	of	 the	 level	and	nature	of	domestic	state	bureaucratic	capacity.	Revisionist	scholars	argue	that,	at	least	for	certain	time	periods	or	certain	components	of	the	state	apparatus,	depictions	of	domestic	state	capacity	defined	solely	by	corruption	and	bureaucratic	ineffectiveness	are	misleading	or	overly	simplistic,	identifying	instances	of	effective	implementation	of	government	plans.	The	main	 approach	of	 the	 revisionist	 literature	has	been	 to	 emphasise	 the	bureaucratic	strength	and	capacity	of	a	number	of	domestic	state	institutions.	Utilising	researches	based	on	 the	 late-imperial	 and	 republican	 historical	 record,	 numerous	 examples	 of	 successful	domestic	bureaucratic	policy	planning	and	implementation	have	been	ascertained.				5.2.1.1.		Revisionist	Views	on	Qing-Era	Bureaucratic	Capacity		The	 so-called	 California	 school	 of	 Chinese	 history	 has	 produced	 considerable	 research	identifying	positive	aspects	of	state	capacity	under	the	Qing	government.	One	of	the	more	important	examples	in	this	line	of	research	has	been	work	expanding	upon	Hsiao	(1960)	to	detail	the	sophisticated	strategic	reserve	state	granary	storage	system	maintained	under	the	Qing,	as	provided	by	Wong	(1982),	Will	&	Wong	(1991),	and	Li	&	Dray-Novey	(1999).	These	and	other	revisionist	scholars	discuss	the	positive	state	capabilities	the	Qing	official	bureaucracy	 exhibited	 in	 implementing	 strategies	 that	 proved	 relatively	 effective	 in	reducing	the	frequency	of	famines,	and	mitigating	associated	negative	impacts.		While	the	concept	of	a	strategic	grain	storage	reserve	system	was	an	extension	of	a	crop	failure	insurance	policy	the	roots	of	which	stretched	back	millennia	to	the	Wei	period	in	450	b.c.e.	(Hui	2005:	61),	under	the	Qing	the	system	was	expanded	throughout	all	provinces,	as	a	deliberate	anti-famine	strategy	(Jia	2013:	107).	By	the	mid-nineteenth	century,	however,	such	 efforts	 had	 become	 considerably	 less	 standardised	 and	 more	 locally-determined	(Wong	2002:	30).	In	a	sharply	non-revisionist	analysis,	Edgerton-Tarpley	(2017)	notes	that	by	the	late-Qing,	the	state's	ability	to	limit	the	outbreak	of	famines	in	the	face	of	natural	disasters	such	as	droughts	or	floods	was	severe	enough	so	as	to	China	was	referred	to	in	the	popular	press	as	the	"land	of	famines."		Revisionist	arguments,	however,	emphasise	 the	effectiveness	of	 the	state	bureaucracy	 in	operating	a	nationwide	state	granary	system.	To	begin	with,	the	state-run	granary	system	was	 extensive	 in	 scale;	 Li	 (2000:690)	 provides	 a	 description	 of	 the	 substantial	 inter-province	importations	of	grains	between	local	governments,	which	totalled	over	one	million	
shi	of	grain	per	annum.	Second,	the	system	proved	itself	to	be	relatively	effective	as	a	state-sponsored	crop	insurance	program	that	helped	to	prevent	the	occurrence	of	severe	famines.	
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Relatedly,	the	literature	largely	presents	the	program	as	successful	in	so	far	as	it	was	able	to	achieve	its	more	primary	goal	of	regime	stability.	The	impetus	behind	the	granary	system,	stretching	back	to	its	earliest	incarnations	under	prior	dynastic	periods,	was	driven	not	by	simply	by	altruistic	impetus	on	the	part	of	state	officials	but	rather	by	the	recognition	that	famines	 and	 associated	 food	 riots	 were	 associated	 with	 the	 overthrow	 local	 and	 even	provincial	 governments	 (Hsiao	 1960).	 As	 Du	 &	 Zhong	 (2011)	 demonstrate,	 data	 on	incidences	of	peasant	uprisings	suggest	that	increased	levels	of	granary	storage	holdings	diminished	the	frequency	and	success	rate	of	civil	uprisings.				5.2.1.2.		Revisionist	Views	on	Republican	Beiyang-period	Bureaucratic	Capacity		For	the	most	part,	even	scholars	strongly	associated	with	revisionist	views	of	domestic	state	capacity	present	fairly	critical	views	regarding	the	aptitude	of	the	state	apparatus	during	the	 latter	 half	 of	 the	 Beiyang	 period,	 riven	 as	 the	 country's	 political	 structure	 was	 by	factionalism	 and	 civil	 war.	 Julia	 Strauss,	 well-identified	 with	 the	 overall	 revisionist	approach,	nonetheless	presents	a	fairly	dismal	view	on	the	bureaucratic	state	capacity	of	the	Beiyang	government,	arguing	it	"had	no	means	by	which	to	project	its	authority	much	beyond	 Beijing	 into	 highly	 unstable	 and	 militarized	 provincial	 and	 local	 environments.	Taxes	 from	 the	provinces	 simply	did	not	 come	 in	and	government	 regulations	had	 little	meaning.	During	the	Beiyang	period	the	central	government	of	China	operated	as	a	head	without	 a	 body,	 fiscally	 kept	 alive	 by	 regular	 transfusions	 of	 the	 surpluses	 remitted	 by	quasi-government	tax	collection	agencies	that	it	did	not	control,	and	loans	from	Western	banks	"	(Strauss	1997:	336).		Nonetheless,	revisionist	arguments	portray	the	Beiyang	period	as	demonstrating	greater	bureaucratic	competency	than	commonly	suggested	in	the	literature.	Myers	(2000:	50),	for	instance,	pushes	back	against	the	standard	trope	of	the	ineptitude	of	the	Beiyang	period	with	his	argument	that	there	occurred	significant	"bureaucratic	modernisation"	under	the	Beiyang.	 Myers	 claims	 that	 central	 government	 officials	 during	 this	 period	 exhibited	tendencies	 suggesting	 a	 commitment	 to	 supporting	 constitutionalism.	 Specifically,	 he	suggest	there	was	a	clear	recognition	within	the	bureaucratic	officialdom	that	in	order	to	secure	necessary	loans	from	foreign	lenders,	it	proved	helpful	for	Beiyang	officials	to	be	able	to	 cite	 the	 nominally	 democratic	 and	 civil	 protections	 private	 economic	 actors	 were	afforded	 under	 the	 constitution;	 that	 is,	 rather	 than	 functioning	 as	 an	 authoritarian	monarchy,	as	under	the	Qing,	the	Beiyang	republic	was	now	committed	to	upholding	the	rule	of	law	and	protecting	private	property	and	other	economic	rights	under	a	constitution.	Thus,	maintaining	this	perception	of	the	Chinese	state	was	beneficial	to	government	officials	because	of	the	potential	financial	benefits	to	be	gained	via	foreign	loans.		While	 compellingly	 presented,	 Myers'	 argument	 suffers	 from	 a	 lack	 of	 accord	 with	 the	historical	record.	As	described	in	Section	4.1,	the	Beiyang	regime	in	practice	operated	as	an	authoritarian	 state.	 That	 state	 officials	 exhibited	 a	 commitment	 to	 honouring	 the	constitution	is	difficult	to	support,	given	the	multiple	constitutions	cycled	through,	quickly	ratified	but	subsequently	discarded	(RCEC	1926),	 such	as	when	 in	1915	president	Yuan	Shikai	declared	himself	emperor.	Nonetheless,	Myers'	argument	underscores	that	domestic	state	 actors	 perceived	 it	 advantageous	 to	 present	 an	 image	 of	 the	 state	 structure	 as	constitutionalist	 in	 order	 to	 increase	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 borrowing	 on	 the	 behalf	 of	 the	Chinese	 people.	 However,	 a	 commitment	 to	 maintaining	 this	 image	 of	 legitimacy	 as	 a	nominally	democratic	republic	did	not	result	in	the	Chinese	state	operating	as	one,	perhaps	only	functioning	so	foreign	lenders	could	justify	the	loans	extended	to	the	Chinese	state.		
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Bureaucratic	capacity	in	regard	to	the	state's	ability	to	combat	famine	via	its	granary	system	and	associated	anti-famine	policies	is	argued	by	Fuller	(2013),	whose	revisionist	analysis	of	domestic	institutions	purports	to	show	that	the	scope	of	the	famine	in	northern	China	in	1920	and	1921	was	considerably	moderated	by	effective	bureaucratic	actions	on	the	part	of	state	officials,	as	well	as	from	efforts	by	domestic	Buddhist	organisations.	According	to	Fuller,	these	public	and	private	charity	efforts	proved	to	be	"significantly	more	viable	and	attentive	to	social	welfare	needs	than	has	been	previously	recognized"	(820).	Conversely,	however,	Myers	(1986:	257)	notes	that	by	the	middle	of	the	Beiyang	period,	famines	and	associated	"rural	misery"	had	"increased	by	leaps	and	bounds",	with	suffering	playing	out	in	the	form	of	"famine;	farmers	fleeing	to	towns	to	beg;	the	degradation	of	women;	parents	forced	to	sell	their	children;	huge	rural	unemployment;	widespread	rural	debt	and	forced	sale	of	land.	Such	events	became	as	familiar	as	they	had	been	previously	rare."	In	this	sense,	the	example	by	Fuller	of	a	singular	instance	of	potential	bureaucratic	capacity	in	handling	a	single	 famine	 event	 must	 be	 counterbalanced	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 bureaucracy	 proved	considerably	 less	 able	 to	 prevent	 famine	 and	 associated	 conditions	 from	 continually	afflicting	the	rural	landscape	during	the	period.			5.2.1.3.		Revisionist	Views	on	Republican	Guomindang-period	Bureaucratic	Capacity		Much	of	 the	revisionist	literature	argues	state	capacity	 increased	dramatically	under	the	Guomindang,	 appearing	 particularly	 supportive	 of	 the	 regime's	 attempts	 to	 centralise	control	 of	 state	 bureaucratic	 authority.	 Our	 own	primary-source	 literature	 review	 finds	multiple	 instances	 of	 examples	 of	 demonstrated	 bureaucratic	 capacity	 during	 the	Guomindang	 Nanjing	 government	 period.	 For	 instance,	 Fong	 (1936:	 31-32)	 describes	 a	relatively	 successful	 attempt	 that	 took	 place	 over	 the	 early	 years	 of	 the	 Guomindang	government	to	increase	bureaucratic	efficiency	by	limiting	and	streamlining	the	number	of	bureaucratic	offices	in	certain	administrative	areas.	Fong	chronicles	the	way	in	which	the	Marine	and	Navigation	Bureau,	created	in	1930	under	the	Ministry	of	Communications,	with	three	primary	regional	offices	across	the	country	(the	fourth,	located	in	Harbin,	was	soon	shuttered	once	 the	 Japanese	military	 took	 control	of	Manchuria	 in	1931),	went	 from	an	initial	bureaucratic	structure	that	saw	approximately	one	hundred	sub-offices	under	each	of	the	three	regional	offices,	to	four	primary	regional	offices,	but	with	only	fifty	sub-offices	under	 each,	 somewhat	 reducing	 the	 amount	 of	 bureaucratic	 overlap	 and	 excessive	redundancies.			Furthermore,	the	ability	of	the	central	state	administration	to	plan	and	complete	relatively	successful	infrastructure-building	projects	was	repeatedly	demonstrated.	For	instance,	by	the	mid-1903s,	the	construction	of	an	extensive	national	highway	service	was	completed,	along	with	expanded	development	of	interprovincial	railway	lines	(Far	Eastern	Survey,	May	8,	1935:	69-70;	July	3,	1935:	102-3;	May	12,	1937:	114).	The	completion	of	such	state-led	efforts,	 undertaken	 during	 the	 time	 period's	 considerable	 political	 discord,	 can	 be	interpreted	as	positive	evidence	underscoring	the	capacity	of	the	domestic	state	apparatus.	An	additional	associated	example	of	 infrastructure	creation	capacity	can	be	 found	 in	 the	implementation	of	a	nine-province	plan	under	the	Ministry	of	Communications,	initiated	in	1934	 and	 completed	 by	 1936,	 for	 the	 laying	 of	 phone	 cables	 allowing	 long-distance	connections	between	localities,	achieved	by	linking	up	local	phone	systems	under	a	single	system	 operated	 by	 the	Ministry	 of	 Communications	 (M.S.F.	 1937:	 125).	 Certainly,	 this	project	represented	an	impressive	display	of	bureaucratic	state	capacity—in	just	over	two	years,	 the	Ministry	of	Communications	was	 able	 to	 implement	 a	nationwide	program	to	install	long-distance	phone	lines	across	much	of	the	nation.	However,	while	successful,	the	methodology	 employed	 in	 this	Ministry	 of	 Communication	project	 underscores	 the	 top-down	nature	of	such	policies.	Rather	than	an	example	of	the	state	creating	conditions	for	private	enterprise	to	undertake	the	lead	in	developing	communications	connections,	this	
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was	another	 instance	where	 state	 planners	 coordinated	 efforts.	 Further,	 as	noted	 in	 an	article	at	the	 time,	much	of	 the	rationale	 for	planned,	centralised	state	 involvement	was	driven	by	military	concerns:	"Efforts	are	also	being	made...	to	centralize	administration	in	the	Ministry	of	Communications...	While	much	remains	to	be	done,	 the	 foundations	have	been	 laid	 for	 a	 unified	 national	 telephone	 system	 under	 government	 auspices.	 Like	 the	recent	activity	in	regard	to	railways	and	highways,	the	new	telephone	developments	are	of	considerable	political	and	military	significance"	(MSF	1937:	126).	While	state-driven,	it	is	noteworthy	that	the	privately-operated	extraterritorial-incorporated	Shanghai	Telephone	Company	played	an	outsized	role	in	this	effort;	out	of	nearly	164,000	telephone	subscribers	in	all	of	China	by	the	end	of	1936,	approximately	half	were	located	within	the	International	Settlement	and	on	Shanghai	Telephone's	system.		The	 previously-described	 anti-famine	 granary	 system	 that	 had	 initially	 been	 expanded	under	 the	mid-Qing	was	still	operating	 in	varying	forms	well	 into	 the	Guomindang	 time	frame,	 albeit	 in	ways	 that	 could	be	described	as	 relatively	 circumscribed	and	 regionally	differentiated.	Nonetheless,	 reference	 to	 the	system	was	 included	 in	 the	 text	of	 the	 June	1931	 provisional	 "political	 tutelage"	 constitution	was	Article	 34,	which	 stated	 that	 "the	State	shall	take	active	steps	for	 the	carrying	out	 the...	enforcement	of	 the	public	granary	system	for	the	prevention	of	famine	and	other	calamities	and	replenishment	of	the	people's	food	supplies"	(Tung	1964:	346).	As	Lee	(2015)	and	Stewart	(2015:	36-42)	note,	however,	Guomindang	 efforts	 towards	 famine	 prevention	 and	 agricultural	 productivity	improvements	were	often	centred	on	scientific-based	research	efforts	divorced	from	actual	farming	and	marketing	practices,	thus	limiting	their	effectiveness;	combined	with	a	lack	of	qualified	 personnel	 and	 administrative	 inefficiencies,	 little	 improvement	 in	 famine	reduction	 was	 realised.	 This	 was	 underscored	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 suffering	 referenced	above	by	Myers	(1986)	that	began	in	the	middle	of	the	Beiyang	continued	throughout	the	Guomindang	period,	with	agricultural	output	stagnating	over	the	1929	through	1937	time	frame,	including	in	terms	of	food	grains	as	well	as	cash	crops	such	as	cotton	and	other	fibres	(259);	 similarly,	 Liu	 (1946:	 12)'s	 estimates	 for	 the	 period	 from	 1932	 through	 1936,	calculated	from	National	Agricultural	Research	Bureau	data,	show	per	capita	agricultural	output	slightly	fell.		Within	 the	 revisionist	 literature,	 Guomindang	 efforts	 at	 centralisation	 and	 top-down	planning	are	frequently	cited	as	evidence	of	a	sophisticated	administrative	bureaucracy	that	demonstrated	much	greater	efficacy	than	exhibited	under	the	late-Qing	or	Beiyang	periods.	Bian	(2005a:37),	for	instance,	venerates	the	concerted	effort	to	adopt	"rationalised"	public	administration	principles	advocated	by	Leonard	White,	an	American	academic	who	argued	administrative	efficiency	was	achieved	by	centralised,	top-down	planning	structures:	"the	Guomindang	succeeded	in	creating	institutions	of	central	planning	and	assessment	and	thus	increased	 the	rationalization	of	state	 institutions."	Bian	builds	on	a	revisionist	approach	that	assigns	the	reason	for	the	failure	of	earlier	domestic	governments	to	a	lack	of	top-down,	centralised	control;	Xu	(2001:	226),	for	instance,	argues	the	Qing	state	failed	to	"modernise"	and	adapt	to	internal	and	external	pressures	because	it	could	only	muster	"a	proliferation	of	ad-hoc	administrative	organizations	from	the	bottom	up."	Similarly,	Ko	(2016:	206),	who	characterises	Guomindang	 industrial	 policy	 as	an	"authoritarian-friendly	market	 control	model",	 emphasises	 the	benefits	 of	 domestic	state	power	 in	shaping	 and	 controlling	 the	corporate	business	form.	Conversely,	however,	some	revisionist	scholarship	goes	as	far	as	to	 claim	 that	 certain	domestic	periods,	 especially	 the	Guomindang	era,	were	defined	by	
decreases	in	the	level	of	centralised	control.	For	instance,	Ma	(2012:15),	in	a	relatively	non-standard	reading	of	the	evidence,	asserts	the	monetary	reform	undertaken	by	the	Ministry	of	 Finance	 in	 1935	 was	 "successful"	 because,	 "The	 close	 cooperation	 and	 consultation	between	the	 finance	personnel	of	 the	Nationalist	government,	 such	as	Kong	Xiangxi	and	Song	 Zhiwen,	 and	 the	 private	 banking	 community	 in	 Shanghai	 marked	 an	 important	departure	from	the	traditional	imperial	governance	model	of	top-down	coercion."	
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	Strauss	(1997,	1998,	2008),	recognised	as	one	of	the	more	prominent	revisionist	scholars,	provides	research	directly	challenging	the	mainstream	interpretation	that	all	Guomindang	state	bureaucratic	offices	were	defined	by	incompetence	and	malfeasance.	Strauss'	work	underscores	that	concepts	such	as	state	capacity	should	not	be	considered	monolithically,	as	she	finds	considerable	variation	in	terms	of	efficacy	and	efficiency	existing	across	various	domestic	 state	 bureaucratic	 organisations.	 Strauss	 (1997)	 is	 relatively	 critical	 of	 state	bureaucratic	 strength	 under	 the	 late-Qing	 and	 Beiyang,	 describing	 it	 as	 weak,	 corrupt,	ineffective.	 Even	 under	 the	 Guomindang,	 she	 finds	 some	 ministries	 within	 the	 central	government	exhibited	characteristics	associated	with	poor	state	capacity,	recognising	that	during	 the	 period	 "institutional	 capacity	 [was]	 inherently	 fragmented,	 ambiguous,	 and	weak"	(1998:	2).	For	instance,	Strauss	(1998)'s	description	of	the	ministry	responsible	for	the	maintenance	of	the	civil	service	exam	system,	the	Examination	Yuan,	indicates	it	was	unable	to	enforce	its	policy	goals	across	the	other	ministries.	The	leadership	of	most	of	the	other	ministries	were	protective	of	 the	power	 to	appoint	 their	own	staff,	and	 frequently	proved	able	to	resist	the	implementation	of	uniform	hiring	standards	by	the	Examination	Yuan,	given	its	lack	of	inter-organisational	authority,	with	its	leadership	and	spokespersons	able	to	only	internally	or	publicly	admonish	other	government	ministries	that	appointed	personnel	outside	its	published	rules.		Nonetheless,	Strauss	(1998:	6)	argues	that	the	Guomindang	state	apparatus	was	"capable	of	building	strong	and	proactive	institutions	under	exceptionally	difficult	circumstances."	Echoing	 previous	 work	 by	 Bedeski	 (1981),	 who	 similarly	 argues	 that	 the	 Guomindang	successfully	 undertook	 state-building	 activities	within	 a	number	 of	 bureaucratic	 offices,	Strauss	identifies	the	Foreign	Affairs	and	Finance	ministries,	and	the	Salt	Inspectorate,	as	successful	state	bureaucratic	structures.	According	to	Strauss,	for	instance,	the	Ministry	of	Finance	exhibited	a	relatively	high	degrees	of	effectiveness	in	implementing	policy	goals	by	engaging	in	strategies	such	as	instituting	a	set	of	non-subjective	goals	based	on	impersonal	norms,	and	creating	"bureaucratic	organisational	insulation."	Other	revisionist	work,	such	as	 Slack	 (2001:	 77,	 83)	 and	 Boecking	 (2011a),	 also	 emphasise	 the	 strong	 bureaucratic	capacity	of	the	Guomindang	Ministry	of	Finance,	exemplified	by	the	overall	increase	in	tax	revenues	achieved	in	the	early	part	of	Guomindang	party	rule	under	the	leadership	of	T.V.	Soong.	 Even	 Paauw	 (1957:	 213),	 albeit	 highly	 critical	 of	 overall	 state	 capacity	 levels	evidenced	 by	 the	 Guomindang	 government	 apparatus,	 recognises	 the	 introduction	 of	federal	 annual	 budgeting	 and	 more	 centralised	 indirect	 taxation	 methodologies	represented	positive	steps	in	increasing	bureaucratic	competence	during	the	period.						5.2.2.	Revisionist	Views	on	State	Capacity	evidenced	by	Joint-Administered	Organisations		Much	 of	 the	 revisionist	 literature	 seeking	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 domestic	bureaucratic	capacity,	and	push	back	against	the	image	of	weak	domestic	institutions,	cites	several	 particular	 examples	 of	 domestic	 state	 organisational	 structures	 unique	 in	 form,	given	that	they	were	jointly-administered	by	both	foreign	and	domestic	nationals,	with	the	leadership	of	these	organisations	predominated	by	foreign	personnel.	Three	examples	are	consistently	cited	in	the	revisionist	literature—the	administration	of	the	salt	gabelle,	the	postal	 service,	 and	 the	 Chinese	 Maritime	 Customs.	 Harris	 (2012:38)	 exemplifies	 the	revisionist	 view	 by	 noting	 that	 while	 much	 of	 the	 late-imperial	 and	 republican	administrative	bureaucratic	structures	signified	failures,	these	three	"semi-colonial	foreign-administered	Chinese-staffed"	government	organisations	symbolised	singular	exceptions.			
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	Strauss	 (1998,	 2008)	 identifies	 the	 successes	 of	 the	 Sino-Foreign	 Salt	 Inspectorate	 as	indicative	 of	 one	 of	 the	 "strong	 institutions"—by	 this,	 she	 specifically	 is	 referring	 to	government	 ministries	 with	 effective	 bureaucratic	 administrative	 capacity—within	 the	Guomindang	state.	Strauss	(2008:	213)	emphasises	analysing	the	strength	and	efficacy	of	bureaucratic	 state	 organisations	 is	 particularly	 in	 their	 ability	 to	 implement	 "uninform	application	 of	 impersonal	 rules."	 According	 to	 Strauss,	 it	 was	 the	 unique	 joint	 foreign-domestic	 management	 structure	 that	 enabled	 the	 national-level	 Sino-Foreign	 Salt	Inspectorate	to	exhibit	a	relatively	high	degree	of	effectiveness	in	implementing	policy	goals	by	engaging	in	strategies	such	as	a	focus	on	impersonal	norms,	objective	goal	orientation,	and	 "rigorous	 bureaucratic	 organisational	 insulation"	 (217),	 owing	 in	 large	 part	 to	 its	organisational	structure	that	included	being	headed	by	British	civil	servant,	as	well	as	both	foreign	and	domestic	regional	administrators	that	reflected	a	"preponderance	of	foreigners	in	position	of	real	administrative	decision-making,	rather	than	simple	advising",	providing	it	with	"de	facto	independence	from	the	Chinese	government"	(219-220).			The	primary	emphasis	of	Strauss'	argument	is	that	the	Sino-Foreign	Salt	Inspectorate	was	effective	because	its	unique	organisational	structure	enabled	maintenance	of	bureaucratic	autonomy	 and	 internal	 insulation	 within	 a	 larger	 republican	 "weak	 polity"	 where	 "the	majority	 of	 government	 organisations,	 especially	 in	 tax	 collection,	 were	 ineffective,	inefficient,	 rent	 seeking	 and	 corrupt"	 (221).	 This	 was	 accomplished	 via	 creation	 of	 an	independent	 civil-service	 recruitment	 system,	 and	 official	 ranking	 and	 salary	 scales	separate	from	those	employed	in	other	areas	of	the	government	bureaucracy,	enabling	the	inspectorate's	leadership	to	implement	standardised	goals	and	oversight	methodologies.		Related	to	revisionist	arguments	on	the	Salt	Inspectorate	are	those	regarding	the	National	Postal	Service	and	the	Chinese	Maritime	Service.	Both	of	these	organisations	date	back	to	the	 late-Qing	period,	and	many	arguments	 cite	 these	bureaucratic	 structures	possessing	strong	capacity	from	early	on.	Fairbank	&	Teng	(1939),	in	a	historically-orientated	analysis,	note	China's	first	national	postal	service,	initially	monikered	the	Imperial	Post	Office,	was	created	 in	 1896	 under	 joint	 foreign	 and	 domestic	 administration,	 with	 extensive	 and	sophisticated	service	continuing	 throughout	 the	entirety	of	 the	republican	period.	Miller	(2000:	22)'s	revisionist	approach	stresses	the	efficacy	of	the	imperial	postal	service	system,	with	a	distributed	delivery	system	that	within	ten	years	of	its	formation	enabled	delivery	from	Guangzhou	in	the	south	up	to	Beijing	in	the	north	to	be	completed	in	under	sixteen	days.	Harris	 (2012:	 450)'s	 revisionist	 analysis	 emphasises	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 postal	service's	organisational	insulation	from	the	broader	state	apparatus,	with	its	"high	degree	of	 administrative	 independence",	 noting	 specifically	 that	 civil	 servants	within	 the	 "Post	Office	viewed	this	independence	as	absolutely	essential	to	its	survival,	and	the	survival	of	the	state,	when	confronting	various	attempts	to	either	interfere	with	its	operations	or	divide	it	territorially.	Postal	administrators	pursued	a	series	of	successful	strategies	to	insulate,	protect,	and	strengthen	the	institution	from	external	disruption	and	territorial	division."			One	of	the	most	recognised	recent	framings	of	revisionist	analysis	of	the	Chinese	Maritime	Customs	Service	is	provided	by	van	de	Ven	(2014).	His	research	details	the	growth	of	an	administrative	structure	similar	to	those	of	the	Salt	Inspectorate	and	the	postal	service—a	technically	 domestic	 government	 organisation,	 under	 the	 purview	 of	 the	 Chinese	authorities	 inside	 the	 larger	 Chinese	 state	 apparatus,	 yet	 one	 operating	 under	 foreign	leadership	throughout	its	existence	(up	until	its	seizure	by	Japanese	military	forces	in	1941).	The	Maritime	Customs	Service	was	able	to	consistently	and	efficiently	assess,	collect	and	allocate	 customs	 revenue,	 even	 within	 chaotic	 political	 environments,	 and	 even	 facing	political	 pressures	 applied	 from	competing	 government	 factions	seeking	 to	use	 customs	receipts	in	differing	fashions.	The	true	power	of	the	Customs	Service	came	from	its	control			
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over	vital	revenues	for	the	state.	After	1911,	the	Service	assumed	responsibility	of	not	only	revenue	 collection	 for	 government	 foreign	 bond	 issuances	 collateralised	 with	 customs	receipts,	but	on	a	much	broader	scale,	of	general	oversight	of	all	central	government	bond	issuances,	including	domestic	bonds.	While	such	direct	control	was	circumscribed	with	the	ascendency	of	 the	Guomindang	after	1927,	 the	 import	 of	 the	 Service	 remained,	 given	 it	provided	over	half	of	government	revenues.	Similar	to	the	analysis	of	the	other	joint	foreign-domestic	 bodies,	 van	 de	 Ven	 argues	 the	 Customs	 Service	 was	 a	 successful	 domestic	government	 institution	 because	 its	 foreign-administration—backed	 in	 this	 instance	 by	implicit	coercive	military	force	of	provided	foreign	powers'	gunboats	along	the	Huangpu	River—provided	 significant	 administrative	 insulation	 from	 overt	 domestic	 political	influence,	and	hence	effective	administrative	independence.			Focussing	on	the	Guomindang	time	frame	of	1928	through	1937,	Boecking	(2011b,	2017)	echoes	much	of	van	de	Ven	in	arguing	the	importance	of	the	Customs	Service	to	the	fiscal	health	of	the	regime;	his	primary	concern	is	to	laud	the	ability	of	the	central	state	to	increase	Maritime	Customs	tariff	revenues,	which	thus	allowed	domestic	central	government	actors	to	 continually	 increase	 fiscal	 inflows,	with	 tariff	 duties	 soon	 becoming	 "the	 single	most	important	 source	 of	 government	 revenue	 for	 the	 Nationalist	 government	 prior	 to	 the	beginning	 of	 the	 Second	 Sino-Japanese	War	 in	 1937"	 (Boecking	 2017:	 1).	 Interestingly,	Boecking	takes	the	increasing	nature	these	inflows	to	be	indicative	of	their	sustainability.	This	claim	is	an	expansion	of	that	made	first	in	Boecking	(2011b:	13),	where	he	argues	that	depictions	 in	 the	 mainstream	 literature	 of	 Guomindang	 state	 bureaucracy	 "fiscal	incompetence"	 are	 belied	 by	 its	 ability	 to	 increase	 tax	 extraction:	 "And	 yet	 central	government	revenue	increased	on	an	annual	basis	for	most	of	this	period	[1929	to	1937],	indicating	that	the	extraction	level	of	Nationalist	fiscal	policy	was	sustainable."	Boecking	(2017)'s	vociferous	revisionist	argument	centres	on	dispelling	the	mainstream	perception	that	the	Guomindang's	loss	to	Chinese	Communist	rebels	in	the	Chinese	Civil	War	should	be	interpreted	as	a	sign	of	weak	state	capacity	and	bureaucratic	corruption	and	incompetence,	arguing	 instead	 that	 it	was	only	after	 the	 fall	of	the	Nanjing	government	 to	 the	 Japanese	military	in	1937,	with	the	resultant	loss	of	access	to	Maritime	Customs	tariff	revenues,	that	later	 iterations	 of	 the	 Guomindang	 government	 were	 forced	 to	 turn	 to	 the	 kind	 of	"rapacious"	tax	extraction	policies	so	famously	criticised	by	Eastman	(1974:	229),	let	alone	its	 policies	 of	 outright	 expropriation	 of	 private	 resources,	 violence	 committed	 against	private	civilians,	or	intrusions	into	private	civil	life	we	describe	later.					5.2.3.		Domestic	State	Bureaucratic	Capacity	—	Mixed	Evidences		Clearly,	 considerable	 disagreement	 exists	 within	 Chinese	 economic	 history	 literature	regarding	 the	 degree	 of	 state	 capacity	 and	 institutional	 strength	 of	 the	 domestic	 state	apparatus	during	late	imperial	and	republican	periods.	Revisionist	scholarship	seeking	to	push	 back	 against	 the	 mainstream	 view	 of	 the	 domestic	 administrative	 state	 as	monolithically	defined	by	 inefficiency,	 ineffectiveness,	and	malfeasance	has	enriched	the	literature,	cataloguing	a	set	of	evidences	argued	to	show	that	at	least	some	domestic	state	organisations	at	various	time	periods	possessed	sufficient	capacity	to	enable	domestic	state	actors	 to	 achieve	 their	 goals—such	as	 extracting	wealth	 from	 the	populace	 via	 effective	taxation	methodologies,	enforcing	an	adherence	to	a	dominant	political	party	ideology,	or	setting	 and	 creating	 and	 enforcing	 regulations	 on	 economic	 activity.	 However,	 the	interpretation	of	revisionist	citations	of	such	evidence	requires	care	in	order	to	place	their	overall	arguments	 in	 the	proper	 context	within	 the	broader	 literature.	 In	particular,	 the	findings	of	this	revisionist	scholarship	are	often	presented	as	indicative	that	the	domestic	state,	especially	under	the	Guomindang,	had	"strong	institutions"	(Boecking	2017).	It	is	in	regard	to	this	interpretation	that	several	important	caveats	are	salient.	
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5.2.3.1.		Contested	Factual	Depictions		Although	Strauss,	van	de	Ven,	Boecking,	Bian,	Young,	and	others	argue	the	domestic	state—particularly	under	the	Guomindang—exhibited	positive	signs	of	state	bureaucratic	capacity,	their	arguments	appear	insufficient	to	close	the	issue	in	the	literature.	To	begin	with,	there	are	multiple	factual	issues	used	as	support	for	their	argumentation	that	can	be	too	readily	contested,	with	cited	state	bureaucracies	claimed	as	exemplifying	successful	and	competent	bureaucratic	 organisations	 sometimes	based	upon	questionable	 evidences.	 For	 instance,	while	Strauss	(1989)	argues	the	Guomindang	Ministry	of	Finance	to	have	been	an	effective	state	organisation	based	on	the	Ministry's	ability	to	formulate	and	implement	bureaucratic	policies,	 such	 as	 its	 attempt	 to	 restructure	 tax	 system	 to	 stimulate	 commerce	 through	abolition	of	 the	 lijin.	But	even	here,	Strauss	 finds	 fairly	uneven	results,	given	 the	 lack	of	government	 authority	 over	 much	 of	 the	 country.	 The	 state	 bureaucracy	 could	 only	implement	desired	policies	within	a	limited	sphere	of	influence	centred	mainly	around	the	capital,	as	common	with	nations	defined	by	weak	state	capacity	(Johnson	&	Koyama	2017:	2).	Thus,	 for	 example,	 the	Ministry	was	unable	 to	halt	 the	practise	of	 lijin	 in	peripheral	provinces,	 even	 after	 it	was	ostensibly	declared	 illegal	 nationwide.	 Furthermore,	 and	of	perhaps	 greater	 damage	 to	 Strauss's	 argument	 of	 the	Ministry	 representing	 a	 "strong"	institutional	 construct	 was	 that	 short-term	 financial	 needs	 of	 for	 revenue	 sources	outweighed	ideological	arguments	that	transit	taxes	harmful	to	commerce,	as	reflected	by	the	fact	that	even	after	the	lijin	was	discontinued,	it	was	soon	thereafter	replaced	by	a	host	of	similar	transit	taxes.	A	Jen	Min	Jih	Pao	editorial	answers	its	rhetorical	question,	"Will	the	abolition	of	likin	and	its	substitution	by	the	Consolidated	and	Special	Consumption	Taxes	make	any	difference	to	the	burden	of	the	sorely	tried	populace?",	by	acerbically	noting	that,	"the	Special	Consumption	Tax	will	be	collected	at	the	same	points	where	likin	was	(and	still	is)	 collected,	 causing	 the	 same	 inconvenience	 and	 trouble	 to	 the	merchants	as	 likin,	 the	same	delays	in	releasing	the	goods	under	inspection,	and	creating	the	same	opportunities	for	extraction	and	extortion.	Against	administrative	negligence	and	misbehaviour,	the	poor	merchant	has	no	effective	remedy"	(People's	Tribune	1931:	22).		Strauss	 cites	 an	 additional	 source	 of	 bureaucratic	 strength	 of	 the	 Ministry	 was	 its	"independence",	 which	 she	 argues	 was	 exhibited	 by	 the	 Ministry's	 disregard	 of	 the	Examination	Yuan's	directives	on	personnel	hiring	and	advancement,	implementing	instead	its	own	systems.	The	Ministry	was	also	largely	immune	from	disciplinary	action	against	its	personnel	brought	forth	by	the	Control	Yuan,	a	body	ostensibly	empowered	to	investigate	and	prosecute	 cases	against	public	 officials	suspected	of	 corruption,	 but	 that	 in	practise	lacked	sufficient	political	clout	to	investigate	or	enforce	findings	against	officials	in	powerful	agencies	such	the	Ministry	of	Finance	(Thornton	2007:	80-81).	If	anything,	however,	this	form	of	independence	on	the	part	of	the	Ministry	serves	to	underscore	the	overall	weakness	of	domestic	state	capacity,	and	the	lack	of	adherence	to	rule	of	law	and	protocol	defining	the	administrative	 state,	 if	 powerful	 ministries	 could	 disregard	 supposedly	 uniform	 and	universal	 state	 bureaucratic	 directives.	 Moreover,	 as	 Strauss	 admits,	 much	 of	 the	"independence"	of	the	Ministry	derived	from	the	personal	power	of	the	head	of	the	Ministry,	T.V	Soong,	and	later	H.H.	Kung—the	first	of	whom	was	Jiang's	wife's	brother,	and	the	latter	married	to	Jiang's	wife's	sister.	Thus,	the	Ministry	derived	much	of	its	political	dominance	not	 from	professionalised	employment	or	 technocratic	mechanisms,	but	rather	 from	the	personal	patronage	of	the	country's	de	facto	authoritarian	ruler.			In	 addition,	 presenting	 the	 Ministry's	 ability	 to	 use	 to	 circumvent	 employment	 and	promotion	 policies	 designed	 to	 decrease	 corruption	 and	 favouritism	 as	 evidence	 of	"purposely	 built	 bureaucratic	 organisational	 insulation"	 from	 political	 pressures	 seems	problematic,	given	the	source	of	the	Ministry's	ability	to	circumvent	such	policies	was	in	fact	 an	 application	 of	 political	 pressure	 based	 on	 the	 ministerial	 leadership's	 personal	connections	to	political	authority.	Furthermore,	rather	than	a	positive	example	indicative	
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of	organisational	independence,	that	the	Ministry	actively	disregarded	rules	and	regulations	over	 employment	 procedures	 mandated	 by	 the	 Examination	 Yuan	 designed	 to	 limit	corruption	might	well	be	read	as	a	contributing	factor	allowing	for	the	relatively	high	degree	of	corruption	and	politicisation	of	the	Ministry's	policies.	This	accords	with	the	evidences	presented	by	Paauw	(1952)	and	others	demonstrating	the	degree	of	political	party	control	over	 bureaucratic	 independence,	 such	 as	 that	 nearly	 the	 whole	 of	 the	 available	 budget	funnelled	to	the	military	apparatus	in	contravention	to	legislatively-mandated	budgeting	guidelines—beholden	 to	 political	 expediencies,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Finance	 continually	facilitated	spending	levels	demanded	by	the	executive	leadership	that	exceeded	yearly	fiscal	budgets,	and	helped	direct	monies	allocated	 for	education	or	other	areas	 to	support	 the	more	politically-powerful	military	departments.			Claims	 of	 bureaucratic	 capacity	within	 the	Ministry	 are	 also	 undermined	 by	 the	 overall	difficulty	it	had	in	effectually	collecting	tax	revenues;	as	Strauss	(1998:	133-140)	recognises,	the	 Guomindang	administration	 proved	 unable	 to	 replicate	 the	 successful	 tax	 collection	managerial	 strategies	 and	 structure	 of	 the	 Beiyang-era	 jointly	 foreign-and-domestic	administered	Salt	Inspectorate	on	a	larger	scale	across	other	tax	collection	divisions	of	the	Ministry.	Strauss	(2008:	233)	 finds	 that	 "programmes	 for	direct	 income	tax,	 inheritance,	savings,	property	and	windfall	 profits	were	 simply	beyond	 the	 technical	and	manpower	capacity"	of	the	Ministry's	tax	collection	infrastructure.	Net	tax	revenues	fell	as	corruption	proved	rampant,	leading	to	high	effective	tax	rates	on	businesses,	as	private	entrepreneurs	were	squeezed	while	the	central	government	bureaucracy	struggled	to	prevent	funds	from	being	 siphoned	 off	 at	 lower	 levels	 of	 government.	 Such	 indicators	 of	 corruption	 in	 tax	administration	 are	 relatively	unaddressed	by	 the	 revisionist	 literature,	 as	are	additional	examples	 of	 corruption	 within	 the	 Ministry	 leadership	 as	 described	 by	 Paauw	 (1952),	Eastman	 (1984a),	 Slack	 (2001)	 and	 others.	 Thornton	 (2007)	 provides	 more	 extensive	documentation	 of	 the	 scope	 and	 scale	 of	 corruption	 that	 permeated	 and	 defined	Guomindang	government	bureaucratic	offices,	 including	 the	Ministry	of	Finance.	Overall,	the	degree	of	documented	official	corruption	within	the	Ministry	run	counter	to	portrayals	of	an	organisation	exhibiting	strong	bureaucratic	capacity.		In	regard	to	what	we	have	labelled	as	Boecking	(2011b,	2017)'s	vociferous	advocacy	of	the	revisionist	position,	particularly	his	claims	of	relatively	strong	Guomindang	bureaucratic	capacity	and	institutional	quality	prior	the	fall	of	the	Nanjing	government	in	1937	and	its	concomitant	loss	of	customs	tax	revenues,	there	exist	several	weaknesses.	To	begin	with,	much	of	the	objectionable	taxation	and	expropriation	policies	undertaken	by	Guomindang	state	 actors	 to	 which	 Eastman	 and	 others	 refer	 occurred	 before	 the	 overthrow	 of	 the	Nanjing	 government	 in	1937.	Moreover,	 the	 suggestion	 that	 Guomindang	 tax	 extraction	policies	were	 "sustainable"	 simply	because	 they	 lasted	over	 the	majority	 of	 the	Nanjing	Decade	fails	to	account	for	the	role	they	played	in	creating	a	weak	institutional	environment	that	 discouraged	 private	 investment	 and	 sustainable	 private-led	 economic	 growth.	Boecking	 (2017:	 151,	 157,	 237)	 provides	 only	 perfunctory	 acknowledgment	 to	 the	pernicious	 impacts	 that	 the	 Guomindang's	 policy	 of	 high	 tariffs	 had	 upon	 domestic	consumers,	 and	 upon	 economic	 growth	 in	 general.	 As	 delineated	 in	 Chapter	 Seven,	 the	Guomindang	state	took	an	ever-increasing	role	in	the	private	economy,	displacing	private	companies	through	the	creation	of	state-owned	enterprises,	and	by	expropriating	the	assets	and	 managerial	 independence	 of	 private	 corporations	 via	 state	 regulatory	 authority.	Furthermore,	while	Boecking	regards	the	ability	by	the	Guomindang	state	to	increase	tariff	rates	 on	 the	modern	 trade	 sector	 of	 the	 economy	 as	 an	 important	 policy	 achievement	indicative	 of	 strong	 state	 capacity,	 these	 policy	 decisions	 can	 equally	 be	 portrayed	 as	indicative	 of	 the	 state's	 weak	 bureaucratic	 capacity.	 First	 of	 all,	 the	 Guomindang	 state	simply	 appropriated	 an	 existing	 efficient	 tax	 collection	 apparatus	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	Maritime	Customs	Service	and	used	it	to	increase	tax	rates	on	the	more	modern	and	growth-generating	sector	of	the	economy.	Second,	according	to	figures	Boecking	(2017:	193)	cites	
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in	his	own	work,	while	by	1936	trade	accounted	for	less	than	four	per	cent	of	gross	national	income,	revenue	from	tariffs	represented	forty-four	per	cent	of	government	revenue.	The	fact	 that	 government	 revenue	 was	 so	 dependent	 on	 tariff	 income	 was	 recognised	 by	multiple	contemporaneous	observers;	Su	&	Barber	(1936:	115)	comment,	for	instance,	that	"To	an	unusual	degree,	the	Central	Government	of	China	derives	its	support	from	customs	imposts	 and	 duties."	 Yet	 in	 weak	 capacity	 states	 with	 ineffectual	 bureaucratic	 and	administrative	resources,	it	is	typical	for	modern	sectors,	including	the	trade	sector,	to	be	taxed	at	higher	rates,	at	the	expense	of	informal	and	traditional	sectors	(Besley	&	Persson	2014).			Meanwhile,	tax	revenue	received	on	agriculture,	still	by	far	the	largest	sector	of	the	economy,	accounting	for	sixty	per	cent	of	gross	national	income	in	1936,	remained	low.	A	as	described	above	in	Section	5.1.1,	this	can	be	seen	as	indicative	of	the	lack	of	bureaucratic	capacity	on	the	 part	 of	 the	 Guomindang	 central	 state	 to	 be	 able	 to	 effectually	 capture	 tax	 revenue,	suffering	as	it	did	from	both	ineptitude	and	corruption	in	its	tax	collection	administration.	Importantly,	 however,	 low	 tax	 revenues	 flowing	 to	 the	 central	 state	 did	 not	 imply	 that	private	 actors	 in	 the	 agricultural	 sector	were	not	heavily	 taxed;	 indeed,	 as	 Section	5.1.1	outlines,	the	number,	variety	and	scale	of	taxes	on	rural	farmers	were	extremely	high	during	the	Guomindang	period,	with	the	state	unable	to	limit	either	private	nonstate	actors	or	local	government	officials	from	exploiting	their	access	to	either	state	police	or	military	power	to	force	rural	farmers	to	yield	not	only	financial	assets	in	tax	fees	but	also	payments	in	kind,	and	productive	private	assets	such	as	land	and	labour.	Such	high	levels	of	taxation	produced	strongly	 negative	 output	 on	 agricultural	 productivity,	 with	 Hsiao	 (1974:83)	 providing	statistics	indicating	imports	of	grains—including	the	staples	of	rice,	wheat	and	flour—more	than	 doubled	 in	 the	 five	 years	 following	 the	 start	 of	 Guomindang	 rule	 and	 the	implementation	of	 its	 tax	policies;	such	 increases	did	not	reflect	substitutions	 from	food	crop	to	cash	crop	cultivation	or	output	(Liu	&	Yeh	1965),	with	exports	of	grains	in	fact	falling	(Hsiao	174:83),	nor	increased	demand	resulting	from	increased	per	capita	income	levels	(Ou	1946:553).			Additional	mixed	signals	regarding	the	bureaucratic	capacity	of	the	Guomindang	Ministry	of	Finance	also	exist.	For	instance,	the	portrayal	by	Young	(1963,	1971),	Strauss	(1998)	and	Ma	 (2012)	 of	 the	 Ministry's	 move	 from	 metallic-backed	 to	 pure	 paper	 currency	 as	"successful"	 is	 a	 subjective	 analysis	 highly	 dependent	 upon	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 behaviour	analysed.	Objectively,	it	is	accurate	that	the	Ministry	of	Finance	employed	several	successful	strategies	in	its	move	to	implement	a	paper	currency,	including	by	November	1935	wresting	the	 ability	 of	 other	 independent	 entities,	 such	 as	 primarily	 foreign	 banks,	 from	 issuing	competing	notes	(Horesh	2008a:	287).	However,	while	these	steps	indicated	a	bureaucratic	capacity	to	achieve	a	stated	policy	goal,	controlled	the	issuance	of	a	fiat	currency,	we	argue	that	consideration	of	the	economic	impact	of	the	move	to	paper	currency	is	equally	salient	in	measuring	 success.	 Given	 the	move	 to	 a	 fiat	 paper	 currency	was	 used	 to	 control	 the	money	supply	allowing	for	greater	levels	of	government	spending	at	the	expense	of	private	savers	by	debasing	the	currency,	and	resulting	in	abject	hyperinflation,	with	inflation	rates	easily	exceeding	one	thousand	per	cent	per	annum	by	the	mid-1940s,	it	is	difficult	to	ascribe	the	policy	undertaking	as	particularly	"successful.".	Overall,	therefore,	evidences	regarding	the	strength	and	efficacy	of	bureaucratic	state	capacity	of	the	Ministry	of	Finance	appear	mixed	at	best.		Moving	beyond	the	question	of	whether	revisionist	claims	of	bureaucratic	capacity	are	valid	characterisations	of	select	domestic	Chinese	state	organisations,	there	is	also	the	question	of	the	representativeness	of	the	organisations	the	revisionists	identify	to	argue	their	claims.	Specifically,	 insofar	 that	 state	 organisations	 did	 exhibit	 strong	 bureaucratic	 capacity,	 it	appears	disingenuous	to	attempt	to	demonstrate	the	strength	of	domestic	state	institutions	by	 pointing	 primarily	 to	 those	 state	 organisations	 that	 were	 jointly	 foreign-and-
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domestically	administrated,	such	as	the	imperial	postal	service,	the	Maritime	Customs,	and	the	 Salt	 Inspectorate,	 given	 that	 by	 definition	 the	 jointly-administered	 nature	 of	 these	organisations	were	not	expressly	domestic	and	typically	acted	under	 foreign	leadership.	Nonetheless,	by	far	the	most	compelling	example	Strauss	(1998)	provides	of	a	"domestic"	state	 organisation	 to	 have	 exhibited	 "strong"	 bureaucratic	 capacity	 is	 the	 jointly-administered	 Salt	 Inspectorate.	 Similarly,	 the	 representation	 of	 a	 strong	 domestic	institution	 for	 van	 de	 Ven	 (2014)	 is	 the	 Chinese	Maritime	 Customs	 Service.	 For	 Harris	(2012),	the	Chinese	Post	Office	is	identified	as	a	domestic	state	organisation	that	exhibits	able	bureaucratic	capacity.			Yet,	 that	 the	 most	 significant	 examples	 of	 effective	 domestic	 state	 bureaucratic	organisations	were	only	partially	domestic	in	nature	underscore	their	nature	as	exceptions	to	 a	 more	 general	 condition	 of	 weak	 domestic	 state	 bureaucratic	 capacity.	 Of	 primary	salience,	 therefore,	 is	why	 it	was	primarily	 only	 jointly-administered	 state	 bureaucratic	organisations	 that	 succeeded	 bureaucratically	 in	 circumstances	 where	 wholly	 domestic	state	bureaucratic	organisations	did	not.	It	is	clear	that	issues	of	corruption,	inefficiency,	and	 bureaucratic	 ineptitude	 are	 features	 not	 unique	 to	 late-Qing	 and	 republican	 state	organisations.	Such	an	obvious	claim	is	underscored	by	denouncements	of	the	practise	of	bribery	 in	 the	 application	 of	 the	 laws	 of	 justice	 and	 legal	 cases	 found	 in	 early	 biblical	references	(Exodus	23:8).	In	the	economic	discipline,	the	lack	of	market	discipline	has	been	theorised	to	act	as	an	inherent	blockade	to	efficiency	in	state	bureaucratic	structures	(Mises	1944,	Mosher	1968,	Freeman	1975,	Boardman	&	Vining	1989,	 Johnson	&	Libecap	1994,	Arum	1996).	Contemporaneous	observations	at	the	time	regarding	the	universality	of	the	"problem	 of	 bureaucracy"	 were	 rife	 throughout	 all	 forms	 of	 political	 systems	 and	governments;	for	instance,	official	corruption	during	the	Prohibition	period	of	the	1920s	in	the	United	States	frequently	led	to	cases	of	state	officials	accepting	bribes	(Behr	1996,	Burns	&	Novick	2011),	accentuated	by	the	several	major	scandals	that	rocked	the	period's	Harding	administration,	and	punctuated	by	convictions	of	fraud,	bribery	and	divergence	of	federal	funds	for	personal	uses	by	top	cabinet-level	officials,	including	Charles	Forbes,	Albert	Fall,	and	Harry	Daugherty	(Stevens	2016,	Rapp	2017).			Such	 examples	 underscore	 that	 it	 was	 not	 any	 inherent	 feature	 of	 domestic	 Chinese	compared	 to	 foreign	 officials	 responsible	 for	 the	 prevalence	 of	 bureaucratic	 capacity	weakness,	 but	 rather	 specific	 qualities	 of	 the	 structure	 of	 domestic	 state	 organisations	contrasted	with	their	jointly-administered	state	bureaucratic	counterparts.	Specifically,	the	fundamental	 difference	 lay	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 quasi-foreign	 structure	 of	 these	 jointly-administered	state	bureaucratic	departments	provided	for	a	classic	credible	commitment	mechanism	that	was	lacking	in	purely	domestic	equivalents.	Thus,	for	instance,	van	de	Ven's	description	of	the	Maritime	Customs	Service	highlights	that	the	organisation's	fundamental	role	in	the	development	of	a	viable	overseas	market	for	Chinese	bonds	derived	precisely	from	the	insulated	and	quasi-independent	nature	of	the	Service,	which	implied	protected	and	dedicated	revenue	collection	for	foreign	bond	payments.	Effective	foreign	control	over	customs	 funds	 outside	 the	 control	 of	 domestic	 state	 officials	 served	 as	 a	 credible	commitment	mechanism,	as	it	created	a	structure	that	implied	attempts	by	state	actors	to	abdicate	on	 their	debt	 obligations	would	prove	difficult	 and	 costly,	 thus	 according	with	Schelling	 (2007)'s	 definition	 of	 credible	 commitment	 mechanisms	 as	 contractual	 or	institutional	mechanisms	that	lower	the	utility	agents	might	gain	from	violating	the	terms	of	 an	 agreement.	 Thus,	 partial	 foreign	 control	 over	 funding	 dedicated	 to	 foreign	 loan	repayments	 created	 credible	 commitment	 mechanisms	 in	 the	 Salt	 Inspectorate	 and	Maritime	Customs	Service.	Foreign	control	did	not	grant	credible	commitment	via	superior	organisational	or	bureaucratic	technology	possessed	by	foreign	bureaucrats,	but	rather	via	effective	 insulation	 from	the	political	environment	 that	 incentivised	corruption	amongst	domestic	state	bureaucrats	and	associated	rent-seeking	from	outside	private	agents.			
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Relatedly,	 the	 revisionist	 argument	 that	 jointly	 foreign-and-domestically	 administrated	state	bureaucratic	organisations	represented	examples	of	strong	domestic	 institutions	is	weakened	when	 considering	 these	 organisations'	 performances	 under	 the	 Guomindang	period	when	foreign	control	and	influence	was	weakened	or	removed.	The	emphasis	by	the	Guomindang	to	remove	foreign	control	of	these	organisations	also	effectively	removed	their	accompanying	 credible	 commitment	 mechanisms,	 thus	 removing	 the	 primary	 driver	 of	effectiveness	of	the	structure.	This	was	observed	quite	clearly	in	case	of	the	Chinese	Postal	Service—shortly	 after	 Guomindang	 came	 to	 power	 in	1928,	 the	 Postal	 Service's	 foreign	administrative	 leadership	 was	 replaced	 by	 domestic	 officials,	 and	 these	 state	 actors	immediately	moved	to	outlaw	private	mail-delivery	companies,	known	as		minxinju	(Harris	 2012:	 155-158).	 Although	 the	 Guomindang	 framed	 their	 takeover	 of	 the	 Postal	Service	 from	 foreign	 administrators	 as	 a	 nationalistic	 action	 undertaken	 to	 benefit	 the	country's	citizens,	by	restoring	the	"dignity	and	glory	of	the	Chinese	people",	the	result	was	a	series	of	actions	that	served	to	benefit	state	actors'	interests	at	the	expense	of	domestic	private	entrepreneurs.	Further,	monopoly	control	over	mail	delivery	by	the	Chinese	Postal	Service	increased	the	power	of	domestic	state	actors	and	the	ability	of	the	state	apparatus	to	 enforce	 the	power	of	 the	 state	 to	 control	 freedom	of	 expression	 through	 its	policy	of	monitoring	 and	 censorship	 of	 communications	 via	 absolute	 control	 over	 domestic	 mail	delivery.	 Harris	 (2012:	 291)	 praises	 the	 Guomindang	 for	 "utilizing	 postal	 bans	 very	effectively",	while	noting,	"The	effectiveness	of	Nationalist	censorship	stemmed	from	its	re-organization	 of	 censoring	 bureaucracies	 and	 the	 promulgation	 of	 new	 media	 laws	 and	regulations."			In	 similar	 fashion,	 the	 removal	 of	 foreign	 control	 over	 the	 administration	 of	 the	 Salt	Inspectorate	 led	 to	 noticeable	 declines	 in	 net	 revenue	 collections,	 even	 while	 the	Inspectorate	 simultaneously	 imposed	 increases	 of	 tax	 rates.	 Strauss	 (1998,	 2008)'s	attempts	to	argue	that	under	the	Guomindang	the	Salt	Inspectorate	exemplified	successful	state	bureaucratic	capacity,	is	partially	undermined	by	data	presented	in	Gale	(1930)	cited	previously	in	Section	5.1.1.1,	and	by	data	presented	by	Strauss	(2008)	herself.	These	data	indicate	the	significant	degree	to	which	net	tax	receipts	fell	once	the	Guomindang	removed	foreign	 oversight	 over	 the	 Salt	 Inspectorate.	 Figure	 5.3	 reproduces	 graphically	 data	presented	in	Tables	9.1	and	9.2	from	Strauss	(2008),	the	original	data	for	which	is	Chen	(1935)	and	Ding	et	al.	(1990),	respectively.	Net	tax	revenues,	which	had	averaged	74	million	
yuan	prior	during	the	Beiyang	period,	averaged	only	49	million	yuan	after	the	Guomindang	ended	the	system	of	joint	foreign-domestic	administrative	control	over	the	Salt	Inspectorate	beginning	in	1927.		The	decline	in	net	tax	receipts	obtained	by	the	Inspectorate	in	the	wake	of	the	end	of	foreign	administration	 was	 not	 due	 to	 any	 inherent	 benefit	 to	 foreign	 oversight	 of	 domestic	administrative	bureaucratic	offices,	per	se,	but	rather	only	insofar	as	foreign	oversight	had	served	to	break	the	incentive	and	opportunity	for	corruption	by	domestic	civil	servants	by	creating	an	oversight	structure	 that	 incentivised	maximisation	of	net	revenue	collection,	and	 not	 vested	 in	 a	 system	 open	 to	 arbitrary	 taxation	 collection.	 The	 domestically-administered	system	that	replaced	the	jointly-administered	system	failed	to	replicate	this	oversight	structure.	Instead,	the	Inspectorate	under	the	Guomindang	was	administratively	weakened	 given	 it	 had,	 per	 Strauss'	 own	 depictions,	 less	 political	 independence	 and	autonomy,	 given	 the	 party	 leadership	 increasingly	 used	 political	 appointees	 to	 lead	 the	Inspectorate,	who	pressured	Inspectorate	officials	to	"raise	tax	rates	continually"	(Strauss	2008:	 233).	 As	 with	 the	 drive	 to	 end	 foreign	 administrative	 authority	 over	 the	 Postal	Service,	 the	 language	 of	 combatting	 "foreign	 exploitation"	 was	 a	 politically	 expedient	rationale	provided	to	justify	ending	foreign	oversight	of	the	Inspectorate;	yet	control	of	the	Inspectorate	by	domestic	state	actors	led	to	the	imposition	of	higher	effective	tax	rates	on	domestic	salt	producers,	implying	a	greater	share	of	private	resources	were	transferred	to	state	actors	at	the	expense	of	private	actors.	
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Figure	5.3.		Salt	Inspectorate	Net	Tax	Revenues,	1914–1937			
		Source:	Constructed	from	data	provided	in	Strauss	(2008:	222-223).				5.2.3.2.		Foreign	Control	and	Credible	Commitment	Mechanisms		It	 is	 notable	 that	 domestic	 state	 actors	 viewed	 the	 ability	 to	 control	 state	 bureaucratic	organisations	that	could	allow	for	the	extraction	of	private	resources	from	economic	actors	as	delivering	greater	expected	gains	than	gains	expected	from	maintaining	partial	foreign	administration	of	these	organisations.	Foreign	administration	provided	a	degree	of	credible	commitment	to	state	promises	to	honour	agreements	(for	instance,	contractual	payments	on	bond	obligations)	by	increasing	the	difficulties	and	costs	of	defecting.	The	source	of	the	credible	commitment	in	this	case	therefore	was	that	the	control	of	revenues	or	other	things	that	state	actors	might	wish	to	control	for	themselves,	whereas	foreign	control	meant	these	benefits	 were	 outside	 the	 purview	 of	 domestic	 state	 actors,	 thereby	 imposing	 effective	limits	 on	domestic	Chinese	 state	 actors'	 behaviour	 in	order	 to	 create	 some	 institutional	constraints	and	effectively	bind	themselves	to	respecting	private	property	rights.		Unlike	liberal	democracies	that	possess	institutions,	such	as	free	and	open	elections	and	free	and	open	media	structures	that	help	to	impose	substantial	costs	on	state	actors	deviating	from	previously-promised	obligations,	the	absence	of	similar	institutions	and	other	formal	or	 self-enforcing	 constraints	 in	 authoritarian	 regimes	 imply	 credible	 commitments	 are	difficult	to	create.	Grzymala-Busse	(2007:81)	emphasises	that	electoral	competition	creates	incentives	for	state	actors	to	impose	limits	on	the	state's	ability	to	expropriate,	so	that	state	actors	facing	electoral	contestation	"would	rather	constrain	themselves,	and	all	subsequent	governments,	than	allow	their	successors	to	have	access	to	state	resources."		
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As	 their	 regimes	 lack	 such	 self-enforcing	 structures	 contributing	 to	 commitment,	contemporary	authoritarian	leaders	often	seek	membership	in	international	organisations,	such	as	the	World	Trade	Organisation	or	International	Monetary	Fund,	in	order	to	utilise	the	required	adherence	to	the	organisations'	membership	rules	as	signalling	mechanisms	to	substitute	for	credible	commitment	devices	(Fang	&	Owen	2011).	In	many	regards,	we	can	view	foreign	control	over	the	Maritime	Customs	Service	or	Central	Salt	Administration	as	 similar	 tools—that	 is,	 quasi-international	 institutions—that	 enabled	 domestic	 state	actors	to	signal	commitment	to	bind	 themselves	to	previously-promised	obligations.	For	instance,	in	regard	to	its	foreign	bond	issuances,	the	domestic	state's	promises	to	repay	such	debt	obligations	were	backed	not	only	by	the	signatory	promises	of	domestic	state	leaders,	but	 also	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 quasi-foreign	 (i.e.,	 jointly-administered)	 institutions	 exercised	considerable	control	over	the	funds	to	be	used	to	repay	the	country's	foreign	debts.		Such	 forms	 of	 external	 or	 other	 control	mechanisms	 appear	 to	 have	 been	 necessary	 to	overcome	 foreign	 investors'	 hesitation	 to	 hold	 Chinese	 external	 bonds	 that	would	 have	otherwise	been	 secured	only	with	 the	promise	 to	 repay	by	 the	Chinese	 government.	As	explored	 in	Chapter	Eleven,	when	 the	domestic	 state	did	have	discretion	 to	defect	 from	honouring	its	repayment	obligations	on	its	bond	commitments,	 it	did	indeed	often	do	so.	For	 instance,	 in	 regard	 to	 domestic	 bonds,	whose	 loans	 were	 secured	 by	 subordinated	collateral	and	general	tax	receipts,	state	actors	had	much	greater	discretion	to	choose	to	default,	acting	to	do	so	on	multiple	occasions	throughout	the	republican	period.	Conversely,	on	 its	 external	 foreign	 bonds,	 since	 foreign	 administrators	 (who	 had	 been	 approved	 or	sanctioned	 by	 the	 foreign	 lenders)	 controlled	 monies	 designated	 for	 collateral	 on	 the	external	bonds,	domestic	state	actors	had	considerably	limited	options	or	extremely	high	costs	 associated	 with	 defecting	 from	 honouring	 its	 repayment	 promises;	 therefore,	 its	commitments	were	viewed	as	credible,	and	thus	the	Chinese	state	was	able	to	access	the	foreign	debt	markets	so	long	as	foreign-controlled	collateral	sources	were	available.	Once	such	insulated	or	externally	controlled	collateral	sources	were	exhausted,	however,	foreign	credit	 markets	 for	 additional	 Chinese	 debt	 effectively	 dried	 up.	 That	 is,	 the	 credible	commitment	device	directly	 came	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 it	was	outside-imposed	via	 foreign	control	 of	 the	 collateral	 sources,	 not	 an	 otherwise	 self-enforcing	 domestic	 institutional	arrangement	signalling	a	commitment	to	protection	of	private	property	rights.		Interestingly,	however,	unlike	in	the	cases	Fang	&	Owen	cite	involving	authoritarian	states	that	 actively	 seek	 to	 leverage	 outside-imposed	 rules	 provided	 by	 membership	 in	international	 organisations	 as	 a	 way	 to	 signal	 credible	 commitment,	 in	 the	 case	 of	republican	China,	the	multiple	Beiyang	and	Guomindang	domestic	regimes	were	continually	seeking	 to	 end	 the	 system	 of	 joint	 foreign-and-domestic	 administered	 organisations.	Although	domestic	governments	officials	sought	 to	utilise	 international	bond	markets	to	raise	funds,	they	chaffed	at	the	arrangements	that	facilitated	foreign	creditors'	willingness	to	proffer	capital—such	as	foreign	control	over	collateral	sources	designated	for	repayment	of	such	international	bonds—and	continually	attempted	to	end	foreign	involvement	in	the	management	of	the	salt	gabelle	and	customs	taxes.		The	reason	for	the	disconnect	between	behaviours	of	authoritarian	regimes	cited	by	Fang	&	Owen	and	that	of	the	authoritarian	republican	governments	could	well	be	related	to	the	degree	of	regime	uncertainty	state	officials	faced.	Regimes	facing	serious	existential	threats	are	primarily	concerned	with	short-term	goals	such	as	regime	preservation,	as	opposed	to	more	long-term	goals	that	involve	future	access	to	credit	markets.	Thus,	one	possible	reason	for	attempts	to	end	foreign	control	of	collateral	sources	was	to	gain	access	to	these	revenue	streams	so	as	to	use	them	for	regime	preservation	purposes	that	in	the	eyes	of	state	actors	would	take	precedence	over	repayment	of	prior	loan	commitments.			
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Soothill	 (1928:124)	notes	Beiyang	negotiators	 continually	pressed	 for	 sovereign	 control	over	the	use	of	tariff	revenues	from	the	Chinese	Maritime	Customs	at	the	international	tariff	conference	 of	 1926	held	between	China	 and	principal	 treaty	powers.	The	 results	 of	 the	conference	were	inconclusive	owing	to	increasing	levels	of	internal	civil	strife,	such	that	"the	Chinese	Delegation,	owing	to	the	resignation	or	flight	of	most	of	its	members	had	ceased	to	exist	 and	 the	 conference	 was	 postponed	 sine	 die."	 The	 breakdown	 of	 national	 central	government	control	during	this	period,	however,	underscored	to	foreign	investors	the	lack	of	domestic	internal	mechanisms	that	could	sufficiently	bind	domestic	actors	to	protect	the	investor	property	 rights	and	ensure	 funds	designated	 for	 loan	 repayment	would	not	be	directed	into	other	purposes	such	as	regime	maintenance.	Indeed,	as	the	historical	record	makes	clear,	numerous	local	warlord	leaders	did	in	fact	use	military	force	to	take	control	of	local	tax	receipts	in	order	to	use	them	to	support	their	goals	of	additional	military	action.		While	 the	 rationale	 for	 state	 officials	 to	 gain	 direct	 control	 over	 designated	 collateral	revenue	sources	might	have	well	been	owing	to	a	desire	by	officials	to	spend	such	revenues	on	activities	that	would	benefit	themselves	by	violating	the	property	rights	of	those	who	had	previously	lent	money,	in	practise	it	was	not	so	articulated.	Instead,	to	justify	attempts	at	ending	foreign	control	over	revenue	streams	designated	for	bond	repayment,	the	issue	of	control	over	collateral	was	often	presented	as	representing	an	affront	to	the	sovereignty	of	China	 over	 its	 own	 resources,	 and	 employing	 calls	 to	 nationalism	 to	 fight	 against	 the	"humiliation"	imposed	upon	the	Chinese	nation	by	foreign	powers.				5.2.3.3.		Addressing	mixed	evidences	within	mainstream	and	revisionist	literatures:		Contemporaneous	Actors		One	of	the	more	perplexing	issues	in	Chinese	economic	history	scholarship	is	the	seemingly	widening	 gap	 between	 mainstream	 and	 revisionist	 viewpoints	 regarding	 the	 level	 of	domestic	 institutional	 strength	 and	 capacity,	 with	 Miller	 (2000:	 15)	 characterising	 the	scholarship	on	the	period	as	"less	settled	than	ever."	As	indicated	from	the	above-citations	of	both	mainstream	and	revisionist	literatures,	such	contrasting	viewpoints	is	partly	due	to	the	existence	of	credible	evidence	that	can	be	used	to	support	of	either	side	of	the	argument.			Such	 conflicting	 conclusions	 are	 partly	 a	 reflection	 of	 a	methodological	 approach	 based	upon	current-period	scholars	looking	back	at	innumerable	and	divergent	sets	of	historical	data.	As	such,	we	argue	a	potentially	more	methodologically	sound	approach	is	not	to	rely	on	the	opinions	of	current-day	researchers,	but	rather	analyse	the	response	behaviour	of	private	economic	agents	acting	within	their	time	period-specific	conditions.			While	the	subsequent	analyses	in	Part	IV	explicitly	employ	this	strategy	using	market	data	from	Shanghai's	early	financial	markets,	we	can	also	utilise	this	strategy	on	a	limited	scale	in	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Finance's	 aforementioned	 policy	 implementations	 to	monopolise	the	production	of	legal	tender,	and	move	from	commodity	to	fiat	money.	On	this	issue,	the	contrasting	views	advanced,	for	instance,	by	Paauw	(1952)	and	Eastman	(1974)	as	evidence	of	weak	institutional	capacity,	and	by	Strauss	(1998)	and	Ma	(2008)	as	evidence	of	strong	of	institutional	capacity,	appear	difficult	to	square	on	the	surface.			In	 this	case,	an	analysis	of	 the	willingness	of	private	agents	to	hold	banknotes	issued	by	various	economic	entities	is	appropriate.	Such	an	analysis	finds	that	prior	to	the	domestic	government's	ending	the	era	of	free	banking	and	monopolising	money	issuance,	much	of	the	domestic	public	 chose	 to	hold	 foreign	banknotes	over	domestic	 government-backed	banknotes	(
	1928:	34;	Wu	1935:	192,	Stapleton	2004:	5),	with	Wu	(1935:192)	noting,	"[foreign]	banks	in	China	have	long	been	issuing	their	own	paper	currency	and	the	latter	has	usually	been	favored	by	the	populace."		
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Such	behaviour	provides	an	instance	of	revealed	preference	by	contemporaneous	domestic	rational	actors	that	indicates	an	indictment	on	the	amount	of	trust	placed	in	the	domestic	state-run	financial	entities	as	compared	to	privately-operated	foreign	financial	entities,	and	in	 the	 differential	 in	 institutional	 quality	 backing	 these	 entities.	 While	 theoretically	 a	hundred-yuan	note	issued	by	a	foreign	private	bank	could	represent	the	same	value	as	a	hundred-yuan	 note	 issued	 by	 a	 domestic	 government	 bank,	 private	 economic	 actors'	preference	to	hold	foreign	private	banknotes	represented	an	inherent	discount	applied	to	domestic	 government-backed	 financial	 institutions,	 reflecting	 a	 lack	of	 faith	 in	domestic	issuing	entities	to	uphold	their	promise	to	back	the	issued	currency	with	silver.			Such	misgivings	might	have	logically	come	from	the	forced	nationalisation	of	much	of	the	domestic	banking	system,	which	not	only	deprived	private	shareholders	of	power	to	choose	mangers	or	force	dividend	payments,	but	also	enabled	the	placement	of	forced	loans	and	bond	purchases	onto	the	balance	sheets	of	these	banks	so	as	to	make	the	bank	technically	economically	 not	 viable	 without	 explicit	 regulatory	 support	 granted	 by	 the	Ministry	 of	Finance.	In	this	sense,	it	should	come	as	no	surprise	that	domestic	economic	agents	were	neither	interested	in	investing	in	these	banks'	equity	shares,	nor	holding	their	bank	notes.		Such	 revealed	 preference	 in	 this	 instance	 accords	 with	 the	 overall	 story	 presented	 in	ensuing	chapters	regarding	the	reluctance	of	domestic	economic	actors	to	hold	domestic	financial	 instruments,	 absent	 a	 steep	 discount,	when	 presented	with	 the	 option	 to	 hold	similar	extraterritorial	financial	instruments.	It	also	suggests	that	revisionist	analyses	that	seek	to	cast	the	domestic	state	as	exhibiting	high	levels	of	state	capacity	and	institutional	strength	are	potentially	overweighting	or	misinterpreting	evidence	they	observe	from	the	current	framework	by	discounting	the	actual	viewpoints	of	contemporaneous	actors	on	the	relative	degree	of	domestic	state	capacity	and	institutional	strength.				5.2.3.4.		Missing	the	Point:	Terminology	and	the	significance	of	bureaucratic	capacity	
	The	 caveats	 cited	 above	 aside,	 Strauss	 (1998,	 2008),	 van	 de	 Ven	 (2014),	 Bian	 (2005a,	2005b),	Ko	(2016),	and	others	within	the	revisionist	scholarship	provide	robust	challenges	the	 uniformly	 dismal	 view	 of	 late-imperial	 and	 republican	 domestic	 state	 capacity	suggested	by	much	of	the	traditional	literature,	by	identifying	sources	of	evidence	to	suggest	that	domestic	bureaucratic	capacity	was	more	centralised	and	potentially	more	effective	than	 previously	 depicted.	 Putting	 aside	 questions	 as	 to	 whether	 the	 discrete	 pieces	 of	evidence	the	revisionist	literature	cites	are	of	a	universality	and	scope	sufficient	to	support	their	claim	of	a	domestic	state	with	substantive	state	capacity,	or	that	bureaucratic	state	capacity	markedly	increased	under	the	Guomindang,	of	far	greater	salience	is	the	issue	of	the	relevance	of	state	capacity	to	the	question	of	"strong	institutions."	Certainly,	the	ability	of	 the	state	bureaucracy	 to	define	and	accomplish	goals	 is	 important	 to	understand	and	document;	however,	it	cannot	be	simultaneously	assumed	that	high	levels	of	state	capacity	are	 necessarily	 correlated	 with	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 type	 of	 institutional	 strength	 that	encourages	 social	 and	 economic	 freedom	 and	 growth.	 However,	 effectiveness	 of	government	bureaucracy	is	not	a	positive	attribute,	per	se,	but	rather	simply	a	measure	of	the	ability	of	state	actors	to	implement	policies	they	so	desire.			Thus,	while	bureaucratic	structures	that	allow	state	actors	to	achieve	their	own	goals	more	effectively	and	capably	is	arguably	beneficial	to	state	actors,	of	more	salience	is	employing	state	capacity	to	create	a	framework	for	economic	growth	and	a	free	civil	society,	which	requires	 limits	on	the	ability	of	state	actors	to	use	state	power	 to	engage	in	arbitrary	or	excessively	extractive	actions	against	private	actors.	Bureaucratic	state	capacity	in	and	of	itself	is	not	particularly	beneficial	to	private	actors	if	state	actors	are	not	bound	by	structures	
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that	allow	and	incentivise	them	to	credibly	commit	to	respecting	private	property	rights.	In	fact,	strong	state	structures	that	imbue	state	actors	with	strong	political	power	but	fail	to	limit	state	actions	violating	private	property	rights	can	generate	worse	outcomes	than	if	the	state	is	too	weak	to	do	so;	i.e.,	authoritarian	regimes	with	high	state	capacity	simply	mean	state	actors	can	more	effectively	act	in	ways	that	violate	private	property	rights.			As	Chapter	Two	emphasised,	governmental	power	presents	a	double-edged	sword:	while	society	can	benefit	from	strong	and	effective	state	authority	that	allows	for	the	provision	of	protection	of	private	property	rights	from	arbitrary	takings	by	internal	or	external	actors,	state	power	can	also	be	employed	to	expropriate	property	from	private	individuals.	Strong	and	effectual	bureaucratic	offices	that	can	efficiently	tax	the	populace	in	order	to	provide	military	and	police	protection	against	arbitrary	takings,	can	also	readily	be	employed	to	extract	private	resources	and	transfer	them	to	state	actors.	It	can	be	argued,	as	revisionist	scholars	 do	 relatively	 effectively,	 that	 compared	with	 the	 bureaucratic	 capability	 of	 the	earlier	late-Qing	and	Beiyang	governments,	the	Guomindang	government	possessed	a	more	complex	 and	 extensive	 bureaucracy,	 imbuing	 state	 actors	 with	 greater	 capability	 to	accomplish	 their	 desired	 goals.	 Greater	 complexity	 and	 even	 capability	 within	 the	bureaucracy	 cannot,	 however,	 be	 presumed	 as	 an	 inherently	 positive	 aspect	 of	 "state-building",	as	is	frequently	found	directly	or	indirectly	in	the	revisionist	literature.			Given	 that	 increasing	 bureaucratic	 capability	 was	 not	 accompanied	 by	 credible	commitment	 mechanisms—such	 as	 an	 independent	 judiciary,	 open	 and	 free	 elections,	representative	government	structures,	and	a	free	press	that	allow	citizenry	to	be	informed	of	 the	actions	of	government	actors	and	hence	held	accountable—that	placed	checks	on	government	actors'	behaviours,	much	of	state	bureaucratic	capacity	was	in	fact	channelled	into	using	state	power	to	exploit	private	economic	actors,	as	described	in	detail	in	previous	sections	of	 this	 chapter.	Bureaucratic	 state	 structures	were	 employed	 to	 extract	private	wealth	for	personal	gain	of	state	actors,	create	effectual	monitoring	of	private	agents	civil	lives	 using	 secret	 police,	 arrange	 assassinations	 of	 political	 opponents,	 develop	sophisticated	 political	 censorship	 and	propaganda	mechanisms,	 and	 use	 regulatory	 and	oversight	authority	to	direct	economic	and	financial	resources	from	private	entrepreneurs	to	state-controlled	enterprises,	such	as	by	nationalising	much	of	the	banking	system.	All	of	these	actions	involved	constraining	the	choice	set	of	individual	private	agents	to	meet	the	desires	and	benefit	of	state	leadership,	rather	than	creating	an	environment	for	in	which	private	agents	could	shape	and	determine	their	economic	and	social	lives.			Thus,	care	is	necessary	when	considering	revisionist	claims	about,	for	instance,	"successful"	Guomindang	institutions.	To	begin	with,	while	the	revisionist	literature	is	often	presented	as	providing	a	counter	to	the	traditional	depiction	of	a	weak	late-imperial	and	republican	institutional	framework,	the	specific	claims	of	the	revisionist	literature	are	in	regard	to	the	bureaucratic	 capacity	 of	 a	 few	 specific	 state	 organisations.	 The	 inherent	 ambiguities	 in	terminology	implied	by	concepts	such	as	"institutions",	or	"institutional	strength"	has	led	to	a	 conflation	 in	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 workings	 of	 specific	 government	 bureaus	 and	ministries	 with	 much	 broader	 concepts	 regarding	 the	 overall	 domestic	 institutional	framework.	 For	 instance,	 when	 Strauss	 makes	 reference	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 "strong	institutions"	 in	 republican	 China,	 she	 is	 specifically	 referring	 to	 strong	 bureaucratic	administrative	capacity	in	one	or	two	specific	government	organisations,	such	the	Ministry	of	Finance	and	the	Salt	Inspectorate,	not,	necessarily,	the	broader	unit	of	analysis	of	overall	institutional	 structures—made	 up	 of	 multiple	 social,	 political,	 civil	 organisations—that	constitute	 the	 way	 concepts	 such	 as	 private	 property,	 contract,	 corporate	 and	 investor	rights	 are	 defined,	 developed	 and	 implemented	 within	 economic	 civil	 society.	 Overall,	therefore,	 the	 focus	 of	 much	 of	 the	 revisionist	 literature	 on	 the	 capability	 of	 state	bureaucracies	to	effectively	enact	policies	considers	an	important	yet	nonetheless	ancillary	portion	of	the	focus	of	the	broader	institutional	literature.	
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	Second,	many	of	the	examples	of	strong	state	bureaucratic	capacity	by	the	Guomindang	that	Strauss,	 Bian,	 Ko	 and	 others	 describe	 are	 in	 fact	 centred	 on	 examples	 of	 the	 state	implementing	actions	that	intruded	on	the	private	economic	and	social	spheres,	as	opposed	to	examples	of	ways	 that	state	capacity	was	directed	 into	creating	credible	commitment	mechanisms.	For	instance,	 the	depiction	by	Young	(1963,	1971),	Strauss	(1998),	and	Ma	(2012)	of	the	Ministry	of	Finance's	move	from	metallic-backed	to	pure	paper	currency	is	described	 in	 their	 subjective	 analyses	 as	 "successful"	 based	 on	 their	 reading	 that	 the	Ministry	developed	the	prerequisite	bureaucratic	capacity	to	carry	out	such	a	policy.	This	reads	quite	differently,	however,	than	an	analysis	of	the	positive	or	negative	implications	the	policy	imposed	on	the	broader	Guomindang	institutional	framework	of	private	property	rights.	Specifically,	while	the	Ministry	did	indeed	institute	a	policy	of	a	single	paper	currency,	successfully	wresting	the	ability	of	independent	entities	such	as	foreign	banks	from	issuing	competing	notes,	 this	move	was	 indicative	of	a	 lack	of	 commitment	by	 the	Guomindang	leadership	to	institutional	protections	of	private	property	rights.	This	dichotomy	between	"strength"	of	bureaucratic	capacity,	and	broader	strength	of	private	property	institutions,	is	underscored	by	the	ensuing	hyperinflation	that	followed	the	Guomindang's	monopolising	of	 power	 to	 issue	 currency,	 followed	by	a	 currency	debasement	 so	as	 to	allow	 for	 ever-greater	levels	of	government	spending	at	the	expense	of	private	savers.			Further,	the	implicit	view	of	state	power	as	an	inherently	positive,	or	even	necessary,	force	to	bring	about	economic	and	social	development,	characteristic	of	much	of	the	revisionist	and	state	capacity	literature,	ignores	the	state's	role	as	a	possible	threat	to	economic	growth	and	civil	society.	This	is	reflected	within	the	revisionist	argument	that	centralised	political	power	is	required	for	states	to	exhibit	"institutional	strength";	both	Strauss	(1997,	1998,	2008)	 and	 Bian	 (2005a,	 2005b),	 for	 instance,	 show	 a	 veneration	 of	 centralised—and	therefore,	in	their	wording,	"rationalised"—governance	structures.	Some	of	this	emphasis	derives	 from	 the	 implicit	 application	 of	 a	 false	 inverse	 between	 conditions	 of	 political	discord	 resulting	 from	 political	 strife	 and	 civil	 war	 versus	 top-down,	 centralised	government	and	social	planning,	as	opposed	to	more	appropriately	defining	the	distinction	as	one	between	centralised,	top-down	control	structures	versus	more	federalist	structures	that	allow	for	a	high	degree	of	local	autonomy.	Many	revisionist	analyses	of	the	domestic	central	government	portray	it	as	having	lacked	"sufficient"	centralisation.	For	instance,	in	support	of	Strauss	(1998)'s	conception	of	the	late	Qing	polity,	Xu	(2001:	226)	argues	the	Qing	 state	 failed	 to	 "modernise"	 and	adapt	 to	 the	pressures	brought	 to	bear	by	 outside	European	powers	and	internal	changes	because	it	could	only	muster	"a	proliferation	of	ad-hoc	administrative	organizations	from	the	bottom	up."	However,	while	the	political	chaos	of	late	Beiyang	period	defined	by	warlordism	and	protracted	war	civil	strife	did	contribute	to	difficulty	in	bureaucratic	and	administrative	capacity	enabling	centralised	government	control,	as	discussed	later	in	this	chapter,	political	strife	proved	a	constant	throughout	the	entirety	of	the	late	imperial	and	republican	period.	Thus,	even	granting	the	Guomindang	to	have	been	more	 administratively	 centralised	 than	prior	domestic	 governments,	 that	 the	level	 of	 political	 strife	 remained	extremely	high	 suggests	a	 lack	of	 relationship	between	political	 centralisation	 and	 levels	 of	 political	 strife.	 In	 addition,	 regardless	 of	 issues	 of	political	centralisation,	the	authoritarian	government	structure	implied	a	lack	of	sufficient	credible	 commitment	 and	 political	 mechanisms—such	 as	 independent	 courts,	 political	rules,	electoral	options—which	could	have	fostered	confidence	amongst	private	actors	to	support	the	state	and	its	interests,	regard	it	as	a	viable	institution,	or	permitted	provincial	leaders	to	contest	central	authority	through	nonviolent	means,	and	which	therefore	instead	contributed	to	creating	conditions	incentivising	the	utilisation	of	violence	by	political	power	brokers	outside	the	central	government	apparatus.	
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Chapter	Six.			
State	 Capacity:	 Protecting	 Private	 Property	 and	 Contract	 Rights	 via	 Effective	
Institutions	—	Ability	to	Enforce	Monopoly	on	Internal	Coercive	Violence			In	this	chapter,	we	analyse	the	role	of	the	domestic	Chinese	state	from	the	standpoint	of	its	ability	to	protect	private	property	rights	by	preventing	nonstate	intrusions	on	such	rights.	As	explored	in	Chapter	Two,	one	theory	of	the	state	originating	with	Hobbes	(1651)	is	that	governments	 serve	 as	 a	 coordinating	 mechanism	 to	 limit	 the	 theft	 or	 destruction	 of	economic	agents'	property	endemic	to	the	State	of	Nature,	so	as	to	allow	private	agents	the	ability	to	own	and	control	(some)	of	the	goods	they	produce.	According	to	this	view,	the	role	of	 the	state	is	to	 implement	a	rationalised	rule	of	law	by	way	of	the	coordinated	martial	power	 of	 the	 state	 to	 provide	 protection	 from—employing	 Olson	 (1962)'s	 figurative	terminology—"roving	 bandits"	 who	 might	 otherwise	 wantonly	 take	 or	 destroy	 agents'	private	 property.	 In	 order	 to	 fulfil	 this	 primary	 role,	 the	 state	 apparatus	must	 possess	sufficient	capacity	to	enforce	a	monopoly	over	the	legitimate	use	of	coercive	force.		The	governments	 in	nominal	control	of	China	from	the	 late-Qing	 through	the	republican	period,	however,	proved	consistently	unable	to	perform	this	basic	role	of	the	state.	Instead,	these	governments	oversaw	conditions	in	which	internal	violence	was	endemic	and	where	the	state	lacked	sufficient	capacity	to	enforce	a	monopoly	on	internal	violence,	typifying	the	classic	example	of	a	low-capacity	state,	and	exemplifying	what	Weingast	(1997)	and	North	
et	al.	(2006)	refer	to	as	state	institution	structures	constructed	as	"limited	access	orders."	We	 analyse	 the	 performance	 of	 the	 domestic	 state	 in	 this	 regard	 using	 a	 conceptual	framework	that	partly	extends	state	capacity	arguments	to	specifically	utilise	those	of	what	Weingast	and	his	co-authors	refer	 to	as	 the	"violence	 trap"	approach	(North	et	al.	2009,	2013;	Weingast	2010,	 2017;	Cox	et	 al.	 2017;	Levi	et	 al.	 2017),	 as	well	 as	what	we	have	referred	to	as	an	extension	of	the	violence	trap	thesis	as	presented	in	Section	2.5.4.2.			Section	6.1	provides	a	brief	overview	of	the	violence	trap	thesis,	as	well	as	reference	to	our	extension	of	the	thesis.	Section	6.2	presents	a	historiographical	analysis	of	domestic	state	capacity	vis-a-vis	its	ability	to	maintain	a	monopoly	on	coercive	violence	within	its	internal	domestic	 borders.	 Finally,	 Section	 6.3	 attempts	 to	 links	 the	 two	 previous	 sections,	 by	explicating	the	way	in	which	the	specific	actual	history	of	the	late-imperial	and	republican	eras	exemplifies	rather	well	that	which	is	predicted	by	the	Violence	Trap	thesis,	as	well	as	our	own	extension	to	their	thesis,	in	both	antecedents	relating	to	its	weak	state	capacity,	and	 in	 terms	 of	 outcomes	 owing	 to	 the	 attempts	 by	 state	 leadership	 to	 overcome	 the	problems	posed	by	endemic	social	violence.			6.1.		The	Violence	Trap	Thesis		As	 previously	 introduced	 in	 Chapter	 Two,	 Weingast	 and	 his	 co-authors	 suggest	 the	leadership	in	many	developing	nations	face	a	"violence	trap"	that	limits	their	policy	options.	Governments	with	weak	 state	 capacity	 frequently	are	unable	 to	 enforce	 a	monopoly	on	coercive	violence.	As	a	result,	multiple	dispersed	actors	with	access	to	means	of	organised	violence	can	pose	a	credible	existential	threat	to	the	state.	The	existence	of	such	distributed	sources	of	access	to	coercive	violence	helps	explain	the	high	levels	of	violence	so	prevalent	in	low	capacity	states.	As	the	prevalence	of	multiple	sources	of	violence	pose	serious	danger	to	those	in	power—from	either	destruction	or	capture	of	their	assets	via	violence,	or	being	overthrown	by	 those	with	access	 to	alternative	sources	of	violence—in	order	 to	protect	their	 privileged	 economic	 positions,	 state	 leaders	 engage	 in	 strategies	 that	 attempt	 to	reduce	the	probability	of	violence.	Congleton	(2010)	finds	rent-extraction	regimes,	rather	than	free	trade,	to	have	been	the	norm	throughout	history,	owing	to	the	political	difficulties	of	 enacting	 liberalisation	 policies.	 Weingast	 and	 his	 co-authors	 present	 an	 additional	
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impediment	 to	adoption	of	 liberalisation	policies,	arguing	 that	 one	of	 the	most	 common	strategies	 sovereigns	 use	 to	 decrease	 the	 probability	 of	 violence	 centres	 on	 creating	economic	rents	that	can	be	distributed	in	a	politically	expedient	manner	to	co-opt	potential	rivals	 and	 induce	 support	 for	 the	 existing	 political	 order.	While	 rent-creation	 strategies	potentially	reduce	the	incidence	of	violence,	in	general	they	prove	antithetical	to	economic	growth.	Yet	abandoning	such	rent-creation	strategies	can	increase	the	likelihood	of	political	violence.	Hence,	therein	lies	the	development	trap	to	which	Weingast	and	his	co-authors	refer,	wherein	which	leaders	of	states	with	weak	capacity	to	enforce	a	monopoly	on	violence	find	themselves	incentivised	to	institute	highly	inefficient	economic	policies.		Our	 extension	 of	 the	 Violence	 Trap	 thesis	 suggests	 that	 weak	 states	 under	 constant	existential	threat	are	unable	to	create	effective	credible	commitment	mechanisms,	as	ex-
ante	 promises	made	 by	 states	 facing	 existential	 threats	 are	 inherently	 not	 credible.	 As	private	actors	can	recognise	existential	 threats	 to	 the	state,	 they	can	also	recognise	 that	state	actors	will	place	 the	short-term	goal	of	 regime	continuance	over	 longer-term	goals	that	 might	 foster	 credible	 commitment,	 implying	 state	 actors	 will	 be	 more	 willing	 to	undertake	drastic	actions	to	prevent	their	overthrow,	such	as	the	declaration	of	military	law,	the	suspension	of	civil	liberties,	or	engaging	in	onerous	taxation	or	outright	expropriation	of	private	economic	output	in	support	of	military	efforts.	Therefore,	private	agents	are	likely	to	 discount	 attempts	 by	 the	 state	 promising	 to	 honour	 commitments	 to	 protect	 private	property	 rights.	 Further,	 just	 as	 private	 actors	 anticipate	 the	 state	 failing	 to	 honour	commitments	to	protect	private	property	rights	under	severe	existential	threats,	so	too	will	state	 actors	anticipate	 this	 expected	 response	of	private	 actors,	 and	as	 such	 are	 further	disincentivised	 to	 attempt	 the	 construction	 or	 maintenance	 of	 credible	 commitment	mechanisms.	As	a	result,	a	"low	credibility	trap",	is	created	that	locks	the	state	into	an	action	set	that	severely	undermines	its	ability	to	credibly	commit	to	protect	private	property	rights.	The	dynamics	of	the	trap	are	self-reinforcing—facing	serious	existential	threats,	incentives	on	state	actors	to	honour	prior	commitments	to	protect	property	rights	are	considerably	reduced,	 given	 that	 private	 actors	 will	 react	 similarly	 whether	 state	 actions	 uphold	 or	violate	commitments.	This	condition	therefore	increases	the	likelihood	that	the	state	will	in	fact	violate	its	prior	commitments.	Recognition	by	private	actors	that	state	actors	are	more	likely	to	violate	prior	commitments	under	such	conditions	creates	secondary	effects	that	further	strengthen	the	overall	dynamics	of	the	described	incentive	structures.			6.2.		Existential	Threats	facing	Late-Imperial	and	Republican	Chinese	Governments		The	state	capacity	and	violence	trap	literatures	frequently	employ	a	dichotomist	concept	of	internal	versus	external	threats	as	a	way	to	distinguish	not	simply	different	sources	but	also	different	degrees	 of	 existential	 threats	 that	 states	might	 face,	with	 the	 supposition	 that	external	threats	represent	the	more	serious.	On	this	issue,	however,	and	certainly	within	the	context	of	post-early	modern	Chinese	history,	we	deviate	slightly	 from	the	standard	conception	 of	 "internal"	 versus	 "external"	 threats	 analysis	 regarding	 the	 monopoly	 on	violence	 and	 the	 type	of	 threats	 that	 the	 state	 can	 face	 from	 rival	 actors	with	 access	 to	coercive	power	of	force.	In	fact,	we	argue	it	is	not	necessarily	the	case	that	external	threats	are	inherently	any	more	serious	than	internal	conflicts.	The	complexity	of	the	situation	in	late-imperial	and	republican	China	was	one	of	such	varied	and	dispersed	sources	of	violence	across	many	multiple	 actors.	 Certainly,	 the	 internal	Taiping	 rebellion	was	 an	 existential	threat	of	quite	serious	degree;	at	its	height,	the	rebellion	managed	to	take	control	over	a	significant	portion	of	the	Qing	state,	establishing	its	own	competing	capital	in	Nanjing	and	nearly	took	Shanghai	and	other	crucial	cities.	Similarly,	the	internal	threat	presented	by	the	communist	rebellion	in	the	1930s	and	1940s	was	equally	as	dangerous	to	the	Guomindang	regime	 as	was	 the	 external	 threat	 posed	 by	 the	 Japanese	military,	 as	 evidenced	 by	 the	regime's	ultimate	successive	defeat	at	the	hands	of	both.		
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To	provide	an	organisational	 framework	 to	 the	discussion,	we	divide	 the	analysis	based	upon	 the	 required	method	 of	 enforcement	 necessary	 to	 respond	 to	 threats	 of	 nonstate	violence.	 In	 general,	 states	 implement	 a	monopoly	 of	 force	 through	 the	 two	 vehicles	 of	internal	 police,	 and	 military	 forces.	 In	 general,	 police	 forces	 are	 designed	 to	 minimise	internal	 disorder	 by	 compelling	 adherence	 to	 laws,	 including	 the	 protection	 of	 private	property	rights,	and	limiting	the	threat	of	small-scale	acts	of	violence	by	non-state	actors;	that	is,	to	limit	the	behaviours	of	Olson's	"roving	bandits."	Military	forces,	conversely,	are	typically	employed	to	provide	defence	against	the	threat	of	larger-scale	forms	of	violence,	especially	those	that	present	immediate	existential	threats	to	regime	survival.	These	large-scale	 threats	 include	 internal	 threats	 such	 as	 rival	military	 cliques,	 and	 armed	 political	forces	or	rebel	groups,	as	well	as	external	threats	from	foreign	militaries.		The	 late-imperial	 and	 republican	 domestic	 state	 apparatus	 constantly	 faced	 serious	existential	 threats	 from	multiple	 rival	 sources	 of	 violence.	 Competing	militarist	 groups,	major	 armed	 social	 uprisings	 such	 as	 Taiping	 and	 Communist	 rebellions,	 rival	 armed	political	parties	such	as	the	Guomindang	Party	based	in	the	south	of	the	country	during	the	Beiyang	 era,	 and	major	military	 offenses	 on	 Chinese	 soil	 executed	 by	 Japanese	military	forces.	Such	serious	and	powerful	internal	and	external	threats	from	competing	sources	of	violence	demonstrated	an	inability	by	the	domestic	Chinese	state	to	maintain	a	monopoly	on	internal	violence.	Ultimately,	the	domestic	state	lacked	adequate	state	capacity	to	either	efficiently	spend	the	financial	resources	it	possessed,	or	to	raise	additional	capital,	to	enable	effective	militarisation	that	could	have	prevented	competing	internal	and	external	groups	from	posing	existential	threats	to	the	domestic	regimes.		The	domestic	governments	in	nominal	control	of	China	were	consistently	unable	to	perform	the	fundamental	and	necessary	role	of	the	state—protection	of	private	property	rights	from	destruction	 or	 expropriation	 by	 external	 or	 internal	 nonstate	 actors.	 Economic	 agents'	perception	of	private	property	rights	was	therefore	 likewise	consistently	affected	by	the	knowledge	 that	 the	 importance	of	keeping	whatever	promises	 the	sovereign	might	have	made—and	 even	 whatever	 credible	 commitment	 devices	 were	 connected	 to	 such	promises—would	be	subordinated	when	faced	with	an	existential	threat.	More	important,	there	was	real	concern	that	any	realised	output	achieved	by	costly	investment	undertaken	could	 be	 plundered	 or	 destroyed	 by	 "roving	 bandits"	 represented	 by	 internal	 rebels,	militarist	 leaders,	 bandits	 and	 organised	 crime	 members,	 or	 foreign	 military	 forces.	Potential	investors	who	might	consider	financing	entrepreneurs	had	to	likewise	worry	that	their	 investment	risks	not	only	 involved	 the	expected	probability	of	 the	 entrepreneurial	venture	being	economically	successful,	but	whether	at	some	point	the	gains	of	that	venture	would	be	expropriated	or	destroyed.	Furthermore,	the	investor	also	faced	the	additional	concern	that	whatever	level	of	private	property	and	contract	protection	the	current	state	apparatus	offered,	that	state	apparatus	could	become	incapacitated	or	removed	altogether.		The	intricacies	of	the	complex	and	fluctuating	vagaries	of	the	political	situation	of	the	late	imperial	and	republican	period	have	been	handled	in	multiple	other	historical	researches.	The	following	section	is	centred	primarily	upon	the	ways	in	which	national	governments	attempted	 to	 fulfil	 the	 fundamental	 state	 function	 to	 defend	 and	 protect	 both	 its	 own	sovereignty	 and	 individuals'	 property	 rights.	 A	 new	 emphasis	 in	 the	 literature	 seeks	 to	stress	the	fundamental	importance	of	the	constant	wartime	conflicts	and	impacts	these	had	on	the	development	of	the	Chinese	nation-state	and	on	state-society	relationships,	and	the	economic	 and	 political	 space	 within	 which	 individual	 economic	 actors	 operated.	 Dong	(2017:	175)	for	instance,	seeks	to	link	contemporary	Chinese	society	with	this	period	of	a	constant	 militarised	 environment,	 stating	 "Many	 key	 factors	 in	 contemporary	 China's	ideological	 constitution,	 administrative	 and	military	 systems,	 social	 structure,	 collective	memory,	cultural	values,	and	even	aesthetic	choices	originated	in	wartime	experiences	or	were	even	enabled	by	wars."	
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6.2.1.		Credible	Commitment	Mechanisms:	Internal	Policing	Forces—			Securing	a	Monopoly	on	Violence	Against	Small-Scale	Internal	Threats		To	address	 threats	presented	by	nonstate	actors	able	 to	partake	 in	small-scale	violence,	especially	in	regard	to	the	taking	of	private	property	from	private	actors,	typically	requires	an	effective	state	police	force.	Yet	the	inability	of	the	state	to	control	non-sanctioned	use	of	force	by	nonstate	actors	in	the	taking	of	private	property	appears	to	have	been	endemic	throughout	much	of	the	time	frame.	Much	of	these	unwanted	takings	came	in	the	form	of	unorganised,	localised	criminal	activity	such	as	banditry.	Such	activities	did	not	necessarily	begin	in	the	late	Qing	period.	Reports	of	piracy	and	banditry	existed	throughout	the	breadth	of	Qing	 rule,	with	Buoye	 (2006:	59)	 finding	 state	officials	 employing	poverty-alleviation	strategies	designed	to	limit	banditry	activities	during	the	end	of	the	late	eighteenth	century.	Although	archival	work	by	Antony	(1989:	128)	finds	most	bandit	associations	in	Guangdong	during	 the	 early	 nineteenth	 century	 were	 "small,	 ad-hoc	 groups	 of	 eight	 to	 ten	 men",	MacKay	 (2013:	551)	argues	 that	maritime	piracy	groups	 that	 simultaneously	sprung	up	along	 China's	 southeastern	 seaboard	 amassed	 sufficient	power	 to	 serve	 as	 independent	"political	actors	distinct	from	the	Chinese	imperial	project	around	them.	They	controlled	sea	 routes,	 collected	 taxes,	 and	 often	 governed	 territory."	 Yet	 the	 weakness	 of	 the	 late	imperial	state,	along	with	similar	weakness	of	successive	republican	governments,	 led	to	marked	increases	in	common	banditry	activities,	as	noted	by	Ly	(1918)	in	his	study	of	its	incidences	and	causes.	Such	problems	persisted	throughout	the	so-called	warlord	period,	with	van	de	Ven	(2003:	78)	noting	that	gangs	of	bandits	were	often	able	to	control	small	villages	 in	 the	 countryside.	 Relatedly,	Wu	 (1935:	193)	 highlights	 the	weakness	 of	 state	police	 power	 to	 curb	 criminal	 activities,	 observing	 that	 "smuggling	 has	 assumed	 such	proportions	in	China	today,	that	it	constitutes	a	threat	to	the	entire	fiscal	as	well	as	financial	structure	of	the	nation.	No	decrees	of	the	Government	to	date	have	been	able	to	stop	it.	In	addition	to	foreign	concessions	over	which	China	has	no	jurisdiction	and	the	ports,	such	as	Amoy,	Swatow,	etc,	all	notorious	for	smuggling,	the	whole	of	North	China	is	practically	open;	and	present	political	developments	in	the	latter	section	can	only	aggravate	the	situation."	 	Unorganised	social	unrest	and	associated	violence	did	not	only	include	activities	of	criminal	gangs	but	also	citizen	riots.	Wong	(1982:	781)	describes	the	high	frequency	of	food	riots	that	occurred	up	through	the	end	of	the	Qing,	including	a	large-scale	riot	in	Hunan	in	1910	on	the	eve	of	the	1911	Revolution	that	Wong	assigns	blame	for	on	landlords:	"The	gentry	were	doubly	responsible	for	the	violence.	By	hoarding	grain	for	export	and	refusing	to	make	grain	available	locally,	these	men	created	the	classic	conditions	for	a	food	riot.	In	order	to	oppose	the	state's	new	policies,	the	gentry	helped	to	organize	popular	protests	against	the	expansion	 of	 government	 functions.	 They	 simultaneously	 undermined	 the	 ability	 of	 the	state	 to	meet	 the	 old	 problems	 of	 food	 riots	 and	attacked	 the	 new	 policies	designed	 to	strengthen	the	state."	While	Wong's	analysis	lacks	an	appreciation	for	free	trade	to	stabilise	prices,	his	research	nonetheless	highlights	not	only	the	severity	of	civil	unrest	throughout	the	period,	but	also	highlights	a	central	state	structure	 too	weak	to	either	 implement	its	desired	trade	policies	so	as	to	be	thwarted	by	local	elites,	or	to	prevent	outbreaks	of	civil	unrest	 such	 as	 riots.	 These	 riots	 frequently	 led	 to	 further	 acts	 of	 violence	 directed	 at	merchants	 (including	 Japanese	 and	 British	 steamship	 operators	 responsible	 for	transporting	grains	outside	the	province),	and	central	government	reformers.		While	unorganised	and	often	spontaneous,	 the	economic	 impacts	of	such	 forms	of	social	unrest	and	violence	destructive	to	private	property	were	significant.	A	1931	editorial	in	the	
Jen	Min	Jih	Pao	newspaper	decries	the	economic	impacts	of	banditry	as	severe,	arguing	that	"China	has	enough	capital	within	her	own	boundaries	for	industrial	reconstruction,	at	least	for	 several	 years	 to	 come,	 the	 only	 thing	 necessary	 is	 confidence	 in	 the	 Government's	sincerity	of	purpose	and	in	its	ability	to	carry	out	its	bandit	suppression	intensions.	...[The	government]	is	unable	to	cope	with	the	bandit-communists	in	the	interior,	with	the	result	
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that	individual	fortunes	are	not	devoted	to	the	development	of	industry,	but	to	the	purchase	of	Government	bonds,	and	other	unhealthy	speculative	activities"	(Peoples	Tribune	1931:	27).	 The	 claims	 regarding	 entrepreneurial	 investment	 behaviour	made	 by	 this	 editorial	match	 well	 with	 the	 type	 of	 behaviour	 that	 associated	 theoretical	 arguments	 predict—entrepreneurs	will	not	invest	under	perceptions	of	weak	protections	on	private	property	rights.	In	this	instance,	available	investment	capital	was	being	redirected	from	profitable	productive	 activities	 in	 the	 real	 economy	 towards	 so-called	 "speculative"	 activity.	 The	warping	of	the	economy	given	the	state's	dominance	over	productive	assets	is	underscored	by	 the	 fact	 that	 rather	 than	 money	 directed	 towards	 private	 financial	 instruments,	investors'	funds	primarily	flowed	into	government-backed	securities.			Beyond	unorganised	banditry,	a	more	problematic	and	serious	threat	came	from	increasing	levels	 of	 formally	 organised	 criminal	 syndicates.	 Much	 like	 the	 pirates	 referred	 to	 by	MacKay	(2013),	these	criminal	organisations,	by	way	of	their	access	to	sources	of	violence,	were	able	to	vie	with	and	even	take	over	designated	functions	of	the	sovereign	state,	such	as	enforcing	rules	and	collecting	taxes.	Perhaps	best	indicative	of	these	organisations,	and	one	that	was	especially	active	in	Shanghai,	was	the	so-called	"Green	Gang"	(_").	The	Green	Gang,	originating	as	a	loosely	knit	secret	society	during	the	Qing	period,	came	to	dominate	the	 underworld	 of	 Shanghai	 by	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 amassing	 its	wealth	and	power	through	opium	smuggling,	systematic	extortion,	and	human	trafficking.	
	Through	its	association	and	support	of	the	Guomindang	Party,	the	Green	Gang	grew	into	an	integral	 albeit	 corrosive	 part	 of	 the	 fabric	 of	 the	 Shanghai	 business	world.	 Gang	 bosses	sometimes	attained	prominent	social	positions,	such	as	Huang	 Jinrong,	who	was	given	a	position	on	the	French	Concession	police	force,	and	charged	with	maintaining	peace	within	the	 local	 Chinese	 community.	 Martin	 (1995:267)	 cites	 estimates	 that	 the	 organisation	employed	 approximately	 100,000	 people	 by	 the	 1920s,	 representing	 a	 seemingly-staggering	 three	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 city's	 population.	While	much	 of	 the	 income	 the	 Gang	received	was	related	to	its	monopoly	control	over	the	city's	illicit	opium	trade,	similar	to	nearly	 all	 other	 organised	 crime	 syndicates,	 extortion	 of	 legitimate	 entrepreneurs	 and	business	 operators	 by	 way	 of	 intimidation	 and	 actualised	 terror	 and	 violence	 was	 an	integral	part	of	the	Green	Gang's	financial	operations.	The	Gang	was	also	recorded	to	have	been	involved	in	major	incidents	of	price	manipulation	in	the	bond	market,	substantially	undermining	the	trust	investors	could	place	in	the	operation	of	the	financial	system	(N9J
=G 1991:	66-67).	By	supporting	 the	 lawlessness	of	a	mafia	running	much	of	China's	largest	and	most	economically	important	city—i.e.,	fostering	the	type	of	lawless	"bandits"	governments	are	supposed	to	prevent—the	Guomindang	Party	helped	create	an	economic	environment	of	excessive	business	costs	and	uncertainty	on	entrepreneurs	and	investors,	undermining	the	ability	of	private	economic	actors	to	function	efficiently.				6.2.2.		Credible	Commitment	Mechanisms:	Internal	and	External	Military	Forces—			Securing	a	Monopoly	on	Violence	Against	Large-Scale	Existential	Threats		
Late	Qing	Period:	Introduction	of	Existential	Military	Threats	Large-scale	 existential	 threats	 requiring	 state	military	 action	 include	 both	 internal	 and	external-based	nonstate	actors	with	access	to	their	own	sources	of	power	to	inflict	violence	within	 the	 borders	 of	 the	 domestic	 state.	 Beginning	 in	 the	 late	 Qing,	 the	 imperial	government	faced	its	first	serious	existential	external	military	threats	with	the	arrival	of	western	warships	in	the	early	nineteenth	century,	which	spilled	into	open	military	warfare	with	 the	British-led	First	Opium	War	(1839-1842).	The	Opium	War	proved	a	watershed	moment	in	the	sense	that	it	served	to	reveal	the	Qing's	military	weakness	vis-a-vis	western	naval	powers.	Prior	to	the	war,	players	on	sides	faced	a	hidden	knowledge	problem,	each	
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unsure	of	the	other's	capabilities	in	relation	to	their	own;	for	the	British,	"Chinese	aloofness	and	 relative	 passivity	 served	 to	 create	 a	 false	 impression	 of	 strength"	 (Shai	 1996:5).	However,	 the	 commencement	 of	 actual	 military	 battle	 served	 to	 reveal	 such	 hidden	knowledge	 to	all	actors	regarding	actual	relative	strengths.	As	a	result	of	 the	 loss	of	 the	Opium	 War,	 the	 Qing	 government	 was	 forced	 to	 signing	 the	 1842	 Treaty	 of	 Nanking.		Numerous	subsequent	military	defeats	at	the	hands	of	foreign	powers	confirmed	the	initial	reveal	 of	 Chinese	military	weakness,	 including	 the	 Second	Opium	War	 (1856-1860),	 the	Sino-French	War	 (1884-1885),	 the	First	 Sino-Japanese	War	(1894-1895),	and	 the	Eight-Nation	Alliance	war	in	response	to	the	Boxer	Rebellion	(1901).	The	result	of	these	losses	was	a	series	of	"unequal	treaties"	granting	foreign	powers	territorial	and	economic	rights	within	 China.	 From	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Nanjing	 onwards,	 the	 Qing	 and	 ensuing	 Chinese	governments	were	forced	to	acquiesce	to	the	system	of	"extraterritoriality,"	wherein	which	sovereign	control	over	certain	sections	of	various	port	cities,	including	Shanghai,	was	ceded	to	foreign	governments,	allowing	for	the	creation	of	legal	and	other	institutional	systems	to	operate	outside	the	full	sovereign	jurisdiction	of	domestic	Chinese	government	control.		In	 addition	 to	 external	 military	 pressures,	 the	 Qing	 government	 was	 simultaneously	besieged	by	numerous	concurrent	internal	rebellions,	some	of	which	began	as	nominally	nationalist	responses	to	the	weakness	of	the	Manchurian-dominated	Qing	government	in	the	face	of	external	foreign	threats.	Most	notable	among	these	was	the	Taiping	Rebellion,	which	started	in	the	southern	province	of	Guangxi	in	1850	and	spread	northward,	engulfing	nearly	all	of	China	in	civil	war	for	over	fourteen	years	before	its	eventual	defeat	by	Qing	forces	in	1864.	Shanghai	itself	was	attacked	several	times	by	Taiping	forces;	in	response,	the	French	naval	 force	bombed	 the	 rebel's	 positions,	 helping	Qing	 Imperial	army	 forces	push	 the	rebels	away	 from	the	city	(Cranston	1936).	The	rebellion	 imposed	tremendous	costs	on	the	Chinese	economy	and	population.	An	estimated	twenty	to	thirty	million	people	died	from	war	and	ensuing	famine	and	economic	disruption,	with	the	populations	of	the	lower	Yangzi	provinces	of	Jiangsu	and	Zhejiang	estimated	to	have	been	halved	(Fairbank	1978	vol.	10:	316-318;	vol.	11:	582).	The	Taiping	rebellion	also	triggered	a	major	fiscal	crisis.	With	 rebels	 controlling	 significant	numbers	of	 cities	 and	 land	area,	 land,	 commerce	 and	customs	tax	receipts	suffered	greatly.	Deng	(2003:	327)	finds	over	a	third	of	agricultural	taxes	and	nearly	a	half	of	customs	revenue,	excluding	Shanghai,	whose	customs	receipts	came	 to	 be	 protected	 by	 foreign	 control,	were	 disrupted	 by	 the	 rebellion.	 The	 imperial	government,	in	an	effort	to	raise	revenue,	debased	its	copper	cash	and	issued	inconvertible	paper	notes,	which	 led	 to	 the	so-called	"Xianfeng	 inflation"	during	 the	reign	of	Emperor	Xianfeng	from	1850	to	1861	(King	1965).			Concurrent	with	the	Taiping	Rebellion,	a	host	of	other	rebellions	raged,	including	the	Nian	Rebellion	(1851-1868)	centred	in	the	north,	the	Du	Wenxiu	Rebellion	(1856-1873)	in	the	southwest,	the	Miao	Rebellion	(1854-1873)	in	the	south,	and	Hui	Minorities	Uprising	(1862-1877)	centred	in	the	west.	These	rebellions	mostly	sought	independence	from	Qing	rule	for	mostly	Muslim	ethnic	 groups.	While	ultimately	 all	defeated,	 these	 concurrent	 rebellions	brought	to	the	fore	numerous	serious	problems	for	the	Qing	governing	coalition.			To	begin	with,	these	continual	military	battles	imposed	enormous	fiscal	costs	on	the	state,	as	discussed	in	the	previous	section	of	this	chapter.	As	van	de	Ven	(2014)	argues,	it	was	the	need	to	pay	for	these	wars	that	helped	drive	the	Qing	government	leadership	to	turn	to	debt	financing	 through	the	 issuance	of	external	and	later	 internal	bonds.	Second,	the	drive	 to	suppress	these	western-based	rebellions	led	to	intense	debate	within	the	leadership	of	the	Qing	Court	as	whether	to	focus	attention	on	bolstering	frontier	defence,	including	perceived	threats	from	Russia	as	well	as	the	central	Asian	steppes,	versus	maritime	defence,	which	many	officials,	advocated	especially	by	Li	Hongzhang,	saw	as	important	particularly	in	light	of	 Japan's	 rising	 power	 (Hsu	 1965).	 Third,	 associated	 costs	 of	 these	 internal	 rebellions	weakened	the	ability	of	the	Qing	state	to	respond	to	external	conflicts,	and	vice	versa.		
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	The	 First	 Sino-Japanese	 War,	 waged	 July	 1894	 until	 April	 1895,	 proves	 instructive	 in	demonstrating	the	lack	of	institutional	capacity	to	prevent	external	powers	from	imposing	external-originating	violence	within	China's	internal	borders.	The	impetus	for	this	war	was	over	the	control	of	Korea,	traditionally	viewed	as	a	tributary	state	by	Chinese	rulers	as	far	back	as	under	the	Tang,	a	view	reinforced	at	the	start	of	Qing	rule	when	Manchurian	forces	conquered	Korea	and	forced	the	Joseon	emperor	to	submit	to	the	Qing	emperor.	By	late-Qing,	however,	encroaching	Japanese	influence	over	the	Korean	peninsula	was	signified	by	the	 signing	 of	 the	 1876	 Treaty	 of	 Kanghwa,	 which	 ostensibly	 ended	 the	 tributary	relationship	 between	 the	 Korea	 Joseon	 and	 Chinese	 Qing	 governments,	 and	 granted	extraterritoriality	to	Japanese	in	Korea.	Subsequent	actions	on	the	part	of	Japanese	military	advisers	in	Korea	led	to	the	outbreak	of	war	in	1894,	a	war	that	most	outside	observers	assumed	China	would	handily	win.	Yet	 the	 Japanese	navy	proved	 far	superior	 to	 that	of	China's,	leading	to	another	military	loss	with	an	external	power.	The	military	failure	by	the	Qing	government	highlights	the	Imperial	Court's	weakened	position,	as	well	as	the	power	struggle	 occurring	 within	 China	 that	 was	 symptomatic	 of	 a	 society	 undergoing	 major	institutional	change.	For	instance,	the	defeat	of	Chinese	forces	at	the	hands	of	a	Japanese	military	that	had	clearly	technologically	surpassed	China	in	terms	of	military	aptitude	was	used,	ironically,	by	conservative	elements	within	the	Qing	Court	to	help	bring	an	end	to	the	Self-Strengthening	 Movement,	 which	 preached	 the	 importance	 of	 importing	 foreign	technologies	to	fight	foreign	imperialism.	Li	Hongzhang,	as	one	of	the	movement's	most	respected	advocates,	had	focussed	much	of	his	attention	on	developing	the	country's	naval	power.	Yet	after	several	years	of	development	and	expensive	outlays	on	ships	and	training,	the	Qing	navy	had	been	soundly	and	readily	defeated	in	the	War.	While	Li	argued	this	to	be	a	result	of	inadequate	resources	directed	to	increasing	military	technological	capabilities,	conservatives	 argued	 the	 defeat	 demonstrated	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 Self	 Strengthening	Movement	as	an	effective	strategy.				6.2.2.1.		Late	Qing:	Increasing	Seriousness	of	Existential	External	Military	Threats		The	Qing	 state,	 considerably	weakened	 from	 internal	 conflicts	and	besieged	by	 external	threats,	 became	 ever	 less	 able	 to	 defend	 its	 borders.	 Loss	 of	 state	 territorial	 integrity	became	 a	 frequent	 theme	 during	 the	 era.	 Russia,	 for	 instance,	 succeeded	 in	 securing	concessions	 and	 extraterritoriality	 claims	 to	 parts	 of	Manchuria	with	 the	 China	 Eastern	Railway	pact	signed	in	1896	(McCormick	1912:	50-1).	Russia's	subsequent	defeat	by	Japan	in	the	Russo-Japan	War	saw	Japan	claim	the	rights	to	the	territories	Russia	had	taken	from	China,	in	an	agreement	signed	between	Russia	and	Japan	on	4	July	1910	at	the	end	of	their	conflict	(Hart	1913:	262).			By	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century,	China's	economy	was	beset	with	problems	owing	to	decades	 of	 internal	 warfare,	 including	 rising	 poverty	 levels,	 which	 were	 further	compounded	by	a	spate	of	natural	disasters.	The	flooding	of	the	Yellow	River	in	1898	was	followed	by	a	severe	drought	in	the	north	in	1900.	Ensuing	social	unrest	and	dissatisfaction	with	 officials'	 responses	 culminated	 in	 a	 rural-based	 movement	 known	 as	 the	 Boxer	Uprising.	 Fearing	 another	 internal	 rebellion	 that	 could	 spiral	 out	 of	 control,	 Qing	government	leaders	managed	to	co-opt	the	movement	and	redirect	hostility	onto	foreigners	as	responsible	for	exploiting	Chinese	citizenry.	Boxer	rebels	sought	to	destroy	foreign	forces	and	their	collaborators,	ultimately	killing	231	foreigners	and	many	thousands	of	Chinese	Christians	 in	an	attack	on	 the	 foreign	section	of	Beijing	 in	 June	1900,	with	Empress	Cixi	immediately	thereafter	declaring	war	on	all	foreign	nations	with	a	presence	in	China.			
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The	response	of	leading	foreign	powers	to	such	attacks	on	their	economic	interests	and	own	citizens	was	swift	and	intense.	Using	the	uprising	of	what	was	a	rather	unorganised	and	lightly	armed	rural-based	rebel	movement	as	a	pretence	to	exhibit	their	military	superiority	and	dominance,	the	foreign	powers	amassed	a	20,000	Eight-Nation	Alliance	force	of	armed	troops.	This	force	marched	to	Beijing,	driving	the	empress	and	high	government	officials	out	of	the	palace,	dealing	an	unprecedented	blow	to	the	Qing	state	sovereignty.	The	degree	of	destruction	brought	on	by	the	Bower	War	was	severe.	As	Louis	Seaman	(1913:287),	a	medical	officer	in	the	US	military	in	China	at	the	onset	of	the	Boxer	Rebellion,	provides	in	an	 eyewitness	 account:	 "The	 eight	 allied	 armies	 of	 the	 'great	 powers'	marched	 to	 their	capital,	slaughtered	their	people,	raped	their	women,	looted	their	temples,	their	treasure	and	 their	 habitations,	 committed	 brutalities	 that	 would	 have	 made	 Nero	 envious,	 and	created	a	sentiment	in	China	which	fairly	crucified	Christianity,	and	which	should	redound	to	 the	 shame	 and	 humiliation	 of	 the	 Christian	 nations	whose	 forces	 participated	 in	 the	outrages;	but	which,	 instead,	secured	monstrous	 indemnities	and	subjected	China	 to	the	most	humiliating	terms	of	peace	that	were	ever	inflicted	upon	a	nation,	and	that	have	kept	her	poverty-stricken	ever	since."	The	Boxer	War	ended	in	September	1901	with	a	peace	settlement	 negotiated	 by	 Li	 Hongzhang	 that	 required	 450	 million	 taels	 of	 silver—approximately	seven	billion	pounds	at	2017	silver	prices	and	more	than	the	government's	annual	tax	revenue—to	be	paid	out	to	allied	foreign	governments	over	the	course	of	the	next	39	years	at	4	per	cent	annual	interest	(Hsu	1980:	117-127).			6.2.2.2.		Xinhai	Revolution	and	the	Fall	of	the	Qing		After	several	failed	rebellions	against	the	Qing—including	the	Zhennanguan,	Huanggang,	Anqing,	and	Qinzhou	uprisings	in	1907,	and	Mapaoying,	Qinlian	and	Hekou	in	1908—the	Xinhai	Revolution	of	1911,	culminating	with	the	Wuchang	Uprising	in	October	1911	under	the	 nominal	 leadership	 of	 Sun	 Zhongshan	 and	 the	 Tongmenghui	 (D/),	 succeeded	 in	bringing	an	end	to	two	hundred	and	seventy-five	years	of	Manchu	rule,	and	two	thousand	years	of	imperial	government	form.	With	the	fall	of	the	Qing	government	and	the	abdication	of	the	emperor	in	early	1912,	however,	China	entered	a	period	of	further	political	instability.			The	chaos	of	revolution	and	the	fall	of	the	Qing	central	government	brought	a	temporary	power	vacuum	that	led	to	increased	uncertainty,	negatively	affecting	economic	conditions	across	the	country.	The	North	China	Herald	described	the	situation	shortly	after	the	fall	of	the	 Qing	 as	 one	 where	 business	 was	 at	 a	 standstill:	 "From	 bad	 to	 worse	 is	 the	 cry	everywhere;	and,	the	progress	of	events,	whatever	effect	it	might	have	on	affairs	in	general,	has	 thrust	 the	 merchants	 deeper	 into	 the	 mire	 of	 an	 almost	 hopeless	 loss	 during	 this	year….Rich	and	poor,	foreigner	and	Chinese,	and	every	one	in	any	part	of	the	world	having	any	dealings	with	China	are	being	indiscriminately	hit	by	the	present	unsettled	condition	in	the	country"	(NCH	9	Dec	1911:	649).	Reports	in	the	North	China	Herald	noted	three	factors	hindering	 normal	 commercial	 operations	 in	 its	 articles	 from	 the	 time,	 and	 especially	highlighted	the	enforced	levy	by	a	government	badly	in	need	of	funds	to	fund	its	military	operations:	"The	first	of	these,	as	we	have	stated	often	is	the	practical	anarchy	in	the	country,	and	the	insecurity	which	prevents	the	free	movement	of	goods	or	money.	The	second	is	the	prospect	of	military	operations	following	upon	the	success	of	one	party	or	another,	and	the	fear	of	reprisals.	But	the	third	and	most	important	is	the	dislocated	finances	of	the	country.	The	revolutionary	party	is	badly	in	need	of	funds,	and	Chinese	merchants	in	Shanghai	and	elsewhere	would	seem	to	be	loath,	indeed	in	many	cases	unable,	to	make	further	inroads	into	 their	purses.	Owing	 to	 the	 stagnation	of	 trade	 consequent	upon	 the	 financial	 crisis,	money	is	scarce,	prices	have	risen	and	everybody,	rich	and	poor,	is	feeling	the	pinch.	The	issue	 of	 revolutionary	 banknotes	 has	 proved	 a	 failure,	 as	 was	 only	 to	 be	 expected.	Subscriptions	are	being	sought,	but,	as	the	same	time,	we	understand	there	is	a	good	deal	of	disaffection	in	the	camp	owing	to	the	enforced	levy	on	people	who	are	not	in	a	position	to	afford	it"	(NCH	9	Dec	1911:	650).	
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6.2.2.3.		Republican	Era:	Early	Beiyang	Period		The	newly-formed	Nanjing-based	Republican	government,	 represented	primarily	by	 the	Tongmenhui	Party,	was	initially	led	by	Sun,	but	while	it	had	succeeded	in	seizing	control	over	much	of	the	southern	and	middle	sections	of	the	country,	it	still	lacked	the	commitment	from	 important	 leaders	of	 the	Qing	 army	 that	 they	would	 support	 the	new	government	backing	necessary	to	force	the	abdication	of	the	throne.	In	order	to	secure	such	commitment,	Sun	turned	to	Yuan	Shikai,	the	most	powerful	of	former	military	commanders	under	the	Qing,	and	also	the	leader	the	Qing	was	simultaneously	courting	to	lead	the	fight	to	retake	the	 country.	 Yuan	 used	 this	 leverage	 with	 both	 sides	 to	 convince	 Sun	 to	 cede	 the	 new	republic's	presidency	 to	Yuan.	 In	 return,	Yuan	persuaded	 the	Qing	 emperor	 to	abdicate,	given	 the	 loss	 of	 the	 last	 of	 the	 remaining	 chance	 of	 military	 power	 to	 be	 exercised	 in	support	of	retaining	the	monarchy.	As	the	former	founder	of	the	Beiyang	(Peiyan)	military	school,	created	in	1905	by	imperial	edict,	Yuan's	power	base	was	in	the	north,	and	as	such	he	demanded	and	succeeded	in	moving	the	new	republican	capital	to	Beijing	from	Nanjing,	leading	to	the	formation	of	the	Beiyang	government	(7+#)	in	February	1912	(Lee	1926:	15).	Yuan	immediately	turned	to	placing	powerful	military	leaders,	whose	loyalty	to	Yuan	had	been	forged	at	the	Beiyang	military	school,	into	important	government	positions	within	the	central	government	in	Beijing,	and	as	governor-generals	throughout	the	country.		Meanwhile,	 Sun's	 supporters	 and	 those	 committed	 to	 the	 Tongmenhui	 and	 similar	revolutionary	parties	combined	to	form	the	Guomindang	political	party,	whose	power	was	now	centred	in	the	southern	provinces.	After	Yuan	unilaterally	ordered	the	disbandment	of	Tongmenhui-affiliated	troops	in	June	1912,	in	violation	of	the	new	republican	constitution,	the	 current	 premier	 Tang	 Shaoyi	 (M)	 and	 four	 other	 cabinet	ministers	 resigned	 in	protest.	By	July	1912,	concerns	that	the	country	would	be	split	in	two	as	a	result	of	contested	infighting	between	supporters	of	rivals	Sun	and	Yuan,	where	already	appearing	in	the	press,	with	a	22	July	1912	article	in	Shun	Pao	warning	of	the	"credible	chance	of	civil	war	with	a	result	 for	China	 to	become	divided	 into	 two	 republics—one	north,	 and	one	 south."	This	threat	became	more	pronounced	after,	with	the	Guomindang	securing	the	majority	of	seats	in	December	1912	parliamentary	elections	and	their	leader	Song	Jiaoren	( ,)	designated	to	 become	 premier,	 Song	 was	 assassinated	 by	 what	was	widely	 recognised	 at	 the	 time	parties	working	under	the	direction	of	Yuan.			Tensions	 further	 increased	 in	 the	 spring,	 when	 Yuan	 agreed	 to	 the	 £25,000,000	Reorganisation	Gold	Loan	of	1913	with	banking	officials	representing	the	governments	of	Britain,	 France,	 Germany,	 Russia	 and	 Japan,	 without	 consultation	 of	 the	 parliament,	 in	violation	 of	 the	 constitution.	 When	 the	 National	 Assembly	 subsequently	 ordered	impeachment	against	the	presidency,	Yuan	ordered	all	Guomindang	governors	dismissed,	which	 led	 to	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 "Second	 Revolution"	 in	 July	 1913,	 which	 saw	 seven	southern	 provinces	 declare	 independence;	 this	 revolution	 was	 short-lived	 however	 as	Yuan's	forces	quickly	overwhelmed	those	troops	loyal	to	the	southern	general-governors.	With	 this	 attempted	 rebellion	 crushed,	 Yuan	 forced	 through	 the	 National	 Assembly	 his	appointment	as	President,	after	which	the	following	month	Yuan	outlawed	the	Guomindang	Party,	 resulting	 in	 the	dismissal	 of	 over	half	 the	parliament.	This	move	 effectively	made	quorum	impossible	to	achieve,	leading	Yuan	to	dissolve	the	parliament	and	formally	assume	dictatorial	 control	 over	 the	 state.	 Yuan	 solidified	 his	 control	 by	 holding	 a	 national	conference	of	parties	loyal	to	his	presidency	who	passed	a	new	constitution	in	May	of	1914	that	 extended	 Yuan's	 term	 to	 ten	 years	 and	 allowed	 for	 his	 unlimited	 re-election.	 The	following	year,	Yuan	agreed	to	a	return	of	monarchy	rule,	with	Yuan	to	become	the	first	Hongxian	 emperor	 in	 December	 1915.	 This	 move,	 however,	 spurred	 another	 rebellion	movement,	 and	 by	 May	 of	 1916	 eight	 southern	 provinces	 had	 declared	 independence	(Young	1983:	252-255).			
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6.2.2.4.		Republican	Era:	Late	Beiyang	Period—	Political	Chaos	and	Warlordism		The	political	situation	deteriorated	further	when	Yuan	unexpected	died	in	August	1916.	As	Yuan's	power	base	of	northern	militarists	subsequently	broke	with	the	Beiyang	government	and	fought	for	control	of	the	Chinese	government,	the	nation	fell	into	disintegration.	The	period's	militarist	leaders,	who	possessed	localised	power	bases	and	ruled	independently	from	the	central	government,	were	referred	to	as	"warlords"	(]),	although	whether	this	term	 unnecessarily	 implies	 inherently	 negative	 connotations	 is	 debated	 (Ch'i	 1976:	 1,	Waldron	1991:1087,	McCord	1996:	n.55).	Given	the	chaotic	state	of	central	authority,	the	years	1916	through	1928	are	often	referred	to	as	the	"Warlord	Period",	although	provincial	warfare	was	already	widespread	prior	to	1916.	The	actual	number	of	warlords	numbered	in	the	hundreds,	with	the	less	powerful	controlling	a	district	or	two,	while	others	amassed	enough	power	to	exercise	military	control	over	entire	provinces,	which	Billingsley	(1988)	refers	to	as	"bandit	mini-states."	The	period	was	characterised	by	constant	warfare	between	these	local	militarist	groups—for	instance,	more	than	140	military	clashes	are	estimated	to	have	taken	place	from	1916	to	1928,	and	over	four	hundred	large-	and	small-scale	episodes	of	civil	strife	were	counted	after	1911	in	Sichuan	alone	(Sheridan	1975:	88).	Terror,	looting,	pillaging	and	tax	demands	plagued	the	general	population	and	further	impoverished	rural	communities,	with	residents	often	forcibly	conscripted	to	serve	in	local	military	armies.		Following	 Yuan's	 death,	 General	 Li	 Yuanhong	 (e8)	 quickly	 assumed	 the	 presidency,	appointing	General	Duan	Qirui	(4I@)	Premier,	and	reconstituting	the	parliament	(Burt	et	
al.	1925).	This	arrangement	proved	untenable,	however,	as	Duan	continually	took	actions	without	 consultation	 of	 parliament	 in	 disregard	 to	 constitutional	 procedure.	 Although	subsequently	formally	dismissed	by	President	Li,	Duan	held	more	power,	backed	as	he	was	by	the	Wanxi	(CL)	(or	Anfu)	group	of	northern	militarists.	In	May	1917,	Duan	organised	the	so-called	Dujun	rebellion	of	militarist	leaders	intended	to	pressure	President	Li	and	the	National	Assembly	 support	China's	 entry	 into	 the	 First	World	War	 against	Germany	 (Li	1967:	438,	Xu	2005:	209-217).	President	Li	sought	 the	assistance	of	General	Zhang	Xun							($)	 to	mediate	 the	 issue;	 this	proved	a	poor	strategy,	however,	as	 in	 June	1917	Zhang	brought	his	Anhui-	and	Jiangsu-based	army	northwards	and	subsequently	overthrew	the	Li	government,	and	 instituting	 the	"Manchu	Restoration"	on	1	 July	1917	by	reinstating	 the	Qing	 emperor	Puyi	 to	 the	 throne.	This	 action	brought	 about	 immediate	 further	military	action	and	subsequent	overthrow	of	the	Zhang-backed	monarchy	just	eleven	days	later	by	General	Feng	Guozhang	(cA),	leader	of	the	Zhili	(FLU\)	militarist	group,	who	restored	Duan	as	premier.	Seeking	greater	power,	Duan	secretly	negotiated	the	so-called	Nishihara	loans	(T3)	from	Japan	in	September	1917	to	fund	the	build-up	of	his	Wanxi	army,	in	exchange	granting	railroad	concessions	to	the	Japanese	government	and	authority	for	Japan	to	base	military	troops	in	Shandong	(Schiltz	2007:	24-30,	Masafumi	2010:	1308).		With	 political	 chaos	 dominating	 the	 northern-based	 central	 government,	 authorities	 in	Guangdong	and	Guangxi	provinces	declared	their	refusal	to	recognise	the	authority	of	the	Beiyang	government	in	September	1917	(RCEC	1926:	98),	with	Sun	Zhongshan	forming	a	rival	 government	 to	 the	 northern-based	 regime.	 Ostensibly	 based	 on	 the	 Constitutional	Protection	Movement,	Sun	soon	declared	himself	Generalissimo	of	the	Republic,	claiming	his	 Guangzhou-based	 government	 the	 one	 true	 government,	 albeit,	 beyond	 Guangdong,	possessing	only	nominal	control	over	Yunnan,	Guanxi,	and	Sichuan	(Gray	2002:	171-174).		In	Beijing,	President	Feng	was	pushed	into	retirement	by	the	Duan-led	Wanxi	group,	who	installed	the	former	Secretary	of	State,	Xu	Shichang	(%-)	as	President	in	1918	(Burt	et	al.	1925).	Dissatisfaction	with	policies	advocated	by	the	Duan-backed	regime,	particularly	those	related	to	military	reunification	efforts	with	the	southern-based	Guomindang	government,	led	to	increasing	internal	conflicts	amongst	various	military	factions	(Chen	2011:	141).	In	July	of	1920,	a	major	civil	war—the	Zhili-Anhui	(FC*<)	war—broke	out	for	control	over	Beijing	between	the	Wanxi	clique	and	an	alliance	of	two	militarist	groups,	the	Zhili	clique,	
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led	by	General	Wu	Peifu	(
),	and	the	Fengxi	group	(L)	(also	referred	to	as	the	Fengtian	group),	led	by	Marshal	Zhang	Zuolin	($	^)	(McNair	1930:	216).	Although	the	Zhili-Fengxi	union	 defeated	 the	Wanxi	 and	 removed	 Xu	 from	 power,	 the	 coalition	 between	Wu	 and	Zhang	was	short-lived,	and	a	subsequent	civil	war	between	the	Zhili	and	Fengxi	groups	took	place	from	April	to	May	of	1922	(b2F*<).	The	Zhili	group	defeated	the	Fengxi	clique,	and	Zhang's	Fengxi	forces	retreated	to	Manchuria	and	immediately	declared	independence	from	the	central	government.	General	Wu,	holding	effective	control	over	the	Beiyang	government,	persuaded	Li	Yuanhong	to	return	to	serve	as	president,	but	less	than	a	year	later	in	May	1923	Wu,	with	pressure	from	the	powerful	Zhili	warlord	General	Cao	Kun	(.Y),	grew	to	view	Li	as	a	liability	and	sought	to	have	him	overthrown.	Under	orders	from	Wu,	General	Xue	Zhi-Heng,	head	of	Beijing	police,	had	his	forces	surround	the	presidential	palace	and	demand	Li	resign;	Li	acquiesced	in	June,	but	initially	hid	the	presidential	seals	with	his	concubine	who	had	taken	refuge	with	French	missionaries,	until	pressure	by	General	Feng	Yuxiang	(c
>H)	and	Xue	persuaded	Li	to	reveal	the	seals'	location	(Nathan	1983:	280,	Chang	1991:	23-25).	General	Cao	then	succeeded	in	assuming	the	presidency	in	October	by	openly	bribing	parliament	members	 to	receive	 their	support,	which,	 for	5000	yuan	apiece,	 they	quickly	provided	(NYT	6	October	1923,	Hicks	1923,	Gao	et	al.	2015).	Cao's	investment	only	earned	him	one	year	of	 the	presidency,	however,	as	 tensions	between	the	military	governors	of	Zhejiang,	Lu	Yongxiang	(E6H),	and	Jiangsu,	Qi	Xieyuan	(f;),	led	to	the	outbreak	of	the	Second	Zhili-Fengxi	War	(K2F*<),	that	included	multiple	battles	fought	at	Shanghai's	doorstep.	Lasting	from	September	through	November	of	1924,	the	war's	resolution	resulted	in	Feng	Yuxiang	conducting	his	Beijing	coup	on	22	October,	overthrowing	Cao	and	installing	General	Huang	Fu	 (dW)	 (NYT	 4	November	1924).	Unsatisfied	with	 the	 situation,	 Fengxi	militarist	forces	led	by	Zhang	Zoulin	succeeded	in	wresting	control	of	the	government	and	replacing	Huang	with	Duan	Qirui	as	president.	At	the	urging	of	Feng	Yuxiang,	however,	Duan	and	Zhang	agreed	meet	with	Sun	Zhongshan	in	an	attempt	at	national	reunification	of	north	and	south	China,	but	Sun	died	of	cancer	upon	his	arrival	in	Beijing	in	March	of	1925.	Duan	remained	in	control	of	the	presidency,	but	given	the	earlier	defeat	of	his	own	Wanxi	forces,	he	possessed	somewhat	limited	actual	executive	powers,	attempting	to	enhance	his	position	by	playing	members	of	the	rival	Zhili	and	Fengxi	factions	against	one	another.		In	the	southern	part	of	the	country,	the	death	of	Sun	Zhongshan	led	to	a	power	vacuum	that	brought	about	the	start	of	the	Yuunan-Guanxi	War	in	March	1925,	after	Tang	Jiyao	claimed	control	over	the	Guomindang,	defying	the	appointed	Hu	Hanmin.	The	war	brought	about	the	rise	to	power	of	Jiang	Jieshi,	who	along	with	Wang	Jingwei	in	the	summer	of	1925	seized	power	of	the	Guomindang	from	Hu,	with	Jiang	as	military	commander	and	Wang	as	party	leader.	 Simultaneously,	 a	 coalition	between	General	Sun	Chuanfang	 (R),	 the	warlord	governor	of	Zhejiang,	and	several	warlords	who	had	previously	supported	the	Wanxi	group	took	control	of	the	southeastern	provinces,	as	well	as	Shanghai.	In	the	central	provinces,	Wu	Peifu	 led	a	competing	group	of	warlords	who	had	previously	supported	 the	Zhili	group.	While	civil	war	continued	in	the	south,	war	also	broke	out	in	late	1925	first	between	the	Zhili	warlord	General	Guo	Songling	(X1g)	and	Zhang	Zuolin's	troops	who	supported	the	Duan	 presidency.	 After	 defeating	 Guo,	 Zhang's	 government	 faced	 an	 attack	 led	 by	 Feng	Yuxiang's	newly-created	National	Army	(5U).	Duan	was	deposed	from	power	by	way	of	a	coup	on	9	April	1926,	orchestrated	by	Feng	Yuxiang,	who	installed	Hu	Weide	(P'&);	Hu's	time	in	power	however	lasted	less	than	a	month,	as	Zhang's	forces,	receiving	support	from	the	Japanese	military,	and	having	formed	a	new	coalition	with	Zhili	warlords	loyal	to	Wu	Peifu,	 defeated	 Feng's	 National	 Army	 in	 the	 Guominjun-Fengxi	 War	 (*< ),	 albeit	destroying	 in	 the	 process	many	 government	 buildings	 in	 Beijing,	 greatly	 damaging	 the	bureaucracy's	ability	to	function	(Nathan	1983:	282).	Wu	subsequently	forced	out	President	Hu,	installing	Yan	Huiqing	(`())	in	his	stead	(NYT	14	May	1926).	Yet	this	move	proved	unsatisfactory	to	Zhang,	who	removed	Yan	after	but	one	month	in	office,	replacing	him	first	with	Admiral	Du	Xigui	(0Z?),	then	in	October	1926	with	Gu	Weijun	(aO[),	before	finally	installing	himself	as	president	of	the	Beiyang	government	in	June	of	the	following	year.	
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	As	 the	 political	 chaos	 continued	 in	 the	 north,	 the	 Guomindang	 Party	 attempted	 to	consolidate	its	strength	in	the	Nanjing	region.	Having	been	rejected	by	western	powers	for	assistance,	 some	members	of	 the	party	 turned	 to	 the	newly-formed	Soviet	 government,	which	was	also	assisting	the	nascent	Chinese	Communist	Party	based	in	Shanghai.	Initially	united	with	 communist	 forces	 under	 the	 First	 United	 Front	 and	 receiving	 financial	 and	tactical	 assistance	 from	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 the	 Jiang	 Jieshi-led	 Guomindang	 National	Revolutionary	Army	represented	a	significant	new	military	threat	to	the	politically	unstable	Beiyang	regime.	With	the	start	of	the	Northern	Expedition	()	in	July	1926,	Guomindang	military	forces	travelled	northwards	and	soon	expanded	their	active	fronts	under	Jiang's	leadership	(Kotenev	1927:	117,	McNair	1930:	215-217,	 Li	&	Li	2011:	731-739).	Quickly	securing	several	important	military	victories,	Jiang	declared	by	early	1927	the	formation	of	a	new	central	 government,	with	Nanjing	 as	 its	 capital.	 In	 late	1927	 Jiang	 supported	 the	rebellion	of	Gansu	province,	led	by	Ma	Tingxiang,	against	the	remnants	of	Feng's	National	Army.	At	this	time,	China	essentially	had	three	"capital"	cities—the	Beiyang	government	in	Beijing,	the	coalition	Communist	and	left	wing	of	the	Guomindang	Party	in	Wuhan,	and	the	rightist	 Guomindang	 government	 in	 Nanjing,	 along	 with	 a	 fourth	 area	 that	 the	 Fengxi	militarist	group	controlled	in	Manchuria,	supported	by	the	Japanese	military.	By	June	1928,	however,	 Guomindang-aligned	 generals	 had	 defeated	 troops	 loyal	 to	 Zhang	 Zuolin's	Beiyang	 regime	 in	 Beijing,	 hastened	 by	 Zhang's	 assassination	 by	 Japanese	 military	operatives	in	the	so-called	Huanggutun	affair	(B!).	Zhang's	son,	Zhang	Xueliang	($
Q)	assumed	 leadership	of	 the	Fengxi	clique,	but	soon	surrendered	 to	 Jiang	 in	December	1928,	bringing	a	formal	end	to	the	Northern	Expedition.				6.2.2.5.		Republican	Era:	Guomindang	Period—	Political	Chaos	and	Warlordism		With	the	capitulation	to	Guomindang	authority	by	Zhang	Xueliang,	the	militarist	leader	of	Manchuria,	at	the	end	of	1928,	and	with	the	Northern	Expedition	was	officially	concluded,	Jiang	declared	China	once	again	reunified.	This	reunification,	however,	was	nominal	at	best.	Yet	 in	 terms	 of	 actual	 levels	 of	 civil	 strife	 and	 political	 chaos,	 the	 Guomindang	 period	represents	 a	 continuance	 of	 that	 experienced	 under	 the	 Beiyang	 period.	 In	 contrast	 to	Jiang's	assertion	of	a	 "united"	China,	the	Guomindang	period	does	not	represent	a	sharp	break	in	regard	to	the	political	disintegration.	Rather,	the	so-called	warlord	era	persisted	throughout	 Guomindang	 rule,	 albeit	 with	 Jiang	 using	 the	 state's	 financial	 resources	 to	induce	warlord	support	the	Guomindang	government.			The	success	of	this	strategy	was	mixed	at	best,	as	the	warlord	support	Jiang	managed	to	obtain	 was	 mostly	 given	 begrudgingly,	 mercurially,	 and	 temporarily.	 Even	 after	 1928,	various	military	 factions	controlled	 five	provinces,	with	on-going	conflicts	still	occurring	across	the	country.	Hebei,	 for	 instance,	under	the	control	of	Zhang	Xueliang,	never	came	under	 direct	 control	 of	 the	 Guomindang	 government	 through	 the	 prewar	 era,	 although	Zhang	maintained	relations	with	Jiang	and	agreed	to	make	certain	fiscal	contributions	to	the	Nanjing	government	(Remick	2002:	406).	Conversely,	the	warlord	leader	of	Guangdong,	Chen	 Jitang,	was	 only	partially	 aligned	with	 the	Nanjing	 government,	 and	 later	 in	1931	formed	 a	 separate	 branch	 of	 the	 Guomindang	 and	 led	 a	military	 campaign	 against	 the	Nanjing	government,	albeit	one	that	ultimately	ended	in	his	defeat	in	late	1936	(Lian	2005).			The	Guomindang	also	faced	numerous	rebellions	from	warlord	leaders,	such	as	revolts	in	1928	and	1929	by	the	Guangxi	clique,	whose	regional	power	was	significant	enough	that	Lary	(1975)	argues	was	able	to	threaten	the	authority	of	the	Nanjing	government.	Other	outbreaks	 of	 rebellion	 by	 forces	 still	 loyal	 to	 the	National	Army	 leadership	 occurred	 in	October	of	1929,	with	both	sides	winning	military	skirmishes		(NYT		25	October		1929).		By	
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	the	 following	 year,	 the	 seriousness	 of	 the	 existential	 threat	 to	 the	 Nanjing	 regime	represented	by	this	rebellion—led	by	Feng	Yuxiang	and	other	warlord	leaders	from	Anhui,	Henan,	Shandong	and	other	central	provinces—was	illuminated	with	the	outbreak	of	the	Central	Plains	War	(*),	involving	over	1,300,000	troops	and	approximately	300,000	battle	 deaths,	while	 requiring	 such	 significant	 financial	 resources	 so	 as	 to	 bring	 Jiang's	Guomindang	government	close	to	fiscal	collapse.	While	defeated	in	the	Central	Plains	War,	Feng	remained	powerful	enough	that	he	continued	to	be	viewed	as	a	threat	by	Jiang,	who	in	1933	attempted	to	weaken	both	Feng	and	western-based	Hui	warlords	known	as	the	Ma	clique	by	ordering	the	warlord	Sun	Dianying,	 into	the	western	areas	where	Feng	and	Ma	warlords	had	their	power	base.	These	events	led	to	the	outbreak	of	the	Ningxia	War	in	1934.			Numerous	 other	 episodes	 of	 violence	 persisted	 throughout	 the	 Guomindang	 period,	including	the	Red	Spears	uprising,	 in	1929	in	Shandong,	in	which	rural	farmers	revolted	against	 perceived	 high	 taxes,	 corruption	 and	 oppression	 by	 the	 Guomindang-aligned	warlord	head	Liu	Zhennian,	leading	to	a	rebellion	of	lower-level	warlords	against	Liu.	Han	Fuju	 eventually	 won	 in	 September	 1932,	 ruling	 as	 dictator	 over	 the	 province	 until	 his	government's	defeat	to	the	Japanese	army	in	1937.	Other	wars	included	the	Sino-Tibetan	War	which	 lasted	 from	1930	 through	1932,	 and	 the	Kamul	Rebellion	 in	Xinjiang,	which	lasted	from	1931	through	1934;	the	rebellion,	while	initially	supported	by	the	Guomindang	military	 leadership,	 eventually	 backfired	 when	 Uighur	 rebellion	 leaders	 demanded	independence	 from	China	 and	was	unable	 to	be	 contained	by	 the	Guomindang	military.	However,	 in	1934	Russian	military	 forces	 invaded	Xinjiang,	squashing	the	 independence	movement,	while	claiming	sovereignty	over	most	of	Xinjiang	in	the	process.		Overall,	throughout	Guomindang	Nanjing	period,	in	terms	of	actual	authority,	the	central	government	primarily	controlled	 the	Yangtze	Delta	 including	Nanjing,	Shanghai,	and	 the	provinces	of	Zhejiang,	Anhui,	Jiangsu	and	Jiangxi	(Sheridan	1975:	167,	184).	While	Strauss	(1998)	suggests	an	overly-optimistic	estimate	of	the	Guomindang	government	controlling	two-thirds	of	the	country,	in	actuality,	much	of	the	areas	under	the	nominal	control	of	the	central	 government	were	 in	 fact	 ruled	 by	powerful	 local	militarists	 (i.e.,	warlords)	who	continued	to	operate	 independently.	Meanwhile,	 Communist	 forces,	with	 Soviet	military	assistance,	formed	the	so-called	"Soviet	Chinese	Republic"	in	the	western	interior	of	China,	using	Yan’an	as	its	headquarters,	instituting	separate	economic	and	social	policies.	Also	in	Later,	after	1931,	all	of	Manchuria,	representing	nearly	a	quarter	of	the	country's	land	area,	was	lost	to	Japanese	military	control.		The	situation	 thusly	described	 is	consistent	with	 the	depiction	of	weak	states	employed	within	the	State	Capacity	literature	as	those	unable	to	effectively	control	regions	outside	the	geographic	region	close	to	the	capital.	Huang	(2017)	argues	therefore	that	from	the	late-imperial	 through	 the	 Guomindang	 period,	 Chinese	 central	 governments	 cannot	 be	described	as	representing	a	unified	or	coherent	nation-state,	but	rather	as	a	collection	of	groups	 fractured	 along	 "serious	 fissures"	 politically,	 economically	 and	 culturally.	Nonetheless,	Jiang	continued	to	assert	his	government	possessed	sovereign	authority	over	all	of	China,	in	what	Thornton	(2007:	101)	refers	to	as	a	"facade	of	national	unity	and	social	stability"	that	in	reality	did	little	to	mask	what	was	a	"myriad	overlapping	webs	of	power	and	influence	connecting	a	broad	range	of	state	and	non-state	agents	jockeying	for	local	and	regional	dominance	[amongst]	strongmen	who	dominated	county	and	sub-county	politics	during	the	1930s."	Such	claims	were	not	uncommon,	however,	as	Ch'i	(1976:190)	notes	that	legitimacy	 over	 the	 entirety	 of	 China	 was	 frequently	 claimed	 by	 each	 of	 leaders	 of	concurrent	(effectively)	sub-national	governments	during	the	republican	period,	no	matter	how	limited	in	actuality	be	the	geographic	area	under	their	control.			
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6.2.2.6.		Republican	Era:	Guomindang	Period—External	Japanese	Military	Existential																		Threats		Increasing	Sino-Japanese	hostilities	in	1931	represented	a	serious	external	threat,	bringing	about	an	additional	fundamental	existential	crisis	to	the	state.	In	September	of	1931	Japan	used	the	pretext	of	the	Mukden	(Shenyang)	Incident	to	invade	Manchuria,	soon	thereafter	renaming	it	Manchukuo	and	installing	the	last	emperor	of	the	Qing,	Puyi,	as	the	ruler	of	this	puppet	government.	Jiang	made	a	strategic	decision	not	to	put	on	a	military	challenge	to	the	Japanese,	arguing	at	the	time	that	the	poorly	trained	Guomindang	army	would	face	certain	defeat	in	a	hasty	full-scale	war	with	the	more	advanced	Japan	force.	Jiang’s	policy	of	"first	internal	 pacification,	 then	 external	 resistance,"	 was	 centred	 on	 defeating	 rival	 military	fractions	and	building	military	strength	before	an	eventual	confrontation	with	Japan.	This	policy,	however,	was	not	shared	by	many	within	the	Party	leadership,	nor	with	much	of	the	public,	leading	to	internal	power	struggles,	and	a	great	deal	of	public	criticism	of	the	lack	of	response	by	the	Guomindang	to	Japanese	aggression.	In	response,	Jiang	briefly	resigned	as	executive	and	military	leader	after	the	loss	of	Manchuria,	although	he	quickly	reassumed	his	role	as	undisputed	leader	of	the	party	less	than	one	month	later	(Mitter	2013:	56-57).		Public	anger	in	other	parts	of	China	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Japanese	invasion	led	to	mass	protests	and	boycotting	of	Japanese	goods,	especially	in	Shanghai	where	a	large	Japanese	population	resided,	and	where	likewise	much	of	the	anti-Japanese	student	movement	was	concentrated.	Shanghai	attracted	a	large	amount	of	Japanese	capital,	much	of	it	going	into	cotton	 and	 textile	 factories	 that	 Japanese	 manufacturers	 opened	 in	 the	 countryside	surrounding	the	city,	and	by	the	start	of	1932,	Shanghai	already	had	a	Japanese	population	of	nearly	20,000	(SMC	1932).	 In	the	 three-month	period	after	 the	Mukden	 Incident,	138	anti-Japanese	protests	were	held	in	Shanghai	alone	(:V		1999b:	268).			With	 tensions	 between	 the	 two	 countries	 running	 high,	 and	 expressions	 of	 strong	anti-Japanese	sentiment	continuing	within	Shanghai,	there	were	sporadic	incidents	of	violent	acts	committed	by	and	against	Chinese	domestic	and	Japanese	residents	within	the	city	over	this	 period	 of	 unrest.	 However,	 the	 situation	 became	 particularly	 critical	 when	 on	 18	January	1932,	a	clash	involving	a	group	of	five	right-wing	Japanese	monks	and	nationalistic	Chinese	factory	workers	ended	with	an	officer	on	the	domestic	Chinese	police	force,	and	a	Japanese	monk,	were	killed	in	the	course	of	an	ensuing	public	brawl.	According	to	Wakeman	(2006:	 187–194),	 however,	 this	 incident,	 while	 reflective	 of	 an	 underlying	 politically	charged	atmosphere	with	nationalist	sentiments	heightened	on	both	sides,	did	not	occur	organically;	 instead,	a	Japanese	intelligence	officer,	Ryukichi	Tanaka,	had	in	fact	paid	the	Chinese	workers	 to	attack	 the	monks,	 seeking	 to	provide	 justification	 for	 an	 increase	 in	Japanese	military	presence	in	the	city.		In	 response	 to	 the	 incident,	 a	 Japanese	Admiral	 in	 charge	of	 Japanese	military	 forces	 in	Shanghai	 demanded	 the	 Shanghai	 municipality	 mayor	 for	 an	 apology,	 reparations	 to	account	for	the	death	of	the	monk,	as	well	as	suppression	of	anti-Japanese	demonstrations	in	the	city	(FRUS	793.94/3970.	30	January	1932).	Despite	the	mayor's	agreement	to	comply	with	 the	 demands,	 Japanese	 troops	 nonetheless	 attacked	 the	 Chinese	 part	 of	 the	 city	without	 warning	 in	 the	 following	 night,	 forcibly	 seizing	 Zhabei,	 home	 to	 the	 Chinese	municipality	administration,	and	in	the	process	destroying	the	municipality's	then-newly	constructed	three	million	yuan	municipal	administration	building,	with	multiple	reports	of	fleeing	 Chinese	 residents	 gunned	 down	 by	 Japanese	 military	 personnel	 (China	 Weekly	
Herald	 27	 February	 1932).	 Although	 initially	 blamed	 as	 random	 acts	 of	 violence	 by	untrained	ronin	reservists,	attacks	by	the	Japanese	military	directed	on	the	Chinese	civilian	population	 and	 residential	 communities	 appear	 to	 have	been	well-coordinated	 (Henriot	2010:297-304).			
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	Eventually,	a	peace	deal	was	reached	with	Nanjing	government	acquiescing	to	the	Japanese	government's	 demands	 to	 formally	 accept	 expanded	 Japanese	 control	 of	 Manchurian	territories.	By	1935,	the	Japanese	military	had	consolidated	control	over	most	of	northern	China,	although	skirmishes	continued	within	and	around	Manchuria.	Yet,	tensions	between	the	 countries	 remained	 high,	 with	 the	 Guomindang	 government	 under	 considerable	pressure	 from	 the	populace	 to	 take	more	 aggressive	 stance	against	 continuing	 Japanese	encroachments	on	Chinese	territories.	A	subsequent	full-scale	Japanese	invasion	of	China	occurred	five	years	after	the	initial	attack	on	Zhabei,	with	the	impetus	deriving	from	the	Lugou	(or	Marco	Polo)	Bridge	Incident	on	the	night	of	7	July	1937—what	started	as	a	small	military	skirmish	between	Chinese	and	Japanese	troops	quickly	flared	up	into	a	full-scale	battle,	 with	 Japanese	 forces	 taking	 control	 of	 Beijing	 and	 Tianjin	 by	 August	 1937.	 The	inability	of	 the	Guomindang	government	to	provide	basic	protection	of	national	security	was	most	apparent	in	the	Battle	of	Shanghai	of	1937.	Since	1932	and	with	the	continuing	control	 over	 much	 of	 the	 country	 by	 Japanese	 military	 forces,	 Jiang	 Jieshi	 had	 lost	considerable	public	esteem	due	to	his	failure	to	mount	an	effective	resistance	against	the	Japanese	 invasion	 in	 the	north.	With	nationalistic	public	sentiment	running	strong,	 Jiang	was	forced	to	mount	a	stronger	military	response.	Undertaken	partly	as	a	way	to	shore	up	support	 within	 the	 Party	 and	 amongst	 his	 generals,	 Jiang	 made	 a	 strategic	 decision	 to	militarily	 engage	 the	 Japanese	 in	 Shanghai,	 hoping	 that	 by	 bringing	 Shanghai	 into	war,	Western	powers,	who	had	been	unwilling	to	intervene	in	the	Japanese	aggression	toward	China	thus	 far,	would	see	 their	economic	 interests	at	stake	and	have	an	 incentive	 to	aid	China	in	mediating	a	peace	settlement	with	Japan.				Jiang's	 calculated	 risk	 would	 prove	 extremely	 costly,	 as	 well	 as	 bring	 about	 a	 partial	realisation	of	the	existential	threat	the	Japanese	military	posed	to	his	regime.	To	begin	with,	the	war	that	started	within	Shanghai	led	to	grave	losses	of	private	property	and	life	for	its	domestic	 and	 extraterritorial	 residents,	 greatly	 diminishing	 the	 region's	 productive	capacity.	In	August	1937,	skirmishes	between	Japanese	marines	and	Guomindang	armed	forces	 in	 Shanghai	 led	 to	 the	Battle	 of	 Shanghai.	 Jiang's	hope	 for	 an	 effective	defence	of	Shanghai	using	his	elite	troops	and	an	air	force	trained	by	the	German	von	Falkenhausen	was	quickly	shattered.	On	14	August,	while	aiming	to	take	out	a	Japanese	warship	parked	in	the	Huangpu	River,	the	Guomindang	military	planes	completely	missed	the	target,	instead	dropping	 three	 bombs	 on	 two	 of	 the	 biggest	 shopping	 streets	 in	 the	 International	Settlement,	Nanjing	Road	and	Avenue	Edward	VII,	leading	to	the	death	of	more	than	three	thousand	mostly	Chinese	civilians,	and	causing	severe	damage	to	businesses	in	the	heart	of	the	 city.	 For	 the	 following	 three	 months,	 Shanghai	 became	 a	 battlefield	 with	 combat	aircrafts	flying	overhead	and	bombs	being	dropped.			The	Battle	caused	unprecedented	devastation	to	Shanghai’s	economy,	with	vast	areas	of	the	city	 destroyed	 and	 hundreds	 of	 thousands	 of	 civilians	 made	 homeless.	 The	 number	 of	factories	destroyed	was	estimated	to	be	5,255.	In	different	areas	of	the	city,	anywhere	from	seventy	to	nearly	one	hundred	per	cent	of	industrial	enterprise	was	destroyed,	and	total	property	damage	was	estimated	to	be	over	 three	billion	yuan	 (Hanwell	1938).	Domestic	businesses	suffered	outright	pillaging,	and	those	that	managed	to	remain	were	forced	to	take	on	Japanese	partners	to	remain	viable.	Henriot	(2004:	31)	recorded	activities	by	the	Japanese	 invading	 force	 that	 constituted	 textbook	 roving	 bandit	 behaviour—after	 open	hostilities	ceased,	the	Japanese	army	barred	the	Chinese	population	from	entering	the	areas	under	its	control,	so	as	to	provide	Japanese	military	personnel	enough	time	to	survey	the	remaining	factories	and	to	remove	undamaged	stocks	and	the	machinery	that	could	be	used	for	military	purposes	or	by	Japanese	firms.	Subsequently,	Chinese	industrialists	were	forced					
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	to	either	work	in	collaboration	with	Japanese	firms,	or	have	their	factories	confiscated.	By	May	1939,	for	instance,	forty	Chinese	cotton	mills	were	under	Japanese	control,	and	by	1940,	the	Japanese	seized	more	than	two	hundred	enterprises	in	Shanghai.			On	a	national	scale,	 the	years	 following	 the	Battle	of	Shanghai	would	see	continued	war	atrocities,	along	with	the	Chinese	state's	continued	inability	to	protect	and	defend	the	life	and	property	of	its	citizenry.	There	are	numerous	contemporaneous	reports	of	countless	atrocities	committed	by	Japanese	soldiers	during	the	1937	Nanjing	Massacre,	including	the	murder	of	up	to	300,000	Chinese	(mostly	civilians	and	surrendered	soldiers)	and	raping	tens	of	thousands	of	women	(Vautrin	1937;	Espy	1938:8).	Charles	McDaniel	(17	December	1937)	of	the	Seattle	Daily	Times	provides	another	report	on	the	scale	of	the	looting,	deaths	and	atrocities	that	took	place:	"Watched	Japanese	throughout	city	looting.	Saw	one	Japanese	soldier	who	 had	 collected	 $3,000	after	demanding	 civilians	 in	 safety	 zone	 to	 give	 up	 at	bayonet	 point.	 Reached	 north	 gate	 through	 streets	 littered	 with	 dead	 humans	 and	horses.	…My	last	remembrance	of	Nanking:	Dead	Chinese,	dead	Chinese,	dead	Chinese."	The	contemporaneous	accounts	of	Vautrin,	Espy,	McDaniel,	and	others	underscore	the	lack	of	protection	of	private	property,	or	life,	provided	Chinese	citizens	by	their	government.		In	addition	to	the	grave	economic,	property,	and	life	and	liberty	losses	suffered	by	private	actors,	the	potential	existential	threat	the	Japanese	military	represented	to	the	Guomindang	government	was	partially	realised	as	a	result	of	the	war.	Faced	with	what	became	apparent	was	as	an	overwhelmingly	superior	military	 force,	Guomindang	 troops	were	continually	pushed	 back	 by	 waves	 of	 Japanese	 offences,	 forcing	 the	 government	 to	 cede	 territory,	including	the	central	seat	of	power	in	Nanjing,	signifying	the	fall	of	the	Nanjing	Guomindang	government.	Jiang	ordered	the	Guomindang	military	government	to	relocated	to	Chongqing.	After	 overthrowing	 the	 Guomindang	 Nanjing-based	 regime	 in	 the	 eastern	 part	 of	 the	country,	the	Japanese	military	sponsored	the	formation	of	a	new	central	government,	the	Provisional	Government	of	the	Republic	of	China,	based	in	Beijing,	on	14	December	1937	(Mote	1954).	A	former	Guomindang	government	official	in	Hebei	who	had	also	previously	served	in	several	Beiyang	administrations,	Wang	Kemin,	was	installed	as	president.	Wang	remained	in	power	as	president	until	March	of	1940,	when	the	Japanese	military,	seeking	to	bolster	the	legitimacy	of	its	political	authority	in	China,	reorganised	the	political	system	and	 created	 a	 new	 Nanjing-based	 national	 government,	 the	 Reorganized	 National	Government	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 China	 (S55+#),	 with	 Wang	 Jingwei,	 the	 former	Guomindang	leader	ousted	by	Jiang,	as	the	leader	of	the	new	government.			While	often	categorically	dismissed	by	both	contemporaries	and	modern	accounts	as	simply	a	puppet	regime	led	by	a	traitor,	Mitter	(2013:	196-209)	provides	a	more	nuanced	account	of	Wang	 Jingwei's	decision	 to	lead	a	rival	 Japanese-sponsored	Guomindang	government,	which	he	argued	would	improve	the	lives	of	ordinary	Chinese	people	by	bringing	an	end	to	war	 with	 Japan.	 Admittedly,	 such	 rationalisation	 was	 perhaps	 assisted	 by	 motivated	reasoning,	given	that	it	brought	him	to	power	after	having	been	exiled	from	the	Guomindang	by	Jiang.	Notably,	the	creation	of	the	Wang	regime	did	help	produce	more	stable	property	rights	protections	within	areas	where	military	operations	had	ceased.	The	Wang	regime	issued	their	own	currency	(Central	Reserve	Banknotes,	C.R.B.),	operated	their	own	budget,	and	directed	resources	rebuilding	the	country's	damaged	infrastructure.	Chinese	citizens	in	Nanjing,	 Shanghai	 and	 surrounding	 regions	 who	 had	 not	 been	 killed	 or	 fled	 began	rebuilding	residences	and	businesses.	Indeed,	the	post-1937	period	saw	business	start	to	prosper	again	in	Shanghai,	in	particular	in	the	International	Settlements.						
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		6.3.		The	Violence	Trap	Framework	and	Late-Imperial	and	Republican	China:	Analysis		In	 their	 work	 on	 the	 Violence	 Trap	 thesis,	Weingast	 and	 his	 co-authors	 argue	modern	economics	has	systematically	under-accounted	for	the	importance	of	political	violence	as	a	fundamental	reason	countries	fail	to	undertake	policies	necessary	for	sustained	economic	growth.	Their	research	finds	political	violence	to	be	endemic	to	poor	countries,	observing	that	from	1840	through	2005,	violent	regime	change	occurred	on	average	once	every	seven	years	for	the	bottom	fifty	per	cent	of	countries,	compared	to	only	every	sixty	years	for	the	top	decile	 of	 countries,	 as	 ranked	by	 gross	domestic	product.	Thus,	 for	most	 states,	 the	actuality	of	serious,	existential	political	violence	is	the	norm,	not	the	exception.	Creating	the	sufficient	level	of	state	capacity	necessary	to	maintain	an	internal	monopoly	on	violence,	rather	than	dispersed	amongst	multiple	non-state	actors,	in	practise	proves	difficult	for	the	majority	of	states.		The	section	immediately	prior	discussed	at	length	the	extreme	levels	of	political	violence	that	persisted	throughout	the	entirety	of	the	late	imperial	and	republican	period,	with	the	central	state	under	continual	existential	threat	from	a	multitude	of	concurrent	internal	and	external	 dispersed	 sources	 of	 violence	 outside	 of	 the	 state's	 control,	 underscoring	 the	domestic	state's	inability	to	secure	a	monopoly	on	coercive	force.	In	this	section,	we	seek	to	emphasise	that	the	political	violence	so	described	is	directly	responsible	for	the	inability	and	 lack	 of	 incentives	 for	 the	 state	 actors	 to	 create	 a	 set	 of	 credible	 commitment	mechanisms,	 leading	 to	 poor	 property,	 contract	 and	 investor	 rights	 that	 defined	 the	domestic	 Chinese	 state's	 institutional	 environment.	 Much	 of	 this	 analysis	 comes	 out	 of	issues	 relating	 to	overall	 the	 state	 capacity	 exhibited	by	domestic	Chinese	 governments	during	 the	 period.	 More	 specifically,	 we	 derive	 our	 analysis	 within	 the	 theoretical	framework	provided	by	the	Violence	Trap	thesis,	as	well	as	our	own	"low	credibility	trap"	extension	of	the	Violence	Trap	argument,	which	suggests	it	to	be	intrinsically	difficult	for	states	 facing	 continual	 existential	 threats	 to	 create	 credible	 commitment	 mechanisms.	These	 related	 conceptual	 tools	 can	help	 illuminate	 some	of	 the	 incentives	 shaping	 state	actors	operating	within	the	chaotic	political	environment	that	characterised	the	time	period.			Indeed,	much	of	the	theoretical	frameworks	developed	within	the	state	capacity	literature,	and	within	 the	 Violence	 Trap	 and	 our	 "low	 credibility	 trap"	 theses,	 appear	particularly	relevant	in	describing	China's	domestic	political	institutional	environment.	To	begin	with,	late-imperial	and	republican	China	typifies	the	definition	of	a	"weak	state",	or	what	North	
et	al.	(2006)	refer	to	as	a	"limited	access"	state,	exhibiting	some	of	the	classic	weaknesses	as	 described	 in	 the	 state	 capacity	 literature,	 with	 "national"	 governments	 frequently	exercising	de	 facto	 control	 over	 but	 a	 fraction	 of	 the	 country	 outside	 areas	 close	 to	 the	capital,	 and	 unable	 to	 enforce	 adherence	 to	 desired	 policies.	 Commenting	 at	 the	 time,	McNair	(1930:	217)	notes	that,	"A	study	of	the	political	changes	in	North	China	from	the	death	of	Yuan	in1916	to	that	of	Sun	in	1925	leads	to	the	conclusion	that	the	successors	of	the	first	substantive	President,	Yuan,	were	rather	more	than	less	fainéant	rulers.	Often	they	were	 able	 to	 force	 obedience	 to	 their	 orders	 hardly	 beyond	 the	 walls	 of	 Peking	 itself.	Nevertheless,	 the	 fiction	 that	 he	 who	 held	 Peking	 was	 the	 de	 jure	 ruler	 of	 China,	 was	maintained	 by	 the	 powers	 down	 to	 1927."	 Such	 a	 fiction	 continued	 to	 be	 perpetrated	throughout	 the	 Guomindang	 era,	 as	 areas	 of	 significant	 import	 and	 geographic	 size—including	 Manchuria,	 central	 and	 western	 regions,	 and	 Guangdong,	 were	 frequently	controlled	by	non-Guomindang	authorities.					
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	While	defined	by	periods	of	lesser	and	greater	bureaucratic	state	capacity,	domestic	central	governments	consistently	lacked	sufficient	capacity	to	effectively	enforce	a	monopoly	on	internal	violence,	also	consistent	with	the	description	limited	access	orders.	As	a	result,	and	as	the	Violence	Trap	thesis	would	suggest,	internal	violence	was	endemic	throughout	the	time	period.	To	mitigate	the	probability	and	effects	of	outbreaks	of	political	violence,	central	government	leaders	often	could	only	maintain	their	power	by	relying	on	nearly	autonomous	actors	who	possessed	their	own	military	power	bases.	Fostering	such	alliances	required	the	creation	of	economic	rents	that	could	then	be	distributed.	The	history	of	frequent	violent	turnovers	 in	 political	 leadership,	 defined	 by	 continual	 warfare	 between	 competing	militarist	cliques	and	a	confusing	array	of	numerous	shifting	alliances,	helps	underscore	the	match	 existing	between	 the	 actual	 empirical	 historiographical	description	of	 the	period,	with	the	theoretical	concepts	presented	in	the	state	capacity	and	Violence	Trap	literatures.					6.3.1.		Empirical	Analysis	of	Levels	of	Political	Violence		Empirical	 support	 for	 the	 theoretical	 concepts	 can	 be	 found	 by	 several	 indicators	 of	government	 change	 and	 political	 instability	 throughout	 the	 period.	 Note	 this	 form	 of	political	instability	is	fundamentally	different	in	form	from	the	type	of	political	"churning"	frequently	 observed	 in	 the	 parliamentary	 governments	 of	 southern	 European	 states	traditionally	 criticised	 for	 low	 stability	 governments	 because	 of	 a	 predominance	 of	 too	many	veto	players	(Sartori	1966;	Tsebelis	1995,	1999,	2002).	Instead,	we	are	concerned	with	 instances	 of	 government	 change	 defined	 by	 a	 forcible	 reordering	 of	 the	 entire	government	structure	via	violent	military	power.			One	such	indicator	can	be	found	in	the	number	of	constitutions	adopted	over	the	republican	era.	 These	 include	 the	 1911	 Provisional	 Constitution,	 1913	 Tianjin	 Draft,	 1914	Constitutional	 Compact,	 1923	 Cao	 Kun	 Constitution,	 and	 1925	 Duan	 Constitution.	 After	1928,	 the	Guomindang	Party	ruled	without	adoption	of	a	 formal	constitution	until	1948,	although	the	1930	Taiyuan	Draft	and	1931	Provisional	Constitution	of	Tutelage	represent	modest	 attempts	 to	 provide	 formal	 structure	 to	 transition	 to	 constitutional	 governance	(Bedeski	 1981:	 67,	 Pan	 1945:	 48).	 While	 substantial	 in	 number,	 these	 seven	 different	constitutions	over	the	course	of	less	than	three	decades	of	republican	rule	fail	to	capture	the	scope	of	political	chaos	that	defined	the	era,	given	that	most	regime	changes	occurred	outside	the	scope	of	a	constitutional	framework,	and	that	those	assuming	power	frequently	ruled	without	the	adoption	of	a	new	constitution,	such	as	when	Yuan	Shikai	briefly	assumed	the	role	and	title	of	emperor	in	1915,	or	the	short-lived	restoration	of	the	Qing	dynasty	in	1917.	Nonetheless,	the	number	of	constitutions	does	underscore	the	lack	of	sanctity	such	documents	 represented	 to	 potential	 political	 actors.	 The	 lack	 of	 institutional	 protection	these	documents	provided	civilian	agents	is	further	evidenced	by	incidences	of	continual	military	intervention	in	politics.	McCord	(1996:	808)	provides	a	telling	example	during	a	meeting	of	northern	militarist	leaders	called	by	Zhang	Xun	at	Xuzhou	in	September	1916	after	Yuan	Shikai's	death,	in	which	one	participant	stated	that	they	as	military	leaders	must	act	against	politicians	when	they	observe	them	doing	wrong	for	the	good	of	the	nation,	with	others	 noting	 in	 agreement	 that	 "If	 politicians	 are	 bad,	 we	 naturally	 should	 overthrow	them"	(trans.	McCord).	Or,	as	opined	a	newspaper	editorial	at	the	time,	""If	peace	and	order	is	 to	 reign	 in	 the	 country	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 have	 some	 kind	 of	 Constitution	 and	 other	fundamental	 laws,	 to	 be	 observed	 not	 only	 by	 the	 common	 people,	 but	 also	 by	 the	Government	itself.	This	is	not	a	matter	of	opinion	and	of	political	propaganda;	it	is	a	choice	between	order	and	chaos,	between	civilisation	and	barbarism"	(Jen	Min	Jih	Pao	1931:	20)			
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A	second	measure,	 relating	 to	our	 analysis	using	 the	 framework	of	 the	 violence	 trap,	 is	consideration	 of	 the	 number	 violent	 regime	 changes	 that	 occurred	 over	 the	 period.	 To	conduct	our	analysis,	we	first	consider	the	methodology	employed	by	Weingast	and	his	co-authors	 in	 Cox	 et	 al.	 (2017),	 which	 provides	 empirical	 background	 to	 the	 theoretical	framework	developed	in	their	Violence	Trap	thesis.	The	data	Cox	et	al.	use	to	produce	their	analysis	 are	 twofold—country-specific	 counts	of	 violent	political	 transitions	 via	military	coups	or	civil	wars,	matched	with	post-1950	country-specific	measures	of	Gross	Domestic	Product	(GDP)	from	the	World	Bank	used	to	rank	countries.			To	construct	country-specific	counts	of	violent	political	transitions,	Cox	et	al.	utilise	data	documented	in	the	Archigos	dataset†,	a	massive	cross-country	data	set	compiled	by	Hein	Goemans,	Krisitan	Gleditsch,	and	Giacomo	Chiozza	(Goemans	et	al.	2009b)	 that	provides	data	on	leadership	transitions	from	188	countries	between	1875	to	2004.	As	explained	in	the	 Archigos	 codebook,	 the	 dataset	 is	 designed	 to	 identify	 "whether	 transfers	 of	 power	between	leaders	take	place	in	a	regular	or	irregular	fashion.	We	code	transfers	as	regular	or	irregular	depending	on	the	political	 institutions	and	selection	mechanisms	in	place."	The	dataset	developers	account	for	the	fact	that,	"many	autocracies	have...	 implicit	or	explicit	rules	for	transfers	of	executive	power.	Leader	changes	that	occur	through	designation	by	an	outgoing	 leader,	 hereditary	 succession	 in	 a	monarchy,	 and	 appointment	 by	 the	 central	committee	of	a	ruling	party	would	all	be	considered	regular	transfers	of	power	from	one	leader	to	another	in	an	autocratic	regime"	(Goemans	et	al.	2009a:	1-2).	In	support	of	the	Violence	Trap	contention	of	political	violence	as	endemic	throughout	most	limited-access	orders,	Goemans	et	al.	(2009b:	273)	note	their	data	indicate	that	"Most	irregular	removals	from	office	are	the	result	of	the	threat	or	use	of	force	as	exemplified	in	coups,	(popular)	revolts,	and	assassinations,	and	occur	at	the	hands	of	domestic	opponents."		Utilising	the	Archigos	dataset,	Cox	et	al.(2017:5)	identify	several	important	stylised	findings.	First,	violent	regime	change	is	endemic:	for	the	162	countries	included	in	their	analysis,	697	cases	of	 leadership	 succession	 took	place	 via	 violent	 regime	 change	 from	1840	through	2004.	 Second,	 a	 key	 component	 of	 their	 findings	 is	 that	 occurrences	 of	 violent	 regime	change	are	not	distributed	evenly	amongst	countries	ranked	by	national	 income;	rather,	there	is	a	clear	correlation	between	political	stability	and	economic	output,	with	wealthier	countries	less	likely	to	undergo	violent	regime	change	than	poor	countries.	However,	the	structure	of	the	correlation	is	not	linear	in	nature,	but	rather	highly	skewed,	with	the	top-most	wealthiest	 countries	 experiencing	 vastly	 a	 lower	degree	of	 violent	 regime	 than	all	other	countries.	As	Cox	et	al.	(2013:	5)	report,	"the	richest	developing	countries	are	more	like	poor	developing	countries	than	they	are	like	the	developed	world.	In	the	poorest	half	of	the	countries	(ranked	by	income),	fifty	percent	of	regimes	last	only	seven	years,	and	only	one-quarter	last	beyond	seventeen	years.	In	countries	ranking	between	the	75th	and	90th	percentiles	of	income–the	developing	world	elite–corresponding	figures	are	12.5	and	45.5.	Finally,	for	the	developed	world	(the	richest	decile	of	countries),	the	figures	are	60	and	88."			___________________________________________________________________________________________________		
†	It	is	necessary	to	mention	some	data	irregularities	regarding	the	Cox	et	al.	(2017)	dataset.	To	begin	with,	there	is	the	issue	of	temporal	mismatch;	Cox	et	al.	claim	their	data	on	violent	political	transitions	go	back	to	1840,	whereas	their	GDP	data	are	from	1950	onwards,	suggesting	the	economic	ranking	of	 countries	prior	assumes	a	consistency	 in	 relative	positions	of	national	 income	 that	 is	perhaps	unwarranted.	There	also	exists	the	issue	of	selection	bias,	given	that	some	countries	are	necessarily	removed	from	analysis	because	they	do	not	exist	after	1950,	so	cannot	be	included.	More	significant	is	 the	 somewhat	 puzzling	 assertion	 by	 Cox	 et	 al.	 that	 their	 dataset	 measures	 violent	 political	transitions	 from	1840	 through	2004;	 it	 is	 unclear	why	 they	 do	 so,	 since	 the	Archigos	 dataset	 is	formally	constructed	using	data	from	1875	onward,	and	Cox	et	al.	do	not	make	any	claims	to	have	collected	additional	data	on	political	transitions	in	countries	via	coups	or	civil	war	themselves	for	time	periods	prior	to	1875.	In	any	event,	however,	the	findings	Cox	et	al.	provide	are	stark	enough	that	the	overall	findings	are	robust	beyond	these	idiosyncrasies	in	regard	to	the	data	compilation.	
	 136 
	Figure	 6.1	 demonstrates	 the	 relationship	 between	 national	 income	 levels	 and	 regime	stability,	constructed	using	data	presented	in	Cox	et	al.	(2013:	6)'s	Table	1.	Such	findings	impress	the	strength	of	the	correlation	between	regime	stability	and	national	income,	as	well	 as	 its	 highly	 skewed	 nature,	with	 a	 large	 jump	 in	 regime	 stability	 occurring	 at	 the	ninetieth	percentile.	For	Cox	et	al.,	this	correlation	is	due	to	a	set	of	factors	owing	to	the	type	of	actions	limited-access	countries	often	employ	to	mitigate	the	threat	of	political	violence,	insofar	as	these	actions	include	strategies	such	as	rent-creation,	price	controls,	and	other	policies	damaging	to	the	protection	of	property	rights,	all	of	which	reduce	expected	national	income.	As	a	result,	 leaders	in	countries	where	the	level	of	political	violence	is	relatively	high—which	includes	middle	income	developing	nations—are	trapped	into	implementing	political	actions	that	lead	to	poor	economic	output;	hence	the	observed	correlation.			Fig.	6.1.		Countries'	Average	Regime	Duration,	in	Years,	by	GDP	Percentile,	1840-2004	
	source:	data	derived	from	Table	1	from	Cox	et	al.	(2013:	6).				We	 seek	 to	 replicate	 the	methodology	 in	Cox	 et	 al.	 (2017),	measuring	political	 violence	through	 the	 very	 defined	 but	 circumscribed	 indicator	 of	 the	 number	 of	 violent	 regime	changes	 that	 occurred	as	 a	 result	 of	 violent	military	 coups	or	 civil	war,	while	using	 the	historical	record	to	focus	solely	on	late-imperial	and	early	republican	era	China.	To	do	so,	we	identify	the	number	of	changes	in	government	leadership	that	took	place	by	political	violence,	 outside	 the	 designated	 succession	 process,	 over	 the	 century-long	 period	 from	1840	to	1941.	As	presented	in	Table	6.1,	we	find	thirteen	identifiable	instances	of	violent	political	regime	change	to	have	occurred	over	the	time	frame.		Before	turning	to	an	analysis	of	based	on	this	tabulation,	we	first	note	that	the	data	included	in	Table	6.1	represent	a	conservative	depiction	of	the	number	of	violent	political	regime	transitions	over	the	period.	Specifically,	we	omit	several	instances	that	represent	instances	of	authoritarian	military	power	overthrowing	civilian	political	structures.	These	include,	for	instance,	 when	 Yuan	 Shikai	 dissolved	 the	 National	 Assembly	 and	 outlawed	 political	opposition	 parties	 in	 1913,	 in	 violation	 of	 the	 Provisional	 Constitution.	 Similarly,	 the	political	assassination	of	Prime	Minister-elect	Song	Jiaoren	is	not	included	in	this	measure,	since	 as	 prime	minister-elect,	 he	was	neither	 in	 office	when	 assassinated,	 nor	 as	prime	minister	was	his	role	the	head	of	state;	however,	surely	one	can	argue	this	to	have	been	an	instance	of	political	violence,	albeit	technically	not	one	inducing	political	regime	transition.		
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	Table		6.1.		Number	of	Forced	Political	Leadership	Transitions,	China,	1840–1941		 Count	 Date	 Outgoing	Government	 Incoming	Government	 Mode	of	Change		 	 	 	 	1	 Feb	1912	 Qing	Imperial	Government		 Republic	of	China,	Beijing	(Gen.	Yuan	Shikai)	 Civil	War:	Xinhai	Revolution	2	 Jul	1917	 Republic	of	China,	Beijing	(Gen.	Li	Yuanhong)	 Manchu	Restoration	(Gen.	Zhang	Xun)	 Military	Coup:	Zhang	Zoulin	Army	3	 Jul	1917	 Manchu	Restoration	(Gen.	Zhang	Xun)	 Republic	of	China,	Beijing	(Gen.	Feng	Guozhang)	 Military	Coup:	Zhili	Clique	4	 Oct	1918	 Republic	of	China,	Beijing	(Gen.	Feng	Guozhang)	 Republic	of	China,	Beijing	(Xu	Shichang)	 Military	Coup:	Wanxi	Clique	5	 Jun	1922	 Republic	of	China,	Beijing	(Xu	Shichang)	 Republic	of	China,	Beijing	(Gen.	Li	Yuanhong)	 Military	Coup:	Zhili	Clique	6	 Jun	1923	 Republic	of	China,	Beijing	(Gen.	Li	Yuanhong)	 Republic	of	China,	Beijing	(Gen.	Cao	Kun)	 Military	Coup:	Zhili	Clique	7	 Oct	1924	 Republic	of	China,	Beijing	(Gen.	Cao	Kun)	 Republic	of	China,	Beijing	(Gen.	Huang	Fu)	 Military	Coup:	Zhili	Clique	8	 Nov	1924	 Republic	of	China,	Beijing	(Gen.	Huang	Fu)	 Republic	of	China,	Beijing	(Gen.	Duan	Qirui)	 Military	Coup:	Fengxi	Clique	9	 Apr	1926	 Republic	of	China,	Beijing	(Gen.	Duan	Qirui)	 Republic	of	China,	Beijing	(Hu	Weide)	 Military	Coup:	National	Army	10	 Jun	1926	 Republic	of	China,	Beijing	(Hu	Weide)	 Republic	of	China,	Beijing	(Yan	Huiqing)	 Military	Coup:	Zhili	Clique	11	 Jun	1926	 Republic	of	China,	Beijing	(Yan	Huiqing)	 Republic	of	China,	Beijing	(Du	Xigui)	 Military	Coup:	Fengxi	Clique	12	 Jun	1928	 Fengxi	Republic	of	China	(Gen.	Zhang	Zoulin)	 Guomindang	 Government,	Nanjing	 Civil	War:	Northern	Expedition	13	 Dec	1937	 Guomindang	 Government,	Nanjing		 Japanese	 military-backed	provisional	government	 War:						Japanese	military	invasion	sources:	please	refer	to	discussion	presented	in	Section	6.2.2.					Likewise,	the	forced	upending	of	adherence	to	a	republican	form	of	government	in	late	1915,	when	Yuan	declared	himself	the	first	Hongxian	emperor,	is	not	included,	although	this	did	represent	a	military	power-backed	overthrow	of	the	existing	political	government	structure,	albeit	one	that	maintained	Yuan	as	leader	of	the	state,	changing	only	his	formal	title;	hence,	its	omission	from	the	table.	Similarly,	the	transfer	of	power	from	Yuan	Shikai	to	Li	Yuanhong	after	Yuan's	death	was	not	included	in	the	table,	given	it	did	not	occur	as	a	violent	transfer.	Instead,	following	classic	imperial	tradition,	Yuan—having	assumed	the	mantle	of	Hongxian	emperor—left	a	will	designating	one	of	three	designated	personages	(Li,	Duan	Qirui,	or	Xu	Shichang)	should	be	chosen	as	his	successor.	With	the	backing	of	several	powerful	Beiyang	generals,	Li	henceforth	assumed	the	presidency.	While	accomplished	without	bloodshed,	this	 procedure	 was	 well	 outside	 the	 designated	 transfer	 of	 power	 under	 the	 civilian	constitution,	 and	 in	 this	 regard,	 similarly	 could	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 another	 example	 of	 a	leadership	transfer	undertaken	utilising	authoritarian	military	power.	§		___________________________________________________________________________________________________		
§	Our	reading	of	the	historical	data	differs	slightly	from	that	presented	in	the	Goemans	et	al.	(2009a)	dataset	 utilised	 by	 Cox	 et	 al.	 (2017).	 Specifically,	 as	 indicated	 in	 Table	 6.2	 below,	 their	 dataset	identifies	fourteen	political	rulers	of	China	over	the	course	of	1861	through	1941	(note	while	the	Archigos	dataset	officially	includes	data	from	1875	onwards,	data	from	earlier	years	are	also	included	if	 the	sovereign	 in	power	 in	1875	began	her	or	his	 reign	earlier).	Of	 those	 fourteen	men,	 six	are	identified	to	have	lost	power	by	way	of	violent	political	change.	As	indicated	in	our	historical	analysis			
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	Beyond	 the	 issue	 of	 possible	 inclusion	 of	 borderline	 instances	 of	 irregular	 political	transitions,	as	Weingast	and	his	co-authors	well	recognise,	a	measure	of	political	violence	that	 limits	 its	 scope	 to	 successful	 instances	 of	 military	 coups	 and	 overthrows	 often	represents	 a	 significant	 underestimation	 of	 the	 true	 scale	 of	 political	 violence.	 This	 is	certainly	the	case	in	regard	to	China	over	the	course	of	the	late-imperial	and	republican	time	frame.	 As	 discussed	 in	 detail	 in	 Section	 6.2.2.,	 there	 were	 a	multitude	 of	 major	 violent	internal	and	external	military	events	affecting	actual	levels	of	realised	political	violence.	For	example,	the	Taiping	Rebellion	represents	perhaps	one	of	the	most	significant	instances	of	internal	 civil	 disorder	 to	 have	 occurred	 over	 the	 past	 two	 centuries.	 Resulting	 in	 over	upwards	 of	 twenty	 to	 thirty	 million	 deaths,	 this	 rebellion	 movement	 led	 to	 an	unprecedented	degree	of	civil	strife	within	the	country,	as	well	as	disrupting	much	of	the	productive	capacity	of	the	economy	(Ho	1959:	247;		Eng	1986:	30,	96;		Motono	2000:	28).	While	not	successful	in	overthrowing	the	Qing	state,	the	Taiping	Rebellion	did	for	a	period	of	 fifteen	 years	 control	 a	 significant	 portion	 of	 eastern	 part	 of	 the	 country,	 creating	 an	alternative	functioning	government	based	in	Nanjing	that	ruled	over	thirty	million	people,	and	by	some	assessments	came	close	defeating	the	Qing	had	alternative	military	strategy	been	undertaken	(Kuhn	1978:	275,	281).			Although	 the	 Taiping	 Rebellion	 represents	 an	 instance	 where	 a	 successful	 alternative	government	that	lasted	for	over	fifteen	years	was	created	within	the	sovereign	boundaries	of	China,	major	episodes	of	political	violence	of	 this	kind	that	do	not	 lead	 to	a	complete	overthrow	 of	 the	 existing	 regime	are	 not	 included	 in	 the	measure	 utilised	 by	Cox	 et	 al.	(2017).	 Similarly,	 additional	 episodes	of	major	political	 violence	owing	 to	 other	 serious	rebellions	during	the	late	Qing—including	the	Nian	(1851-1868),	Du	Wenxiu	(1856-1873),	Miao	(1854-1873),	and	Hui	Minorities	(1862-1877)	rebellions—are	also	not	included	in	the	formal	Cox	et	al.-based	measure	of	political	violence,	notwithstanding	the	incredibly	high	levels	of	destruction	and	loss	caused	by	these	wars,	which	were	likely	responsible	for	the	deaths	of	an	estimated	sixty	million	people	(Fairbank	1986:	80).				___________________________________________________________________________________________________		
§	(cont.)	presented	in	Section	6.2.2,	however,	their	dataset	suffers	from	several	omissions,	which	is	why	we	identify	thirteen	as	opposed	to	only	six	instances	of	violent	political	regime	change	over	the	course	of	the	pertinent	time	frame.			Table	6.2.		List	of	National	Government	Leaders,	China,	1875–1941,	Archigos	Database		 Number	 		Year	 Ruler	 Entered	Office	 Exited	Office	 Violent	Exit	1	 		1861	 Tz’u	His	 22/08/1861	 15/11/1908	 	2	 		1908	 Zaifeng	 02/12/1908	 06/12/1911	 	3	 		1911	 Empress	Jonyu	 06/12/1911	 12/01/1912	 X	4	 		1912	 Sun	Yat-sen	 12/01/1912	 15/02/1912	 	5	 		1912	 Yuan	Shih-kai	 15/02/1912	 06/06/1916	 	6	 		1916	 Li	Yuan-Hung	 06/06/1916	 14/08/1917	 	7	 		1917	 Feng	Kuo-chang	 14/08/1917	 04/09/1918	 	8	 		1918	 Hsu	Shih-ch’ang	 04/09/1918	 02/06/1922	 	9	 		1922	 Li	Yuan-Hung	 11/06/1922	 14/06/1923	 X	10	 		1923	 Tsao	Kun	 05/10/1923	 02/11/1924	 X	11	 		1924	 Tuan	Chi-jui	 24/11/1924	 20/04/1926	 X	12	 		1926	 Chang	Tso-lin	 21/04/1926	 10/10/1928	 X	13	 		1928	 Chiang	Kai-shek	 10/10/1928	 14/12/1937	 X	14	 		1937	 Wang	Kemin	 14/12/1937	 30/03/1940	 	source:	Goemans	et	al.	2009a	Archigos	dataset		
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	Similarly,	 much	 of	 the	 continual	 instability	 during	 republican	 period,	 while	 undeniably	exemplative	of	political	violence	and	chaos,	are	not	captured	by	the	Cox	et	al.	measure,	such	as	 Sun's	 Second	Revolution	 in	 1913,	which	 eventually	 led	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 separate	sovereign	 southern	 faction	 of	 the	 central	 government	 throughout	 the	 early	 republican	period,	with	nearly	half	the	country	ruled	by	a	government	structure	different	from	that	operating	in	the	nation's	capital	of	Beijing.	Further,	the	seeming	stability	indicated	by	the	measure	during	the	Nanjing	government	period	from	1928	through	1937	masks	the	actual	amount	of	civil	and	military	strife	that	took	place.	As	documented,	there	were	numerous	rebellions	and	warlord-related	battles,	including	the	Central	Plains	War	(1929-1930),	Sino-Tibetian	War	(1930-1932),	Kumul	Rebellion	(1931-1934),	Red	Spears	Revolt	(1932),	and	Ningxia	War	(1934),	as	well	as	fratricidal	battles	between	rival	Guomindang	Party	factions	in	Guangdong,	let	alone	the	military	conflict	Jiang	Jieshi	saw	as	perhaps	the	most	serious	existential	threat	to	his	regime—presagely,	it	turned	out—that	with	the	Communist	Party.	Additionally	 during	 this	 period,	 the	 Chinese	 state	 lost	 sovereign	 control	 of	 significant	geographic	areas,	such	as	all	of	Manchuria	in	1931	after	its	seizure	by	the	Japanese	military	and	subsequent	creation	of	the	Manchukuo	puppet	state,	or	the	loss	of	all	of	Xinjiang	in	1934	in	wake	of	the	Kumul	Rebellion	which	led	to	the	takeover	of	the	province	by	Soviet	forces.	Neither	 are	 any	of	 the	military	battles	with	 foreign	powers,	 commencing	with	 the	1854	Opium	War,	 captured	by	 the	Cox	et	 al.	 (2017)	measure,	with	 the	 exception	of	 the	1937	Japanese	 military	 invasion	 that	 resulted	 in	 the	 loss	 of	 power	 by	 Jiang	 of	 the	 Nanjing	government.	Finally,	and	of	further	significance,	also	not	captured	is	the	scope	of	violence	associated	with	 an	 overall	 lack	 of	 adherence	 to	 law	and	 order;	 yet,	 as	 conveyed	 by	 our	discussion	on	the	criminal	activities	perpetrated	by	the	Green	Gang,	the	existence	of	daily	violence	on	a	personal	level	within	Shanghai	and	other	affected	cities	was	considerable.			In	some	ways,	the	omission	of	so	many	significant	instances	of	political	and	civil	strife	would	suggest	there	exists	an	inherent	fundamental	weakness	of	the	measure	Cox	et	al.	(2017)	employ	 to	 capture	 levels	 of	 political	 violence	within	 countries.	While	 not	 resulting	 in	 a	violent	overthrow	of	an	existing	leader,	the	events	described	above	bely	the	existence	of	a	peaceful,	orderly	political	order.	Yet,	as	the	authors	make	clear,	they	well	recognise	their	descriptor	might	 well	 undercount—and	 in	 some	 instances,	 such	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 late-imperial	 and	 republican	China,	 quite	 significantly—the	 true	degree	of	 political	 violence.	They	 argue,	 however,	 that	 this	 only	 bolsters	 their	 claim	 regarding	 the	 overwhelming	frequency	 and	 importance	 that	 political	 and	 societal	 violence	 plays	 in	 the	 economic	development	patterns	of	limited	access	order	countries,	given	that	the	degree	of	political	violence	 captured	 by	 their	 preferred	metric	 represents	 at	 best	 a	 lower	 bound	 of	 actual	societal	violence.		Putting	aside	this	issue	of	undercounting	the	scale	of	political	violence	in	its	entirety,	the	findings	suggested	by	our	analysis	of	Table	6.1	are	nonetheless	significant.	To	begin	with,	the	table	indicates	a	considerable	degree	of	violent	political	regime	change.	The	thirteen	occurrences	over	the	course	of	the	approximate	one	hundred	years	of	our	analysis	imply	an	average	of	violent	political	transition	occurring	more	than	once	every	eight	years.	Second,	however,	it	is	clear	that	these	violent	political	transitions	are	not	spread	equally	across	the	time	 period;	 instead,	 all	 occur	 in	 the	 time	 frame	 starting	 from	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	republican	period	in	1912,	until	the	disposal	of	the	Nanjing	regime	by	 Japanese	military	invasion	in	1937.	Constricting	ourselves	to	consideration	of	this	twenty-six	year	time	frame	indicates	a	very	concentrated	period	of	violent	regime	change,	with	incidences	of	violent	political	transition	occurring	on	average	a	staggering	once	every	two	years.	Such	an	average	places	China	over	this	period	in	line	with	data	that	matches	those	deriving	from	some	of	the	poorest	countries	in	the	Cox	et	al.	(2017)	dataset,	suffering	from	the	most	violence.	In	this	regard,	the	limited	economic	growth	that	did	occur	in	China	over	this	period	might	well	be	considered	surprising	to	have	been	as	strong	as	it	was	under	such	an	environment.		
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Third,	 even	within	 the	 limited	 time	 frame	 of	 the	 republican	 period,	 the	 distribution	 of	violent	overthrow	of	the	central	government	is	itself	skewed,	with	all	but	the	final	incidence	occurring	within	the	Beiyang	era.	From	1912	through	1928,	there	occurred	a	total	of	eleven	military	coups	resulting	in	change	of	the	nominal	seat	of	central	government	power.	This	represents	an	average	of	one	violent	military	coup	occurring	once	every	year	and	a	half	over	this	 seventeen	 year	 period.	 Thus,	 the	 stability	 of	 the	 Nanjing	 Decade,	 with	 ten	 years	consecutive	years	of	an	absence	of	violent	overthrow	of	political	leadership,	represents	a	substantial	difference	from	the	previous	several	decades.				6.3.2.		The	Violence	Trap	thesis	and	late-imperial	and	republican	China:	some	caveats		Of	 course,	 as	 with	 any	 generalised	 analytical	 theoretical	 conceptualisation,	 there	 exist	caveats	where	our	theoretical	constructs	fall	short	in	application	to	analysing	late-imperial	early	republican	China	case.	In	particular,	one	of	the	arguments	advanced	by	Cox	et	al.	(2017)	is	that	one	possible	way	for	countries	to	overcome	the	violence	trap	is	from	the	impetus	of	external	existential	threats,	since	potential	disruption	of	the	social	order	from	battle	with	an	 external	 power	 likely	 represents	 considerably	 greater	 costs	 than	 internal	 fighting	amongst	rivals.	Therefore,	Cox	et	al.	surmise,	the	presence	of	an	external	threat	incentivises	internal	domestic	rivals	to	settle	differences	to	address	the	more	serious	external	threat,	banding	together	in	face	of	a	common	external	enemy.	This	commonality	of	interests	can	lead	to	a	reduction	in	rent	creation	arrangements,	and	therefore	greater	economic	growth,	increasing	power	of	merchants	and	other	private	actors	compared	to	the	state,	initiating	a	virtuous	growth	dynamic.	This	argument	represents	an	extension	of	that	advanced	earlier	by	Epstein	(2000)	and	within	the	state	capacity	literature,	which	attributes	the	increase	in	European	government	size	and	state	capacity	as	due	to	increased	external	threats.	Problems	of	weak	state	capacity	were	overcome	as	a	result	of	the	necessity	to	defend	themselves	from	existential	 threats	 posed	 by	 their	 external	 neighbours,	 leading	 to	 greater	 focus	 on	mechanisms	that	could	successfully	raise	and	capture	tax	revenue.	Hoffman	(2012)	further	argues	the	fiscal	and	technological	developments	that	led	Europe	to	outpace	other	parts	of	the	world	were	likewise	spurred	by	military	competition	between	European	nations.		Whether	or	not	such	an	argument	represents	an	accurate	recounting	of	 the	dynamics	of	early	 western	 European	 growth,	 and	 while	 ostensibly	 theoretically	 parsimonious,	 it	 is	nonetheless	evident	that	the	same	story	does	not	hold	for	late	imperial	and	republican	China;	in	fact,	in	many	instances,	it	can	be	argued,	the	opposite	effect	occurred.	To	begin	with,	while	various	internal	rivals	often	collaborated	with	other	internal	rivals,	they	also	occasionally	collaborated	with	 external	 rivals	 as	well,	 such	 as	when	 the	Fenxi	warlord	Zhang	Zuolin	turned	to	align	with	the	external	Japanese	military	when	faced	with	a	serious	existential	threat	 from	 his	 internal	 rival	 Feng	 Yuxiang.	 Similarly,	 the	 Guangdong	military-governor	Chen	 Jitang	consistently	dealt	with	 Japanese	economic	actors	 in	order	 to	import	 in	 large	quantities	of	sugar	outside	of	the	required	tariff	provisions	on	the	commodity,	depriving	the	central	 government	 of	 customs	 duties,	 while	 simultaneously	 receiving	 sugar	 at	considerably	lower	costs;	as	Hill	(2010:	5)	notes,	most	of	these	"disputed	imports	either	originated	in	Japan	or	were	carried	to	China’s	coastal	waters	in	Japanese	ships."	In	general,	therefore,	as	advanced	at	the	start	of	Section	6.3,	rather	than	an	"internal"	versus	"external"	dichotomy,	 we	 find	 it	 more	 useful	 to	 analyse	 state	 behaviour	 in	 terms	 of	 responses	 to	serious	existential	threats,	whether	internally	or	externally	based.		Second,	even	in	instances	where	state	actors	perceived	serious	existential	threats	such	that	they	were	incentivised	to	work	together	with	rivals,	they	failed	to	develop	strategies	that	reduced	rent-creation.	For	example,	in	the	wake	of	the	Boxer	Rebellion,	the	Qing	state	faced	a	 number	 of	 serious	 external	 existential	 threats,	with	 a	 united	military	 force	 of	 foreign	
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powers	having	just	destroyed	the	imperial	palace	and	forced	the	Court	to	flee	the	capital,	and	just	recently	having	lost	major	military	battles	with	Japan	and	Russia,	losing	significant	territory	in	the	process	including	the	vassal	states	of	Taiwan	and	Korea.	Yet,	such	serious	external	existential	threats	were	unable	to	overcome	internal	divisions	so	as	to	successfully	address	interventionist	behaviour	in	the	economy,	or	to	rationalise	the	tax	collection	system	to	significantly	amass	tax	revenues	into	the	centre	from	the	local	provinces.			Additionally,	while	the	Guomindang	government	and	Green	Gang	collaborated	to	attack	the	existential	threats	each	faced	coming	from	the	communist	movement	and	Japanese	military	aggressions,	 this	 collaboration	 failed	 to	 lead	 to	 a	 reduction	 in	 economic	 rent	 creation.	Indeed,	 in	many	ways	 it	 incentivised	 the	 Guomindang	 leadership	 to	 further	 protect	 the	Green	 Gang's	 monopoly	 control	 over	 the	 illicit	 opium	 trade.	 Thus,	 in	 this	 sense,	 the	collaboration	 actually	 solidified	 the	 rent-creation	 dynamic,	 as	 well	 as	 contributing	 to	 a	generalised	 decrease	 in	 perceived	 and	 actualised	 rule	 of	 law	 defining	 the	 domestic	institutional	legal	environment.		Thus,	 it	 is	possible	that	 in	certain	 instances,	existential	threats	can	serve	 to	 induce	state	actors	into	actions	that	might	worsen	the	private	property	rights	environment,	as	opposed	to	improving	it.	This	can	occur	because	in	response	to	existential	threats,	state	leadership	can	be	incentivised	to	bring	in	more	nonstate	rival	actors	to	bolster	their	position	against	serious	existential	forces.	Even	when	these	rivals	find	their	interests	co-aligned,	often	rivals	to	 the	 state	 act	 in	 ways	 that	 are	 inherently	 damaging	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 an	 effective	institutional	environment	with	strong	support	of	private	property	rights	and	law	and	order.	In	order	to	have	the	Green	Gang	strong	enough	that	they	might	effectively	harass	communist	supporters	and	the	Japanese	military,	the	Gang	needed	income	from	its	opium	smuggling	activity	and	other	criminal	endeavours;	yet	by	allowing	such	inherently	criminal	activities	that	had	the	rule	of	law	blatantly	circumvented	and	diminished	the	overall	private	property	rights	environment.	In	this	regard,	therefore,	the	existence	of	serious	external	existential	threats	might	actually	serve	to	reinforce	behaviours	that	undermine	the	rule	of	 law,	and	therefore	the	degradation	of	overall	protection	of	private	property	rights.		There	have	been	multiple	attempts	in	the	literature	to	provide	a	possible	explanation	for	why	Chinese	state	actors	were	unable	to	reform	the	inefficient	rent-seeking	structure	of	the	Chinese	economy	during	this	crucial	period.	For	some,	the	directionality	of	factors	starts	with	the	initial	weakness	of	the	late-Qing	state	capacity.	Ma	(2013)	and	Johnson	&	Koyama	(2017)	start	with	the	supposition	that	the	Qing	state	was	weak,	and	reason	that	as	a	result	of	its	weak	capacity	to	raise	revenue,	the	state	apparatus	could	not	respond	to	external	or	internal	threats.	For	these	authors,	it	was	the	state's	initial	weak	capacity	that	created	the	conditions	leading	to	the	development	of	internal	rivals	who	could	gain	access	to	levers	of	organised	violence,	and	once	there	were	existing	rivals	with	access	to	organised	lever	of	violence,	this	weakness	precluded	the	state	from	being	able	to	raise	the	capital	necessary	to	either	defeat	foreign	external	imposed	threats.	Thus,	what	internal	coalitions	state	actors	formed	by	way	of	economic	rent	offerings	to	rivals	became	necessary	to	maintain.			Another	 line	 of	 argument	 focusses	 on	 the	 self-replicating	 nature	 of	 decentralisation	 of	power,	weakened	state	capacity,	and	an	inherent	inability	to	reform.	Ma	&	Rubin	(2017)	argue	that	by	the	mid-Qing,	central	state	officials	had	already	allowed	a	system	of	corruption	to	become	ingrained	into	the	local	tax	collection	process,	which	over	time	had	increased	the	power	of	 local	authority	over	 the	centre.	As	a	result,	when	the	central	Qing	state	actors	needed	to	suddenly	induce	greater	tax	receipts,	found	the	state	apparatus	had	a	weakened	capacity	to	do	so,	and	in	turn,	in	an	attempt	to	raise	more	tax	revenue,	gave	more	power	to	local	authorities	in	terms	of	tax	collection	and	administration.	This	begins	a	self-replicating	process	that	continually	reduces	the	power	of	the	centre	to	local.	As	local	areas	increased	their	power	relative	to	the	centre,	they	were	more	able	to	exert	that	power	by	limiting	the	amount	of	tax	remitted	to	the	centre.	This	led	to	continual	weakened	fiscal	position	of	the	
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central	state,	which	therefore	had	less	resources	to	devote	to	accomplishing	some	of	the	desired	defence-related	projects,	such	as	investment	into	the	Jiangnan	Arsenal	and	Fuzhou	Dockyards,	both	of	which	abandoned	before	completion	because	of	lack	of	funding	(Pong	1987).	The	lack	of	financial	resources	of	the	Qing	state	to	complete	these	and	other	military	projects	decreased	 their	 ability	 to	 succeed	 in	military	 contests,	 losing	wars	with	Russia,	Japan,	 and	 the	 eight-powers	 coalition,	 incurring	 both	 huge	 military	 and	 subsequent	indemnity	 costs.	 This	 situation	 continued	 the	 self-replicating	 downward	 spiral,	 as	 the	central	state	was	put	in	a	worse	financial	situation,	hence	making	it	less	able	to	prevent	local	authorities	 from	 further	withholding	 taxes	 to	 the	 centre,	 thereby	 further	 increasing	 the	power	of	local	militarists	and	decreasing	the	power	of	the	central	state,	so	much	so	that	the	capacity	for	large-scale	violence	was	ever-greater	dispersed	internally	amongst	powerful	state	 actors	 in	 control	 of	 large	 armies,	 the	 upkeep	 of	 which	 demanded	 greater	 fiscal	resources	 and	 led	 to	 local	 actors	 imposing	 greater	 tax	 burdens	 on	 private	 actors	 and	keeping	more	of	it	locally	at	the	expense	of	the	central	state.			Additional	 avenues	 involve	 recent	 exercises	 in	 game	 theoretic	 modelling	 that	 has	emphasised	 the	 serious	 coordination	 problems	 large	 states	 such	 as	 China	 face.	 This	research	suggests	the	scale	of	countries	and	economies	plays	an	important	role	in	the	ability	of	 state	 actors	 to	 respond	 to	 external	 threats	 in	ways	 that	 provide	 the	 kind	 of	 benefits	Epstein,	Hoffman	or	Cox	et	al.	claim.	For	instance,	Ko	et	al.	(2018)	model	finds	that	a	single	existential	 threat	drives	centralisation	of	state	power	across	states	of	all	 sizes.	However,	when	 faced	 with	 multiple	 existential	 threats,	 while	 small	 states	 are	 pushed	 towards	centralisation	and	are	incentivised	to	undertake	political	and	economic	reform	measures,	large	states	 facing	multiple	 threats	conversely	are	moved	to	undergo	decentralisation	of	political	 power,	 accompanied	 by	 a	 weakening	 of	 reform	 efforts.	 Ko's	 theoretic	 results	therefore	match	 in	many	 respects	 the	 political	 economy	 observed	 in	 China	 during	 this	period,	as	the	late	Qing	experienced	considerable	political	decentralisation	of	its	political	authority	and	recurrent	undermining	of	reform	efforts.			Other	arguments	attempt	to	explain	why	Japan	succeeded	in	successfully	developing	during	this	period	while	its	larger	and	seemingly	advantaged	(in	terms	of	labour	force,	absolute	size	 of	 fiscal	 means,	 and	 natural	 resources)	 neighbour	 China	 could	 not.	 For	 instance,	Koyama	 et	 al.	 (2018)	 surmise	 that	 while	 both	 small	 states	 and	 large	 states	 are	disadvantaged	in	responding	to	external	threats,	constrained	by	a	lack	of	resources,	and	by	organisational	 complexities,	 respectively,	 "by	 comparison,	 states	 in	 the	 middle	 of	 the	spectrum,	like	Japan,	were	most	incentivized	to	embark	on	a	program	of	centralization	and	modernization."	Thus,	unlike	medium-sized	nations	such	as	Europe	or	Japan,	as	a	large	state,	late-imperial	China	faced	excessive	coordination	costs	and	inefficiencies	in	attempting	to	respond	to	external	and	internal	threats.	Koyama	et	al.'s	model	"further	highlights	that	for	a	large	state,	the	goals	of	defense	and	development	are	not	congruent.	To	take	full	advantage	of	 the	 new	 economic	 and	 technological	 possibilities,	 a	 large	 state	 like	 China	 needs	 to	decentralize	and	allow	provincial	authorities	to	take	the	lead	in	implementing	initiatives	such	as	building	schools	and	roads	that	serve	local	needs.	However,	decentralization	may	generate	collective	action	problems	in	defense	and	diplomacy."	While	the	game	theoretic	approach	taken	by	Koyama	et	al.	(2018),	or	as	in	a	similar	attempt	by	Ma	&	Rubin	(2017),	is	admittedly	 overly	 simplistic,	 suffering	 from	what	Hayek	would	 label	 a	 category	 error—given	 that	 individuals	 have	 goals,	whereas	 the	 actors	 in	 these	models	 are	 states,	which	whether	large	or	small,	are	but	conceptual	constructs	that	do	not	"act"	nor	have	goals	that	can	be	modelled	or	maximised—nonetheless	their	work	serves	as	an	additional	potentially	useful	 approach	 to	 understand	 the	 forces	 that	 drove	 state	 actors	 to	 continue	 to	 thwart	liberal	economic	reform	efforts	while	instead	promoting	inefficient	and	rent-seeking	based	economic	policies.	
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Chapter	Seven.			
The	Violence	Trap	and	Related	Theoretical	Constructs:		
Consequences	on	Economic	Outcomes				The	nature	of	the	relationship	between	state	capacity	and	economic	growth	is	one	of	the	most	studied	topics	in	the	recent	economic	development	literature	(De	Long	&	Shleifer	1993,	Acemoglu	2005,	Dincecco	2009,	Knutsen	2013,	Acemoglu	et	al.	2015,	Dell	2015,	Wang	2015,	Dong	&	Guo	2017,	Liu	&	Zhao	2017,	Dincecco	2018,	Geloso	&	Slater	2018,	van	Noort	2018).	Dincecco	(2018)	in	his	opening	chapter	presents	a	series	of	bivariate	correlations	showing	strong	 relationships	 between	 per	 capita	 national	 income	 and	 various	measures	 of	 state	capacity—tax	as	a	percentage	of	GDP,	average	income	tax	share,	strength	of	state	capacity	scores	 as	 constructed	 by	 Rice	 &	 Patrick	 (2008),	 the	 International	 Country	 Risk	 Guide	property	 rights	 protection	 index,	 and	 the	 World	 Bank	 Doing	 Business	 contract	 rights	enforcement	index.	His	publication	represents	one	of	the	more	recent	efforts	demonstrating	strong	empirical	correlations	between	economic	output	and	state	capacity	indicators.		However,	while	robust	single	variable	correlations	are	observable,	they	nonetheless	fail	to	demonstrate	casual	linkages.	Whatever	the	relationship	existing	between	state	capacity	and	modern	economic	development,	it	appears	highly	complex,	with	numerous	transits	existing	by	which	levels	and	degrees	of	state	capacity	can	influence	and	shape	economic	outcomes.	To	begin	with,	 as	 Johnson	&	Koyama	(2017)	argue,	 state	 structures	 that	 create	 credible	commitment	mechanisms	 in	 the	mould	of	North	&	Weingast	 (1989)	 are	 fundamental	 to	constraining	the	power	of	the	sovereign	from	violating	rights	of	private	actors,	and	hence	leading	 to	 long-run	 economic	 development.	 Johnson	 &	 Koyama	 primarily	 focus	 the	considerable	variety	of	historical	outcomes	resulting	from	attempts	to	constrain	absolutist	sovereigns,	 arguing	 that	 in	 some	 cases	 these	 fostered	 a	decentralisation	of	 taxation	 and	other	 state	 capacity	 factors	 that	 led	 to	 a	weakening	of	 overall	 central	 government	 state	capacity	and	poorer	outcomes.§	Knutsen	(2013)'s	evidence	is	slightly	contradictory—while	his	cross-country	analysis	confirms	strong	correlations	between	state	capacity	measures	and	economic	output	exist	for	all	regime	types,	he	finds	increases	in	state	capacity	to	have	a	 greater	 positive	 effect	 in	 authoritarian	 regimes,	 compared	 to	 democratic	 countries;	conversely,	however,	he	finds	the	independent	effect	of	democratic	state	structures	lead	to	considerably	 more	 positive	 economic	 growth	 than	 do	 authoritarian	 state	 structures,	suggesting	 a	 complex	 dynamic	 exists	 between	 state	 structure	 and	 state	 capacity	 that	impacts	economic	outcomes	differentially.			________________________________________________________________________________________________________		§	 While	 acknowledging	 Weingast	 (1995)'s	 contention	 of	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 federal	 forms	 of	governance,	 Johnson	&	Koyama	focus	on	issues	related	to	decentralisation	of	government	power,	especially	in	relation	to	the	ability	of	central	states	to	effectively	capture	and	control	tax	revenues.	Specifically,	 they	 attribute	 the	 success	 of	 England	 in	 centralising	 tax	 authority	 to	 its	 ethnic	 and	geographic	 homogeneity,	 albeit	 without	 development	 of	 a	 direct	 casual	 hypothesis	 or	 testing	methodology,	other	than	by	way	of	contrasting	the	historical	example	of	post-Glorious	Revolution	England	with	the	cases	of	seventeenth	century	Spain	and	France,	where	they	attribute	greater	ethnic	and	geographic	heterogeneity	to	have	led	to	a	less	centralised	polity	and	hence	less	central	control	over	 tax	 collection.	 Without	 more	 substantive	 historical	 research	 that	 address	 the	 many	 other	differences	 between	 England,	 Spain	 and	 France	 during	 these	 periods	 that	 could	 also	 factor	 into	differing	 levels	 of	 state	 capacity,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	consider	 such	 arguments	as	at	 best	 tentative;	nonetheless,	the	importance	of	the	degree	of	centralised	tax	authority	remains	prevalent	in	the	state	capacity	literature	as	an	explanatory	factor	ascribing	overall	levels	of	state	capacity.
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	Other	avenues	explored	in	the	state	capacity	literature	emphasise	the	importance	of	state	functionaries'	 ability	 to	provide	 services	 to	 the	 public,	which	 in	 turn	 can	 lead	 to	 better	economic	outcomes.	Dittmar	&	Meisenzahl	(2016)	identify	the	beginning	of	the	growth	of	the	modern	European	state	as	starting	with	the	late	sixteenth	century	and	development	of	state	capacity	enabling	the	delivery	of	public	goods	such	as	mass	education,	which	in	turn	increased	levels	of	human	capital,	leading	to	economic	growth	over	the	long-term.	Similarly,	Acemoglu	(2005)	finds	that	for	states	defined	by	either	autocratic	political	structures,	or	possessing	excessively	weak	 tax	collection	capacity	 thereby	 constraining	revenues,	state	actors	 will	 underinvest	 in	 socially	 productive	 public	 goods,	 leading	 to	 lower	 economic	growth.	It	is	possible	to	argue	that	the	late-imperial	and	republican	China	in	part	might	well	have	exhibited	both	of	these	conditions,	of	militarily	powerful	autocratic	leaders	in	charge	of	a	state	apparatus	that	nonetheless	proved	relatively	ineffective	in	terms	of	tax	extraction.	Both	Acemoglu's	and	Knutsen's	findings	accord	with	the	conceptualisations	developed	by	Bueno	 de	 Mesquita	 et	 al.	 (2003),	 who	 emphasise	 the	 importance	 of	 state	 structure—especially	 in	 regard	 to	 the	 way	 in	 which	 state	 leaders	 are	 selected—in	 shaping	 the	incentives	acting	on	state	actors	in	determining	their	decisions	to	allocate	efforts	towards	the	provision	of	public	goods	versus	private	benefits,	and	thus	leading	to	growth-enhancing	or	growth-limiting	institution	 formation	and	policy	 implementation.	A	recent	critique	by	Arena	&	Nicoletti	(2014),	however,	calls	into	question	Bueno	de	Mesquita	et	al.	(2003)'s	choice	of	model	selection,	and	after	rerunning	the	data	based	on	revised	modelling	obtain	results	that	suggest	a	more	ambiguous	and	attenuated	relationship	existing	between	state	capacity	aspects	of	public	good	provision,	and	the	nature	of	state	structure.		The	relationship	between	state	capacity	and	growth	is	further	addressed	in	the	literature	in	regard	to	the	importance	of	societal	warfare.	However,	 it	 is	a	matter	of	some	contention	within	the	state	capacity	literature	as	to	the	degree	that	warfare	proves	to	be	a	beneficial	or	confounding	influence	on	economic	development.	For	much	of	the	literature	(Tilly	1990,	Besley	&	Persson	2008,	Dincecco	&	Prado	2012,	Gennaioli	&	Voth	2015,	Rasler	&	Thompson	2017),	military	conflict	fosters	state	capacity	by	providing	the	impetus	for	greater	reform	and	mobilisation	of	resources	to	undertake	combat,	with	greater	long-run	economic	growth	rates	attributed	to	the	increases	in	derived	fiscal	capacity.	For	others,	however,	the	focus	remains	on	the	importance	of	the	state	to	prevent	the	destruction	of	economically	valuable	resources	due	to	warfare.	Imai	&	Weinstein	(2000)	note	that	while	military	conflict	can	lead	to	greater	levels	of	government	 investment	in	military-related	resources,	 it	also	 leads	 to	lower	levels	of	private	investment,	which	overwhelms	any	economic	growth	or	productivity	effects	of	greater	government-led	investment;	this	effect	is	further	impacted	by	destruction	of	capital	stocks,	 leading	to	lower	rates	of	future	investment.	(Peng	2018)	finds	evidence	that	warfare	impairs	state	capacity	through	undermining	bureaucratic	capacity,	especially	as	measured	through	staffing,	as	again	resources	for	aspects	of	bureaucratic	capacity	that	could	 be	 focussed	 on	 growth-enhancing	 activities	 are	 directed	 towards	 military	 uses.	Relatedly,	 as	 Paauw	 (1952)	 emphasises	 in	 his	 research,	 bureaucratic	 resources	 and	functions	 that	 were	 designed	 to	 enhance	 economic	 growth	 were	 consistently	 can	 be	siphoned	off	and	re-directed	towards	military	expenditures.	Bueno	de	Mesquita	et	al.	(1999,	2013)	link	state	structure	with	levels	of	state	capacity	to	wage	war,	based	on	the	types	of	institutional	 constraints	 facing	 leaders	 under	 differing	 political	 formulations.	 Bueno	 de	Mesquita	et	al.	argue	democratic	state	structures	generate	superior	institutional	structures	that	allow	for	greater	resource	mobilisation	for	military	purposes;	this	increased	capacity	to	 conduct	 warfare	 in	 turn	 leads	 to	 reductions	 in	 the	 actual	 occurrence	 of	 war	 for	democracies,	 since	 they	 appear	 as	 more	 formidable	 to	 other	 potential	 adversaries,	presenting	 their	 findings	as	a	possible	 explanation	 for	 the	 greater	 levels	 of	warfare	and	societal	violence	observed	in	historical	data.	Clarke	&	Stone	(2008),	however,	attack	Bueno	de	Mesquita	et	al.'s	testing	methodology,	and	claim	that	when	accounting	for	biased	results	due	to	omitted	variables,	the	relationship	no	longer	is	statistically	significant.	
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		In	summary,	therefore,	it	appears	that	whatever	the	relationship	between	state	capacity	and	economic	development,	the	findings	from	large,	cross-country	testing	strategies	has	yet	to	produce	definitive	and	compelling	empirical	results.	Overall,	it	seems	clear	from	theory	that	greater	 state	 bureaucratic	 and	 fiscal	 capacity	 must	 have	 some	 bearing	 on	 a	 nation's	economic	 development,	 yet	 the	 specific	 mechanisms	 by	 which	 such	 a	 relationship	 is	manifested	appear	to	be	highly	dependent	on	country-	and	time-specific	factors.	Further,	a	similar	confusion	exists	in	regard	to	studies	attempting	to	relate	the	development	of	state	capacity	and	state	structure	with	 the	 incidence	of	war,	and	how	these	 factors	ultimately	impact	economic	outcomes,	with	cross-country	statistical	studies	again	failing	to	provide	definitive	answers.	nonetheless,	it	would	be	hard	to	argue	that	the	prevalence	of	war	has	profound	effects	on	the	development	of	state	capacity	and	on	economic	growth;	yet	once	again,	 the	 dynamics	 of	 these	 impacts	 might	 well	 be	 more	 granular	 requiring	 a	 more	historical	and	country-specific	empirical	approach.		To	that	end,	we	look	to	consider	the	specific	historical	case	of	the	impact	that	the	domestic	Chinese	state	actors	played	in	affecting	economic	outcomes	through	their	policy	choices,	focussing	on	the	incentives	and	rationales	that	impacted	state	actor	behaviour.	In	line	with	the	above	literature,	we	conduct	our	analysis	within	the	broader	state	capacity	framework,	with,	 however,	 our	 primary	methodological	 approach	more	 specifically	 focussed	 on	 an	application	of	the	twin	theoretical	constructs	outlined	in	the	previous	chapter	relating	to	the	Violence	Trap	and	low-credibility	trap.	Thus,	we	hope	to	shape	an	understanding	of	the	reasons	that	late-imperial	and	republican	state	actors	undertook	the	kind	of	policies	choices	they	did	that	so	impacted	the	nature	of	the	period's	economic	activity,	by	relating	this	to	the	incentive	 structures	 placed	 on	 state	 actors	 under	 an	 environment	 in	 which	 the	 state	apparatus	proved	continually	unable	to	enforce	a	monopoly	over	coercive	internal	violence.				7.1.		State	Capacity:	Ability	to	Enforce	Monopoly	on	Coercive	Violence—Economic	Impacts		An	enduring	question	within	Chinese	economic	history	scholarship	remains	that	given	the	potential	 of	 the	 Chinese	 economy—with	 a	 massive	 labour	 force,	 numerous	 natural	resources	that	included	coal,	robust	internal	and	external	trading	networks,	and	a	nascent	financial	 system	 able	 to	 accumulate	 and	 direct	 capital—what	 accounted	 for	 the	 lack	 of	sustained	 economic	 growth	 taking	 hold?	 While	 no	 single	 definitive	 reason	 for	 such	 a	multidimensional	and	multifaceted	dynamic	as	country-level	economic	growth	exists,	one	approach	based	on	using	general	state	capacity	arguments	is	to	suggest	a	reason	for	why	late-imperial	and	republican	China	was	unable	to	overcome	issues	antithetic	to	economic	growth—such	as	corruption,	rent-creation	via	monopolies	and	barriers	to	trade—was	due	to	a	lack	of	capacity	by	the	state	bureaucracy	to	implement	policies	that	can	promote	growth	in	an	effective	and	rationalised	manner.	As	Acemoglu	et	al.	(2015)	claim,	"the	weakness	or	lack	of	‘capacity’	of	states	in	poor	countries	is	a	fundamental	barrier	to	their	development	prospects.	Most	poor	 countries	have	 states	which	are	 incapable	or	unwilling	 to	provide	basic	public	goods	such	as	 the	enforcement	of	 law,	order,	education	and	infrastructure."	Thus,	one	potential	answer	could	be	to	that	the	late-imperial	and	republican	state	lacked	the	capacity	to	implement	the	"correct"	policies.	In	this	regard,	the	debate	in	the	literature	between	revisionists	and	conventional	scholars	 in	regard	to	 the	degree	of	state	capacity	looms	 particularly	 relevant;	 the	 question	 partly	 becomes,	 therefore,	were	 there	 enough	institutional	and	bureaucratic	constructs	that	were	sufficiently	effective	so	as	to	have	been	able	to	generate	effective	implementation	of	desirable	policies?		
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However,	as	suggested	by	the	analysis	in	Chapter	Five,	there	appears	to	be	a	disparate	set	of	evidences	available	to	researchers	regarding	the	degree	of	state	bureaucratic	capacity	over	the	period.	Moreover,	as	argued	as	far	back	as	Smith	(1776),	powerful	states	can	also	implement	policies	 that	 harm	 growth;	 indeed,	 states	might	well	 be	 effective	 at	 creating	monopolies	or	other	rent-creation	strategies.	Thus,	whether	the	degree	to	which	the	state	apparatus	was	capable	and	effective	 in	implementing	 the	desired	policies	of	state	actors	does	not	answer	the	question	as	to	whether	observed	anti-economic	growth	policies	were	due	to	weak	state	capacity	leading	to	ineffective	implementation	of	desirable	policies,	or	strong	 state	 capacity	 that	 effectively	 implemented	 negative	 policies;	 or,	 for	 that	matter,	what	might	well	be	a	conflicting	a	combination	of	both.		The	more	 fundamental	 question	 that	we	are	presented	with	 is	 therefore	 rather	why	do	countries	 undertake	 strategies	 that	 lead	 to	 poor	 economic	 growth,	 whether	 effectively	implemented	or	not?	As	such,	our	approach	is	to	focus	on	a	more	specific	feature	of	the	state	capacity	argument,	that	encapsulated	by	the	arguments	presented	within	the	violence	and	low-capacity	traps,	which	centre	on	explaining—regardless	of	whether	the	state	possessed	the	ability	 to	 implement	economically-productive	policy	choices—the	reasons	why	state	actors	 were	 incentivised	 to	 implement	 policies	 that	 were	 necessarily	 economically	destructive.	 Thus,	 rent-creation,	 generating	 barriers	 to	 entry	 and	 trade,	 bureaucratic	structures	 that	 encouraged	 corruption,	 outright	 expropriation	 of	 private	 property	 and	growing	presence	of	state	control	over	civil	society—all	of	these	actions	on	the	part	of	the	state	were	not	due	to	failures	of	state	capacity	per	se,	but	rather	directly	resultant	from	the	fact	that	state	actors	in	states	with	a	high	degree	of	political	violence	and	lack	of	civil	security,	such	as	clearly	observed	in	late-imperial	and	republic	China,	are	incentivised	to	undertake	a	more	weighted	consideration	on	an	action	set	focussing	almost	exclusively	on	obtaining	short-term	benefits,	including	especially	those	that	reduce	the	likelihood	of	overthrow	from	power.	 We	 find	 that	 utilisation	 of	 this	 theoretic	 approach	 to	 the	 available	 qualitative	evidence	helps	 to	provide	a	significant	part	of	 the	explanation	as	 to	 the	 inability	 for	 the	Chinese	economy	to	achieve	a	sustained	growth	path.	Overall,	the	persistent	inability	of	the	state	to	enforce	a	monopoly	on	coercive	violence,	leading	to	extreme	levels	political	violence	throughout	late	imperial	and	republican	China	period,	profoundly	impacted	the	country's	economic	 growth	 process	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 state-society	 relationship	 in	 multiple	 and	diverse	ways.	Below,	we	describe	the	severe	impacts	on	the	domestic	economic	landscape	and	on	private	economic	actors,	via	both	primary	and	secondary	effects,	that	such	frequent	and	endemic	episodes	of	internal	violence	ultimately	produced.				7.1.1.		Primary	Level	Economic	Effects		It	seems	clear	there	are	significant	negative	consequences	on	economic	growth	in	countries	where	weak	state	capacity	does	not	enable	the	maintenance	of	an	internal	monopoly	over	coercive	force.	Indeed,	the	deleterious	economic	effects	of	violence	are	cited	as	far	back	as	Smith	(1776:	II,	30),	who	notes	that,	"In	those	unfortunate	countries,	 indeed,	where	men	are	continually	afraid	of	the	violence	of	their	superiors,	they	frequently	bury	and	conceal	a	great	part	of	their	stock."	The	actions	of	Olson's	"roving	bandits"—represented	by	corrupt	state	police	or	military	forces,	internal	rebels	and	militarist	leaders,	thieves	and	organised	crime	 members,	 or	 foreign	 military	 forces—often	 lead	 to	 the	 direct	 and	 literal	 actual	destruction	or	theft	of	productive	assets.	The	costs	of	the	inability	for	the	state	to	enforce	a	monopoly	on	coercive	violence	are	borne	by	holders	of	property	and	productive	assets,	to	say	nothing	of	 the	 toll	accruing	 to	 the	 loss	of	 life	and	human	 suffering.	 Factories	 can	be	bombed	 and	 destroyed,	 traded	 goods	 confiscated	 by	 soldiers,	 transportation	 pathways	trade	depends	upon	disrupted,	 fields	burned,	 labour	 forces	depleted	and	dispersed,	and	numerous	other	direct	impacts	are	among	the	most	obvious	impacts	on	economic	output.	Furthermore,	economic	agents,	aware	of	the	potential	for	such	direct	theft	or	destruction	of	their	assets	to	occur,	are	therefore	loathe	to	utilise	them	or	undertake	costly	investment.	
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7.1.1.1.		Direct	Effects—																	Physical	destruction	or	theft	of	productive	assets			The	historical	record	of	the	late	imperial	and	republican	time	period	is	replete	with	a	nearly	innumerable	set	of	examples	highlighting	the	scope	and	scale	of	such	economic	and	human	costs.	To	begin	with,	there	was	widespread	theft	and	seizure	of	private	property	carried	out	by	warlords,	bandits,	or	organised	criminal	syndicates,	due	to	the	inability	of	the	domestic	state	to	enforce	a	monopoly	on	internal	violence.	For	instance,	an	eyewitness	account	by	a	British	official	to	the	British	Minister	regarding	looting	of	Yueyang,	Hunan	in	1920	by	the	troops	of	militarist	leader	Zhang	(Chang)	Jingyao	("%)	underscores	the	lack	of	protection	on	private	property	and	life	during	the	time:	"The	arrival	of	Chang	himself	on	June	13th	was	the	signal	for	a	general	looting	of	the	city.	I	have	never	seen	more	thorough	work.	Every	shop,	every	house	in	this	beautiful	and	prosperous	city	has	been	literally	stripped.	There	is	not	a	vestige	of	any	usable	commodity	from	one	end	of	the	city	to	the	other,	including	the	great	 old	 yamen	 used	 by	 Chang	 himself.	 The	 place	 is	 furnished	 only	 by	 troops,	who	 lie	disconsolate,	dirty,	hungry	and	demoralized	on	the	floors	and	the	counters	of	the	shops	and	on	every	flat	surface	that	is	shaded	from	the	sun.	Most	of	the	population	has	fled,	but	some	10,000	remain	all	crowded	into	the	American	Mission	Hospital"	(Rose	1920).			McCord	(2012)	emphasises	how	the	weak	central	authority	was	not	only	unable	to	control	powerful	regional	military	leaders,	but	was	in	fact	beholden	to	them	for	the	maintenance	of	civil	order,	thereby	partly	complicit	for	acts	of	looting	and	other	expropriatory	behaviours.	The	 case	 of	Wang	 Zhanyuan	 proves	 instructive.	 Sent	 by	 Yuan	 to	 command	 the	 Second	Division	of	the	Beiyang	Army	stationed	in	Hubei	in	1913,	by	1915	Wang	had	leveraged	his	military	power	to	become	the	province's	military	governor.	As	McCord	(2012:482)	notes,	the	fiscal	weakness	of	the	central	government	led	to	social	unrest,	including	armed	mutiny	by	troops	owed	back	wages:	"units	based	in	Hubei	with	‘national’	designations	(including	Wang’s	2nd	Division)	were,	in	theory,	supposed	to	be	paid	by	the	central	government,	[but]	the	depletion	of	the	national	treasury	made	it	increasingly	difficult	for	central	authorities	to	meet	their	payrolls.	Thus,	in	August	1919,	troop	pay	for	some	national	units	in	Hubei	were	four	to	eight	months	in	arrears.	One	by	one,	the	affected	units	began	to	mutiny."			Given	the	lack	of	fiscal,	organisation,	bureaucratic	and	military	state	capacity	on	the	part	of	the	 central	government,	 central	 state	 actors	 chose	 to	 rely	on	 the	military	might	 of	 local	warlords	to	obtain	financial	resources	necessary	to	deal	with	issues	such	as	mutinies	and	other	social	disruptions.	"The	[central]	government	increasingly	relied	on	Wang	Zhanyuan	to	find	the	resources	to	support	these	troops	within	Hubei	itself.	Wang	did	this	by	raiding	the	provincial	treasury,	withholding	national	taxes	and	fees,	negotiating	major	loans	from	foreign	banks,	and	issuing	bonds.	As	 these	sources	also	began	 to	dry	up,	Wang	began	to	demand	loans	or	‘advances’	from	public	organizations,	particularly	chambers	of	commerce,	to	meet	military	payrolls.	Thus,	we	can	see	that	the	central	state	was	sufficiently	weak	so	as	to	not	be	able	to	protect	its	own	state	property	(its	provincial	treasury,	or	enforcing	the	transference	 of	 locally-collected	 national	 taxes),	 let	 alone	protect	 the	property	of	private	actors	(public	and	commercial	organisations).		The	economic	impact	of	these	behaviours	is	referenced	by	Chen	(1926:	14),	who	describes	how	 local	 military	 warlords	 used	 their	 non-state-sanctioned	 military	 power	 to	 extract	property	from	private	citizens	through	"repeated	[forced]	contributions	and	taxes	to	their	armies...	 [leaving]	industry	 is	virtually	at	a	standstill."	Chen	provides	an	example	of	why	industry	becomes	so	poor	in	such	an	environment	by	describing	the	case	of	a	pawn	shop	business	in	Guangdong	that	went	bankrupt	as	a	direct	result	of	civil	war	waged	nearby.	In	order	to	wage	their	war,	the	local	warlord	army	needed	money,	and	thus,	"over	the	course	of	12	months,	military	officers	and	soldiers	went	to	the	shop	175	times,	demanding	money	on	 each	 occasion...	 all	 under	 the	 threat	 of	 the	 gun",	 eventually	 driving	 the	 venture	 into	bankruptcy.	Similar	examples	abound.	The	Jiangsu-Zhejiang	War	in	1924	led	to	numerous	
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instances	by	the	armies	on	both	sides	committing	acts	of	expropriation	of	private	assets.	After	Lu	Yongxiang	fled	Zhejiang	in	the	wake	of	his	loss	to	Sun	Chuanfang's	forces,	the	fourth	and	tenth	divisions	of	his	army,	having	not	received	their	military	salaries,	forced	a	payment	of	five	hundred	thousand	yuan	from	the	Hangzhou	Chamber	of	Commerce	as	compensation	(Yuehto	JihpaoAE(		21	September	1924);	the	arrival	Sun's	conquering	army	in	Hangzhou	led	 to	 demand	 of	 an	 additional	 eight	 hundred	 thousand	 yuan	 from	 the	 city's	 banking	community	(Yuehto	Jihpao	2	October	1924).	Myers	(1986:	262)	cites	a	contemporaneous	report	produced	 in	the	1920s	by	 Japanese	academics	which	described	 the	misery	 facing	much	 of	 the	 rural	 population:	 "arson,	 theft	 and	 rape	 occurred	 everywhere...	 [F]ood	mobilized	for	the	military	has	been	seized	by	bandit	groups,	moreover	food	is	forcibly	taken	by	various	warlord	armies.	In	this	fashion,	peasants	in	the	same	locale	are	pillaged	two	and	three	 times	by	 outsiders.	Bandits	and	warlord	 factions	 abscond	with	 their	 children	 and	dogs."	Chen	(1936:	81)	describes	the	similar	plight	of	small	farmers	during	the	Guomindang	period,	who	not	only	had	the	majority	of	their	output	taxed	away	by	onerous	levies	imposed	by	local	state	officials,	but	also	faced	arbitrary	takings	by	what	can	justly	be	characterised	as	exemplifying	Olson's	"roving	bandits":	"As	a	rule,	the	tenants	pay	one	half	of	the	total	amount	[of	formally	assessed	taxes]	directly	to	the	tax	collectors,	the	other	half	being	paid	by	the	landlord,	but	in	addition	they	often	have	to	make	regular	payments	to	the	organized	bandits.	These	payments	to	bandits	are	called	the	‘black	ticket	fees.’	For,	should	a	peasant	family	 in	 the	Sha-ku,	nearly	 in	every	 case	a	 tenant,	neglect	 to	pay	such	 fees,	 the	bandits	would	issue	a	‘black	ticket’	to	prevent	it	from	cultivating	or	from	reaping	the	harvest.	Thus	every	year,	at	the	time	of	planting	in	March,	the	Sha-ku	tenants	have	to	pay	3.00	Yuan	per	mow	to	the	bandit	organization;	and	in	July	and	in	November,	they	have	to	pay	for	every	mow	the	taxes	amounting	to	1.60	Yuan	as	well	as	the	‘black	ticket	fees’	of	5.00	Yuan.	The	total	 tax	burden	per	mow	which	 is	 borne	by	 the	 tenants	 is,	 therefore,	 no	 less	 than	9.60	Yuan."	§	 	Foreign	military	actions	also	led	to	instances	of	theft	of	domestic	actors'	private	property,	such	as	the	blatant	example	cited	by	Henriot	(2004)	of	Japanese	military	forces	expropriating	productive	assets	 from	Chinese	privately-owned	 factories	 in	Zhabei	 in	 the	wake	of	the	Japanese	seizure	of	the	domestic	section	of	the	city	in	August	of	1937.		Beyond	theft	of	private	property,	another	direct	effect	of	the	period's	multitude	of	military	battles	 fought	 on	 Chinese	 soil	was	 the	 damage	and	 destruction	 of	 private	property	 and	productive	 assets,	 thereby	diminishing	 the	productive	 capacity	of	 the	Chinese	 economy.	Here,	too,	the	historical	record	provides	a	seeming	unending	set	of	examples	that	stretches	back	to	include	the	devastation	writ	large	due	to	the	Taiping	Rebellion	which	engulfed	the	majority	 of	 the	 most-populated	 regions	 of	 the	 country,	 to	 the	 unrest	 caused	 by	 the	overthrow	of	the	Qing	empire	("Rich	and	poor,	foreigner	and	Chinese,	and	every	one	in	any	part	 of	 the	world	 having	 any	 dealings	with	 China	 are	 being	 indiscriminately	 hit	 by	 the	present	unsettled	condition	in	the	country"	notes	the	9	December	1911	North	China	Herald),	to	 trade	 disruptions	 caused	 by	 the	 persistent	 civil	 wars	 of	 the	 so-called	 warlord	 era	("incessant	and	widespread	civil	wars	has	trade	hampered	enormously	and	silver	supplies	cannot	freely	be	moved	throughout	the	country",	as	per	the	16	October	1926	North	China	
Herald),	 to	 the	reports	of	bombings	and	 fires	engulfing	Zhabei—the	primary	residential,	commercial	 and	manufacturing	 centre	 of	 domestically-governed	 Shanghai—during	 both	the	1932	and	1937	Japanese	military	invasions	as	described	in	detail	in	Section	6.2.2.	The	weight	 of	 these	 and	 many	 other	 instances	 all	 serve	 to	 highlight	 the	 constant	 loss	 of	agricultural-,	trade-,	financial-,	and	industrial-related	productive	assets	suffered	by	private	entrepreneurs	throughout	the	course	of	this	period	of	tumultuous	political	strife.		________________________________________________________________________________________________________		§		Chen's	appraisal	of	the	situation	underscores	the	lack	of	respect	for	rule	of	law	by	noting	that	even	when	organised	criminal	elements	were	removed	by	authorities,	the	exploitation	continued,	with	only	a	change	in	regard	to	the	exploiting	party:	"In	some	places	where	bandits	have	been	driven	away	by	the	governmental	troops,	the	‘black	ticket	fees’	are	abolished	only	to	make	room	for	new	extra	assessments	made	by	the	military	authority	on	the	spot."	
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	Moreover,	 perhaps	 the	most	 significant	 and	 tragic	 aspect	 of	 such	 destruction	 of	 private	property	involved	the	magnitude	of	the	loss	of	the	most	valuable	class	of	property	possessed	by	private	agents,	life	itself.	The	loss	of	human	life,	the	many	who	were	maimed	and	tortured,	and	the	associated	emotional	suffering	that	common	citizenry	experienced	as	a	result	of	the	constant	warfare	engendered	by	a	series	of	domestic	governments	enable	to	successfully	maintain	a	monopoly	on	 internal	violence	should	not	be	glossed	over	 in	 the	discussions	cataloguing	 the	number	and	years	spanned	of	various	 internal	rebellions,	or	 tabulations	constructed	such	as	in	Table	3.3	of	 the	number	of	violent	political	transitions,	 the	often-glorified	exploits	of	the	Shanghai-based	organised	criminal	syndicate	the	Green	Gang,	or	recounts	of	external	military	battles.	All	of	these	involved	immeasurable	human	suffering,	experienced	most	intensely	and	often	by	those	with	the	least	power	in	society,	the	common	private	citizen,	whereas	the	powerful	autocratic	state	official	or	warlord	leader	was	mostly	protected	from	the	human	suffering	that	was	the	consequence	of	self-interested	decisions	undertaken	for	personal	aggrandisement,	greater	political	power,	or	financial	benefits.	In	truth,	it	is	difficult	to	fully	conceive	the	level	of	human	tragedy	and	suffering	experienced	by	common	private	agents	in	China	during	this	period	due	to	constant	coercive	civil	strife	and	violence.	The	horrendous	scale	of	loss	of	life	due	to	the	Taiping	Rebellion,	with	the	lowest	estimates	 of	wartime	 deaths	 at	 twenty	million	 people,	 the	 additional	 estimated	 seventy	million	 deaths	 from	 other	 internal	 rebellions	 and	 the	 warlord	 period,	 the	 number	 of	murders,	kidnappings	and	torture	inflicted	by	members	of	the	Green	Gang	on	Shanghai's	citizenry,	the	human	rights	abuses	committed	by	the	Japanese	military	during	the	Rape	of	Nanjing	and	similar	military	exercises—all	of	these	represent	just	some	of	the	largest	and	most	 significant	 examples	 of	 societal	 violence	 perpetrated	 by	 nonstate	 actors	 in	 an	environment	where	state	capacity	was	insufficient,	or	state	actors	disincentivised,	to	limit	such	unsanctioned	violence.				7.1.1.2.		Indirect	Effects—																	Perceptions	of	expected	destruction	or	theft	of	productive	assets		Another	set	of	primary	economic	effects	related	to	the	inability	of	the	state	to	maintain	a	monopoly	on	internal	coercive	violence	impacts	economic	output	via	the	expectations	and	perceptions	of	economic	agents.	While	the	realisation	of	civil	strife	and	violence	can	lead	to	the	theft	or	destruction	of	actors'	private	productive	assets	and	output,	the	existence	of	the	threat	of	violence	acts	to	prevent	the	necessary	investment	that	produces	productive	assets	and	output	from	taking	place	via	two	primary	mechanisms.			First,	in	an	environment	where	the	threat	of	violence	is	as	high	as	it	was	in	late	imperial	and	republican	 China,	 private	 domestic	 entrepreneurs	 are	 likely	 to	 anticipate	 future	occurrences	 of	 violence	 that	 can	 destroy	 or	 lower	 the	 value	 of	 the	 output	 from	 costly	investment	or	trade,	or	subject	their	output	to	expropriation	by	force	from	non-state	actors.	Thus,	 beyond	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 actual	 destruction	 or	 theft	 due	 to	 actual	 violence,	 the	expectations	of	private	entrepreneurs	and	investors	of	future	possible	destruction	or	theft	due	to	future	possible	violence	changes	the	calculus	of	the	investment	decision.	Anticipating	their	output	from	costly	investment	can	be	destroyed	or	stolen,	economic	agents	are	less	likely	to	engage	in	costly	investment;	the	higher	the	perceived	likelihood	of	violence,	the	less	likely	are	investors	to	invest.	In	an	environment	as	politically	chaotic	and	violent	as	was	China	 during	 this	 period,	 and	 actors	 constantly	 observing	 the	 scale	 of	 destruction	 of	productive	output,	or	 the	 loss	of	output	 from	theft	or	seizure	by	bandits	or	warlords	or	foreign	militaries,	 increased	 business	 uncertainty	 and	 lowered	 perceptions	 of	 expected	returns	on	costly	investment.			
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	Such	impacts	on	investor	and	entrepreneurial	activity	were	often	noted	at	the	time,	with	a	1931	 editorial	 in	 the	 Jen	Min	 Jih	 Pao	 newspaper	 arguing	 that	 the	 lack	 of	 monopoly	 on	internal	violence,	which	allows	activities	of	bandits	expropriating	private	business	goods,	leads	to	investors	reluctant	to	place	their	capital	into	productive	investment	assets:	"China	has	 enough	 capital	within	her	own	boundaries	 for	 industrial	 reconstruction,	at	 least	 for	several	years	to	come,	the	only	thing	necessary	is	confidence	in	the	Government's	sincerity	of	 purpose	 and	 in	 its	 ability	 to	 carry	 out	 its	 bandit	 suppression	 intensions.	 ...[The	government]	is	unable	to	cope	with	the	bandit-communists	in	the	interior,	with	the	result	that	individual	fortunes	are	not	devoted	to	the	development	of	industry,	but	to	the	purchase	of	Government	bonds,	and	other	unhealthy	speculative	activities"	(Peoples	Tribune	1931:	27).	 Similarly,	 uncertainty	 regarding	 political	 violence	 often	 affected	 entrepreneurial	investment	and	production	decisions,	with	the	North	China	Herald	reporting	in	early	spring	1933	that,	"Shanghai	millers	have	adopted	a	waiting	attitude	which	possible	is	principally	due	to	the	uncertainty	regarding	the	northern	situation,	and	little	business	has	been	done...";	and	that,	"the	political	situation	in	the	north	has	cast	a	heavy	shadow	over	the	local	markets...	[it]	has	been	inactive	and	no	business	has	been	reported,	buyers	preferring	to	wait	until	the	political	situation	clears.	Similarly,	importers	do	not	desire	to	increase	their	commitments	under	present	conditions."	Such	conditions	were	highly	detrimental	to	the	formation	of	a	stable	private	property	rights	environment—domestic	private	economic	actors	in	Shanghai	and	throughout	China	could	not	be	confident	that	the	returns	to	ex	ante	costly	investments	would	not	be	ex	post	expropriated	or	destroyed	by	the	activities	of	non-state	actors.	Such	additional	 levels	 of	 risk	 above	 and	 beyond	 normal	 business	 risk	 lowered	 incentives	 to	engage	in	private	entrepreneurial	and	financial	activity.			Second,	 the	perception	by	entrepreneurs	and	investors	of	 the	realistic	threat	of	violence	affects	 their	 associated	perception	 of	 the	 efficacy	of	 institutional	 structures	designed	 to	enable	 the	 enforcement	 of	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 protection	 of	 private	 property	 and	 contract	rights—such	 as	 police	 and	 legal	 systems,	 business	 associations,	 and	 social	 mores—as	weakened	 or	 incapacitated.	 Similar	 to	 the	 impact	 on	 investment	 that	 results	 from	 the	anticipation	 of	 potential	 destruction	 or	 expropriation	 of	 realised	 output,	 perceptions	 of	poor	 institutional	 environments	 increase	 overall	 business	 uncertainty	 while	 decreasing	expected	 returns,	 thus	 reducing	 actual	 outlays	 of	 costly	 investment,	 dampening	 overall	levels	of	private	investment	necessary	for	sustained	economic	growth.	As	Chen	(1926:	14)	notes	in	his	description	of	the	societal	costs	associated	with	the	warlordism	of	the	period,	the	institutional	environment	of	areas	under	the	control	of	 local	military	leaders	is	poor,	one	that	is	"based	on	personal	rule	[of	the	warlord	leader],	which	is	rule	of	thumb,	not	rule	of	 law.	 Prosecutions	may	 be	 proceeded	without	warrant	 and	 trials	 held	without	 public	hearing.	Militarism	knows	no	due	process	of	law,	and	gives	little	protection	to	life,	liberty,	and	property...".			That	 the	 impacts	 of	 warlordism	 on	 Chinese	 state	 development	 were	massive	 was	 well	recognised	at	the	time	by	contemporaneous	actors,	with	Park	(1929:	25)	noting	that	the	actions	of	competing	local	military	leaders	referred	to	as	warlords	"did	more	harm	to	China	in	sixteen	years	than	all	the	foreign	gunboats	could	have	done	in	a	hundred	years."	Or,	as	he	toll	of	destruction	from	war	was	expressed	in	a	newspaper	editorial	during	the	midst	of	the	Guomindang	period,	"Every	patriot	realises	the	futility	and	the	waste	involved	in	civil	strife,	both	as	regards	the	loss	of	lives	and	the	destruction	of	national	wealth.	How	great	the	actual	damage	has	been	in	the	trampling	of	the	farms	and	in	the	ruin	of	commerce	we	cannot	know.	We	only	know	that	the	longer	the	civil	strife,	the	greater	the	number	will	be	of	bankrupts	and	unemployed,	and	of	those	dependent	for	their	living	on	parasitic	militarists	and	bandit	leaders"	(Jen	Min	Jih	Pao	1	February	1931).			
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		7.1.1.3.		Summary:	Direct	and	Indirect	Economic	Effects	of	Lack	of	Monopoly	on	Violence		Recognition	 of	 the	 massive	 scale	 of	 economic	 harms	 owing	 to	 the	 direct	 and	 indirect	primary	level	effects	of	actual	destruction	or	theft	of	productive	assets—or	the	damage	to	the	 overall	 institutional	 environment	 due	 to	 the	 future	 expectation	 by	 agents	 of	 future	destruction	or	 theft	 of	 productive	 assets—helps	provide	 a	mechanism	to	understanding	some	 of	 the	 dynamics	 behind	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 Chinese	 economy	 during	 this	 period	 to	achieve	a	sustained	steady-state	high	growth	path.	As	Rodrik	(1999)	notes	in	his	research	paper	 that	 asks,	 "Where	 did	 all	 the	 growth	 go?",	 most	 developing	 countries	 do	 in	 fact	experience	economic	growth,	in	many	instances	quite	substantial	rates	of	growth.	As	Rodrik	also	 notes	 however,	 developing	 economies	 frequently	 subsequently	 experience	 growth	reversals,	oftentimes	due	to	civil	or	external	war.	It	is	not	difficult	to	interpret	the	economic	growth	 experience	 of	 China	 in	 such	 a	 light.	 We	 argue	 that	 much	 of	 the	 debate	 in	 the	economic	history	literature	on	late-Qing	and	republican	China	over	competing	growth	rates,	with	some	evidence	indicating	high	growth	and	other	suggesting	depressed	growth	rates,	is	at	least	in	part	due	to	the	phenomenon	suggested	by	Rodrik's	research.	As	Rawski	(1989),	Ma	(2008),	and	others	demonstrate,	it	is	possible	to	identify	industry-	or	period-	or	region-specific	discrete	instances	high	rates	of	economic	growth	and	industrialisation,	in	particular	the	 Yangzi	 littoral	 region.	 Yet,	 as	 delineated	 above,	 much	 of	 this	 Yangzi	 area	 also	experienced	some	of	 the	most	severe	 levels	of	expropriation,	damage	and	destruction	of	factors	 of	 production	 during	 periods	 of	 intense	warfare.	 But,	 temporal	matters	 take	 on	particular	importance	in	such	analyses,	as	measures	of	increases	in	output	and	factories	and	other	 productive	 assets	 can	 be	 valid,	 but	 when	 such	 output	 and	 factories	 and	 other	productive	 assets	 are	 subsequently	 burned	 down,	 bombed,	 or	 stolen,	 absolute	 levels	 of	income	 can	 fall	 dramatically,	 and	 the	 growth	 path	 can	 continually	 be	 reset	 backwards.	Finally,	it	is	necessary	to	emphasise	the	persistence	of	the	violence	that	took	place	in	China	over	this	period.	The	key	factor	is	that	there	was	a	continual,	constant	pattern	of	internal	civil	strife	and	military	warfare	that	created	a	constant	cycle	of	severe	growth	shocks	and	never	allowed	sustained,	long-term	economic	growth	to	take	hold.	Thus,	it	is	plausible	that	occurrences	of	civil	conflict	are	a	primary	reason	for	continual	episodes	of	growth	reversals	that	undermined	sustained	economic	growth	rates.				7.1.2.		Secondary	Level	Economic	Effects		The	primary	level	effects	of	sustained	societal	violence	on	the	dynamics	of	economic	growth	are	 generally	 well	 understood	 from	 a	 theoretical	 standpoint	 within	 the	 economic	development	literature,	although	there	remains	considerable	debate	regarding	the	relevant	factors	 affecting	 the	 degree,	 sectoral	 impact	 and	 persistence	 of	 economic	 performance	declines	due	to	internal	and	international	armed	conflict	(Blattman	&	Miguel	2010:	39-44).	Beyond	the	twin	aspects	of	primary	level	effects	of	realised	violence	owing	to	a	diminished	private	 property	 rights	 environment	 given	 the	 actualisation	 and	 expectation	 of	 theft	 or	destruction	of	private	productive	assets	and	output,	such	effects	are	compounded	by	the	existence	 of	 two	 main	 secondary	 level	 economic	 effects	 that	 impact	 particularly	 the	incentive	mechanisms	shaping	the	behaviour	of	key	state	actors,	each	deriving	out	of	the	conceptual	 considerations	 developed	 under	 the	 Violence	 Trap	 thesis,	 and	 our	 "low	credibility	trap"	extension	of	that	thesis.					
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7.1.2.1.		Low	Credibility	Trap:		Lack	of	Credible	Commitment,	Weak	Institutions		First,	as	our	suggestion	of	a	"low	credibility	trap"	emphasises,	the	existence	of	persistent	existential	threats	to	the	political	survival	of	state	leaders	causes	state	leaders	to	operate	under	an	exaggerated	"short-term"	mindset.	As	a	result,	such	short-termism	on	the	part	of	state	actors	creates	strong	 incentives	 for	them	to	disregard	the	development	of	credible	commitment	mechanisms	 to	protect	private	property	 rights	 of	 private	 actors.	Given	 the	primacy	of	maintain	their	hold	on	power,	under	threat	as	it	is	from	immediate	and	credible	existential	 threats,	 state	 actors	 are	 therefore	 incentivised	 to	 focus	 on	 undertaking	behaviours	 minimising	 the	 likelihood	 of	 being	 overthrown	 in	 the	 short-term,	 while	discounting	the	long-term	consequences	of	such	behaviours.			Credible	commitment	mechanisms	represent	ways	government	agents	bind	themselves	so	as	to	limit	their	policy	choice	sets	and	thereby	increase	the	credibility	of	their	promises	to	adhere	to	protections	of	property	rights.	In	reality,	of	course,	state	actors	rarely	willingly	seek	to	bind	their	power;	instead,	state	actors,	each	acting	in	their	own	self-interest,	and	based	on	their	access	to	power,	attempt	to	implement	policies	that	will	provide	themselves	economic,	 social	 or	 other	benefits.	As	 illuminated	within	much	 of	 the	public	 choice	 and	political	economics	literature,	it	is	in	the	process	of	acting	in	such	a	self-interested	manner	that	 credible	 commitment	mechanisms	 can	 in	actuality	be	 created.	However,	 as	we	also	demonstrate	in	this	section,	it	can	also	frequently	prove	to	be	the	case	that	in	the	process	of	acting	 in	 their	self-interest	 to	maintain	 themselves	 in	power,	state	 leaders	can	also	 take	actions	that	actively	undermine	credible	commitment	mechanisms.	As	emphasised	by	our	own	extension	of	the	violence	trap	thesis,	this	is	particularly	true	in	the	case	of	state	leaders	who	find	themselves	continually	under	the	threat	of	being	disposed	from	power	in	the	face	of	substantial	and	sustained	existential	threats	of	political	violence.			Operating	as	they	are	under	constraints	of	severe	short-termism,	the	incentive	structure	facing	 state	 actors	 leads	 to	 actions	 that	 are	 not	 conducive	 to	 the	 formation	 of	 effective	credible	 commitment	 mechanisms.	 In	 order	 for	 governments	 to	 make	 credible	 their	commitments	to	protect	private	property	rights,	state	actors	need	to	be	seen	as	justifiably	not	willing	to	suffer	costs	associated	with	breaking	the	commitments	they	have	made.	For	instance,	while	the	sovereign	has	the	ability	to	default	on	bond	payments,	recognition	by	state	actors	that	such	action	will	lead	to	future	increased	borrowing	costs	helps	serve	as	a	deterrent	 to	 default;	 and	 knowledge	 of	 that	 deterrent	 by	 private	 agents	 increases	 their	perception	that	the	sovereign's	commitment	to	repay	is	credible.	If,	however,	state	leaders	are	continually	faced	with	existential	threats,	the	power	of	the	deterrent	is	marginalised—that	is,	the	priority	of	state	leaders	is	first	and	foremost	to	remain	in	power;	only	after	that	immediate	 and	 primary	 goal	 is	 secured	 will	 leaders	 consider	 the	 more	 distant	 and	secondary	level	goals,	such	as	attaining	a	favourable	cost	of	capital	in	the	future.		Given	the	constant	state	of	political	violence	that	defined	the	period's	political	conditions,	it	can	 therefore	be	 argued,	 our	 theoretical	 framework	 suggests	 that	we	 should	 expect	 the	domestic	institutional	environment	to	have	been	characterised	by	relatively	poor	private	property	 rights,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 lack	of	 incentives	 and	means	 enabling	 state	 actors	 to	develop	credible	commitment	mechanisms.	Rational	private	agents	perceived	attempts	by	government	actors	to	bind	themselves	to	their	promises	to	protect	private	property	rights	to	be	 inherently	hollow,	 given	 that	 as	 a	 regime	under	 constant	 threat	 of	 violent	 regime	change,	state	actors	were	likely	willing	to	consider	any	action	set	in	the	immediate	to	stay	in	power,	 including	those	that	violated	seemingly	credible	commitments—i.e.,	those	that	had	 large	negative	 costs	 on	 the	 state	actors—given	 that	 the	 costs	 associated	with	being	overthrown	would	 be	 even	 greater.	 Furthermore,	 even	 were	 agents	 to	 view	 the	 state's	commitments	as	credible,	the	existence	of	serious	existential	threats	implies	a	likelihood	that	 the	 existing	 state	 could	 be	 overthrown,	 along	with	 existing	 institutional	 structures	
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defining	property	rights;	this,	too,	works	to	cause	rational	agents	to	discount	attempts	by	the	state	to	credibly	commit,	which	again	diminishes	expected	benefits	to	state	actors	from	attempting	 to	 develop	 credible	 commitment	 mechanisms	 and	 protect	 private	 property	rights.	Given	the	frequency	of	political	civil	wars	waged	throughout	the	period,	as	well	as	incidences	of	political	assassinations,	the	precariousness	of	any	particular	leader's	hold	on	power	was	apparent	to	all.	Further,	 it	was	also	well-recognised	that	when	a	new	regime	came	 to	 power,	 there	 was	 a	 frequent	 restructuring	 of	 the	 political	 and	 institutional	environment	 in	 ways	 that	 greatly	 impacted	 and	 changed	 economic	 relationships,	highlighting	the	uncertainty	facing	entrepreneurs	and	investors	at	the	time.		Thus,	it	is	not	surprising	to	observe	the	number	and	consistency	of	defaults	on	sovereign	debt	payments,	 since	even	 in	the	 face	of	clear	 increased	costs	and	difficulty	 in	obtaining	future	funding,	the	incentives	brought	on	by	endemic	political	violence	induced	such	strong	short-termism	that	future	costs	were	so	heavily	discounted	by	state	actors	in	the	present	as	to	 diminish	 their	 otherwise	 credible	 commitment	 effects.	 So,	 too,	 did	 the	 gravity	 and	immediacy	 of	 existential	 threats	 provide	 impetus	 for	 state	 officials	 to	 engage	 in	expropriation	or	onerous	taxation	of	economic	agents'	private	property.	Again,	while	such	actions	could	logically	be	foreseen	as	deleterious	to	future	long-run	economic	health	and	hence	expected	government	tax	receipts,	the	immediate	nature	of	existential	threats	led	to	short-term	 needs	 for	 resources	 to	 maintain	 state	 existence	 outweighing	 long-term	considerations	 of	 the	 negative	 effects	 on	 the	 broader	 economy	 or	 financial	 markets.	Consequentially,	rational	private	economic	agents—recognising	the	threat	to	state	survival,	and	anticipating	the	rational	reaction	by	state	actors	would	lead	them	to	expropriate—were	less	likely	to	trust	the	state	to	not	engage	in	expropriation,	thereby	ultimately	limiting	the	ability	of	the	state	to	credibly	commit	to	not	expropriate	private	assets.			As	a	result,	state	actors	were	more	likely	to	discount	the	long-term	costs	of	expropriating	the	 property	 of	 private	 actors,	 or	not	developing	 institutions	 that	 could	 create	 a	 strong	property	 rights	 regime	 and	 lead	 to	 sustained	 long-term	 economic	 output—such	 as	 an	independent	 judiciary,	 transparent	 government	 financing	 and	 oversight	 structures,	adherence	 to	rule	of	 law	by	all	 including	state	actors—and	only	 focus	on	 the	short-term	benefits	 gained	 from	 expropriation,	which	 included	 in	 the	 instance	 of	 late	 imperial	 and	republican	China,	not	only	unrequited	takings	of	private	productive	assets,	but	also	onerous	taxation,	debasement	of	private	savings,	directing	nearly	all	government	expenditure	on	military	undertakings	rather	than	construction	of	fundamental	infrastructure,	and	even	the	takings	of	 life	of	own	private	citizenry	when	their	actions	were	viewed	as	disturbing	the	short-term	goals	of	state	actors.	In	all	such	cases,	the	long-term	highly	negative	costs	of	such	actions	on	the	overall	perception	of	the	institutional	environment	defining	and	protecting	private	property	rights	and	the	rule	of	law	was	discounted	in	favour	of	gaining	short-term	benefits	to	further	the	immediate	continuance	of	state	actors'	hold	on	power	in	the	face	of	existential	threats.	Finally,	note	that,	just	as	with	harmful	primary	economic	effects,	faced	with	a	poor	institutional	environment,	lacking	as	it	is	in	credible	commitment	mechanisms,	and	in	which	private	property	can	be	expropriated	not	only	by	nonstate	but	also	by	state	actors,	 private	 entrepreneurs	 and	 investors	 are	 disincentivised	 from	 engaging	 in	 costly	investment	necessary	for	the	creation	and	development	of	long-term	growth.			7.1.2.2.		Violence	Trap:		Government	Corruption	and	Rent	Creation		The	second	of	the	two	main	secondary	level	economic	effects	impacting	incentives	shaping	the	behaviour	of	 key	 state	 actors	 is	 derived	out	 of	 conceptual	 considerations	developed	under	the	Violence	Trap	thesis.	An	important	contribution	of	the	work	by	Weingast	and	his	co-authors	is	the	recognition	that	conditions	of	large-scale	and	continual	political	violence	in	 developing	 countries	 shape	 the	 incentives	 acting	 on	 key	 state	 actors	 affecting	 the	organisation	of	these	countries'	economies	in	ways	that	incentivise	rent-creation,	leading	
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to	 much	 of	 the	 inefficiency	 and	 poor	 growth	 outcomes	 observed	 in	 many	 developing	countries	both	today	and	throughout	history,	including	late-imperial	and	republican	China.	Given	 that	 political	 violence	 poses	 such	 negative	 potential	 consequences	 on	 those	 in	power—namely,	their	removal	from	power	or	loss	of	life	or	other	benefits—state	leaders	seek	to	minimise	the	likelihood	of	political	violence	from	occurring.	When	political	leaders	do	not	possess	a	sufficient	monopoly	on	violence	so	as	to	negate	the	ability	of	potential	rivals	from	 engaging	 in	 political	 violence	 that	 threatens	 political	 leaders'	 hold	 on	 power,	 one	strategy	 often	 employed	 to	 diminish	 the	 probability	 of	 violence	 is	 via	 the	 creations	 of	economic	 rents	 that	 can	 be	 distributed	 to	 potential	 competitors.	 Yet	 such	 rent-creation	strategies,	while	potentially	reducing	the	incidence	of	violence,	are	economically	inefficient,	involving	the	creation	of	state-enforced	monopolies	and	barriers	to	entry,	barriers	to	the	free	 exchange	 of	 goods	 and	 capital,	 price	 controls,	 and	 other	 impediments	 to	 efficient	market	functioning	(Tullock	1967,	Tollison	2012).	Such	strategies	are	inherently	designed	to	 create	 concentrated	 economic	 benefits,	 so	 that	 these	 concentrated	 benefits	 may	 be	directed	to	those	the	rent	creator	seeks	to	reward	or	co-opt.	Therefore,	the	"trap"	faced	by	leaders	of	states	unable	to	enforce	an	internal	monopoly	on	coercive	force	derives	from	the	fact	 that	 abandoning	 economically-inefficient	 rent-creation	 strategies	 increases	 the	likelihood	of	political	violence,	given	that	those	nonstate	actors	with	access	to	coordinated	violence	who	would	lose	their	privileges	under	liberalisation	are	incentivised	to	use	their	access	to	violence	to	attempt	to	overthrow	the	state	via	violent	regime	change.			The	 authoritarian	 nature	 of	 the	 late-imperial	 and	 republican	 Chinese	 state	 was	 a	contributing	factor	to	the	observed	levels	of	corruption	and	rent-seeking	behaviour.	Liberal	democratic	 government	 structures,	 and	 rights	 to	 open	 media	 that	 supports	 them,	 are	viewed	as	mechanisms	disincentivising	corruption	by	state	actors	(Montinola	&	Jackman	2002,	Brunetti	&	Weder	2003).	While	Heymann	(1996)	raises	concerns	 that	 these	same	factors	can	also	work	to	pressure	state	actors	to	respond	to	lobbying	efforts	that	leads	to	corruption,	 in	 ways	 that	 Kubbe	 &	 Englebert	 (2018)	 note	 vary	 considerably	 based	 on	country-specific	 characteristics,	 leading	 to	 observed	 levels	 of	 corruption	 in	 democratic	government	forms	(Fisman	&	Golden	2017),	for	Hollyer	&	Wantcheckon	(2015:501)	the	key	factor	 is	 that	 in	 authoritarian	 regimes,	 the	 incentives	 for	 corruption	 are	 inherent,	 not	country-specific:	 "Authoritarian	 states	 have	 an	 incentive	 to	 systematically	 rely	 on	corruption	 as	 a	 means	 to	 motivate	 bureaucratic	 	 agents	 and	 ruling	 party	 members";	similarly,	Kukutschka	(2018)	highlights	that	anti-corruption	measures	undertaken	within	authoritarian	systems	are	more	dependent	upon	the	decisions	of	only	a	few	high-level	state	actors,	and	hence	easily	subject	to	change	based	on	whim,	as	opposed	to	defined	aspects	of	the	political	system.	Meanwhile,	Rose-Ackerman	(1999)	suggests	government	structures	such	as	liberal	democracies	where	multiple	political	actors	are	forced	to	bargain	to	achieve	political	 goals	 increases	 the	 impediments	 to	 receiving	 benefits	 from	 rent-seeking	opportunities.	While	the	frequency	and	costs	of	rent-seeking	activity	under	authoritarian	dictatorships	versus	majority	voting	settings	is	still	a	topic	of	theoretical	debate	within	the	public	choice	 literature	(Congleton	1980,	Hillman	&	Riley	1989,	Mohtadi	&	Roe	2003,	Li	2013),	recent	empirical	work	has	indicated	a	negative	relationship	between	rent-seeking	and	economic	growth,	with	the	observed	relationship	to	be	stronger	in	poorer	countries	with	worse	institutions	(Schwab	&	Werker	2018).	Such	empirical	findings	are	in	line	with	the	Violence	Trap	claim	that	rent-seeking	and	associated	poor	economic	performance	are	a	partly	a	consequence	of	the	high	levels	of	political	violence	found	in	developing	nations.			This	theoretical	framework	contributes	to	our	understanding	of	some	of	the	policy	choices	undertaken	by	domestic	state	actors	within	the	historical	framework	of	the	late-imperial	and	republican	period.	The	historical	description	of	the	magnitude	of	political	existential	violence	provided	in	Section	6.2,	in	part	represented	by	the	measure	presented	in	Table	6.1,	underscores	the	precarious	hold	on	power	state	leaders	faced.	Those	securing	power	did	so	by	 only	 slightly	 besting	 a	 group	 of	 powerful	 rivals,	 implying	 their	 hold	 on	power	 to	 be	
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tenuous,	with	a	low	expected	value	assigned	to	their	chance	at	remaining	in	control	of	the	state	for	a	substantial	period	of	time.	As	such,	they	were	highly	incentivised	to	take	steps	to	reduce	the	probability	of	political	violence	being	perpetrated	against	their	hold	on	power.	Our	 argument	 is	 that	 the	 high	 degree	 of	 political	 interference	 in	 the	 economy	 by	 state	actors—including	a	great	deal	of	 rent-creation	via	state-controlled	monopolies,	amongst	the	many	inefficiencies	throughout	the	economy—was	not	a	coincidence,	but	rather	a	direct	outcome	of	 the	 low	weak	state	capacity	 that	exhibited	 itself	via	an	 inability	to	enforce	a	monopoly	over	political	violence.	Given	the	multiple	dispersed	sources	of	violence	present	throughout	 the	 society,	 domestic	 state	 actors	 sought	 to	 reduce	 the	 probability	 of	 such	political	 violence	 via	 the	 creation	of	 economic	 rents	 to	be	used	 to	 co-opt	 their	potential	rivals	with	access	to	the	machinations	of	coercive	force,	thereby	decreasing	the	threat	of	violence.	 This	 dynamic	 was	 clearly	 observable	 both	 through	 the	 practice	 of	 outright	corruption,	wherein	which	state	funds	were	directed	to	nonstate	actors	for	the	expressed	purpose	of	 inducing	 their	 support	 of	 the	 existing	political	 regime,	 as	well	 as	 generating	considerable	 impact	on	 the	structure	and	performance	of	 the	domestic	economy	via	 the	creation	and	maintenance	of	state-enforced	monopolies,	reflected	in	ever-increasing	levels	of	state	intervention	in	the	domestic	economy.				7.1.2.2.1.		Incentives	for	State	Corruption	Shaped	by	the	Lack	of	Monopoly	Over	Violence		Official	corruption	manifested	itself	in	several	ways.	Often,	monies	that	were	intended	for	development	purposes	"mysteriously	disappeared"	and	instead	were	directed	to	powerful	potential	rivals	of	state	leadership.	This	was	the	case	with	nearly	all	of	the	controversial	£25	million	 loan	President	Yuan's	 government	negotiated	with	 five	 creditor	nations;	 several	years	later,	a	senior	official	in	the	Chinese	Maritime	Customs	Service	was	quoted	remarking	that	"the	greater	part,	 if	not	all,	of	the	reorganisation	loan	of	1913	was	accounted	for	by	statements	and	vouchers,	 but	 that	 in	actual	 fact	 very	 little	 of	 it	was	 ever	 applied	 to	 the	purposes	for	which	it	was	lent",	instead	used	to	solidify	Yuan's	relationship	with	his	former	Beiyang	military	school	associates,	who	as	commanders	of	powerful	armies	represented	potential	 rivals	 (Thomson	 2012).	 Similarly,	 Paauw	 (1952:11)	 notes	 several	 examples	during	the	Guomindang	period	of	payments	that	flowed	from	the	central	state	to	provincial	and	local	leaders;	these	leaders,	given	their	command	over	powerful	armies,	represented	substantial	threats	to	the	central	state:	"In	1928	the	Nationalist	government	had	assigned	ample	revenue	sources	to	provincial	and	local	governments,	renouncing	the	claims	of	the	central	government	to	lucrative	sources	of	income.	...[These]	subsidies	were	employed	to	buy	the	loyalty	of	strong	local	and	provincial	rulers."	Paauw	(1952:	16)	further	puts	into	scale	the	degree	to	which	the	state	leadership	went	to	secure	the	support	of	potential	rivals,	arguing	that	"Military	expenditures	were	not	made	to	provide	for	the	political	and	economic	security	of	 the	masses;	by	and	large	 they	were	used	 to	protect	the	political	and	military	position	 of	 the	 Kuomintang	 from	 the	 challenge	 of	 internal	military	 revolt.	 Less	military	resources	were	used	to	repel	the	Japanese	aggression	in	Manchuria	and	North	China	than	to	preserve	the	military	supremacy	of	the	Kuomintang	among	a	group	of	Chinese	military	rivals."	Thus,	direct	flows	of	financial	resources	to	potential	rivals	were	purposely	designed	to	 create	 a	 degree	 of	 reliance	 on	 the	 existing	 political	 structure	 for	 financial	 resources,	thereby	decreasing	 the	probability	 for	potential	 rivals	 to	attempt	 to	dispose	 the	 current	state	leadership.	Nonetheless,	even	paying	such	subsidies,	the	Guomindang	faced	continual	rebellions	by	rival	warlord	groups,	such	as	the	extensive	Central	Plains	and	Ningxia	wars.		That	 corruption	 and	 bribery	 were	 so	 widespread	 partly	 reflected	 the	 low	 costs	 to	government	officials	in	engaging	in	such	behaviour.	As	Eastman	(1990:	18)	describes,	the	government	watchdog	agency,	the	Control	Yuan,	over	the	seven	years	from	its	founding	in	1931	 through	 August	 1937,	 was	 rarely	 able	 to	 even	 bring	 formal	 charges	 against	
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government	 officials	without	 encountering	 resistance	 for	 such	 actions	 from	senior-level	Party	leadership,	whose	interests	often	dovetailed	with	the	maintenance	of	the	corruption	scheme	under	investigation.	This	lack	of	enforcement	reflected	the	conflict	within	the	state	bureaucracy	between	the	official,	stated	desires	for	reduction	in	levels	of	corruption,	and	the	incentives	as	discussed	above	regarding	the	underlying	need	to	use	government	funds	in	ways	that	allowed	for	the	essential	pay-off	of	political	and	military	rivals	who	presented	serious	threats	to	the	current	political	order.				7.1.2.2.2.		Incentives	for	Rent-Creation	Shaped	by	the	Lack	of	Monopoly	Over	Violence		Beyond	the	direct	transfer	of	monies	involving	official	corruption,	domestic	state	officials	often	supported	policies	related	to	the	creation	of	economic	rents	via	the	construction	and	maintenance	of	state-controlled	monopolies	and	other	barriers	to	free	exchange	of	goods,	allowing	 for	 the	 generation	 of	 concentrated	 benefits	 able	 to	 be	 transferred	 to	 potential	rivals.	Thus,	the	government	created	barriers	to	entry	on	large	industries,	serving	as	gate-keeper	to	access	certain	markets.	The	state	also	used	numerous	aspects	of	its	regulatory	and	enforcement	power	to	affect	such	monopolies.	This	was	true,	for	instance,	especially	in	the	area	of	anti-smuggling	efforts,	leading	to	what	Thai	(2015:	2,5),	in	consideration	of	the	Guomindang	 government's	 "militarized	 antismuggling	 campaign	 to	 protect	 its	 revenues	and	assert	its	authority	as	China's	new	central	government",	suggests	was	representative	of	part	of	the	state's	overall	"creeping	regulatory	encroachment	in	everyday	life."		Numerous	prohibitions	existed,	designed	to	place	limitations	and	restrictions	on	the	size	of	markets	 and	 amount	 of	 trading	 activity.	 Rice	 produced	 in	 a	 certain	 region	 was	 often	restricted	 to	 be	 sold	 within	 that	 same	 region,	 with	 strict	 prohibitions	 placed	 on	 the	transportation	 of	 rice	 along	 the	 Yangzi,	 with	 similar	 restrictions	 being	 placed	 on	 other	commodities,	such	as	salt.	For	instance,	Gale	(1930:	248)	notes	that	salt	derived	from	the	brine	wells	found	in	western	China	was	prohibited	to	be	sold	outside	the	west-China	region	or	shipped	on	the	Yangzi	river.	Indeed,	the	entire	salt	production	industry	operated	under	strict	state	control,	with	the	state	granting	monopoly	rights	to	privileged	merchant	groups.	The	same	was	true	for	numerous	other	industries,	such	as	tea,	porcelain,	and	coal	mining,	monopoly	status	granted,	usually	on	 the	provincial	or	 local	 level,	to	a	sole	producer	of	a	commodity	within	a	given	region.	In	Guangdong,	for	instance,	the	provincial	government	founded	six	modern	sugar	mills	and	then	used	its	legal	power	to	ban	imports,	police	and	military	power	to	limit	smuggling	of	sugar,	and	regulatory	power	to	prevent	the	issuing	of	business	licenses	to	private	entrepreneurs	seeking	to	open	competing	sugar	mills.	In	this	manner,	the	powerful	state	actor,	provincial	leader	Chen	Jitang,	used	the	power	of	the	state	to	create	rents	via	a	monopoly	and	then	hand	them	out	to	privileged	cooperating	merchants,	such	as	Mo	Yinggui	and	Feng	Rui	(Lian	2005).	Chen	also	employed	selective	enforcement	of	smuggling	laws	to	allow	the	duty-free	importation	of	certain	types	of	refined	sugar	to	supply	favoured	suppliers	with	cheap	imported	sugar	and	avoid	the	collection	and	transference	of	required	 customs	 duties	 to	 the	 central	 government,	 which	 had	 established	 customs	collection	stations	throughout	the	province's	ports	(Hill	2010:	5-8).	Numerous	other	market	restrictions	were	continually	created	by	domestic	governments.	Under	the	Guomindang,	the	Ministry	 of	 Industries	 established	 numerous	 joint	 government-private	 enterprises	 that	were	granted	monopoly	control	over	the	sale	of	specific	commodities,	such	as	firms	that	dealt	in	paper,	tea,	vegetable	oils,	and	even	founded	the	Central	Fish	Company	in	Shanghai,	which	was	granted	monopoly	control	over	the	fish	trade	in	the	Jiangnan	region.	Given	that	the	 Ministry	 itself	 was	 the	 controlling	 shareholder,	 in	 these	 concerns,	 the	 significant	economic	rents	created	from	these	monopoly	ventures	were	under	its	control	and	able	to	be	directed	to	privileged	parties	the	Ministry	and	the	Guomindang	sought	to	favour	(Coble	1980:	245-246).		
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	7.1.2.2.3.		Corruption	and	Rent-Creation	as	an	outcome	of	Lack	of	Monopoly	on	Violence:																				The	Guomindang	and	the	Green	Gang:		Understanding	the	usefulness	of	rent	creation	and	official	corruption	play	in	obtaining	the	political	and	military	support	of	potential	 rivals	helps	to	 illuminate	 the	rationale	 for	 the	Guomindang	leadership	to	provide	support	to	 the	Green	Gang.	Having	developed	 from	a	small	secret	society	into	a	full-scale	sophisticated	criminal	syndicate,	the	Green	Gang	had	access	 to	 sources	of	 coercive	 violence	of	 considerable	magnitude;	 although	 in	a	 vacuum	perhaps	unlikely	to	represent	an	existential	threat	to	the	Guomindang	regime	by	itself,	in	a	political	 environment	 in	 which	 the	 Guomindang	 government	 faced	 multiple	 additional	existential	threats,	the	level	of	violence	able	to	have	been	inflicted	by	the	Green	Gang	was	potentially	highly	destabilising.	Similar	power	dynamics	between	the	state	and	organised	crime	 syndicates	 frequently	 exist	 within	 other	 developing	 countries,	 such	 as	 in	 Mexico	between	the	government	and	paramilitarised	drug	cartels	(Correa-Cabrera	et	al.	2015).	As	a	result,	rather	than	attempting	to	enforce	an	adherence	to	rule	of	law	and	directly	combat	the	 disruptions	 to	 the	 social	 order,	 defiance	 of	 police	 control,	 and	 violations	 of	 private	property	 rights	 of	 Shanghai's	 residents	 inflicted	by	 the	Green	Gang,	 the	 state	 leadership	apparently	 found	 it	more	advantageous	 to	co-opt	 this	criminal	organisation	 through	the	creation	and	enforcement	of	a	monopoly	on	opium	smuggling—as	Wakeman	(1995a:	254)	describes	it,	"the	creation	and	elaboration	of	an	official	narcotics	monopoly."	This	extensive	and	highly	lucrative	venture	delivered	concentrated	and	excludable	benefits	to	those	who	could	utilise	it.	Thus,	by	allowing	the	Green	Gang	exclusive	rights	to	run	this	monopoly,	the	Guomindang	leadership	was	able	to	successfully	demand	in	return	support	of	the	Party's	anti-communist	and	anti-Japanese	political	goals.	Such	an	arrangement	began	early	on	in	the	Guomindang	regime	with	the	infamous	April	1927	white	terror	episode	in	Shanghai,	in	which	Jiang	Jieshi	ordered	a	purge	of	Communists	from	the	Guomindang	Party	and	used	his	relationship	with	Green	Gang	boss	Du	Yuesheng	(-+6)	to	have	the	Gang	coordinate	the	round-up	and	murder	of	thousands	of	the	Party's	former	allies.			The	 Guomindang	 leadership	 was	 already	 familiar	 with	 the	 lucrative	 financial	 benefits	generated	from	creating	a	monopoly	in	opium	trade.	Song	Ziwen,	acting	as	Finance	Minister	of	the	southern-based	Guomindang	government	in	the	1920s,	had	helped	create	an	opium	monopoly	 in	 Guangdong	 (van	 de	 Ven	 2003:	 90-93).	With	 the	 ascension	 of	 the	 Party	 to	achieving	nominal	control	over	the	central	government	apparatus	by	1927,	the	size	of	the	economic	rent	created	from	a	nationwide	opium	monopoly	was	not	small.	As	a	result,	the	illicit	opium	trade	brought	in	huge	sums	of	money	to	the	Green	Gang,	much	of	which	was	then	funnelled	to	the	Guomindang	benefactors	(Wakeman	1988,	1995a,	2003;	Taylor	2014).	As	Finance	Minister,	Song	was	able	 to	extract	 large	 tax	payments	from	the	opium	cartel,	since	it	earned	monopoly	profits.	Wakeman,	(1995a:	34)	even	goes	so	far	as	to	claim	that	"modern	 Shanghai	was	 literally	 built	 on	 the	 proceeds	 of	 the	 opium	 trade".	 Further,	 the	monopoly	and	co-option	exemplified	exactly	the	kind	of	quid	pro	quo	Weingast	and	his	co-authors	argue	are	representative	of	the	type	of	violence-reduction	techniques	commonly	employed	 in	 low-capacity	 states.	 According	 to	 Wakeman	 (1995a:	 205),	 the	 agreement	between	 Du	 and	 Jiang	 was	 explicit:	 "Du	 Yuesheng	 agreed	 to	 organize	 anti-Communist	terrorist	activities	in	Shanghai	in	exchange	for	Chiang's	recognition	of	his	drug	monopoly	in	the	Yangzi	Valley."	Thus,	the	Guomindang	state	created	monopoly	rents,	and	then	used	the	expected	benefits	of	access	to	that	rent	to	buy	off	one	of	its	rivals,	who	in	return	agreed	not	to	use	 their	access	 to	mechanisms	of	violence	against	the	state,	but	rather	against	other	rivals	of	the	state.	Hence,	we	observe	a	set	of	behaviours	well	suggested	by	the	violence	trap	theory—lacking	 the	 ability	 to	 secure	 a	 monopoly	 on	 force,	 and	 faced	 with	 multiple	existential	threats,	Guomindang	leaders	engaged	in	a	policy	to	co-opt	a	potential	rival	who	also	possessed	access	to	coercive	violence	to	decrease	the	probability	of	such	violence	being	directed	towards	them	and	negatively	affecting	their	ability	to	remain	in	power.	
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	Of	 course,	 beyond	 the	 rent-creation	 aspect,	 much	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	Guomindang	and	the	Green	Gang	involved	corruption,	with	various	state	actors	receiving	personal	financial	benefits	deriving	from	their	cooperation	and	implicit	support	of	Gang's	opium	trading	and	other	illicit	business	activities.	It	was	certainly	in	the	interest	of	Green	Gang	 members	 to	 entice	 greater	 cooperation	 from	 Guomindang	 authorities	 by	 way	 of	offering	financial	bribes,	helping	to	further	the	justified	reasoning	behind	the	Guomindang	rationalisation	of	their	acquiescence	of	Green	Gang	activities.	Wakeman	(1995a)	goes	into	extensive	 detail	 regarding	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 Jiang	 and	 his	 family	 became	 personally	enriched	 via	 their	 implicit	 approval	 of	 the	 opium	 smuggling	 trade.	 In	 one	 instance,	 the	Smuggling	Prevention	Office	determined	that	members	of	Jiang's	own	inner	circle,	including	Jiang's	 brother-in-law,	 helped	 conduct	 a	 large	 smuggling	 operation;	 in	 response,	 Jiang	ordered	 the	case	against	his	compatriots	dismissed,	and	 instead	 fired	the	director	of	 the	Smuggling	Prevention	Office	(Wakeman	2003:	325-327;	Taylor	2014:	40).		Whatever	sincere	attempts	at	control	of	the	illicit	drug	trade	by	some	state	actors	that	did	occur	 were	 often	 undermined	 by	 countermeasures	 taken	 by	 other	 state	 actors.	 The	Smuggling	Prevention	Office	consistently	experienced	interference	from	other	branches	of	government	 whose	 principals	 were	 invested	 in	 protecting	 the	 Green	 Gang's	 ability	 to	conduct	its	opium	trade.	That	elements	in	the	government	were	involved	heavily	in	opium	trafficking	and	trade,	beyond	even	simple	tacit	non-enforcement,	in	an	inherently	corrupt	manner,	was	well-known.	Major	English-	and	Chinese-language	newspapers	of	the	period	often	recounted	instances	of	government	involvement	in	promoting	and	sanctioning	trade	in	opium.	For	instance,	a	March	1931	Shanghai	Evening	Post	&	Mercury	article	notes	that,	"The	Opium	Suppression	Bureau,	a	government	affair,	has	been	 functioning	 in	a	manner	peculiarly	its	own	for	the	past	two	years.	At	times	a	guard	of	soldiers	and	men	bearing	what	are	said	to	be	 the	credentials	of	the	O.S.B	approach	opium	runners	on	ships	and	receive	consignments	of	opium	for	which	they	pay	‘transportation	charges.’	At	other	times	a	great	show	 of	 a	 seizure	 is	 made	 but	 those	 ‘in	 the	 know’	 usually	 hear	 afterwards	 that	 the	consignment	was	the	property	of	some	small	man	not	in	the	Ring	and	that	the	drug	was	returned	to	him	on	payment	of	‘squeeze’"	(Woodhead	1931).	In	any	event,	all	pretence	that	the	government	was	interested	in	preventing	Opium	smuggling	came	to	be	discarded	when	Green	Gang	boss	Du	Yuesheng	himself	was	appointed	head	of	the	National	Board	of	Opium	Suppression	Bureau	in	1932,	providing	the	Gang	essentially	official	control	over	the	entire	opium	trade	in	China.		Yet	while	corruption	was	endemic,	the	rationale	for	the	Guomindang	leadership	to	support	the	 activities	 of	 the	 Green	 Gang	 clearly	 go	 beyond	 the	 simple	 explanation	 of	 a	 result	 of	personal	corruption.	The	corruption	observed	was	of	an	institutional	nature,	and	not	one	that	can	easily	be	ascribed	to	uniquely	poor	moral	character	of	those	employed	by	domestic	Shanghai	 police	 forces	 in	 the	 Public	 Security	 Bureau	 or	 the	 Opium	 Suppression	 Board.	Instead,	 the	agreement	between	 Jiang	and	Du,	so	well-known	and	observable	by	private	actors	and	police	force	members,	institutionalised	and	incentivised	a	culture	of	corruption.	There	was	little	benefit	for	police	personnel	to	behave	in	an	incorrupt	manner,	as	they	well	knew	that	sincere	efforts	to	fight	opium	smuggling	were	prone	to	be	reversed	and	subverted	at	 the	 highest	 levels	 of	 government.	 In	 such	 an	 environment,	where	 corruption	was	 so	obviously	 officially	 sanctioned,	 it	 likely	 appeared	 more	 rational	 to	 accept	 the	 financial	incentives	in	the	way	of	bribes	and	avoid	potential	violence	that	the	smugglers	could	direct	their	way.	In	this	manner,	widespread	corruption	became	normalised.	So,	too,	therefore,	did	a	 more	 generalised	 lack	 of	 adherence	 to	 rule	 of	 law	 throughout	 society,	 thus	 clearly	degrading	the	overall	environment	of	private	property	rights.			
	 159 
In	 this	 regard,	 we	 disagree	 with	 much	 of	 the	 literature	 that	 ascribes	 the	 Guomindang	government,	 or	 its	 municipal	 police	 force,	 to	 have	 been	 "corrupted"	 by	 the	 criminal	elements	of	Shanghai.	For	instance,	Wang	(2017)	suggests	Jiang	Jieshi	"wished"	to	control	corruption	and	attempted	to	establish	good	governance,	arguing	that	corruption	derailed	the	Party's	state-building	efforts.	The	University	of	California	Press'	 review	of	Wakeman	(1995a)	notes	that	"Chiang	Kai-shek	wanted	to	prove	that	the	Chinese	could	rule	Shanghai	and	the	country	by	themselves,	rather	than	be	exploited	and	dominated	by	foreign	powers.	His	efforts	to	reclaim	the	crime-ridden	city	failed,	partly	because	of	the	outbreak	of	war	with	Japan	in	1937,	but	also	because	the	Nationalist	police	force	was	itself	corrupted	by	the	city."	Likewise,	Li	(1997)	confidently	claims,	"In	1927,	at	the	beginning	of	the	Nanjing	decade,	the	Nationalists'	goal	in	Shanghai	was	to	build	a	new	civic	society	in	which	the	primary	function	of	 a	professionalized	police	 force	was	 law	 enforcement,	 as	 it	 is	 in	 any	modern	 civilized	society",	but	then	laments	that	by	the	start	of	the	next	decade,	already	ambitions	had	been	tempered	by	the	realities	of	a	"crime-	and	crisis-ridden	society."			Yet	while	many	state	actors	certainly	received	personal	financial	and	other	benefits	deriving	from	their	cooperation	and	implicit	support	of	the	Green	Gang,	Guomindang	leadership	was	not	 incentivised	 to	 create	 policies	 to	 reduce	 corruption,	 and	 were	 themselves	 open	 to	receiving	 benefits	 from	 corruption,	 because	 the	 benefits	 of	 doing	 so	 outweighed	 the	alternative	costs	from	fighting	the	Green	Gang.	Thus,	the	Guomindang	and	the	police	were	not	"corrupted"	by	the	Green	Gang;	rather,	given	the	existential	threats	faced	by	the	state,	the	short-term	nature	of	the	incentive	outlook	implied	that	rent	creation—in	the	form	of	opium	trade	made	illegal	and	hence	closed	off	to	competitive	entry—that	could	be	used	to	buy	off	a	potential	rival	of	the	state	created	conditions	for	corruption	to	so	readily	thrive.		The	 "crime-ridden	 society"	 of	 Shanghai	 was	 an	 outcome	 of	 the	 Guomindang	 policy	 of	placating,	 enabling	 and	 even	 encouraging	 the	 Green	 Gang,	 the	 city's	 major	 criminal	organisation	that	was	directly	responsible	for	the	city's	high	crime	and	murder	rates,	with	much	 of	 the	 civilian	 community	 terrorised	 by	 the	 organisation's	 illicit	 and	 extortionist	practices	that	disregarded	the	private	property	and	lives	of	private	agents.		Ultimately,	the	leadership	of	the	Guomindang	state	were	attempting	to	stay	in	power,	and	in	 order	 to	do	 so	 it	was	 necessary	 to	 prevent	 those	 outside	 the	 state—such	 as	military	commanders,	communist	forces,	or	external	Japanese	military	forces—from	overthrowing	them	using	violence.	 In	an	environment	 fraught	with	existential	 threats	 from	rivals	who	possessed	access	 to	sources	of	coercive	violence,	 the	violence	 that	 the	Green	Gang	could	bring	to	bear	on	the	Guomindang	military	and	police	apparatus	was	sufficient	to	represent	a	credible	serious	threat	to	their	ability	to	stay	in	power.	Therefore,	Guomindang	leaders	were	open	to	engage	in	strategies	that	could	co-opt	private	actors	with	access	to	coercive	violence,	 inducing	 such	 actors	 to	not	use	 such	violence	 against	 state	 leaders,	 but	 rather	against	 state	 leaders'	 rivals.	 The	 desire	 to	 stay	 in	 power	 outweighed	 any	 rationales	Guomindang	 leaders	might	have	had	 in	 regard	 to	allowing	 the	Green	Gang	 to	 engage	 in	highly	illegal	activities	that	so	thoroughly	corrupted	the	domestic	environment	for	rule	of	law	 and	 the	 overall	 state	 of	 private	 property	 rights	 protections,	 clearly	 negatively	dampening	entrepreneurial	activity.		Interestingly,	for	all	the	use	of	rent	creation	and	delivering	economic	rents	to	entice	support	from	 political	 rivals	 possessing	 the	 power	 of	 coercive	 force,	 the	 strategy	 proved	 only	partially	effective.	Certainly,	that	is	apparent	if	from	nothing	more	than	the	frequency	of	realised	 violent	 regime	 change	 and	 outright	 civil	 war	 that	 dominated	 the	 period.	 Chen	(2000:195)	reflects	the	precariousness	of	the	strategy	by	noting	the	inherent	difficulty	of	using	 rents	 to	 bribe	 rivals,	 leading	 to	 it	 being	 "extremely	 difficult	 to	 follow	 the	 shifting	alliances	 among	 the	 myriad	 military	 and	 political	 leaders	 in	 China	 at	 this	 time.	 Most	agreements	 were	 simply	 cynical	 short-term	 arrangements	 to	 eliminate	 a	 rival	 before	turning	against	one's	erstwhile	partner."		
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Such	complex	shifting	alliances	were	often	due	to	changes	in	perceived	expected	gains	a	given	political	rival	might	anticipate	in	response	to	changes	in	group	power	dynamics	or	the	likelihood	of	military	victory,	affected	as	well	by	changes	support	or	capacity	demonstrated	by	other	rivals	(Powell	2006,	Driscoll	2015,	Cox	et	al.	2017).	Indeed,	an	important	caveat	is	necessary	in	regard	to	the	nature	and	causes	of	political	violence	that	took	place	throughout	the	period.	While	we	have	focussed	on	the	way	in	which	political	violence	poses	existential	threats	 for	 state	 leaders	 and	 incentivises	 them	 to	 undertake	 policies	 that	 reduce	 the	probability	 of	 violence,	 so	 too	 is	 it	 true	 that	 in	 certain	 instances,	 when	 the	 risks	 of	undertaking	violence	appears	high	relative	to	the	potential	benefits	received,	state	leaders	can	actually	be	the	drivers	of	political	violence,	rather	than	attempting	to	limit	its	outbreak	(Cox	et	al.	2017	model	a	subset	of	the	factors	that	can	lead	actors	to	choose	violence	in	their	development	of	their	‘proportionality	principle’,	which	balances	the	costs	of	fighting	versus	the	benefits	from	receiving	rents).	Dincecco	(2015:903),	building	on	work	by	Cox	(2011)	and	Hoffman	(2015)	regarding	the	problem	of	royal	moral	hazard	wherein	which	monarchs	do	not	bear	the	full	costs	of	warfare	but	do	gain	full	benefits,	presents	the	reason	European	states	 were	 unable	 to	 overcome	 institutional	 impediments	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 credible	commitment	mechanisms:	"To	evade	parliament,	monarchs	used	fiscal	predation	including	forced	loans,	the	sale	of	state	lands,	monopolies,	and	offices,	and	the	seizure	of	private	goods.	The	 problem	 of	 royal	 moral	 hazard	 in	 warfare	 aggravated	 this	 fundamental	 tension	between	monarchs	and	parliaments.	Monarchs	saw	definite	upsides	from	military	victory,	such	as	personal	glory,	but	few	downsides	from	defeat...	Parliamentary	elites,	by	contrast,	had	to	bear	new	tax	burdens	related	to	the	monarch’s	military	adventures...	Royal	moral	hazard	helps	 explain	why	monarchs	were	nearly	always	 in	battle;	wars	 involving	major	powers	were	underway	in	78	to	95	percent	of	all	years	between	1500	and	1800."	In	certain	ways,	this	description	accords	with	behaviours	of	the	domestic	state	leadership	during	the	late-imperial	period	onward—the	constant	wars	fought	whose	costs	were	borne	primarily	by	the	common	populace,	and	the	use	of	authoritarian	state	power	to	create	monopolies,	impose	forced	loans,	and	undertake	the	seizure	of	private	property.			Nonetheless,	as	indicated	by	the	number	of	violent	regime	changes	as	displayed	in	Table	6.1,	and	by	the	outcomes	of	many	of	the	civil	wars	and	foreign	invasions,	at	least	a	significant	number	 of	 the	military	 threats	 faced	 by	 domestic	 state	 governments	 were	 of	 sufficient	seriousness	 as	 to	 have	 been	 considered	 existential;	 thus,	 the	 conditions	 necessary	 to	generate	our	"low	credibility	trap",	or	to	support	the	rationale	by	state	actors	to	engage	in	rent-creation	as	per	the	Violence	Trap,	remained.	Moreover,	regardless	the	impetus	of	the	entire	 range	 of	 civil	 strife	 and	warfare	 experienced	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 period,	 the	primary	economic	impacts	relating	to	the	actual	or	future	expectation	of	destruction	or	theft	of	productive	assets	also	remains	consistent.			7.1.2.4.		Lack	of	Monopoly	on	Violence:	Further	Implications		An	 advantage	 of	 applying	 this	 analytic	 approach	 is	 that	 it	 also	 proves	 useful	 to	 better	understand	some	of	the	more-contested	aspects	of	Chinese	economic	history.	As	mentioned,	there	exist	conflicting	views	regarding	the	level	of	Chinese	economic	growth	over	the	late	imperial	 and	 republican	periods.	 The	 observed	 relative	political	 stability	 during	 the	 so-called	 "Nanjing	Decade"	admittedly	 fits	with	 some	of	 the	 revisionist	 economic	historical	research	 on	 the	 Guomindang	 period,	 which	 argues	 the	 Chinese	 economy	 underwent	substantive	growth	(Brandt	1989,	Rawski	1989).	While	true	that	certain	indicators	might	suggest	growth	 to	have	been	 comparatively	stronger	 than	 in	previous	periods,	 even	 the	most	optimistic	appraisals,	when	viewed	 in	comparison	with	the	growth	experienced	by	Japan,	 or	 European	 and	 American	 economies,	 are	 not	 particularly	 impressive.	 Though	increased	 industrialisation	 took	place,	 the	number	of	 factories	and	 the	degree	of	 capital	utilisation	in	manufacturing	remained	low	in	absolute	terms,	especially	given	the	size	of	the	
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economy.	Ultimately,	however	robust	was	actual	economic	growth,	it	appears	to	have	been	uneven	throughout	the	period,	given	that	nothing	approaching	a	Rostowian	"take-off"	was	achieved,	signifying	perhaps	the	strongest	indicator	that	the	seeming	great	potential	of	the	Chinese	economy	remained	unactualised.	Yet	the	opportunities	presented	by	ready	access	to	modern	industrial	technologies—as	well	as	to	capital	via	Shanghai's	financial	markets—suggest	 the	 outcome	 could	 have	 been	much	 different.	 Brandt	 (1997:	 287)	 outlines	 the	pertinent	issue	facing	economic	historians	of	the	period:	"the	important	question	is:	why	after	the	opening	up	of	China	in	the	1840s	did	the	utilization	of	new	technology	take	so	long	to	cement	and	the	modem	sector	take	so	long	to	emerge?"	For	Brandt,	the	real	puzzle	is	the	lack	of	modern	 industrial	 technology	 transfer	 that	 economic	 logic	 suggests	 should	have	taken	place:	"Insofar	as	the	transfer	of	technology	to	China	in	textiles	and	other	emerging	industries	was	profitable	–and	estimates	suggest	that	it	usually	was–	what	combination	of	forces	prevented	this	transfer	from	successfully	occurring	earlier,	or	at	a	more	rapid	rate?	[C]ase	studies	on	technology	transfer...	generally	suggest	that	the	technologies	introduced	were	not	economically	incompatible	with	China.	That	is,	they	could	produce	at	lower	cost	than	their	traditional	counterparts	and	were	not	crowded	out	by	more	efficient	indigenous	producers."	And	yet,	such	technological	transfers	were	rare,	and	those	that	did	occur	often	failed	or	were	 incomplete.	Brandt	continues	to	present	his	puzzle	by	noting	 that,	 "When	they	failed,	the	problem	appears	to	lie	in	the	non-economic	costs	of	the	transfer,	which	were	frequently	tied	to	China's	system	of	political	economy.	These	costs	frequently	forced	firms	to	shut	down	after	a	 few	years	and	discouraged	 investment	by	others."	Brandt	 finds	the	situation	 particularly	 puzzling	 given	 that	 "it	 is	 probably	 correct	 that	 no	 potentially	profitable	industries	failed	in	19th	or	20th-century	China	because	of	official	opposition."			To	answer	the	puzzle	Brandt	poses	as	why	domestic	Chinese	entrepreneurs	would	not	take	advantage	of	profitable	new	technologies	for	"non-economic"	reasons	that	did	not	include	official	opposition,	we	consider	the	peculiar	system	of	political	economy	to	which	Brandt	refers.	Due	to	the	high	degree	of	political	violence,	and	the	resultant	low	level	of	credible	commitment	mechanisms	that	could	assure	entrepreneurs	of	the	state's	institutional	ability	and	resolve	to	provide	private	property	rights	protections,	we	would	argue	that	the	risk	return	profiles	domestic	entrepreneurs	faced	were	driven	too	high	and	too	volatile	to	allow	the	 undertaking	 of	 costly	 investment	 opportunities,	 such	 as	 implementing	 modern	industrial	technologies	in	production.	The	lack	of	private	property	rights	that	existed,	due	to	 the	 level	of	destruction	writ	 large	brought	on	by	 the	constant	condition	of	civil	 strife,	meant	that	the	"non-economic	costs"	to	which	Brandt	refers	above	included	the	potential	of	a	representative	entrepreneur's	property	destroyed	or	expropriated	by	nonstate	actors,	or	by	state	actors	unable	to	constrain	themselves	to	honour	commitments	not	to	expropriate	when	 faced	with	 the	 a	 constant	 stream	 of	 existential	 threats—i.e.,	 one's	 factory	 getting	bombed,	 burned,	 or	 confiscated.	 All	 of	 these	 factors	 implied	 very	 real	 economic	 costs	discouraging	entrepreneurial	investment.	Of	course,	other	factors	undoubted	also	played	important	 roles;	 for	Wang	 (2013),	 who	 reiterates	 the	 puzzle	 Brandt	 raises,	 the	 role	 of	information	costs	was	an	important	early	factor	when	price	and	supply	information	could	not	be	transmitted	between	commodity	producers	and	manufacturers	quickly	and	at	low	cost;	 as	he	notes,	 however,	 this	 constraint	was	 removed	as	 early	 as	 the	1880s	with	 the	development	of	better	transportation	networks	and	laying	of	telegraph	lines.		Another	 puzzle	 in	 the	 historical	 evidence,	 identified	 above,	 is	 why	 the	 institutional	environment	providing	private	property	 and	 contract	 rights	protections	 appeared	more	robust	during	the	early-	and	mid-Qing	period	compared	to	what	followed	starting	in	the	late-Qing	(Ocko	&	Gilmartin	2009).	Extensive	research	illustrates	a	legal	environment	that	successfully	 provided	 protections	 on	 contracts	 (Liang	 1996,	 Buoye	 2000)	 supporting	 a	robust	set	of	market	exchanges	(Huang	1996,	2010;	Allee	2004;	Chui	2008),	including	the	development	of	domestic	proto-financial	instruments	that	pre-dated	the	arrival	of	similar	instruments	by	foreign	businesses	(Zelin	1988,	2005a;	Morck	&	Yang	2011).	Thus,	if	late-
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imperial	and	republican	governments	lacked	appropriate	legal	institutional	environments	for	 dynamic	 economic	 and	 financial	 development,	 it	 must	 have	 come	 from	 conditions	unique	to	those	time	frames,	and	not	inherited	from	prior	institutional	structures.	Similarly,	state	 bureaucratic,	 fiscal	 and	military	 capacity	 also	 appears	 to	 have	 been	 demonstrably	stronger	during	these	earlier	periods	when	contrasted	with	the	latter	(Kung	&	Ma	2014).			Early	period	Qing	governments,	defined	by	 low	 levels	of	 taxation	and	concomitant	small	fiscal	expenditures,	exhibited	 little	direct	active	role	and	 large-scale	 interventions	 in	 the	economy	(Wang	1973:	79-83),	with	Miller	(2000:	23)	noting	that	"Taxes	on	commerce	were	insignificant	until	the	institution	of	the	 lijin	(likin)	in	the	mid-nineteenth-century."	Rowe	(1993)	has	written	persuasively	in	regard	to	the	relative	market	orientation	of	mid-Qing	economic	policy,	embodied	by	the	two	concepts	of	1C	(free	circulation	of	commodities),	and		(adherence	to	market	prices).	Using	archival	sources,	Rowe	documents	the	actions	of	 Chen	 Hongmou,	 a	 provincial	 official	whose	 economic	 liberalisation	 efforts	 led	 to	 the	reduction	in	trade	barriers.	An	opponent	of	price	controls,	Chen	maintained	his	stance	that	market	forces	could	better	allocate	scare	goods.	When	a	poor	harvest	drove	up	prices	on	rice	in	Jiangxi	in	1740,	Chen	stated	that	"any	action	[government	officials]	took	should	show	respect	for	actual	market	prices	and,	however	alarmingly	grain	prices	shot	up,	[officials]	must	never	impose	official	price	controls	nor	compel	owners	to	sell	at	sub-market	prices.	In	Chen's	logic,	just	as	buyers	would	be	attracted	to	an	item	at	the	right	price,	so	too	would	sellers	sell	when	they	felt	the	price	to	be	favourable....	To	alter	it	by	fiat	would	be	unnatural	and	immoral,	as	well	as	counterproductive"(14).			If	depictions	of	a	less	intrusive,	laissez-faire	government	prior	to	the	start	of	the	late-Qing	are	correct,	the	Violence	Trap	analytic	approach	provides	potential	insight	explaining	the	existence	of	stronger	protections	on	private	property	and	contract	rights	during	the	earlier	period.	Importantly,	the	degree	and	consistency	of	political	violence	that	dominated	China	from	the	late-Qing	onwards	was	unique,	signifying	a	sharp	break	from	the	relative	stability	of	earlier	Ming	and	Qing	periods.	Those	imperial	states	did	not	face	continual	existential	violence	threats;	while	uprisings,	wars	and	episodes	of	social	instability	were	present,	the	scale	and	persistence	of	such	social	unrest	was	dissimilar	to	that	of	the	subsequent	period.	The	 implications	 of	 such	 differences	 fit	 well	 with	 the	 historical	 evidence	 regarding	 the	nature	of	legal	and	other	institutional	protections	on	private	property	and	contract	rights,	and	degree	of	state	capacity,	which	defined	the	earlier	periods	of	Qing	rule.	It	is	perhaps	therefore	more	 than	 an	 interesting	 coincidence	 that	 a	 deterioration	 in	 institutional	 and	bureaucratic	capacity	appears	to	have	occurred	with	the	onset	of	continual	and	existential	levels	 of	 political	 violence	 starting	 in	 the	 late-Qing,	 when	 the	 incentive	 structures	 that	shaped	the	behaviour	of	state	and	private	actors	thereby	changed	considerably,	increasing	short-termism	and	reliance	on	rent-creation	and	corruption	amongst	state	actors.		Both	aspects	of	the	secondary	level	economic	impacts	caused	by	weak	state	capacity	in	the	enforcement	of	a	monopoly	on	internal	coercive	violence,	and	the	concomitant	condition	of	continual	 and	 persistent	 existential	 political	 violence,	 led	 to	 conditions	 where	 private	entrepreneurs	 and	 investors	 were	 disincentivised	 to	 engage	 in	 the	 kinds	 of	 costly	investment	required	to	generate	sustained	economic	growth.	On	the	one	hand,	given	the	existence	of	constant	existential	threats,	state	actors	undertook	strategies	that	encouraged	the	creation	of	economic	rents	in	order	to	deliver	concentrated	economic	benefits	to	rival	nonstate	actors	so	as	to	secure	their	support	or	reduce	the	probability	of	them	using	violent	means	leading	to	the	overthrow	of	the	state.	Such	policies,	however,	were	conducive	to	state	control	and	intervention	into	the	economy,	designed	to	limit	the	free	trade	of	goods	and	create	government-controlled	barriers	to	entry.	As	such,	the	environment	for	business	was	not	conducive	to	encouraging	costly	investment	by	private	entrepreneurs	and	investors,	as	it	 required	 private	 actors	 to	 engage	 in	 unproductive	 rent-seeking	 behaviour	 to	 gain	favoured	status	as	opposed	to	channelling	scare	resources	into	productive	activities.		
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Relatedly,	 the	 degree	 of	 corruption	 engendered	 by	 these	 policies	 contributed	 to	 a	 clear	weakening	 of	 institutional	 structures	 such	 as	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 In	 addition,	 the	 continual	existence	of	existential	threats	meant	state	actors	were	effectively	unable	to	create	credible	commitment	 mechanisms	 necessary	 for	 the	 development	 of	 a	 strong	 institutional	environment	supporting	the	protection	of	private	property	and	contract	rights.	Under	such	a	 political	 environment,	 state	 actors	 discounted	 the	 long-term	 harms	 to	 the	 overall	institutional	environment	caused	by	state	interventions	in	the	economy	and	violations	of	private	 actors'	 private	 property	 rights,	 instead	 only	 concerned	 with	 increasing	 the	likelihood	of	regime	survival	to	be	derived	in	the	immediate	from	undertaking	such	actions.	Support	for	theoretical	arguments	regarding	the	importance	of	the	relationship	between	state	capacity	to	maintain	a	monopoly	on	violence,	with	levels	of	institutional	strength	and	economic	development	is	suggested	by	the	findings	in	recent	empirical	work	by	Haggard	&	Tiede	(2011:	683)	indicating	that	there	exist	"complex	complementarities"	between	rule	of	law	and	property	rights	institutions,	and	that	many	of	these	complementarities	seem	to	rest	upon	issues	pertaining	to	political	and	social	violence:	"The	incidence	of	violence	appears	to	 be	 a	 powerful	 factor	 in	 discriminating	 among	 rule	 of	 law	 complexes	 in	 developing	countries	and	was	an	important	determinant	of	the	volatility	of	economic	growth."				7.2.		 The	"Grabbing	Hand"	of	Taxes,	Regulation,	and	Expropriations		Violations	of	Private	Property	Rights	by	State	Actors	as	an	Outcome	of	Lack	of	Monopoly	over	Violence			As	noted,	state	actors	operating	under	conditions	of	continual	threats	of	severe	existential	violence	 are	 incentivised	 to	 engage	 in	 behaviours	 that	 reduce	 the	 threat	 of	 the	 regime	overthrow	 in	 the	 short-term,	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 long-run	 consequences	 of	 those	behaviours.	As	a	result,	deterrents	that	can	typically	induce	state	actors	to	avoid	engaging	in	the	expropriation	of	private	actor	assets	because	of	the	long-run	harms	that	come	from	such	actions—e.g.,	low	economic	output	because	of	poor	property	rights	institutions,	or	the	inability	of	the	state	to	obtain	low-cost	financing	in	the	future	if	the	state	defaults	on	loans	in	 the	present—are	 so	heavily	discounted	 that	 the	 short-term	benefits	 of	 expropriatory	behaviours	outweigh	expected	long-term	harms.	Similar	dynamics	can	induce	state	actors	to	seek	to	exert	control	over	other	areas	of	private	civil	society	so	as	to	limit	the	probability	that	public	dissatisfaction	with	expropriatory	behaviours	can	spur	dispersed	private	actors	to	overcome	coordination	problems	so	as	to	represent	a	credible	threat	to	the	stability	of	the	 existing	 regime.	 We	 find	 ample	 evidences	 of	 state	 actors	 undertaking	 steps	 to	continually	expand	control	over	increasing	aspects	of	society,	 in	both	economic	and	civil	spheres,	over	the	course	of	the	time	period,	with	many	of	the	drivers	for	such	behaviours	owing	to	pressures	and	incentives	on	state	actors	as	they	operated	within	a	highly	uncertain	and	unstable	political	environment	defined	by	the	threat	of	violent	overthrow.			7.2.1.		Violations	of	Private	Property	Rights	by	State	Actors:	Expropriation		In	this	section,	we	highlight	actions	taken	by	state	actors	that	involved	specific	violations	of	private	actors'	private	property	rights.	Note	that	while	the	end	result	is	the	same—private	actors	deprived	of	 their	private	property	via	 taking	by	 force—the	means	by	which	such	takings	occurred	represents	an	 important	philosophical	distinction	 from	that	previously	discussed	in	Sections	6.2	and	7.1.1,	of	state	actors	unable	or	disincentivised	to	enforce	an	internal	 monopoly	 on	 violence,	 thereby	 allowing	 nonstate	 actors	 (e.g.,	 Taiping	 rebels,	warlords,	Green	Gang	members,	the	Japanese	military)	to	expropriate	private	property	via	coercive	 force.	 Instead,	what	 is	discussed	here	 are	 systematic	 examples	where	 the	 state	itself	was	involved	in	the	taking	of	private	actors'	property.	
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Given	 the	 extensive	 time	 scale,	 size	 of	 the	 population,	multitude	 of	 political	 actors,	 and	complexity	of	the	Chinese	economy,	it	is	not	feasible	to	provide	a	representative	accounting	of	 the	 innumerable	 examples	 regarding	 instances	 of	 domestic	 state	 actors	 engaging	 in	expropriation	or	other	forms	of	taking	actions	against	private	actors.	Any	compiled	sample	can	reasonably	be	viewed	as	necessarily	selective,	and	suffering	 from	confirmation	bias.	Moreover,	many	examples	of	such	behaviour	on	the	part	of	state	actors	has	already	been	well-explored	in	previous	discussions	throughout	this	chapter.	Recognising	this	inherent	deficiency	in	the	following	analysis,	we	nonetheless	attempt	to	limit	such	adverse	effects	by	identifying	several	examples	indicative	of	consistent	and	systemic	utilisation	of	the	tools	of	state	authority	by	domestic	state	actors	that	violated	private	actors'	property	rights.				7.2.1.1.		Legal	System		Legal	systems	help	safeguard	protection	of	private	property	rights	by	enforcing	previously-agreed	 to	 limits	 on	 state	 actions,	 thus	 serving	 as	 a	 credible	 commitment	 mechanism.	However,	for	this	role	to	be	realised,	legal	systems	need	to	possess	authority	outside	of	and	over	the	sovereign;	otherwise,	the	legal	system	can	serve	as	another	tool	of	state	authority	to	exploit	private	actors.	Given	that	at	no	time	during	either	the	Qing	or	Republic	periods	did	the	legal	system	possess	independent	authority	over	executive	state	power,	it	not	only	lacked	the	ability	to	provide	limits	on	expropriative	or	extra-legal	behaviour	of	state	actors,	but	instead	frequently	served	to	advance	state	interests	over	those	of	private	actors.		We	observe	this	dynamic	under	the	Qing	from	research	by	Kwan	(2004),	who	provides	a	telling	example	of	the	way	in	which	state	officials	adjudicated	cases	under	the	Qing	Code.	The	role	of	the	magistrate	was	not	to	conduct	a	dispassionate	application	of	immutable	law,	but	rather	 to	 treat	 the	 law	as	an	adaptable	 tool	 to	be	used	 to	ensure	 the	protection	and	advancement	of	state	interests.	In	1911,	for	instance,	after	merchants	holding	state-granted	monopoly	rights	fell	into	arrears	on	their	loan	obligations,	"the	state	expropriated	the	ten	merchants	and	had	their	monopolies,	leased	or	otherwise,	seized	and	operated	by	the	state.	The	lessees	suddenly	found	themselves	dealing	with	government	officials	who	refused	to	pay	 rent	 while	 demanding	 repayment	 of	 security	 deposits	 owed	 to	 the	 bankrupted	merchants"	 (192).	 Importantly,	 the	 legal	 decision	behind	 this	move	 did	 not	 conform	 to	standard	norms	or	previous	rulings:	"It	did	not	matter	that	the	registration	of	monopolies	under	different	names	had	been	a	widespread	and	long-standing	practice.	It	did	not	matter	that	a	record	of	household	division,	though	filed,	was	not	under	seal	and	therefore	legally	invalid.	It	did	not	matter	that	the	authority	of	the	household	head	might	be	compromised	as	a	result	of	the	ruling"	(191).	All	of	these	factors	cited	would	have	traditionally	signalled	the	case	 should	have	been	decided	differently.	 Yet	 the	 ruling	 ignored	 those	 factors	 so	 as	 to	ensure	the	furthering	of	state	interests,	via	the	expropriation	of	merchant	private	property,	both	that	of	the	bankrupted	merchants,	and	that	of	their	lessees	and	creditors.			Under	 circumstances	where	 the	 application	 of	 the	 law	was	 often	 fungible,	 adapted	 and	interpreted	on	a	case-by-case	basis,	used	to	ensure	the	desired	outcome—advancement	of	the	 interests	 of	 the	 state—the	 legal	 system	 could	 not	 serve	 as	 an	 effective	 check	 on	government	power.	Utilisation	of	the	legal	system	in	such	a	manner	continued	throughout	the	Republic	period,	as	indicated	with	the	previously-cited	government-mandated	policy	of	enforcing	a	"partification"	of	the	judiciary,	as	appointed	judges	were	expected	to	"forward	the	interests	of	the	Party",	ensuring	judiciary	power	remain	subordinate	to	the	executive	branch,	represented	by	the	Guomindang	Party	itself.	This	was	made	clear	by	examples	such	as	after	Chief	Justice	Lu	made	a	ruling	that	upheld	the	law	at	the	expense	of	government	(i.e.,	the	Guomindang	Party)	interests,	he	was	immediately	removed	from	power	and	replaced	with	a	judge	who	had	provided	his	assurance	to	"abide	by	the	decisions	of	the	party	and	do	the	best	to	carry	out	party	principles"	(Xu	1997:12),	clearly	underscoring	the	lack	of	judicial	
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independence,	and	thereby	lack	of	ability	to	impose	limits	on	the	state	power	over	private	individuals.	Although	Thai	 (2015)	was	 able	 to	 identify	 an	 example	 showing	 an	 instance	where	 the	 national-level	 court	 exhibited	 a	 degree	 of	 independence,	 providing	 limited	protection	 for	an	 individual	 from	the	arbitrary	application	of	state	power	 in	a	particular	case,	 his	 study	 suggests	 this	 to	 have	 been	 more	 the	 exception	 than	 the	 rule	 of	 an	administration	of	the	law	that	was	more	often	than	not	applied	non-uniformly.				7.2.1.2.		Financial	and	Monetary	Systems		State	actors	also	frequently	utilised	coercive	state	power	to	aspects	of	the	domestic	financial	and	monetary	 systems.	 For	 instance,	 as	 initially	 explored	 in	 Section	3.2.3.1.2,	 and	 to	 be	explored	in	considerable	detail	in	Chapters	Five	and	Six,	the	central	government	continually	reneged	 on	 its	 promises	 made	 to	 bondholders	 to	 repay	 their	 debts,	 by	 way	 of	 forced	"renegotiations"	and	repudiations	of	the	loans.	As	a	result,	the	government	faced	a	high	cost	of	capital	and	often	faced	difficulty	placing	its	bonds	with	domestic	investors	without	the	use	of	 the	 coercive	power	of	 state	 authority;	 thus,	 for	 instance,	 during	 the	Guomindang	period,	the	Ministry	of	Finance	used	its	regulatory	over	the	banking	industry	to	enforce	the	purchasing	of	government	bonds.	The	framework	of	the	Violence	Trap	and	what	we	label	as	the	"low	credibility	trap"	help	illuminate	why	knowledge	of	future	difficulty	in	raising	capital	often	proved	an	insufficient	impediment	for	state	actors	to	violate	their	promises	to	bondholders	in	the	immediate—short-term	needs	for	funding	to	pay	for	military	defences	against	 existential	 internal	 or	 external	 threats	 to	 the	 state	 leadership's	 hold	 on	 power	outweighed	such	future	considerations.	Further,	few	internal	checks—such	as	independent	courts	to	enforce	bond	repayment,	or	the	threat	of	removal	from	power	by	property	holders	through	electoral	means—existed	on	state	actors	beyond	future	considerations	of	access	to	capital.	 Conversely,	 externally-imposed	 checks	 on	 state	 actor	 behaviour—primarily	through	 foreign	 control	 over	 certain	 bonds'	 funding	 mechanisms—did	 prove	 relatively	effective	in	inducing	state	actors	to	honour	the	state's	debt	obligations.	Once	again,	however,	we	saw	the	impact	that	the	threat	of	violence	played	in	shaping	the	incentives	of	state	actor	behaviour	in	ways	that	from	a	long-run	perspective,	seem	perverse—unlike	the	examples	identified	 by	 Fang	 &	 Owen	 (2011)	 of	 authoritarian	 regimes	 turning	 to	 membership	 in	international	organisations	as	supplying	otherwise	difficult	 to	achieve	domestic	credible	commitment,	 state	 actors	 in	 control	 of	 domestic	 Republic	 governments,	 in	 the	 face	 of	 a	multitude	of	existential	threats,	took	steps	to	remove	those	externally-derived	credibility	devices	 and	 gain	 control	 over	 the	 funding	 sources	 of	 such	 bonds.	 As	 noted	 above,	 it	 is	noteworthy	then	that	after	doing	placing	these	funding	sources	under	domestic	rather	than	external	control,	the	funding	revenues	collected	from	sources	such	as	salt	taxes	fell,	and	the	default	rate	on	bonds	dependent	on	such	funding	sources	rose.	For	instance,	from	1927	to	1933,	the	Nanjing	government	floated	over	1.6	billion	yuan	of	internal	loans;	as	most	had	no	secured	collateral,	the	majority	fell	into	default	or	underwent	reorganisation.		In	addition,	various	domestic	governments	used	the	tools	of	state	power	over	the	banking	industry	 and	monetary	 system	 to	 advance	 state	 interests	 to	 allow	 for	 greater	 levels	 of	government	spending,	at	the	expense	of	private	savers.	Without	the	existence	of	credible	checks	on	state	actors,	promises	to	balance	the	budget	or	avoid	inflationary	policies	were	easily	broken	without	recourse.	Thus,	for	instance,	when	faced	with	existential	pressures,	government	 actors	 in	 charge	 of	 monetary	 policy	 increased	 spending	 levels,	 yet	 proved	unable	 or	 disincentivised	 to	 institute	 taxation	 systems	 enabling	 sufficient	 revenue	collection.	 As	 a	 result,	 Horesh	 (2007)	 notes,	 "Though	 both	 [the	 Qing	 and	 Beiyang	governments]	 promulgated	 countless	 measures	 to	 the	 contrary,	 the	 Beijing-based	 late-Imperial	and	early	Republican	governments	further	complicated	the	situation	by	resorting	to	debasement	in	order	to	jack	up	seigniorage	revenue	from	newly-founded	state	mints",	undertaking	policies	that	Yan	(2015:	140)	describes	as	"over-issuing	for	seigniorage	profit."	
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	While	 domestic	 governments	 were	 able	 to	 finance	 budget	 deficit	 spending	 by	 enacting	inflationary	policies,	the	tael	and	yuan	were	nonetheless	silver-backed	currencies,	and	as	such	currency	devaluations	were	necessary	to	enable	continual	deficit	spending.	As	such,	as	previously	 referenced,	 the	 Guomindang	 government	 took	 steps	 to	 abandon	 the	 silver	standard	and	move	to	a	pure	fiat	paper	money	system.	The	Guomindang	government	had	prior	 experience	 with	 paper-backed	 currency;	 during	 its	 control	 over	 the	 southern	provinces	as	the	opposition	government	to	the	Beiyang,	it	had	relied	on	printing	money	to	meet	financing	needs.	For	instance,	as	reported	by	the	Hongkong	Telegraph	(30	November	1922)	 newspaper,	 in	 October	 of	 1922,	 in	 order	 to	 finance	 the	 government's	 military	expenditures,	the	provincial	treasury	had	issued	over	twenty-six	million	yuan	unsecured	official	state	bank	notes,	leading	to	sudden	inflation,	with	the	value	of	the	notes	dropping	forty	per	cent.	A	decade	later,	the	Nanjing-based	Guomindang	government	used	the	move	to	 pure	 fiat	money	 as	 a	way	 to	 finance	 budgetary	 shortfalls;	 as	 Yan	 (2015:	183)	 states,	"Another	 driving	 force	 behind	 the	 abandoning	 of	 silver	 was	 the	 Chinese	 government	strategy	 to	 escape	 the	 'silver	 fetter'	 and	 to	 increase	 the	 government	 ability	 to	 extract	seigniorage	revenues."	While	part	of	the	 fabi	reform	process	in	1934	saw	the	Ministry	of	Finance	assuring	the	public	it	would	balance	the	budget	within	eighteen	months	to	reduce	inflationary	pressures	on	the	fabi,	by	mid-1935	the	fiscal	deficit	had	actually	risen,	and	the	Ministry	 continued	 to	undertake	 a	policy	 that	Ho	 (2010:	43)	describes	 as	an	 "excessive	expansion	of	the	money	supply,	via	bank	advances,	to	finance	budget	deficit."	Bloch	(1941:	28)	critiques	the	government's	"large-scale	borrowing"	used	to	finance	spending,	blaming	it	for	the	major	currency	devaluation	in	taking	place	in	late	1935.	As	with	prior	devaluations,	the	domestic	government's	debt	burden	was	sharply	reduced;	however,	once	again,	this	was	accomplished	at	the	expense	of	domestic	private	economic	actors	who,	after	the	currency	reform,	were	forced	to	hold	government	banks	notes.				7.2.1.3.		State-run	Economic	Planning	Structures		The	 relationship	between	the	business	 community	 and	 state	 actors	was	 complex.	While	private	merchants	were	often	eager	to	see	the	power	of	the	state	used	to	provide	protection	from	 competitive	 forces,	 they	 chaffed	 at	 state	 officials	 exerting	 control	 over	 business	decisions.	 This	 dynamic	 played	 out	 continually	 in	 the	 undulating	 state-merchant	relationship	 throughout	 the	 period.	 Overall,	 however,	 state	 actors,	 unconstrained	 by	governmental	structure,	an	independent	judiciary,	or	other	commitment	mechanisms,	were	able	 to	use	state	power	 to	advance	state	goals	at	 the	expense	of	policies	 to	 improve	 the	overall	 business	 environment;	 further,	 when	 protectionist	 policies	 were	 instituted,	 the	frequently	were	used	to	provide	the	state	with	control	over	economic	rents	that	could	be	directed	 towards	 individual	privileged	actors,	as	opposed	 to	an	entire	 industry.	For	Yeh	(1990:	 26),	 the	 reason	 government	 officials	 treated	 private	 business	 interests	 as	subordinate	to	those	of	the	state	was	partly	cultural,	owing	to	an	adherence	within	official	circles	of	the	Confucian	concept	that	goal	of	business	activity	was	to	"support	the	nation".	Yet,	patriotic	calls	to	"support	the	nation"	are	typical	across	nearly	all	regimes,	conveniently	employed	by	state	actors	as	cover	to	utilise	the	tools	of	state	authority	to	acquire	assets	from	private	business	for	personal	gain.			Government	interference	and	control	over	the	market	were	commonplace	during	the	late	Qing.	Wong	 (1982:	781)'s	 analysis	 of	 price	 controls	 on	 grains	and	 limits	 on	 commodity	trading	during	the	course	of	the	second	half	of	the	nineteenth	century	serves	to	highlight	government	intervention	in	commodity	markets.	These	policies	were	repeated	throughout	the	 Republican	 era	 as	well,	 with	 Brandt	 (1997:296)	 noting	 that	 in	 provinces	 along	 the	Yangzi,	during	periods	of	rising	grain	prices,	government	officials	would	attempt	to	prevent	
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river-based	trade.	As	a	result	of	such	government	intervention	in	the	marketplace,	enforced	grain	prices	frequently	did	not	reflect	market	prices,	instead	the	result	of	trade	blockades	and	rationing	schemes.	These	policies	reflected	a	move	away	the	greater	market	orientation	efforts	led	by	reformers	in	the	mid-Qing,	such	as	the	influential	government	official	Chen	Hongmou,	whose	economic	liberalisation	efforts	led	to	the	reduction	in	trade	barriers.			Another	 important	policy	 initiative	 initiated	 in	 the	 late-Qing	 that	 reflected	 greater	 state	intervention	in	economic	activities	was	that	of	joint-stock	firms	founded	under	the	principle	of 4
	 (government-supervision,	merchant-management).	The	concept	envisioned	an	idealised	partnership	between	government	officials	and	private	merchants,	as	these	firms	would	benefit	 from	the	 financial	contributions	and	business	acumen	supplied	by	private	merchants,	and	preferential	taxation	and	financing	policies	from	the	state;	overall,	however,	the	firm	would	operate	under	the	guiding	direction	of	state	officials.	The	system	was	initially	enthusiastically	 supported	by	merchants	when	perceived	 as	 a	way	 to	promote	business	activities	 by	 providing	 private	 ventures	 with	 government	 capital,	 enforcing	 barriers	 to	entry	 on	 foreign	 firms,	 and	 bestowing	 favourable	 tax	 policies.	 Over	 time,	 however,	enthusiasm	waned	as	it	became	clear	that	state	actors	would	play	an	interventionist	role	in	the	 relationship,	 with	 government	 officials	 installed	 in	 managerial	 roles,	 resulting	 in	companies	undertaking	actions	for	political,	as	opposed	to	economic,	reasons.	In	practice,	merchants	could	invest	capital	in	these	concerns,	but	exercised	little	input	after	their	initial	contribution.	 In	 the	 1890s,	 a	 businessman,	Wu	 Zuoqing,	 summarised	 the	 disadvantages	faced	 by	private	 capitalists	 under	 this	 system	 as,	 "If	 you	 think	 it	 [a	 business]	 is	 private	operated,	 there	 are	 [government	nominated]	 general	managers,	 assistant	managers	 and	supervisors.	 Private	 businessmen,	 once	 they	 become	 shareholders	 are	 no	 more	 than	strangers.	They	do	not	have	decision	rights	even	 in	whether	 they	should	receive	annual	dividends,	 let	along	in	matters	such	as	whether	fees	should	be	paid,	and	appointment	of	managers.	Even	though	there	is	an	annual	shareholders’	meeting,	business	shareholders	are	frequently	uninvolved	and	feel	at	a	loss"	(quoted	in	Du	et	al.	2007).		Beyond	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 government-supervision,	 merchant-management,	mercantilist	style	policies	that	included	the	granting	of	monopoly	rights	and	the	erection	of	barriers	 to	 entry	 and	 trade	 also	 represented	 important	 and	 oft-used	 policy	 options	employed	 by	 state	 actors.	 Such	 interventions	 in	 the	 markets	 led	 to	 several	 long-term	economic	 consequences.	Wang	 (1994)'s	 analysis	 of	 the	 origins	 of	 cotton	manufacturing	during	the	Qing	makes	note	of	the	frequent	use	of	granting	of	monopoly	production	rights,	as	well	as	the	attempted	implementation	of	tariff	structures	or	import	quotas,	was	designed	to	 provide	 protection	 to	 domestic	 producers	 using	 non-mechanised	 and	 low-efficiency	technology	 in	 their	 production	 of	 cotton	 goods,	 as	 a	 way	 to	 combat	 the	 impact	 of	importation	of	 low-cost	cotton	products	from	abroad.	Adherence	 to	mercantilist	policies	prevented	 the	 acceptance	 of	 plans	 by	 foreign	 investors	 to	 set	 up	 factories	 employing	modern	 technology	 within	 China,	 even	 when	 these	 plans	 were	 supported	 by	 local	entrepreneurs	and	investors;	this	included	the	rejection	in	1877	of	a	proposed	cotton	mill	factory,	the	Anglo-Chinese	Shanghai	Cotton	Cloth	Mill	Company,	to	be	financed	primarily	by	domestic	Chinese	 investors	and	managed	by	 Jardine,	Matheson	and	Company	(LeFevour	1970:	 37).	Another	domestic	 entrepreneur,	 Peng	Rucong,	 had	 his	plans	 in	 1878	 for	 the	establishment	 of	 a	 domestically-owned	 cotton	manufacturing	mill	 denied	 by	 Governor-General	Li	Hongzhang,	when	Peng	refused	to	structure	the	venture	under	the	government-supervision,	 merchant-management	 corporate	 management	 structure	 that	 included	government	 official	 oversight	 (Wang	 1994:	 66).	 Government	 officials	 resisted	 granting	license	to	these	attempts	to	build	modern	cotton	manufacturing	concerns	in	China	because	they	sought	to	control	the	industry	by	the	creation	of	a	single	firm	under	the	direction	of	the	government.	As	a	result,	they	supported	the	granting	of	a	monopoly	license	to	a	single	firm	controlled	 by	 state	 actors.	 Overall,	Wang	 finds	 that	 the	 use	 of	 monopoly	 rights	 for	 the	creation	 of	mechanised	 cotton	manufacturing	 to	 have	 set	 back	 the	 adoption	 of	modern	
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technology	by	Chinese	entrepreneurs;	"The	ten-year	monopoly	of	the	Shanghai	Cotton	Cloth	Mill	was	implemented	to	simply	prevent	foreigners	from	setting	up	mills	un	China.	It	was	effective	as	such,	but	it	also	restricted	investment	in	the	cotton	manufacturing	industry	by	Chinese	merchants"	(77).	We	would	argue	that,	contrary	to	Wang's	assessment,	the	self-interests	of	state	actors	suggest	that	the	monopoly	granted	to	the	Shanghai	Cotton	Cloth	Mill	firm	was	not	"simply"	to	limit	foreign	competition,	but	rather	all	competition,	as	the	management	structure	of	 the	 firm	 included	political	and	business	allies	of	Li	Hongzhang	who	could	benefit	from	the	economic	rents	that	a	monopoly	structure	could	provide.		By	 the	 Guomindang	 era,	 government	 bureaucratic	 machinery	 had	 become	 more	sophisticated	 and	extensive,	 responding	 to	 the	desire	on	 the	part	 of	Party	 leadership	 to	exert	greater	control	over	the	direction	of	industry.	Zanasi	(2006)	explains	at	length	the	attraction	that	fascist	and	corporatist	economic	strategies	held	for	the	senior	leadership	of	the	Guomindang,	including	Jiang	Jieshi,	Chen	Gongbo,	and	Wang	Jingwei,	focussing	on	the	importance	 of	 instituting	 tight	 control	 over	 the	 economy—in	 practise,	 therefore,	 tight	control	 over	 the	 decisions	 and	 behaviours	 of	 economic	 actors.	 The	 Party	 leadership	instituted	a	number	of	measures	in	their	attempts	to	increase	the	level	of	direct	control	the	Party	exerted	over	private	economic	actors.		First,	there	was	an	increase	in	regulatory	measures,	designed	to	bring	about	greater	control	over	private	industry.	These	measures	were	combined	with	a	concomitant	increase	in	the	number	 of	 state	 economic	 planning	 and	 regulatory	 organisations	 which	 could	 set	 and	enforce	regulations	over	private	industry.	A	complex	morass	of	bureaucratic	state	planning	agencies,	operating	under	the	Ministry	of	Economic,	the	Ministry	of	Finance,	the	Ministry	of	Industries,	 and	 other	 state	 organs,	 all	 had	 authority	 to	 create	 various	 regulations	 and	demands	on	the	business	community.	Bian	(2005b:	101-102),	for	instance,	makes	note	of	the	extreme	regulation	to	which	private	and	state-owned	firms	were	subject,	citing	as	an	example	 the	 detailed	 directives	 to	 ordnance	 enterprises	 regarding	 intricate	 required	accounting	 methodologies	 produced	 by	 the	 Bureau	 of	 Ordnance,	 a	 division	 under	 the	Ministry	of	Military	Administration.	Such	regulations	were	replicated	across	a	wide	array	of	enterprises,	given	the	extensive	number	of	national	development	plans	state	economic	planning	organisations	generated,	including	the	1928	"Plan	for	the	Development	of	Basic	Industries	in	China",	the	1929	"Programme	and	Budget	for	Material	Reconstruction	in	the	Period	of	Political	Tutelage",	the	1931	"Six-year	Programme	for	Material	Reconstruction",	the	 1931	 "Ten-year	 Plan	 for	 China",	 and	 the	 1932	 "Three-year	 Plan"	 of	 the	 National	Economic	Council,	the	1932	"Four-Year	Industrial	Plan",	the	1933	"Three-Year	Industrial	Plan"	(Fong	1936).		Complying	with	the	plethora	of	bureaucratic	regulation	measures	imposed	large	costs	on	industry,	 as	 efforts	 were	 directed	 into	 activities	 such	 as	 submitting	 reports	 to	 various	regulatory	oversight	agencies	in	order	to	fulfil	the	minutiae	of	regulatory	measures,	leading	to	overall	inefficiency	within	the	economy.	For	instance,	the	Ministry	of	Economics,	as	well	as	serving	as	an	implementing	arm	of	state	economic	planning,	functioned	in	large	part	as	a	regulatory	 body	 over	 domestic	 private	 enterprises,	 and	 enforced	 requirements	 on	 all	companies,	 not	 just	 those	 publicly	 traded,	 to	 submit	 documentation	 in	 line	 with	bureaucratic	reporting	regulations	regarding	issues	such	as	financial	statements,	board	of	directors	meetings,	appointments	of	senior	personnel,	wages	of	employees,	justification	of	staffing	decisions,	 and	an	 inordinate	degree	of	 other	business	 activities	 (Eastman	1974,	Cochran	2000,		Zanasi	2006,	Ko	2016).	In	a	similar	vein,	Thai	(2015:	30)	notes	the	impact	of	 increased	regulation	on	merchants,	 including	 those	 involved	 in	 the	shipping	business,	some	 of	 whom	 were	 accused	 of	 smuggling	 not	 because	 they	 wilfully	 partook	 in	transportation	of	contraband,	but	because	an	ever-shifting	and	increasingly	complex	set	of	regulations	often	made	previously	legitimate	commercial	activity	illegitimate.			
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	Second,	Guomindang	Party	leaders	sought	to	increase	control	over	the	economy	by	way	of	control	over	economic	resources;	by	limiting	access	to	the	supply	of	necessary	economic	inputs	 to	 those	 companies	 that	 acted	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 desired	 behaviours	 of	government	actors,	private	industry	was	compelled	to	conform	to	serve	the	interests	of	the	state,	rather	than	the	interests	of	their	private	ownership.	One	of	the	most	important	tools	the	Party	had	at	its	disposal	in	this	regard	was	control	over	access	to	financing.	The	Ministry	of	Finance	was	active	in	its	promulgation	of	directives	to	the	banking	sector	regarding	which	industries	 should	 receive	 preferential	 loan	 treatment;	 the	 level	 of	 control	 over	 these	decisions	 became	 much	 more	 direct	 after	 the	 domestic	 banking	 sector	 was	 effectively	nationalised	in	1935.	Such	regulations	had	serious	impacts	on	the	efficiency	of	utilisation	of	financial	resources,	as	well	as	negative	consequences	regarding	the	deepening	of	business	acumen	within	 the	banking	 industry.	Pan	(2003)	 finds	the	 fiscal	dependence	on	 funding	internal	debt	issuances	by	the	Beiyang	and	Guomindang	central	governments	led	to	"lop-sided"	development	structures	within	the	banking	industry—given	that	so	much	of	their	revenue	streams	were	derived	from	underwriting	and	placing	domestic	central	government	bonds,	 banks	 focussed	 much	 less	 on	 other	 parts	 of	 their	 business	 model,	 including	developing	 sufficiently	 sophisticated	 risk	 management	 practices	 for	 private	 loans,	 or	supplying	sufficient	capital	to	private	entrepreneurs.			Beyond	 control	 over	 financial	 resources,	 numerous	 industry-specific	 organisations	were	formed	to	exert	control	over	the	business	decisions	of	private	businesspersons	on	a	more	granular	basis.	 For	 instance,	 the	Cotton	Control	Commission,	 a	 state	 agency	designed	to	promote	 and	 control	 the	 development	 of	 the	 cotton	 textile	 manufacturing	 industry,	controlled	access	to	technological,	managerial	and	financial	resources	which	to	engage	in	factory	 modernisation	 efforts;	 such	 resources	 were	 only	 directed	 to	 privileged	 firms	selected	by	state	bureaucratic	decision-makers	(Shepherd	1939:	172).	The	Commission	also	actively	encouraged	industrialists	to	place	"public"	(viz.,	state-actor	designated)	interests	over	 private.	 "If	 a	 Chinese	 industrialist	 was	 not	 willing	 to	 do	 so,	 the	 economic-control	apparatus	of	the	[Cotton	Control	Commission]	would	intervene	to	impose	change.	Private	industrialists,	although	respected	as	producers,	were	to	be	circumvented	if	they	followed	their	own	interests	and	not	those	of	the	industry	and	the	nation"	(Zanasi	2006:	176).			Such	strict	control	of	access	by	state	bureaucrats	over	limited	beneficial	resources	led	to	additional	adverse	economic	effects.	Most	notably,	it	induced	considerable	amounts	rent-seeking	behaviour	on	the	part	of	private	businesspersons.	Thus,	for	example,	in	the	cotton	industry,	 as	 Zanasi	 describes,	 it	 was	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 cotton	 textile	 manufacturers	 to	engage	 in	 rent-seeking	 activities,	 lobbying	 the	 Cotton	 Control	 Commission	 for	 access	 to	valuable	limited	resources,	as	well	as	to	avoid	potential	intervention	from	state	regulators	if	 their	 behaviours	 were	 seen	 to	 run	 counter	 to	 state	 policy	 goals.	 Similarly,	 Cochran	(2000:168-170)	details	 the	extensive	efforts	of	Lui	Hongsheng,	 the	 founder	of	 the	China	Match	 Company,	 to	 obtain	 protectionist	 and	 other	 favourable	 policies	 for	 his	 company,	devoting	much	of	his	 time	over	 the	 first	six	years	after	 founding	his	company	to	 intense	lobbying	to	members	of	the	Ministry	of	Finance,	the	Ministry	of	Industry,	and	the	National	Economic	Council.	While	such	actions	can	be	characterised	as	economically	wasteful,	they	proved	personally	beneficial	to	Liu,	and	his	private	shareholders,	once	he	received	in	1936	a	national	monopoly	for	the	production	and	sale	of	matches	in	China,	which	included	clear	barriers	 to	 entry,	prohibiting	 the	 establishment	of	new	match	 factories,	 and	designating	Liu's	 company	 the	 sole	 authorised	 seller	 of	matches	within	 China.	Hence,	 a	 highly	 anti-competitive	scheme	that	brought	about	reduced	supply	and	higher	prices	for	consumers	yet	proved	highly	beneficial	to	a	single	firm	was	instituted	in	the	name	of	"national	economic	progress."			
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A	related	regulatory	control	measure	was	the	use	of	tariffs	and	other	trade	barriers	that	effectively	 limited	 access	 by	 economic	 actors	 to	 imported	 economic	 resources.	 In	 the	aftermath	of	the	1928	Sino-American	Tariff	Treaty	granting	the	Guomindang	government	authority	over	the	setting	of	tariff	and	customs	duties,	tariff	rates	were	steadily	increased	on	a	wide	array	of	imported	goods.	While	much	of	the	impetus	for	increasing	tariff	rates	was	driven	by	a	desire	to	increase	fiscal	revenue,	their	function	in	creating	barriers	to	entry	for	protected	products,	implied,	as	Su	&	Barber	(1936:	115)	comment	at	the	time,	the	tariffs	were	to	be	used,	"even	more	importantly,	to	protect	and	foster	the	development	of	native	industries."	Protectionist	tariff	policies	are	lucrative	for	domestic	manufacturers	if	placed	on	 competing	 imports	 (Grossman	 &	 Helpman	 1994).	 Under	 the	 Guomindang,	 such	protection	 from	 import	 competition	 could	be	 considerable—tariffs	 on	 refined	 sugar,	 for	instance,	reached	upwards	of	two	hundred	per	cent	(Boecking	2011b:	17),	and	similarly	high	 tariffs	 on	 were	 placed	 on	 cigarettes,	 matches,	 kerosene,	 and	 fertiliser	 (Tan	 1990:	100)—generating	additional	rent-seeking	opportunities	for	companies.	Indeed,	part	of	the	motivation	behind	the	lobbying	efforts	of	Lui	Hongsheng	described	above	in	regard	to	his	match	cartel	was	to	secure	protection	from	imports,	which	he	ultimately	received.	Wright	(1991:	 655-656)	 describes	 similar	 extensive	 lobbying	 efforts	 to	 the	 government	 for	increased	 tariffs	 by	 the	 Flour	 Manufacturers'	 Association	 in	 1933,	 the	 Cement	Manufactures'	Association	in	1934,	and	the	Chinese	Cotton	Mill	Owners	Association	and	a	group	of	fifty	factory	owners	in	Shanghai	in	1935.	Beyond	furthering	non-productive	rent-seeking	activity,	increased	tariff	schedules	also	led	to	excessive	smuggling	opportunities,	as	consumers	sought	access	to	greater	product	choice	and	lower	prices	offered	by	imports	that	were	either	banned	due	to	import	quotas,	or	priced	higher	due	to	tariff	fees	(Thai	2016,	Boeking	2017).	As	with	other	rent-creation	strategies	undertaken	by	the	state,	so	too	did	the	strategic	application	of	selective	smuggling	enforcement	and	seizure	and	distribution	of	contraband	provide	state	actors	with	the	ability	"to	reach	revenue-sharing	agreements	with	[the	Guomindang]'s	local	political	rivals"	(Shiroyama	2018:	334).			Beyond	 the	 pernicious	 effects	 of	 rent-seeking	 on	 economic	 output,	 Coble	 (1980)	 and	Eastman	 (1986)	 highlight	 the	 ways	 the	 control	 over	 scarce	 economic	 inputs	 created	incentives	for	individual	government	officials	to	increase	their	own	personal	incomes	via	corruption	 under	 the	 Guomindang.	 Indeed,	 this	 outcome	 follows	 in	 general	 under	most	rent-creation	schemes—because	the	benefits	of	accessing	rents	are	high,	private	actors	are	willing	to	bestow	gifts	to	the	decision-makers,	the	granters	of	the	rents,	benefits	(viz.,	bribes)	nearly	 equal	 to	 the	 value	 of	 the	 rent	 (Tullock	 1980).	 Concordant	 with	 the	 theoretic	prediction	Tullock	lays	out,	and	with	the	concerns	Coble	and	Eastman	highlight,	Cochran	(2000:	169)	details	the	bribes	that	Liu	Hongsheng	funnelled	to	the	Minister	of	Finance	to	help	win	support	for	his	proposals,	including	paying	the	rent	on	the	Minister's	private	home.	In	general,	the	many	forms	of	rents	controlled	by	state	bureaucrats—the	approval	of	the	formation	of	companies,	the	awarding	of	favourable	financing	(or	access	to	any	financing	after	1935),	the	granting	of	monopoly	rights,	or	the	arbitrary	strictness	in	application	of	regulatory	control—implied	that	the	ability	to	favourably	influence	the	decision-making	of	certain	state	actors	could	prove	 financially	beneficial,	thus	creating	strong	 incentives	 for	corruption.	For	instance,	despite	aggressive	lobbying	efforts	by	domestic	industry	groups,	taxes	on	cigarette	manufacturers	remained	high,	with	the	British-owned	British-American	Tobacco	 Company	 enjoying	 tax	 advantages	 of	 up	 to	 ten	 per	 cent	 reductions	 vis-a-vis	domestic	producers,	given	its	ability	to	enjoy	discounts	from	prepayment	of	assessed	taxes	that	 domestic	 producers	 were	 hard-pressed	 to	 match	 given	 cash-flow	 concerns.	 The	situation	suddenly	changed	in	April	of	1937,	however,	a	month	after	Song	Ziwen,	the	former	Minister	 of	 Finance	 and	 governor	 of	 the	 Central	 Bank	 of	 China,	 became	 a	 significant	shareholder	 and	 chairman	 of	 Nanyang	 Brothers	 Tobacco	 Company,	 the	 largest	domestically-owned	 tobacco	manufacturer.	 Taxes	 on	 domestic	 tobacco	 producers	 were	drastically	slashed	while	those	on	foreign	producers	significantly	raised	(Wright	1991:	657,	Swan	2005:	75).		
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	The	 third	 strategy	 the	Guomindang	Party	 leadership	undertook	 to	 exert	 greater	 control	over	private	economic	activity	was	through	the	creation	of	an	increasing	number	of	state-owned	 enterprises.	 Such	 enterprises,	 which	 operated	 under	 the	 direct	 control	 of	 the	Ministry	of	Industries,	or	other	economic	planning	bureaucratic	offices,	represented	a	more	deliberate	attempt	on	the	part	of	state	actors	to	control	economic	activity.	As	Ko	(2016:	173)	notes,	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 state	 economic	 planning	 apparatus	 directed	 by	 leadership	 of	government	bureaucratic	organisations	such	as	the	National	Resource	Commission,	besides	explicitly	 focussing	 its	 efforts	bringing	 the	 activities	 of	 private	 entrepreneurs	under	 the	control	of	government	planners	that	is,	existing	companies),	it	increasingly	turned	to	modes	of	direct	control:	"In	the	Republican	period,	existing	businesses	were	either	taken	over	by	government	investing	in	their	companies	or	new	businesses	were	formed	by	government	corporate	 investments."	 State-owned	 enterprises	 represented	 the	 possibility	 for	 greater	control,	given	that,	as	under	the	former	Qing	policy	of	government-supervision,	merchant-management,	government	officials	were	placed	 in	managerial	positions	within	economic	firms,	and	hence	firm	decision-making	accorded	with	political	objectives	above	and	beyond	economic	 objectives.	 Indeed,	 the	 focus	 of	 activities	 undertaken	 within	 state-owned	enterprises	 became	 so	 intertwined	 with	 conforming	 with	 state	 interests	 that	 many	positions	became	quasi-government	 roles,	 even	when	 the	particular	managers	were	not	technically	employees	of	the	state	bureaucracy.	As	Qi	Zhuli,	writing	in	1948	shortly	after	the	conclusion	of	the	Anti-Japanese	War,	notes,	"State-owned	enterprises...	treated	department	heads	 and	 other	 administrative	 leaders	 as	  	 (officials);	 pointedly,	 he	 continues	 by	commenting	that	those	in	such	roles	"paid	little	attention	to	issues	of	efficiency"	(Qi	1948:	126).			The	structure	of	most	of	the	new	state-owned	firms	facilitated	their	control	by	government	actors.	 These	 were	 enterprises	 that	 were	 organised	 as	 joint-stock	 companies,	 partly	government	 financed,	 and	 partly	 private	 financed;	 however,	 given	 that	 the	 corporate	governance	 structure	 of	 these	 firms	 mandated	 that	 a	 state	 organisation	 (such	 as	 the	Ministry	of	Finance,	the	National	Economic	Council,	or	one	of	the	smaller	industry-specific	commissions)	retained	ownership	of	at	least	a	fifty	per	cent	of	outstanding	shares,	actual	control	 of	 the	 firms	managerial	 policies	was	possessed	by	government	authorities.	Over	time,	the	share	of	productive	output	attributed	to	state-owned	enterprises	as	a	percentage	of	total	output	continued	to	grow.	Eastman	(1986)	notes	that	over	the	course	of	its	time	in	power,	 the	degree	of	government	control	by	 the	Guomindang	Party	over	 the	productive	assets	of	the	economy	increased,	such	that	by	1937,	the	government	"was	operating	fifteen	spinning	mills,	which	comprised	30	per	cent	of	all	the	spindles	in	Chinese-owned	mills.	It	also	held	investments	in,	inter	alia,	flour,	meat-packing,	telephone,	paper,	and	vegetable-oil	companies."			Paauw	(1952)'s	research	on	the	fiscal	budgets	of	the	Guomindang	central	government	also	finds	state-owned	enterprises	to	have	comprised	a	large	part	of	economy,	and	of	the	budget.	As	Paauw	shows,	many	of	the	line	items	in	the	budget	were	labelled	in	ways	to	obfuscate	the	 degree	 of	 state	 spending	 on	 state-owned	 enterprise	 activities,	 by	 falling	 under	categories	such	as	"civil	expenditures"	or	"reconstruction",	rather	than	under	the	separate	budget	item	labelled	"investment	in	state	enterprises".	Paauw	also	finds	large	differences	between	the	amounts	reported	in	Chinese	 language	versions	of	 the	national	budget,	and	those	found	in	the	bi-lingual	Statistical	Abstract	published	for	international	consumption	(for	example,	in	1935	reported	investment	in	government	enterprises	totalled	610	million	yuan	 in	domestically	published	 sources,	 but	 only	 164	million	 in	 international	 versions),	surmising	that	"This	may	indicate	an	effort	to	obscure	the	increasing	encroachment	of	the	government	on	private	industry	from	Western	readers"	(11-12).			
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7.2.1.4.		State-directed	Expropriation:	Nationalisation	and	Seizure	of	Assets		Beyond	 the	 several	 examples	provided	 indicating	 the	use	by	 state	 actors	of	 the	 tools	 of	government	 authority	 to	 advance	 their	 interests	 over	 those	 of	 private	 economic	 actors	through	economically-interventionist	policies,	 the	historical	 record	of	 this	period	 is	 also	replete	with	more	drastic	cases	of	state	power	utilised	to	engage	in	outright	expropriation	of	private	actors'	properties.	These	examples	of	takings	frequently	involved	more	blatant	use	of	the	coercive	power	of	the	state—via	force,	or	the	threat	of	force—to	induce	taking	actions.	The	authoritarian	governmental	form	of	both	the	Qing	and	Republic	governments	facilitated	 state	 actors'	 ability	 to	 expropriate	 private	 property,	 given	 state	 actors	 were	neither	 accountable	 to	 an	 electorate	 comprised	 of	 property	 holders,	 nor	 restrained	 by	credible	 commitment	 mechanisms	 such	 as	 an	 independent	 judiciary,	 yet	 possessed	complete	control	over	the	levels	of	coercive	authority	of	the	state.			Examples	of	domestic	state	actions	falling	under	this	rubric	comprised	one	of	two	general	categories.	 The	 first	 approach	 involved	 using	 the	 tools	 of	 state	 authority	 to	 simply	nationalise	or	otherwise	take	control	of	privately-held	productive	assets.	One	reason	state	actors	undertook	these	types	of	actions	was	to	gain	greater	control	over	a	firm	or	industry.	An	example	of	this	can	be	observed	in	the	response	of	state	officials	to	calls	for	assistance	from	the	domestic	silk	industry	business	community	in	the	1930s	in	the	face	of	competition	from	Japanese	producers.	Total	 relative	silk	production	 in	 Japan	and	China,	 respectively,	had	fallen	from	31,485000	versus	19,678,000	kilograms	of	raw	silk	in	1925,	to	44,120,000	versus	 just	 10,555,000	 kilograms	 by	 1932,	 with	 Japan's	 share	 of	 world	 supply	 of	 silk	production	rising	from	fifty-five	to	seventy-five	per	cent,	while	China's	fell	from	thirty-four	to	only	eighteen	per	cent.	For	state	officials,	the	solution	was	more	government	ownership	and	control:	"The	Chinese	Economic	Council	has	recommended	to	the	Central	Government	that	it	assume	control	of	the	supply	of	cocoons	and	of	silk	filatures,	establish	sales	offices	in	foreign	silk	centers,	and	aid	in	the	formation	of	research	and	financing	organizations"	(Far	
Eastern	Survey	1935:	54).	Hence,	the	state	responded	by	taking	ownership	of	the	productive	assets	of	cocoon	and	filature	production,	at	the	expense	of	private	ownership	and	control	of	the	industry.	Far	from	atypical,	the	behaviour	of	state	actors	in	this	case	reflected	a	common	pattern	during	the	Guomindang	period,	when	the	government	forcibly	nationalised	some	of	the	country's	largest	businesses	and	industries.	As	to	be	described	in	Chapter	Ten,	the	China	Merchants	Steamship	Navigation	Company,	the	country's	oldest	joint-stock	company	and	largest	domestic	steamship	company,	was	nationalised	in	1928	against	the	wishes	of	the	firm's	management.	Similarly,	the	domestic	banking	industry	was	effectively	nationalised	in	1935.	Nationalisation	in	these	instances	allowed	the	Guomindang	government	to	force	the	affected	firms	to	institute	the	policies	desired	by	state	decision-makers;	in	the	case	of	China	Merchants,	that	meant	using	their	fleet	to	advance	military	over	commercial	purposes,	and	in	the	case	of	the	banking	system,	it	allowed	the	Ministry	of	Finance	to	more	directly	control	monetary	policy,	including	the	practise	of	financing	the	deficit	through	the	issuance	of	fiat	currency	unbacked	by	silver,	as	well	as	directing	banks	to	lend	capital	to	those	firms	and	industries	the	government	leadership	felt	was	advancing	Party	interests,	while	limiting	funding	access	to	those	firms	which	had	fallen	out	of	favour.		Beyond	 reasons	 of	 increased	 control	 of	 managerial	 decision-making,	 the	 attraction	 of	financial	 gain	 via	 capture	 of	 profits	 also	 drove	 state	 actors	 to	 use	 the	 power	 of	 state	authority	to	take	over	private	firms.	The	access	to	authoritarian	state	power,	and	the	lack	of	 a	 countervailing	 independent	 court	system,	meant	such	 abuses	of	 government	power	could	occur	unchecked.	In	1905,	for	instance,	after	the	completion	of	an	official	government	field	report	on	mining	production	in	Guangdong	showed	that	the	privately-owned	Qujiang	Baochang	Coalmine	Company	was	generating	large	profits,	state	officials	issued	orders	to	nationalise	the	firm	(Gong	1999:	262).	During	the	Beiyang	period	in	Hunan,	government	officials	justified	the	nationalisation	of	several	private	mining	companies	as	one	of	financial	
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benefits	to	the	provincial	treasury,	noting	nationalisation	and	capture	of	the	firm's	profits	would	 "improve	 the	 future	outlook	of	 the	 financial	 difficulties	 facing	 the	province"	 (Zhu	1993:	107).	Such	state	actions	were	not	confined	to	corporations,	but	also	individual	private	actors;	indeed,	it	was	often	those	least	organised	and	without	easy	access	to	advocacy	tools	that	were	most	exploited.	Chen	(1936:	77-78)	notes	how	during	the	Guomindang	Nanjing	period	 private	 holders	 of	 rural	 lands	 were	 often	 expropriated	 without	 appropriate	remuneration,	ostensibly	for	the	purpose	of	road-building:	"Often	agricultural	lands	have	been	confiscated,	or	nearly	confiscated,	because	of	road	building;	after	having	been	heavily	taxed	for	this	purpose,	they	are	incorporated	in	the	road	area	without	payment."	Chen	goes	on	to	describe	a	specific	example	in	Weiyang,	where	a	twenty-five	miles	stretch	of	property	was	confiscated	from	agricultural	lands,	with	the	original	landowners	not	even	eventually	receiving	the	one-half	market	price	of	the	land	that	had	originally	been	promised	in	way	of	remuneration...	[Moreover],	agricultural	 lands	have	been	confiscated	not	only	because	of	road	building,	but	also	by	unexpected	orders	of	military	and	civil	authorities	to	establish	some	real	or	fictitious	public	institutions,	experimental	agricultural	stations,	and	charitable	homes	being	a	favourite	form	of	such	deceit.	The	villages	of	Shih-pai	and	Tang-yai	can	best	testify	to	this—in	some	cases,	the	Government	has	made	a	promise	to	pay	from	80	to	100	Yuan	 per	 mow,	 according	 to	 the	 grades	 of	 the	 land;	 but	 while	 this	 promise	 remains	unfulfilled,	the	authorities	keep	on	collecting	the	land	tax	year	after	year."	Finally,	beyond	expropriation	 of	 land	 assets,	 Chen	 (1936:78-79)	 describes	 the	 similar	 expropriation	 of	labour,	where	private	 individuals	were	conscripted	 into	working	to	build	roads	or	other	tasks	determined	by	local	government	officials,	yet	again	no	remuneration	was	provided	for	the	provision	of	such	conscripted	labour.	Chen	concludes	by	pointedly	noting	that,	"As	most	of	 the	 confiscated	 lands	 belong	 to	 unorganized	 small	 peasants,	 their	 feeble	 attempts	 to	protest	are	of	no	avail";	further,	even	in	those	cases	where	local	landholders	did	attempt	to	withhold	assessed	taxes,	the	power	of	the	state	was	exercised	to	compel	compliance;	Chen	(76)	cites	an	example	from	1932	from	a	village	in	Guangdong:	"in	the	3rd	sub-district	of	
Hwa-hsien,	immediately	north	of	Pan-yu,	every	adult	male	was	ordered	to	pay	6.00	Yuan	for	a	public	road.	The	villages	tried	hard	to	dodge	this	tax,	and	even	organized	themselves	to	oppose	it.	Troops	were	sent	to	subdue	them,	their	leaders	were	imprisoned,	and	finally	they	had	to	pay	according	to	the	governmental	orders."		The	second	approach	of	state-directed	expropriation	involved	cases	of	outright	seizure	of	assets	by	way	of	use	of	governmental	force,	or	the	threat	of	force	equivalent	to	extortion.	Many	 of	 these	 actions	 involved	 powerful	 state	 agents	 threatening	 either	 economic	 or	personal	harm	to	the	private	owner	of	the	property	or	asset	so	as	to	compel	the	private	owner	to	acquiesce	to	the	government's	taking	demand.	For	instance,	in	February	1890,	a	government	 auditor	 decided	 that	 the	 China	 Merchants	 Steamship	 Navigation	 and	 the	Imperial	 Chinese	 Telegraph	Administration	 companies	were	making	 "excessive	 profits",	and	 decreed	 they	 should	 therefore	 pay	 increased	 distributions	 to	 the	 government.	 Not	coincidentally,	for	each	of	the	following	two	years,	China	Merchants'	leadership	decided	it	was	 in	 their	 interests	 to	donate	 one	 hundred	 thousand	 taels	 to	 government	 coffers	per	annum,	and	eventually	by	the	mid-1890s,	both	companies	had	submitted	to	agreeing	to	pay	the	government	a	minimum	of	sixty	thousand	taels	in	"contributions"	each	per	annum.			This	 form	of	 the	use	of	state	power	 to	compel	donations	 from	private	businesses	 to	 the	government	continued	to	occur	over	 the	course	of	successive	governments.	 In	1913,	 for	instance,	 Yuan	 Shikai	 demanded	 from	 Changlu	 salt	 merchants	 a	 forced	 contribution	 of	120,000	taels	made	to	the	Beiyang	government	under	the	threat	of	nationalisation	of	their	businesses	 (Kwan	 2004:	 279,	 292).	 In	 a	 similar	 fashion,	 in	 1927	 the	 Guomindang	government	in	Wuhan	assessed	a	donation	of	250,000	yuan	to	the	Wuchang	and	Hankou	Merchants'	Association	(/)2*)	in	support	of	the	Northern	Expedition.	Compliance	was	assured	after	the	government	had	the	two	leaders	of	the	Association	arrested	after	their	initial	decline	to	make	the	required	donation	(Zhu	2010).		
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	In	addition,	throughout	the	Republic	period,	companies	faced	demands	for	"contributions"	from	both	national	and	sub-national	government	actors;	 further,	 similar	 to	 the	situation	described	 above	 regarding	 China	Merchants	 and	 Chinese	 Telegraph,	 the	 same	 company	could	 face	 repeated	demands	 over	 the	 course	 of	multiple	 years.	 Table	 7.1,	 for	 instance,	provides	an	illustrative	account	of	the	"donations"	assessed	to	Yudahua	Textile	Company	(>;),	 a	 private	 cotton-spinner	 located	 in	 Hubei,	 over	 the	 first	 three	 years	 of	 the	Guomindang	rule.	All	of	the	donations	listed	were	assessed	to	the	company	management,	as	opposed	to	voluntary	donations	decided	on	by	company	management	 for	political,	 rent-seeking,	social	signalling,	or	altruistic	reasons.			Table	7.1.		"Donations"	and	forced	loans	assessed	to	Yudahua	Textile,	1927-1930		 			Date	 			Enforcing	Party		 			Form	of	Donation	 Amount	(taels)	1927.12	 warlord	 Cheng	Ruhuai	Army	borrowing	 			16,000		1928.5	 Hubei	Provincial	 Cigarette	Donations	 			24,000		1928.8	 Nanjing	Guomindang	 Disarmament	Borrowing	 			50,000		1928.1	 Nanjing	Guomindang	 Government	Finance	Borrowing	 136,000		1928.11	 Nanjing	Guomindang	 Government	Finance	Borrowing	 			34,000		1929	 Nanjing	Guomindang	 Government	Bonds	Purchases	 			34,000		1929.1	 Nanjing	Guomindang	 Military	Reorganisation	Bonds	 			46,000		1930.9	 Nanjing	Guomindang	 Tariff	Short-term	Treasury	Bills	 			92,000		Source:		>89@,G'	(1984),	Luo	&	Li	(2010:	210).			The	information	provided	in	Table	7.1	is	instructive	in	underscoring	the	multitude	of	ways	that	the	government	failed	to	protect	private	property	rights	of	private	actors,	in	this	case,	the	owners	of	the	Yudahua	Textile	Company.	To	begin	with,	the	company	was	forced	to	pay	donations	to	powerful	nonstate	actors	(or,	"roving	bandits"),	such	as	Cheng	Ruhai's	warlord	army.	Second,	the	local	provincial	government	forced	the	company	to	donate	money	to	buy	cigarettes	for	the	government,	with	the	central	state	authorities	or	institutional	legal	system	unable	 to	 provide	 protection	 from	 such	 unauthorised	 taking.	 Finally,	 the	 central	government,	itself	also	leviathan	in	nature,	and	with	no	limits	on	its	power	to	violate	private	property	rights,	also	forced	monies	from	the	company,	by	way	of	assessed	loans	and	forced	purchases	of	government	bonds.		Given	the	political	turmoil	and	violence	characterising	especially	the	Guomindang	era,	the	rationale	provided	by	state	actors	for	the	numerous	coercive	loans,	forced	donations,	and	outright	 confiscation	 frequently	 took	 the	 form	 of	 "state	 security"	 issues.	 Facilitating	 the	ability	of	the	government	to	easily	turn	to	this	rationale	for	seizure	of	private	assets	was	a	series	 of	 regulations	 enacted	 soon	 after	 the	 founding	 of	 the	 Guomindang	 Nanjing	government.	Promulgated	on	7	May	1927,	=B3.	(Regulations	Regarding	Disposition	of	Traitors'	Property)	expressly	provided	that	all	property	and	money	belonging	to	"counter-revolutionary	people	or	enemies	of	the	Nanjing	government"	were	to	be	taken	over	by	the	government.	 Both	 the	 ambiguous	 nature	 of	 who	 could	 be	 characterised	 as	 "anti-government",	as	well	as	 incentives	motivating	government	officials	 to	raise	 funds,	 led	 to	frequent	use	of	these	regulations	to	expropriate	private	property.	In	Hubei	province	alone,	one	hundred	sixty-five	cases	of	confiscation	were	recorded,	causing	a	considerable	amount	of	capital	flight	from	nervous	merchants,	with	twenty-seven	million	yuan	worth	of	assets	transmitted	 from	 Hubei	 to	 Dalian	 alone;	 undoubtedly	 considerably	more	 assets	 flowed	outward	to	escape	confiscation,	although	estimates	are	difficult	to	obtain.	Nonetheless,	the	result	was	clear—massive	capital	shortages	in	local	banks	and	amongst	merchant	groups	led	to	considerable	declines	in	investment	and	a	freezing	of	financing	of	business	ventures.	
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In	this	instance,	the	ensuing	social	outrage	that	occurred	forced	Guomindang	Party	to	take	some	action,	 instituting	 review	process	of	some	 cases,	 resulting	 in	 the	 return	of	 a	 small	portion	of	assets	as	wrongful	confiscation;	however,	the	return	process	was	arduous,	and	most	 of	 the	 confiscated	 assets	were	 not	 returned	 (Guo	 2010,	 Feng	 2015).	 Government	confiscation	of	assets	under	these	regulations	also	frequently	included	equity	shares	and	ownership	 interests	 in	 private	 companies.	 After	 several	 large	 shareholders	 of	 Yudahua	Textile	were	accused	by	regulators	from	the	Disposition	of	Traitors'	Property	department	of	being	"enemies	of	the	government",	and	therefore	confiscated	their	shares	in	Yudahua,	the	company	engaged	in	extended	negotiations	with	the	department	on	the	shareholders'	behalf,	 arguing	 that	 such	 action	was	 against	 the	 company's	 Articles	 of	 Association.	 The	company'	 request	was	denied,	 however,	 and	 the	 equity	 shares	of	 the	 accused	 "counter-revolutionaries"	were	taken	over	by	the	government	(Luo	&	Li	2010:	211).			Besides	targeting	large	companies	for	either	takeover	or	extorting	contributions,	other	acts	of	direct	takings	were	directed	at	wealthy	individuals	with	access	to	significant	financial	assets,	such	as	urban	merchants,	bankers,	and	business	owners;	their	concentrated	wealth	and	lack	of	independent	military	power	to	prevent	such	compulsory	donations.	Tellingly,	for	instance,	none	of	the	leaders	of	the	Green	Gang,	whose	wealth	surpassed	the	majority	of	those	 targeted	 for	 extortion	 by	 the	 Guomindang	 regime,	 were	 targeted	 for	 such	 forced	takings;	the	fact	that	these	actors	had	access	to	considerable	sources	of	nonstate	violence	that	 could	 have	 been	 directed	 at	 the	 state	 likely	 played	 into	 this	 choice.	 Less	 powerful	private	actors,	however,	faced	the	possibility	that	simply	by	direct	order	of	a	government	actor,	 backed	 by	 the	 police	 power	 of	 the	 state,	 such	 individual	 private	 agents	 could	 be	demanded	 to	 give	 up	 their	 property,	 or	 else	 face	 serious	 repercussions	 such	 as	imprisonment.	 In	 1926,	 for	 instance,	 after	 a	 first	 attempt	 in	 Guangdong	 at	 issuing	 five	million	yuan	of	bonds	failed	because	of	a	lack	of	subscribed	investors,	a	second	attempt,	for	ten	million	 yuan,	 achieved	 success,	 the	 result	 of	 a	 government	 programme	 that	 forced	households	and	shops	to	purchase	debt	equal	to	the	value	of	one	month's	rent,	or	one	per	cent	of	the	value	of	their	real	estate	(Luo	1992:	79,	van	de	Ven	2003:	90-91).			Other	examples	include	the	previously-cited	case	of	Rong	Zongjing,	forced	in	1927	to	buy	500,000	yuan	of	government	bonds	under	threat	of	a	warrant	for	his	arrest	that	was	only	removed	after	the	bond	purchase	was	made.	His	case	was	not	uncommon;	throughout	1927,	in	response	 to	weak	subscriptions	of	the	Nanjing	government's	 thirty	million	yuan	bond	issuance,	 business	 owners	 received	 "military	 advice	 to	 subscribe,	 with	 intimations	 that	arrests	may	follow	failure	to	do	so"	(New	York	Times	19	May	1927).	Song	Hanzhang	(25),	the	Shanghai	Branch	manager	of	Bank	of	China,	was	threatened	with	arrest	for	"obstruction	of	revolution"	and	"helping	the	enemy	force"	and	forced	to	resign	his	position	after	initially	rejected	 a	 demand	 by	 Jiang	 for	 the	 bank	 to	 lend	 one	million	 yuan	 to	 fund	 government	Treasury	 bonds	 (SMA	 2012:	 t20120312-5694;	 Ji	 2003:175-176).	 Similar	 threats	 and	coercion	 continued	 to	 be	 employed	 by	 the	 Guomindang	 government	 to	 compel	 private	banks	or	businesspersons	to	subscribe	to	government	debt	issuances.	Describing	the	plight	faced	by	 the	Chinese	 capitalists,	 Isaacs	 (1938:	209-210)	notes,	 "The	military	authorities	have	 ordered	 the	 reorganization	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 and	 other	institutions	with	new	directors…	Outlawry	against	the	better	class	of	Chinese	is	rampant."	Evidence	 of	 such	 expropriatory	 actions	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 government,	 including	 those	undertaken	 against	 organisations,	 such	 as	 chambers	 of	 commerce,	 representing	commercial	 interests,	 undercuts	 the	 revisionist	 arguments	 of	 Fewsmith	 (1982)	 or	 Ma	(2012:15)	 that	 suggest	 a	 more	 cooperative	 and	 corporatist	 relationship	 between	government	 actors	 and	 the	 commercial	 class.	 	 Likewise,	 the	 rise	 to	 power	 of	 the	Guomindang	in	the	wake	of	the	Northern	Expedition	saw	Party	cadres	in	certain	towns	and	cities	use	their	access	to	levers	of	state	coercive	force	to	confiscate	private	property	from	wealthy	 individuals,	 typically	 under	 the	 justification	 that	 such	 wealthy	 individuals	 had	accumulated	their	wealth	through	the	"exploitation	of	the	people".	A	1928	North	China	Daily	
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News	article	describes	the	implementation	of	a	"general	campaign	against	the	wealthy"	that	took	place	in	Lianyungang,	Jiangsu	against	ex-officials,	wealthy	merchants,	and	any	others	who	had	"turned	to	his	own	profit	and	amassed	great	wealth"	 (NCDN	19	April	1928:	4).	Geisert	(1984:	28)	notes	similar	instances	of	Party	leaders	in	Jiangsu	who	expropriated	land	from	local	elite	landlords	("local	bullies	and	evil	gentry"),	only	to	rent	it	back	to	landless	farmers	 at	 market	 rates,	 thereby	 enriching	 themselves	 under	 the	 guise	 of	 fighting	"exploitation"	 via	 land	 reform.	 Geisert	 (1986:682-684)	 does	 note,	 however,	 that	 such	actions	were	often	 carried	out	by	 local	Party	members	not	necessarily	acting	under	 the	command	of	 central	Party	officials;	 in	many	 cases,	 such	 actions	 towards	merchants	and	landed	elites	eventually	resulted	in	the	removal	of	local	party	members	and	installation	of	new	local	officials	more	sympathetic	to	the	interests	of	local	gentry	and	merchant	classes,	a	phenomenon	Geisert	describes	as	"de-revolutionising"	the	Guomindang	at	the	local	level,	bringing	about	a	reorientation	of	local	party	interests	to	become	more	aligned	with	local	elites.	
	The	examples	of	extreme	violations	of	private	property	rights	undertaken	by	state	actors	were	 a	 function	of	several	 important	 factors.	To	begin	with,	 although	 instances	of	 these	types	 of	 takings	 behaviours	 are	 not	 without	 precedence	 in	 all	 states,	 the	 authoritarian	governmental	form,	whether	that	be	the	Qing	or	that	of	the	Republic,	helped	facilitate	state	actors'	ability	to	expropriate	private	property.	Autocratic	governments,	given	that	they	are	less	directly	accountable	to	an	electorate	of	property	holders,	are	more	likely	to	engage	in	expropriatory	 behaviour,	 given	 the	 more	 complete	 control	 over	 the	 levels	 of	 coercive	authority	state	leadership	holds,	as	well	as	the	less	severe	consequences	that	state	actors	face	 from	private	economic	actors	when	they	engage	 in	such	behaviour;	unlike	 in	open-access	states,	where	effective	credible	commitment	mechanisms	such	as	an	 independent	judiciary	or	open	and	fair	elections	can	lead	to	the	removal	of	state	actors	from	office	were	they	to	violate	the	legal	protections	of	property	holders,	leadership	in	authoritarian	states	are	 unconstrained	 by	 such	 mechanisms,	 with	 private	 actors	 possessing	 no	 formal	mechanisms	to	check	governmental	power,	other	than	internal	revolt.	Given	coordination	problems,	however,	 this	dispersed	power	 is	difficult	 to	enact	and	only	serves	as	a	weak	deterrent	on	state	behaviour	until	 coordination	 is	enabled	(such	as	with	 the	Communist	Party's	mobilisation	of	primarily	dissatisfied	rural	citizenry).			Second,	 as	 Weingast	 and	 his	 Violence	 Trap	 co-authors	 have	 shown,	 limited-access	authoritarian	states	frequently	are	defined	by	high	levels	of	political	violence	that	signify	serious	existential	threats	to	the	regime	in	power.	Certainly,	that	was	indeed	the	case	with	the	domestic	governments	of	the	late-imperial	and	republican	period.	Further,	as	we	have	shown	via	the	"low	credibility	trap"	argument,	the	extreme	levels	of	political	violence	and	the	 existence	of	 existential	 threats	 to	 state	 survival	 characterising	 the	 late-imperial	 and	republican	era,	resulting	from	a	lack	of	monopoly	on	violence,	implied	that	state	actors	were	neither	incentivised	nor	able	to	create	credible	checks	on	state	power	from	violating	private	property	rights.	Further,	faced	with	continual	threats	of	loss	of	power	by	violent	overthrow,	long-term	goals—such	as	 improving	institutional	conditions	to	 foster	long-run	economic	growth,	or	the	ability	to	obtain	capital	cheaply	in	the	future—were	subordinated	in	order	to	meet	the	immediate	goal	of	holding	on	to	power	by	decreasing	the	probability	of	violent	overthrow	in	the	short-term.	Thus,	state	actors	were	willing	to	take	extraordinary	actions	that	involved	taking	as	much	resources	as	possible	in	the	immediate	term,	including	actions	that	violated	private	actors'	property	rights,	such	as	confiscation	of	property	from	private	actors.	 It	 is	 not	 surprising	 in	 such	 an	 environment,	 especially	 under	 authoritarian	conditions	where	 there	exist	 few	limits	on	state	actors	 from	exercising	 the	 full	power	of	government	authority	to	take	whatever	they	wanted	in	the	immediate,	state	actors	utilised	the	tools	of	government	authority	to	undertake	such	relatively	extreme	forms	of	takings.			
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7.3.		State-sponsored	Violence	Against	Private	Agents		Beyond	the	litany	of	examples	referenced	above	regarding	state	takings	of	private	actors'	properties,	there	also	occurred	numerous	instances	of	the	most	egregious	violation	against	private	 actors'	 property	 rights,	 that	 of	 takings	of	 private	 actors'	 lives.	Violence	directed	against	the	state's	own	citizens	represents	an	attack	on	the	most	fundamental	property	that	private	 agents	 possess,	 life	 itself.	 Defining	 the	 primary	 role	 of	 the	 state	 as	 to	 provide	protection	of	life,	liberty	and	property,	there	can	no	greater	failing	of	a	state	that	not	only	fails	to	provide	citizens	protection	from	other	nonstate	actors	able	to	use	force	to	deprive	private	 citizens	 of	 their	 life,	 liberty	 or	 property,	 but	 also	 functions	 so	 as	 to	 permit	government	actors	themselves	continually	able	to	undertake	actions	depriving	the	citizenry	of	that	which	the	primary	purpose	of	the	state	is	to	protect.			While	there	exist	examples	of	state	violence	directed	against	citizens	during	the	late-Qing	(Wong	2009),	especially	towards	those	suspected	of	advocating	an	end	to	imperial	rule,	the	lack	of	rule	of	law	that	came	to	dominate	the	republican	era	fostered	ever	greater	violations	of	state	power	in	this	manner.	State	actors	were	generally	unrestrained	by	rule	of	law.	This	was	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 authoritarian	 republican-era	 governments	 were	characterised	by	military	 control	 of	government,	 further	diminishing	 the	ability	 for	 civil	society	to	exert	control	over	the	exercise	of	government	power.		For	instance,	during	the	Beiyang	period,	broad	powers	under	the	so-called	"Anti-Banditry	Regulations"	were	initially	promulgated	by	Yuan	Shikai's	government.	According	to	the	Yi	
Shih	 Pao	 newspaper	 (1931:	16),	 "These	 anti-Banditry	 regulations...	 degenerated	 into	 an	instrument	with	which	to	deprive	the	people	of	their	liberties.	It	was	Yuan	Shih-Kai	who	invented	the	Provisional	Regulations	for	the	Punishment	of	Bandits	with	a	view	to	limiting	the	freedom	of	speech	and	the	liberty	of	action	of	the	Chinese	intellectuals	in	the	political	sphere...	It	is	true,	unfortunately,	that	they	provided	a	convenient	pretext	to	the	Northern	militarists	 for	 doing	 away	with	 political	 enemies,	 for	 violating	 the	 judicial	 system.	How	many	innocent	people	were	victimised	during	these	two	decades	as	a	result	of	the	abuse	of	those	 regulations	we	 cannot	 know."	 Similar	abuses	were	 conducted	by	 the	Guomindang	government,	especially	after	enactment	of	the	1931	National	Emergency	Act	allowing	the	government	to	arrest	and	execute	private	citizens	without	provision	of	civil	trial,	for	a	broad	array	of	infractions	that	could	be	deemed	to	lead	to	"disturbing	the	public	peace"	(Article	I);	"inciting	 other	 to	 disturb	 the	 peace",	 or	 "carrying	on	 seditious	 propaganda	 by	writings,	pictures,	or	word	of	mouth"	(Article	II);	or	even	"organis[ing]	associations	or	meetings,	or	propagates	 doctrines	 incompatible	with	 the	 Three	 People’s	 Principles"	 (Article	 VI).	 Nor	were	 private	 citizens	 accused	 under	 this	 act	 afforded	 the	 right	 to	 civil	 trial,	 but	 rather	subject	to	military	courts:	"the	highest	local	military	organ	shall	be	responsible	for	the	trial	of	persons	charged	with	crimes	enumerated	in	this	law"	(Article	VII).		State-sponsored	 violence	 included	 violent	 suppression	 of	 labour	 unions	 and	 suspected	members	of	the	Communist	Party	through	arrests	and	executions,	 including	the	12	April	1927	 Incident,	 when	 troops	 and	 gangsters	 suddenly	 attacked	 various	 headquarters	 of	labour	 unions	 throughout	 Shanghai,	 killing	 hundreds	 of	 workers	 (Time	 25	 June	 1928).	Following	the	incident,	Jiang	carried	out	a	full-scale	purge	of	Communists	from	within	the	Guomindang	 Party,	 and	 suppressed	 several	 violent	 uprisings	 in	 a	 period	 known	 as	 the	"White	Terror."	An	estimated	twelve	thousand	Communists	were	killed	within	a	three-week	period	after	the	12	April	Incident	(Rummel	1997:	125),	initiating	the	formal	start	of	a	civil	war	by	the	Guomindang	against	the	Communist	Party.		The	 state	 leadership	 also	 often	 employed	 the	 coercive	 power	 of	 state	 violence	 to	 force	desired	economic	behaviours	from	private	actors,	such	as	threatening	imprisoning	of	those	who	refused	to	purchase	government	bonds	or	provide	"donations"	to	the	Party.	Writing	in	
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reference	 to	 the	 frequency	of	 forced	 loans	placed	on	Shanghai's	 business	 leaders,	 Issacs	(1938:	209)'s	contemporaneous	observation	is	indicative	of	the	way	an	intrusive	state	tried	to	 control	 private	 business	 activity:	 "The	 plight	 of	 the	 Chinese	merchant	 in	 Shanghai	 is	pitiable.	At	the	mercy	of	General	Chiang	Kai-Shek's	dictatorship,	the	merchants	do	not	know	what	the	next	day	will	bring—confiscations,	compulsory	loans,	exile,	or	possible	execution."		Indeed,	perhaps	the	most	odious	examples	of	state-sponsored	terror	included	instances	of	assassinations	of	private	actors	by	state	agents.	Beyond	the	state's	silent	acquiescence	to	the	violence	perpetrated	on	private	citizens	by	local	favoured	criminal	organisations	such	as	Shanghai's	Green	Gang,	incidents	of	state-sponsored	assassination	of	ordinary	civilians	who	advocated	 the	 end	of	 authoritarian	military	 rule.	A	particularly	noteworthy	 case	of	political	assassination	was	the	death	of	Shi	Liangcai	(D$).	Shi	was	the	publisher	of	Shun	
Pao,	Shanghai's	most	respected	Chinese-language	daily	newspaper.	In	the	1930s,	coverage	of	Guomindang	policies	turned	fairly	critical,	especially	regarding	issues	surrounding	the	persecution	of	human	rights	advocates.	The	political	assassination	of	Yang	Xinfo	in	1933,	who	had	served	as	Executive	Director	of	the	Preparatory	Committee	of	the	China	League	for	Civil	Rights,	 and	had	been	an	outspoken	advocate	of	China's	democratic	movement	 and	prominent	 critic	 of	 Guomindang	 policies,	 led	 to	 a	 series	 of	 articles	 highlighting	 the	government's	 role	 in	 the	 assassination	 (Lean	2007;	 Jia	2010:4).	 According	 to	Wakeman	(1996:	257),	it	was	Shun	Pao's	coverage	of	the	assassination	of	Yang	and	continuing	public	criticism	of	the	Guomindang	Party	that	led	Jiang	to	personally	order	Shi	to	be	assassinated.	†		This	episode	underscores	 the	persuasive	 lack	of	rule	of	 law	and	a	government	structure	inimical	to	protection	of	private	property	rights,	the	most	fundamental	property	being	life	itself.	 Shi	was	one	of	 Shanghai's	wealthiest	and	most	 respected	 citizens;	 yet	his	 life	 and	liberty	were	taken,	without	consequence,	at	the	whim	of	state	leadership.	Such	examples	of	politically-sponsored	unlawful	assassination,	carried	out	on	private	citizens	by	state	actors	employing	the	government	police	apparatus—the	very	institution	supposedly	responsible	for	 upholding	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 preventing	 assassination—underscores	 the	 fact	 that	private	property	rights,	and	the	rule	of	law,	were	severely	compromised	during	the	period.			As	 demonstrated,	 state	 actors	 continually	 utilised	 the	 levers	 of	 state	 power	 to	 inflict	violence	against	private	individuals—communist	sympathisers,	critics	of	the	government,	those	 attempting	 to	 resist	 government	 takings—via	 coercion,	 imprisonment,	 or	assassination.	Such	actions	further	undermining	the	rule	of	law,	served	also	to	undermine	the	 ability	 of	 the	 state	 to	 create	 commitment	mechanisms	 that	 could	appear	 credible	 to	private	 actors,	 or	 to	 change	 private	 actor	 perceptions	 of	 the	 institutional	 environment	surrounding	 the	 enforcement	 of	 private	 property	 rights.	 Quite	 conversely,	 it	was	 easily	observable	that	state	actors	were	quite	willing	not	only	to	break	previous	commitments	to	protect	property	rights,	but	also	to	act	to	violate	the	property	of	private	actors,	including	even	their	very	personal	safety.		___________________________________________________________________________________________________		†	 Wakeman	 (1996:258)	 describes	 the	 assassination	 in	 graphic	 detail:	 "Chiang	 [Jiang	 Jieshi]	commanded	Dai	Li	[head	of	the	Guomindang	Army	police]	to	assassinate	Shi,	who	was	then	serving	in	one	of	the	most	prominent	public	positions	in	Shanghai	as	head	of	the	Chinese	Municipal	Council.	Dai	Li	originally	planned	to	carry	out	the	operation	against	Shi	in	Shanghai,	but	the	editor	lived	in	the	International	Settlement	where	police	protection	was	difficult	 to	circumvent...	 	On	November	13,	1934,	Shi	Liang-cai	and	his	family	wound	up	their	holidays	and	prepared	to	return	to	their	Shanghai	residence	by	automobile.	Shi's	party–his	wife	Shen	Qiushui,	son	Shi	Yonggeng,	niece	Shen	Lijuan,	and	son's	classmate	Deng	Zuxun–took	the	Hu-Hang	highway.	When	the	car	drew	near	Boai	zhen,	not	far	from	the	harbor	of	Wenjia	in	Haining	county,	they	came	across	another	automobile	drawn	across	the	highway.	As	Shi's	chauffeur	slowed	down,	the	doors	of	the	other	car	opened	and	the	assassins	jumped	out	with	drawn	guns.	In	the	first	hail	of	bullets	the	chauffeur	and	school-chum	were	shot	down	dead...	Mrs.	Shi	was	hit	and	fell	wounded,	as	did	her	niece	Shen	Lijuan.	Shi	Yonggeng,	the	son,	managed	to	run	to	safety.	But	Shi	Liangcai	was	killed	on	the	spot,	and	his	body	was	dropped	into	a	dry	cistern."	
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7.4.		Growth	of	the	Leviathan—The	State	and	Civil	Society		One	of	the	great	debates	in	liberal	thought	has	been	in	regard	to	the	proper	role	of	the	state	in	relation	 to	civil	 society.	The	state	at	its	core	 is	an	organisation	of	individuals	who	are	imbued	with	authority	over	others	by	way	of	the	power	they	obtain	via	the	coordination	and	collectivisation	of	their	resources	in	comparison	to	the	more	dispersed,	individualised	power	 of	 uncoordinated	 private	 individuals.	 Under	 classical	 liberalism,	 the	 purpose	 of	government	is	to	secure	liberty.	Philosophical	issues	shape	the	definitions	of	liberty—Klein	&	Clark	(2010:42)	refer	to	"positive"	and	"negative"	liberty	that	depend	upon	views	of	the	configuration	of	ownership—and	in	the	identification	of	the	appropriate	balance	between	protections	on	individual	liberty,	versus	the	justifiable	suppression	of	that	individual	liberty	for	 the	 betterment	 of	 a	 "collective	 good";	 that	 is,	 sufficiently	 liberty-enhancing	 in	 the	aggregate,	whether	in	the	immediate	or	the	future,	to	justify	the	limiting	of	liberty	in	the	immediate.	From	a	theoretical	standpoint,	it	is	difficult	to	find	consistent	parameters	as	to	when	 limits	 on	 individual	 freedoms	 are	 outweighed	 by	 collective	 concerns,	 and	 how	 to	prevent	a	tyranny	of	the	majority	from	transgressing	upon	the	rights	of	the	minority.			Philosophical	concerns	aside,	in	application,	the	problem	is	more	sharply	delineated	given	that	state	actors,	imbued	with	the	coercive	power	of	the	state	apparatus,	can	find	it	easy	to	advance	 their	 own	private	 interests	 by	 violating	 the	 individual	 freedoms	 of	 civil	 actors,	often	under	the	guise	of	doing	so	by	equating	the	"collective	good"	with	the	maintenance	of	stable	governance;	 i.e.,	a	continuance	of	state	actors	remaining	 in	power.	Further,	as	 the	power	 of	 the	 state	 grows	 vis-a-vis	 individual	 private	 actors,	 state	 actors	 can	 find	 it	 of	increasing	advantage	to	use	such	power	to	extend	state	control	over	areas	previously	the	purview	of	private	concerns	private	matters	into	the	public	domain.			In	 general,	 China's	 authoritarian	 domestic	 state	 leadership,	 over	 the	 late-imperial	 and	republican	 period,	 undertook	 actions	 to	 control	 an	 increasing	 range	 of	 aspects	 and	behaviours	that	were	previously	solely	the	domain	of	private	civil	society.	The	impetus	for	such	actions	on	the	part	of	state	actors	was	to	secure	the	primacy	of	the	Party,	and	hence	the	Party's—and	state	actors'—hold	on	political	power.	The	desire	for	state	actors	seeking	to	implement	policies	designed	to	control	increasingly	greater	facets	of	common	citizens'	daily	lives	can	be	best	understood	by	the	ways	that	such	controls	limited	threats	to	state	leadership's	hold	on	power,	given	such	controls	sought	to	limit	the	ability	of	free	expression	of	 ideas	 counter	 to	 the	 permanence	 of	 Party	 rule,	 or	 the	 ability	 of	 free	 association	 for	individuals	to	join	together	in	organisations	that	advance	their	interests	in	ways	that	might	threaten	the	power,	benefits	or	permanence	of	rule	of	the	Party	leadership.			7.4.1.		Growth	of	the	Leviathan—Education	System	and	Propaganda		The	growth	in	the	role	of	the	state	can	be	observed	in	the	field	of	education.	For	nearly	the	entirety	of	the	Qing	era,	education	was	not	a	government	provision.	Nonetheless,	education	was	a	service	heavily	demanded	by	the	populace,	and	as	such,	private	entrepreneurs	met	the	need	by	operating	small	private	schools.	As	Lee	(1914:	215)	describes	the	system	at	the	time,	"Schools	in	China	are	generally	kept	by	private	gentlemen.	The	Government	provides	for	advanced	scholars	only.	But...	schools	are	to	be	found	everywhere,	in	small	hamlets	as	in	large	 towns,	 although	 the	 Government	 appropriates	 no	 funds	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	common	schools;	and	although	no	such	thing	is	known	as	'compulsory	education,'	there	is	a	general	desire,	even	among	the	poorer	classes,	to	give	their	children	‘a	little	schooling.’"	As	 part	 of	 larger	 reform	 efforts	 implemented	 to	 create	 more	 responsive	 government	institutions,	 the	 Court	 took	 several	 nascent	 steps	 to	 a	 create	 formal	 national	 education	system,	including	the	development	of	a	national	university	system	and	national	curriculum.	The	 transition	 to	a	 republican	 form	of	 government	brought	 about	a	more	manifest	 shift	amongst	state	policymakers	to	move	from	an	elite-based	to	a	mass-based	education	system.	Providing	public	education,	especially	at	an	elementary	school	level,	became	viewed	as	the	state's	purview	(Schulte	2013:	231).	
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While	education	was	deemed	important	for	producing	a	workforce	able	to	lead	the	drive	for	economic	growth,	government	leaders	also	viewed	the	education	system	as	a	tool	for	the	promotion	 of	 nationalism	 and	 patriotism.	 Even	 before	 the	 institution	 of	 compulsory	elementary	 school	 education	 under	 the	 Republic,	Qing-era	 educational	directives	 in	 the	early	part	of	the	twentieth	century	had	begun	to	utilise	newly-established	schools	opened	by	 local	 magistrates	 that	 were	 designed	 to	 engender	 loyalty	 and	 patriotism	within	 the	educated	populace.	For	instance,	as	Harrison	(2001:	92)	relates,	"One	of	the	primary-school	textbooks	issued	at	the	time,	which	closely	reflects	the	government's	ideas,	has	a	lesson	that	reads,	‘Two	brothers	sing	a	song	together.	First	they	sing	of	loyalty	to	the	monarch.	Then	they	sing	of	love	of	country.’	The	teacher's	manual	explains	that	the	image	of	the	brothers	singing	 together	 is	 supposed	 to	 suggest	 the	 close	 relationship	 between	 loyalty	 and	patriotism,	 which	 tis	 the	 base	 of	 education	 for	 citizenship.	 The	 manual	 provides	 an	explanation	the	teacher	can	give	to	the	students	for	the	words	‘love’,	‘loyalty’,	‘country’,	and	‘monarch’:	‘He	who	loves	the	country	must	be	loyal	to	the	monarch	He	who	is	loyal	to	the	monarch	must	love	the	country.	When	one	knows	the	close	links	between	the	monarch	and	country,	then	loyalty	to	the	monarch	and	love	of	country	cannot	be	separated.’"		State	control	over	the	education	process	had	all	schools	falling	under	direct	control	of	the	Ministry	of	Education	(China	Year	Book	1916:	413).	The	emphasis	of	the	education	system	as	a	vehicle	for	the	development	of	a	citizenry	loyal	to	the	state	was	particularly	pronounced	during	the	Guomindang	period,	where	education	was	to	serve	as	an	extension	of	nationalist	ideology	(Chen	1976:	180).	All	aspects	of	the	education	system,	including	curriculum,	were	under	Party	authority	(Peake	1932,	Yeh	1990).	Guomindang	government	officials	instituted	a	set	of	educational	reforms	designed	to	ensure	a	"partification	of	education"	(Chen	1976:	184).	To	accomplish	this	goal,	the	head	of	the	Ministry	of	Education,	Cai	Yuan-Pei	(<),	a	respected	 scholar,	 was	 soon	 replaced	 with	 Dai	 Ji-Tao	 (#F),	 a	 party	 bureaucrat.	 Dai	oversaw	 policies	 such	 as	 the	 creation	 of	 ‘political	 education’	 departments	 on	 university	campuses,	with	the	Ministry	using	the	threat	of	withholding	accreditation	to	compel	both	public	and	private	institutions	complied	with	mandates	on	textbook	selection,	budgeting,	and	hiring	and	retention	of	faculty	and	administration.	As	under	the	Qing,	the	goal	of	such	‘partification’	of	the	education	system,	as	well	as	other	social	institutions,	was	to	ensure	a	nationalist	 ideology	 amongst	 the	 populace	 to	 foster	 a	 love	 for	 country	 (patriotism)	 and	simultaneously	equate	the	Party	(monarch)	and	state	(country)	as	one	and	the	same.			7.4.2.		Growth	of	the	Leviathan—Censorship	and	Propaganda		The	state	also	took	on	an	active	role	in	controlling	information	dissemination.	Conceptually,	censorship	was	not	a	new	idea	to	state	actors.	Alford	(1995:13)	details	early	instances	of	the	state	seeking	to	control	the	publication	of	materials	dating	back	to	the	Tang	era,	with	imperial	edicts	prohibiting	the	publication	and	distribution	of	documents	such	as	almanacs	or	calendars	that	might	be	used	for	prognostication,	so	as	to	control	the	potential	use	of	such	tools	as	a	way	to	forecast	events	unfavourable	to	the	Emperor,	such	as	bad	harvests,	and	Tangyuenyong	(2017)	shows	examples	of	the	early	Qing	imperial	state	banning	books	for	political	indoctrination	reasons.	However,	with	the	increase	in	the	publication	of	books	and	newspapers,	government	officials	began	to	take	on	a	more	active	role	in	terms	control	and	oversight	of	the	media.	Such	changes	were	exemplified	by	a	level	of	formalisation	of	state	 control	 of	 information	 dissemination,	 such	 as	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 department	 of	censorship	starting	under	the	late	Qing.	The	repercussions	for	printing	"seditious"	material	were	severe,	with	observers	during	the	period	noting	that	"the	native	[Chinese]	press...	was	at	the	mercy	of	the	administrative	and	judicial	discretion	of	various	officials	who	did	not	fail	to	use	their	privileges	to	strangle	any	semblance	of	free	thought	and	opposition...	any	free	thought	regarding	the	monarchical	form	of	the	government	in	China,	any	slightest	criticism	of	its	function,	could	be	interpreted	as	lese-majest	and	the	unfortunate	editor	or	author,	and	even	their	relatives,	were	liable	to	the	penalty	of	death"	Kotenev	(1927:	74).	
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	Under	the	Qing,	there	was	no	formal	legal	code	designed	to	protect	or	restrict	the	press,	with	censorship	and	punishments	meted	by	the	arbitrary	decisions	of	local	magistrates.	It	was	only	 in	1906,	after	 the	 implementation	of	a	national	 education	 curriculum,	 that	 the	Ministry	 of	 Education	 decreed	 that	 all	 educational	 textbooks	 were	 to	 be	 reviewed	 by	Ministry	officials	prior	 to	publication.	This	policy	resulted	 in	the	banning	 in	1908	of	 the	primary	school	textbook	 7&	for	its	use	of	the	phrase	 7	("equality")	(Wang	2007:	viii).	During	the	republican	period,	enacted	laws	regarding	expression	by	the	press	were	mostly	 decried	 for	 their	 draconian	 nature,	 beginning	 with	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 1914	"Provisional	 Regulations	 for	 the	 Punishment	 of	 Bandits".	 While	 ostensibly	 designed	 to	combat	 the	 issue	of	 banditry,	 these	 regulations	were	 also	used	by	 the	 state	 to	 suppress	freedom	of	expression.	According	 to	 the	newspaper	Yi	Shih	Pao	 (1931:	16),	 "These	anti-Banditry	regulations...	degenerated	into	an	instrument	with	which	to	deprive	the	people	of	their	liberties.	It	was	Yuan	Shih-Kai	who	invented	the	Regulations	with	a	view	to	limiting	the	freedom	of	speech	and	liberty	of	action	of	the	Chinese	intellectuals	in	the	political	sphere"		Strict	censorship	and	control	over	the	press	continued	under	the	Guomindang,	with	even	greater	 resources	 devoted	 to	 an	 expanded	 Department	 of	 Censorship.	 For	 instance,	 all	books	had	 to	be	 reviewed	by	 state	bureaucrats	prior	 to	publication.	Moreover,	 the	pre-existing	Censorship	Law	was	replaced	at	the	start	of	1931	by	an	even	stricter	Publications	Law	that	T'ang	(1931:	5)	for	instance	harshly	criticises	as	allowing	for	nearly	any	seemingly	negative	printed	comments	regarding	the	Party	to	result	in	imprisonment	of	their	author	and	publisher.	The	promulgation	in	February	1931	of	the	National	Emergency	Law	soon	followed.	Together,	 these	 two	 laws	were	 employed	as	 tools	by	 the	 state	bureaucracy	 to	suppress	 the	 publication	 of	 materials	 viewed	 as	 not	 providing	 the	 proper	 veneration	towards	the	Party.	Specifically,	the	National	Emergency	Law's	six	articles	mandated	those	engaged	 in	 "disturbing	 the	 public	peace,	with	 Intent	 to	 subvert	 the	 Republic"	would	 be	"punished	 with	 death";	 so	 too	 criminalised	 was	 "carrying	 on	 seditious	 propaganda	 by	writings,	pictures,	or	word	of	mouth",	with	punishments	also	directed	towards	the	editors	or	publishers	of	such	materials.	The	law	included	not	only	prohibitions	on	the	printing	and	dissemination	 of	 "seditious"	 materials,	 but	 even	 those	 criticising	 the	 ideals	 of	 the	Guomindang	Party,	with	Article	VI	defining	it	illegal	to	"propagate	doctrines	incompatible	with	the	Three	People’s	Principles"	(National	Emergency	Law	1931:	Articles	I-VI).		The	law	was	criticised	by	observers	at	the	time	for	its	"Its	vague	wording,	its	administration	by	 local	military	and	administrative	authorities	 instead	of	by	the	regular	Courts	of	Law"	(Peoples	Tribune	1931:	11).	Employing	more	bombastic	rhetoric,	T'ang	(1931:	1)	complains	"the	 so-called	 Emergency	 Law…renders	 anyone	 who	 says	 or	 does	 something	 short	 of	fulsome	flattery	or	abject	submission	to	those	in	authority,	liable	to	capital	punishment	or	life-imprisonment."			An	editorial	 in	Yi	Shih	Pao	(1931:	16-19)	found	Article	Vi	to	be	particularly	problematic,	arguing,	"No	political	doctrine	other	than	the	Three	People's	Doctrine	may	thus	be	used	as	material	for	publication,	translation	or	speech,	on	pain	of	imprisonment	for	five	to	fifteen	years.	Is	this	not	ridiculous…	And	what	do	the	gentlemen	of	the	Central	Party,	who	regard	themselves	as	Orthodox,	really	consider	 ‘compatible	with	the	Three	People's	Principles’?	The	absence	of	any	clear	definition,	if	such	were	possible,	inevitably	leads	to	the	creation	of	abuses,	and	in	view	of	the	large	discretionary	powers	of	local	administrative	officials,	a	free	press	must	 remain	an	 illusion	and	a	dream.	As	 any	writing	of	 a	political	 or	 sociological	nature	may	be	declared	‘incompatible	with	the	Three	People's	Principles,’	it	is	now	of	course	out	of	the	question	to	oppose	the	policy	of	the	Government,	but	even	sympathetic	criticism	will	soon	become	impossible	as	being	liable	to	be	misunderstood	or	misinterpreted."			
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It	is	noteworthy	that	the	Yi	Shih	Pao	editors	appear	quite	content	to	accept	a	good	degree	of	censorship	 over	 the	 press,	 stating	 that	 "In	 the	 so-called	 period	 of	 tutelage	 it	 may	 be	justifiable	to	suppress	theories	as	affecting	the	question	of	party	monopoly…	[and	that]	It	may	 be	 granted	 that	 those	 who	 are	 opposed	 to	 the	 Three	 People’s	 Principles	must	 be	suppressed,	but	those	who	are	merely	discontented	with	the	Government	should	be	treated	differently",	underscoring	that	even	those	not	committed	to	absolute	freedom	of	the	press	objected	to	the	limits	on	free	expression	imposed	by	the	Emergency	Law,	and	the	arbitrary	nature	of	the	application	of	such	limits.		While	the	majority	of	censorship	activities	were	directed	towards	domestic	publishers	of	Chinese	language	materials,	the	foreign	press	was	also	targeted	by	government	censorship	efforts	under	the	Guomindang.	The	North-China	Daily	News	repeatedly	drew	responses	by	the	 state	 actors	 in	 the	Department	 of	 Censorship	 and	 related	 organs,	 such	 as	when	 the	Standing	 Committee	 of	 the	 Central	 Executive	 Committee	 of	 the	 Guomindang	 Party	 (the	highest	body	in	China's	national	government),	enacted	a	resolution	effective	18	April	1929	suspending	mail	services	for	the	Daily	News.	While	the	paper	itself	was	published	inside	the	International	 Settlement,	 and	 hence	 technically	 out	 of	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 domestic	government's	 ability	 to	 suspend	 its	 publication,	 the	 Committee	 issued	 orders	 for	 the	Chinese	Post	Office	to	refuse	transmission	via	the	mail	service	of	the	Daily	News,	and	for	the	Chinese	Maritime	Customs	to	detain	copies	of	the	newspaper.	The	second	component	of	the	same	resolution	ordered	the	deportation	from	China	of	Mr.	George	Sokolsky,	an	American	citizen	who	served	as	an	editor	of	the	Daily	News.	The	rationale	for	the	resolution,	as	given	by	Mr.	Yeh	Chu-tang,	chief	of	the	Publicity	Division	of	the	Guomindang	Central	Headquarters,	was	 that	 the	Daily	 News	 "had	 made	 ridiculous	 statement	 [sic]	 in	 its	 columns,	 creating	baseless	 sensation...	 [that	 was]	 detrimental	 to	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 Chinese	 nation	 and	causing	unwarranted	consternation	among	foreigners	and	Chinese."			An	article	posted	by	Reuters	news	service	on	20	April	1929	notes	that	the	North-China	Daily	
News	had	been	singled	out	by	members	of	 the	Guomindang	Third	National	Congress	 for	having	"repeatedly	and	maliciously	attacked	the	national	government	and	the	Kuomintang."	The	proposal	stated	that,	"While	the	Government	is	keeping	a	strict	censorship	over	Chinese	publications,	it	has	paid	comparatively	little	attention	to	the	foreign	press.	A	number	of	the	foreign	newspapers	and	magazines	in	China	are	maliciously	attacking	our	Government	and	the	Party.	...Severe	disciplinary	action	should	be	taken	against	such	reactionary	publications	to	uphold	the	prestige	of	the	Central	Government	and	the	Party."	Another	one	of	Shanghai's	daily	newspapers,	Sin	Wan	Pao,	quotes	in	its	23	April	1929	issue	China's	Commissioner	of	Foreign	 Affairs,	 King	 Wun-sz,	 as	 justifying	 the	 resolution	 since	 the	 Daily	 News	 "often	published	 false	 statements	 and	 unfavourable	 criticism,	 evidently	 with	 the	 aim	 of	undermining	confidence	and	respect	of	the	general	public	in	the	national	Government."	The	story	by	Reuters	noted	that	the	discord	leading	to	the	suspension	of	mail	service	for	the	
Daily	News	was	long-seated,	with	the	official	statement	claiming	that	the	paper	was	a	source	of	"constant	fault-finding	and	criticism	of	conditions	under	the	National	government",	citing,	for	 instance	 that	 "Prior	 to	 the	 occupation	 of	 Shanghai	 and	 the	 Yangtsze	 Valley	 by	 the	Nationalist	forces,	the	North-China	Daily	News	constantly	published	reports	and	editorials	alleging	the	impregnability	of	the	Northern	militarists	previously	in	control	of	this	area."		The	use	of	state	bureaucratic	tools	such	as	censorship,	legal	regulations	on	the	media,	and	the	education	system	to	indoctrinate	the	population	was	symptomatic	of	the	authoritarian	nature	of	the	late	imperial	and	republican	domestic	state.	By	the	time	the	Guomindang	Party	came	to	power,	however,	an	even	greater	degree	of	bureaucratic	resources	were	invested	in	attempts	 to	control	civil	 society,	with	not	 just	a	Department	of	Censorship,	but	also	a	dedicated	Department	of	Propaganda	created	for	the	expressed	purpose	of	controlling	and	directing	public	sentiment	in	support	of	the	Party.		
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	7.4.3.		Growth	of	the	Leviathan—Mass	Control	and	Propaganda:	The	New	Life	Movement		A	significant	representative	example	of	the	scale	of	state-sponsored	propaganda	is	reflected	by	the	New	Life	Movement.	Inaugurated	in	February	1934	in	Jianxi,	this	movement	did	not	begin	 organically,	 but	 rather	 was	 a	 top-down,	 Party-driven	 state-sponsored	 mass	mobilisation	effort	explicitly	designed	to	indoctrinate	the	public	and	modify	behaviour	in	support	 of	 Party	 objectives.	 A	 considerable	 amount	 of	 state	 resources	 went	 into	 the	promotion	of	this	movement,	 its	 importance	highlighted	by	the	 fact	 that	 Jiang	appointed	himself	 the	 formal	 leader	of	 the	National	Association	 for	 the	New	Life	Movement.	 Local	counties	were	ordered	 to	create	 their	own	branches,	and	by	 the	start	of	1937,	branches	existed	in	1355	counties	across	24	provinces	(Lin	1995).			The	 power	 of	 the	 state	 was	 directed	 towards	 enforcing	 promotion	 of	 the	 New	 Life	Movement.	Business	organisations,	such	as	industrial	groups,	unions,	and	professional	and	business	 associations,	 as	 well	 as	 private	 civil	 organisations,	 such	 as	 religious	 groups	including	the	YMCA	and	the	National	Christian	Council	of	China,	were	compelled	by	state	officials	with	regulatory	and	funding	authority	over	these	organisations,	to	institute	"study	groups"	ad	hold	rallies	promoting	the	Movement's	ideals	(Wen	&	Li	2006,	Felanti	2010:	972-977).	 Likewise,	 state	 education	officials	were	 involved	 in	 incorporating	 the	Movement's	indoctrination	 techniques	 throughout	 the	 national	 education	 system	 (Averill	 1981),	including	those	directed	specifically	towards	university	students	(Huang	1996:	78).		Ostensibly,	the	New	Life	Movement	was	reactionary	social	movement,	designated	by	Jiang	as	a	way	 to	resurrect	 traditional	Chinese	morality,	 thereby	restoring	China	to	 its	former	glory	that	had	existed	prior	to	the	imposition	of	foreign	imperialism.	The	operationalisation	of	 this	 restoration	 was	 to	 occur	 via	 the	 modification	 of	 behaviour	 amongst	 common	citizenry	in	regard	to	manners	and	hygiene,	becoming	more	that	of	a	gentleman."	An	early	introduction	to	the	movement	presented	in	the	North	China	Herald	describes	the	movement	prescribing	 "the	 fundamental	 way	 of	 bringing	 about	 the	 nation's	 recovery	 lies	 in	 the	improvement	of	the	daily	life	of	the	people.	In	the	matter	of	clothing,	food,	and	housing,	the	people	 must	 cultivate	 the	 habit	 of	 the	 order,	 cleanliness,	 simplicity	 and	 frugality.	Furthermore,	 the	people	must	 respect	 the	qualities	 of	 a	gentleman,	 as	 they	were	 taught	many	centuries	ago	by	Confucius,	which	include:	 ‘Li,	Yi,	Lien,	Chih.’	These	four	characters	stand	for:”	Good	manners,	chivalry,	honesty	and	consciousness"	(NCH	21	March	1934:	)		In	reality,	the	essence	of	the	New	Life	Movement	was	to	foster	support	of	authoritarianism	amongst	the	population.	The	conception	of	the	relationship	between	private	individuals	and	the	government	was	to	be	one	of	subservience,	with	documents	published	in	1936	in	the	Outline	of	the	New	Life	Movement	highlighting	the	dependent	nature	of	civil	society	to	the	state:	"People	depend	upon	the	government...	for	a	satisfactory	life"	(quoted	in	Li	1986:	29).	More	explicitly,	the	alumni	association	of	the	Whampoa	Military	Academy	published	in	its	weekly	journal	the	Moral	Endeavour	in	1934	an	article	starting	that	"if	the	government	used	political	power	to	improve	the	material	condition	of	people’s	lives,	then	it	was	entitled	to	discipline	 the	 people	 using	 coercive	 power	 to	 ensure	 they	 fit	 into	 these	 new	 living	conditions"	(quoted	in	Liu	2013:	44).	In	the	same	publication,	Gong	(1934:	3)	openly	states	that	individual	rights	are	to	be	subordinate	to	those	of	the	state,	declaring,	“We	should	give	up	individual	freedom	to	pursue	the	freedom	of	the	nation."		The	Movement	fit	in	well	with	the	larger	drive	by	state	leadership	to	impose	ever-greater	control	over	and	"correct"	individual	private	behaviour.	As	Wakeman	(1997:	431)	describes,	much	of	the	Movement's	focus	included	restrictions	on	smoking,	dancing,	and	the	wearing	of	western	clothing.	Also	included	was	an	anti-opium	smoking	initiative	(Li	1987:	30),	one	that	must	be	considered	 ironic	given	the	well-known	 linkages	between	the	Guomindang	
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regime	 leadership	 and	 the	 opium	 smuggling	monopoly	 previously	 described.	 The	 1935	annual	 report	 of	 the	 New	 Life	 Movement	 Association	 listed	 detailed	 procedures	 that	businesses	and	public	organisations	were	to	follow,	including	the	"proper	behaviour"	for	workers,	servants,	hotels	and	restaurants	staff,	the	use	of	toilet	facilities,	and	social	group	participation	 (NLMA	 1935:	272).	Many	 of	 these	 directives	were	 centred	 on	 concepts	 of	orderliness,	or	what	Felanti	(2010:	981)	labels	as	‘hygienic	modernity’:	"The	NLM	[New	Life	Movement]	was	launched	within	administrative	organs,	public	places,	shops,	public	toilets,	factories,	 guild	 halls,	 and	 labour	 unions	 and	 promoted	 the	 improvement	 of	 the	 city	appearance	(city	building	facades	as	well	as	dykes	were	to	be	cleaned	up	and	advertisement	displays	tightly	regulated)	and	changes	in	etiquette	and	customs	(for	wedding,	funerals	and	the	like)."			Such	guidelines	reflected	a	degree	of	fastidiousness	in	the	desire	for	order	and	specificity	in	behaviour	over	a	broad	array	of	private	activities.	Even	activity	within	the	organisation	was	highly	regimented.	For	instance,	Felanti	(2010:988)	relates	that	"meetings	of	the	students,	even	for	small	groups	(e.g.	five	to	ten),	were	tightly	regulated.	The	students	had	to	stand	up	and	sing	the	party’s	anthem	and	then	read	Sun	Yat-sen’s	will.	Afterwards	they	had	to	discuss	and	criticise	their	work	of	the	past	week	and	plan	activities	for	the	following	week.	They	adjourned	 the	meeting	by	 singing	 the	 corps’	 anthem.	 If	 the	meeting	 involved	 the	whole	student	 body,	 the	 corps	would	 both	 sing	 the	 party	 anthem	 and	 bow	 three	 times	 in	 the	direction	of	the	party	and	national	flag	and	Sun	Yat-sen’s	portrait."		While	couched	in	the	terminology	of	a	movement	based	on	popular	participation,	the	New	Life	 Movement	 was	 clearly	 driven	 from	 above;	 Dirlik	 (1975:	 947)	 finds	 that	 "Its	 basic	intention	was	 to	 substitute	 ‘political	mobilization’	 for	 social	mobilization,	 thus	 replacing	revolutionary	change	from	the	bottom	(which	threatened	the	social	structure)	with	closely	supervised	 change	 orchestrated	 from	 the	 top."	 Taylor	 (1936:404)	 notes	 New	 Life	 and	similar	state-sponsored	mass-mobilisation	movements	under	the	Guomindang	"had	their	origins	in	military	circles,	[and]	a	strong	authoritarian	conception	of	the	State	lies	behind	the	movements."	The	focus	on	authoritarian	values	was	not	by	accident,	with	Wen	(2003)	finding	the	New	Life's	goals	to	be	regime	legitimisation,	based	on	fascist-styled	methods	of	indoctrination	 and	 propaganda.	Wakeman	 (1997)	 identifies	 the	 explicit	 use	 of	 a	 fascist	blueprint	 for	 the	construction	of	 the	Movement,	and	Eastman	(1972)	notes	much	of	 the	movement's	 organisation	 and	 recruitment	 strategies	 purposely	 emulated	 similar	movements	created	contemporaneously	in	Nazi	Germany	and	Imperial	Japan,	especially	in	regard	to	the	use	of	secret	societies.	Regarding	recruitment,	Wang	(1998:57-58)	and	Felanti	(2010:	987)	both	note	the	emphasis	on	adopting	the	fascist	strategy	used	in	Germany	of	recruiting	 younger	 generation	members,	 as	 they	were	viewed	most	 impressionable	 and	more	easily	subject	to	indoctrination,	reflected	in	the	Movement's	the	activities	designed	to	enrol	elementary	schoolchildren.	Huang	(1993)	finds	a	similar	dynamic	operating	behind	the	formation	of	the	Three	People's	Principles	Youth	Corp	(0H!)	in	1938.			The	 New	 Life	 Movement	 represented	 just	 one	 of	 several	 efforts	 by	 the	 Guomindang	designed	to	promote	Soviet-style	 'controlled	mobilisation'	to	 foster	patriotism	and	party	loyalty	through	'training	sessions'	(Edmonds	1997:	257).	Such	efforts	dovetailed	with	the	"Partyfication"	 strategies	 undertaken	 through	 the	 enforcement	 of	 propaganda	 tools	 to	support	the	Guomindang	party	in	the	education	system	and	through	its	censorship	policies	(Kirby	 1997,	 Strauss	 1997).	 These	 efforts	 included	 large	 political	 rallies	 and	 mass	mobilisation	events	were	directed	and	controlled	by	state	authorities,	designed,	"from	the	top	 down:	 part	 of	 a	 larger	 plan,	 drawn	 from	 Sun	 Yat-sen's	 testament	 for	 national	reconstruction...	 These	 symbolic	 events,	 however,	were	ultimately	 corporatist	 occasions,	arranged	and	led	by	party	and	police	agents"	(Wakeman	1995b:	20).		
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An	extreme	use	of	state	authority	was	employed	to	enforce	this	control	over	private	space.	As	Wakeman	(1995a:	165)	describes,	Guomindang	police	actively	engaged	not	only	in	law	enforcement,	but	also	"order	maintenance"—a	purposely	broad	concept	comprising	nearly	all	aspects	of	social	 life,	further	diminishing	the	division	between	private	and	public	life.	"The	police...	sought	to	regulate	every	aspect	of	popular	culture,	from	movies	and	funeral	arrangements	 to	astrologers,	 fortune	 tellers,	and	even	neighborhood	gossips"	(92).	With	greater	authoritarian	control	backed	by	the	coercive	power	of	the	state,	the	autonomy	of	private	 economic	 agents	 was	 continually	 limited	 as	 behaviours	 traditionally	 under	 the	purview	of	private	civil	society	were	placed	under	state	control.	This	continued	the	trend	begun	in	the	late	Qing,	of	a	limited,	distant	state	becoming	a	more	powerful,	authoritarian	and	pervasive	presence	overseeing	 the	daily	activities	of	ordinary	citizens,	elevating	 the	primacy	of	the	public	state-dominated	realm	at	the	expense	of	that	of	the	private	individual.				7.4.4.		Growth	of	the	Leviathan—Increasing	Employment	of	Nationalist	Propaganda		Not	surprisingly,	similar	to	other	fascist	and	authoritarian	movements,	the	tone	of	the	New	Life	and	other	Party-sponsored	mass	mobilisation	and	propaganda	movements	was	openly	nativist	 and	 nationalist.	 For	 instance,	 Jiang	 Jieshi	 delivered	 a	 well-publicised	 speech	 in	September	1933	stressing	that	China's	citizens	needed	a	"national	self-confidence	(zixin)	[that]	necessarily	believes	 that	his	own	nation	is	 'best	of	all'	(zui	youxiu),	with	 the	most	glorious	 history	 and	 superior	 culture	 of	 any	 country"	 (Wakeman	 1997:	 424).	 Such	nationalist	rhetoric	was	also	evident	in	state	actions	noted	previously	in	Section	3.2	in	cases	such	as	the	Salt	Inspectorate	or	Postal	Service,	whereby	domestic	political	leaders	sought	to	depict	joint	foreign	leadership	of	these	organisations	as	symbolic	of	foreign	exploitation	of	Chinese	citizens	so	as	to	take	control	of	these	organisations	so	as	to	use	them	for	their	own	benefit,	 ironically	thereby	effectively	exploiting	domestic	private	nonstate	actors	all	the	more.	Indeed,	stoking	nationalist	nativist	flames	amongst	the	populace	is	often	viewed	as	a	useful	distractionary	technique	by	authoritarian	leaders.		This	dynamic	was	similarly	observed	when	the	Ministry	of	Finance	in	the	mid-1930s	sought	to	monopolise	 the	 power	 of	 currency	 issuance,	 so	 as	 to	 obtain	 control	 over	 the	money	supply	 and	allow	 for	 greater	 levels	 of	 government	 spending	via	 a	 currency	debasement	strategy	at	 the	expense	of	domestic	private	savers.	Notably,	domestic	state	 leaders	once	again	turned	to	the	strategy	of	employing	ideological	calls	to	nationalism	for	an	end	to	the	"exploitative"	practise	of	foreign	banks	from	issuing	currency.	Thus,	a	blatant	attempt	by	state	 actors	 to	 prevent	 domestic	 private	 economic	 agents	 the	 ability	 to	 exercise	 choice	amongst	 currency	 issuers	 outside	 of	 government	 control	 was	 presented	 as	 a	 patriotic	matter—only	state-sanctioned	entities	under	the	direction	of	state	actors	should	have	the	right	 to	 issue	currency	 in	China.	Such	nationalistic	arguments	were	directed	 throughout	society,	 to	 be	 found	 even	 in	 officially-sanctioned	 Guomindang	 Ministry	 of	 Education	publications—as	claimed	 in	a	beginning-level	 reading	 textbook,	 the	reason	 that	only	 the	domestic	state	should	be	able	to	issue	currency	was	to	end	the	exploitation	of	the	Chinese	people:	 "Foreign	 banks	 are	 an	 additional	 form	 of	 economic	 oppression.	 They	 print	banknotes	in	order	to	take	our	supply	of	hard	currency	and	goods	in	return	for	worthless	paper.	They	also	cheat	us	with	their	exchange	commissions.	Yet	those	of	us	who	have	money	still	deposit	it	in	foreign	banks,	totalling	hundreds	of	millions	of	yuan.	Even	if	foreign	banks	do	lend	money	to	our	modest	businessmen,	they	charge	high	interest	rates,	and	so	every	year	they	make	profits	of	a	hundred	million	dollars	off	of	us	Chinese"	(0:?	1928:	34).	(It	might	be	noted	that	the	use	of	the	terminology	"worthless	paper"	reads	ironic	given	the	fall	in	value	of	the	Guomindang	government's	paper	currency	that	occurred	in	the	1940s	after	state	actors	had	monopolised	the	power	to	issue	currency,	and	subsequently	used	such	power	to	exploit	private	domestic	economic	actors	via	seigniorage.)	
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	Whether	developed	organically	or	 through	effective	use	of	persuasive	state	propaganda,	many	 Chinese	 exhibited	 a	 sense	 of	 patriotism	 that	 found	 foreign	 intrusions	 on	 Chinese	sovereignty	an	affront	 "dishonouring	 the	dignity	of	 the	nation."	Thus,	 for	 instance,	 Su	&	Barber	(1936:115),	writing	in	the	economic	trade	journal	Far	Eastern	Review,	refer	to	the	Guomindang	government's	securing	of	the	ability	to	increase	tariff	rates	"a	point	of	national	honor",	 as	 opposed	 to	 consideration	 of	 the	 economic	 hardships	 imposed	 on	 ordinary	Chinese	 private	 citizens	 as	 they	 were	 forced	 to	 pay	 higher	 prices	 on	 imported	 goods.	Similarly,	 calls	 to	 end	 foreign	 presence	 or	 for	 an	 end	 to	 extraterritoriality	 came	 from	throughout	society.	The	popular	press,	politicians,	and	legal	scholars	all	made	effective	and	passionate	 cases	 for	why	 it	 should	 be	 abolished.	 T'ang	 (1931:	 5)	 is	 exemplative	 of	 this	sentiment	when	 stating,	 "Extraterritoriality...	 is	 at	present	of	 little	practical	 value	 to	 the	foreigner,	but	being	derogatory	to	Chinese	national	dignity,	its	total	abolition	is	imperative."			Yet,	ironically,	T'ang's	view	is	also	exemplative	in	the	sense	that	such	a	call	for	the	abolition	of	extraterritoriality	comes	in	an	essay	regarding	the	blatant	and	arbitrary	unjustness	facing	society	owing	to	the	enactment	by	the	Guomindang	Party	of	the	Publications	Law	and	the	National	Emergency	Act,	both	of	which	granted	the	government	police	apparatus	the	right	to	imprison	or	mandate	capital	punishment	for	anyone	deemed	to	have	acting	the	Party,	with	 trial	 and	 judgement	 to	 be	 determined	 in	 military	 not	 civilian	 court;	 further,	 he	complains	of	continued	behaviour	by	"corrupt	and	greedy	officials"	who	 frequently	 levy	illegal	taxes	yet	escape	punishment	because	of	a	weak	and	ineffective	legal	system.	While	the	sentiments	expressed	by	T'ang	calling	for	the	end	of	extraterritoriality	were	not	unique,	they	nonetheless	appear	to	lack	a	consistency	of	logical	reasoning—demanding	as	they	are	for	an	end	to	a	legal	system	that	while	not	ideal,	was	absent	the	type	of	arbitrariness	and	lack	of	protections	afforded	the	civil	population	due	to	a	basic	lack	of	rule	of	law—simply	on	 the	 grounds	of	perceived	affronts	 to	 "national	dignity".	Likewise,	 it	 seems	 somewhat	further	ironic	that	T'ang	published	his	critique	of	the	Guomindang	laws	and	legal	system	in	a	 domestically-owned	 publication	 that	 was	 distributed	 by	 a	 company,	 The	 French	Bookstore,	operating	out	of	Tienjin's	foreign	concession	area,	where	it	was	protected	by	the	extraterritorial	legal	system	from	the	very	censorship	laws	he	attacks	in	his	publication.		Yet,	perhaps	 the	expression	of	patriotic	and	nationalistic	sentiments	throughout	Chinese	society	at	the	time—or	perhaps	within	any	society	ant	any	time—should	not	be	unexpected.	The	lessons	described	above	in	Qing	elementary	school	textbooks,	and	the	teachings	of	the	New	Life	Movement,	and	in	speeches	given	by	the	country's	supreme	leader	Jiang,	reflect	the	kind	of	 language	often	promulgated	via	state	 instruments	 in	nearly	all	governments.	Such	 language	 is	 often	 designed	 to	 distract	 the	 populace	 with	 populist	 claims	 of	economically	liberal	policies	as	representing	"humiliations"	imposed	by	"outsiders",	while	domestic	 state	 actors	 seek	 to	 enact	 ever-greater	 control	 over	 ever-more	 aspects	 of	economic	and	civil	society.	Tolstoy	(1893:5)	refers	to	such	strategies	of	"hypnotising	the	people"	as	the	employment	of	state	resources	designed	to	spread	"the	savage	superstition	of	patriotism,	and	the	same	pretended	obedience	to	the	governing	authorities.	The	patriotic	superstition	 is	 encouraged	 by	 the	 creation—with	 money	 taken	 from	 the	 people—of	national	fetes,	spectacles,	monuments,	and	festivals	to	dispose	people	to	attach	importance	to	 their	 own	 nation,	 and	 to	 the	 aggrandisement	 of	 the	 state	 and	 its	 rulers,	 and	 to	 feel	antagonism	and	even	hatred	towards	other	nations."		
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Part	III.	
Shanghai's	Parallel	Institutional	Environments			
The	 chapters	 in	 Part	 II	 provided	 an	 in-depth	 description	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 China's	 overall	
domestic	 institutional	 environment;	 in	 Part	 III,	 we	 turn	 our	 attention	 to	 consider	 more	
specifically	the	particular	institutional	environments	found	within	Shanghai	itself,	attempting	
to	undertake	an	analogous	analysis	of	the	city's	parallel	dualistic	institutional	environment.	
Late-imperial	and	early	republican	Shanghai	presents	a	unique	opportunity	to	consider	the	
impacts	 of	 institutional	 differences	 on	 economic	 outcomes,	 given	 that	 this	 singular	 city	
comprised	both	a	domestically-controlled	municipality,	and	extraterritorial	settlements,	each	
of	which	were	defined	by	differing	institutional	environments,	nonetheless	housed	a	similar	set	
of	 economic	 agents,	 and	 were	 influenced	 by	 the	 same	 economic	 forces	 within	 the	 same	
geographic	physical	space	and	same	temporal	time	frame.	Thus,	differences	between	the	two	
sections	of	the	city	primarily	were	of	a	political,	legal	and	social	institutional	nature.		
	
In	 Chapter	 Eight,	 we	 present	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 domestic	 institutional	 environment	 as	 it	
existed	 within	 the	 domestically-controlled	 sections	 of	 Shanghai.	 Relatively	 abbreviated	 in	
length,	 this	 chapter	 focusses	 fairly	 specifically	 on	 those	 unique	 aspects	 of	 the	 institutional	
environment	 and	 historical	 events	 that	 differed	 from	 the	 broader	 Chinese	 environment.	
However,	given	the	authoritarian,	hierarchical	and	unitary	nature	of	the	domestic	political	
system,	 limited	 control	 was	 provided	 to	 local	 governance	 mechanisms.	 As	 such,	 the	
institutional	environment	in	Shanghai	was	predominantly	defined	by	the	broader	domestic	
institutional	environment	described	in	detail	in	Part	II.	From	a	methodological	standpoint,	this	
fact	proves	advantageous	in	regard	to	our	study;	as	shall	be	discussed	in	Part	IV,	the	similarity	
between	 the	 overall	 national	 domestic	 institutional	 environment	 and	 the	 more	 specific	
domestic	municipal	institutional	environment	allows	us	to	use	a	comparative	analysis	between	
institutional	 environments	 of	 domestic	 Shanghai	 and	 extraterritorial	 Shanghai	 to	 make	
broader	claims	about	the	broader	domestic	environment.	
	
In	that	regard,	the	focus	of	Chapter	Nine	is	to	provide	a	detailed	qualitative	consideration	of	
the	 extraterritorial	 institutional	 environment.	 As	 noted	 in	 the	 text,	 although	 Shanghai	
extraterritorial	 settlements	came	to	comprise	 two	separate	partitions,	of	 the	 International	
Settlement	 and	 the	 French	 Concession,	 our	 focus	 is	 primarily	 upon	 the	 International	
Settlement,	mostly	taken	for	parsimonious	reasons.	
	
Similar	 to	 that	 described	 for	 Shanghai's	 domestic	 institutional	 environment,	 the	 nature	 of	
Shanghai's	 extraterritorial	 institutional	 environment,	 far	 from	 being	 uniform	 or	 time	
invariant,	 was	 defined	 by	 multidimensional	 complexity,	 and	 experienced	 considerable	
variation	throughout	the	lifespan	of	the	system	of	extraterritoriality.	
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Chapter	Eight.	
Perceptions	of	Institutional	Quality	in	Shanghai's	Domestic	Municipality			Following	a	brief	introductory	Section	8.1,	Section	8.2	presents	the	domestic	political	state	structure	 apparatus	 that	 defined	 the	 domestically-controlled	 Shanghai	 municipality.	Section	8.3	considers	a	few	specific	features	of	municipal	bureaucratic	capacity	that	allowed	state	 actors	 to	 plan	 and	 implement	 economic	 and	 social	 policies,	 in	 large	 part	deterministically	 proscribed	 by	 central	 government	 directives	 and	 control	 structures.	Section	8.4	describes	the	ability	of	the	domestic	municipality,	protected	as	it	was	by	central	government	military	apparatuses,	to	enforce	a	monopoly	on	violence	within	its	sovereign	territory.	Section	8.5	briefly	summarises.				8.1.		Historical	Background		As	described	 in	Chapter	One,	no	mere	"sleepy	 fishing	village",	Shanghai	was	a	relatively	thriving	 trading	 port	 well	 before	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Nanjing	 led	 to	 the	 arrival	 of	 foreign	merchants	in	significant	numbers	and	the	city's	designation	as	a	Treaty	Port.	Even	prior	to	the	arrival	of	foreign	merchants,	Shanghai	was	already	a	city	of	immigrants.	The	allure	of	economic	 growth	brought	 about	 considerable	 internal	migration	as	domestic	merchants	flocked	to	the	city	from	areas	throughout	China,	helping	drive	the	city's	growth.	As	a	result,	the	 population	was	 relatively	diverse	 in	 terms	 of	 ethnic	 and	 regional	 background	 of	 its	residents.	Du	(1983:7-8)	finds	over	twenty-six	native-place	and	associated	merchant	guild	associations	to	have	existed	in	the	city	already	by	the	start	of	the	nineteenth	century.			The	subsequent	opening	of	Shanghai	as	a	treaty	port	brought	to	Shanghai	not	only	scores	of	foreign	 merchants—and	 the	 attendant	 warships	 of	 foreign	 powers	 docked	 along	 the	Huangpu	 River	 to	 guard	 the	 interests	 of	 these	 merchants—but	 also	 foreign	 legal	 and	political	 institutions	 that	was	 able	 to	 operate	within	 the	 construct	 of	 extraterritoriality.	Simultaneously,	however,	within	the	domestically-controlled	areas	of	Shanghai,	the	same	form	and	administration	of	 the	domestic	Chinese	 legal	and	political	 institutional	system	existed	for	the	most	part	as	found	throughout	the	rest	of	China.				8.2.		State	Structure	of	Shanghai's	Domestic	Municipality		Overall,	 as	 indicated,	 the	 institutional	 framework	 as	 operating	 within	 domestically-controlled	 Shanghai	 was	 simply	 reflective	 of	 the	 broader	 domestic	 institutional	environment.	 This	 included	 in	 the	 areas	 of	 administration	 of	 justice	 through	 either	magisterial	or	"modern"	court	and	judicial	systems,	which	underwent	changes	that	were	instituted	 at	 the	national	 level.	Nonetheless,	 given	 the	difference	 in	 state	 administrative	level	of	municipal	versus	national,	there	existed	obvious	specific	political	state	structural	differences	between	the	domestic	municipal	and	national	government	state	structures,	with	Shanghai's	domestic	municipal	structure	experiencing	evolutions	concomitant	with	those	occurring	at	the	national	level	of	government.	Administratively,	Shanghai	historically	had	been	 considered	 part	 of	 Jiangsu	 province,	 with	 responsibility	 for	 its	 municipal	administration	therefore	falling	under	the	purview	of	the	provincial	leadership.	While	this	remained	mostly	true	during	the	late-imperial	period,	the	ensuing	political	instability	of	the	republican	era,	combined	with	Shanghai's	ever-increasing	population	and	economic	output,	led	political	forces	in	neighbouring	provinces	to	seek	control	over	the	city	via	annexation,	or	for	others	to	push	for	greater	autonomy	for	the	city.	
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8.2.1.		Domestic	Municipal	State	Structures	under	the	Qing		Throughout	the	entirety	of	the	late-Qing	era,	Shanghai	administratively	remained	part	of	Jiangsu	 province.	 Shanghai	was	 designated	 as	 a	 xian	 (:F),	 a	 county	 reporting	 to	 the	Songjiang	fu	(17#)	prefecture,	which	operated	under	the	Susong	Tai	Dao	(L1T)	circuit	level,	 which	 in	 turn	 reported	 to	 the	 Jiangsu	 provincial	 government.	 Appointed	 by	 the	emperor,	the	local	magistrate	functioned	as	the	municipal	executive	head,	responsible	for	the	maintenance	of	peace	and	order,	collection	of	tax	revenue,	and	also	serving	as	the	local	highest	judicial	and	prosecutorial	authority	(Wang	1890).	As	an	important	city,	the	circuit-level	office	of	the	dao	was	located	in	Shanghai,	and	thus	effectively	the	daotai	acted	in	direct	control	of	the	local	magistrate.	Given	the	physical	presence	of	the	circuit	office	stationed	within	the	city,	the	officeholder	was	often	referred	to	as	the	"Shanghai	daotai"	(Leung	1991).			During	the	Qing	period,	the	official	domestic	Shanghai	city	initially	consisted	solely	of	the	old	walled	city,	referred	to	as	Nanshi.	As	the	attraction	of	economic	opportunity	brought	about	 significant	 population	 growth,	 so	 too	 did	 the	 informal	 settlements	 and	neighbourhoods	 surrounding	 the	 walled	 city	 grow	 in	 scale.	 Soon	 these	 became	 more	formally-recognised	sections	of	the	domestic	city,	including	Hu-nan,	or	Nan-tao,	formed	to	the	south	of	 the	walled	city,	and	Hu-pei,	or	Cha-pei	 [Zhabei],	 located	 to	 the	north	of	 the	International	 Settlement.	 At	 this	 time,	 however,	 these	 separate	 areas	 cannot	 aptly	 be	described	as	districts	in	the	modern	sense,	as	each	section	was	separately	administered	by	minor	 officials	 while	 a	 single	 Qing	 Court-appointed	magistrate	 and	 his	 staff	 of	 officials	comprised	the	official	leadership	over	the	proper	walled	city	within	Nan-shi.			Near	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Qing	 period,	 pressure	 from	 business	 groups	 in	 some	 of	 these	neighbourhoods	 began	 to	 push	 for	 greater	 control	 over	 local	 spending	 and	 financing	decisions.	Combined	with	official	acceptance	of	such	efforts	as	a	result	of	the	reform-minded	Self-Governance	Movement	(.J8S),	organic	efforts	for	privately-funded	public	works	appeared,	 with	 nascent	 elected	 municipal	 governance	 councils	 created	 to	 manage	 the	administration	 of	 local	 laws	 and	 regulations.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 Shanghai	 magistrate	exercised	ultimate	authority	given	he	possessed	the	power	to	accept	or	nullify	any	decision	made	by	such	councils	(Tung	1964,	Elvin	1996).			8.2.2.		Domestic	Municipal	State	Structures	under	the	Beiyang		The	initial	Wuchang	Uprising	occurring	in	October	1911	that	led	to	the	Xinhai	Revolution	spawned	numerous	other	major	uprisings	in	cities	across	China,	including	also	in	Shanghai.	Taking	place	in	November	1911,	the	Shanghai	Uprising	comprised	several	small	groups	who	took	up	arms,	led	primarily	by	Chen	Qimei	and	the	Guangfu	Association,	and	members	of	the	Tongmenghui	Party.	Establishing	the	Shanghai	Revolutionary	Army	on	8	November,	the	rebellion	first	captured	the	Jiangnan	Arsenal,	and	then	overthrew	the	Shanghai	Daotai	and	other	Qing	city	officials,	declaring	Shanghai	city	independent	from	Qing	authority	(Fu	2016).	One	week	later,	sixty	civic	leaders	comprised	of	members	of	the	city's	business	association	(G0)	 and	 representatives	 of	 the	 Shanghai	 Self-Governance	 Council	 (:J8	+)	declared	 the	 founding	of	 the	 Shanghai	Military	Government	 (=PVD#).	 Simultaneously,	other	areas	of	the	municipal	region,	including	the	Baoshan	and	Qingpu	neighbourhoods,	as	well	 as	 surrounding	 counties	 including	 Chongming	 and	 Songjiang,	 soon	 also	 declared	autonomous	 independence	 from	 Qing	 rule.	 In	 Baoshan,	 for	 instance,	 local	 civic	 leaders	pushed	the	wealthy	landowner	Qian	Gan	(Y<)	to	serve	as	the	effective	leader	of	a	Baoshan	municipality	( F4-).	While	Wang	(2007)	notes	the	relative	indifference	the	majority	of	the	 city's	 populace	 took	 to	 the	 political	 happenings	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 Uprising	 and	overthrow	of	its	Qing	leadership,	the	events	leading	to	the	formation	of	the	new	government	were	not	entirely	bloodless,	with	violence	marking	the	overtaking	of	the	Jiangnan	Arsenal,	along	with	reports	of	civilian	causalities	and	destroyed	private	homes	(Schroder	1912).	
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With	the	ascension	of	Yuan	Shikai	to	the	presidency	of	the	new	republic,	Yuan's	allies	in	Jiangsu	sought	to	reconstitute	Shanghai	back	under	the	authority	of	the	province.	This	was	driven	primarily	by	Shanghai's	fiscal	importance	to	the	province—as	the	local	trading	centre,	revenue	from	goods	and	transit	taxes,	especially	on	opium	shipments,	represented	lucrative	sources	of	income	provincial	leaders	wished	to	reclaim	(Feng	2004:56).	Seeking	to	solidify	support	 amongst	 his	 allies	 by	 providing	 them	 access	 to	 the	 desirable	 financial	 benefits	control	of	Shanghai	represented,	Yuan	sanctioned	the	actions	of	General	Cheng	Dequan,	the	military	governor	of	Jiangsu,	to	enforce	the	removal	of	the	Shanghai	Military	Government	(Henriot	 2010).	 The	 Shanghai	 Military	 Governor's	 Office	 was	 abolished	 31	 July,	 and	reconstituted	 as	 the	 Office	 of	 Jiangsu	Municipal	 Supervision	 (
)	 (STCC	 2005).	General	Chen	Qimei,	assuming	the	post	of	Military	Governor	of	the	Shanghai	region	in	the	same	year,	created	the	Office	of	Municipal	Affairs	(!-AQ	)	to	administer	Shanghai.		As	one	of	the	first	attempts	at	centralising	control	over	the	entirety	of	the	domestic	Shanghai	municipal	areas,	Chen's	efforts	via	the	Special	Office	of	Municipal	Affairs	yielded	relatively	minimal	administrative	and	bureaucratic	changes,	with	Woodhead	(1933:	661)	suggesting	progress	in	this	regard	over	much	of	the	Beiyang	period	to	have	been	"practically	nil".	Such	subjective	critical	depictions	aside,	there	were	a	series	of	steps	taken	by	Beiyang-appointed	administrators	to	modify	much	of	the	city's	municipal	bureaucracy.	With	the	end	of	the	Qing	bringing	with	it	an	end	to	the	old	magistrate	adjudication	system,	new	legal	frameworks	in	the	 form	 of	 formal	 courts	 with	 judges	 trained	 in	 the	 law	were	 installed	 to	 replace	 the	traditional	magistrate-administered	system.	However,	aspects	of	the	old	magistrate	system	remained.	While	in	Shanghai	the	formal	offices	of	the	Songjiang	fu	prefecture	and	Shanghai	Daotai	were	formally	abolished	on	1	January	1912,	twelve	months	later	in	January	1913	the	Beiyang	government	 issued	a	proclamation	(	)	reinstituting	 the	position	of	the	Daotai,	albeit	under	the	new	officeholder	title	of	County	Administrator	().		In	January	1914,	Yang	Sheng	(3/)	was	appointed	as	the	first	Shanghai	Administrator	(:
M).	More	administrative	changes	in	municipal	structure	followed,	however.	In	May	of	1914,	by	decree	of	the	central	Beiyang	government,	the	Shanghai	Administrator	position	was	reorganised	back	to	the	dao	(T)	level,	with	the	creation	of	the	Shanghai	County	Level	Office	(=:TH),	under	which	twelve	towns	were	designated,	including	Shanghai	city.	Yang	sheng	was	retained	as	County	leader.	The	following	month,	a	further	reorganisation	took	place	as	the	County	Office	became	the	Office	of	Public	Administration	(T	H)	(STCC	2005).			In	May	1924,	efforts	to	create	an	autonomously-governed	Shanghai	County	were	partially	realised	with	a	promulgation	by	Beiyang	authorities	designating	 the	County	as	a	special	urban	district	under	the	direct	administration	of	the	central	government.	As	Fei	(1991)	and	Feng	(2000)	explore,	these	efforts	were	primarily	driven	by	local	private	merchant	groups	concerned	that	the	threat	of	war	between	Jiangsu	and	Zhejiang	in	the	early	1920s	presented	risk	of	disruption	to	economic	activity	and	destruction	to	private	assets.	Contemporaneous	reports	 in	Shun	Pao	 (18,	19	April	1922)	describe	extensive	efforts	by	 local	Chambers	of	Commerce	to	procure	assurances	from	provincial	military	leaders	to	avoid	warfare;	such	efforts	were	successful	in	obtaining	a	signed	peace	treaty	between	the	military	leaders	of	Jiangsu	and	Zhenjiang.	As	Feng	(2004:	58)	notes,	however,	the	failure	of	the	peace	treaty	to	prevent	a	war	for	control	Shanghai	between	Jiangsu	and	Zhejiang	led	to	the	development	of	a	 more	 serious	 self-determination	 movement	 by	 civic	 and	 business	 leaders.	 Although	success	 was	 achieved	 in	 so	 far	 as	 in	 June	 1924	 Sun	 Baoqi	 was	 appointed	 the	 first	superintendent	of	the	new	Self-Government	of	Shanghai	Special	City,	success	was	fleeting,	as	this	government	was	shortly	abolished	in	1925	by	the	actions	of	Marshal	Qi	Xieyuan,	the	military-governor	of	Jiangsu	province,	who	desired	control	over	Shanghai's	fiscal	resources	for	the	purposes	of	funding	his	provincial	warlord	armies.	Yet	by	late	January	1925,	Qi	had	fled	to	Japan	after	losing	control	over	Shanghai	to	Zhang	Zongchang's	Fengxi	army,	who	then	subsequently	lost	control	of	the	city	to	Sun	Chuanfang's	army	by	autumn	of	the	same	year.	
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Throughout	these	myriad	administrative	changes,	the	uncoordinated	nature	of	municipal	structure	remained.	The	domestic	city's	various	neighbourhoods,	which	 included	Nanshi	and	Nantao	to	the	south,	and	Zhabei,	Baoshan	and	Wusong	to	the	north,	had	grown	in	an	unplanned	and	organic	fashion,	and	administratively	the	domestic	city	continued	to	operate	with	little	overarching	coordination	in	planning	or	management	across	the	various	sections.	However,	Sun	Chuanfang's	rule	brought	with	it	an	attempt	to	institute	centralised	municipal	control,	with	a	unified	position	of	Directorate-General	of	the	Port	of	Shanghai	and	Wusong	created	in	June	1926.	Although	this	bureaucratic	office	lasted	only	nine	months	before	Sun's	ouster	from	power	by	the	incoming	Guomindang	army,	the	office	of	the	Directorate-General	served	as	a	precursor	to	the	formal	role	of	mayor	(Woodhead	1933:	661).		Interestingly,	it	was	during	the	weakened	central	authority	periods	of	the	end	of	the	Qing	and	the	Beiyang	that	domestic	Shanghai	experienced	some	of	its	most	dynamic	localised	governance	structures.	The	decentralised	domestic	administrative	structure	led	to	organic	experimentation	with	local-driven	funding	and	business-municipal	relations.	For	instance,	as	 to	 be	 explored	 further	 in	 Chapter	 Eleven,	 local	 business	 groups	 in	 several	 domestic	neighbourhoods	formed	spontaneously,	and	initiated	the	incorporation	of	either	privately-funded	or	public-private	enterprises	responsible	for	public	works	projects	that	the	business	community	felt	useful,	such	as	road	construction;	in	Nan-shi,	for	instance,	an	extension	of	the	 foreign	Bund	was	 financed	by	 the	 issuance	of	bonds	by	a	public-private	 joint	public	works	enterprise,	while	a	similar	road-building	project	was	undertaken	by	a	purely	private	venture	initiated	by	a	business	association	in	Zhabei.	Structures	that	were	successful	were	in	turn	copied	and	modified	by	business	associations	in	some	of	the	domestic	city's	other	neighbourhoods,	such	as	Nan-tou.	Thus,	this	period	was	partly	exemplified	on	the	local	level	by	municipal	public	administration	moderately	characterised	by	the	type	of	polycentricism	identified	 in	 general	 form	by	Polanyi	 (1951)	 and	applied	more	 specifically	 to	municipal	governance	 in	 Ostrom	 et	 al.	 (1961),	 with	 examples	 of	 multiple	 independent	 decision-making	 centres	overcoming	problems	of	 funding,	 or	whether	 and	where	 to	build	public	works,	taking	place	locally	rather	than	within	a	single,	centralised	administrative	body.			8.2.3.		Domestic	Municipal	State	Structures	under	the	Guomindang		The	end	of	Beiyang	control	over	domestic	Shanghai	formally	arrived	in	March	1927,	when	Guomindang	Northern	Expedition	troops	entered	the	city.	Their	arrival	led	to	the	defeat	and	subsequent	flight	of	troops	loyal	to	Sun	Chuanfang,	leading	also	to	an	immediate	dissolution	of	 the	 Port	 of	 Shanghai	 and	Wusong	 Directorate	municipal	 structure.	 In	 its	 place,	 local	workers	militia	forces	and	allied	Communist	Party	members	attempted	to	institute	a	new	municipal	government,	but	relative	disorganisation	and	lack	of	elite	support	meant	it	was	relatively	weak,	falling	after	the	so-called	April	12	Massacre	ordered	by	Jiang	Jieshi	that	led	to	 the	 death	 and	 arrest	 of	 hundreds	 of	 Communist	 Party	 members	 and	 sympathisers	(Henriot	2010:	299).	By	7	July,	a	new	formal	municipal	administrative	structure	of	domestic	Shanghai	had	been	instituted.	This	reorganised	single	administrative	unit	was	referred	to	as	 the	 City	 Government	 of	 Greater	 Shanghai	 (Borg	 1939:	192).	 The	 new	 administrative	structure	 was	 explicitly	 monocentrist	 in	 nature—the	 areas	 of	 Nantao	 and	 Nanshi	 were	aggregated	into	the	Nantao	district,	and	Zhabei,	Baoshan	and	Wusong	were	amalgamated	into	the	Zhabei	district,	all	under	the	centralised	control	of	a	single	administrative	structure.	Given	the	importance	of	the	Shanghai,	by	proclamation	of	the	Organic	Law	of	14	July	1927,	the	city	government	was	classified	as	a	Special	Municipality,	and	elevated	to	 the	 level	of	
sheng,	 or	province,	 reporting	directly	 to	 the	 central	Nanjing	government.	The	municipal	administration	 operated	 under	 control	 of	 a	 mayor,	 who	was	 appointed	 directly	 by	 the	central	government.	Underscoring	the	nature	of	military	influence	and	control	over	civilian	affairs,	the	first	four	of	the	five	men	who	served	as	mayor	of	the	domestic	municipality	after	1927	before	its	fall	in	1937	were	Guomindang	Army	generals.	
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	General	Huang	Fu	(]U)	was	appointed	mayor	in	early	1927;	Wakeman	(1995:	44)	notes	Jiang	Jieshi	personally	attended	Huang's	mayoral	inauguration	service	and	proclaimed	that,	"The	Shanghai	Special	Municipality	cannot	be	compared	to	an	ordinary	city",	emphasising	the	importance	of	Shanghai	to	the	success	of	the	new	government.	Poor	health	saw	Huang	shortly	succeeded	less	than	six	months	later	by	General	Zhang	Dingfan	(%B)	in	August	1927.	Zhang	ruled	until	March	of	1929,	when	he	was	replaced	in	April	by	Zhang	Qun	(&I),	the	Vice-Minister	of	Military	Affairs	and	Director	of	the	Jiangnan	Arsenal.	Zhang	resigned	from	office	in	light	of	his	inability	to	control	mounting	student	demonstrations	coming	in	response	to	the	Shenyang	Incident	in	September	1931.	General	Wu	Tiecheng	(Z)	was	simultaneously	 appointed	 mayor	 and	 Wusong	 Garrison	 Commander	 in	 January	 1932,	immediately	prior	to	the	outbreak	of	war	with	the	Japanese	military,	remaining	in	power	through	April	1937,	at	which	time	he	was	appointed	to	chairman	of	Guangdong	Province	(Tan	2016:	68).	Wu	was	 succeeded	by	Yu	Hongjun	 (\X)	 later	 in	April	 1937,	 but	 only	remained	in	office	for	less	than	a	year	before	the	Japanese	military	invasion	in	August	of	that	 year	 led	 to	 the	 overthrow	 from	 power	 of	 the	 Guomindang	 Nanjing	 government,	including	effectively	ending	its	control	over	non-extraterritorial	Shanghai	by	November.		Municipal	 governance	 throughout	 the	period	 remained	authoritarian	 in	nature	over	 the	course	of	 the	Guomindang	regime.	However,	a	 limited	degree	of	representative	rule	was	attempted	with	the	creation	of	a	directly-elected	municipal	assembly.	As	designated	under	the	Provisional	Constitution	such	municipal	councils	were	to	be	responsible	for	deliberating	on	municipal	matters,	including	budgeting,	and	rules	and	regulations.	In	n	practise,	however,	these	assemblies	remained	provisional	in	nature.	More	important,	assembly	membership	was	constituted	via	appointment	by	the	mayor	for	limited	terms	(Tung	1964:	147-148).	As	such,	these	assemblies,	including	the	one	operating	in	Shanghai,	failed	to	function	in	the	role	of	an	accountable	representative	legislative	or	oversight	body	on	executive	power.	Further,	
in keeping with the fundamentally non-representative nature of the government structure that 
characterised domestic municipal administration	under	the	Guomindang, not only was the 
city mayor directly	appointed	by	the	central	government	in	Nanjing,	but	so	was	the	city's	chief	 secretary,	 who	 operated	 directly	 under	 the	 mayor,	 and	 each	 of	 the	 heads	 every	administrative	municipal	department	(Crow	1933:	143).		Overall,	 the	 most	 salient	 factor	 in	 regard	 to	 municipal	 state	 structure	 as	 it	 applied	specifically	to	Shanghai	is	that	for	entirety	of	the	time	frame	covering	the	late-Qing	through	early-republican	era,	all	principal	domestic	municipal	government	officials	were	appointed	by	 the	 ruling	 central	 government.	 Government	 authority	 remained	 centralised—while	municipalities	were	administered	locally	by	local	officials,	such	officials	were	appointed	by,	and	received	their	authority	from,	the	central	government.	Indeed,	even	the	concept	of	a	"national"	 or	 "central"	 government	 was	 somewhat	 redundant,	 in	 that	 all	 governmental	structures	were	centrally	controlled.	Thus,	whether	embodied	by	the	Shanghai	Daotai,	who	was	 appointed	 by	 the	 Qing	 imperial	 court	 as	 the	 local	 representative	 of	 the	 central	government;	or	the	military	municipal	administrators	of	the	Nantao	and	Zhabei	sections	of	Shanghai,	respectively,	appointed	by	the	Beijing-based	Beiyang	government;	or	the	Mayor	and	associated	heads	of	administrative	departments	of	the	Municipality	of	Greater	Shanghai	as	appointed	by	the	Guomindang	government	in	Nanjing—all	local	municipal	officials	were	direct	 representatives	 of	 the	 central	 state.	 As	 such,	 it	 is	 more	 apt	 to	 characterise	 their	primary	constituencies	as	located	 in	the	ruling	central	government's	capital,	 rather	 than	residing	or	conducting	business	within	the	domestic	sections	of	Shanghai.			Further,	 and	 in	 line	with	 incentive	 structure	 frameworks	 outlined	 by	Ostrom	&	Ostrom	(1971)	and	Ostrom	(1972),	rent-seeking	activity	(Li	2018)	and	administrative	corruption,	especially	 within	 the	 police	 (Martin	 1991),	 increased	 with	 the	 installation	 of	 a	 more	explicitly	monocentric	municipal	governance	structure,	as	the	quasi-market	structures	of	
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competition	between	multiple	decision	centres	across	the	domestic	municipality	that	had	been	developed	under	 the	organic	polycentricity	of	 the	end	of	 the	Qing	and	Beiyang	era	essentially	disappeared.	The	explicitly	hierarchical	organisation	of	the	Guomindang	Party	design,	structured	along	Leninist	lines,	and	committed	to	a	strict	obedience	of	Party	goals	under	its	"partyfication"	strategy	of	all	government	offices,	reflected	a	style	of	governance	focussed	on	obedience	to	mandated	policies	and	hierarchical	decision-making	processes.				8.3.		Bureaucratic	and	Administrative	Domestic	Municipal	State	Capacity			Over	time,	more	complex	domestic	municipal	bureaucratic	structures	were	developed	in	response	to	growing	responsibilities	and	fiscal	requirements.	The	rather	skeletal	domestic	municipal	 government	 structure	 up	 through	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Qing,	 providing	 few	 social	services,	slowly	gave	way	to	an	increasingly	complex	administrative	municipal	bureaucratic	structure.	 By	 the	 late	 Qing,	 several	 semi-public	 bureaus	 devoted	 to	 the	 construction	 of	public	 works	 had	 already	 been	 formed.	 This	 process	 continued	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	Beiyang,	albeit	haltingly	given	the	political	chaos	that	dominated	much	of	the	period.			The	formal	institution	of	the	Nanjing-based	Guomindang	government	in	1928	brought	with	it	a	more	formalised	bureaucratic	administration.	Separate	departments	for	health,	public	works,	education,	and	police	were	delineated,	with	the	semi-public	bureaus	responsible	for	administration	of	infrastructure	construction	projects	becoming	incorporated	into	formal	municipal	government	departments.	The	Organic	Law	of	1927	that	constituted	Shanghai	as	a	 Special	Municipality	 formally	designated	 this	more	 centralised	municipal	 bureaucratic	structure,	with	 the	Mayoral	executive	office	supported	by	a	Secretariat	and	Counsellor's	Office,	as	well	as	ten	administrative	departments:	(i)	finance,	(ii)	public	works,	(iii)	public	safety,	(iv)	public	health,	(v)	public	utilities,	(vi)	education,	(vii)	land	administration,	(viii)	harbour	administration,	(ix)	public	welfare,	and	(x)	agriculture,	labour	and	commerce.	The	revised	Organic	Law	of	May	1931	led	to	a	new	administrative	municipal	structure	for	cities	of	Shanghai's	size	that	partly	streamlined	municipal	bureaucratic	structure	down	to	eight	administrative	departments	(Woodhead	1933:	661).		In	 sharp	 contrast	 to	 the	 rather	 limited	 and	 less	defined	 responsibilities	 assigned	 to	 city	administrators	under	the	Qing	and	Beiyang	administrative	periods,	Article	7	of	the	1927	Charter	 of	 the	 City	 Government	 of	 Greater	 Shanghai	 laid	 out	 twenty-four	 specific	enumerated	 powers	 of	 the	 municipal	 government,	 including	 responsibilities	 such	 as	conservation	 of	 food	 supplies;	 educational	 and	 cultural	 undertakings;	 erection	 and	maintenance	 of	 public	 buildings,	 parks,	 recreational	 buildings,	 and	 cemeteries;	 fire	prevention;	care	of	children,	old	people	and	 the	poor,	 regulation	of	private	construction	works;	 construction	 and	maintenance	 of	 roads,	 bridges,	 canals	 and	 other	 public	works.	These	municipal	duties	were	to	be	exercised	"in	the	absence	of	conflict	with	the	laws	and	ordinances	of	the	Central	Government"	(Tyua	:	374).		The	 effectiveness	 and	 efficiency	 of	 these	 new	 bureaucratic	 structures	 in	 regard	 to	 their	ability	 to	deliver	 the	kinds	of	municipal	 services	desired	by	 the	domestic	municipality's	residents	 appear	 to	 have	 been	 somewhat	 uneven.	 The	 mixed	 success	 in	 regard	 to	bureaucratic	municipal	state	capacity	is	partly	reflected	by	that	of	the	experiences	of	the	administration	of	General	Wu	Tiecheng,	the	fourth	mayor	of	Shanghai.	Coming	to	power	just	prior	to	the	onset	of	open	military	conflict	with	Japanese	military	in	January	1932,	Wu's	administration	 faced	 a	 serious	 set	 of	 economic,	 civil	 and	 social	 development	 issues,	particularly	in	the	war-devastated	district	of	Zhabei.			
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Numerous	 policy	 goals	 appear	 to	 have	 been	 achieved	 over	 the	 course	 of	Wu's	mayoral	domestic	administration.	Henriot	(1993:	234-235)	notes	that	under	Wu's	tenure	provision	of	domestic	services	related	to	public	utilities	improved	substantially,	which	he	suggests	was	 achieved	 by	 refining	 regulations	 regarding	 private	 utility	 providers	 infrastructure	requirements,	as	well	as	overseeing	the	amalgamation	of	eight	of	Nanshi	District's	older	electric	power	plants	into	two	newer	modern	ones.	Wu's	administration	also	directed	the	formation	 of	 a	 new	 water	 purification	 facility	 located	 in	 the	 Pudong	 district	 whose	construction	 was	 funded	 by	 private	 domestic	 investors.	 Wakeman	 (1995:289-292)	 is	somewhat	less	generous	of	the	performance	of	Wu	as	Mayor,	arguing	 that	his	municipal	administration	ultimately	failed	to	accomplish	a	majority	of	its	stated	goals,	particularly	in	the	area	of	crime	reduction,	with	violent	crime	rates	remaining	especially	high	the	Nanshi	District,	as	did	petty	offences	such	as	the	activities	of	unregistered	impermanent	vendors	who	blocked	both	pedestrian	and	motorised	traffic	flows	on	the	city's	sidewalks	and	streets.	Moreover,	Henriot	(2016)	documents	the	city's	continual	inability	to	secure	sufficient	land	and	construction	resources	to	accommodate	the	demand	for	necessary	cemetery	facilities.	Further,	both	Henriot	and	Wakeman	note	Wu	was	unable	realise	the	municipality's	largest	policy	goal,	that	being	relocating	Shanghai's	business	centre	out	of	the	foreign	settlements	northward	into	the	Wusong	area.	This	unrealised	goal	was	to	be	accomplished	by	erecting	modern	 port	 facilities	 at	 the	 mouth	 of	 the	 Huangpu	 further	 upstream	 of	 those	 wharfs	operated	 primarily	 by	 foreign-registered	 companies	 along	 the	 riverbank	 of	 the	International	Settlement	and	in	Pudong	directly	across	(Henriot	1993:	179-182).	As	implied	by	the	institutional	arguments	presented	throughout	this	dissertation,	whether	changes	in	port	infrastructure	could	have	overcome	serious	deficiencies	in	terms	of	the	structure	of	domestic	 private	 property	 and	 contract	 rights	 protections	 can	 be	 argued	 to	 have	 been	unlikely,	 given	 that	 the	 revealed	 preferences	 of	 domestic	 entrepreneurs	 and	 investors	continually	 indicated	 their	 desire	 to	 utilise	 extraterritorial	 as	 opposed	 to	 domestic	institutional	protections	when	choosing	where	to	locate	their	business	and	financial	assets.				8.3.1.		Bureaucratic	Municipal	State	Capacity:		Taxation	and	Revenue-Raising	Capabilities		Concomitant	with	the	increase,	formalisation,	and	specification	of	municipal	government	responsibilities	laid	out	in	the	Organic	Law	of	1927	and	revisions	in	1930	and	1931,	so	too	were	 the	 types	 of	 tax	 revenue	 sources	more	 systematically	 delineated.	 Article	 9	 of	 the	Revised	 Law	 of	 1930,	 for	 instance,	 specified	 that	 seven	 specific	 taxes	 were	 defined	 as	comprising	 the	 revenue	 for	 municipal	 governments;	 (i)	 Land	 tax,	 (ii)	 House	 tax,	 (iii)	Business	tax,	(iv)	License	fees,	(v)	outdoor	adverts	fees,	(vi)	income	from	public	lands,	(vii)	income	from	municipally-owned	business	(Tyua	:	375).		Prior	 to	 the	 Guomindang	 period	 of	 municipal	 administration,	 supervision	 over	 the	assessment	and	collection	of	tax	matters	was	handled	separately	within	separate	sections	of	 the	domestic	 city;	 two	 such	offices	were	 the	Nantao	Municipal	Office,	 and	 the	 Zhabei	Works	and	Tax	Bureau.	As	a	result,	different	tax	structures	and	effective	tax	rates	existed	across	these	areas;	for	instance,	while	a	monthly-collected	public	welfare	tax	of	five	per	cent	on	residences	(twelve	per	cent	for	homes	along	the	banks	of	the	Huangpu),	and	seven	per	cent	on	small	business	shops,	was	levied	in	Nantao,	a	quarterly-collected	general	tax	of	six	per	cent	on	residential	units	(twelve	per	cent	on	houses	located	along	Suzhou	Creek),	and	ten	per	cent	on	small	business	shops,	was	 in	place	 in	Zhabei;	the	district	government	of	Shanghai	also	imposed	a	fifteen	per	cent	tax	on	residential	units	(Woodhead	1933:	663).	In	keeping	with	the	drive	for	coordinated	control,	these	separate	divisions	were	abolished	and	their	functions	consolidated	under	various	departments	of	the	Greater	Shanghai	domestic	municipal	 bureaucratic	 structure,	 eventually	 becoming	 centralised	within	 the	 Bureau	 of	Finance,	which	ultimately	 instituted	a	per-unit	 based	house	 tax	 standardised	 across	 the	entire	domestic	municipality,	in	line	with	rates	the	Zhabei	office	had	earlier	imposed.		
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	The	 inability	 of	 Beiyang-era	 local	 governments	 to	 raise	 significant	 levels	 of	 capital	 is	highlighted	by	Woodhead	(1933:	663),	who	notes	that	local	taxes	"were	not	usually	paid	in	full.	Some	influential	personal	contrived	to	be	practically	exempt	from	such	payment,	less	influential	personals	made	it	a	rule	to	pay	only	one-half	or	less	than	one-half	of	the	stated	amount."	As	 a	 result,	 total	 tax	 receipts	were	 relatively	 low.	Moreover,	 corruption	was	a	significant	feature	of	the	tax	collection	procedure,	owing	partly	to	the	practise	of	tax	farming	which	had	taxes	collected	through	an	array	of	commercial	ventures	and	merchant	groups	that	often	found	it	more	in	their	interest	to	keep	significant	portions	of	actual	collected	tax	amounts	as	opposed	to	passing	along	 to	government	officials,	often	by	assessing	below-value	taxes	while	collecting	amounts	in	excess	of	assessed	amounts.		Significant	attempts	were	undertaken	by	the	Guomindang	administration	to	standardise	tax	collection	policies	with	the	intent	to	increase	tax	receipts.	To	begin	with,	tax	farming	was	curtailed,	 with	 tax	 collection	 directly	 administered	 by	 Bureau	 of	 Finance	 officials.	Municipality	administrators	also	worked	to	increase	tax	receipts	by	increasing	the	number	of	taxes	that	were	designated	as	municipal	revenues	as	opposed	to	provincial;	for	instance,	Mayor	Zhang	Dingfan	was	able	to	transfer	control	over	the	proceeds	of	the	tax	on	horse-racing	 betting	 and	 operations	 from	 the	 province-level	 to	 the	municipal	 level,	 and	 after	securing	 control	 over	 these	 tax	 revenues,	 immediately	proceeded	 to	 increasing	 the	 rate	from	one	and	a	half	per	cent	up	to	five	per	cent	in	1928,	increasing	municipal	tax	revenues	by	nearly	half	a	million	yuan	per	annum	(Woodhead	1933:	664).			Beyond	tax	collection,	municipal	revenues	were	also	derived	 from	the	sale	and	rental	of	municipal	lands,	as	well	as	from	business	revenue	of	municipality-owned	ventures.	As	at	the	national	level,	the	degree	of	government	control	and	ownership	over	productive	assets	at	 the	 local	 level	 experienced	 substantial	 increases	during	 the	Guomindang	 time	period.	This	 can	 be	 observed	 from	 the	 drastic	 increases	 in	 tax	 receipts	 received	 from	 such	properties	and	assets.	For	instance,	revenues	from	municipal-owned	properties	increased	from	 79,105	 yuan	 in	 1927	 to	 525,158	 yuan	 by	 1931,	 while	 revenues	 from	 public	 and	municipal	 businesses	 and	 industrial	 undertakings	 increased	 from	 68,270	 in	 1927	 to	704,570	yuan	 by	1931	(Woodhead	1933:	665);	 such	 increases	were	on	 the	 scale	of	 five	hundred	and	sixty-four	per	cent,	and	nine	hundred	and	thirty-two	per	cent,	respectively.		Shanghai's	municipal	governments	also	generated	income	from	the	sale	of	municipal	bonds.	As	 explored	 in	 detail	 in	 Part	 IV	 of	 the	 dissertation,	 the	 success	 of	 Shanghai's	 domestic	municipal	governments	raising	capital	via	the	flotation	of	such	bonds	was	decidedly	mixed.	For	the	majority	of	the	period,	only	relatively	small	and	sporadic	amounts	were	able	to	be	floated	on	local	markets	given	investors'	consistent	hesitancy	to	take	on	significant	levels	of	debt	backed	by	the	pledge	of	municipal	government	officials	to	repay	loans	collateralised	by	locally-managed	tax	receipts.	As	at	the	national	level,	continual	default	events	occurred,	with	missed	coupon	payments	or	outright	stoppage	of	debt	repayment.	It	was	only	well	into	the	middle	of	the	Guomindang	period	that	a	domestic	Shanghai	government	proved	able	to	raise	a	significant	amount	of	funds	from	investors.	Both	the	1932	and	1934	flotations	issued	by	 the	City	Government	of	Greater	Shanghai	were	 fully	subscribed,	and	proceeded	to	be	priced	as	valuable	and	viable	financial	securities	on	the	city's	secondary	bond	markets.	The	income	 generated	 by	 these	 bonds	 for	 the	 domestic	 city	 government	 was	 considerable,	contributing	extraordinary	income	of	4.8	and	3.3	million	yuan,	respectively,	to	municipal	budgets	with	ordinary	revenue	receipts	of	8.8	and	11.7	million	yuan,	respectively.	However,	while	both	issuances	initially	proved	successful	and	were	well-received	by	investors,	the	inability	of	 the	domestic	state	at	 the	national	and	 local	 level	 to	maintain	a	monopoly	on	internal	violence	ultimately	resulted	in	both	of	these	bond	issuances	falling	into	complete	default	 after	 late	 1937,	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 Japanese	 military	 invasion	 and	 subsequent	overthrow	of	the	Nanjing-based	Guomindang	central	government,	and	the	accompanying	overthrow	of	Shanghai's	Guomindang	regime-backed	domestic	municipal	government.		
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8.3.2.		Bureaucratic	Municipal	State	Capacity:	Fiscal	Expenditures	Policies		Concomitant	with	 the	 above-described	 increases	 in	 tax	 receipts	during	 the	Guomindang	period,	so	too	did	municipal	spending	outlays	increase.	Much	of	this	increase	in	spending	came	about	as	a	result	of	significant	increases	in	the	assumption	of	the	provision	of	social	and	civil	services	by	the	domestic	municipal	administration.	Part	of	the	change	in	the	fiscal	outlay	process	was	procedural	 in	nature.	Prior	 to	 the	Guomindang	administration,	 fiscal	outlays	at	the	local	level	were	undertaken	primarily	on	an	ad-hoc	basis,	with	local	municipal	departments	 undertaking	 neither	 financial	 forecasting	 nor	 the	 budgeting	 of	 definitive	allocated	appropriations	over	set	time	periods.	Beyond	such	new	bureaucratic	procedural	norms,	 also	 introduced	 under	 the	 Guomindang-backed	 municipal	 government	 was	 the	practise	 of	 standardised	 financial	 reports	 for	 municipal	 departments.	 So,	 too,	 was	 a	complicated	 system	 of	 fund	 disbursement,	 embarked	 upon	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 minimise	spending	outside	of	budgeted	 limits	and	uses:	 "Standard	stationary	 forms	are	 in	use	 for	depositing	and	withdrawing	authorized	funds.	These	forms	are	required	to	be	filled	out	in	triplicate,	 sometimes	 in	 quadruplicate,	 and	 to	 bear	 the	 official	 seals	 of	 the	 competent	functionaries	 before	 they	 will	 be	 deemed	 valid	 or	 honoured"	 (Woodhead	 1933:	 664).	Woodhead	approvingly	refers	to	such	procedures	as	"scientific",	utilising	terminology	used	by	advocates	of	the	time	period's	modern	accounting	techniques	(Morgan	2003).		Yet	employment	of	"scientific"	budgeting	methods	did	not	imply	more	efficient	or	effective	municipal	bureaucracy.	Reforms	centring	upon	increasing	the	number	of	rote,	bureaucratic	procedures—such	as	requiring	government	officials	to	fill	forms	out	in	triplicate,	or	even	in	quadruplicate—failed	 to	 solve	 issues	 of	 corruption	 in	 spending	 or	 allocating,	 nor	 did	 it	imply	 efficiency	or	usefulness	 in	 application	of	 expenditures,	 nor	 incentivise	 the	overall	economising	of	spending	levels.	In	fact,	municipal	spending	levels	increased	nearly	fivefold	over	the	course	of	the	decade	of	Guomindang	municipal	control	of	the	Shanghai	municipal	government	 from	1927	through	1937,	with	budgeted	outlays	 rising	 from	approximately	three	and	a	half	million	yuan	up	to	over	thirteen	and	a	half	million.	Increases	in	spending,	whether	documented	in	triple	or	quadruplicate,	could	be	argued	to	have	been	an	outgrowth	of	a	leviathan	state	structure	that	continually	extracted	greater	amounts	of	tax	revenue	from	private	actors	so	as	to	be	utilised	in	ways	that	state	actors	desired.		The	inclination	by	domestic	municipal	officials	to	spend	significant	sums	of	taxpayer	money	was	exemplified	by	actions	during	the	Wu	administration.	While	Henriot	(1993,	2016)	and	Wakeman	(1995)	write	critically	of	the	administration's	ability	to	effectively	deliver	public	services,	it	did	at	least	prove	adept	at	spending,	especially	on	ostentatious	projects	designed	to	project	state	power.	For	instance,	the	administration	oversaw	the	opening	of	a	new	City	Hall	 (!-$)	 in	 October	 1933	 in	 the	 Zhabei	 district.	 Built	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 1932	hostilities	with	the	Japanese	military	that	destroyed	much	of	the	northern	districts,	the	cost	of	this	new	facility	housing	the	municipal	government	was	considerable,	estimated	by	Borg	(1939:	192)	to	have	totalled	twenty-five	million	yuan.	Beyond	the	new	city	hall	structure,	other	municipal	building	projects	were	undertaken,	including	a	new	municipal	library,	city	museum,	and	sports	 facility,	all	 completed	 in	1937	(Henriot	1993:	181).	 It	 is	debateable	whether	 expenditures	 of	 scarce	 public	 resources	 on	 these	 large	 government-owned	facilities	represented	those	that	best	addressed	the	concerns	of	the	majority	of	the	domestic	municipality's	residents,	especially	given	the	multitude	of	serious	issues	that	for	the	most	part	 remained	 unresolved—many	 of	 which	 were	 highlighted	 by	 a	 public	 address	 Wu	himself	in	December	1932	in	which	he	noted,	"we	are	seriously	handicapped	by	a	system	of	roads,	or	rather	the	lack	of	a	system,	which	even	at	its	best	is	a	makeshift,	grown	out	of	a	maze	of	old	roads	hap-hazardly	laid	out	without	an	eye	to	the	future.	No	human	power	can	render	these	roads	adequate	in	taking	care	of	the	ever	growing	traffic.	Shanghai	is	rated	as	the	third	largest	city	in	the	world.	Its	harbour	accommodates	tens	of	millions	of	tons	of	cargo	in	shipping.	Yet	it	takes	more	than	an	hour	for	any	individual	steamer	to	come	up	to	its	berth	
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or	mooring.	In	many	cases	passengers	are	obliged	to	take	to	lighters	of	tenders	to	reach	the	shore.	The	value	of	 this	unnecessary	waste	of	 time	and	 cost	 is	 incalculable"	 (Woodhead	1933:	672).	Given	such	pressing	need	for	infrastructural	facilities	for	economic	expansion,	it	is	telling	that	municipal	leaders	chose	to	prioritise	the	construction	of	a	new	government	office	 building	 to	 serve	 as	 their	 workspace,	 as	 opposed	 to	 utilising	 fiscal	 resources	 on	projects	that	would	more	directly	lead	to	municipal	economic	development	and	therefore	improvement	in	the	quality	of	the	daily	lives	of	the	majority	of	the	municipality's	residents.		The	 scale	 of	 the	 increase	 in	 overall	 levels	 of	 domestic	 spending	 and	 tax	 extraction	 that	occurred	under	Guomindang	administration	can	be	observed	from	data	presented	in	Figure	8.1,	 which	 graphs	 total	 revenues	 and	 outlays	 made	 by	 domestic	 municipal	 authorities	during	periods	of	late-Qing,	Beiyang,	and	early	Guomindang	control	over	governance	of	the	domestic	city,	adjusted	for	inflation.	Several	aspects	of	domestic	municipal	fiscal	matters	are	immediately	clear	from	the	chart.	To	begin	with,	deficit	spending	was	kept	to	a	relative	minimum,	 with	 revenues	 and	 expenditures	 approximately	 equal	 throughout	 the	 time	period.	 Revenues	 exceeded	 expenditures	 in	1932	when	 the	 city	 successfully	 floated	 4.8	million	yuan	worth	of	new	municipal	bonds,	although	this	difference	was	nearly	equally	reversed	 to	 the	 opposite	 the	 following	 year	 once	municipal	 officials	 allocated	 the	 new	monies.	The	high	revenue	and	spending	mark	occurring	in	1934	also	coincides	with	that	year's	issuance	of	another	municipal	bond	netting	the	city	3.5	million	yuan.				Figure	8.1.		Shanghai's	Domestic	Municipal	Fiscal	Position,	in	constant	1937-yuan,	1905-1937		
	sources:		Shanghai	Finance	and	Taxation	Committee	(1995:	61-62,	100-101,	151-154);	inflation	data	from	He	(1927),	Shanghai	Institute	of	Economics	(1958:	126-143,	163-170).			On	a	more	fundamental	level,	the	shape	of	the	graph	clearly	demonstrates	the	difference	in	the	scale	of	provision	of	social	services	at	the	municipal	level	during	different	governmental	periods.	During	the	late-imperial	and	Beiyang	periods,	the	administration	of	the	city	was	not	 conducted	 by	 a	 formal	 municipal	 authority	 overseeing	 a	 standardised	 budget	responsible	for	the	supply	and	maintenance	of	social	services;	instead,	most	such	services	were	either	absent,	or	supplied	privately	or	by	quasi-public	bureaus	whose	creation	were	often	 initiated	 by	 private	 concerns	 but	 received	 official	 government	 sponsorship	 or	authorisation.	 As	 the	 figure	 plainly	 shows,	 however,	 a	 marked	 change	 in	 the	 scale	 of	municipal-level	taxation	and	spending	occurred	at	the	start	of	the	Guomindang	period—not	only	do	the	levels	of	both	indicators	immediately	sharply	rise	in	1927,	but	they	then	both	exhibit	 a	distinct	upward	 trend	throughout	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 time	period.	Obviously,	 then,	these	data	suggest	that	the	general	trend	of	an	increasing	role	of	the	domestic	state	in	the	economy	and	economic	actors'	daily	lives	during	the	Guomindang	period	that	occurred	on	a	 larger	national	scale,	 as	described	 throughout	Part	 II,	was	 also	 reflected	 in	 the	 size	of	Shanghai's	domestic	municipal	governance	structure	under	the	Guomindang.	
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8.4.		Domestic	Municipal	State	Capacity:		Maintaining	a	Monopoly	on	Violence		As	extensively	detailed	in	Chapter	Six,	from	the	late-Qing	period	and	throughout	the	course	of	the	Republic,	China	was	wracked	by	continuous	episodes	of	social	strife,	political	violence,	and	internal	and	external	warfare.	Overall,	as	to	be	described,	while	certainly	experiencing	its	share	of	social	violence,	 in	the	aftermath	of	the	Taiping	and	Small	Swords	Rebellions,	comparatively	 speaking,	 Shanghai	 avoided	much	 of	 the	 civil	 violence	 that	 characterised	China	throughout	the	end	of	the	Qing	and	the	Beiyang's	so-called	warlord	period.	This	was	due	in	part	to	an	implicit	protective	influence	exerted	by	the	presence	of	the	extraterritorial	settlements	and	their	 attendant	 foreign	 gunboats	 that	provided	 the	 settlements	military	protection.	In	this	way,	the	foreign	gunboats	parked	along	Huangpu's	harbours	represented	both	a	potential	threat	to	the	city's	sovereignty,	yet	also	provided	the	domestic	municipality	with	implicit	protection,	given	its	proximate	position	to	the	extraterritorial	settlements.			8.4.1.		Domestic	Shanghai:		Maintenance	of	Monopoly	on	Violence	under	the	Qing		Shanghai	did	not	entirely	avoid	the	wave	of	social	unrest	and	internal	rebellions	that	defined	that	late-Qing	period,	including	that	related	to	the	Taiping	Rebellion.	The	city	was	besieged	7	September	1853	by	members	of	the	Small	Swords	Society	(
0)	(also	referred	to	as	Short	Swords;	Cranston	1936:	152),	a	secret	society	originating	in	the	southern	city	of	Xiamen	(Amoy)	 and	 brought	 to	 Shanghai	 by	Fujianese	migrants.	While	 not	 formally	 part	 of	 the	Taiping,	with	its	members	more	closely	aligned	with	Triad	organised	crime	elements	from	Fujian,	 for	citizens	dissatisfied	with	 the	Qing	rule,	 the	Small	Swords	presented	a	similar	appeal	as	that	of	the	Taiping	in	their	advocacy	of	overthrow	of	the	Manchus	and	attacks	against	corrupt	officials.	The	weak	support	for	Qing	municipal	officials	is	underscored	by	the	 Small	 Swords'	 capture	of	 the	domestically-controlled	 formal	 Shanghai	 city	 centre	of	Nanshi—at	 the	 time,	 a	 city	 with	 over	 200,000	 domestic	 residents—with	 a	 force	 of	 but	approximately	three	thousand	(de	Jesus	1909:	59-63).	The	rebels	succeeded	in	defeating	those	Qing	imperial	troops	stationed	at	Shanghai,	killed	the	municipal	magistrate	and	took	the	daotai	prisoner,	within	the	course	of	only	a	few	days	(Pott	1928:	58).	The	daotai	at	the	time,	Wu	Jianzhang	('),	was	a	former	Cantonese	merchant	who	had	purchased	his	title,	and	remained	heavily	involved	in	trade	with	the	American	firm	Russell	&	Co.	in	Shanghai.	Wu	was	rescued	through	the	efforts	of	his	American	supporters	at	Russell	&	Co.,	afterwards	seeking	protection	from	the	rebel	forces	by	fleeing	to	the	safety	of	the	American	Settlement.	The	Small	Swords	rebels	initially	maintained	some	public	support	by	issuing	a	cessation	on	tax	collection	shortly	after	taking	power	(NCH	15	October	1853);	once	in	power,	however,	the	rebel	leadership	reneged	on	an	earlier	set	of	promises	to	halt	taxes	on	rural	peasantry,	who	had	fought	in	support	of	the	rebel	movement	outside	the	city	walls	against	the	Qing	soldiers	(Perry	1985:91).	This	policy	reversal	helped	eventually	turn	enough	of	the	rural	population	against	the	rebel	cause	so	as	to	allow	Qing	soldiers	to	retake	the	walled	city	in	February	1855,	a	year	and	a	half	after	it	had	been	lost,	with	the	assistance	of	French	troops.		Shanghai	was	again	besieged	several	 years	 later	when	 in	December	1861	a	battalion	of	Taiping	rebel	forces	advanced	toward	Shanghai	from	their	Nanjing	capital	stronghold.	Li	Xiucheng,	the	Taiping	general,	mistakenly	anticipated	little	resistance	to	taking	Shanghai,	given	 the	 overall	weakness	 of	 the	 Qing	 forces	 in	 the	 area,	 and	 the	 general's	 (mistaken)	understanding	that	foreign	military	forces	in	extraterritorial	Shanghai	would	welcome	the	defeat	of	the	Qing	imperial	officials	overseeing	the	domestic	sections	of	the	city	(Lindley	1866:	 268-274).	 However,	 given	 reports	 of	 destruction	 and	 atrocities	 that	 frequently	accompanied	the	seizure	of	cities	by	Taiping	rebels,	the	leadership	of	the	extraterritorial	settlements	 appeared	 loath	 to	 allow	 the	 rebels	 free	 access	 into	 Shanghai,	 which	 they	believed	would	likely	bring	about	a	huge	disruption	to	trade.	Perhaps	more	salient	to	their	misgivings	 of	 potential	 Taiping	 rule	was	 the	 rebellion's	 ban	 on	 the	 opium	 trade,	which	threatened	to	cut	off	a	sizeable	revenue	stream	for	many	of	the	city's	foreign	merchants.	In	any	 event,	when	 the	 first	 battalion	of	 the	Taiping	army	advanced	upon	the	 city,	 foreign	
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military	forces	fired	upon	and	soundly	defeated	them.	General	Li	returned	again	later	that	summer,	however,	with	a	larger	rebel	army,	and	besieged	Shanghai.	Known	as	the	Taiping	Battle	of	Shanghai	("P,:),	 the	siege	 lasted	nearly	one	year,	 involving	over	100,000	soldiers	on	each	side.	With	assistance	from	the	bombing	of	rebel	positions	by	British	and	French	naval	forces,	Qing	Imperial	army	forces	under	the	leadership	of	Li	Hongzhang,	who	had	 been	 promoted	 to	 General,	 drove	 the	 Taiping	 rebel	 forces	 away	 from	 the	 city,	 and	restored	 the	municipal	 governance	 run	by	Qing-appointed	officials.	A	 contemporaneous	accounting	of	the	Taiping	army's	attempt	to	take	Shanghai	is	provided	by	Frederick	Lindley,	a	former	British	Navy	officer	who	became	a	Taiping	army	commander,	in	his	monograph	in	published	in	London	in	1866	under	his	Chinese	name	"Lin-Le"	(Lindley	1866).		In	 the	 years	 after	 the	Taiping,	while	 the	Qing	 state	 as	 a	whole	 faced	 a	 series	 of	 serious	internal	 rebellions	and	external	military	 threats,	 Shanghai	 remained	 relatively	 insulated	from	these	series	of	violent	episodes.	The	battles	fought	between	the	Chinese	and	Japanese	navies	during	the	First	Sino-Japanese	War	of	1894,	for	instance,	stayed	far	from	Shanghai's	harbours;	 the	 violence	 that	 characterised	 the	 Boxer	 Rebellion	 and	 the	 severe	 military	response	 of	 the	 Eight-Nation	 Alliance	 did	not	 impact	 the	 city.	With	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	Wuchang	Uprising	and	Xinhai	Revolution	in	1911,	however,	the	stability	characterising	the	vast	majority	of	the	time	frame	of	Qing	rule	over	domestic	Shanghai	came	to	a	sudden	end.			8.4.2.		Domestic	Shanghai:		Maintenance	of	Monopoly	on	Violence	under	the	Beiyang			A	brief	consideration	of	the	situation	Shanghai	experienced	during	the	Beiyang	time	period	helps	 illuminate	how	political	chaos	on	 the	national	stage	 impacted	 the	 level	of	political	violence	in	regard	to	control	over	the	city	itself.	In	the	wake	of	the	Xinhai	Revolution,	a	local	military	commander,	General	Chen	Qimei,	with	the	backing	of	his	battalion	of	troops,	took	control	 over	 Shanghai,	 and	 assumed	 authority	 as	 governor	 of	 the	 city	 and	 surrounding	region.	 His	 leadership,	 however,	 lasted	 only	 a	 few	 years.	 After	 the	 ascendency	 of	 the	authoritarian	military	Beiyang	regime	under	General	Yuan	Shikai	in	1912,	Chen,	who	was	aligned	with	Sun	Zhongshan	and	supported	Sun's	attempted	Second	Revolution	 in	1913,	was	forced	to	flee	Shanghai	in	wake	of	the	revolt's	failure.	Chen	went	to	Japan	to	work	with	Sun	Zhongshan's	provisional	 government	 in	 exile.	Upon	his	 return	 to	 Shanghai	 in	1916,	Chen	was	assassinated,	mostly	likely	by	agents	loyal	to	Yuan	(Bergere	1998:	268).			After	Chen's	initial	abscondence,	the	domestic	sections	of	Shanghai	fell	under	the	leadership	of	a	revolving	succession	of	military	commanders	that	were	either	installed	by	the	current	central	 Beiyang	 regime,	 or	 by	 local	 warlords	 desiring	 control	 of	 the	 economically	 vital	region,	 and	 sought	 to	 do	 so	 by	 installing	 a	 friendly	 representative	 to	 oversee	 the	 city's	municipal	leadership.	As	suggested	by	Chen's	fate,	the	ongoing	political	turmoil	experienced	on	the	national	level	also	greatly	shaped	control	of	the	Shanghai	municipal	region	during	the	Beiyang	period.	For	instance,	Chen's	immediate	successor,	Zheng	Rucheng	(W6)),	was	installed	 as	 military	 commander	 over	 Shanghai	 by	 region	 by	 Feng	 Guozhang,	 the	 Zhili	warlord	leader	controlling	Jiangsu	at	the	time,	and	also	aligned	with	the	Feng	warlord	group.	Zheng's	time	as	military	commander	over	Shanghai	was	cut	short	when	he	was	assassinated	in	November	1915	as	his	motorcade	crossed	Shanghai's	Waibaidu	Bridge	(Qiao	2013:B1).	Evidence	 suggests	 that	 the	 son	 of	 powerful	 Zhejiang	warlord	Lu	 Yongxiang	 (C5E)	 had	arranged	the	action	(STCC	2005);	Lu	was	aligned	with	the	Anhui	militarist	group,	which	sought	to	control	access	to	the	lucrative	tax-	and	trade-related	revenues	Shanghai	generated,	particularly	those	associated	with	the	opium	trade.			In	Zheng's	place,	Yuan	Shikai	installed	Yang	Shande	(3(),	a	senior	Anhui	militarist;	after	Yang	assumed	the	military-governorship	of	Zhejiang,	Lu	replaced	Yang	as	Shanghai	military	commander	(Feng	2004:	56).	After	Yang	died	in	August	1919,	Lu	once	again	assumed	Yang's	former	 role,	 becoming	military-governor	 of	 Zhejiang,	 and	 backing	 the	 installation	 of	 He	
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Fenglin	(O2)	as	Shanghai	military	commander	(;=NP).	Beholden	to	Lu	for	his	political	position,	He	ceded	control	over	domestic	municipality	 fiscal	 revenues	 to	Lu's	surrogates,	which	 included	 a	 partnership	 with	 Du	 Yuesheng,	 leader	 of	 the	 Green	 Gang	 organised	criminal	organisation,	to	assure	control	over	the	city's	lucrative,	albeit	illicit,	opium	trade.			However,	the	ascension	of	Qi	Xieyuan	(^?)	as	military	leader	of	Jiangsu	in	October	1920	saw	an	increased	effort	by	the	Zhili	clique	to	reassert	control	over	Shanghai.	Qi	declared	Shanghai	to	be	rightfully	part	of	Jiangsu,	to	which	Lu	responded	by	vowing	to	retain	control	over	Shanghai	(STCC	2005).	Tensions	over	control	of	Shanghai	remained	high	between	the	two	warlords;	while	a	peace	 treaty	was	brokered	at	 the	urging	of	 local	business	leaders	(Shunpao	19	April	1922),	and	eventually	signed	in	August	of	1923,	subsequent	events	led	to	an	outbreak	of	open	warfare	by	September	of	the	following	year.	After	the	military	leader	of	 the	 Zhili	 clique,	 General	 Cao	 Kun,	 assumed	 the	 national	 presidency	 by	 forcing	 the	resignations	of	Xu	Shichang	and	Li	Yuanhong,	Lu	declared	Zhejiang	would	no	longer	submit	to	the	authority	of	the	national	government,	sparking	an	end	to	the	peace	treaty,	and	the	start	of	the	Jiangsu-Zhejiang	War	(79*@),	which	served	as	the	precursor	to	the	outbreak	of	the	Second	Zhili-Fengtian	War	on	a	national	scale.		Although	the	Jiangsu-Zhejiang	War	lasted	but	little	more	than	one	month,	the	damage	to	Shanghai	 and	 its	 surrounding	 environs	was	 considerable.	 Civilian	non-combatants	were	frequently	conscripted	 into	battle,	or	 forced	 to	provide	services	 for	 the	battling	warlord	armies.	 From	 an	 economic	 standpoint,	 the	war	was	 equally	 devastating,	 with	 complete	disruption	to	trade	and	the	closure	of	markets.	The	attendant	breakdown	of	law	and	order	also	led	to	numerous	instances	of	business	forced	to	contribute	funds	to	warlord	armies,	with	kidnappings	undertaken	to	ensure	compliance	(Feng	2004).	In	mid-October,	with	the	forces	 of	 the	 two	 sides	 seemingly	 at	 a	 military	 deadlock,	 Sun	 Chuanfang	 (K),	 the	powerful	Fujian	military-governor,	an	ally	of	Sun	Zhongshan	and	also	aligned	with	the	Zhili	clique,	suddenly	entered	 the	battle,	 sending	his	army	northward	 to	attack	Lu's	southern	flank.	 As	 a	 result,	 Lu	 and	He's	 forces	 are	 defeated,	 sending	 both	 leaders	 to	 first	 flee	 to	Shanghai's	extraterritorial	settlements,	before	both	leaving	the	country	to	seek	refuge	in	Japan.	Sun	thus	assumed	control	over	Zhejiang,	 leaving	Qi's	 forces	 to	 take	control	of	 the	domestic	areas	of	Shanghai	(Kotenev	1927).	President	Cao	there	forth	declared	Marshal	Qi	Xieyuan,	 as	military-governor	of	 Jiangsu	province,	 to	possess	 complete	 control	 over	 the	domestic	Shanghai	municipality.		Qi's	control	over	Shanghai	was	to	be	short-lived,	however,	once	Feng	Yuxiang	successfully	implemented	his	coup	 in	Beijing	on	22	October	1924,	overthrowing	the	Zhili	 leader	Cao	(NYT	4	November	1924).	The	newly-installed	president,	General	Huang	Fu,	 revoked	Qi's	formal	control	over	Jiangsu,	and	Feng	sent	his	National	Army	(4P)	on	the	so-called	Anhui-Fengxi	 expedition	 to	 re-commandeer	 Shanghai's	 domestic	 districts.	 This	 action	 led	 to	 a	series	of	battles	for	control	over	domestic	Shanghai	that	took	place	throughout	the	end	of	1924	and	the	start	of	1925	between	various	warlord	powers	for	the	control	of	Shanghai.	General	 Sun	 Chuanfang,	 sent	 a	 battalion	 of	 troops	 that	 captured	 Songjiang.	 This	 action	brought	about	a	military	response	by	the	Generals	Lu	Yongxiang	and	Chen	Yaosan,	both	of	whom	had	previously	fled	to	Japan,	but	had	returned	as	allies	of	the	new	Beijing	government.	By	January	1925,	four	thousand	troops	under	the	command	of	Chen	Yaosan	reached	the	outskirts	of	Shanghai.	However,	General	Sun	Chuanfang	and	Marshal	Qi	repositioned	troops	stationed	 at	 nearby	 Nanjing	 into	 the	 Shanghai	 area,	 securing	 the	 Jiangnan	 Arsenal	 and	defeating	Chen's	and	Lu's	troops.	With	this	victory	secured,	Qi	declared	the	formation	of	a	new	municipal	government	in	Zhabei;	this	"Shanghai	Citizen's	Government"	was	to	be	no	longer	subject	to	the	orders	of	the	new	regime	in	Beijing	(Kotenev	1927:	117).	In	response,	the	 new	 Beijing	 government,	 now	 led	 by	 President	 Duan	 Qirui,	 sent	 General	 Zhang	Zongchang,	who	had	amassed	10,000	troops,	along	with	support	of	Russian	troops,	to	retake	Zhabei,	which	they	successfully	did,	after	which	Qi	himself	fled	to	Japan	(SMC	1925:	59).		
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This	brief	overview	of	 the	politics	of	 the	domestic	sections	of	Shanghai	over	 this	period	underscores	that	political	control	over	Shanghai	was	one	accomplished	by	way	of	force,	as	opposed	to	a	peaceful	maintenance	or	transfer	of	power.	Removal	of	municipal	leaders	from	power	was	not	accomplished	by	election	or	other	peaceful	means,	but	rather	through	direct	appointment	by	military	commanders,	and	frequently	via	armed	conflict,	forcing	the	losing	to	flee	and	perhaps	face	assassination	upon	return.	Clearly,	then,	not	only	on	a	national	scale,	but	 so	 too	 on	 local	 municipal	 levels,	 we	 find	 the	 political	 situation	 to	 have	 been	 one	exemplifying	that	of	a	political	structure	defined	by	violence,	as	opposed	to	rule	of	law.			Not	surprisingly,	the	effects	of	these	military	actions	had	profoundly	negative	impacts	on	business	 and	 trading	 activities.	 Throughout	 the	 period,	 newspaper	 reports	 sounded	 the	constant	theme	of	uncertainty	and	disruption,	with	one	example	among	the	many	being	the	nearly	four	per	cent	drop	in	the	price	of	silver	on	9	October	1926	was	blamed	on	"incessant	and	widespread	civil	wars	that	has	trade	hampered	enormously	and	silver	supplies	cannot	freely	be	moved	throughout	the	country"	(NCH	16	October	1926:	119).					8.4.3.		Domestic	Shanghai:	Maintenance	of	Monopoly	on	Violence	under	the	Guomindang		The	 arrival	 of	 Guomindang	 troops	 outside	 the	 city	 limits	 in	March	 of	 1927,	 part	 of	 the	Northern	Expedition	military	drive,	in	many	ways	can	be	seen	as	representing	just	another	in	 a	 string	 of	 serious	 existential	 threats	 to	 the	 existing	 regime	 controlling	 the	 Shanghai	domestic	municipality.	 Controlled	 at	 the	 time	 by	 the	 forces	 of	 the	militarist	 leader	 Sun	Chuanfang,	the	domestic	sections	of	the	city	had	been	administratively	and	bureaucratically	consolidated	under	a	single	municipal	governance	structure	of	the	Shanghai-Wusong	Port	Directorate.	As	described	in	a	series	of	daily	articles	published	in	the	ShunPao	(21,22,23	March	1927),	brief	but	intense	fighting	took	place	between	Sun's	forces	and	the	incoming	Guomindang	army,	supported	by	small	groups	of	 local	workers	militias	aligned	with	 the	Communist	Party.	Although	brief,	the	damage	caused	by	the	fighting	was	significant,	given	it	took	place	in	the	middle	of	the	roads	and	business	district	of	the	Zhabei	neighbourhood.	As	such,	those	suffering	the	most	damage	proved	to	be	the	owners	of	private	residential	and	business	properties,	 especially	 once	 large-scale	 fires	broke	out	 ([>)	 that	ultimately	caused	an	estimated	five	million	yuan	worth	of	property	damage,	and	destroying	nearly	two	thousand	private	residential	houses,	helping	to	account	for	approximately	one	hundred	and	fifty	civilian	deaths	(ShunPao	22,	25	March	1927).			The	lack	of	sufficient	state	capacity	to	enable	the	domestic	state	to	enforce	a	monopoly	over	internal	coercive	force,	allowing	nonstate	actors	to	engage	in	unsanctioned	violence	that	resulted	 in	 the	destruction	or	 takings	of	 private	 economic	 actors'	properties	 and	assets,	continued	throughout	the	Guomindang	period	on	the	municipal	level	in	domestic	Shanghai.	Crime	was	 a	 serious	 problem	 in	 the	 domestically-run	 sections	 of	 the	 city,	 with	 serious	crimes	such	as	kidnappings,	burglaries,	and	robberies	rising	 from	205	cases	reported	 in	1927,	 to	288	by	1930	(Woodhead	1933:	672).	One	of	 the	most	 significant	 and	 constant	forms	of	violence	experienced	within	the	domestic	city	came	from	the	multitude	of	illegal	and	violent	activities	perpetrated	by	the	Green	Gang.	As	detailed	in	Chapter	Six,	domestic	state	police	forces	were	not	only	unable	to	prevent	this	criminal	organisation	from	engaging	in	such	activities,	but	in	fact	in	many	instances	tacitly	turned	a	blind	eye	to	such	actions,	or	even	 actively	 provided	 support.	 Yet	 as	 violent	 crime	 levels	 increased,	 so	 too	 did	 police	actions	directed	toward	control	over	the	city's	domestic	residents,	with	Woodhead	(1933:	672)	reporting	the	total	number	of	arrests	or	citations	for	offences	against	city	ordinances	rising	nearly	tenfold,	from	4,652	in	1927,	to	40,231	in	1930.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	Seven,	the	Guomindang	government	became	increasingly	involved	in	matters	previously	left	to	the	private	sphere,	and	we	find	that	many	of	these	infractions—over	one-quarter,	in	fact—were	
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those	classified	as	violations	of	"public	duty"	and	"public	morals".	Thus,	while	violent	crimes	were	increasing,	much	of	policing	activity	seemed	more	centred	upon	stricter	control	over	residents'	activities	previously	considered	private	actions	not	subject	to	state	oversight.		Beyond	the	high	level	of	criminal	activity	that	existed	within	the	city	resulting	in	violence	and	 resultant	 loss	 of	 property	 and	 life,	 Shanghai	 also	 suffered	 from	 two	 significant	 and	horrific	outbreaks	of	open	warfare,	initiated	by	the	Japanese	military	and	directed	primarily	against	the	private	resident	populations	of	the	domestic	Shanghai	municipality.	The	first	of	these	incidents	occurred	at	the	start	of	1932.	The	invasion	and	annexation	of	Manchuria	in	September	1931	by	 the	 Japanese	military	 led	 to	mass	public	protests	 and	boycotting	of	Japanese	goods,	especially	in	Shanghai,	where	much	of	 the	anti-Japanese	movement	was	concentrated.	As	a	treaty	port,	Shanghai	attracted	a	large	amount	of	Japanese	capital,	much	of	 it	 going	 into	 cotton	 and	 textile	 factories	 that	 Japanese	manufacturers	 opened	 in	 the	countryside	surrounding	the	city.	In	the	three-month	period	after	the	Mukden	Incident,	138	anti-Japanese	 protests	 were	 held	 in	 Shanghai	 alone	 (:R 	 1999b:	 268).	 Fears	 of	 an	outbreak	of	serious	violence	were	to	be	realised	when	in	January	1932	a	clash	involving	five	right-wing	Japanese	monks	and	nationalistic	Chinese	factory	workers	ended	in	the	deaths	of	Chinese	policeman	and	a	Japanese	monk.	While	reflective	of	the	heightened	politically	charged	atmosphere,	Wakeman	(2006:	187–194)	notes	that	this	incident	was	initiated	by	a	Japanese	intelligence	officer	who	had	paid	the	Chinese	workers	to	attack	the	monks,	seeking	to	provide	justification	to	increase	Japanese	military	presence	in	the	city.			In	 response	 to	 the	 incident,	 a	 Japanese	Admiral	 in	 charge	of	 Japanese	military	 forces	 in	Shanghai	demanded	an	 apology	 from	 the	domestic	municipality	Mayor	Zhang	Qun,	plus	reparations	 for	 the	 death	 of	 the	 monk,	 and	 suppression	 of	 further	 anti-Japanese	demonstrations	(FRUS	793.94/3970.	30	January	1932).	Despite	the	mayor's	agreement	to	comply	with	the	demands,	Japanese	troops	attacked	domestically-controlled	sections	of	the	city	without	warning	in	the	following	night,	forcibly	seizing	Zhabei,	home	to	the	Chinese	municipality	administration.	In	the	process,	the	then-newly	constructed	three	million	yuan	domestic	municipal	administration	building	was	destroyed,	with	multiple	reports	of	fleeing	Chinese	residents	gunned	down	by	Japanese	military	personnel	(China	Weekly	Herald	27	February	1932).	Although	initially	blamed	as	random	acts	of	violence	by	untrained	ronin	reservists,	attacks	by	the	Japanese	military	directed	on	the	Chinese	civilian	population	and	residential	communities	appear	to	have	been	well-coordinated	(Henriot	2010:297-304).			In	a	well-publicised	first-hand	newspaper	account,	Walter	Brown,	a	correspondent	with	the	United	 Press	 in	 Shanghai	 during	 the	 attack,	 described	 the	War's	 impact	 on	 the	 Chinese	sections	of	the	city:	"I	watched	last	Friday	the	aerial	bombardment,	without	warning,	of	an	open	and	defenceless	 city,	 and	 saw	how	 Japanese	spectators	on	 the	 same	 roof	with	me	capered	in	joy,	shouting,	"Banzai"	(hurrah)	and	embracing	each	other	as	explosions	spread	fire	 and	death	 in	Chinese	 territory.	 It	was	 a	 terrible	 sight,	 this	dropping	of	 bombs	on	 a	crowded	 territory	 far	 down	 below,	death	 and	mangling	were	 the	 fate	 of	many	 Chinese,	caught	without	a	chance...	An	uncounted	number	of	Chinese	were	killed	or	maimed	by	the	bombardment	and	the	ground	fighting.	Women	and	children	suffered...	many	in	hospitals	and	others	left	to	 fill	unmarked	graves...	 [Bombers]	swarmed	over	 the	new	works	of	 the	Commercial	 Press,	 China's	 latest	 educational	 publishing	 institution,	 and	 let	 off	 some	incendiary	bombs.	The	plant	soon	was	all	afire.	It	doesn't	take	many	bombs	to	tear	up	a	railroad	station,	and	smash	down	a	lot	of	houses,	and	kill	off	residents.	And	once	the	bombs	have	started	a	fire	in	such	a	spot	as	Chapei,	they	have	done	their	job.	This	was	the	case	last	Friday.	It	was	just	as	though	somebody	with	a	big	torch	had	come	down	out	of	the	air.	The	Commercial	Press	burned	fast.	The	wind	off	the	Whangpoo	River	spread	the	fire	westward.	Nothing	could	stop	it.	The	less	substantially	built	houses	went	up	like	kindling	on	a	stove.	Poor	families	ran	out	in	a	panic.	I	can't	tell	you	of	the	tragedy	of	these	swarms.	They	grabbed	what	they	could	bear,	mattresses,	a	handful	of	clothes,	sometimes	a	bird	cage,	and	with	their	
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loads	on	their	backs	and	in	wheelbarrows	set	out	in	a	daze	to	find	a	shelter	where	bombs	and	 fire	 would	 not	 follow	 them.	 Many	 of	 them	went	 into	 the	 International	 Settlement,	dumbly	pleading	for	a	corner	to	set	down	their	humble	belongings	and	shield	themselves	from	the	invader"	(United	Press	2	February	1932).	As	Brown's	account	suggests,	airstrikes	and	fighting	were	mostly	concentrated	in	Zhabei,	and	hence	the	majority	of	the	damage	on	life	and	property	was	to	the	Chinese	section	of	the	city,	with	the	extraterritorial	settlements	mostly	unaffected.	In	the	three	weeks	of	fighting,	domestic	Chinese	residents	in	Shanghai	suffered	over	14,000	casualties,	with	10,000	or	more	civilian	deaths	(Mitter	2013:	57).			The	negative	impact	from	the	political	instability	was	felt	across	Shanghai's	economy.	The	
North	China	Daily	News	published	a	continual	stream	of	reports	of	disruptions	to	business	activities,	 as	 the	 uncertainty	 of	 the	 political	 situation	 caused	 weakness	 in	 commodity	markets	 in	 1933:	 "Shanghai	 millers	 have	 adopted	 a	 waiting	 attitude	 which	 possible	 is	principally	due	to	the	uncertainty	regarding	the	northern	situation,	and	little	business	has	been	done...	All	the	telegraph	and	post	office	in	the	Northern	region	had	been	destroyed	by	bombs	dropped	by	Japanese	aeroplanes.	Severe	fighting	was	raging…"	(NCH	22	February	1933:	302).	Two	weeks	later,	a	similar	report	noted,	"the	political	situation	in	the	north	has	cast	a	heavy	shadow	over	the	local	markets	during	the	past	week,	and	there	has	been	little	doing...	all	prices	have	fallen...	the	local	market	has	been	inactive	and	no	business	has	been	reported,	buyers	preferring	to	wait	until	the	political	situation	clears.	Similarly,	importers	do	not	desire	to	increase	their	commitments	under	present	conditions"	(NCH	4	March	1933:	382).	Likewise,	activity	on	the	city's	financial	markets,	initially	closed	during	the	worst	of	the	hostilities,	was	mostly	moribund	after	their	reopen.			The	second	major	outbreak	of	warfare	within	Shanghai	in	August	1937	proved	to	be	of	a	more	devastating	scale	than	even	that	which	had	occurred	in	1932.	In	the	wake	of	the	Lugou	Bridge	Incident	on	7	July,	and	subsequent	skirmishes	between	Japanese	and	Chinese	forces,	the	following	month	Generalissimo	Jiang	Jieshi	initiated	a	major	military	attack	on	Japanese	naval	forces	 in	Shanghai.	As	a	result,	 for	the	 following	three	months,	Shanghai	became	a	battlefield,	with	combat	aircrafts	flying	overhead	and	bombs	being	dropped.	The	war	caused	unprecedented	devastation	 to	Shanghai’s	economy,	with	vast	areas	of	the	city	destroyed	and	hundreds	of	thousands	of	civilians	made	homeless.	Refugees	once	again	poured	into	the	extraterritorial	settlements	 to	seek	shelter,	 swelling	 their	population	from	1.5	million	to	four	million	within	a	few	weeks.	The	number	of	factories	destroyed	was	estimated	to	be	5,255.	In	different	areas	of	the	city,	anywhere	from	seventy	to	nearly	one	hundred	per	cent	of	industrial	enterprise	was	destroyed,	and	total	property	damage	was	estimated	to	be	over	three	billion	yuan	(Hanwell	1938).	Additionally,	the	war	caused	a	loss	of	approximately	US	$800	million	in	foreign	investments	to	the	country	(Wakeman	1996:	6-7;	280-281).			An	American	businessman	living	in	Shanghai	at	the	time	described	the	damage	and	ensuing	economic	stagnation	in	stark	terms,	noting,	"The	settlements	are	packed	with	hundreds	of	thousands	of	destitute	refugees.	Normal	trade	and	industrial	activities	were	brought	almost	to	a	standstill	during	the	fighting	and	the	financial	structure	of	the	community	was	frozen	in	large	degree…	Early	in	October	it	was	estimated	that	only	15,000	out	of	175,000	workers	regularly	employed	in	the	Settlement	were	at	work.	Withdrawals	from	Chinese	banks	were	limited	to	5	per	cent	or	no	more	than	$150	a	week.	Most	of	Shanghai's	wharves	were	in	the	fighting	zone,	and	 insurance	rates	rose	to	prohibitive	 levels.	For	 the	 first	 time	 in	history	Shanghai’s	 trade	contacts	with	virtually	all	 interior	districts	were	cut	off,	except	as	 they	could	be	maintained	by	indirect	routings	making	use	of	coastal	steamers.	Exports	dropped	47	per	cent	and	imports	91	per	cent	between	July	and	September"	(Lockwood	1937:	278).			For	the	majority	of	Chinese	citizens	in	Shanghai,	the	destruction	of	homes	and	businesses	brought	about	increased	economic	hardship	and	greater	uncertainty.	Shanghai's	Chinese	businesses	suffered	outright	pillaging,	and	those	that	managed	to	remain	were	forced	to	
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take	on	Japanese	partners	to	remain	viable.	Henriot	(2004:	31)	recorded	activities	by	the	Japanese	 invading	 force	 that	 constituted	 textbook	 roving	 bandit	 behaviour—after	 open	hostilities	ceased,	the	Japanese	army	barred	the	Chinese	population	from	entering	the	areas	under	its	control,	so	as	to	provide	Japanese	military	personnel	enough	time	to	survey	the	remaining	factories	and	to	remove	undamaged	stocks	and	the	machinery	that	could	be	used	for	military	purposes	or	by	Japanese	firms.	Subsequently,	Chinese	industrialists	were	forced	to	either	work	in	collaboration	with	Japanese	firms,	or	have	their	factories	confiscated.	By	May	1939,	for	instance,	forty	Chinese	cotton	mills	were	under	Japanese	control,	and	by	1940,	the	Japanese	seized	more	than	two	hundred	enterprises	in	Shanghai.			From	an	administrative	side,	the	loss	of	power	by	the	Nanjing-based	Guomindang	led	to	the	domestic	 municipal	 government	 structure	 of	 the	 City	 Government	 of	 Greater	 Shanghai	replaced	by	the	Dadao	Municipal	Government	of	Shanghai,	a	Japanese-military	sanctioned	regime	established	in	December	1937	in	Pudong.	While	domestic	municipal	bureaucratic	organisations	 still	 operated,	 they	 exercised	 limited	 autonomy,	 as	 Japanese	 military	personnel	were	appointed	as	heads	of	each	bureaucratic	division.	Thus,	for	instance,	while	there	still	technically	existed	a	domestic	municipal	police	force	to	enforce	rule	of	law	in	the	domestic	sections	of	Shanghai,	now	administered	under	Japanese	control,	Japanese	military	officers	were	appointed	as	the	 forces'	commanding	officers.	Moreover,	 Japanese	military	law	was	enforced	within	the	city	by	Japanese	military	troops,	who	by	legal	right	and	military	might	outranked	and	outnumbered	the	domestic	police	force.					8.4.4.		Domestic	Shanghai:	Monopoly	on	Violence—Comparisons	with	National	Experience		As	demonstrated	by	the	previous	three	sub-sections	of	text,	the	degree	of	political	strife	and	violence	experienced	by	the	domestic	sections	of	Shanghai	throughout	the	late-imperial	and	republican	periods	was	 significant.	To	 create	 a	 rough	 comparison	with	 level	 of	 political	discord	experienced	at	the	central	government	level,	we	look	to	construct	a	simple	measure	of	local	municipal-level	occurrences	of	violent	political	regime	change,	in	line	with	the	similar	measure	designed	by	Cox	et	al.	(2013,	2017)	to	capture	political	violence	on	a	national-level	scale	that	results	in	the	violent	overthrow	of	the	country's	ultimate	sovereign	power.	As	a	local	municipality	under	a	series	of	unitary	authoritarian	governments,	Shanghai's	domestic	municipal	governments	did	not	exercise	autonomous	political	power.	However,	we	believe	this	exercise	is	useful	as	a	comparative	analysis	tool,	both	against	the	similar	measure	at	the	national	 level	 previously	 presented	 in	 Table	 6.1	 in	 Chapter	 Six,	 as	 well	 as	 with	 the	neighbouring	extraterritorial	settlements	to	be	discussed	in	the	proceeding	chapter.		The	data	presented	in	Table	8.1	indicate	a	story	somewhat	similar	as	that	found	in	Table	6.1.	As	on	the	national	level,	the	total	number	of	violent	transitions	of	power	are	similar;	thirteen	over	the	same	period	at	the	national	level	compared	to	twelve	at	the	local	level.	Also	similar	is	the	highly	skewed	nature	of	these	occurrences,	albeit	of	an	even	more	extreme	nature	than	during	 the	national	period.	During	 the	Qing,	 there	was	only	one	 instance	of	violent	transition	of	power	from	one	municipal	government,	represented	when	the	Small	Swords	insurgency	took	hold	of	the	domestic	city	for	nearly	two	years.	While	there	was	an	early	instance	of	 change	of	power	by	way	of	 assassination	 at	 the	 start	 of	 the	Beiyang	period,	relative	to	the	turmoil	experienced	throughout	the	rest	of	the	country,	domestic	Shanghai	remained	well	removed	from	the	political	violence	that	so	significantly	affected	the	majority	of	the	middle	Beiyang	period.	The	situation	however	changed	quite	drastically	with	the	start	of	 the	 Jiangsu-Zhejiang	War	 in	October	1924,	which	 led	 to	 five	violent	municipal	 regime	changes	 over	 the	 next	 year.	 As	 at	 the	 national	 level,	 the	 Guomindang	 "Nanjing	Decade"	period	was	characterised	by	stability,	with	no	forced	regime	changes	at	the	municipal	level	occurring	until	the	overthrow	of	the	Guomindang	Nanjing-based	regime	in	the	wake	of	the	outbreak	of	war	with	Japan	in	late	1937.	
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Table	8.1.		Number	of	Forced	Political	Leadership	Transitions,	Shanghai,	1840–1941		 Count	 Date	 Outgoing	Government	 Incoming	Government	 Mode	of	Change		 	 	 	 	1	 Sep	1853	 Qing	Imperial	Government		 Small	Swords	Society	 Insurgency		2	 Feb	1855	 Small	Swords	Society	 Qing	Imperial	Government	 Central	Govt	Military	Action	3	 Nov	1911	 Qing	Imperial	Government		 Jiangsu	Province	(Gen.	Chen	Qimei)	 Rebellion:	Xinhai	Revolution	4	 Sep	1913	 Jiangsu	Province	(Gen.	Chen	Qimei)	 Jiangsu	Province	(Gen.	Zheng	Rucheng)	 Civil	War:	Second	Revolution	5	 Nov	1915	 Jiangsu	Province	(Gen.	Zheng	Rucheng)	 Zhejiang	Province	(Gen.	Yang	Shande)	 Assassination	6	 Oct	1924	 Shanghai	Self-Govt	(Sun	Baoqi)	 Jiangsu	Province	(Marshal	Qi	Xieyuan)	 Civil	War:	Jiangsu-Zhejiang	War	7	 Dec	1924	 Jiangsu	Province	(Marshal	Qi	Xieyuan)	 Republic	of	China,	Beijing	(Gen	Chen	Yaosan)	 Civil	War:	Fengxi	Clique	8	 Jan	1925	 Republic	of	China,	Beijing	(Gen	Chen	Yaosan)	 Shanghai	Citizen's	Govt	(Marshal	Qi	Xieyuan)	 Civil	War:	Zhili	Clique	9	 Jan	1925	 Shanghai	Citizen's	Govt	(Marshal	Qi	Xieyuan)	 Republic	of	China,	Beijing	(Gen	Zhang	Zongchang)	 Civil	War:	Fengxi	Clique	10	 Oct	1925	 Republic	of	China,	Beijing	(Gen.	Zhang	Zongchang)	 Port	of	Shanghai	&	Wusong	(Gen.	Sun	Chuanfang)	 Civil	War:	Zhili	Clique	11	 Mar	1927	 Port	of	Shanghai	&	Wusong	(Gen.	Sun	Chuanfang)	 City	Government	of	Greater	Shanghai	 Civil	War:	National	Army	12	 Dec	1937	 City	Government	of	Greater	Shanghai	 Dadao	Municipal	Govt	of	Shanghai	 War:						Japanese	military	invasion	sources:	please	refer	to	discussion	presented	in	Sections	8.2	and	8.4.				Yet	also	as	is	the	case	with	the	national	level	situation,	the	measure	devised	by	Cox	et	al.	(2013,	2017),	while	instructive,	fails	to	capture	an	important	component	of	political	strife.	The	siege	that	occurred	on	the	domestic	sections	of	Shanghai	during	the	Taiping	Battle	of	Shanghai	in	1861	through	1863,	for	instance,	was	enormous	in	the	scale	of	military	battles,	with	the	imperialist	Qing	and	rebellion	Taiping	armies	each	committing	over	one	hundred	thousand	 combatants	 to	 the	 battle,	 which	 was	 enormous	 also	 in	 cost,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	human	life	and	economic	assets.	Although	the	formal	government	housed	within	the	walled	city	itself	did	not	fall,	nearly	all	of	the	surrounding	neighbourhoods—where	the	majority	of	the	 domestic	 population	 lived—were	 devastated	 during	 the	 course	 of	 the	 war,	 with	numerous	disturbing	atrocities	 and	examples	of	violations	of	property	rights	and	human	dignity	committed	by	the	armies	of	both	sides	documented	by	several	contemporaneous	and	later	historical	accounts	(Blue	Book	1862,	Lindley	1866:	498-538,	de	Jesus	1909).	Similarly,	while	 the	 Japanese	military	 incursions	 on	 domestic	 Shanghai	 did	 not	 result	 in	 a	 forced	change	in	political	leadership	of	the	domestic	municipality,	it	nonetheless	extracted	a	huge	set	of	costs	on	the	city	and	its	domestic	populace.	As	Woodhead	(1933:	670-671)	documents,	the	economic	cost	of	the	war	totalled	nearly	two	hundred	million	yuan,	with	over	twenty-five	 thousand	 workers	 unemployed	 after	 their	 places	 of	 business	 were	 destroyed	 or	otherwise	reduced	employees	in	the	wake	of	hostilities.	Of	the	total	losses,	twenty-five	per	cent	was	attributed	to	damage	or	destruction	of	private	civilian	residences,	another	quarter	to	private	small	businesses,	and	approximately	thirty	per	cent	to	privately-owned	domestic	factories;	government	properties,	schools,	and	temples	accounted	for	the	remaining	twenty	per	cent.	Beyond	direct	economic	costs,	nearly	three	thousand	domestic	civilian	deaths	were	recorded.	 Yet	 for	 all	 their	 destructive	 economic	 and	 human	 costs,	 the	 two	wars	 of	 the	Taiping	Battle	of	Shanghai	and	the	1932	Japanese	military	attack	on	domestic	residential	neighbourhoods	of	Shanghai	are	not	captured	by	the	Cox	et	al.	political	violence	measure.	Also	not	captured	is	the	degree	of	political	violence	caused	by	non-military	factors,	such	as	the	activities	of	the	Green	Gang	or	other	organised	criminal	elements	in	the	city.		
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	Nonetheless,	after	the	conclusion	of	the	Taiping	Battle	of	Shanghai	in	the	early	1860s,	and	until	the	military	attacks	on	the	city	in	1932,	domestic	Shanghai	was	relatively	spared	the	scale	of	military	violence	that	characterised	so	much	of	the	rest	of	domestic	China.	Even	the	Jiangsu-Zhejiang	War	in	1924	and	its	derivative	battles	over	the	next	two	years	were	fought	on	 the	 outskirts	 of	 the	 domestic	 city.	 Compared	 to	 the	 political	 discord	 and	 associated	violence	 that	 affected	 so	 much	 of	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 domestic	 institutional	 environment,	domestic	Shanghai	remained	relatively	unaffected.	This	relative	level	of	political	stability	was	due	to	a	kind	of	"halo	effect"	(or,	what	Henriot	2006:	216	refers	to	as	part	of	a	"pax	
occidentalia")	due	to	the	proximity	of	the	extraterritorial	settlements,	which	as	discussed	in	the	following	chapter,	the	governments	of	which	were	able	to	maintain	a	general	monopoly	on	violence,	due	in	large	part	to	the	implicit	backing	of	superior	foreign	military	force.		The	 level	 of	 political	 violence	plays	an	 important	 role	 in	 the	Violence	Trap	argument	of	Weingast	and	his	co-authors,	and	in	our	argument	of	a	"low-credibility	trap",	in	sofar	that	pervasive	and	constant	occurrences	of	political	violence	affect	the	incentives	and	the	ability	of	state	actors	to	create	credible	commitment	mechanisms	that	can	serve	to	generate	strong	protections	on	private	property	 and	 contract	 rights.	While	 the	 values	of	 the	measure	of	political	violence	via	forced	leadership	transition	devised	by	Cox	et	al.	are	similar	across	both	 the	 domestic	 national	 level	 and	 Shanghai	 municipal	 level,	 at	 thirteen	 and	 twelve,	respectively,	there	were	significant	differences	in	the	overall	lower	level	of	political	violence	that	 directly	 impacted	 the	 domestic	 municipal	 setting	 of	 Shanghai.	 This	 difference	 is	significant	for	the	purposes	of	our	study,	given	our	use	of	Shanghai's	domestic	institutional	environment	as	a	proxy	 for	 the	broader	national-level	 institutional	 environment.	 In	 this	regard,	therefore,	the	lower	levels	of	political	violence	imply	that,	at	least	along	the	political	violence	 vector,	 differentials	 between	 the	 domestic	 and	 extraterritorial	 institutional	environments	 at	 the	 municipal	 level	 are	 less	 divergent	 than	 would	 be	 between	 the	extraterritorial	and	domestic	national	level.	This	further	implies,	therefore,	that	in	terms	of	a	 comparative	 analysis	 between	 the	 domestic	 and	 extraterritorial	 environments,	 the	Shanghai	 domestic	 municipal	 environment	 represents	 one	 more	 favourable	 than	 the	domestic	 national-level	 environment.	 Hence	 use	 of	 the	 domestic	 Shanghai	 municipal	institutional	environment	as	a	proxy	for	the	national	Chinese	institutional	environment	in	our	comparative	analysis	safely	represents	a	lower	bound	in	terms	of	economic	actor	and	investor	perceptions	of	differentials	between	domestic	and	extraterritorial	environments.			8.5		Conclusions		Given	 the	 importance	 that	 Shanghai	 played	 in	 terms	 of	 economic	 and	 sociopolitical	landscape	of	China,	many	of	the	examples	regarding	the	development	and	perception	of	the	domestic	institutional	environment	already	noted	in	Part	II	pertain	also	to	Shanghai.	For	instance,	some	of	 the	 earliest	state-owned	enterprises	created	under	 the	auspices	of	 the	Self-Strengthening	Movement	were	founded	in	Shanghai.	Jiangnan	Arsenal	was	formed	in	Shanghai	in	1865	to	manufacture	weapons	and	warships;	and	China	Merchants	Steamship	Navigation	was	 formed	 in	 Shanghai	 in	 1873	as	 a	 shipping	 concern	designed	 to	 provide	commercial	services	while	supplementing	the	development	of	a	military	steamship	fleet.	Further,	the	examples	of	the	domestic	state's	inability	to	enforce	a	monopoly	over	internal	coercive	force	was	exemplified	by	its	complex	relationship	with	the	Green	Gang	organised	crime	 outfit	 and	 its	 leader	 Du	 Yuesheng.	 Likewise,	 in	 analysing	 the	 impact	 on	 judicial	independence	played	by	the	"partyising	the	judiciary"	strategy,	we	highlighted	the	removal	from	power	in	1927	of	domestic	Chief	Justice	Lu	of	the	Provisional	Court,	after	he	refused	to	sanction	the	issuance	of	extradition	orders	for	suspects	residing	within	the	International	Settlement,	replaced	by	a	judge	incentivised	to	"carry	out	party	principles"	(Xu	1997:12).		
	 207 
Interestingly,	 in	 each	 of	 these	 instances,	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 extraterritorial	settlements	 and	 the	 domestic	 administration	 played	 an	 important	 role.	 The	 modern	factories	and	industry	in	centred	in	Shanghai,	many	foreign	in	origin,	were	viewed	by	those	in	the	Self-Strengthening	Movement	as	a	model	for	the	creation	of	state-owned	enterprises;	in	 the	 summer	of	1883,	at	 the	 invitation	of	 the	American	Consul-General,	 Li	Hongzhang	travelled	to	Shanghai	for	the	express	purpose	to	examine	several	of	the	city's	foreign-owned	factories	(NCH	6	July	1883).	The	Green	Gang,	while	in	origin	a	domestic	criminal	organisation,	operated	 throughout	 the	 entirety	 of	 the	 city	 of	 Shanghai,	 in	 areas	 both	 domestic	 and	extraterritorial.	 As	Martin	 (1991)	 describes,	 in	 fact,	 much	 of	 the	 organisation's	 base	 of	operations—as	 well	 as	 Du	 Yuesheng's	 personal	 residence—was	 located	 in	 the	 French	Concession,	purposely	done	so	as	a	way	to	shield	the	organisation	and	its	leadership	from	domestic	police	and	prosecution.	For	Chief	Justice	Lu,	his	failure	came	out	of	his	respecting	the	rule	of	law,	as	it	pertained	to	the	issue	of	extraterritoriality,	over	"party	principles."		All	of	these	examples	underscore	the	rather	complicated	relationship	that	existed	between	the	 domestic	 institutions	 that	 operated	 within	 the	 domestically-controlled	 sections	 of	Shanghai	 with	 the	 extraterritorial	 settlements	 located	 in	 the	 city's	 midst.	 While	 often	viewed	as	an	affront	to	China's	sovereignty,	the	city	also	received	economic	benefits	from	the	existence	of	the	settlements,	as	well	as	a	level	of	increased	security	from	general	political	and	 civil	 strife	 owing	 to	 the	 proximate	 nature	 of	 the	 extraterritorial	 settlements	 and	domestic	municipality.	 This	 complicated	 relationship	 is	 perhaps	 signified	 by	 the	way	 in	which	domestic	government	officials	were	some	of	the	most	active	participants	in	the	cross	pollination	of	life	across	the	boundaries.	Officials	of	 the	domestic	municipal	government	often	 chose	 to	 make	 their	 residence	 inside	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 extraterritorial	settlements—an	example	where	 contemporaneous	 actors	 exhibited	 a	preference	 for	 the	extraterritorial	over	the	parallel	domestic	institutional	environment.	As	Henriot	(1993:	75-110)	makes	note	of,	this	could	lead	to	ironic	situations,	such	as	during	the	mayoral	term	of	General	 Zhang	 Dingfan	 when	 the	 domestic	 Shanghai	 municipal	 government	 drafted	resolutions	requesting	the	national	government	enact	prohibitions	on	Party	members	from	residing	within	 the	 settlements,	 even	while	 the	majority	of	 local	 senior	Party	officials—including	Mayor	Zhang	himself—chose	to	reside	within	their	boundaries.		Overall,	 relations	 between	 the	 domestic	 and	 extraterritorial	 administrations	 vacillated	between	positive	and	adversarial,	depending	both	on	larger	national	directives,	as	well	as	issue-by-issue.	Overall,	however,	especially	by	the	latter	half	of	the	Guomindang	period,	had	a	positive	working	 relationship	between	the	 two	municipal	 governments,	 symbolised	 in	part	by	the	mutual	praise	exchanged	in	the	comments	made	by	the	extraterritorial	Shanghai	Municipal	 Council	 and	 the	 domestic	 municipal	 leadership	 upon	 the	 resignation	 of	 the	domestic	Mayor	Wu	 in	April	 1937.	 "On	his	 appointment	as	Chairman	of	 the	Kwangtung	[Guangdong]	Provincial	Government,	the	Council	expressed	to	General	Wu	Te-chen,	Mayor	of	the	City	Government.,	its	congratulations	and	its	regret	at	his	departure	from	Shanghai.	General	 Wu	 Te-chen,	 in	 replying,	 spoke	 of	 his	 happy	 relations	 with	 the	 Settlement	authorities	and	the	ready	co-operation	which	had	always	been	extended.	Later	in	the	year,	the	Council,	in	congratulating	Mr.	Yui	on	his	appointment	as	Mayor	of	the	City	Government,	expressed	confidence	that	the	same	happy	relations	would	also	mark	his	term	of	office,	and	Mr.	Yui,	 in	reply,	 said	 it	would	always	be	his	endeavour	 to	work	 for	harmony	and	peace	among	 the	 peoples	 of	 many	 nationalities	 residing	 in	 Shanghai"	 (SMC	 1937:	 20).	 In	 the	following	 chapter,	 we	 turn	 to	 a	 more	 explicit	 consideration	 of	 the	 extraterritorial	settlements	and	the	way	in	which	they	developed	internal	and	external	mechanisms	that	created	formal	and	informal	linkages	between	the	parallel	municipal	governments,	as	well	as	those	which	formed	the	basis	for	the	overall	extraterritorial	institutional	framework.	
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Chapter	Nine.	
Perceptions	of	Institutional	Quality	in	Shanghai's	International	Settlement			The	 focus	of	 this	chapter	 is	 twofold.	First,	after	a	brief	 review	of	 the	historical	setting	in	section	9.1,	we	seek	to	provide	in	Section	9.2	the	way	in	which	the	institutional	framework	of	 Shanghai's	 extraterritorial	 settlements	 is	 typically	 viewed	 and	 discussed	 within	 the	economic	history	literature.	In	general,	unlike	in	the	case	of	China's	domestic	institutional	environment	and	state	capacity,	there	appears	less	debate	in	the	literature	regarding	the	overall	nature	of	institutional	quality	of	the	extraterritorial	settlements.	In	particular,	the	presumption	 typically	 presented	 is	 that	 the	 extraterritorial	 institutional	 environment	provided	relatively	strong	protections	of	private	property	and	contract	rights	in	accordance	with	similar	safeguards	found	within	the	liberal	republican	states	whose	governments	had	helped	 to	 create	 and	 support	 the	 extraterritoriality	 system,	 and	 founded	 associated	settlements	within	Shanghai.	Unfortunately,	however,	similar	to	much	of	the	mainstream	literature	 that	 attempts	 to	 link	 the	 impacts	 of	 China's	 pre-war	 domestic	 institutional	environment	on	attendant	economic	outcomes,	there	exists	a	tendency	within	the	literature	to	make	inferences	about	the	impact	of	extraterritorial	institutions	on	aspects	of	economic	activity	occurring	within	the	settlements,	by	simply	positing	a	monolithic	and	immutable	institutional	quality	of	the	extraterritorial	environment.	As	to	be	described,	however,	the	nature	of	the	extraterritorial	institutional	environment,	and	the	level	of	protection	provided	to	private	economic	actors'	property,	was	neither	time	invariant,	nor	consistently	effected	across	 institutional	constructs;	 further,	 the	nature	of	 institutional	protection	afforded	to	private	 economic	 actors	 often	 differed	 across	 differing	 population	 sub-groups,	 such	 as	between	foreign	and	domestic	residents.		Second,	 this	 chapter	 additionally	 describes	 and	 analyses	 the	 factors	 shaping	 Shanghai's	contemporaneous	 economic	 agents'	 perceptions	 of	 the	 extraterritorial	 institutional	environment,	including	an	explicit	focus	on	the	way	in	which	agents	viewed	protections	on	private	property	rights	and	contract	enforcement.	Given	the	relative	lack	of	explicit	focus	in	the	 literature	 on	 extraterritorial	 institutions,	 our	 analysis	 primarily	 employs	 the	 use	 of	contemporaneous	 sources	 to	 conduct	 our	 analysis.	 In	 general,	 we	 follow	 the	 approach	adopted	 in	 Part	 II	 analysing	 the	 domestic	 institutional	 environment,	 and	 discuss	 the	primary	facets	of	the	efficacy	and	capacity	of	state	institutions	involved	in	the	production	of	institutional	protections	on	private	property	and	contract	rights.			Such	 institutional	constructs	 include	 the	ability	of	 the	extraterritorial	state	apparatus	 to	develop	state	capacity	and	create	credible	commitment	mechanisms.	Section	9.3	discusses	how	the	extraterritorial	political,	 legal,	and	judicial	systems	operated	in	ways	that	either	limited	 or	 fostered	 the	 ability	 of	 state	 actors	 to	 engage	 in	 government	 expropriation	 of	individual	private	property.	Section	9.4	considers	the	development	of	state	bureaucratic	capacity	that	allowed	state	actors	to	plan	and	implement	economic	and	social	policies	that	defined	the	state-private	agent	relationship	and	either	created	space	and	ability	for	private	economic	activity	to	flourish	or	be	constricted	by	government	action.	Such	policies	included	those	on	taxation,	business	regulations,	provision	of	infrastructure,	as	well	as	social	policy	such	 as	 provision	 of	 education	 and	 public	 health	 services.	 Section	 9.5	 describes	 the	structures	in	place	and	ability	of	the	Settlement	to	enforce	a	monopoly	on	coercive	force	within	 its	 sovereign	 territory	 through	 the	 establishment	 of	 internal	 police	 and	 external	military	forces.	Section	9.6	analyses	the	degree	to	which	credible	commitment	mechanisms	created	private	property	rights	protections,	as	well	as	the	impact	of	attempts	by	the	state	to	control	 private	 actors	 in	 areas	 such	 as	 censorship	 of	 free	 expression	 that	 shaped	 the	openness	of	civil	society.	Finally,	a	brief	summary	in	section	9.7	concludes	the	discussion.	
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	9.1.			Introduction:	Historical	Setting		Shanghai's	famous	waterfront	promenade,	the	Bund,	stretches	one	and	a	half	kilometres	along	the	west	bank	of	the	Huangpu	River.	Representing	some	of	the	world's	most	expensive	real	estate,	the	cluster	of	fifty-two	historical	buildings	along	the	Bund	exhibit	a	mixture	of	Gothic,	Neo-Classic,	and	Art	Deco	architectural	styles,	and	provide	a	popular	backdrop	for	tourist	photos.	Yet	while	the	Bund	is	regarded	as	an	important	symbol	of	Shanghai,	it	elicits	mixed	feelings	for	many	residents	as	an	incongruous	sight	in	a	Chinese	city,	and	harkens	back	to	a	period	that	saw	western	governments'	partial	usurpation	of	Chinese	sovereignty.	In	 fact,	 however,	much	 of	 the	 capital	 and	 enterprise	 that	 drove	 the	 construction	 of	 the	buildings	lining	this	architecturally	impressive	promenade	was	Chinese	in	origin.	As	such,	the	Bund,	and	as	by	extension	the	entirety	of	Shanghai's	early	extraterritorial	settlements,	signify	the	amalgamation	of	both	foreign	and	Chinese	physical,	financial,	and	human	capital.		When	 a	 young	 Englishman,	 George	 Balfour,	 arrived	 in	 Shanghai	 aboard	 the	 steamship	
Medusa	one	hundred	and	seventy-five	years	ago,	on	8	November	1843,	the	area	that	would	become	the	Bund	appeared	considerably	different.	Stepping	off	the	boat	and	onto	a	muddy	narrow	lane	at	the	southwest	corner	of	where	the	Wusong	(Soochow	Creek)	and	Huangpu	(Whangpoo)	Rivers	met,	Balfour	was	greeted	only	by	the	marshland	lying	north	of	the	old	walled	city	of	Shanghai,	dotted	with	reeds	and	wild	birds.	Yet	within	a	mere	fifty	years,	the	landscape	would	be	transformed	into	one	of	Asia's	leading	financial	centres.			Balfour	had	come	to	Shanghai	following	the	conclusion	of	the	Opium	War	and	subsequent	signing	of	the	Treaty	of	Nanjing,	Article	II	of	which	compelled	the	Qing	government	to	allow	British	citizens	access	to	five	Chinese	cities	"for	the	purpose	of	carrying	on	their	Mercantile	pursuits."	Balfour,	representing	the	vanguard	of	British	political	and	commercial	interests,	had	been	selected	to	serve	as	the	first	British	Consul	of	Shanghai,	and	tasked	by	Sir	Henry	Pottinger,	the	first	Governor	of	Hongkong	and	one	of	the	original	negotiators	of	the	Treaty	of	Nanjing,	to	create	a	viable	and	successful	treaty	port	from	which	British	merchants	could	operate.	 The	 Treaty	 defined	 treaty	 ports	 as	 places	 where	 "British	 Subjects,	 with	 their	families	and	establishments…	[be]	allowed	to	reside,	with	the	purpose	of	carrying	on	their	Mercantile	pursuits,	without	molestation	or	restraint"	(Treaty	of	Nanjing	1842:	Art.	II).		The	International	Settlement	in	Shanghai	traces	its	origin	to	1845,	when	Balfour	was	able	to	strike	an	agreement	with	the	ranking	local	Chinese	official,	the	Daotai	(& ),	for	access	to	a	stretch	of	undeveloped	land	north	of	the	walled	city	for	residences	of	British	merchants,	in	accordance	with	the	provisions	of	the	Treaty.	The	stipulations	of	the	Land	Regulations	first	 drawn	up	 in	1845	(later	 revised	 in	1854,	1869,	 and	1898)	 served	as	 the	basis	 of	a	municipal	constitution	 for	 the	British	(and	 later	 International)	Settlement.	With	such	an	agreement	in	place,	Balfour	set	about	overseeing	the	construction	of	the	British	Consulate	General's	 office	 along	 the	 bank	 of	 the	 Huangpu	 River.	 Thirty-Three	 the	 Bund	 was	 the	starting	point	of	the	development	of	the	British	Settlement,	originally	referred	to	as	simply
	#	(or,	"ten	li	of	foreign	territory").	Although	the	original	structure	completed	in	1849	was	destroyed	by	fire	in	December	1870,	the	Consulate	building	was	reconstructed	in	1873	as	a	two-floor	neo-Renaissance	building,	and	currently	still	stands	on	the	site.		The	nature	of	the	agreement	that	Balfour	negotiated—a	perpetual	lease	of	land	to	British	residents—stipulated	no	forfeit	of	Chinese	soil;	while	designated	for	use	by	the	British,	"fair	and	equitable"	rent	was	to	be	paid	to	the	Chinese	government	(Hsia	1929:	40).	Under	the	Land	Regulations,	British	citizens	 living	in	 the	Settlement	would	pay	rent	directly	 to	 the	Chinese	 government	 (albeit	 collected	 and	 transferred	 via	 the	 British	 consul	 office).	Nonetheless,	 the	 right	 to	 rent	 the	 land	was	 granted	 "in	perpetuity",	 and	hence	 effective	control	of	the	land,	although	technically	still	Chinese	soil,	was	ceded	to	the	British.	Therefore,	
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despite	Article	28	unequivocally	stating	that	"the	land	encompassed	in	the	territory	remains	Chinese	territory,	subject	to	China’s	sovereign	rights,"	the	British	Settlement	obtained	what	legal	experts	at	the	time	called	"a	delegated	power	of	municipal	administration…	equipped	to	deal	with	 these	matters	 in	 an	 area	where	 the	 large	majority	of	 the	 foreigners	dwell"	(Fraser	1939:	45).			As	greater	numbers	of	foreign	merchants	arrived	in	the	treaty	port	in	search	of	business	opportunities,	 settlements	 for	 other	 foreign	merchant	 communities	 (American,	 German,	Italian,	 and	Dutch)	were	 formed,	 negotiated	 under	 similar	 arrangements	 between	 their	respective	governments	and	Qing	officials.	Given	perceived	common	interests	and	wishing	to	 cut	 administrative	 costs,	 the	 American	 Settlement	 officially	 merged	 with	 the	 British	Settlement	 in	 1863	 to	 form	 the	 International	 Settlement,	 with	 the	 Shanghai	 Municipal	Council	as	 its	governing	body	(NCH	8	 July	1854:	194-195).	Foreign	settlements	of	other	nations,	 considerably	 smaller	 in	 size	 and	 scope,	 soon	 also	 subsumed	 their	 separate	administrations	under	 the	 general	 umbrella	 of	 the	 International	 Settlement.	Undergoing	several	expansions,	the	original	Settlement	increased	from	just	138	acres	in	1846	to	5,583	acres	by	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century	(Chronicle	1906:	676;	Jones	1940:	1).			Of	exception	was	the	French	settlement.	Having	withdrawn	from	the	Land	Regulations	in	1855,	 the	French	Concession	was	officially	 established	 comparatively	 late,	 in	May	1862,	under	an	agreement	negotiated	with	the	Qing	government	by	 the	French	consular	agent	Charles	de	Montigny.	The	French	Concession	was	of	a	slightly	different	form	of	agreement	than	that	which	represented	the	settlements	run	by	the	other	foreign	nations,	as	it	more	explicitly	represented	a	grant	of	land	(a	"concession")	by	the	Chinese	government	to	the	French	 government,	 although	 this	 grant	 also	 was	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 perpetual	 lease.	Technically,	 however,	 the	 French	 government	 formally	 controlled	 the	 land,	 and	 could	therefore	act	as	landlord	by	sub-leasing	the	plots	to	individuals,	either	foreign	or	Chinese	(Johnstone	1937:	942-943).			With	 the	 arrival	 of	European	mercantile	houses	 and	 foreign	banks	 into	 the	 settlements,	along	with	attendant	foreign	and	Chinese	workers,	traders	and	entrepreneurs,	the	foreign	settlements	and	the	entire	city	of	Shanghai	continued	to	grow	in	population	and	territory.	Figure	9.1	provides	depictions	of	the	city	in	1862,	1900,	and	1933,	respectively.	The	map	of	the	city	in	1862	indicates	the	walled	domestic-government	administered	section	of	the	city	bordered	to	the	north	by	the	French,	British	and	American	settlements,	with	the	relative	sizes	of	the	foreign	settlements	to	the	domestic	walled	city	approximately	equal	in	area.	By	the	 turn	 of	 the	 century,	 the	 foreign	 settlements—in	 particular	 the	 amalgamated	International	Settlement—had	expanded	in	size	to	surpass	that	of	the	original	Chinese	city.	The	 1933	 map	 illustrates	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 domestic	 municipality;	 while	 both	 foreign	settlements	encircled	in	bold	lines,	and	the	location	of	the	original	walled	city—albeit	by	that	 time	 no	 physical	walls	 remained—are	 clearly	 evident,	 their	 relative	 sizes	 are	 now	dwarfed	 in	 scale	 by	 the	 overall	 size	 of	 the	 total	 land	 area	 controlled	 by	 the	 Shanghai	domestic	municipality.		Already	by	1850,	Shanghai	came	to	displace	the	other	treaty	ports	to	serve	as	the	leading	seaport	 for	 international	 trade	 in	 China.	 Opium	 boats,	 which	 used	 to	 dock	 mainly	 in	Guangzhou,	 now	 mostly	 congregated	 along	 the	 Wusong	 wharves.	 From	 1847	 onward,	nearly	half	of	the	opium	imported	into	China	was	via	Shanghai	(Morse	1910:	541).	In	1859,	the	Qing	government	moved	the	office	of	the	Minister	of	Trade	in	charge	of	the	five	treaty	ports	from	Guangzhou	to	Shanghai.	Over	the	next	half	century,	the	city	would	continue	to	grow	 such	 that	by	1930,	 over	 thirty	 thousand	 foreigners	 from	 fourteen	 countries	 called	Shanghai	their	home,	having	built	their	lives	and	businesses	within	the	confines	of	foreign	settlements,	governed	by	locally-elected	councils	under	extraterritorial	legal	systems.		
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Figure	9.1.		Maps	of	Shanghai,	c.	1886	and	1933	
	Sources:	Encyclopædia	Britannica,	1886;	General	Staff	No.	3956	U.S.	Army	War	Office	1935	
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	9.2.			Brief	Review	of	the	Literature:	A	Presumption	of	Strength			Unlike	 the	 debate	 in	 the	 economic	 history	 literature	 regarding	 the	 institutional	 quality	defining	the	domestic	the	late-Qing	and	early	Republican	Chinese	state	described	in	detail	in	Part	II,	considerably	more	agreement	exists	in	the	literature	in	regard	to	depictions	of	the	overall	institutional	quality	that	characterised	Shanghai's	extraterritorial	settlements.			Such	lack	of	debate	is	partly	due	to	a	general	dearth	of	detailed	researches	focussed	on	the	extraterritorial	settlements	 themselves.	Compared	to	 the	wealth	of	research	undertaken	regarding	 the	 economic	 history	 and	 institutional	 framework	 defining	 late-imperial	 and	republican	domestic	state	capacity,	considerably	less	analogous	attention	has	been	paid	in	regard	to	Shanghai's	extraterritorial	settlements.	According	 to	Bickers	(2013:	162,	167),	"On	the	whole	they	are	mostly	ignored	in	English	[language	literature]",	while	within	the	comparable	 Chinese-language	 literature,	 "the	 International	 Settlement	 and	 French	Concession	administrations	have	attracted	in	fact	little	by	way	of	direct	analysis	up	to	now,	aside	from	consideration	of	their	political	impact	in	the	turmoil	of	the	mid-1920s."		That	 said,	 several	 significant	 exceptions	 exist	 to	 the	 literature's	 general	 omission,	 with	research	by	Bickers	(1998,	1999,	2003,	2004,	2016)	providing	some	of	the	most	notable.	In	particular,	 his	 work	 focusses	 on	 the	 lives	 and	 attitudes	 of	 the	 British	 merchants	 and	opportunity-seekers	who	largely	dominated	the	population	of	the	International	Settlement.	His	research	also	stresses	the	way	in	which	official	British	interests	began	to	diverge	with	those	of	the	residents	of	the	Settlement,	resulting	in	increasing	levels	of	discord	between	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	leadership	and	the	British	Foreign	Office	over	time.	Bickers'	focus	on	the	lives	and	personalities	of	expatriate	individuals	comprising	the	Settlement,	and	his	 discussion	 on	 the	 workings	 of	 many	 of	 the	 institutions	 that	 defined	 extraterritorial	International	 Settlement,	 including	 the	 Mixed	 Court	 and	 Shanghai	 Municipal	 Council,	provide	 a	 generalised	 consideration	 of	 the	 institutional	 make-up	 of	 the	 extraterritorial	community,	albeit	one	coming	from	a	primarily	personality-driven	narrative.		Jackson	(2017)	provides	a	more	detailed	historical	examination	of	the	ways	in	which	the	Council	 and	 related	 institutions	 governed	 the	 International	 Settlement,	 describing	 the	transformation	of	 the	Council	 from	a	 rather	modest	 governing	 construct	 into	 a	 complex	bureaucratic	 structure	 as	 it	 increased	 its	 authority	 and	 scope	 over	 the	 lives	 of	 the	Settlement's	residents,	while	simultaneously	attempting	 to	maintain	 its	 independence	of	rule	from	control	by	the	domestic	Chinese	state	leadership.	Jackson	contends	that	at	its	core,	the	Council	was	a	colonial	institution,	even	if	its	leadership	was	occasionally	at	odds	with	that	of	the	interests	of	Britain	and	the	United	States.	Referring	to	the	Municipal	Council	as	operating	a	system	of	"freelance	colonialism",	Jackson	ultimately	regards	it	to	have	served	as	an	arm	of	foreign	imperialism	in	China.		Whewell	(2015)	focusses	her	research	on	the	institution	of	British	extraterritoriality	itself	as	 it	 operated	 in	 the	 treaty	 ports	 of	 China,	with	 special	 attention	paid	 to	 Shanghai.	 For	Whewell,	British	extraterritoriality	represented	a	symbol	of	British	imperialism	in	China,	and	central	to	her	investigation	are	the	similarities	and	linkages	of	extraterritorial	law	in	China	to	that	of	more	formal	British	colonial	legal	systems.	Whewell	further	emphasises	the	role	 played	 by	 extraterritorial	 law	 insofar	 that	 it	 "supported,	 regulated	 and	 protected	trading	and	property	rights	[for	British	merchants	and	entrepreneurs]"	(2).				
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Several	 additional	 researches	 focus	 on	 other	 specific	 institutional	 features	 of	 the	settlements.	Stephens	(1992),	Ruskola	(2003),	and	Yang	(2006)	concentrate	solely	on	the	extraterritorial	 judicial	 institution	of	the	Mixed	Court.	As	the	Mixed	Court	was	a	western	legal	 construct	 designed	 to	 implement	 Chinese	 law,	 Stephens	 presents	 a	 comparative	examination	of	 the	philosophical	differences	between	Chinese	 and	western	 law,	 arguing	that	"true"	adjudicative	law	as	defined	by	western	legal	traditions	depends	upon	adherence	to	 the	principles	of	 application	of	 rule	of	 law:	 "rigid,	 universal,	 specific"	 legal	 objectives	applied	equally	to	all;	conversely,	Chinese	law	operates	on	the	disciplinary	model,	and	thus	is	 necessarily	 arbitrary,	 with:	 "predetermined,	 rigid,	 universal	 imperatives	 governing	conduct	and	imposing	order	from	without	not	to	be	found"	(4,8).	Noting	the	Mixed	Court	had	 at	 best	 dubious	 legal	 status,	 with	 its	 legitimacy	 not	 explicitly	 recognised	 under	extraterritorial,	international,	or	domestic	Chinese	law,	the	Mixed	Court	system	nonetheless	worked	well	because,	according	to	Stephens,	issues	of	legitimacy	were	not	problematic	to	most	Chinese	subject	 to	 its	rule,	given	 that	Chinese	culture	and	 legal	understanding	was	based	on	the	disciplinary	model	of	law,	where	arbitrary	rules	are	applied	by	those	holding	the	power	to	make	the	rules;	i.e.,	a	"might	makes	right"	conceptualisation	of	legal	reasoning.	Yang	makes	a	similar	case,	arguing	that	Chinese	citizens	historically	looked	to	government	magistrates	as	paternalistic	figures	whose	role	was	to	help	resolve	what	would	be	termed	legal	civil	disputes,	and	that	 the	Mixed	Court	was	designed	 to	take	over	 this	role	 for	 the	settlements'	Chinese	residents.	Ruskola	(2003:	2)	suggests,	however,	that	the	Mixed	Court	was	doomed	to	 fail	 in	 its	 application	of	Chinese	 law	given	 that	he	 views	Chinese	 law	as	"congenitally	 lawless,"	with	 the	 Court	 struggling	 to	 combine	 Chinese	 and	western	 legal	precepts.	 Lee	 (1994:	193),	meanwhile,	 presents	an	 implicit	 critique	of	 such	dichotomist	analyses,	noting	that	in	many	respects,	the	actual	operation	of	the	Mixed	Court	"seems	to	fit	better	with	the	adjudicative	than	with	the	disciplinary	model."	Lee	also	draws	attention	to	instances	where	the	Chinese	public	actively	opposed	Mixed	Court	decisions,	thus	implying	it	was	unlikely	that	Court's	foreign	judges	were	uniformly	viewed	as	"figures	of	paternalistic	authority	in	the	eyes	of	the	court's	Chinese	subjects,"	as	implied	by	Stephens	and	Yang.	Law	(2015)	 also	 considers	 the	 extraterritorial	 legal	 system,	 but	 during	 the	 Guomindang	 era,	after	the	abolishment	of	the	Mixed	Court.			In	 other	work,	 Jackson	 (2012)	 provides	 a	detailed	 consideration	 of	 the	 structure	 of	 the	Shanghai	Municipal	Police,	and	outlines	its	role	as	an	important	institution	in	maintaining	internal	peace	and	order	in	the	International	Settlement	in	accordance	with	the	norms	and	interests	of	the	Settlement's	business	and	political	elites	whose	interests	were	represented	by	the	Council	and	Settlement	business	owners.	Martin	(1991,	1995,	1996)	and	Wakeman	(1995a)	also	contribute	to	an	understanding	of	law	enforcement	mechanisms	within	the	settlements	and	larger	Shanghai	in	research	on	the	operations	of	the	Green	Gang	organised	crime	 syndicate.	 Their	 work	 underscore	 some	 of	 the	 inherent	 weaknesses	 of	 the	institutional	structures	of	the	settlements	in	maintaining	law	and	order,	a	story	that	seems	to	 be	 in	 sharp	 contrast	 to	 the	 overly	positive	 descriptions	 of	 the	 legal	 and	 order	 of	 the	Settlement	that	is	generally	assumed	by	the	economic	historical	literature.	Also	consistent	throughout	the	literature	is	the	perception	that	the	byzantine	nature	of	legal	jurisdictions	operating	throughout	Shanghai	created	opportunities	for	lawlessness.	Scully	(1998:	858)'s	description	of	the	implications	of	multiple	jurisdictions	is	typical:	"the	division	of	Shanghai	into	 Anglo-American,	 French	 and	 Chinese	 sectors	 with	 different	 municipal	 regulations	complicated	questions	of	law	and	order	helped	anyone	on	the	margins	of	society	to	resist	authority."	 Similar	 sentiments	 are	 expressed,	 amongst	 others,	 by	 Martin	 (1996)	 in	 his	description	of	the	operations	of	the	Green	Gang,	Ma	(2008)	in	his	look	at	industrialisation	and	economic	growth	rates	in	the	Lower	Yangzi,	and	by	Whewell	(2015)	in	her	description	of	the	complexities	in	the	application	of	extraterritorial	law.				
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Numerous	 additional	 studies	 on	 various	 aspects	 of	 social	 institutions	 and	 constructs	defining	life	in	the	extraterritorial	settlements	exist,	such	as	those	debating	the	degree	to	which	Shanghai's	private	sector-based	commercial	culture	was	dependent	upon	the	foreign	settlements	 (Chan	 1999),	 the	 role	 played	 by	 small	 business	 owners	 (Lu	 1995),	 spatial	construction	 effects	 on	 Bund-based	 businesses	 (Taylor	 2002),	 the	 impact	 of	 corporate	culture	on	the	lives	of	domestic	Chinese	employees	of	the	Settlement's	modern	commercial	enterprises	such	as	banks,	publishers	and	department	stores	(Yeh	2007),	and	the	social	and	racial	dynamics	reflected	in	the	practice	of	prostitution	in	the	settlements	(Hershatter	1997,	Scully	1998).	Harris	 (2018)	 considers	 the	 impact	 on	 the	 development	 of	 administrative	capacity	provided	via	the	creation	of	a	local	postal	office	by	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	in	1863.	However,	while	these	and	previously-cited	literatures	provide	valuable	archive-based	contributions	to	a	historical	understanding	of	Shanghai's	extraterritorial	settlements,	the	 overall	 literature	 lacks	 for	 the	most	part	 explicitly	 economic	 historical	 or	 economic	studies	 on	 the	 development	 and	 evolution	 of	 Shanghai's	 extraterritorial	 institutional	environment.	 This	 makes	 sense,	 as	 none	 of	 these	 authors	 are	 economists	 or	 economic	historians;	 Bickers,	 Jackson,	 Martin,	 and	 Whewell	 are	 historians,	 while	 Stephens,	 Lee,	Ruskola	and	Yang	are	legal	historians,	and	Taylor	an	architectural	scholar.		There	 do	 exist,	 however,	 several	 researches	within	 the	 economic	 history	 literature	 that	analyse	the	importance	of	the	extraterritorial	settlements	to	Shanghai's	economic	growth	path	and	dynamics,	as	well	as	specific	ways	in	which	the	settlements'	institutions	drove	the	expansion	of	Shanghai's	financial	and	industrialisation	process.	Early	on,	Hao	(1970)	argues	domestic	Chinese	compradors	played	a	significant	role	in	bringing	"modern	business"	into	the	Chinese	economy,	by	using	the	wealth	and	human	capital	gained	from	working	within	the	 extraterritorial	 institutional	 environment	 at	 the	 many	 foreign	 joint-stock	 firms	operating	within	 Chinese	 treaty	 ports	 such	 as	 Shanghai.	More	 recently,	Ma	 (2008)	 also	stresses	the	important	of	western	institutional	influence—from	legal	structures,	property	rights	 —provided	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 Shanghai's	 foreign	 settlements	 as	 providing	 the	primary	 spark	 that	drove	 the	 rates	of	 economic	 growth	and	 industrialisation	within	 the	Yangzi	Delta	region	that	outstripped	those	found	elsewhere	in	the	Chinese	economy.		These	 works,	 while	 important	 in	 their	 consideration	 of	 the	 way	 that	 institutional	 form	impact	economic	outcomes,	suffer	from	a	criticism	similarly	identified	with	the	literature	that	relates	the	domestic	Chinese	institutional	environment	with	attending	behaviours	of	domestic	Chinese	economic	actors	and	accompanying	economic	outcomes,	insofar	as	the	overall	nature	of	the	underlying	institutional	environment	is	primarily	assumed	as	opposed	to	 rigorously	 analysed.	 Instead,	 when	 the	 institutional	 environment	 of	 the	 foreign	settlements	is	referenced	by	this	literature,	it	is	typically	done	so	in	a	manner	that	implicitly	assumes	the	existence	of	strong	state	capacity	reflecting	efficient	bureaucratic	faculty,	and	a	high	quality	institutional	environment	that	provided	good	protection	of	private	property	rights;	 certainly,	 it	 is	assumed	 to	be	 superior	 to	 that	 found	 in	 the	domestic	 institutional	environment	of	either	domestically-controlled	Shanghai,	or	China	as	a	whole.			Certainly,	it	is	not	surprising	to	find	the	contemporaneous	English-language	literature	parti	
pris,	eager	to	paint	a	self-congratulatory	view	of	the	settlements	as	beacons	of	modernity	and	 home	 to	 efficient	 and	 strong	 institutions,	 effective	 in	 their	 protection	 of	 private	property	rights.	Accordingly,	Feetham	(1931:	I,317),	in	poetically	describing	the	towering	buildings	 of	 Shanghai's	 banking	 sector	 along	 the	 Bund	 as	 symbols	 not	 only	 of	 the	Settlement's	wealth	and	economic	success,	but	more	importantly,	as	possessing	"a	deeper	economic	 significance	 than	 this;	 they	are	 the	 first	conspicuous	 signs	 and	 symbols	 of	 the	sanctity	of	the	rights	of	private	property	as	recognized	and	safeguarded	in	the	Settlement".	Gundry	(1920:59)	boasts	that	"It	has	been	said,	indeed,	that	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council				
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	are	the	best	missionaries	in	China,	as	they	offer	to	the	myriads	of	Chinese	who	pass	through	the	Settlement	an	example	of	what	orderly	and	good	government	may	mean."	Crow	(1933:	143),	meanwhile,	adopting	the	"model	settlement"	terminology,	claims	that	"under	the	long	and	honourable	administration	of	the	Council,	this	section	of	Shanghai	has	become	known	the	world	over	as	'The	Model	Settlement.'	Its	modern	buildings,	clean,	paved	streets,	and	its	prosperous	air	of	business	activity	usually	surprise	the	visitor	who	expects	to	find	a	Chinese	city	rather	than	one	which	has	all	the	aspects	of	a	Continental	metropolis."		More	 recent	 literature	 appears	 equally	 ready	 to	 pronounce	 Shanghai's	 extraterritorial	settlements	home	to	effective,	and	superior,	 institutions.	Lee	(1995:5),	 for	 instance,	 first	posits	that	"the	foreign	laws	promised	a	reasonably	objective	and	impartial	standard	for	managing	 private	 affairs,"	 before	 proceeding	 with	 analyses	 of	 business	 relations	 in	 the	settlements	based	on	 that	assumption	of	 impartiality	 for	private	business	 activities.	 Yet	Lee's	supposition	of	the	construction	and	application	of	foreign	laws	in	an	impartial	manner	are	not	supported	by	in-depth	study	or	citation	of	such	a	study;	rather,	there	seems	to	be	an	implicit	assumption	that	the	fact	that	these	laws	were	foreign,	and	adjudicated	in	foreign-run	(extraterritorial)	courts	must	imply	they	were	impartial;	or,	certainly	more	impartial	than	that	which	agents	could	expect	from	the	domestic	legal	environment.			Similarly,	prior	to	ascribing	the	superior	growth	of	the	lower	Yangzi	to	capitalists	operating	out	 of	 an	 improved	 institutional	 environment	 that	 owed	 its	 existence	 to	 extraterritorial	Shanghai,	Ma	claims,	"The	[Shanghai	Municipal]	Council	was	remarkably	corruption	free"	(2006:19);	and	that	"[i]n	comparison	with	the	Chinese	quarter	governed	by	the	local	Qing	government,	 the	 business-dominated	 council	 was	 far	more	 efficient	 in	 the	 provision	 of	public	goods	including	the	maintenance	and	improvement	of	city	roads,	transportation	and	communication	infrastructures,	public	utilities,	and	port	facilities"	(2008:	373).		The	reasons	for	this	implicit	assumption	of	superior	institutional	quality	are	rather	clear	for	contemporaneous	 actors,	 who	 undoubtedly	 found	 it	 in	 their	 interests	 to	 assert	 such	superiority	to	use	as	an	implicit	(and	frequently,	explicit)	justification	for	the	continuation	of	the	extraterritoriality	system.	More	recent	examples	are	more	likely	owing	to	the	fact	that	the	settlements'	 institutional	framework,	as	derivative	European	institutions,	are	viewed	from	Northian	assumptions	that	it	was	"European	exceptionalism"	that	created	the	unique	institutional	 frameworks	 capable	 of	 effectively	 protecting	 private	 property	 rights	 and	contract	enforcement.			However,	 as	 noted	 in	 previous	 discussions	 regarding	 assumptions	 presented	 in	 the	literature	on	the	domestic	Chinese	institutional	environment,	without	more	rigorous	and	disinterested	 methodologies	 employed	 to	 analyse	 the	 quality	 of	 these	 institutional	environments,	 we	 risk	 arriving	 at	 conclusions	 that	 ascribe	 varying	 observed	 economic	outcomes—growth	 rates,	 industrialisation	 levels,	 formation	of	 joint-stock	 companies,	 or	financial	market	development—to	an	assumed	and	constant	institutional	framework	that	exists	only	as	a	banal	typecast	but	not	to	be	found	in	historical	reality.		In	 this	 respect,	 our	 approach	 going	 forward	 is	 to	 look	 to	 present	 a	 detailed	 qualitative	analysis	 of	 the	 institutional	 environment	 of	 the	 extraterritorial	 settlements,	 one	 that	attempts	 to	understand	their	 construct	 from	 the	point	 of	 view	of	 the	perspective	of	 the	settlements'	resident	economic	actors,	whether	domestic	Chinese	or	expatriate.	Further,	we	highlight	both	the	undulating	nature	of	the	institutional	environment	over	the	late-imperial	and	early-republican	time	frame,	as	well	as	the	myriad	inconsistencies	and	contradictions	that	 shaped	 the	way	 contemporaneous	 actors	 perceived	 the	 quality	 of	 private	property	protections	and	overall	institutions	operating	within	the	extraterritorial	settlements.		
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9.3		 State	 Capacity:	 Protecting	 Private	 Property	 and	 Contract	 Rights	 via	 Effective	Institutions	within	the	International	Settlement	
	Before	 starting	 our	 analysis	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 perceived	 institutional	 quality	 within	 the	foreign	settlements,	we	note	that	the	following	discussion	shall	primarily	focus	attention	on	factors	 shaping	 the	 property	 rights	 environment	 of	 the	 International	 Settlement,	 with	considerably	 less	 attention	 paid	 to	 the	 French	 Concession.	 Admittedly,	 some	 loss	 of	specificity	and	consideration	of	the	diversity	between	these	two	foreign-run	environments	is	 lost,	 given	 the	 existence	 of	 several	 substantive	differences	 in	 administration	 of	 these	municipalities.§	Overall,	however,	 the	nature	of	 the	 institutional	differences	between	the	two	foreign	settlements	can	be	defined	as	one	of	scale,	as	opposed	to	one	of	form	for	the	types	of	differences	existing	between	the	domestic	Chinese	controlled	areas	of	Shanghai,	and	those	of	the	two	extraterritorial	settlements.				9.3.1	Credible	Commitment	Mechanisms:	State	Structure		Clear	 differences	 existed	 across	 Shanghai's	 domestic	 and	 extraterritorial-administered	municipal	governments	in	terms	of	their	ability	to	create	credible	commitment	mechanisms	that	fostered	the	perception	amongst	relevant	actors	that	the	government	was	competent	in	 creating	 an	 effective	 private	 property	 framework,	 and	 that	 expropriation	 of	 private	property	by	the	state	was	of	relatively	low	likelihood.			Of	 the	 most	 important	 form	 was	 the	 government	 structure.	 The	 domestic	 municipal	governments	were	run	by	officials	appointed,	successively,	by	the	Qing	Court,	the	Beiyang	central	 government,	 and	 the	 Guomindang	 party.	 Conversely,	 moderately	 representative	municipal	councils	governed	the	foreign	settlements.	Soon	after	the	founding	of	the	British	Settlement	in	1845,	and	with	the	implementation	of	the	Land	Regulations,	several	of	the	largest	land	renters	began	meeting	to	discuss	ways	to	improve	the	services	for	residents	of	the	Settlement.			Soon	 thereafter,	 the	 Committee	 of	 Roads	 and	 Jetties	 was	 formed	 and	 tasked	 with	coordinating	the	construction	of	roads,	canals,	jetties	and	other	public	works.	In	July	1854,	the	first	official	meeting	of	"Land	Renters"	(later	referred	to	as	"ratepayers")	was	held	by	the	organisation	that	would	later	become	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council.	At	the	meeting,	the	 ratepayers	agreed	 to	a	 set	 of	 rules	 and	guidelines	 for	 self-governance,	 including	 the	formation	of	a	formal	governing	council	to	be	run	by	members	elected	from	ratepayers.	This	council	was	granted	the	power	to	create	regulations	and	levy	taxes	on	the	ratepayer	body	as	a	whole	in	order	to	raise	funds	necessary	to	provide	services	and	public	facilities	to	the	International	Settlement	residents	(NCH	8	July	1854:	194-195,	NCH	22	July	1854:	202-203).	This	first	meeting,	and	the	early	meetings	that	followed	it,	were	the	first	steps	in	creating	and	entering	into	the	constitutional	agreement	that	would	govern	the	Settlement.	Such	a	process	 might	 well	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 practical	 application	 of	 the	 theoretical	 framework	Buchanan	&	Tullock	(1962)	lay	out	in	their	seminal	work	The	Calculus	of	Consent	regarding	constitution	 construction	 as	 deciding	 on	 the	 decision	 rules	 that	 will	 determine	 self-governance.		________________________________________________________________________________________________________	§	Bergère	(2002	[2009])	provides	a	useful	comparative	examination	of	the	French	Concession	with	the	 International	Settlement,	 contrasting	many	of	 the	 important	ways	in	which	 the	 two	 foreign	settlements	 differed.	 Overall,	 the	 French	 municipality	 was	 much	 more	 an	 explicitly	 colonial	structure,	 with	 absolute	 power	 residing	 in	 Paris,	 whereas	 the	 International	 Settlement	 was	governed	locally	and	not	beholden	to	a	foreign	government's	policies.		
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By	the	 time	the	British	and	American	Settlements	had	merged	to	 form	the	 International	Settlement,	much	of	the	authority	originally	bestowed	onto	the	British	or	American	Consuls	had	been	appropriated	by	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council.	The	early	community	actively	sought	to	seize	authority	and	consular	control	from	western	foreign-government-appointed	Consuls	based	in	Beijing.	A	statement	by	a	member	of	the	Council,	Mr	Robson,	at	the	Annual	Ratepayers	Meeting	 in	 1881,	 is	 telling:	 "I	 simply	wish	 to	deprive	 Consuls	 of	 any	power	except	 as	 judges.	We	 are	more	 capable	 of	 governing	 ourselves	 than	 the	 Consuls	 are	 of	governing	us.	That	is	the	idea	I	want	to	express,	and	that	idea	is	not	inconsistent	with	the	regulations	as	drawn.	 I	propose	to	withdraw	from	the	Consuls	all	unnecessary	authority	which	these	regulations	give	them.	They	ought	to	be	our	servants"	(de	Jesus	1909	:226).	In	many	respects,	 the	autonomy	of	 the	Council	came	partly	 from	ambiguity	surrounding	 to	whom	it	was	ultimately	answerable.	As	Pott	(1928:	68)	notes,	neither	the	British	nor	United	States	ambassadors	 to	China	 in	Beijing	had	authority	over	 the	Council,	 lacking	ability	 to	command	its	members	to	obey	directives	from	their	governments.	Essentially,	the	authority	of	the	Council	derived	from	its	construction;	formed	by	an	agreement	of	the	governed,	its	members	were	directly	elected	by	the	governed—or,	at	least,	a	portion	of	them.			In	reality,	the	ratepayers	represented	only	a	small	fraction	of	the	actual	number	of	residents	comprising	the	International	Settlement's	population.	The	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	was	annually	elected	based	on	a	property-based	franchise,	with	only	foreign	ratepayers	either	owning	land	of	a	minimum	value	of	500	taels	or	paying	annual	rental	fees	of	10	taels	entitled	to	vote;	further,	renters	were	only	qualified	to	run	for	council	positions	if	rental	payments	were	 a	 minimum	 of	 50	 taels	 per	 annum	 (Lockwood	 1934:	 1032-1033).	 While	 formal	mechanisms	 in	 the	 Land	 Regulations—such	 as	 the	 elected	 nature	 of	 the	 Council,	 or	mandating	that	budgeting	and	other	substantive	issues	put	forward	by	the	Council	or	by	other	ratepayers	required	majority	voted	approval	at	annual	or	extraordinary	ratepayers	meetings—helped	 provide	 an	 important	 check	 on	 the	 Council's	 taxation	 and	 regulatory	powers,	the	qualifications	on	voting	and	electability	requirements	implied	the	vast	majority	of	residents	were	unqualified	to	either	vote	or	run	for	Council	membership	positions.	Prior	to	 the	 late	 1930s,	 less	 than	 one-sixth	 of	 the	 British	 community	 had	 voting	 right	 in	 the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	elections	(Bickers	1998:	168;	Bergere	2002[2009]:	97).	Even	by	1934,	the	total	number	of	eligible	foreign	voters	in	the	Settlement	was	approximately	3,500	ratepayers	out	of	a	total	foreign	population	of	over	27,000,	meaning	therefore	only	approximately	thirteen	per	cent	of	the	Settlement's	foreign	population	was	eligible	to	vote	in	Council	elections	(NCH	28	March	1934:	489).		For	the	majority	of	its	existence,	the	most	glaring	omission	in	the	Council's	composition	was	its	lack	of	domestic	Chinese	membership.	By	1927,	the	International	Settlement	population	nearly	 topped	 850,000	 residents,	 comprised	 of	 approximately	 7,000	 British,	 13,000	Japanese,	 2,000	 Americans,	 3,000	 Russians,	 and	 5,000	 nationals	 of	 other	 treaty	powers—all	 far	 outweighed	 by	 a	 Chinese	 population	 of	 approximately	 810,000,	representing	ninety-seven	per	cent	of	the	population,	and	two-thirds	of	the	taxpayers	(SMC	1927:	80-81).	Figure	1.2	presented	earlier	in	Chapter	One	displays	the	relative	population	within	the	Settlement	graphically.	The	International	Settlement	was	clearly	a	Chinese	city,	albeit	one	with	a	colonial	feel	given	the	determinedly	foreign	political	leadership	and	their	outsized	control	of	socio-political	power.		As	early	as	1925,	representatives	of	the	Guomindang	Party	were	increasingly	and	stridently	calling	 on	 the	 Council	 to	 include	 Chinese	 participation	 in	 its	 rule;	 these	 calls	 grew	increasingly	more	strident	in	following	increased	anti-foreigner	sentiment	the	wake	of	the	May	Thirtieth	Movement.	While	similar	pressure	exerted	by	Beiyang	central	government	actors	on	the	International	Settlement	leadership	was	not	immediately	successful	in	ending	the	 extraterritoriality	 system,	 these	 efforts	 had	 important	 impacts	 on	 the	 structure	 of	governance	and	responsiveness	by	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council.	
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Historically,	 Shanghai	 Municipal	 Council	 membership	 had	 only	 comprised	 British	 and	American	nationals,	with	two	seats	later	allocated	to	Japanese	representatives	in	the	early	1920s,	 as	 the	 Japanese	 population—and	 business	 and	 political	 clout—had	 dramatically	increased	in	the	International	Settlement	(Contemporary	Japan	1936:	449-456).	By	1928,	Council	 membership	 comprised	 of	 five	 British,	 two	 Americans	 and	 two	 Japanese,	 with	Chairmanships	having	been	held	exclusively	by	either	British	or	American	nationals.			The	1926	Annual	Ratepayers	Meeting	vote	granting	three	seats	to	Chinese	members	on	the	Council,	 as	 per	 an	 initial	 request	 by	 the	 Chinese	 Ratepayers	 Association,	 represented	 a	belated	effort	by	the	Council	to	diversify	its	membership.	However,	although	the	proposal	was	approved	by	 the	Beiyang	government,	before	 the	election	 took	place	 in	1927,	more	strident	members	of	the	Chinese	community	expressed	dissatisfaction	with	the	plan,	arguing	that	 three	members	were	 too	 few	 given	 the	 community's	 size	 and	 contributions	 to	 the	Settlement,	and	demanded	nine	seats	for	Chinese,	to	equal	the	total	number	of	seats	held	by	foreign	members	(SMC	1927:	80).	Considerable	pushback	was	forthcoming	from	the	foreign	community,	however,	with	editorials	in	English-language	periodicals	pointedly	questioning	why	both	Chinese	Settlement	residents	and	the	domestic	Guomindang	government	could	so	strongly	demand	representative	rights	for	Chinese	Settlement	residents	when	all	Chinese	citizens	lacked	such	rights	under	the	authoritarian	military-led	Guomindang	regime,	with	Kotenev	(1926:7)	defensively	noting	that	"Chinese	living	in	the	native	sections	of	Shanghai	have	certainly	no	more	representation	or	voice	in	their	local	municipal	government	than	those	living	nearby	in	the	foreign	settlements,	with	both	equally	disenfranchised."		In	1928,	for	the	first	time,	three	Chinese	Council	members	were	appointed	to	the	Council,	selected	by	members	of	the	Chinese	Ratepayers	Association	and	the	Shanghai,	Nantao	and	Zhabei	 Chambers	 of	 Commerce.	 Further	 resolutions	 were	 passed	 to	 increase	 Chinese	appointments	 to	more	 senior	 positions	within	 the	 Council	 and	administrative	 structure	(Pacific	Relations	1934:	1-2).	Whilst	representation	on	the	Council	by	Chinese	members	was	an	important	step	in	rationalising	and	increasing	the	legitimacy	of	the	Council	at	a	time	of	increasing	 calls	 for	 an	 end	 to	 extraterritoriality,	 although	 dissatisfaction	 amongst	many	Chinese	residents	remained.	After	an	embarrassing	failure	to	pass	a	resolution	at	the	annual	ratepayers	meeting	 in	 April	 1930	 to	 increase	 the	 number	 of	 Chinese	 representatives,	 a	month	later	the	Council	called	a	Special	Meeting	of	the	ratepayers	which	saw	a	successful	vote	on	a	similar	resolution	to	add	two	more	Chinese	members	to	the	Council	(SMC	1930:	32-56),	 increasing	 the	 number	 of	 elected	 Chinese	members	 on	 the	 Council	 to	 five.	 This	structure	remained	in	place	until	the	dismantling	of	the	International	Settlement	in	1942,	when	 the	 population	 of	 the	 Settlement	 had	 reached	 over	 1,600,000,	 of	 whom	 all	 but	approximately	125,000	residents	were	Chinese	nationals	(Woodhead	1945:	301).		The	 impact	 of	 increased	 representation	 certainly	 yielded	 some	 increases	 in	 the	responsiveness	 of	 the	 state	 apparatus	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 a	 greater	 percentage	 of	 the	Settlement's	population;	it	is	no	surprise,	for	instance,	that	after	admittance	of	the	Chinese	members	to	the	Council	in	1928,	it	was	later	in	the	same	year	that	Chinese	were	admitted	to	freely	utilise	the	Settlement's	public	parks,	long	a	point	of	contention	and	humiliation	for	Chinese	 residents	 (Lockwood	 1934:	 1035).	 Other	 services,	 especially	 in	 the	 area	 of	education,	were	 introduced,	 such	 as	 a	 school	 construction	program	 initiated	 in	1931	 to	increase	 the	number	 elementary	 schools	designated	 for	Chinese	 school-aged	 children	 to	reach	a	modest	seven	and	one-half	per	cent	by	the	start	of	1938;	the	program	however	was	curtailed	in	late	1934	after	costs	were	deemed	excessive	(Lockwood	1934:	1036).		While	much	of	the	literature,	both	contemporaneous	and	modern,	cite	the	representative	nature	of	the	International	Settlement's	governing	structure	as	an	important	feature	that	helped	 place	 credible	 limits	 on	 government	 actors	 and	 contributed	 to	 the	 protection	 of	private	 property	 rights	 from	 state	 interference,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 avoid	 overstating	 the	degree	of	accountability	the	system	produced.	The	Council	was	an	institution	representing	
	 219 
a	limited	set	of	interests	within	the	International	Settlement—an	elected	body,	true,	but	one	characterised	as	the	few	elected	by	the	few.	With	the	set	of	voting	ratepayers	remaining	limited	 to	 wealthy	 expatriate	 landowners—and,	 eventually,	 equally	 exclusive	 Chinese	Ratepayers	associations—it	was	evident	that	the	interests	represented	on	the	Council	were	those	 of	 the	 Settlement's	 business	 elite.	 Representatives	 to	 the	 Council	 selected	 by	 the	Chinese	community	were	done	so	less	directly	than	in	the	western	foreign	community,	with	the	board	of	directors	of	the	Chinese	Ratepayers'	Association	electing	the	Chinese	members	of	the	Municipal	Council.	One-third	of	board	membership	was	determined	by	the	votes	of	eligible	domestic	Chinese	residents	of	the	Settlement,	which	in	1930	came	to	a	total	of	only	2,011	voters	out	of	a	total	Settlement	Chinese	population	of	the	of	971,397,	representing	just	0.2	per	cent;	the	remaining	two-thirds	of	board	members	were	chosen	by	local	domestic	commercial	organisations	and	resident	guilds	(NCH	30	March	1934:	523).		The	limited	accountability	and	responsiveness	to	the	broader	community	of	Settlement	did	not	exist	without	contemporaneous	critique.	Observations	such	as	those	by	de	Jesus	(1909:	249-250)	were	not	uncommon,	expressing	 frustration	with	 the	lack	of	transparency	and	limited	voting	pool,	describing	the	Settlement	as	"at	once	a	republic	and	oligarchy,	whose	council	 holds	 its	 meetings	 behind	 closed	 doors,	 the	 proceedings,	 howsoever	 important,	being	sparingly,	tardily	reported	to	the	press.	The	ratepayers	are	powerless	to	carry-out	their	pet	schemes	however	popular,	if	opposed	by	the	council	with	its	influential	clique,	with	plural	votes	and	proxies	of	ever-absent	landlords	 to	 turn	 the	voting	of	ratepayers	 into	a	mere	farce."	de	Jesus	continues	his	criticism	by	claiming	there	is	"lavish	expenditure	if	not	actual	 waste	 of	 public	 funds."	 Writing	 several	 decades	 later,	 Lockwood	 (1934:	 1036)	critiques	the	governing	structure	in	similar	terms,	noting	that	"Council	membership,	foreign	and	 Chinese,	 is	 drawn	 very	 largely	 from	 the	 ranks	 of	 big	 business.	 ...Thus,	 despite	 the	significant	 admission	 of	 Chinese	 to	 a	 share	 in	 the	 responsibility	 of	 government,	 the	municipal	regime	as	at	present	constituted	remains	highly	oligarchical	in	character."		The	degree	to	which	appraisals	such	as	de	Jesus'	and	Lockwood's	criticisms	had	merit	are	difficult	 to	 accurately	 assess;	what	 some	may	 call	wasteful	 spending,	 others	might	well	characterise	as	the	provision	of	necessary	social	services.	Further,	attempts	at	increasing	the	transparency	of	Council	actions	do	appear	to	have	improved	over	time;	by	the	start	of	the	1900s,	the	Council	published	a	"Municipal	Gazette"	which	provided	residents	updates	and	 announcements	 regarding	 Council	 news,	 including	 regulations,	 announcements	 of	ratepayers	meetings	and	the	results	thereof,	licensing	and	fee	increases,	and	bond	sale	and	redemption	notices,	amongst	other	news.	Further,	what	we	may	observe	is	that	such	open	criticisms	in	the	local	press	with	calls	for	greater	transparency,	reductions	in	government	spending,	or	even	accusations	of	corruption	and	wastefulness	were	partly	indicative	of	the	type	of	healthy	debate	of	state	power	that	Weingast	and	his	co-authors	identify	as	useful	and	necessary	in	an	open	society	to	assist	in	curbing	the	excesses	of	government	overreach.		Nonetheless,	the	aforementioned	weaknesses	of	the	Settlement's	representative	governing	system	in	terms	of	institutional	mechanisms	relating	to	transparency,	accountability	and	responsiveness,	 relatively	 speaking,	 in	 both	 objective	 scale	 and	 by	 indication	 from	 the	observed	behaviours	of	contemporaneous	actors,	paled	in	comparison	to	those	defining	the	domestic	 municipal	 government.	 Throughout	 the	 entirety	 of	 the	 late-Qing	 through	republican	era,	Shanghai's	domestic	municipal	government	officials	were	appointed	by	the	ruling	 central	 government.	 All	 local	 municipal	 officials—whether	 the	 Shanghai	 Daotai,	appointed	by	the	Qing	imperial	court	as	local	representative	of	the	central	government;	or	the	 chief	municipal	 administrators	of	 the	Nantao	 and	Zhabei	districts,	 appointed	by	 the	Beiyang	government;	or	the	Mayor	and	associated	administrative	department	heads	of	the	Municipality	of	Greater	Shanghai,	appointed	by	the	Guomindang	government—were	direct	representatives	of	the	central	state	(Crow	1933:143).	As	such,	such	municipal	government	officials'	 ultimate	 constituencies	 would	 be	 more	 accurately	 portrayed	 as	 having	 been	located	in	the	central	government's	capital	than	in	the	domestic	sections	of	Shanghai.	
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9.3.2	Credible	Commitment	Mechanisms:	Extraterritorial	Legal	and	Judicial	System			9.3.2.1.	Extraterritoriality	and	Protection	of	Legal	Rights	of	Foreign	Citizens		The	original	language	found	in	the	Qing	Code	specified	that	foreign	citizens	who	committed	crimes	within	China	would	be	treated	solely	under	its	own	domestic	laws,	with	Section	34	of	the	Penal	Code	stating,	"In	general,	all	foreigners	who	come	to	submit	themselves	to	the	government	 of	 the	 Empire	 (*C),	 shall,	 when	 guilty	 of	 offences,	 be	 tried	 and	 sentenced	according	to	the	established	laws"	(cited	in	Liu	1925:	38).	Prior	to	the	Opium	War,	various	efforts	had	already	been	unilaterally	undertaken	by	Britain	to	try	to	effect	jurisdiction	over	British	citizens	in	China,	typically	under	the	justification	that	Chinese	criminal	laws	were	"barbaric."	 For	 instance,	 on	 28	 August	 1833,	 	 the	 British	 Parliament	 passed	 "An	 Act	 to	Regulate	the	Trade	to	China	and	India,"	of	which	Article	6	authorised	the	establishment	of	a	British	 court	 of	 justice	with	 criminal	 and	admiralty	 jurisdiction	 for	 the	 trial	 of	 offenses	committed	by	British	 subjects	 in	China	(State	Papers	1833:	260-262).	A	 subsequent	bill	introduced	by	Lord	Palmerston	in	1838	sought	to	establish	a	court	in	China	to	oversee	all	civil	as	well	as	criminal	and	admiralty	matters	(Journal	of	House	of	Commons	1838:	476).	However,	the	powers	passed	under	such	legislation	were	not	exercised,	due	partly	to	the	anticipated	resistance	of	Chinese	authorities,	and	partly	to	the	concern	on	the	British	side	that	such	reach	of	legal	power	would	not	be	in	accord	with	the	rules	of	international	law	(Hansard	Parliamentary	Debates	1842:	751-752).		One	of	the	goals	of	the	British	negotiators	in	the	Treaty	of	Nanjing	was	to	ensure	that	British	law,	rather	than	domestic	Chinese	law,	be	applied	to	its	subjects	in	China.	With	the	signing	of	 the	 Treaty,	 and	 later,	 the	 General	 Regulations	 of	 Trade,	 published	 22	 July	 1843,	extraterritoriality	was	granted	to	British	citizens	in	China.	Over	the	next	few	years	China	concluded	 a	 series	 of	 similar	 treaties	 granting	 similar	 extraterritorial	 rights	 to	 foreign	citizens	of	other	nations,	 including	 in	1844	the	Treaty	of	Whampoa	with	France	and	the	Treaty	of	Wanghia	with	the	United	States	(Wu	1930:	185).			While	much	of	the	focus	of	extraterritoriality	was	on	exempting	British	residents	in	China	from	 prosecution	 in	 Chinese	 criminal	 courts	 to	 instead	 face	 trial	 and	 punishment	 from	British-run	courts	under	British	criminal	law,	the	desire	to	secure	the	protection	of	the	trade	interests	 of	 British	 merchants	 was	 also	 present	 (Koo	 1912:	 260-265).	 Indeed,	 early	attempts	 to	push	open	trade	and	utilise	British	laws	to	govern	 trade	relations	are	 found	throughout	British	government	officials'	internal	communiques	in	the	British	and	Foreign	
Papers	from	this	period	(State	Papers	1833:	1241-1244).			The	1858	Treaty	of	Tianjin	between	China	and	the	United	Kingdom	subsequently	further	expanded	the	power	of	extraterritoriality,	and	more	specifically	included	explicit	clauses	prohibiting	 the	 involvement	 of	 the	 imperial	 Chinese	 government	 in	 private	 business	dealings	regarding	British	merchants.	Much	of	the	Treaty's	language	dealt	with	ensuring	that	British	merchants	had	the	right	to	conduct	business	within	China.	For	instance,	Article	XII	 of	 the	 Treaty	 specified	 that	 British	 subjects	 had	 the	 right	 to	 rent	 land	 for	 business	purposes,	"at	the	rates	prevailing	among	the	people,	equitably	and	without	extraction	on	either	 side."	 Likewise,	Article	XIV	 stated	 "British	subjects	may	hire	whatever	boats	 they	please	for	the	transport	of	Goods	or	Passengers,	and	the	sum	to	be	paid	for	such	boats	shall	be	 settled	 between	 the	 parties	 themselves	 without	 the	 interference	 of	 the	 Chinese	Government."	The	Article	further	noted	however,	that	if	the	British	subjects	are	found	to	be	smuggling	goods,	however,	"the	offenders	will	of	course	be	punished	according	to	[British]	Law."	While	Article	XV	clearly	stated,	"All	questions	in	regard	to	rights,	whether	of	property	or	person,	arising	between	British	subjects,	shall	be	subject	to	the	jurisdiction	of	the	British	authorities,"	other	articles	in	the	Treaty	that	attempted	to	specify	legal	matters	pertaining	
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to	business	did	not	do	so	by	seeking	to	further	expand	the	application	of	British	law	in	China	as	much	as	require	 that	Chinese	law	be	used	 to	protect	British	merchants'	 interests.	For	instance,	Article	XVII	required	Chinese	authorities	to	provide	full	protection	to	the	person	and	property	of	British	subjects;	Article	XIX	required	Chinese	authorities	to	protect	British	merchant	vessels	against	robbery	and	piracy;	and	Articles	XXII	and	XXIII	required	Chinese	authorities	to	arrest	Chinese	subjects	failing	to	discharge	debts	and	enforce	the	recovery	of	debts	owed	to	British	subjects.	Similar	treaties	were	also	signed	at	the	same	time	in	Tianjin	between	 China,	 Russia,	 France,	 and	 the	 United	 States.	 In	 general,	 the	 role	 of	extraterritoriality	in	commercial	dealings	was	designed	to	ensure	the	protection	of	foreign	merchants'	 property	 rights,	 as	 opposed	 to	 providing	 explicit	 advantages	 to	 foreign	merchants.§		Subsequent	 additional	 treaties	 expanded	 upon	 the	 rights	 of	extraterritoriality,	 and,	 as	 a	result,	 Western	 merchants	 obtained	 a	 set	 of	 independent	 legal,	 judicial,	 policing,	 and	taxation	systems	within	the	treaty	ports,	including	Shanghai.	By	the	early	1900s	it	was	well	accepted	that	a	key	function	of	extraterritoriality	was	to	provide	"a	means	for	the	protection	and	furtherance	of	the	interest	of	trade"	(Wu	1930:	182).	Nations	enjoying	extraterritorial	rights	included	Britain,	the	US,	France,	Italy,	Japan,	Belgium,	Norway,	Brazil,	Denmark,	and	Sweden;	although	later	as	a	result	of	the	First	World	War,	Germany,	Austria,	Hungary	and	Russia	 lost	 their	extraterritorial	 rights	and	 their	citizens	and	companies	were	subject	 to	domestic	Chinese	law	(Helmick	1945:	252).		That	 foreign-operated	 business	 was	 able	 to	 operate	 under	 the	 purview	 of	 foreign	commercial	law	had	significant	effects	on	the	business	organisation	and	financing	of	such	firms	that	were	founded	in	China.	Firms	founded	under	British	law,	for	instance	were	able	to	utilise	the	British	1844	and	1856	Joint	Stock	Companies	Acts,	and	later	the	consolidated	1862	Companies	Act,	which	created	a	streamlined	process	for	company	incorporation	with	limited	 liability	 shareholders.	 Under	 the	 1862	 Companies	 Act,	 companies	 could	 be	registered	under	British	law	if	incorporating	in	any	British	colony,	including	Hongkong,	and	for	much	of	the	late	Qing	and	early	Beiyang	period	the	majority	of	British-owned	Shanghai	firms	were	incorporated	out	of	Hongkong.	Companies	owned	primarily	by	citizens	of	other	Western	nations	or	by	Japan	typically	would	incorporate	firms	under	the	ordinances	of	their	home	 countries.	 Subsequently,	 the	 1915	 Ordinance	 created	 a	 Companies	 Registry	 in	Shanghai	under	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	the	International	Settlement,	which	allowed	companies	incorporating	in	Shanghai	to	be	protected	under	British	law.		The	 ability	 for	 foreign	 companies	 to	 open	 manufacturing	 concerns	 within	 China	 was	another	 important	 step;	 the	 1895	 Treaty	 of	 Shimonoseki	 between	 China	 and	 Japan	expanded	legal	protections	and	property	rights	of	Japanese-incorporated	businesses,	and	allowed	 Japanese-incorporated	manufacturing	 companies	 to	 open	 and	 operate	 factories	inside	 China	 proper.	 Other	 treaty	 nations	 immediately	 thereafter	 amended	 their	agreements	with	China	to	include	similar	language	and	rights.		________________________________________________________________________________________________________	§	 While	 the	 treaties	 between	 China	 and	 foreign	 powers	 are	 frequently	 referred	 to	 using	 the	terminology	"unequal	treaties,"	this	reflects	their	signing	to	have	come	at	the	conclusion	of	China's	military	defeat,	and	thus	China	entered	the	treaty	as	an	unequal	and	unwilling	partner;	furthermore,	these	treaties	frequently	imposed	onerous	reparations	upon	the	Qing	government.	However,	for	the	most	part,	the	language	of	the	treaties	did	not	impose	"inequalities"	in	regard	to	commercial	dealings	between	foreign	and	domestic	economic	actors	(e.g.,	tax	rates	were	never	specified	in	any	of	these	treaties	along	the	lines	of,	"foreign	merchants	to	pay	X	per	cent	lower	than	tax	rates	applied	to	domestic	merchants").	In	this	important	sense,	domestic	merchants	were	not	per	se	placed	at	a	disadvantage	to	foreign	merchants	due	to	the	provisions	of	these	treaties.	However,	as	discussed	in	earlier	chapters	in	regard	to	the	lijin	tax	system,	in	application,	domestic	merchants	faced	punitive	tax	rates	imposed	by	domestic	state	actors	from	which	foreign	merchants	were	effectively	exempt.	
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	Perhaps	 the	 most	 important	 way	 extraterritoriality	 was	 applied	 in	 Shanghai's	 foreign	settlements	was	via	the	court	systems.	In	essence,	extraterritoriality	created	a	system	of	foreign	 courts	 administered	 by	 foreign	 justices	 administering	 foreign	 laws.	 Foreign	residents	and	foreign-incorporated	companies	in	treaty	port	cities	were	subject	to	the	legal	jurisdiction	 of	 their	 home	 countries	 under	 consular	 authorities,	 rather	 than	 that	 of	 the	domestic	 Chinese	 legal	 system.	 Owing	 to	 its	 international	 structure,	 within	 Shanghai's	International	Settlement	there	operated	a	multitude	of	jurisdiction-specific	courts.	Britain,	for	instance,	established	the	British	Supreme	Court	for	China	and	Japan.	In	1906,	the	U.S.	Congress	passed	legislation	creating	the	United	States	Court	for	China	in	Shanghai,	which	exercised	 extraterritorial	 jurisdiction	over	U.S.	 citizens	and	U.S.-registered	 companies	 in	Shanghai	 regarding	 both	 civil	 and	 criminal	 matters	 from	 1906	 to	 1943.	 Other	 treaty	countries	 that	 utilised	 the	 International	 Settlement	 structure	 also	 operated	 their	 own	consular	courts	within	which	their	citizens	could	receive	the	legal	protections	offered	by	their	home	country's	particular	legal	system.		The	rights	of	these	non-Chinese	courts	to	adjudicate	under	foreign	laws	was	consistently	affirmed	and	expanded.	For	instance,	in	1904	several	rulings	were	made	by	the	British	Court	to	clarify	that	such	jurisdiction	covered	British	subjects,	including	British	protected	persons,	the	property	and	all	rights	and	liabilities	of	British	subjects,	British	ships,	and	all	persons	and	property	on	board,	within	100	nautical	miles	of	the	Coast,	including	the	administration	or	control	of	the	property	or	persons	of	British	subjects	(London	Gazette	28	October	1904:	6887-6909).			This	separate	set	of	court	systems	provided	an	institutional	framework	for	legal	resolution	of	disputes	 and	an	application	of	 the	 rule	of	 law	that	 accorded	with	 the	 expectations	of	foreign	 nationals	 in	 Shanghai,	 including	 business	 managers	 and	 investors.	 Foreign-incorporated	companies—including	joint-stock	companies	whose	stock	and	bond	issuances	traded	on	 the	city's	 local	 foreign-operated	stock	exchange—operated	under	 foreign	 law,	and	hence	disputes	 regarding	 their	 business	 activities	 or	 issues	 concerning	 shareholder	rights	were	governed	by	applicable	foreign	law.	This	situation	differed	from	companies	and	shareholders	of	domestic	Chinese	joint-stock	companies	incorporated	under	domestic	law,	particularly	prior	to	the	period	of	the	passage	of	codified	or	formalised	company	law.		Milton	Helmick,	who	served	on	 the	United	States	Court	 for	China	 from	1934	until	1941,	describes	 a	 relatively	 effective	 legal	 system	 operating	 in	 the	 Settlement,	 despite	 the	multitude	of	different	nations'	courts	in	simultaneous	operation.	Helmick	(1945:	252)	notes,	"There	was	 not	 nearly	 so	much	 confusion	 as	 one	would	 think.	 If	 a	 Chinese	 had	 a	 claim	against	an	American,	he	sued	in	the	American	court;	if	an	American	had	a	cause	of	action	against	a	Briton,	he	filed	in	the	British	Court;	if	a	Frenchman	had	been	wronged	by	a	Swiss	he	 sought	 damages	 in	 the	 Swiss	 Court".	 While	 Lockwood	 (1934:	 1038)	 is	 slightly	 less	sanguine	 regarding	 the	 complexities	 the	 extraterritorial	 court	 system	 brought,	 he	 too	accords	with	Helmick,	 commenting	 that	whatever	 "confusion	 and	uncertainty	 in	 judicial	arrangements"	there	existed,	it	was	at	least	"less	perhaps	than	the	clumsiness	of	the	system	might	lead	one	to	expect."		Nonetheless,	 issues	 of	 inadequacy	 in	 this	 somewhat	 contrived	 legal	 system	 existed,	including	in	terms	of	commercial	law.	As	Hinckley	(1912:	105-106)	notes,	the	United	State	Court	 for	 China	 lacked	 formal	 jurisdiction	 to	 enforce	 the	 federal	 U.S.	 bankruptcy	 law,	restricted	as	it	was	to	application	in	federal	courts.	As	a	result,	American	judges	on	the	Court	would	frequently	resort	to	performing	more	in	the	role	of	an	arbitrator	than	an	adjudicator	in	 circumstances	 involving	 bankruptcies,	 as	Hinckley	 describes	 the	 actions	 of	 involving	chief	justice	Rufus	Thayer	in	a	complex	bankruptcy	case	that	came	before	the	Court	in	1908.		
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As	 typical	 of	 many	 of	 those	 who	 participated	 in	 constructing	 and	 implementing	 the	Settlement's	legal	institutional	framework,	Helmick	(1945:	255)	expresses	the	goal	of	the	system	to	have	been	the	application	of	"impartial"	justice,	as	opposed	to	providing	special	protection	to	foreigners:	"One	is	likely	to	think	of	extraterritoriality	and	the	[U.S.]	Court	in	terms	of	protection	to	American	citizens,	 forgetting	 that	the	duty	of	 the	Court	to	protect	Americans	was	no	higher	than	its	obligation	to	afford	just	remedies	to	four	hundred	million	potential	plaintiffs.	The	majority	of	the	plaintiffs	were	not	Americans	but	Chinese,	British,	Russian,	Portuguese	 and	every	other	nationality."	 Such	positive	 characterisations	of	 the	extraterritorial	 legal	 system,	 however,	 need	 be	 tempered	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 Helmick's	perception	of	the	system	was	necessarily	heavily	coloured	by	his	very	embeddedness	within	the	extraterritorial	system	itself.			9.3.2.2.		Legal	Protections	Afforded	Chinese	Citizens	in	the	International	Settlement		While	extraterritorial	rights	covered	citizens	of	applicable	countries,	the	vast	majority	of	the	International	Settlement	population	was	comprised	of	Chinese	citizens.	As	such,	many	commercial	 legal	disputes	 involved	 issues	between	Chinese	 citizens	 themselves,	 or	with	citizens	of	other	nations.	Accordingly,	a	unique	legal	structure	of	the	appellation	the	"Mixed	Court"	 was	 established	 in	 1864.	 Mixed	 Court	 cases	 were	 presided	 both	 by	 a	 Chinese	magistrate	and	a	foreign	assessor,	both	of	whom	needed	to	agree	before	judgement	could	be	rendered	(anon.	1927:	87).	The	authority	of	the	Mixed	Court	derived	from	the	fact	that	within	the	Settlement,	Chinese	legal	authority	was	limited.			Stephens	 (1992)	 controversially	 claims	 that	 since	 there	 was	 no	 actual	 "Chinese	 law"—defining	 the	 term	 narrowly	 along	 the	 lines	 of	Hadfield	&	Weingast	 (2012)	 to	 reject	 the	application	of	the	Chinese	legal	system	as	applied	by	Chinese	magistrates	solely	represented	a	"disciplinary	system",	meaning	decisions	were	made	according	not	to	defined,	established	law,	but	rather	an	individual	assessor's	own	(potentially	arbitrary)	opinion	and	reasoning—instead,	 the	 actual	 law	 as	 implemented	 by	 the	 Mixed	 Court	 was	 in	 fact	 based	 upon	underlying	 legal	principals	underlying	 the	 legal	 traditions	of	 the	 foreign	(Western)	 legal	assessors,	a	claim	earlier	supported	by	Gundry	(1920:	53).			For	Chinese	citizens	residing	or	conducting	business	within	the	 foreign	settlements,	 this	unique	legal	structure	created	a	partial	layer	of	legal	authority	between	Chinese	citizens	and	the	power	of	the	Chinese	state.	As	Jernigan	(1904:	222-223)	details,	"The	settlements	are	further	protected	 from	the	authority	of	China	 to	 the	extent	 that,	 if	China	should	wish	 to	arrest	one	of	her	own	subjects	residing	in	a	settlement,	such	subject	could	not	be	arrested	until	the	warrant	for	the	arrest	had	been	resent	to	the	senior	consular	representative	and	countersigned	by	him.	 ...And	after	China	had	 conformed	 to	 the	 above	 requirements,	 the	arrested	Chinese	would	still	have	the	accusation	against	him	heard	and	passed	upon	under	the	supervision	of	a	foreign	consular	officer	in	a	tribunal	known	as	the	Mixed	Court."	This	procedure	 was	 reiterated	 numerous	 times	 by	 official	 Shanghai	 Municipal	 Council	documentation,	including,	for	instance,	the	1899	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	Annual	Report	which	noted,	"in	all	cases	of	warrants	for	the	arrest	of	native	residents	in	the	Settlement,	a	preliminary	inquiry	must	always	be	held	at	the	Mixed	Court,	for	verification	of	the	facts,	prior	to	removal	of	the	prisoner	beyond	Settlement	limits"	(SMC	1899:	70).			Lee	 (1993:1354-1356)	 argues	 the	 Settlement's	 Mixed	 and	 foreign	 court	 system	 was	accessible	 to	 Chinese	 litigants,	with	 low	 fees	 and	 filing	 procedures	 that	did	 not	 require	attorneys;	 she	 further	 cites	 instances	 of	 the	 Shanghai	 Municipal	 Police	 encouraging	aggrieved	Chinese	victims	to	file	civil	cases	in	the	Mixed	Court.	The	willingness	of	Chinese	residents	 to	utilise	 the	Mixed	Court	apparatus	 is	supported	by	a	general	reading	of	case	records	 that	 consistently	 finds	 commercial	 cases	 brought	 by	 Chinese	 applicants,	 many	
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decided	in	favour	of	Chinese	litigants	over	those	foreign.	For	instance,	a	Mixed	Court	case	between	plaintiffs	F.	Bartley	and	W.	Sauer	against	Li	Yuen	of	the	Li	Shang	Trading	Company	as	 defendant	 involved	 the	 plaintiffs	 making	 a	 claim	 of	 18,340	 taels	 because	 they	 had	received	a	lower	price	than	they	had	wanted	on	the	sale	of	stocks.	Assessor	E.	Mead	decided	5	July	1923	in	favour	of	the	Chinese	defendant,	noting	defendant	acted	solely	as	a	broker	and	was	not	at	fault	the	defendants	received	a	lower	price	than	they	wished;	the	judgement	specifically	cites	the	contract	made	and	signed	between	the	defendant	and	plaintiffs,	with	the	 judgement	upholding	 the	 intent	 of	 the	 contract	 as	 implied	 in	 its	wording	 (Shanghai	Municipal	Archives	6.317-1-46).			In	another	Mixed	Court	case	decided	two	weeks	prior	on	22	June	1923,	a	Chinese	plaintiff	Wong	Vung	Dah	sued	the	Chinese	domestic-owned	Chartered	Stock	and	Produce	Exchange	for	158,380	yuan.	Wong	claimed	that	under	the	terms	of	the	contract,	 in	the	event	that	a	valid	trade	was	entered	into	according	to	the	regulations	of	the	Exchange,	if	the	Exchange	was	unable	to	later	complete	the	transaction	as	agreed	upon,	the	Exchange	was	required	to	refund	the	shares	and	pay	a	five	per	cent	penalty.	The	Exchange	had	not	done	so	after	a	trade	had	been	nullified,	and	Wong	was	suing	 for	his	shares	and	 the	penalty.	The	Court	found	in	favour	of	the	plaintiff	and	ordered	the	Exchange	to	deliver	to	Wong	the	shares	due	him	as	well	as	to	pay	five	per	cent	damages	as	pursuant	to	the	contract	(Shanghai	Municipal	Archives	6.317-1-20).			These	 two	 example	 cases	 are	 informative	 in	 two	 regards.	 First,	 in	 both	 decisions,	 the	wording	of	the	judgements	clearly	held	the	existing	contracts	between	the	parties	as	the	determining	 factor	 in	 their	 judgement	 methodology,	 underscoring	 the	 weight	 that	protection	of	contracts	was	given	under	the	foreign-jurisdiction	system	of	the	Mixed	Court.	Second,	it	appears	that	Chinese	litigants	utilised	the	Mixed	Court	even	in	instances	such	as	
Wong	v.	Chartered	Stock	and	Produce	Exchange,	when	both	parties	were	domestic	residents	or	companies.	In	this	case,	we	might	presume	Wong	chose	to	bring	his	claim	to	the	Mixed	Court	alleging	violation	of	contract	because	he	was	aware	of	the	strong	adherence	to	and	protection	of	contract	rights	provided	under	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Mixed	Court	system.	As	noted	by	Helmick	(1945:	253),	subsequent	to	the	dissolution	of	the	Mixed	Court	in	1927,	the	Settlement's	domestic	Chinese	population	continued	to	heavily	utilise	the	jurisdiction-specific	extraterritorial	courts.		Lee	(1994:	193)	centres	her	discussion	of	the	Mixed	Court	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	Settlements'	domestic	Chinese	 end-users,	 in	particular	 in	 their	 choice	 to	 adjudicate	 civil	cases	 under	 the	 Mixed	 Court	 system:	 "The	 hundreds	 of	 thousands	 of	 civil	 cases	 and	judgments	at	the	court,	for	instance,	may	fit	less	easily	into	the	disciplinary	model	than	do	the	court's	criminal	cases.	The	civil	side	of	the	court	was	service-oriented	and	competed	with	other	courts	for	business."	This	concept	of	competition	underscores	the	fact	that,	at	least	 for	 civil	 cases,	 domestic	Chinese	nationals	had	 some	amount	of	 choice	whether	 to	utilise	 the	Mixed	Court	system,	and	 the	relatively	 large	amount	of	cases	 tried	under	 the	system	 is	 indicative	 of	 a	 "revealed	 preference"	 for	 this	 legal	 form	 that,	 "at	 least	 in	commercial	cases",	Gundry	(1920:	54)	claims,	the	Mixed	Court	would	"base	its	decisions	more	and	more	upon	principles	of	Western	jurisprudence."			Beyond	 the	 formal	 court	 system,	 extraterritoriality	 also	 proved	 partially	 effective	 at	providing	 a	 partial	 shield	 to	 the	 Settlement's	 domestic	 Chinese	 residents	 from	 the	overarching	 power	 of	 the	 domestic	 state	 in	 terms	 of	 economic	 activities.	 This	 was	particularly	true	in	regard	to	attempts	by	domestic	government	officials	to	impose	domestic	taxes	on	 foreign	or	domestic	business	activities	within	the	Settlement.	The	 International	Settlement	continually	asserted	its	immunity	from	the	Chinese	taxation	system	by	declaring,	"goods	as	well	as	other	property	within	the	limits	of	the	said	concession	are	under	Municipal	protection	 and	 without	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 Chinese	 authorities"	 (Commission	 on	Extraterritorial	Jurisdiction	in	China	1926:	109).		
	 225 
	The	assertion	for	the	right	of	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council,	and	the	Council	alone,	to	levy	taxes	on	any	resident	within	the	Settlement,	foreign	or	domestic,	can	be	traced	back	to	early	within	 British	 Settlement	 policy.	 The	 issue	 was	 partly	 driven	 by	 concerns	 for	 potential	corruption.	In	regard	to	the	handling	of	the	Council's	financing	needs,	at	the	annual	Land	Renter's	 meeting	 of	 1861,	 a	 Mr	 Smith	 objected	 vigorously	 and	 repeatedly	 that	 it	 was	problematic	 that	 the	Municipal	Council's	Defence	Committee	had	used	 the	power	of	 the	Taotai	 to	 issue	 a	 proclamation	 to	 commanding	 all	 Chinese	 renters	 in	 the	 Settlement	 to	contribute	an	amount	equivalent	to	two	months'	rental,	and	were	they	to	refuse,	they	would	be	severely	punished.	Smith	noted	that	given	the	Council	was	seeking	collection	of	60,000	
taels,	 and	 that	were	all	Chinese	renters	to	submit	two	months'	salary	the	amount	raised	would	be	more	than	300,000	taels,	his	concern	was	that	the	fee	collectors	were	going	engage	in	a	 "gigantic	 squeeze"	 scheme	on	 the	domestic	 residents.	As	a	 landlord,	 he	was	able	 to	produce	 stamped	 receipts	 from	many	 of	 his	 domestic	 residents	 who	 had	 paid	 the	 two	months	fee;	yet	he	noted	there	was	no	associated	accounting	from	the	domestic	collectors	of	 total	 amounts	 collected	 thus	 far,	 and	 he	 forcefully	 expressed	 that	 granting	 Chinese	officials	the	authority	to	collect	taxes	from	Chinese	residents	in	the	Settlement	"would	lead	to	no	end	of	abuse"	(NCH	5	April	1862:	56).	The	Council	subsequently	had	the	proclamation	by	the	Taotai	rescinded,	and	instead	the	British	Consul	produced	a	translated	notice	posted	declaring	the	contribution	voluntary.	In	addition,	this	led	to	a	more	general	effort	by	the	Council	 to	 reassert	 its	position	 that	 it	 alone	had	 sole	 authority	 to	 levy	 and	 collect	 taxes	within	the	Settlement.	The	Council,	for	practical	reasons	in	the	late	1850s,	had	farmed	out	the	 authority	 to	 local	 government	 officials	 to	 collect	 certain	 domestic	 taxes	 from	 the	Settlement's	domestic	residents;	within	several	years,	however,	reference	to	an	imperium	
in	 imperio	 issue	was	cited	as	 leading	 to	"confusion	and	disorder"	as	 these	officials	were	exercising	 authority	within	 what	 was,	 in	 the	 regard	 of	 the	 Council	 leadership,	 the	 sole	domain	of	the	Settlement's	authority	(NCH	11	April	1863:	58).	Moving	forward,	the	Council	continually	strove,	with	varying	degrees	of	success,	to	reassert	and	maintain	its	sole	taxing	authority	within	the	Settlement.		In	 addition	 to	 concerns	 of	 potential	 corruption	 opportunities	 for	 either	 domestic	 or	extraterritorial	 municipal	 government	 officials,	 a	 secondary,	 perhaps	 more	 important,	driving	factor	in	exempting	domestic	Chinese	firms	and	individuals	from	domestic	Chinese	taxation	was	economic.	As	continually	stressed,	the	International	Settlement	was,	at	its	core,	a	Chinese	city,	comprised	of	Chinese	residents	and	Chinese	businesses.	As	Lockwood	(1934:	1039)	 notes,	 "from	 an	 early	 date,"	 the	 Council	 leadership,	 representing	 local	 business	concerns,	viewed	the	imposition	of	heavy	domestic	"Chinese	taxes	on	Chinese	residents	and	firms…	 [as]	 a	 burden	 on	 business	 enterprise."	 More	 lightly	 taxed	 businesses,	 whether	foreign-	 or	 Chinese-owned,	 generated	 greater	 overall	 economic	 growth.	 Insofar	 as	 the	Settlement	 tax	 environment	was	more	 attractive,	 it	would	 also	 serve	 to	 draw	 domestic	Chinese	entrepreneurs	to	open	business	concerns	within	the	Settlement,	further	boosting	overall	growth.		A	 Mixed	 Court	 case	 in	 July	 1909	 illustrates	 an	 application	 of	 the	 attempt	 to	 provide	protection	to	domestic	merchants	within	the	Settlement	against	domestic	Chinese	taxation.	Brought	 before	 Assistant	Magistrate	 Pao	 Yi,	 and	 German	Assessor	Mr.	 I.	 Pratt,	 the	 case	concerned	 the	 attempted	 debt	 collection	 by	 the	 City	 Magistrate	 for	 the	 local	 Shang	government	in	the	Foreign	Settlements.	The	case	involved	two	Chinese	shopkeepers	(Tsung	Yang-shing,	 and	 Zee	 Yuen-Zung)	 who	 were	 being	 summoned	 by	 the	 domestic	 City	Magistrate	 and	 charged	with	 outstanding	debt.	 Importantly,	 given	 the	 two	 shopkeepers	were	residents	of	the	Foreign	Settlements,	the	City	magistrate	needed	to	bring	suit	against	the	defendants	in	the	Mixed	Court.	However,	during	the	course	of	the	trial,	it	came	to	light	that	the	debt	claim	was	for	non-payment	of	a	lijin	tax	on	fuel.	Upon	learning	of	this,	the	Court		
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	was	emphatic	and	unequivocal	in	declaring	this	to	be	an	illegal	tax:	"The	City	Magistrate	had	no	right	to	tax	anyone	living	in	the	International	Settlement."	Zee	and	Tsung		each	produced	documents	showing	they	he	had	been	residents	of	the	International	Settlement	for	thirty	and	forty	years,	respectively.	The	city	collector,	Loh	Yue-man,	was	questioned	at	length	by	the	 Court,	 and	 admitted	 he	 had	 collected	 taxes	 outside	 Settlement	 for	 17	 years,	 but	sometimes	also	collected	inside	the	Settlement.	The	Court	ruled	that	according	to	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	regulations,	the	defendants	were	to	be	released	and	tax	collector	held,	because:	 "Any	 Chinese	 official	 or	 the	 employee	 of	 any	 Chinese	 official	 found	 levying	 or	attempting	to	levy	likin,	that	is	duty	on	any	goods	of	any	kind	whatsoever,	will	be	arrested	and	brought	before	the	proper	authorities."	While	ultimately	Magistrate	Pao	chose	not	to	formally	 arrest	 and	 charge	 the	 tax	 collector,	 the	 defendants	 were	 successfully	 granted	freedom	from	the	debt	(NCH	3	July	1909:	47).		Shanghai	Municipal	Council	pronouncements	continually	emphasised	that	Chinese-owned	and	operated	business	activity	had	 the	right	 to	be	conducted	solely	under	 the	rules	and	regulations	 of	 the	 Settlement,	 and	 not	 interfered	with	 by	 domestic	 law	 or	 officials.	 For	instance,	this	view	is	reflected	in	a	letter	the	Chairman	of	the	Council	addressed	to	the	Taotai	in	1900,	stressing	that,	"No	establishments	opened	by	Chinese	subjects	in	the	Settlement	are	subject	to	the	control	of	the	[Chinese	government]"	(SMC	1900:	69).	That	year's	Annual	Report	contained	additional	 language	explicitly	noting	 that	 it	was	 the	role	of	Settlement	authorities	to	"protect	the	industries	of	the	Chinese	from	the	interference	of	their	officials"	(SMC	1900:	70).	However	sincere	this	sentiment,	the	actions	of	the	Council	should	not	be	discounted,	 for	 as	 documented	 throughout	 Chapter	 Three,	 much	 of	 the	 violations	 of	domestic	economic	agents'	property	rights	came	at	the	hand	of	the	Chinese	state	apparatus.	The	 foreign	 settlements,	 therefore,	 at	 least	 on	 paper	 and	 in	 pronouncement,	 provided	partial	 protection	 of	 property	 rights	 through	 an	 institutional	 environment	 that	 while	ostensibly	designed	for	the	use	of	foreign	economic	agents,	could	also	prove	beneficial	to	domestic	Chinese	economic	agents	and	their	entrepreneurial	activity.			9.3.2.3.			Uneven	Protection	Provided	by	the	Extraterritorial	System		It	is	important	not	to	overstate	the	degree	to	which	the	system	of	extraterritoriality	and	the	Settlement's	 legal	 institutions	 served	 to	 afford	 legal	 protection	 to	 domestic	 Chinese	residents	and	businesspersons	from	possible	domestic	government	expropriatory	actions,	or	 whether	 such	 protections	 were	 necessarily	 welcome.	 To	 begin	 with,	 it	 must	 be	emphasised	 that	widespread	prejudice	 and	 ingrained	 bias	 in	 favour	 of	 Europeans	 in	 all	aspects	of	social	dealings	vis-a-vis	the	domestic	Chinese	population	permeated	the	foreign	settlements	 (Wu	 1991);	 even	 overall	 positive	 depictions	 of	 the	 settlements	 such	 as	 Ma	(2008:	376)	recognise	the	presence	of	a	"systematic	practice	of	political	exclusion	and	racial	discrimination."	 The	 extraterritorial	 legal	 system	 was	 unavoidably	 reflective	 of	 such	prejudice.	 	Bishop	(1920:	175)	criticises	 the	 foreign-run	extraterritorial	courts	 in	noting	that	they	sometimes	handed	down	lighter	sentences	on	foreigners	convicted	of	crimes	than	on	domestic	citizens.	While	claims	of	impartiality	and	application	of	the	law	equally	to	all	parties—foreigner	or	domestic—that	were	frequently	made	by	Mixed	Court	practitioners	are	to	be	discounted	as	driven	by	motivated	reasoning,	the	structure	the	Mixed	Court,	 in	which	both	domestic	Chinese	and	foreign	legal	officials	co-jointly	delivered	judicial	rulings,	nonetheless	served	to	partially	mitigate	the	adverse	effects	of	racial	prejudice	on	Chinese	litigants.	 Yet	 this	 structure	 itself	 must	 be	 regarded	 as	 biased,	 as	 there	 were	 recorded	instances	 of	 the	 foreign	 assessor	 enforcing	 his	 judgement	 over	 that	 of	 the	 domestic	magistrate	when	there	was	disagreement	between	the	two	(Clark	1894:	111-112).		
	 227 
Second,	it	is	evident	that	the	International	Settlement	and	Mixed	Court	apparatus	proved	unable	 to	provide	a	 complete	 shield	 against	 the	domestic	 state's	 legal	power	within	 the	Settlement	over	Chinese	citizens.	There	occurred	numerous	examples	of	domestic	police	forces	disregarding	the	Settlement's	claimed	absolute	jurisdiction	to	arrest	and	adjudicate	residents,	foreign	or	domestic.	For	instance,	the	1899	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	Annual	Report	 references	 the	 events	 of	 25	October	 in	 that	 year	when	a	Chinese	 resident	of	 the	Settlement	was	"arrested	without	any	warrant	and	forcibly	taken"	out	of	the	settlement	to	be	 imprisoned	 in	 domestically-administered	 Shanghai;	 while	 the	 Municipal	 Council's	Chairman	issued	a	formal	letter	of	complaint	to	the	district	Taotai	highlighting	the	"gravity"	of	the	situation,	and	demanding	the	return	of	the	prisoner	to	be	tried	in	front	of	the	Mixed	Court	 under	 due	 process,	 as	well	 as	 the	 surrender	 of	 the	 domestic	 Chinese	 police	who	ordered	 and	 conducted	 arrest,	 the	 Report	 also	 pointedly	 notes	 that	 these	 efforts	 had	"produced	no	results"	(SMC	1899:	71).	Such	issues	persisted,	and	the	Council	found	itself	constantly	asserting	to	the	domestic	government	authorities	its	perceived	sole	sovereign	right	of	arrest	and	initial	judicial	review	for	all	Settlement	residents,	foreign	or	domestic.		Third,	although	the	Mixed	Court	represented	a	collaboration	between	domestic	and	foreign	legal	officials,	 it	nonetheless	operated,	 in	theory,	under	the	common	 law	conception	of	a	formalistic	and	consistent	application	of	 legal	 reasoning,	 immune	 from	social	opinion	or	influence	 by	 government	 or	 business	 leaders.	 However,	 such	 an	 approach	 was	 not	universally	 appreciated	 by	 some	 domestic	 economic	 actors,	 particularly	 those	who	 had	historically	 served	 as	 the	 primary	 power	 brokers	 for	most	merchant	 disputes,	 such	 as	domestic	Chinese	business	and	commerce	guilds	who	were	loath	to	cede	their	authority	in	such	matters	to	a	different	institution.		The	case	of	Barlow	&	Co.	v.	the	Ming	Sung	Umbrella	Factory	and	Yen	Siao	Hong	can	be	viewed	as	symbolic	of	the	tension	between	the	traditional,	more	flexible	and	subjective	arbitration	methodologies	preferred	by	the	domestic	guilds,	opposed	to	the	more	formulaic	code-based	procedures	utilised	by	the	Mixed	Court	and	other	newly-formed	"modern"	Chinese	courts.	The	 case	 received	 extensive	 attention	 in	 the	 local	 press,	 with	 the	 North	 China	 Herald	publishing	the	Chinese	magistrate's	and	foreign	assessor's	conflicting	decisions	in	full	due	to	the	case	being	viewed	as	of	"utmost	importance	to	the	business	community	of	Shanghai"	(NCH	 31	 July	 1926:	 223).	 The	 specifics	 of	 the	 case	 were	 indeed	 central	 to	 commercial	dealings	that	took	place	within	the	city	between	and	across	Chinese	and	foreign	merchant	relationships,	 centred	 around	 the	 issue	 of	 liability	 of	 debts	 under	 partnership—under	Western	legal	conceptualisations,	which	had	also	been	adopted	by	formal	Chinese	courts,	any	 individual	 partner	 could	 be	 liable	 for	 all	 debts	 to	 creditors	 in	 the	 event	 of	 default,	regardless	of	the	relative	share	of	the	business	held	of	the	partnership;	for	the	leadership	of	the	 local	 Chinese	 business	 community	 (including	 the	 Chinese	 Shanghai	 Chamber	 of	Commerce),	liability	was	to	be	dependent	on	the	individual	circumstances	of	the	particular	situation,	subject	to	the	approbation	of	the	local	business	community	leadership.	While	in	this	particular	case	this	called	for	the	plaintiffs	to	only	be	able	to	extract	outstanding	debts	from	solvent	partners	in	proportion	to	the	partners'	initial	investment	in	the	defaulting	firm,	more	 generally,	 the	 process	was	 described	 by	 one	 of	 the	 representatives	 of	 a	domestic	Chinese	commercial	association	as	one	of	consensus,	such	 that	 "if	a	Chinese	partnership	became	bankrupt	what	happened	was	that	there	was	a	meeting	of	creditors	and	debtors	and	an	arrangement	come	to	by	which	a	percentage	of	the	total	partnership	liabilities	was	accepted	by	the	creditors"	(NCH	31	July	1926:	225).	In	their	respective	judgements,	upon	which	 no	 agreement	 between	 the	 two	 could	 be	 made,	 the	 foreign	 assessor	 found	 for	plaintiffs	by	citing	precedent	based	on	prior	Mixed	Court	and	recent	Chinese	Supreme	Court	rulings	that	affirmed	the	full	liability	concept,	while	the	domestic	magistrate	ruled	for	the	defendants,	basing	his	finding	"in	accordance	with	custom"	(NCH	31	July	1926:	224).			
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Ultimately,	the	result	of	the	case	was	viewed	as	a	blow	to	the	adoption	of	formal	commercial	law	 within	 Shanghai.	 The	 testimony	 of	 a	 member	 of	 the	 local	 rice	 guild	 was	 seen	 as	particularly	telling	in	regard	to	the	hesitation	by	the	domestic	business	community	to	accept	legal	decisions	by	the	Chinese	Supreme	Court	as	trumping	the	authority	of	local	business	leaders,	in	which	he	stated,	"If	[a	ruling	by	the	Supreme	Court]	is	reasonable	I	will	obey;	if	it	is	not,	I	will	not	obey,"	and	ultimately	agreed	with	the	sentiment	that	in	this	particular	case,	"What	we	[merchants]	say	is	right,	what	the	Supreme	Court	says	is	wrong,	even	on	a	matter	of	 law"	(NCH	 31	 July	1926:	225).	Thus,	we	 find	 that	while	 it	 is	 accurate	 to	depict	 some	domestic	merchants	 as	 apt	 to	utilise	 the	 authority	 of	 the	Mixed	Courts,	with	 its	 stricter	adherence	to	respect	for	contract	and	investor	rights,	 it	 is	also	clear	that	other	domestic	agents	chose	to	utilise	more	traditional,	relationship-based	adjudication	methodologies,	at	least	in	instances	when	they	proved	beneficial.	Representing	perhaps	an	earlier	form	of	the	"adjudicative/disciplinary"	dichotomy	outlined	by	Stephens	(1992)	regarding	differences	in	Chinese	and	western	law,	contemporaneous	observers	accorded	the	results	of	the	Ming	
Sung	case	to	differing	"psychologies"	regarding	legal	matters.	Writing	at	the	time,	Kotenev	(1927:220)	states,	"a	feature	which	is	absolutely	unique,	a	feature	which	recurs	infallibly	through	all	the	conscious	and	sub-conscious	mentality	of	the	two	peoples.	It	is	an	exercise	of	an	absolute	obeisance	on	the	part	of	foreigners	to	the	principles	of	legality	and	law,	and	of	reverence	and	adherence	to	traditional	customs	on	the	part	of	the	Chinese."		Fourth,	 we	 can	 observe	 that	 the	 relative	 strength	 of	 the	 legal	 protections	 afforded	 to	domestic	Chinese	economic	agents	by	the	extraterritoriality	system	were	not	time	invariant,	and	that	in	particular	the	ability	of	the	foreign-administered	institutional	environment	to	impose	a	safeguard	from	potential	expropriation	by	the	domestic	state	declined	with	the	ascendance	of	the	Guomindang	government.	This	was	particularly	true	in	regard	to	taxation	issues.	From	early	on,	imposition	and	collection	of	taxes	by	domestic	government	officials	within	Settlement	borders	had	proved	a	contentious	issue.	While	adamant	in	its	position,	the	 Council	 found	 itself	 frequently	 unable	 to	 fully	 enforce	 their	 desired	 policy	 of	 sole	authority	to	levy	tax	within	the	Settlement.	A	description	of	the	difficulties	experienced	by	the	 Council	 in	 preventing	 local	 domestic	 government	 officials	 from	 imposing	 lijin	 on	domestic	merchants	in	the	Settlement	is	provided	in	the	1900	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	Annual	 Report,	 which	 opened	 with	 the	 grouse,	 "It	 would	 appear	 that	 no	 amount	 of	correspondence,	 no	 application	 of	 Consular	 pressure,	 will	 ever	 instil	 into	 the	 Chinese	officials	the	fact	that	the	Settlement	is	exempt	from	the	collection	of	lekin",	noting	that	local	officials	 only	 seemed	 to	 take	 this	 issue	 more	 seriously	 after	 the	 arrest	 of	 a	 several	government	tax	collectors	by	the	Municipal	police	(SMC	1900:	31).	The	1916	Annual	Report	described	similar	pushback	efforts	by	the	Council	after	Chinese	government	agents	began	patrolling	Soochow	Creek	(,	Wusong	River)	in	riverboats	within	Settlement	territorial	limits,	imposing	lijin	taxes	on	cargo	transported	along	the	river.		Overall,	 however,	 for	 much	 of	 the	 history	 of	 the	 Settlement,	 both	 foreign	 and	 Chinese	individuals	and	firms	were	generally	shielded	from	the	imposition	of	arbitrary	and	putative	taxation	policies	of	local	and	national	Chinese	officials,	especially	in	comparison	with	those	imposed	on	firms	and	business	operations	in	the	domestic-controlled	part	of	Shanghai,	as	well	as	the	rest	of	China—Lockwood	(1934:	1039)	notes	pointedly	that	"the	immunity	of	the	 Settlement	 from	 taxation	 means	 chiefly	 the	 evasion	 of	 irregular	 levies	 to	 finance	destructive	civil	wars	and	to	line	the	pockets	of	Chinese	warlords."	Such	independence	from	the	 domestic	 taxation	 system,	 however,	 suffered	 considerably	 when	 in	 1926	 the	Extraterritoriality	Commission	submitted	to	the	incoming	Guomindang	Party's	demand	to	allow	the	domestic	government	to	impose	excise	taxes	on	goods	such	as	cement,	flour,	and	tobacco	on	businesses	operating	within	the	Settlement,	foreign	or	domestic	Chinese	alike.	As	 Lockwood	 (1934:	 1039)	 subsequently	 comments,	 the	 local	 business	 community	consented	to	this	new	reality	"as	a	matter	of	business	and	political	expediency."		
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Such	acquiescence	on	the	part	of	the	Council	was	to	be	the	first	of	several	contests	over	the	authority	 of	 the	 new	 central	 and	 local	 municipal	 Guomindang	 governments	 to	 enforce	policies	within	the	International	Settlement	on	Chinese	residents	in	which	the	Council	saw	its	sovereign	power	effectively	diminished.	Guomindang	Party	officials	applied	continual	pressure	to	have	domestic	tax	laws	enforced	within	extraterritorial	settlements.	In	1927	the	Guomindang	 government	 sought	 to	 impose	 a	 tax	 equivalent	 to	 two	 months'	 rent	 on	domestic	 Chinese	 residents	 of	 Shanghai's	 foreign	 settlements	 in	 support	 the	 Northern	Expedition,	and	established	collection	bureaus	within	the	International	Settlement.	While	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	immediately	declared	the	tax	illegal	and	collectors	liable	to	arrest	and	punishment,	and	demanded	the	closure	of	the	collection	bureaus	(NCDN	28	June	1927:	5),	a	compromise	was	eventually	reached	that	allowed	the	Guomindang	government	to	collect	stamp	duty	by	post,	provided	no	police	or	tax	collectors	from	an	outside	authority	operated	 within	 the	 Settlement.	 However,	 by	 1929	 the	 Council	 had	 consented	 to	 the	establishment	of	 a	domestic	 government-run	office	of	 the	 Stamp	Tax	Bureau	within	 the	International	Settlement	itself.	In	the	agreement,	the	Council	reiterated	that	the	validity	of	the	Chinese	Stamp	Tax	Law	within	the	Settlement	was	not	recognised,	and	that	no	foreign	nationals	be	compelled	to	comply	with	this	tax;	the	agreement	further	stated	that	although	Chinese	 residents	of	 the	 Settlement	were	 technically	 required	 to	 comply	with	 such	 law,	"Chinese	police,	or	other	agents	of	the	Chinese	authorities,	must	not,	on	any	pretext	or	in	any	form,	be	used	within	the	Settlement	limits	for	the	enforcement	of,	or	in	connection	with,	the	Stamp	Tax	Law",	and	further	stressed	that	the	Council	and	its	agents	would	not	conduct	inspections	 of	 books	 or	 records	 of	 domestic	 Chinese	 businesses	 in	 connection	with	 the	application	of	the	law	(SMC	1929:	22).	Nonetheless,	while	the	Council	attempted	to	control	the	enforcement	of	this	tax,	that	formal	domestic	tax	collection	bureaus	operated	within	the	Settlement	for	the	first	time	since	the	1850s	was	highly	significant.		Further	weakening	of	the	Settlement's	sovereignty	authority	in	regard	to	the	enforcement	of	law	within	its	territorial	borders	can	be	reflected	in	the	ultimate	results	stemming	from	disagreement	 over	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 implementation	 of	 the	 Guomindang	 government's	1929	 Factory	 Act,	which	 ostensibly	 sought	 to	 improve	working	 conditions	 and	 prohibit	child	labour	throughout	China.	After	the	law's	passage,	the	central	government	immediately	began	to	pressure	the	Council	allow	inspectors	to	enter	the	Settlement	to	enforce	this	law	(albeit,	it	was	not	until	1934	that	the	Ministry	of	Industry's	Bureau	of	Factory	Inspection	produced	a	five-stage	plan	to	actually	implement	the	law),	to	which	the	Council	vigorously	protested.	Certainly,	much	of	the	resistance	on	the	part	of	the	Council	derived	from	a	general	commitment	to	lax	regulation	on	industry;	while	the	Council	had	itself	begun	efforts	to	limit	child	labour	and	improve	working	conditions	in	the	early	1920s	(SMC	1923:	59-61),	little	substantive	action	had	taken	place;	as	the	Far	Eastern	Review	(20	Nov.	1935:	187)	remarked,	"The	continuation	of	 laissez-faire,	 as	 it	exists	in	 the	 ‘model	settlement’	with	 its	large	and	growing	 industrial	 proletariat,	 is	 without	 parallel	 outside	 China."	 However,	 the	 more	fundamental	issue	was	only	tangentially	related	to	the	specific	nature	of	regulatory	control	that	should	exist	on	factory	owners;	this	fact	perhaps	underscored	by	fact	that	the	Council's	proposal	to	enact	and	enforce	the	exact	same	regulations	as	specified	in	the	Factory	Act	was	opposed	by	the	central	authorities,	who	remained	adamant	that	factory	activity	within	the	Settlement	was	theirs	to	regulate,	on	the	grounds	that	the	Settlement	was	part	of	Chinese	territory.	Hence,	the	ultimate	disagreement	centred	around	the	validity	of	domestic	law	and	the	enforcement	mechanisms	of	such	law	within	the	Settlement.		Nearly	two	years	after	the	law's	implementation,	the	issue	remained	open.	A	statement	on	the	issue	by	the	domestic	city	Mayor,	General	Wu	Techen,	in	May	1933	was	pointed:	"The	International	Settlement	being	Chinese	territory,	foreigners	residing	and	doing	business	in	the	 International	 Settlement	 by	 virtue	 of	 existing	 treaties	 can	 only	 enjoy	 the	 rights	stipulated	therein.	Chinese	citizens	resident	in	the	International	Settlement	have	the	same	duty	 towards	 the	 Chinese	 Government	 as	 those	 who	 reside	 outside	 it.	 The	 natural	
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relationship	between	Chinese	citizens	and	the	Chinese	Government	must	not	be	interfered	with	by	foreigners"	(NCDN	07	May	1933).	In	reply,	Council	members	issued	several	abstruse	statements	indicating	 they	 intended	to	comply;	however,	 the	 issue	remained	unresolved	until	a	formal	agreement	on	the	system	of	factory	inspection	in	the	International	Settlement	was	signed	by	the	Council	and	 the	City	Government	 in	1936	(Far	Eastern	Survey	15	 July	1936:	 156-157).	 In	 this	 instance,	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 Council	 to	 use	 the	 shield	 of	extraterritoriality	to	limit	enforcement	of	domestic	government	regulations	on	residents	of	the	Settlement,	after	an	extended	period	of	pushback,	eventually	 lost	out	as	 the	relative	power	of	 the	 two	parties	evened.	 In	general,	an	ever-increasingly	powerful	Guomindang	bureaucracy	 that	 sought	 to	 end	 extraterritoriality	 and	 implement	 policies	 amenable	 to	those	 in	 line	 with	 Party	 goals,	 including	 those	 that	 were	 occasionally	 inimical	 to	 the	protection	of	domestic	economic	agents'	private	property	rights,	was	able	to	reshape	the	legal	institutional	landscape	of	Shanghai's	International	Settlement	to	one	less	definitively	distinct	 from	 that	 of	 the	 city's	 domestically-administered	 municipality,	 especially	 for	domestic	economic	agents.		Of	a	similar	form,	Law	(2015)'s	research	indicates	that	during	the	Guomindang	era,	starting	as	early	as	late	1927,	weakened	judicial	independence	of	the	extraterritorial	legal	system	was	manifested	in	the	form	of	numerous	concessions	by	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	and	Municipal	Police	in	acquiescence	to	Guomindang	demands	to	curtail	arrest,	detainment	and	expedition	procedures	and	regulations	in	regard	to	suspected	communists.	Over	time,	Law	shows,	 legal	protections	designed	to	ensure	 the	rights	of	suspects	were	continually	eroded	in	a	series	of	compromises	on	the	part	of	the	Settlement	that	effectively	transferred	policing	and	judicial	authority	from	the	extraterritorial	to	the	domestic	legal	system.	As	Law	(2015:3)	 observes,	 "the	 Kuomintang	 demanded	 the	 Shanghai	 Municipal	 Police	 for	 the	simplification	of	arrest	procedures	when	arresting	communists	hiding	 in	 the	Settlement.	Later,	 the	 Chinese	 authorities	 furthered	 requested	 the	 Shanghai	 Municipal	 Council	 to	extradite	 important	 communist	 convicts	 immediately	 and	 to	 hand	 over	 communist	prisoners	 to	 the	 Soochow	 reformatory."	 Although,	 as	 Law	 continues,	 these	 "demands	violated	the	legal	procedures	of	the	Settlement",	they	nonetheless	occurred,	given	that	many	of	the	leadership	of	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Police	believed	"Violations	of	settlement	judicial	procedures	 and	 legal	 practices	 [made]	 arrests	 more	 effective	 and	 efficient"	 (7).	 While	violations	of	suspects'	rights	is	indeed	likely	to	increase	the	efficiency	of	the	ability	of	state	police	apparatuses	to	arrest,	whether	the	goal	of	the	legal	system	is	to	prioritise	efficiency	or	 justice	 is	 a	 question	 that	 historically	 within	 the	 common	 law	 legal	 tradition	 of	 the	ascribed	to	by	the	International	Settlement	had	been	more	heavily	weighted	towards	justice,	but	 one	 from	 which,	 under	 pressure	 from	 Guomindang	 political	 structures,	 the	extraterritorial	legal	system	continually	seemingly	abandoned.				9.3.2.4.		The	End	of	the	Extraterritorial	System		This	reshaping	of	the	extraterritorial	legal	environment	from	one	of	relative	insulation	from	domestic	political-legal	intrusions,	to	one	more	adaptive	and	responsive,	coincided	with	the	waning	 in	 the	 support	 from	 Britain,	 France	 and	 other	 treaty	 nations	 to	 continue	 the	extraterritorial	system.	As	Bickers	(1998)	argues,	in	the	period	following	the	First	World	War,	government	officials	in	Britain	and	the	United	States	had	already	started	to	seek	ways	to	extricate	themselves	from	the	legal	and	diplomatic	morass	of	the	extraterritorial	system;	it	was	the	"Shanghailanders"—local	expatriate	residents—who	continually	fought	hard	for	maintenance	of	the	extraterritoriality	system,	much	to	the	consternation	of	the	British	and	American	foreign	ministries.		
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The	practice	of	extraterritoriality	was	regularly	described	in	the	Chinese	popular	press	and	by	most	Chinese	government	officials	as	an	affront	to	Chinese	sovereignty,	and	calls	to	end	its	existence	began	quite	early.	However,	 the	general	weakness	of	 the	Qing	and	Beiyang	governments,	coupled	with	a	strong	commitment	to	the	system	by	the	foreign	treaty	powers,	led	to	little	substantive	movement	on	the	issue	beyond	the	commitment	at	the	Washington	Conference	to	"examine	the	issue"	(NCH	24	April	1926:	165).	The	situation	began	to	change	once	a	more	powerful	and	bureaucratically	competent	Guomindang	Party	secured	control.	To	 begin	 with,	 the	 Guomindang	 central	 government	 began	 increasing	 pressure	 on	 the	International	 Settlement	 leadership	 to	 relinquish	 the	 right	 to	 extraterritoriality,	 and	 to	prepare	for	the	ultimate	return	of	the	International	Settlement	to	China.	Additionally,	in	the	wake	 of	 legal	 reform	 in	 1926,	 the	 Guomindang	 government	 abolished	 the	Mixed	 Court	system	and	replaced	it	with	a	provisional	Chinese	court	comprised	of	a	sole	Chinese	judge,	and	subsequently	in	1930,	by	the	Chinese	Special	Courts.			Furthermore,	 such	 increased	 pressure	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 domestic	 government	 to	 end	extraterritoriality	 coincided	 with	 waning	 support	 for	 the	 system	within	 the	 diplomatic	corps	of	the	two	major	treaty	powers,	Britain	and	the	United	States,	as	it	was	increasingly	viewed	as	generating	 few	diplomatic	benefits	yet	causing	continual	disagreement	with	a	government	they	increasingly	saw	as	a	potential	important	ally	in	the	global	battle	against	communism	(Bickers	1999).	Expatriate	residents	of	the	Settlement,	conversely,	continued	to	voraciously	call	for	the	continuance	of	the	extraterritoriality	system.	In	response	to	rising	pressure	by	the	domestic	central	government	to	end	the	system	as	early	as	1932,	in	1930	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	commissioned	a	report	by	a	South	African	 legal	scholar,	Judge	Richard	Feetham,	 to	provide	an	"unbiased"	report	and	propose	a	course	of	action.	Feetham	(1931)'s	conclusion	that	extraterritoriality	should	be	maintained	at	least	for	a	few	more	"decades"	was	met	with	immediate	rejection	by	the	Guomindang	government,	and	a	marked	distancing	by	the	foreign	treaty	powers.			Pressure	 to	 rescind	 extraterritoriality	 lessened,	 however,	 after	 the	 Japanese	 invasion	 of	Northern	China	in	1931,	when	the	Guomindang	government	leadership	viewed	appeasing	Western	countries	on	the	extraterritoriality	issue	to	be	valuable	in	gaining	their	support	in	combat	 against	 the	 Japanese	 military	 (Lockwood	 1937:	 277).	 In	 addition,	 the	 British	position	 regarding	 extraterritoriality	 hardened	 considerably	 after	 a	 young	 Briton	 was	secretly	 killed	by	 a	Chinese	military	 commander	 in	1931.	The	 subsequent	 cover-up	and	initial	denials	by	the	Guomindang	government	was	viewed	as	further	evidence	that	ending	extraterritoriality	would	be	premature	(Bickers	1996).		A	 complete	 dismantling	 of	 the	 extraterritoriality	 system	would	 not	 come	 until	 nearly	 a	decade	 later.	 Concerns	 about	 the	 lack	 of	 independent	 judiciary	 under	 the	 Guomindang	government	 and	 corruption	 in	 the	 Chinese	 legal	 process	 aside,	 the	majority	 of	Western	powers	exercised	a	voluntary	relinquishment	of	extraterritorial	rights	shortly	after	the	start	of	the	Pacific	War	in	December	1941.	The	decision	to	end	extraterritoriality	by	the	United	States	and	Britain	appeared	prompted	more	by	political	expediency	rather	than	confidence	in	 China's	 judicial	 system.	 Neither	 country	 cited	 their	 satisfaction	 with	 Chinese	 legal	development	as	 a	 reason	 for	 the	 relinquishment;	on	 the	 contrary,	 at	 least	 from	 internal	discussions,	China's	judicial	system	was	seen	a	cause	for	continuing	concern.	In	a	tellingly	blunt	assessment,	Clarence	Gauss,	the	American	Ambassador	to	China,	upon	learning	of	the	State	Department's	plans	to	abolish	extraterritoriality,	stated,	"The	unsatisfactory	Chinese	police,	judicial	and	prison	systems	have	not	improved	during	the	past	decade;	they	have,	in	fact,	 suffered	 in	 retrograde;	 and	 unfortunately,	 a	 system	 of	 both	 government	 and	 Party	secret	 services	 has	 spread	 throughout	 the	 country	 and	 gained	 extensive	 power	 and	domination	which	seriously	threatens	the	enjoyment	of	‘four	freedoms’	not	only	by	Chinese	people	but	by	foreigners	in	this	country"	(US	State	Dept.	1942:	FRUS	711.933/374).	
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		9.4.		Credible	Commitment	Mechanisms:	Bureaucratic	Capacity		The	finances	of	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	were	organized	in	a	modern	"fiscal	state"	model	similar	to	what	was	deployed	for	municipalities	in	Britain	at	the	time,	where	regular	and	 ordinary	 expenditures	 for	 on-going	 services	were	 paid	 for	primarily	 from	 taxation,	while	the	costs	of	long	term	capital	investment	projects	such	as	public	works	were	financed	by	bond	issuances.	Taxes	were	generally	low—this	might	be	partly	attributable	to	a	stated	commitment	to	small	and	efficient	government	continually	espoused	by	Council	members;	of	greater	import,	however,	were	the	constitutional	limitations	placed	on	the	Council	that	prescribed	the	levy	of	taxes	on	business	operations,	allowing	the	Council	only	the	right	to	impose	real	estate	 taxes,	as	well	as	customs	dues	and	 licensing	 fees.	Thus,	 the	Shanghai	Municipal	 Council	 had	 no	 ability	 to	 arbitrarily	 raise	 taxes	 or	 fees	 on	 individuals	 or	businesses	without	 first	 passing	municipal	 ordinances	 at	public	 hearings	 during	 annual	ratepayers	meetings.			The	 Shanghai	 Municipal	 Council	 maintained	 a	 stated	 commitment	 to	 relative	 fiscal	transparency.	 The	 need	 for	 keeping	 strong	 oversight	 on	 fiscal	 outlays	 was	 continually	stressed	in	the	press;	indeed,	one	finds	such	sentiments	stressed	from	the	very	onset	of	the	formation	of	the	Council	itself:	"above	all,	the	financial	economy	of	the	Council	is	of	primary	importance.	 However	 well	 the	 various	 parts	 of	 the	 municipal	 machinery	 maybe	 be	controlled	by	the	body	of	councillors	and	their	staff	of	employés,	unless	the	revenue	and	expenditure	be	judiciously	managed,	affairs	are	certain	to	get	into	an	unsatisfactory	state"	(NCH	11	April	1863:	58).	External	critiques	in	the	press	and	by	outside	observers,	such	as	de	 Jesus	 (1909:	249-250)'s	previously-cited	 criticism	of	poor	 transparency,	 represented	additional	sources	of	oversight	on	fiscal	outlays.		An	important	check	on	Council	spending	came	from	some	amount	of	direct	oversight,	as	budgets	were	subject	to	scrutiny	by	the	general	ratepayers.	Contest	of	budgeted	line	items	was	not	infrequent.	The	salaries	of	the	Council's	staff	might	be	reviewed	and	discussed	(SMC	1930:	7),	concerns	regarding	the	appropriateness	of	allocating	additional	taxpayer	funds	for	a	new	park	might	be	raised	(SMC	1933:	18-22),	and	requests	for	increases	in	tax	rates	protested	amid	cries	that	too	much	prior	spending	was	simply	"squandered"	(SMC	1940:	13).	 Hence,	 the	 annual	 meeting	 process	 provided	 a	 potential	 check	 on	 the	 role	 of	 the	government	to	expropriate	through	taxation.		The	 Council	 also	 maintained	 a	 treasury	 system,	 with	 a	 Finance	 Committee	 that	 made	recommendations	to	the	full	Council	and	conducted	annual	budget	reviews,	which	occurred	both	 via	 externally-administered	 audits,	 and	 in	 public	 forums	 at	 the	 annual	 ratepayers	meetings.	It	was	at	these	annual	meetings	that	the	Council	would	submit	its	budget	to	the	ratepayers	for	review.	The	budget	was	not	a	simple	document—the	overall	annual	reports	produced	 each	 year	 by	 the	 Council	 numbered	 several	 hundreds	 of	 pages,	 and	 included	detailed	line	items,	with	sections	specifying	every	category	of	spending,	and	explaining	the	full	amount	budgeted	and	spent,	and	reasons	for	such	variances.	However,	simply	ascribing	importance	 to	 the	 length	 of	 the	 Annual	 Reports	 is	 a	 potentially	 poor	 indicator	 of	 state	capacity.	 The	 political	 and	 fiscal	 administrators	 of	 the	 Council	 were	 incentivised,	 albeit	indirectly,	to	produce	work	indicating	the	seriousness	and	importance	of	their	positions,	both	to	help	ensure	resources	would	be	allocated	for	continual	employment	in	their	roles,	as	well	as	for	personal	accolades.			Nonetheless,	detailed	readings	of	these	Annual	Reports	underscore	that	the	tasks	and	role	of	the	Settlement's	municipal	government	continued	to	increase	in	complexity	and	scope	over	time.	Further,	it	is	evident	that	an	attention	to	detail	especially	in	regard	to	the	financial	
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matters	 of	 the	 government	 structure	 was	 paramount.	 Monies	 spent	 on	 police	 and	 fire	protection,	education,	parks	and	other	public	works	were	fully	accounted.	The	1902	Report,	for	instance,	included	several	pages	on	a	budgeting	issue	regarding	rising	school	expenses	due	to	increasing	numbers	of	students	attending	public	schools,	and	that	a	new	policy	was	being	put	in	place	to	charge	attending	children's	parents	0.50	yuan	per	month	for	the	use	of	school	books	 to	help	defray	costs.	The	Report	provided	breakdowns	 for	previous	school	book	costs	and	projected	budgets	based	on	expected	increases	in	school	children	(SMC	1902:	367-369).			Although	the	Council	leadership	and	other	members	of	the	Settlement	community	liked	to	reference	the	efficiency	of	governance	(e.g.,	Gundry	1920:59),	as	the	size	of	the	municipal	bureaucratic	governance	structure	grew,	so	too	did	criticisms	of	its	efficiency.	For	instance,	the	Council's	response	to	the	call	for	housing	reform	within	the	Settlement	in	the	mid-1930s	could	be	deemed	inefficient;	certainly,	it	proved	ineffective.	The	influx	of	refugees	from	the	Chinese	municipality	area	in	early	1932	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Japanese	bombing	of	Zhabei,	followed	by	subsequent	inflows	of	additional	refugees	from	other	parts	of	China	in	response	to	 continuing	 civil	 strife	 owing	 to	 civil	 war	 and	 Japanese	 military	 aggressions,	 led	 to	increasingly	 growing	 areas	 in	 the	 Northern	 and	 Eastern	 districts	 of	 the	 Settlement	characterised	 by	 sub-standard	 housing,	 described	 in	 the	 press	 and	 contemporaneous	depictions	as	"slum"	housing.	The	main	 issue	 facing	 these	areas	was	an	extreme	 level	of	overcrowding,	which	combined	with	the	lack	of	modern	toilet	provisions	or	water	supply	implied	a	high	risk	of	dangers	from	fire	or	disease.	In	response	to	calls	at	the	ratepayers	annual	meeting	held	April	1936	to	 address	 the	 situation	 (NCH	 27	April	 1936:	721),	 the	Council	 	 created	 a	 "committee	 of	 inquiry"	 to	 study	 the	 problem,	which	 in	March	 of	 the	following	year	 issued	 its	 findings	 in	a	 report,	which	 after	 enumerating	a	host	 of	serious	issues	 facings	 the	 residents	 of	 such	 sub-standard	 dwellings,	 produced	 as	 "its	 chief	recommendation	is	for	the	appointment	of	a	permanent	committee	to	further	study	means	for	reducing	rents	and	for	improvements	in	hygiene"	(Far	Eastern	Survey	26	May	1937:	125).			Such	response	might	well	suggest	reasonable	critique	of	the	bureaucratic	efficiency	of	the	Council—analogous	 to	 that	 levelled	 by	 Hanwell	 (1938:96)	 in	 regard	 to	 the	 reputed	inefficiency	of	the	Guomindang	central	government	as	evidenced	by	ably	producing	"paper	plans"	but	extremely	poor	in	implementation—as	effective	in	creating	committees	but	not	at	actual	definitive	action.	Further,	calls	to	improve	sub-standard	housing	was	hardly	a	new	issue	 facing	 the	 Council,	 having	 been	 brought	 forward	 previously	 in	 the	 press	 or	 by	advocacy	groups,	or	even	in	prior	Council	Annual	Reports	highlighting	similar	issues;	for	instance,	 in	 1907	 the	 Report	 stated,	 "As	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 work	 of	 the	 systematic	limewashing	 and	 disinfecting	 of	 Chinese	 dwellings,	 an	 attempt	 was	 made	 to	 improve	ventilation	and	lighting	by	opening	up	back	premises	and	removing	overhead	stages	and	high	 partitions	within	 rooms.	 The	 overcrowding	met	with	was	 deplorable;	 rooms	 large	enough	to	provide	sleeping	accommodation	for	four	persons	being	frequently	used	for	as	many	 families;	 the	 sanitary	 condition	 being	 rendered	 worse	 by	 dividing	 the	 rooms	 by	partitions	which	shut	out	the	air	and	make	them	permanently	dark.	The	Sanitary	Inspectors	were	 brought	 directly	 and	 sympathetically	 into	 touch	 with	 the	 Chinese,	 facilitating	 the	explanation	of	the	benefits	of	disinfection,	vaccination	and	other	sanitary	measures.	Many	houses	thus	disinfected,	visited	three	or	four	months	afterwards,	were	still	found	in	a	clean	and	healthy	condition,	but	the	greater	number	had	relapsed	into	their	former	condition	of	oriental	 squalor.	 After	 a	 fair	 trial	 it	was	 concluded	 that	 until	 there	 was	 some	 effective	legislation	against	overcrowding,	little	lasting	benefit	could	be	expected.	A	rule	dealing	with	overcrowding	 is	 recommended	 for	 inclusion	 among	 the	 conditions	 of	 license	 of	 native	lodging	houses"	(SMC	1907:87).	That	similar	or	worse	conditions	persisted	into	the	1930s	certainly	does	not	preclude	bureaucratic	ineptitude.			
	 234 
However,	an	alternative	analysis	considers	the	underlying	incentive	structures	behind	issues	such	as	the	curbing	of	"slum"	housing.	Whether	expatriate	or	Chinese,	Council	members'	direct	 electorate	 constituency	 did	not	 comprise	 residents	 of	 "slums"	nor	 reside	 nearby.	Meanwhile,	 implementing	 public	 assistance	 housing	 programs	 or	 enforcing	 stricter	sanitation	standards	in	the	multitude	of	domestic	resident	households	requiring	the	hiring	of	additional	safety	inspectors	represented	budgetary	cost	outlays,	with	few	direct	benefits	accruing	to	Council	members	or	electors;	in	fact,	it	implied	less	available	funds	for	projects	more	readily	supported	by	the	Council's	constituency,	or	greater	debt	financing	implying	potentially	higher	borrowing	 costs.	 Thus,	 the	 observed	practise	of	 committee	 formation	coupled	with	an	associated	lack	of	policy	implementation	in	at	least	certain	instances	might	have	reflected	a	lack	of	interest	alignment	more	than	bureaucratic	inefficiency,	per	se.		Numerous	other	bureaucratic	divisions	within	 the	 Shanghai	Municipal	Council	 structure	existed,	increasing	greatly	over	time	in	terms	of	diversity	and	size	of	departments.	Thus,	for	instance,	by	the	1930s,	the	number	of	municipal	administrative	offices	and	divisions	had	grown	extensively,	while	still	including	major	departments	such	as	Public	Works,	Health,	Education,	 Finance,	 Fire,	 Municipal	 Police,	 and	 the	 Volunteer	 Corps,	 these	 were	 now	supplemented	 by	 numerous	 various	 committees,	 such	 as	 the	 Housing	 Committee,	 the	Special	 Education	 Committee,	 Salaries	 Commission,	 Communicable	 Health	 Committee,	Meteorological	Services,	the	Industrial	Section,	and	the	Economy	Committee,	among	many	others.	Each	of	these	often	comprised	of	several	sub-committees	formed	to	address	issues	of	greater	specificity	or	for	a	limited	time	frame.	Cultural	initiatives,	such	as	the	Municipal	Orchestra,	and	the	Public	Library,	as	well	as	parks	maintenance,	had	continued	to	grow	in	scale	 over	 time,	 perhaps	 lending	 some	 weight	 to	 de	 Jesus	 (1909:	 250)'s	 accusation	 of	"wasteful	public	funds",	although	apparently	well-appreciated	by	enough	influential	or	self-interested	ratepayers	to	have	been	continually	funded	throughout	the	time	frame.		While	space	considerations	preclude	detailed	descriptions	of	the	initiatives	and	spending	historiographies	of	these	many	municipal	divisions,	reporting	by	the	local	newspapers	or	the	 Council's	 annual	 reports	 indicate	 rather	 consistent	 and	 substantial	 increases	 in	administrative	 complexity	 and	 budgetary	 resources.	 Several	 brief	 discussions	 of	 the	administrative	structures	and	policies	of	a	few	of	the	divisions	can	prove	exemplifying.	For	instance,	reporting	statistics	on	the	municipality's	Fire	Department	demonstrate	the	growth	from	 a	 small	 volunteer	 force	 in	 the	 late	 1860s	 into	 one	 of	 the	municipal	 government's	largest	administrative	divisions.	By	the	1940s,	the	Municipal	Fire	Brigade,	as	it	became	to	be	called,	was	responsible	for	a	complex	array	of	services,	including	the	maintenance	of	a	system	 of	 hydrants	 and	multiple	 fire	 stations	 throughout	 the	 Settlement,	 a	 team	 of	 fire	inspectors	to	install	and	inspect	fire	alarms	and	certify	Settlement	commercial	properties	(including	 restaurants,	 hotels,	 factories,	 department	 stores,	 and	 apartment	 buildings)	satisfied	appropriate	 fire	 code	 regulations,	 responsibility	 for	 the	 issuance	of	permits	 for	hazardous	 materials	 such	 as	 petrol.	 The	 Fire	 Brigade	 was	 also	 responsible	 for	 the	maintenance	and	publication	of	monthly	statistics	on	the	number	of	fires	and	emergency	calls,	including	false	alarms;	the	monetary	damages,	injuries	and	deaths	caused	by	fires;	and	the	number,	type,	and	cost	of	equipment	used	in	extinguishing	fires	(SMC	1940:	100-111).			A	brief	consideration	of	the	administrative	complexity	exhibited	by	the	Health	Department	in	1930	is	also	instructive.	As	reported	in	that	year's	Annual	Report,	the	department	was	comprised	 of	 a	 total	 of	 eight	 major	 sub-departments,	 including	 its	 administrative	 unit,	pathological	 laboratory,	 chemical	 laboratory,	 dispensary,	 sanitation	unit,	 food	 and	dairy	inspection	 unit,	 cemeteries	 and	 public	 mortuary	 division,	 swimming	 pools	 section,	 and	hospitals	unit.	The	hospitals	unit	itself	was	comprised	of	more	than	sixteen	subdivisions,	including	administration,	 radiology,	mental	hospital,	 isolation	hospital,	 isolation	hospital	for	 Chinese,	 sanatorium,	 tuberculosis	 sanatorium,	 nurse	 housing,	 ambulance	 services,	convalescence	 home,	 police	 hospital	 for	 Chinese,	 police	 hospital	 for	 Indians,	 prison	
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hospitals,	 community	 outreach	 services	 including	 public	 lectures,	 health	 training	 for	Chinese	police	and	firemen,	and	a	venereal	disease	clinic.	Each	year,	the	Council's	report	to	the	 ratepayers	 the	 Health	 Department's	 detailed	 recording	 of	 communicable	 disease	outbreaks.	In	1930,	for	instance,	data	in	table	and	chart	form	were	presented	for	incidents	of	 specific	 disease	 outbreaks,	 including	 smallpox,	 cholera,	 influenza,	 typhoid	 fever,	tuberculosis,	 diphtheria,	 amongst	 others.	 Figure	 9.2,	 for	 instance,	 reproduces	 a	 graph	presented	in	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council's	1930	Annual	Report	indicating	the	number	of	cholera	cases	in	the	Settlement	over	a	five-year	period.	As	evidenced	from	the	chart,	the	severity	of	 this	 issue	was	 considerable,	with	particularly	serious	outbreaks	occurring	 in	1926	and	1929,	with	hundreds	of	cases	reported	throughout	the	summer	months.		However,	of	more	importance	than	recording	the	number	of	cases	was	the	Department's	actions	 to	 reduce	 outbreaks.	 In	 that	 year,	 an	 "Anti-cholera	 Inoculation	 Campaign"	 was	instituted,	which	represented	an	effort	led	by	the	Settlement's	Health	Department	across	all	three	divisions	of	Shanghai	(domestic,	French	Concession,	and	International	Settlement)	to	vaccinate	Shanghai's	populace	in	order	to	prevent	outbreaks	of	cholera	the	following	year	(SMC	1930:	144).	Over	thirty	litres	of	the	vaccine	were	produced	in	the	initial	year,	which	doubled	 in	1931	(with	 the	scale	of	 this	effort	prompting	the	establishment	of	a	separate	Vaccine	Institute	within	the	Health	Department	devoted	to	production	of	vaccines).	Henriot	(2006)	provides	extensive	details	of	the	preventative	measures	taken	to	reduce	outbreaks	of	communicable	diseases	in	the	massive	refugee	camps	that	sprang	up	in	the	wake	of	the	outbreak	 of	 war	 in	 August	 1937	 which	 led	 to	 a	 flood	 of	 desperate	 refugees	 into	 the	Settlement.	Notably,	while	the	Council's	Public	Health	Department		was	involved	in	much	of	the	coordination	efforts,	as	Henriot	describes,	the	source	of	nearly	all	of	the	actual	provision	of	 health,	 housing	 and	 food	 services	 came	 from	 the	 donations	 and	 volunteer	 efforts	 by	private	charitable	organisations,	both	extraterritorial	and	domestic	in	composition,	such	as	the	Shanghai	Federation	of	Charity	Organisations,	and	the	Chinese	Medical	Association.			Figure	9.2.		Reported	Cases	of	Cholera	within	the	International	Settlement,	1926-1930	
	Source:	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	1930	Annual	Report:	138B.	
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	Finally,	 a	 consideration	 of	 the	 many	 functions	 of	 the	 Council's	 Industrial	 Section	 is	illustrative	of	the	depth	of	bureaucratic	activities	engaged	in	by	the	Council	apparatus.	The	Industrial	Section	was	a	sub-division	involved	in	numerous	outreach	interactions	with	the	business	community	to	improve	working	conditions.	For	instance,	the	Section	was	tasked	with	addressing	issues	related	to	child	labour	in	the	Settlement's	factories,	including	what	was	referred	to	as	the	"mui	tsai"	problem.§	Much	of	the	Industrial	Section's	work	was	related	to	 improving	 the	 safety	 conditions	 in	 factories.	 The	 Section	 sponsored	 technical	 classes	taught	by	engineers	to	help	factory	owners	build	appropriate	safety	measures	for	plants	utilising	steam	power.			As	 a	more	 specific	 example,	 in	 1937,	 the	 Industrial	 Section	 alerted	 factory	 owners	 and	workers	 through	 a	 series	 of	 announcements	 and	 visitations	 of	 the	 dangers	 from	 heavy	metals	exposure	of	lead	and	antimony,	after	receiving	the	results	of	a	safety	study	it	partially	financed	conducted	in	coordination	with	the	Henry	Lester	Institute	of	Medical	Research	and	published	by	the	Chinese	Medical	Association.	The	same	year,	the	Industrial	Section	also	funded	a	field	study	by	the	Dr.	B.	S.	Platt	Institute	on	the	prevention	of	worker	malnutrition.	The	study	found	that	workers	who	only	consumed	bowls	of	boiled	white	rice,	a	typical	meal	serviced	to	many	factory	workers	by	the	in-house	cafeterias	of	factories,	led	to	numerous	cases	of	"beri-beri	disease"	(thiamine	deficiency),	which	the	study	attributed	to	the	practise	of	washing	stored	white	rice	prior	to	its	cooking	so	as	to	remove	bacteria	that	grew	on	the	outside	of	the	dehusked	rice;	however,	the	washing	process	also	removed	the	majority	of	the	rice's	nutritional	value	(including	vitamin	B1,	thiamine).	The	study	found	that	by	storing	the	rice	in	its	husk	and	only	conducting	dehusking	just	prior	to	consumption,	the	rice	was	prevented	 from	 turning	 rancid	 while	 stored,	 alleviating	 the	 need	 for	 washing,	 thus	maintaining	 its	 nutritional	 value,	 and	 preventing	 the	 occurrence	 of	 cases	 of	 thiamine	deficiency	in	the	test	group.	The	rather	complex	nature	of	the	study	underscores	the	relative	sophistication	 of	 the	 type	 of	 activities	 that	 the	 Industrial	 Section	 was	 involved	 in	undertaking	(SMC	1937:19-36).		While	 ambitious	 in	 their	 efforts,	 the	 relative	 successes	 and	 failures	 of	 the	 various	implemented	policies	undertaken	by	these	various	administrative	departments	is	telling	in	both	the	complexity	of	the	tasks	the	Council	attempted	to	address,	as	it	sought	to	administer	to	a	municipality	 that	by	 the	start	of	 the	1940s	had	a	population	of	over	one	and	a	half	million	residents.	For	instance,	as	the	1930	Annual	Report	reports,	the	implementation	of	a	program	designed	to	increase	the	control	over	and	reporting	of	communicable	diseases	in	the	Settlement	was	to	be	inaugurated	in	1931,	which	represented	a	full	eight	years	after	it	was	first	formulated	by	the	Department	and	three	years	after	approved	by	the	Council:	"The	scheme	 for	 the	 Voluntary	 Registration	 of	 Medical	 Practitioners,	 Dentists	 and	 Surgeons,	which	was	formulated	by	this	Department	in	1923,	but	held	up	for	various	reasons	until	formally	approved	by	the	Council	in	1928,	will	at	last	become	effective	next	year"	(SMC	1930:	133).	Likewise,	the	ambitious	Anti-cholera	Inoculation	Campaign,	designed	to	vaccinate	the	populace	against	cholera,	could	not	prevent	multiple	serious	outbreaks	of	cholera	occurring	in	Shanghai,	including	the	Settlement,	in	1932,	1937,	and	1938.	The	seeming	failure	of	the	program	might	be	partly	mitigated	given	these	outbreaks	were	all	precipitated	by	the	flood	of	refugees	into	the	Settlement	in	the	aftermath	of	the	1932	and	1937	episodes	of	Japanese	military	aggression	on	residential	areas	of	the	domestic	Chinese	sections	of	Shanghai	and	beyond;	as	discussed	earlier,	the	Settlement's	bureaucratic	resources	struggled	to	handle	the	impacts	such	sudden	population	increases	brought.		________________________________________________________________________________________________________	
§	This	referred	to	the	practise	where	underage	girls	were	acquired	for	cash,	either	directly	from	their	parents,	 or	 indirectly	 via	 illegal	 kidnapping,	 by	 wealthier	 families	 to	 serve	 as	 indentured	maidservants,	remaining	in	bondage	until	reaching	marriageable	age.	
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	9.5.		State	Capacity:	Ability	to	Enforce	a	Monopoly	on	Violence	
	As	 previously	 advanced,	 a	 fundamental	 role	 of	 a	 sovereign	 power	 is	 the	 exercise	 of	 a	monopoly	 on	 force	within	 its	 boundaries,	 thus	 allowing	 it	 to	 enforce	 a	 rule	 of	 law	 and	consistent	 legal	 system,	 and	 prevent	 non-government	 actors,	 internal	 or	 external,	 from	violating	laws,	or	arrogating	or	destroying	the	property	of	its	subjects.	Throughout	the	late-imperial	and	republican	era,	domestic	Chinese	governments	struggled	fulfilling	this	role,	as	did,	by	extension,	the	local	domestic	municipal	governments	of	Shanghai.	The	weakness	of	the	domestic	sovereign	in	this	regard	can	be	contrasted	with	a	relative	absence	of	civil	strife	and	open	warfare	within	the	extraterritorial	settlements.	For	the	vast	majority	of	the	history	of	Shanghai's	extraterritoriality	system,	there	were	limited	disruptions	to	the	civil	peace,	with	the	jarring	exception	of	December	1941	when	the	entire	extraterritorial	institutional	environment	 itself	 came	 to	 an	 abrupt	 and	 violent	 end	 after	 the	 armed	 takeover	 of	 the	settlements	by	the	Japanese	military.			The	 extraterritorial	 municipal	 governments	 proved,	 in	 general,	 relatively	 capable	 of	providing	protection	of	 private	property	 from	banditry	or	 other	nonstate	 violent	actors	within	their	borders.	The	leadership	of	these	governments	were	clear	in	their	mission	of	defence	of	life	and	property	within	the	settlements.	As	Stirling	Fessenden,	Chairman	of	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council,	remarked	in	1927,	"[The	Council]	has	not	only	the	moral	but	also	 the	 unquestionable	 legal	 right	 to	 defend,	 by	 force	 if	 necessary,	 the	 political	 and	territorial	integrity	of	the	International	Settlement	against	military	or	mob	aggression	on	the	part	of	any	political	or	military	party"	(Jackson	2012:	151).					9.5.1.	 Credible	 Commitment	 Mechanisms:	 Enforcing	 a	 Monopoly	 on	 Violence	 via	 an	Internal	Police	Force				To	begin	with,	 the	 International	Settlement	sought	 to	maintain	 law	and	order	within	 its	territorial	borders	through	its	own	police	force.	Formed	in	1854,	the	role	of	the	Municipal	Police	Force	was	to	enforce	the	power	of	the	state,	as	represented	by	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council,	within	the	state	itself,	the	International	Settlement.	The	Council	issued	regulations	binding	on	residents	in	the	Settlement,	and	it	was	the	function	of	the	Municipal	Police	to	enforce	such	regulations,	and	to	maintain	general	civil	order,	and	discourage,	prevent	and	respond	to	outbreaks	of	criminal	activity.			Concern	over	issues	of	internal	law	and	order	were	of	constant	concern	to	the	Council	from	the	very	beginning.	As	the	Settlement	rapidly	expanded	in	the	early	1860s,	with	population	inflows	of	both	domestic	Chinese	and	European	immigrants,	quasi-xenophobic	and	classist	arguments	were	frequently	found	expressed	in	the	press	as	well	as	in	the	minutes	of	Council	meetings.	For	instance,	in	April	1863,	the	Council	Chairman	claimed	that	many	of	the	newly-arrived	European	immigrants	were	without	way	of	earning	income,	and	therefore,	must	be	responsible	 for	 the	uptick	 in	 reported	 crime.	Considerable	 attention	of	 the	 annual	 Land	Renters	meeting	was	paid	to	ways	to	deal	with	the	incorporation	of	the	eastern	Hongkew	[Hongkou	"]	District	 into	 the	Settlement.	 In	 the	words	of	 the	chairman,	a	significantly	increased	police	force	was	necessary	as	the	area	was	home	to	many	"dangerous	elements",	resulting	in	a	relative	lack	of	law	and	order,	with	the	current	police	force	allocated	to	the	area	insufficient	to	restrain	"the	almost	reign	of	terror	which	now	prevails	there"	(NCH	11	April	1863:	58).		
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Each	year's	Annual	Report	of	the	Council	contained	a	detailed	listing	of	crime	statistics,	with	significant	crimes	such	as	murder,	or	new	types	of	criminal	activity,	 receiving	particular	attention	 in	 the	 annual	 written	 summary.	 For	 instance,	 it	 was	 reported	 that	 only	 two	murders	were	 reported	 to	 have	 occurred	 in	 the	 Settlement	 in	 the	 year	 1879,	 in	 each	 a	domestic	 Chinese	 resident	 having	 been	murdered	 by	 other	 domestic	 Chinese	 residents;	after	arrest	in	both	cases	the	accused	were	remanded	to	the	domestic	Chinese	municipality	for	trial	and	punishment	(SMC	1879:	55).	Detailed	monthly	arrest	statistics	were	reported	separately	 for	 expatriate	 and	 domestic	Chinese	 residents,	 with	 yearly	 totals	 of	 383	and	6,545,	respectively.	Arrests	were	broken	down	by	type	of	infraction,	albeit	the	seven	types	of	infractions	listed	for	foreigners	(assault,	cutting	and	wounding,	desertion,	drunkenness,	drunkenness	 and	 disorderly,	 larceny,	misdemeanour),	was	 less	 than	 half	 the	 twenty-six	types	 listed	 for	 Chinese	 residents,	which	 also	 included	 infractions	 such	 as	 "committing	nuisance,	embezzlement,	firing	crackers,	forgery,	fraud,	gambling,	 loitering,	uttering,	and	vagrancy,	with	the	lattermost	category	by	far	the	largest,	at	3,647,	more	than	the	total	of	all	other	 crimes	 at	 2,898	 (SMC	 1879:	 56-59).	 Further	 breakdowns	 were	 given	 by	 the	 age,	literacy	of	the	arrested,	as	well	as	the	type	and	length	of	sentence	received;	vagrancy,	while	violators	 were	 arrested,	 was	 not	 a	 crime	 receiving	 punishment.	 Given	 population	differentials,	 the	 numbers	 reveal	 fairly	 stark	 differences	 in	 crime	 rates	 within	 the	Settlement's	expatriate	and	domestic	Chinese	resident	populations.	Using	population	data	from	the	1880	census	taken	the	 following	year,	of	2,197	expatriates	and	99,201	Chinese	(SMC	1880:	35),	we	can	calculate	crime	rates	of	those	arrested	for	punishable	offences	as	17.4	per	cent	versus	2.9	per	cent,	respectively;	including	vagrancy	arrests,	brings	up	the	arrest	rates	for	the	Settlement's	Chinese	population	to	6.6	per	cent,	well	below	that	of	the	expatriate	 population.	While	 such	 differences	 appear	 large,	 these	 early	 statistics	 reflect	reported	arrest	rates	as	opposed	to	actual	crime	rates,	and	thus	the	differences	might	be	partly	accounted	for	by	the	underreporting	of	crime,	or	the	inability	of	victims	or	police	in	identifying	the	perpetrators	of	criminal	activity,	which	often	occurred	(SMC	1900:	46).		By	1900,	comparable	figures	had	fallen	to	only	184	foreigners	arrested,	albeit	for	a	greater	variety	of	infractions,	with	arrests	of	Chinese	for	punishable	offences	numbering	25,221,	which	reflected	arrest	rates	by	population	based	on	the	1900	census	of	2.7	per	cent	and	7.3	per	cent,	a	considerable	 fall	and	rise	in	 the	respective	arrest	rates	across	the	population	groups	(SMC	1900:	49-53,	356-357).	Reported	statistics,	however,	are	of	considerably	more	detailed	 than	 in	1879,	with	data	on	district	crime	 rates,	 those	arrested	but	not	charged,	breakdown	of	 types	of	 larcenies	 committed,	 all	 supplied	by	week	 rather	 than	month.	 In	addition,	details	on	the	total	number	of	the	police	 force	are	provided,	by	ethnicity,	along	with	numbers	of	new	enlistments,	resignations,	dismissals,	and	injuries	and	deaths	on	while	duty,	as	well	as	listing	of	the	force's	weaponry	and	other	equipment	(SMC	1900:	54-64).	Similar	reporting	 in	 the	1915	Annual	Report,	which	now	 includes	several	more	detailed	crime	statistics,	shows	general	arrests	of	foreign	and	domestic	residents	to	have	been	692	and	 65,359;	 or	 3.7	 and	 10.5	 per	 cents,	 out	 of	 populations	 of	 18,519	 and	 620,401,	respectively	(SMC	1915:	40A).		By	1930,	statistics	collected	included	the	number	of	fingerprints	of	arrestees	sent	to	and	received	 from	 police	 departments	 in	 other	 jurisdictions	 (in	 particular	 the	 French	Concession	police),	as	well	as	identifications	made	from	said	fingerprints.	By	this	time	the	police	force	had	grown	to	twelve	permanent	main	police	stations,	divided	into	five	major	divisions,	along	with	a	special	crimes	unit,	as	well	as	three	armed	reserve	units	(SMC	1930:	102).	 The	 increase	 in	 resources	 for	 police	 services	 had	 accompanied	 an	 increase	 in	 the	volume	of	violent	crimes,	with	105	people	arrested	for	homicide-related	crimes	over	the	course	of	the	year,	as	well	as	246	for	armed	kidnapping	or	abduction,	and	those	for	armed	robbery	at	642	(SMC	1930:	105).	Superior	reporting	statistics	also	included	actual	reported	crimes,	not	solely	arrest	rates.	The	crime	report	identified	40	confirmed	cases	of	murder,	and	36	of	armed	kidnapping,	for	which	5	of	the	cases	resulted	in	the	death	of	the	victim,	10	
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were	rescued	by	police	action	(not	 including	3	additional	persons	kidnapped	 in	Chinese	section	of	the	city	but	rescued	within	the	Settlement	by	Municipal	Police),	4	released	after	ransom	paid	 and	 2	 released	 by	 kidnappers	without	 ransom,	 and	another	 16	 reportedly	escaped	the	kidnapping	unharmed.	Overall,	the	total	number	of	reported	crimes	was	14,575	in	1930,	which	out	of	a	total	Settlement	population	of	1,007,868	represented	a	crime	rate	of	slightly	more	than	1.5	crimes	per	every	hundred	residents;	of	these	reported	cases,	7,648	resulted	in	conviction,	slightly	over	half	(SMC	1930:	90)		Data	for	1940	indicated	that,	based	on	an	estimated	total	population	of	1,500,000	residents	in	 the	 International	 Settlement,	 total	 crime	 rates	 (based	 on	 reported	 crimes)	 averaged	slightly	less	that	1	per	every	hundred	persons,	with	the	largest	proportion	of	those	crimes	falling	into	the	category	of	petty	larceny.	The	data	show	that	the	conviction	rate	for	criminal	cases	sent	to	trial	rose	to	slightly	over	90	per	cent,	which	the	report	attributed	to	the	fact	that	"the	high	standard	of	efficiency	in	the	preparation	of	cases	has	been	maintained",	as	well	as	increased	usages	of	the	modern	forensic	techniques,	such	as	superior	fingerprinting	collection	methodologies	and	ammunition	identification	technologies	enabling	the	linking	of	fired	ammunition	with	specific	guns	(SMC	1940:120,	123).	Violent	crimes	continued	to	rise,	with	138	 confirmed	homicide-related	 cases	 investigated	over	 the	 year;	 131	people	were	arrested	in	connection	with	these	cases.	Total	arrests	for	the	year	measured	27,876,	representing	 a	 significant	 arrest	 rate	 of	 nearly	 two	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 entire	 Settlement	population	arrested	over	the	course	of	the	year	(SMC	1940:	128-131).	The	report	included	a	 discussion	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 crime,	 especially	 serious	 and	 violent	 crimes,	 that	 was	associated	with	an	increase	in	"gangster	activity"	quasi-political	and	criminal	organisations	flourished	within	the	western	and	eastern	borders	of	the	Settlement	given	what	was	implied	to	 be	 a	 weakened	 power	 of	 the	 domestic	 municipal	 state	 in	 light	 of	 the	 deteriorating	economic	 and	 political	 conditions	 prevailing	 throughout	 the	 Yangzi	 valley	 region	 (SMC	1940:120)		The	 police	 were	 involved	 in	 many	 aspects	 of	 maintain	 order	 in	 the	 daily	 life	 of	 the	Settlement,	with	traffic	control	duties	rising	in	importance,	both	in	terms	of	maintenance	of	traffic	flow	at	intersections	of	high	usage,	registration	and	inspection	of	non-motorised	and	later	motorised	vehicles	and	their	drivers,	and	the	handling	of	traffic	accidents,	as	well	as	writing	 citations	 for	 driving	 infractions	 and	 even	 making	 arrests	 in	 cases	 of	 reckless	(referred	to	as	"furious")	driving.			Another	one	of	the	primary	functions	of	the	municipal	police	force	was	in	dealing	with	the	actions	 of	 labour	 strikes.	 For	 the	most	 part,	 labour	 strikes	 by	workers	were	 prohibited	under	company	and	Settlement	regulations.	Workers	who	encouraged	others	to	strike	could	and	were	 frequently	 arrested	 for	 breaking	 prohibitions	 on	 "inciting	 workers	 to	 strike",	"labour	agitation",	or	"creating	disturbances"	(SMC	1930:	96,	SMC	1937:	94,	SMC	1940:124).	As	 a	 city	 that	 became	 increasingly	 industrial	 in	 nature,	 with	 many	 factories	 moving	production	facilities	into	the	limits	of	the	Settlement	itself,	factory	labour	unrest	became	a	common	feature	of	industrial	relations,	and	yearly	summaries	regarding	the	strike	actions	were	published	by	the	police.			However,	labour	strikes	and	public	demonstrations	within	the	Settlement	predated	large-scale	industrial	production	activities,	with	nearly	all	of	these	actions	initiated	by	domestic	Chinese	residents	over	either	social	or	labour	issues	that	typically	related	to	poor	treatment,	or	perceived	sociopolitical	injustices.	For	instance,	in	1897,	the	Council	imposed	an	increase	on	 vehicle	 (wheelbarrow)	 taxes;	 in	 response,	 riots	 ensued	 amongst	 domestic	 vehicle	operators.	 The	 incident	 was	 of	 sufficient	 scale	 so	 as	 to	 lead	 the	 Council	 to	 order	 the	Volunteer	Corps	deployed	to	quell	the	riots	(de	Jesus	1909:	244).				
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		In	1925,	one	of	the	largest	and	most	significant	anti-imperialist	mass	movement	protests	in	China	began	in	the	International	Settlement	of	Shanghai.	On	15	May,	a	Chinese	employee	of	a	 Japanese-owned	 cotton	 factory	 on	 strike	 was	 killed	 in	 a	 dispute	 turned	 violent	 with	Japanese	management,	resulting	in	the	arrest	of	several	of	the	workers'	striking	colleagues,	but	none	of	 the	 Japanese	managers	ostensibly	responsible	 for	the	worker's	death.	 Initial	protests	by	workers	and	students	over	this	issue	became	considerably	more	inflamed	when	on	30	May	eleven	people	were	killed	when	the	Municipal	Police	fired	into	a	crowd	of	Chinese	demonstrators	(Bickers	1998:	162).	Violent	rioting	ensued	in	the	aftermath,	and	martial	law	was	ordered	by	the	Council.			After	social	order	was	restored	and	civilian	law	resumed	several	days	later,	an	international	commission	was	constructed	 to	review	the	causes	of	 the	situation	and	assess	blame	and	resolution.	 Notably,	 although	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 injuries	 and	 deaths	 precipitating	 the	movement	 were	 domestic	 Chinese	 residents	 of	 the	 Settlement,	 the	 three-person	international	 commission	 of	 judges	 was	 comprised	 of	 a	 Briton,	 an	 American	 and	 an	Australian.	The	commission's	findings	were	mixed,	with	the	British	and	Australian	judges	finding	the	shootings	by	 the	police	 to	have	been	 justified,	whereas	 the	American	 judge's	opinion	argued	the	Police	structure	needed	comprehensive	reforms,	including	the	removal	of	 the	 chief	 of	 the	 Municipal	 Police	 force.	 Viewing	 the	 findings	 unacceptable,	 the	 May	Thirtieth	 Movement	 led	 to	 a	 spike	 in	 anti-foreign	 sentiment	 within	 China,	 a	 renewed	stridency	 in	 calls	 for	 an	 end	 to	 the	 extraterritoriality	 system,	 and	 a	 relatively	 effective	nationwide	 boycott	 of	 foreign	 imported	 goods.	 Locally,	 many	 extraterritorial-owned	businesses	suffered	in	the	wake	of	the	boycott;	in	addition,	the	incident	increased	pressure	for	Chinese	 representation	on	 the	 Shanghai	Municipal	Council,	 ultimately	 leading	 to	 the	addition	of	three	designated	seats	for	Chinese	representatives	three	years	later	in	1928.		The	racial	biases	 that	afflicted	 the	majority	of	expatriate	residents	were	 instrumental	 in	shaping	the	entirety	of	the	institutional	framework	of	the	Settlement,	including	the	police	force.	 The	 structure	 of	 the	 police	 force	 was	 that	 of	 a	 typical	 imperialist	 colonial-style	institution,	with	an	ingrained	racialist	organisational	structure	from	the	start.	Given	the	size	of	the	foreign	population	compared	to	the	Chinese	population,	the	Council's	initial	intent	to	hire	 one	 foreign	 deputy	 supervisor	 for	 every	 two	 Chinese	 policemen	 was	 financially	impossible,	and	as	such	early	on	the	Municipal	Police	force	turned	to	hiring	Sikhs	to	serve	as	a	middle	layer	of	authority	in	the	police	structure	(Jackson	2012:	1677).	The	hierarchy	of	European	 supervisors	 at	 the	 top,	 with	 Sikh	 constables	 supervising	 local	 Chinese	 hires,	helped	 to	 reinforce	 the	perception	amongst	many	of	 its	 residents	 that	 the	 International	Settlement	 was	 colonial	 in	 nature.	 The	 description	 of	 "the	 Chinese	 Policeman"	 in	 Clark	(1894:	89-90)	is	chilling	in	its	racialist	caricature	of	the	domestic	Chinese	employees	of	the	Settlement's	police	force.			The	 events	 triggering	 the	 May	 Thirtieth	 Movement	 were	 extreme	 examples	 of	 a	 more	underlying	condition	of	police	mistreatment	towards	 the	majority	Chinese	population.	A	general	 reading	 of	 the	 contemporaneous	police	 reports	 and	 related	press	 reports	make	clear	that	Chinese	residents	received	a	small	but	disquieting	level	of	unequal	treatment	by	the	 police	 and	 authorities	 compared	 to	 expatriate	 residents,	 reflective	 of	 the	 racial	inequality	inherent	within	the	Settlement.	While	for	the	most	part	the	Municipal	Police	were	viewed	 by	 both	 expatriate	 and	 domestic	 Chinese	 residents	 as	 performing	 their	 job	adequately,	there	were	reported	cases	of	police	abuse,	especially	of	Chinese	citizens	at	the	hands	 of	 Sikh	 policemen,	 towards	 whom	 the	 local	 populace	 seemingly	 expressed	more	resentment	against	than	toward	the	European	officers	(Jackson	2012:	1691).				
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	Such	events	and	practises	help	to	underscore	the	fact	that	the	foreign	settlements	were	far	from	places	of	exemplary	law	and	order.	Similarly,	there	existed	other	signs	that	undercut	the	perception	that	the	extraterritorial	police	forces	were	able	to	maintain	an	orderly	and	safe	environment	throughout	the	settlements.	For	instance,	the	ambiguous	legal	status	of	the	extraterritorial	settlements	likely	contributed	to	their	use	as	sanctuaries	by	domestic	Chinese	 agents	 who	 engaged	 in	 illegal	 or	 subversive	 activities	 seeking	 to	 escape	 the	jurisdiction	of	domestic	law.	It	is	no	coincidence	that	the	founding	of	the	Chinese	Communist	Party	 in	 July	1921	 took	place	within	 the	French	Concession,	 outside	 the	purview	of	 the	republican	state	apparatus.	The	organised	crime	syndicate	 the	Green	Gang	also	chose	 to	coordinate	its	criminal	activities	out	of	the	French	Concession.	The	settlements	were	not	immune	from	the	corruptive	influence	and	violence	perpetuated	by	the	Green	Gang,	which	became	so	embedded	within	the	socioeconomic	fabric	of	settlements	that	its	membership	became	intertwined	with	the	those	of	the	police	forces	of	both	the	International	Settlement	and	French	Concession,	 including	prior	 to	his	 remove	 in	1923	 the	head	of	 the	 Shanghai	Municipal	Police's	domestic	Chinese	detective	squad	(Martin	1996,	Hunter	2017:	114-115).		In	addition,	neutrality	from	Chinese	internal	politics	was	asserted	only	when	it	served	the	Settlement's	purposes.	During	the	1920s	and	1930s,	for	instance,	support	was	frequently	lent	 to	 the	 Guomindang	 government's	 efforts	 in	 purging	 communist	 supporters	 and	suppressing	student	movements.	In	advance	of	the	infamous	“Shanghai	massacre	of	12	April	1927”	 propagated	 by	 the	 Jiang	 leadership	 to	 eliminate	 communist	 members	 from	 the	Guomindang,	authorities	in	the	International	Settlement	and	the	French	Concession	were	informed	of	the	impending	attack,	and	the	police	forces	of	both	extraterritorial	settlements	actively	stood	by	while	the	massacre	took	place	(Wilbur	1983:	635,	Wakeman	1995a).			These	descriptions	of	support	for	lawless	elements	operating	out	of	the	settlements,	and	examples	of	active	disregard	for	the	rule	of	law	on	the	part	of	the	Municipal	Police	and	other	Settlement	 institutions	 in	 regard	 to	due	process	 and	protection	of	 life	and	 liberty	when	involving	"dangerous"	social	elements	such	as	Communist	Party	members,	should	not	be	simply	viewed	as	minor	caveats	 in	 the	 larger	story	of	 the	extraterritorial	settlements	as	oases	of	peace	and	order	in	an	otherwise	chaotic	domestic-administered	Shanghai.	Rather,	these	 instances	 serve	 to	 underscore	 our	 contention	 that	 private	 property	 and	 contract	rights,	and	the	institutions	that	support	them,	were	far	from	absolute	in	the	setting	of	the	extraterritorial	settlements.				9.5.2.	 Credible	 Commitment	 Mechanisms:	 Enforcing	 a	 Monopoly	 on	 Violence	 via	 an	External	Militia		The	governments	of	the	extraterritorial	settlements	were	able	to	maintain	their	territorial	integrity	in	the	face	of	external	threats	through	two	main	institutional	systems.	First,	as	part	of	"gunboat	diplomacy,"	there	existed	the	implicit	(and	occasional	explicit)	employment	of	military	force	by	European	naval	fleets	patrolling	the	Shanghai	harbour.	The	presence	of	these	foreign	naval	forces,	as	well	as	accompanying	stationed	armed	military	troops,	were	explicitly	granted	to	signatory	foreign	powers	in	several	of	the	treaties	signed	in	the	wake	of	the	Opium	War	and	similar	military	defeats	suffered	by	the	Qing	through	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	 century	 (Wright	1930:	220).	An	 early	 example	of	 the	use	of	 force	 took	place	during	the	First	Battle	of	Shanghai,	fought	as	part	of	the	Taiping	Rebellion	over	the	course	of	the	summer	of	1860	through	the	following	summer.	British	military	commanders	issued	a	warning	 to	 the	Taiping	 from	entering	 the	 city,	 explicitly	highlighting	 the	 concern	with	maintenance	of	a	good	business	climate	for	trade	as	the	rationale	to	threaten	to	wage	war	against	 the	 rebellion	 if	 they	 attacked	 Shanghai.	 On	 26	 May	 1860	 Frederick	 Bruce,	 the	
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superintendent	of	trade	for	Britain,	announced	by	proclamation	that	the	might	of	the	British	military	would	be	directed	to	meet	the	oncoming	Taiping	army	to	protect	property	interests:	"Shanghae	is	a	port	open	to	foreign	trade,	and	the	native	dealers	residing	therein	have	large	transactions	with	the	foreigners	who	resort	to	the	place	to	carry	on	their	business.	Were	it	to	become	the	scene	of	attack	and	civil	war,	commerce	would	receive	a	severe	blow,	and	the	interests	of	those,	whether	foreign	or	native,	who	wish	to	pursue	their	peaceful	avocations	in	quiet,	would	suffer	great	loss.	The	undersigned	will	therefore	call	upon	the	commanders	of	 Her	Majesty's	 naval	 and	military	 authorities	 to	 take	 proper	measures	 to	 prevent	 the	inhabitants	 of	 Shanghae	 from	 being	 exposed	 to	massacre	 and	 pillage,	 and	 to	 lend	 their	assistance	 to	 put	 down	 any	 insurrectionary	movements	 among	 the	 ill-disposed,	 and	 to	protect	the	city	against	any	attack"	(Lindley	1866:	284).	As	noted	in	Chapter	Six,	the	British	and	French	military	forces	carried	through	on	this	proclaimed	threat,	using	their	gunboat	cannons	 to	 fire	 upon	 the	 Taiping	 army	 based	 in	 Pudong,	 eventually	 helping	 lead	 to	 the	withdrawal	of	Rebellion	troops	from	Shanghai.			Overall,	 however,	 going	 forward,	 although	most	 of	 the	major	 treaty	powers	maintained	small	stations	of	soldiers	 in	Shanghai,	 they	were	 rarely	 engaged	 in	military	 actions.	The	implied	threat	of	the	gunboats	was,	ostensibly,	enough	to	keep	most	rebellion,	warlord	or	Chinese	 governmental	 forces	 from	 seriously	 considering	 an	 attack	 on	 the	 foreign	settlements.	 As	 time	 passed,	 however,	 with	 the	 distinct	 exception	 of	 Japan,	 the	 treaty	powers'	commitment	to	use	military	force	in	Shanghai	noticeably	decreased.			Second,	 the	 foreign	 settlement	 governments	 created	 their	 own	 militias	 to	 defend	 their	territory	 from	 external	 attack.	 The	 Shanghai	 Volunteer	 Corps	 was	 formed	 in	 1853	 in	response	to	the	potential	threat	to	the	foreign	settlements	from	the	Small	Swords	Society's	attack	 on	 Shanghai.	 As	 described	 in	 detail	 by	 Pott	 (1928:	 60-65),	 the	 initial	 volunteers	consisted	of	about	75	residents,	who	joined	about	200	British	soldiers	and	100	American	marines	 to	defend	the	 foreign	settlements,	both	against	 the	rebels,	and	against	 Imperial	troops	stationed	nearby,	who	frequently	entered	the	settlements	to	steal	goods.	The	Corps	was	disbanded	after	the	domestic	section	of	the	city	was	retaken	by	Imperial	forces,	but	constituted	 again	 in	 1861	when	 Shanghai	was	 again	 under	 attack	 by	 the	 Taiping	 army.	Defence	 of	 the	 Settlement	 took	 much	 of	 the	 minutes	 of	 the	 following	 year's	 Shanghai	Municipal	Council	annual	meeting.	Nearly	half	of	the	1862	Annual	Report	was	concerned	with	 issues	 related	 to	 additional	 defence	 fortifications,	 including	 excavating	 part	 of	Soochow	(Suzhou)	Creek,	building	guard	houses,	and	purchasing	guns	and	uniforms	for	the	newly	constituted	Shanghai	Volunteer	Corps	(NCDN	5	April	1862).	By	1870,	 the	Council	assumed	the	full	responsibility	of	the	Corps,	and	over	time	greater	resources	were	allocated	to	 the	 militia	 force,	 including	 cavalry.	 In	 1906,	 a	 group	 of	 leading	 Chinese	 merchants	residing	 in	 the	 Settlement	 instituted	 a	 program	 to	 facilitate	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 "Chinese	Physical	Association"	of	young	Chinese	male	residents	of	the	Settlement	to	later	incorporate	into	the	larger	Corps.	By	the	end	of	the	year,	a	unit	of	Chinese	volunteers	had	formally	been	merged	into	to	Corps,	labelled	the	"Chinese	Company"	(SMC	1906:	21-26).		By	the	mid-1930s,	the	Corps	membership	had	risen	to	over	2,000,	including	4	battalions,	a	horse	cavalry	and	armoured	car	company,	and	active	training	exercises	were	continually	conducted	 (SMC	1935:	77).	 Such	 a	 force	 represented	 considerable	 size	 considering	 that	there	 was	 only	 slightly	 over	 12,000	 men	 aged	 17	 and	 above	 of	 foreign	 origin	 in	 the	Settlement,	and	 that	about	1,800	of	 the	Corps	came	 from	their	ranks,	with	 the	over	500	British	men	forming	the	largest	contingent	from	one	country.	By	this	time,	the	force	did	also	include	243	Chinese,	although,	given	that	there	were	over	525,000	adult	males	living	in	the	International	Settlement	by	1935,	this	figure	in	percentage	terms	was	quite	marginal.					
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	The	overall	effectiveness	of	the	Shanghai	Volunteer	Corps,	combined	with	the	implied	threat	of	 foreign	 powers'	 gunboats,	 served	 to	 provide	 fairly	 safe	 harbour	 for	 the	 Settlement	throughout	the	period.	The	foreign	settlements	in	Shanghai	never	experienced	the	type	of	attack	that	Tientsin	(Tianjin)'s	foreign	concession	areas	suffered	during	the	Boxer	Uprising,	when	that	treaty	port's	foreign-controlled	areas	were	heavily	shelled	and	significant	loss	of	life	occurred	within	(Brown	1902).	The	International	Settlement	continually	claimed	a	right	to	exclude	Chinese	troops	and	police	from	the	area,	to	which	Chinese	authorities	typically	begrudgingly	 acquiesced	 (SMC	 1899:	 71).	 The	 Settlement's	 military	 resources	 proved	successful	in	preventing	domestic	Chinese	government	troops	from	entering	the	Settlement	during	episodes	of	civil	war;	the	Council	mobilised	the	Corps	in	1913,	1924,	1925	and	1927	in	response	to	the	proximity	of	hostilities	involving	domestic	troops	engaged	in	civil	wars,	even	disarming	 and	 interning	 surrendering	domestic	 troops	of	 various	battling	warlord	factions	into	concentration	camps	inside	the	Settlement	borders	in	1924	and	1925	(Kotenev	1927:	116-121,	Crow	1933:	142).			The	 International	Settlement,	comprised	of	area	8.7	square	miles,	along	with	 the	French	Concession	laying	slightly	to	the	south	occupied	3.9	square	miles,	came	to	be	dwarfed	in	size	by	 the	Guomindang	government	municipality	of	 the	Chinese	Municipality	of	Greater	Shanghai,	which	was	made	up	approximately	320	square	miles.	As	Chamberlain	(1931:	146)	notes,	 "There	 is	no	natural	barrier	between	the	areas;	persons	and	goods	are	constantly	passing	back	and	forth	from	one	to	the	other."	As	such,	there	were	no	city	walls,	no	fortified	defences	around	the	Settlement.	In	a	sense,	the	Settlement's	lack	of	physical	barriers	was	a	sign	of	its	power.	The	power	of	the	Shanghai	Volunteer	Corps	was	in	many	aspects	primarily	symbolic—certainly,	the	actual	physical	guns,	ammunitions	and	cavalry	were	themselves	important;	but	it	was	much	more	the	implied	threat	of	imperialist	power	implicitly	behind	the	Corps	that	provided	its	true	fortification.			The	 International	Settlement	generally	strove	 to	stay	uninvolved	 in	 the	Chinese	 internal	politics	and	repeatedly	asserted	neutrality	when	conflicts	broke	out	between	factions,	and	in	 most	 cases	 managed	 to	 stop	 government	 as	 well	 as	 anti-government	 troops	 from	accessing	 its	 territory.	 Neutrality	 was	 first	 asserted	 in	 the	 Taiping	 Rebellion,	 and	 then	subsequently	 in	 the	 1911	 Revolution	 and	 in	 the	 Sino-Japanese	 Wars.	 The	 assertion	 of	neutrality	 for	 a	 leased	 area	 within	 a	 country	 had	 no	 true	 legal	 basis.	 Nevertheless,	 the	precedent	continued	and	was	respected	to	a	large	extent	by	the	republican	governments,	and	later	by	the	Japanese	military	to	a	large	degree	until	the	full	breakout	of	the	Pacific	War.		Overall,	the	Municipal	Council	placed	a	tremendous	importance	on	the	maintenance	of	law	and	 order	 and	 the	 protection	 of	 business	 property.	 Outlays	 on	 external	 and	 internal	mechanisms	to	maintain	order	represented	an	increasing	share	of	the	budgeted	spending	by	 the	 Council,	 with	 "the	 special	 position	 of	 the	 International	 Settlement	 call[ing]	 for	unusually	heavy	expenditures	on	military	and	police	protection"	(Lockwood	1934:	1036).	In	 1907,	 for	 instance,	 the	 Council	 spent	 over	 547,000	 taels	 on	 police,	 fire	 and	military	protection,	or	a	little	under	29	per	cent	of	its	1.9	million	taels	of	total	revenues	received;	by	1929	over	4.7	million	yuan	went	to	police,	fire	and	military	protection,	or	a	little	under	40	per	cent	of	12	million	in	revenues;	by	1935	these	figures	had	risen	to	over	12	million	yuan	accounting	for	over	half	of	the	23	million	in	revenues	(SMC	1907:	240-242;	SMC	1929:	337,	347-351;	SMC	1935:	286-291).	Elected	by	the	ratepayers	of	the	Settlement,	the	Shanghai	Municipal	 Council's	 decisions	 therefore	 represented	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 ratepayers,	embodying	the	wealthy	and	landed	interests;	i.e.,	those	with	the	most	private	property.	As	such,	it	is	hardly	surprising	that	significant	portions	of	Council	monies	were	spent	on	tools	ensuring	the	protection	of	private	property	rights.				
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9.5.2.1.			Perceived	Oases	of	Peace		The	 emphasis	 on	 defence-related	 expenditures	 assisted	 the	 Council	 in	 safeguarding	 its	autonomy	and	interests,	as	well	as	enforcing	the	prohibition	of	domestic	Chinese	police	and	military	authorities	from	operating	within	the	Settlement.	By	application	of	three	devices–implicit	foreign	power	gunboat	presence,	and	explicit	external	and	internal	martial	power–	the	International	Settlement	enjoyed	relative	freedom	from	the	turmoil	that	was	otherwise	widespread	 in	China	 throughout	much	of	 the	 late-imperial	 and	 republican	period.	Aside	from	the	early	attack	of	the	Taiping	rebels	and	several	sporadic	incidents	typically	involving	strike-related	 riots,	 the	 International	 Settlement	 was	 a	 safe	 haven	with	 law	 and	 order	compared	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 country,	 including	 the	 neighbouring	 domestic	 Shanghai	municipality.	Warlords,	revolutionaries,	and	Japanese	military	invasions—up	until	1937—all	effectively	stopped	at	the	borders	of	the	Settlement.	Predatory	practises	such	as	looting	and	pillaging	by	local	bandits	or	warlords,	or	forced	conscription	of	labour	or	service	by	government	forces,	prevalent	in	much	the	rest	of	China,	did	not	occur	in	the	Settlement.			The	 perception	 of	 the	 foreign	 settlements	 as	 oases	 of	 safety	 within	 a	 more	 dangerous	domestic	political	environment	appears	to	have	been	well-recognised	by	contemporaneous	domestic	economic	agents,	leading	to	continual	inward	migration	into	the	settlements	by	Chinese	nationals,	punctuated	by	sharp	influxes	of	refugees	during	periods	of	acute	political	strife.	 It	 is	 noteworthy,	 however,	 that	 the	 extraterritorial	 settlements	 were	 initially	intended	by	both	the	applying	foreign	Consuls	and	the	granting	Daotai	to	serve	as	sections	of	the	city	to	house	only	foreign	residents.	By	decree	of	the		(Land	Charter)	in	1845	handed	down	by	 the	Qing	Court	via	the	 local	Daotai,	Chinese	residents	were	required	to	reside	within	 the	 confines	of	 the	walled	 city,	 referred	 to	Nan-shi,	while	 foreigners	were	segregated	 into	 their	respective	 foreign	settlements.	However,	 the	political	violence	and	unrest	surrounding	the	Small	Swords	uprising	in	that	occurred	in	Shanghai	from	1853	to	1855	drove	thousands	of	refugees	from	the	local	surrounding	neighbourhoods	outside	the	walled	domestic	city	into	the	foreign	settlements	for	safety.	Prior	to	1853,	only	about	five	hundred	Chinese	nationals	were	estimated	to	have	been	residents	of	the	foreign	settlements,	but	by	1854	this	number	had	increased	dramatically	to	over	twenty	thousand,	after	a	large	number	of	 domestic	Chinese	were	 allowed	to	 remain	 residing	 in	 the	British	 Settlement.	Initially	met	with	considerable	apprehensive	on	the	part	of	many	European	residents	(de	Jesus	1909:	95-104),	the	number	of	Chinese	residents	continued	to	steadily	grow.	By	1855,	Qing	officials	formalised	the	precedent	by	issuing	a	statement	that	any	Chinese	wishing	to	live	in	the	foreign	settlements	needed	to	apply	to	the	relevant	foreign	consul	of	the	foreign	landlord,	and	undertake	to	"conform	strictly	to	the	land	regulations	and	contribute	his	share	to	any	general	assessments"	(Advocate	1927:	156).	The	population	increase	was	partially	accepted	because	 it	 brought	 about	 considerable	 economic	benefits	 to	 foreign	 landlords;	Hauser	(1940:	55-61)	documents	the	resultant	spike	in	real	estate	prices	and	rents	in	1855	that	accompanied	the	initial	population	increase.	When	Taiping	rebel	forces	marched	on	Shanghai	 in	1862,	 another	major	wave	of	domestic	Chinese	 refugees,	 numbering	nearly	500,000,	fled	into	the	foreign	settlements	for	protection	(SMC	1863).		Over	the	succeeding	decades,	increasing	numbers	of	Chinese	residents	chose	to	move	into	Shanghai's	extraterritorial	settlements.	As	shown	in	Figure	1.2	in	Chapter	One,	the	relative	domestic	and	expatriate	populations	comprising	the	International	Settlement	over	the	late-imperial	and	early-republican	period	indicates	a	continual	increase	in	the	size	the	domestic	population,	 with	 Chinese	 residents	 making	 up	 no	 less	 than	 ninety-five	 per	 cent	 of	 the	Settlement's	total	population	for	the	entirety	of	the	period.	Occasional	episodes	of	outward	migration,	such	as	in	1900	after	the	Boxer	Uprising	(SMC	1900:	158)	were	relatively	rare,	and	temporary	in	nature.	The	perception	of	Shanghai's	foreign	settlements	as	oases	of	peace	within	a	turbulent	domestic	Chinese	political	environment	continued	long	after	the	early	period	following	the	Short	Swords	and	Taiping	rebellions;	even	post-1937	after	the	start	of	
	 245 
open	military	hostilities	between	the	Japanese	military	and	the	Guomindang	government,	the	perception	of	 the	 settlements	 as	 areas	of	 relative	 safety	drew	people	 into	 Shanghai,	continuing	 to	 reshape	 the	 economy	 of	 the	 city.	 As	 Bloch	 (1941:	 31)	 relays,	 "The	International	Settlement	of	Shanghai...	has	now	become	a	center	of	attraction	 to	Chinese	peasants.	From	Japanese	oppression	to	which	they	are	subject	at	home,	they	escape	into	Shanghai	factory	life.	The	sharp	decline	in	the	Shanghai	real	wage	level	thus	mirrors	to	a	large	extent	the	decline	in	the	Chinese	peasants'	living	standard	under	Japanese	rule	and	the	newly	increased	competition	for	jobs	in	Shanghai's	industries."		Further,	it	was	not	only	individuals	who	came	seeking	the	protection	perceived	to	be	offered	by	the	settlements'	internal	and	external	institutional	mechanisms	promising	a	monopoly	on	 violence,	 hence	 limiting	 the	 destruction	 to	 life	 and	 property	 by	 violence	 potential	perpetrated	by	nonstate	actors.	Entrepreneurs	and	major	business	leaders	too	identified	the	settlements	as	areas	of	safety	that	would	better	protect	their	private	assets	than	what	the	domestic	institutional	environment	could	offer.	As	Feetham	(1931)	notes	in	his	report,	the	 Settlement	 was	 the	 not	 only	 the	 principal	 banking	 centre	 in	 China,	 with	 the	 most	important	Chinese	banks	having	their	head	offices	there,	including	the	Central	Bank	of	China.	Johnstone	 (1937:947)	 echoes	 this	 concept	when	observing,	 "The	Shanghai	 International	Settlement...	 contains	 headquarters	 for	 most	 of	 the	 foreign	 banks	 and	 business	 houses	operating	in	China.	A	large	proportion	of	foreign	and	Chinese	industries	are	also	located	in	these	foreign-controlled	areas,	where	they	are	generally	free	from	Chinese	jurisdiction	and	taxation,	and	where	their	property	is	under	the	protection	of	foreign	guns."				9.5.2.2.		Diminishing	Capacity	of	Monopoly	on	Force:	1932	and	1937	Incidents			The	ability	of	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	to	maintain	the	perception	of	the	International	Settlement	 as	 an	 oasis	 within	 the	 otherwise	 militarily	 dangerous	 larger	 domestically-administered	municipal	Shanghai	environment	began	to	falter	after	the	events	following	the	Shanghai	Incident	()	of	28	January	1932.	Public	anger	in	China	toward	the	Japanese	in	the	aftermath	of	the	September	1931	Mukden	Incident	and	the	subsequent	occupation	of	Northeastern	 China	 by	 Japanese	military	 forces	 led	 to	mass	 protests	 and	 boycotting	 of	Japanese	 goods.	 Clashes	 and	 discord	 between	 Japanese	 soldiers	 and	 Chinese	 citizens	became	common,	particularly	 in	Shanghai	given	the	city's	large	 Japanese	population	and	Japanese	military	presence.		By	this	time	frame,	Japanese	residents	now	represented	the	largest	number	of	foreigners	in	the	International	Settlement,	with	7,169	Japanese,	out	of	a	total	of	a	total	foreign	population	of	18,519,	with	4,822	British	the	second-most	populous	nationality	(SMC	1915:	162B).	In	1915,	 the	 Japanese	obtained	one	designated	 seat	 on	 the	Council,	and	by	1925,	 they	had	secured	two	seats.	The	Japanese	population	continued	to	rise	to	exceed	18,000	in	1930,	with	the	vast	majority	of	the	 Japanese	population	living	 in	the	Hongkou	(")	section	of	the	Settlement	(Contemporary	Japan	1936),	 leading	to	its	role	as	the	centre	of	Japanese	civil,	political	and	military	presence	in	Shanghai.		On	 20	 January	 1932,	 a	 fight	 between	 several	 apparently	 drunk	 Japanese	 monks	 of	 an	extremist	nationalistic	sect	and	Chinese	workers	triggered	a	military	action	from	Japan	on	Shanghai.	In	response,	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	declared	a	state	of	emergency	(FRUS	793.94/3970.	Annex	“Statement	Issued	by	Mr.	Murai,	Consul	General	of	Japan	at	Shanghai,	on	January	29,	1932”).	From	the	beginning	of	the	incident,	the	Japanese	leadership	provided	assurance	there	was	"no	intention	of	interference	with	the	rights	or	interests	of	any	foreign	powers	 in	 Shanghai"	 (FRUS	 793.94/3679.	 28	 January	 1932).	 Notwithstanding	 such	assurances,	Japanese	forces	started	using	parts	of	the	International	Settlement	as	a	base	for	military	manoeuvres,	causing	much	consternation	to	the	American	ambassador	in	Shanghai	(FRUS	793.94/3758f,	31	January	1932;	793.4265,	15	February	1932).	Written	protests	by	
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the	American	and	the	British	consulates	to	the	Japanese	military	authorities	in	Shanghai	and	the	Japanese	government	in	Tokyo	were	met	with	assurances	that	there	was	"no	intention	to	cause	damage	to	foreign	life	and	property"	(FRUS	793.94/4311,	19	February	1932).			Tuchman	(1971)	describes	the	bombing	campaign	as	"the	first	terror	bombing	of	a	civilian	population"	in	China.	Despite	urgings	from	the	American	and	British	consuls	for	all	sides	to	forgo	aggression,	Japanese	military	forces	continued	fighting	and	brought	in	an	additional	3,000	troops,	 housed	within	 the	Hongkou	 section	of	 the	 International	 Settlement	(FRUS	793.94/4014a.	6	February	1932).	As	Chinese	military	forces	arrived	on	the	scene,	Japanese	forces	would	further	increase	to	15,000	land	troops	and	3,000	marines	in	the	following	days	(FRUS	793.94/4201.	15	February	1932).	The	fighting	within	Shanghai	lasted	several	weeks,	and	 Japanese	military	 action	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 China	 continued	 until	May	when	a	peace	agreement	was	finally	brokered	by	the	Western	powers.			The	damage	to	the	city	from	the	1932	Shanghai	Incident	was	considerable,	with	over	14,000	Chinese	casualties,	including	more	than	10,000	civilian	deaths	(Mitter	2013:	57).	However,	as	 airstrikes	 and	 fighting	 primarily	 took	 place	 outside	 of	 the	 foreign	 settlements,	 their	impact	 was	 unevenly	 felt.	 The	 vast	 majority	 of	 the	 damage	 occurred	 in	 the	 domestic-administered	sections	of	the	city,	with	relatively	little	impact	experienced	within	the	foreign	settlements,	other	than	the	mass	influx	of	refugees.	That	said,	while	there	was	little	physical	damage	to	the	International	Settlement,	business	and	trade	slowed	tremendously.	The	stock	and	 bond	markets	 closed	 for	 several	weeks,	 and	 even	 after	 they	 reopened,	 trading	was	muted	given	uncertainty	over	the	political	turmoil.			The	events	surrounding	the	1932	Shanghai	Incident	underscore	two	main	issues.	First,	as	with	prior	instances	involving	civil	strife	and	military	violence	that	occurred	in	the	city's	history,	 the	 perception	 amongst	 the	 population	 that	 the	 foreign	 settlements	 provided	greater	protection	of	 life	 and	property	 from	civil	 strife	 than	did	domestically-controlled	areas	 of	 the	 city	 was	 underscored	 as	 the	 settlements	 experienced	 a	 massive	 inflow	 of	refugees	seeking	security	once	fighting	broke	out.			Second,	the	year	1932	represented	a	beginning	of	the	loss	of	sovereignty	and	control	over	the	International	Settlement	by	the	Municipal	Council,	and	a	breakdown	of	the	“rule	of	law.”	As	 a	direct	 result	 of	 the	 Shanghai	 Incident,	 the	 local	 Japanese	 took	direct	 control	 of	 the	Hongkou	 district,	with	 law	and	 protection	 enforced	 to	 varying	degrees	 by	 the	 Japanese	Consular	 Police	 and	 Japanese	members	 of	 the	 Shanghai	Municipal	 Police.	 The	 Shanghai	Amalgamated	 Neighbours	 Union,	 a	 militant	 group	 of	 Japanese	 shop	 owners	 and	 small	business	 interests	 in	 the	 Hongkou	 district	 actively	 patrolled	 the	 streets	 of	 the	 district,	frequently	intimidating	and	harassing	outsiders	(Review	of	Japanese	Affairs	1936:	452).		In	response	to	the	perceived	weakness	on	the	par	of	the	SMC	internal	policing	apparatus,	Japanese	military	forces	began	to	act	in	ways	that	disregarded	the	sense	of	"rule	of	law"	that	the	International	Settlement	had	prided	itself	in	upholding.	An	example	occurring	shortly	after	 the	 Shanghai	 Incident	 came	 in	 the	 aftermath	of	 a	 terrorist	 attack	 in	Hongkou	Park	where	a	large	Japanese	crowd	had	gathered	to	celebrate	the	Emperor's	birthday	on	29	April	1932.	A	single	Korean	assailant	threw	a	hand	grenade	that	resulted	in	serious	injuries	to	the	leaders	of	the	celebration,	as	well	as	the	death	of	the	president	of	the	Japanese	Residents	Association.	In	response,	the	Japanese	military	police	went	through	the	concession	areas,	arresting	and	beating	Korean	residents,	without	due	process	of	law.	According	to	a	report	by	the	China	Weekly	Review	(7	May	1932:	3),	there	were	many	instances	of	Japanese	police	officers	beating	the	elderly	and	women	trying	to	ascertain	the	location	of	the	Koreans	who	were	thought	to	be	hiding	in	American	missionaries	or	at	the	homes	of	American	or	British	friends.	In	addition,	over	the	protests	lodged	by	the	Municipal	Council,	the	Japanese	military	marched	 10,000	 troops	 along	with	 heavy	 artillery	 and	 tanks	 through	 the	 streets	 of	 the	International	Settlement	the	following	week	(China	Weekly	Review	7	May	1932:	4).	
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	By	 1936,	 the	 Shanghai	 Municipal	 Council	 had	 already	 lost	 effective	 control	 over	 the	Hongkou	section	of	the	Settlement,	as	well	as	the	ability	to	levy	taxes	to	Hongkou	residents,	as	the	Japanese	military	presence	in	the	district	had	grown	in	size	since	the	1932	Shanghai	Incident.	As	a	British	observer	wrote	at	the	time:	"Of	the	fifty	different	nationalities	which	go	to	make	up	foreign	population	of	the	international	settlement	the	Japanese	alone	have	so	definitely	made	for	themselves	a	special	racial	quarter,	have	so	deliberately	and	thoroughly	organised	themselves	as	a	separate	entity	apart	from	and	almost,	at	times,	in	opposition	to	all	 the	 others.	 It	 is	 a	 development	 which	 goes	 altogether	 contrary	 to	 the	 international	conception	 of	 the	 settlement,	 and	 threatens	 to	 break	 up	 the	 spirit	 of	 international	 co-operation	 which	 has	 so	 far	 distinguished	 its	 administration...	 Hongkew,	 is	 constantly	patrolled	by	pockets	of	Japanese	marines	and	the	Japanese	military	are	ready,	I	had	almost	written	anxious,	to	turn	out	at	a	moment's	notice	to	'assist'	the	settlement	police	in	the	task	of	maintaining	order.	A	Chinese	boy	on	the	roof	of	a	house	throws	a	stone	at	a	cat	and	the	stone	 accidentally	 rebounds	off	 a	wall	and	drops	on	 the	 shoulder	of	 a	 Japanese	marine.	Immediately	 the	 Japanese	military	 are	 on	 the	 spot,	 a	 foreign	 police	 inspector	 has	 to	 be	summoned,	 and	 an	 utterly	 trivial	 occurrence	 is	 magnified	 out	 of	 all	 proportion	 by	 this	unjustifiable	military	interference	in	the	management	of	the	district.	At	frequent	intervals,	too,	 the	 Japanese	 parade	 their	 troops	 through	 the	 streets,	 on	 one	 occasion	 practically	'occupying'	the	area	for	the	purpose	of	their	manoeuvres.	...	The	deliberate	organisation	of	the	community	along	its	present	lines	and	the	manner	in	which	Hongkew	is	being	converted	into	a	special	area	where	the	Japanese	military	claim	equal	authority	with	the	Municipal	Council	is	not	a	healthy	portent	for	the	future"	(Spectator	18	September	1936:	454).		An	 important	symbol	 of	 loss	of	 sovereignty	of	 the	Council	was	 the	Council's	 inability	 to	control	the	actions	of	the	Japanese	military	within	the	Settlement,	except	so	far	as	to	issue	expressions	 of	 "displeasure."	 Public	 anger	 among	 the	 Chinese	 at	 the	 Japanese	 military	presence	in	Shanghai	led	to	various	incidents	of	terrorist	bombings	by	activists	against	the	Japanese	troops.	On	3	December	1936,	when	the	Japanese	troops	of	about	6,000	marched	through	 the	 International	 Settlement,	 a	 grenade	was	 thrown	 by	 a	 Chinese,	 killing	 three	Japanese	soldiers	and	wounding	more.	Japanese	officials	immediately	put	on	a	search	in	the	International	Settlement	and	on	the	same	day,	demanded	the	Council	that	Japanese	troops	be	allowed	to	pass	through	the	International	Settlement	without	prior	notice.	By	April	1937,	both	the	International	Settlement	and	the	French	Concession	had	accepted	agreements	with	the	 Japanese	military	 to	 allow	 the	 Japanese	 troops	 access;	 additional	 liberties	 taken	 by	Japanese	military	forces	of	patrolling	the	streets	of	the	Settlement	and	preventing	Municipal	Police	from	performing	their	normal	duties	were	perfunctorily	met	with	protestations	from	the	Council	and	equally	perfunctory	assurances	by	Japanese	civilian	authorities	that	steps	were	being	taken	to	avoid	similar	future	events	nonetheless	continued	to	occur	throughout	the	year	(SMC	1937:	17,	Shanghai	Concessions	Archives	2001:	104).		The	 outbreak	 of	 open	 warfare	 in	 August	 1937	 signified	 another	 significant	 loss	 of	sovereignty	 by	 the	 Municipal	 Council.	 To	 begin	 with,	 unlike	 at	 any	 other	 time	 in	 the	Settlement's	history,	the	physical	toll	of	war	directly	caused	severe	and	extensive	loss	of	life	and	property	 inside	 the	 International	 Settlement	 itself.	 Contemporaneous	 reports	 tell	 of	horrendous	 loss	of	life	to	 the	city,	both	within	 the	International	Settlement	and	without,	from	bombs	and	artillery	fire.	The	China	Journal	(September	1937:	3),	an	English	language	monthly,	described	the	situation,	when	carnage	came	to	"streets	and	foreshore	at	the	time	were	packed	tight	with	a	mass	of	refugees	from	the	Chinese	area	of	Chapei	[Zhabei]	and	Kiangwan	[Jiangwan]	seeking	safety	in	the	International	Settlement.	But	in	the	afternoon	the	same	day	was	to	bring	home,	as	never	before,	to	the	Shanghai	people,	who	have	many	times	during	the	past	two	decades	seen	it	at	their	very	doors,	what	modern	warfare	really	means...."	Bombs	were	dropped	on	 the	Palace	Hotel,	 "demolishing	 the	upper	stories	and	killing	a	 large	number	of	Chinese	 there,	 the	other	 landing	 in	Nanking	Road	between	the	
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Palace	Hotel	and	the	Cathay	Hotel,	dealing	out	death	and	destruction	amongst	the	crowds	of	 Chinese	 refugees,	 largely	 women	 and	 children,	 blowing	 out	 the	 windows	 of	 the	sumptuous	shops	that	line	the	street	in	this	area,	and	setting	fire	to	numerous	motor	cars.	Several	 foreigners	 also	 were	 killed	 and	 others	 injured	 at	 this	 spot."	 The	 journal	 also	reported	on	the	bomb	falling	near	"the	junction	of	Tibet	Road	with	Avenue	Edward	VII,	at	all	times	Shanghai's	most	crowded	corner	and	particularly	so	at	this	moment	with	the	huge	influx	of	refugees….	The	result	was	a	scene	of	slaughter	that	has	probably	never	before	been	witnessed	by	man."	Such	devastation	was	to	be	repeated	several	days	later	when	bombs	fell	on	Nanjing	Road	and	destroyed	parts	of	some	of	Shanghai's	most	prominent	department	stores,	including	Wing	On	Department	Store,	killing	an	estimated	two	hundred	people.			The	economic	effect	of	the	war	proved	significant.	The	extraterritorial-run	stock	exchange	remained	effectively	closed	for	months,	with	little	trading	taking	place;	the	domestic-run	stock	exchange	was	permanently	closed.	Weekly	Share	Reports	published	by	the	Shanghai	Stock	Exchange	in	October	1937	indicated	market	activity	remained	at	a	complete	standstill:			1	October:	"There	is	about	as	much	movement	in	the	market	as	there	appears	to	be	in	the	local	war	although	the	latter	makes	considerably	more	noise	about	it.	The	conviction	that	the	struggle	is	likely	to	be	prolonged	gathers	strength	as	the	days	go	by	and	although	Shanghai	would	gain	enormously	were	the	theatre	of	war	to	shift	even	a	score	of	miles	from	its	gates	there	can	be	little	real	recovery	in	trade	until	there	is	peace	once	more...	there	is	naturally	very	little	investment	demand."		15	October:	"Another	week	of	almost	complete	idleness	was	experienced	on	the	Stock	Exchange…	The	Settlement	is	still	rocked	from	time	to	time	by	bombing	and	shell	fire	and	every	day	casualties	in	the	International	Settlement	are	recorded...	The	greatest	bar	to	trade,	however	still	continues	with	the	moratorium	of	Chinese	Banks	 and	 it	 is	 indeed	 surprising	 that	 the	 powers	 that	 be	 allow	 this	position	to	continue."		22	October:	"...we	have	once	again	to	report	a	week	of	practical	stagnation.	There	does	not	appear	to	be	any	improvement	of	consequence	in	the	general	situation,	the	International	Settlement	continues	to	be	surrounded	by	armed	forces	and	ceaseless	gunfire	and	bombing	are	the	order	of	the	day."		Writing	 of	 the	 period	 following	 the	 invasion,	 Barnett	 (1941:112)	describes,	 "Shanghai's	great	 industrial	 resources	were	 either	destroyed,	disabled	or	starved	 for	 raw	materials;	Shanghai's	commercial	 life	was	at	a	standstill;	and	the	threat	to	life	and	property	was	so	great	that	those	with	liquid	capital	sought	to	disperse	it	to	safer	regions,	either	in	China	or	abroad."	 Overall,	 the	 Battle	 of	 Shanghai	 signified	 a	 stunning	 inability	 of	 the	 Council	 to	protect	the	loss	of	property	and	life	within	its	borders.	The	economic	and	property	damaged	suffered	 within	 the	 Settlement	 was	 considerable;	 the	 Council's	 yearend	 Annual	 Report	estimated	 over	 $7.4	million	 in	 damages	 to	 properties	within	 the	 Northern	 and	 Eastern	Districts	of	the	Settlement	alone	(SMC	1937:	268).		Yet	 the	 severity	 of	 the	 military	 violence	 and	 economic	 damage	 was,	 relative	 to	 that	experienced	 in	 the	domestic	 sections	of	 the	 city,	 considerably	 less,	 and	 the	 settlements'	status	as	safe	havens	accordingly	returned	as	hostilities	within	the	city	died	down	within	the	end	of	the	year,	especially	as	worsening	fighting	took	place	in	the	broader	China	theatre.	Barnett	(1941:112)	notes	how	the	capital	exodus	now	reversed	itself,	as	seeking	safety,	it	again	 found	concessional	Shanghai	to	be	 the	relative	safest	home	within	China:	 "when	 it	became	evident	that	the	foreign	areas	in	Shanghai	were	to	remain	safe	from	danger	and	free	from	wartime	political	control,	the	process	[of	capital	flight]	was	reversed—rich	refugees	and	liquid	funds	from	all	over	China	began	to	return	to	Shanghai.	…Shanghai	became	an	area	where	investors	began	to	put	their	money	in	goods	or	industries."	As	the	fighting	ended	in	Shanghai,	 the	 Japanese	military	 occupied	 all	 areas	 of	 Shanghai	 except	 the	 International	Settlement	and	French	Concession.		
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The	inability	of	the	Council	to	prevent	the	military	violence	of	August	1937	from	impacting	the	 property	 and	 lives	 of	 its	 residents	 underscored	 the	 increasing	 deterioration	 of	 the	Council's	sovereign	power	vis-a-vis	the	Japanese	military.	Although	formal	hostilities	within	Shanghai	ended	by	October,	anti-Japanese	incidents	continued	to	be	carried	out	within	the	Settlement	by	groups	of	Chinese	residents.	Such	actions	were	cited	as	rationale	by	Japanese	military	authorities	to	exert	greater	control	within	the	Settlement.	On	12	November	1937,	the	local	Japanese	military	leadership	presented	a	list	of	demands	to	the	Council	to	suppress	anti-Japanese	activities,	including	shuttering	anti-Japanese	organisations	in	the	Settlement,	evicting	Chinese	 governmental	 officials	and	 representatives,	 and	 forbidding	any	Chinese	government	news	or	telecommunications.	While	the	Council	 initially	attempted	to	refuse	the	order	by	declaring	the	Settlement	would	remain	"neutral"	in	the	on-going	Sino-Japanese	conflict	(Jackson	2017:88),	the	ability	of	the	Council	to	enforce	a	free	and	open	environment	that	 respected	 property	 rights	 based	 on	 rule	 of	 law	 was	 severely	 compromised.	 Soon	thereafter,	a	number	of	private	Chinese	language	newspapers	that	had	been	operating	in	the	International	Settlement	were	closed	down,	with	newspapers	such	as	ShunPao	and	Ta	
Kung	Pao	suspended.	A	few	Chinese	newspapers	and	journals,	such	as	Meiri	yibao	($),	and	Wenhui	Bao	()	changed	their	corporate	registration	and	paid	British	nationals	to	become	 nominal	 owners	 to	 avoid	 Japanese	 harassment.	 These	 too,	 however,	were	 shut	down	by	the	following	year	(Hanwell	1938:	170-171).		Additional	disintegration	of	the	International	Settlement's	institutional	structure	was	also	reflected	in	damage	to	the	integrity	of	the	Settlement's	legal	system.	Whewell	(2015:	210-212),	 for	 instance,	describes	a	criminal	case	 in	October	1939	where	 Japanese	police	and	military	personnel	coerced	and	 intimidated	witnesses.	The	occurrence	created	a	climate	undermining	 the	 supposed	 independent	 and	 objective	 administration	 of	 justice	 by	 the	consular	courts:	 "If	 the	 Japanese	were	 interfering	with	incidents	and	witness	statements	how	could	consular	jurisdiction	reliably	operate?"			Friedman	(1940:	36)	highlights	one	of	the	ancillary	impacts	the	1937	war	had	on	Shanghai's	economy,	drawing	attention	 to	 the	 fact	that	 the	activities	of	 the	Whangpoo	Conservancy	Board—the	multi-national	engineering	enterprise	created	in	1912	responsible	for	dredging	the	sand	bars	that	had	previously	plagued	shipping	activities	along	the	Huangpu	River—had	been	suspended	since	August	1937	after	the	Japanese	military	seized	the	Conservancy's	ships	and	equipment,	greatly	disrupting	"the	vital	role	that	dredging	plays	in	the	economic	life	of	Shanghai."	In	January	1940,	the	Japanese	military	authorities	agreed	to	restart	the	Board,	but	only	after	Japanese	military	personnel	were	given	positions	on	the	board	and	all	Chinese	 staff	were	 replaced	 with	 Japanese	 engineers.	 Effective	 control	 of	 the	 economic	lifeblood	of	the	city,	shipping,	thus	came	to	be	held	by	the	Japanese	military.		From	1937	to	April	1941,	the	Council	continued	to	operate	those	areas	of	the	Settlement	still	under	its	control,	which	now	excluded	the	Hongkou	district.	Much	of	the	activity	of	the	Council	centred	on	managing	the	huge	influx	of	refugees	that	had	poured	into	the	Settlement	to	seek	shelter	from	the	war.	The	Shanghai	Journal	(September	1937)	estimated	more	than	one	million	Chinese	refugees	entered	the	extraterritorial	settlements	over	the	course	of	a	month.	The	Council	struggled	to	provide	adequate	services	in	the	wake	of	the	economic	and	social	 problems	 that	 grew	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 refugee	 inflow	While	 solid	 economic	growth	 did	 return	 by	 the	 close	 of	 the	 1930s,	 the	 Council	 faced	 a	 multitude	 of	 related	problems,	 including	 lacking	 the	 financial	 and	 bureaucratic	 capacity	 to	 conduct	 the	 five-yearly	 census	 in	 1940	 (SMC	 1940:	 26),	 noting:	 "Dictates	 of	 economy	 necessitated	 the	Council	deferring	the	taking	this	year	of	the	usual	five-yearly	census	of	population...	So	large	a	 population	 rendered	 impracticable	 the	 former	 manual	 system	 of	 tabulating	 census	returns.	Only	a	mechanical	process	would	have	sufficed	to	undertake	the	census	of	so	large	a	population.	 It	was	estimated	that	the	cost	of	 taking	a	census	would	have	amounted	 to	approximately...	$134,000	for	[a	population	of]	2,500,000."	Estimates,	however,	placed	the	domestic	Chinese	resident	population	at	figures	above	two	million	(SMC	1940:	124).	
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A	degree	of	normalcy	nevertheless	returned	to	the	International	Settlement	after	the	halt	of	active	hostilities.	The	influx	of	new	Chinese	residents	into	the	extraterritorial	settlements	included	amongst	them	numerous	wealthy	 individuals	and	business	entrepreneurs,	who	brought	 with	 them	 physical,	 financial	 and	 human	 capital.	 The	 resulting	 increase	 in	manufacturing	output	and	employment	within	the	Settlement	was	substantial.	Whereas	at	the	 start	 of	 the	 hostilities	 in	 August	 1937	 there	 existed	 approximately	 1100	 factories	operating	within	Settlement	borders,	by	the	end	of	the	year	after	the	outbreak	of	hostilities	this	number	had	increased	by	422,	and	by	1	May	1938,	it	had	increased	by	an	additional	339	(Chinese	Economic	&	Statistical	Review	May	1938:	24).	These	increases	represented	nearly	seventy	per	cent	in	the	number	of	factories	operating	in	the	Settlement.	Dong	(1940:	101)	finds	that	by	the	end	of	1939,	the	number	of	domestically-owned	factories	operating	in	the	Settlement	 had	 further	 increased	 to	 3310,	 suggesting	 a	 near	 tripling	 of	 the	 number	 of	factories	that	had	either	moved	into	the	Settlement	or	been	subsequently	founded	by	its	new	domestic	residents	within	two	years	after	the	start	of	the	war	in	August	1937.	Similarly,	Wei	(1985)	cites	additional	signs	of	economic	growth	in	the	Settlement	during	this	period,	with	over	five	hundred	new	stores	having	opened	during	the	1938	to	1940	time	period.				9.5.2.3.			Collapse	of	State	Capacity	in	Preventing	Violence:	Total	Loss	Sovereignty			In	March	1941,	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	acquiesced	to	pressure	from	the	Japanese	military	and	accepted	an	additional	Japanese	member,	after	prior	refusals	from	Britain	and	the	U.S.	failed.	In	April	1941,	the	Japanese	authorities	suspended	the	Land	Regulations,	and	a	 consular-appointed	 council	was	 established	under	 the	Provisional	Council	Agreement.	The	Japanese	takeover	of	the	governance	of	the	International	Settlement	was,	according	to	Bickers	(2004:	247),	"slow,	legalistic,	and	undertaken	with	due	decorum."	The	Guomindang	government	refused	to	participate	nor	consent	to	the	modifications	of	the	Regulations.		With	the	all-out	attack	on	Pearl	Harbour	and	declaration	of	War	on	the	Allies	by	Japan	in	December	 1941,	 Japanese	military	 forces	 in	 Shanghai	mobilised	 to	 take	 over	 all	 of	 the	International	Settlement.	At	first,	a	facade	of	normalcy	was	attempted,	with	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	maintaining	its	nominal	administrative	control	over	of	the	city.	However,	several	weeks	thereafter,	the	Japanese	military	"requested"	British	and	U.S.	members	of	the	Council	to	resign,	and	a	Japanese	council	member,	Katsuo	Okazaki,	was	installed	as	the	new	chairman	(SMC	1942:	1).	On	10	October	1942,	Britain	and	the	United	Stated	declared	their	renunciation	 of	 extraterritorial	 rights	 in	 China,	 formally	 returning	 the	 International	Settlement	to	China,	although	in	actuality	the	entire	city	was	under	Japanese	military	control.		Loss	 of	 monopoly	 on	 force	 complete,	 so	 too	 lost	 Shanghai	 Municipal	 Council	 power	 to	prevent	expropriation	of	private	property	by	external	actors	such	as	the	Japanese	military.	Expropriation	by	confiscation	or	forced	nationalisation	had	hitherto	never	occurred	in	the	Settlement,	but	now	became	commonplace.	Businesses	had	their	assets	confiscated	or	the	operations	 overtaken	 by	 the	 Japanese	 administrators	 under	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 Asia	Development	Board,	and	nearly	all	Allied	nation	employees	were	fired	(Bickers	2004:	246).		Loss	of	property	and	liberty	soon	also	included	forced	taking	of	personal	residences	and	the	ban	on	free	movement.	Citizens	of	Allied	Nations	were	at	first	required	to	wear	armbands	signifying	their	nationality	when	outside	their	homes,	and	later	rounded	up	by	the	Japanese	military	and	placed	in	internment	camps.	Shanghai	had	12	such	camps	in	total;	most,	such	as	Lunghwa	internment	camp,	held	more	than	1,800	foreigners	in	dirty	and	over-crowded	conditions,	with	 "[h]unger	 and	malnutrition	 [and]	disease	 coming	 from	 lack	of	 clothing,	poor	housing,	poor	sanitation,	over-crowding	and	the	stresses	associated	with	captivity"	(SCMP	4	February	2014).	Life	in	the	camps	was	difficult	mainly	because	of	the	treatment	by	the	Japanese	guards.	Rosebury	Beck,	a	former	inmate	later	recalled	"[the]	constant	fear	that	you	might	have	been	shot,	picked	up,	or	tortured,	anytime"	(Felton	2013).		
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While	the	majority	remained	interned	in	camps,	foreign	nationals	were	not	immune	from	suffering	 some	 of	 the	 same	 inhumane	 torture	 that	 happened	 to	 Chinese	 inmates	 in	 the	Japanese	 military	 prisons.	 Wasserstein	 (1998)	 presents	 archival	 accounts	 of	 the	 few	survivors	of	the	Bridge	House	Hotel,	which	was	run	as	a	prison	by	the	Kempeitai	(Japanese	secret	police)	organisation,	where	countless	Chinese	and	foreign	prisoners	were	tortured	in	gruesome	manners,	including	death	by	beating,	forcing	prisoners	to	consume	gallons	of	water	 mixed	 with	 kerosene	 or	 petrol,	 and	 the	 application	 of	 electric	 shocks	 or	 hot	instruments	to	genitalia.	American	reporter	John	Powell	was	illegally	taken	from	his	home	to	 the	 notorious	 Bridge	 House	 prison	 where	 Japanese	military	 police	 subjected	 him	 to	"atrocious	assaults,	beating	him	unmercifully”	(Niderost	2017).	Limited	knowledge	exists	of	 this	military	prison,	with	 just	a	 few	reports	by	Sir	Frederick	Maze	(former	 inspector-general	of	Chinese	Customs)	and	Howard	Woodhead	(editor	of	Oriental	Affairs),	who	were	amongst	the	most	fortunate,	as	albeit	tortured	over	a	course	of	several	weeks,	they	were	ultimately	released	alive	(Felton	2013).	Such	fear	of	death	by	torture	represents	perhaps	the	 most	 drastic	 form	 of	 a	 total	 breakdown	 of	 private	 property	 rights	 and	 liberty	experienced	by	Shanghai's	residents	after	the	collapse	of	the	existing	government	structure.				9.5.2.4.			Extraterritorial	State	Capacity	in	Preventing	Violence:		An	Absence	of	Traps		As	mentioned	at	the	start	of	Section	9.5,	the	contrast	between	the	level	of	civil	strife	and	open	warfare	in	domestic	and	extraterritorial	environments	was	relatively	stark.	From	the	standpoint	of	the	Violence	Trap	analysis	employed	in	Chapter	Six,	the	difference	becomes	even	more	pronounced	when	considering	the	thirteen	violent	regime	changes	occurring	at	the	national	level	between	1840	and	1941,	or	the	twelve	such	instances	between	1840	and	1941	at	the	domestic	Shanghai	 level,	measures	that	underscore	 the	outlier	nature	of	the	singular	violent	regime	change	experienced	by	the	extraterritorial	governments	at	the	very	end	of	1941.	These	differences	provide	sharp	relief	between	the	level	and	nature	of	political	violence	 that	 defined	 the	 domestic	 and	 extraterritorial	 institutional	 environments.	 The	stark	difference	in	the	frequency	of	violent	overthrow	of	the	existing	governance	structure	is	demonstrated	graphically	in	sharp	relief	in	Figure	9.3.	As	the	figure	also	makes	clear,	at	least	from	the	standpoint	of	political	violence	characterised	by	violent	regime	change	of	the	existing	political	authority,	the	years	following	the	fall	of	the	Qing	through	the	start	of	the	Guomindang	regime	in	1927	were	extremely	tumultuous	on	the	domestic	side.			Figure	9.3.		Number	of	Violent	Transitions	of	Political	Power,	by	Government,	per	annum	
	Sources:	refer	to	Tables	6.1	and	8.1		
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As	noted	previously,	the	Cox	et	al.	(2013,	2017)	measure	of	violent	forced	regime	change	represents	a	circumscribed	consideration	of	actual	levels	of	political	violence	and	civil	strife,	with	instances	of	military	events	not	resulting	in	regime	change	not	included	in	the	measure,	no	matter	how	large-scale	or	ruinous	their	effects	on	the	economy	and	human	life	might	be,	nor	included	are	non-military	levels	of	violence	characterised	by	an	inability	of	the	state	to	enforce	a	monopoly	on	violence	to	prevent	the	actions	of	organised	criminal	activities.	As	described	 in	 Chapters	 Six	 and	 Eight,	 this	 implied	 a	 serious	 undercounting	 of	 significant	levels	 of	 political	 violence	 that	 defined	 the	 domestic	 national	 and	 Shanghai	 municipal	environments.	Somewhat	conversely,	however,	as	evident	from	the	discussion	throughout	this	section,	overall	levels	of	political	and	organised	criminal	violence	within	the	Settlement	remained	relatively	low,	in	both	absolute	and	comparative	terms,	as	did	resultant	impacts	on	private	actors'	private	properties	and	productive	assets.	It	was	true	that	organised	crime	levels	were	considered	problematic	by	the	Settlement's	leadership,	and	inflicted	important	costs	on	economic	activity;	however,	even	assuming	the	level	of	Green	Gang	activity	to	have	been	 constant	across	both	domestic	 and	extraterritorial	 Shanghai,	 the	 vast	difference	 in	military	battles	occurring	within	the	two	environments	itself	was	enough	to	heavily	skew	the	perception	of	the	levels	of	political	and	social	violence	between	the	two	environments.		The	implication	of	this	stark	difference	in	the	level	of	political	violence	across	Shanghai's	two	parallel	institutional	environments	was	accordingly	large.	Regarding	primary	effects,	unlike	 in	 the	 domestic	 environments	 of	 broader	 China	 or	non-extraterritorial	 Shanghai,	little	destruction	of	private	assets,	or	human	life,	took	place	as	a	result	of	military	actions.	The	exceptions	were	important,	but	limited,	such	as	the	damage	stores	and	businesses	in	the	wake	of	the	May	Thirtieth	Movement-related	riots,	or	to	businesses	along	Nanking	Road	(now	
%)	during	the	1937	Sino-Japanese	hostilities.	Similarly,	there	was	an	absence	of	expropriation	and	theft	of	private	assets	by	internal	or	foreign	military	actors.	These	two	factors	signify	huge	positive	implications	for	entrepreneurial	economic	activity.	Owners	of	private	 property	 and	 firms	 operating	 within	 the	 extraterritorial	 settlements	 faced	considerably	 lower	 risks	 of	 their	 productive	 assets	 being	 destroyed	 in	 the	 process	 of	military	battles,	or	seized	by	military	actors.	This	level	of	security	helped	make	the	prospect	of	costly	outlay	of	investment	more	likely	to	produce	positive	returns	for	entrepreneurs	and	investors.	Such	perceptions	were	acted	upon,	for	instance,	by	the	opening	of	factories	and	businesses	by	domestic	entrepreneurs	in	the	Settlement	cited	above	that	occurred	in	the	wake	of	the	August	1937	military	violence.	Similarly,	Shanghai's	extraterritorial	municipal	governments	were	spared	from	the	need	to	constantly	devote	resources	to	rebuilding	roads,	municipal	buildings	and	other	public	facilities	destroyed	in	the	course	of	military	actions,	nor	was	their	bureaucratic	and	administrative	capacity	destroyed	or	hampered	by	actions	of	military	combat	or	violent	overthrow	of	the	existing	political	regime.	A	more	favourable	tax	collection	situation	was	also	implied,	given	that	widespread	destruction	of	productive	assets,	residences,	and	lives	of	extraterritorial	municipal	residents	was	relatively	infrequent,	thereby	allowing	for	the	creation	of	greater	taxable	output	for	the	government	to	tax.		Likewise,	significantly	lower	levels	of	political	violence	in	the	extraterritorial	setting	also	implies	 significant	differences	 in	 regard	 to	 secondary	 effects	 owing	 to	 political	 violence	across	the	institutional	environments.	In	particular,	we	find	there	to	have	been	an	absence	of	the	kind	of	political	violence	related	"traps"—either	the	Violence	Trap	of	Weingast	and	his	co-authors,	or	our	concept	of	a	"low	credibility	trap"—thereby	alleviating	much	of	the	pressure	 on	 state	 actors	 to	 operate	 under	 significant	 short-term	 biases	 that	 can	 induce	drastic	expropriative	behaviours,	and	instead	enhancing	the	incentives	to	commit	resources	to	developing	and	maintaining	credible	commitment	mechanisms	that	stimulate	economic	growth.	These	mechanisms	 included	a	 representative	 form	of	 governance	 that	 operated	under	 adherence	 to	 a	 written	 and	 known	 constitution	 (the	 Land	 Regulations).	 These	mechanisms	were	viewed	to	be	credible	given	that	the	negative	consequences	accruing	to	state	actors	by	deviating	from	adherence	to	their	maintenance,	could	credibly	be	viewed	by	
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private	 actors	 as	 likely	 higher	 than	 potential	 received	 positive	 consequences.	 Thus,	 for	instance,	if	state	actors	acted	to	violate	private	property	rights	by	enacting	onerous	taxation	rates,	or	by	ordering	the	expropriation	of	private	assets	without	just	compensation,	they	would	likely	be	voted	out	office	by	the	electorate	of	ratepayers	(i.e.,	property	owners),	and	thus	unable	to	benefit	over	the	long	term	from	their	policy	implementations;	or,	similarly,	the	 extraterritorial	 court	 system	 could	 rule	 in	 ways	 that	 prevented	 implementation	 of	policies	that	violated	established	norms	or	rules	specified	under	the	Land	Regulations.	As	such,	the	expected	costs	for	state	actors	of	attempting	to	violate	property	rights	were	high,	thus	 implying	 net	 expected	 benefits	 from	 such	 attempts	were	 likely	 to	 be	 considerably	lower	than	the	expected	net	benefits	derived	from	encouraging	commercial	activity	to	grow	under	a	strong	property	rights	environment.		Nonetheless,	 as	 discussed	 throughout	 the	 description	 of	 the	 domestic	 institutional	environments	at	both	the	national	and	domestic	Shanghai	level,	the	institutional	features	that	determine	the	strength	of	private	property	and	contract	rights	are	represented	by	a	complex	and	multi-faceted	set	of	vector	that	are	not	only	non-unidirectional	at	any	single	given	 time	 period,	 but	 also	 certainly	 each	 individual	 vector	 itself	 highly	 subject	 to	experienced	variations	in	both	strength	and	direction	over	time.	This	would	certainly	be	the	case	in	regard	to	the	set	of	vectors	characterising	the	level	of	political	and	social	violence	within	the	extraterritorial	settlements	over	the	time	frame,	particularly	so	during	the	period	of	 rising	 Japanese	 militarism	 throughout	 the	 1930s.	 The	 ability	 of	 the	 International	Settlement	to	maintain	a	monopoly	on	internal	coercive	force	during	the	1930s	noticeably	waned,	especially	during	the	post-1937	time	frame,	when	the	Municipal	Council	faced	an	increasing	number	of	realistic	existential	threats	owing	primarily	to	aggressive	actions	of	the	 Japanese	 military.	 As	 a	 result,	 extraterritorial	 state	 actors	 operated	 in	 a	 changed	institutional	environment,	facing	a	series	of	existential	threats	to	regime	survivorship	that	had	not	previously	been	present.		This	changing	reality	led	to	a	changing	institutional	environment,	one	with	a	degraded	level	of	 protection	 on	 private	 property	 and	 legal	 rights	 for	 the	 Settlement's	 residents.	 The	increasing	power	of	the	Japanese	military,	combined	with	a	decided	retreat	by	American	and	British	politicians	in	the	willingness	or	ability	to	provide	political	and	military	support	to	the	Settlement,	led	to	a	set	of	pressures	and	incentives	on	state	actors	that	made	them	more	open	to	the	undertaking	of	violations	of	private	property	and	legal	rights	previously	considered	off-limits.	This	was	demonstrated	by	 the	 actions	of	 the	Municipal	Police	and	backed	 by	 rulings	 of	 the	 local	 courts	 in	 reference	 to	 a	 loosening	 of	 civil	 protections	 for	suspects	 arrested	 under	 suspicion	 of	 communist	 support.	 Likewise,	 from	 an	 economic	policy	 standpoint,	 the	 Council	 considered	 actions	 such	 as	 the	 implementation	 of	 price	controls,	 or	 open	 to	 consideration	 to	 break	 with	 over	 a	 century	 of	 adherence	 to	 the	"constitutional"	dictates	of	the	Land	Regulations	in	order	to	implement	an	income	tax.	The	economic	wisdom	of	introducing	an	income	tax	aside,	the	more	salient	issue	is	that	the	Land	Regulations—the	Constitution—had	been	considered	sacrosanct,	and	undertaking	policies	that	violated	its	mandates	were	seen	as	politically	unacceptable.	We	are	able	to	observe,	however,	as	in	the	case	of	domestic	government	actors	who	operated	in	a	political	landscape	defined	 by	 arguably	 much	 greater	 and	 more	 continual	 existential	 threats,	 so	 too	 did	extraterritorial	state	actors,	in	the	face	of	increasing	existential	threats,	begin	to	consider	behaviours	that	violated	previously	socially	and	politically	accepted	norms	and	constructs.	The	implications	of	such	drastic	behavioural	changes	by	state	actors	is	highly	significant.	By	way	of	such	examples,	we	observe	evidence—while	admittedly	qualitative	and	certainly	open	to	interpretation—that	is	suggestive	of	support	for	the	Violence	Trap	thesis,	where	political	 actors	 in	 an	 environment	 facing	 serious	 existential	 threats	 behaved	 in	 ways	considerably	 different	 than	 similar	 political	 actors	 behaved	 when	 operating	 in	 an	environment	considered	to	be	under	substantially	less	serious	existential	pressures.		
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	9.6		State	Actions:	Commitment	to	Protect	Private	Property	Rights		In	words	and	perception,	if	not	in	deeds,	the	founders	of	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	were	ostensibly	committed	 to	a	general	adherence	of	 the	classical	 liberal	state.	From	an	economic	 standpoint,	 this	 implied	 conduct	 of	 a	 minimally-intrusive	 state	 that	 taxed	 its	populace	only	enough	to	extract	resources	necessary	to	maintain	the	ability	to	create	an	institutional	 legal	 environment	 of	 consistent	 rules	 while	maintaining	 a	 dispassionately-administered	system	of	law	and	order	that	protected	residents'	private	property	rights	from	internal	and	external	threats.	Outright	expropriation	of	private	economic	assets	by	the	state,	or	explicit	 interference	with	 the	market	process	was	conceptually	 inherently	prohibited.	However,	a	degree	of	limited	regulations	imposed	on	economic	actors	to	ensure	consumer	safety	or	to	address	externalities,	such	as	polluting	activities	that	externalised	production	costs	onto	larger	society,	were	consistently	stated	as	being	appropriate.	In	the	broader	area	of	 civil	 society,	 too,	 a	 generally-limited	 conception	 of	 the	 state's	 role	 was	 expressly	articulated,	albeit	again,	certain	economic	or	social	private	behaviours	were	deemed	subject	to	regulation	or	prohibition	based	on	morality	or	social	acceptability	grounds.				9.6.1		The	State's	Role	in	the	Economy:	Taxes,	Regulation,	and	Expropriations		As	noted	 in	 the	prior	discussion,	 the	 role	of	 elections	 and	 the	 annual	and	extraordinary	Ratepayers	 Meetings	 provided	 relatively	 effective	 checks	 on	 Council	 members'	 natural	proclivity	to	increase	the	size	of	the	state,	and	their	personal	prestige	and	power,	through	taxation.	 Overall,	 the	 system	 was	 successful	 in	 keeping	 taxation	 at	 a	 minimal,	 with	Lockwood	(1934:	1036,	1039)	commenting,	"Tax	rates	in	the	International	Settlement	are	unusually	 low	 and	 the	 powers-that-be	 are	 reluctant	 to	 sanction	 any	 upward	 revision.	…Foreign	business,	which	is	largely	exempt	from	home	taxation,	has	had	to	bear	only	the	comparatively	light	burdens	of	municipal	taxes,	except	in	so	far	as	operations	outside	the	Settlement	brought	it	within	reach	of	the	Chinese	authorities."		The	taxation	structure	imposed	by	the	Council,	however,	was	not	necessarily	designed	to	promote	 entrepreneurial	 activity.	 As	 noted,	 the	 membership	 of	 the	 Council	 and	 the	electorate	Ratepayers	Association	was	heavily	comprised	of	owners	of	the	largest	and	most	economically	 powerful	 business	 ventures	 operating	 in	 the	 Settlement.	 Taxation	 policy,	therefore,	reflected	the	interests	of	these	larger	concerns.	From	the	earliest	beginnings	of	the	ratification	of	the	Land	Regulations	up	through	its	subsequent	revisions	and	expansion	of	the	size	of	the	state,	the	Council	operated	under	the	initial	 interpretations	of	the	Land	Regulations	 that	 the	Council	 lacked	authority	 to	 levy	direct	 taxes	on	 residents.	As	 such,	throughout	its	history,	there	was	no	system	of	personal	or	business	income	taxes	levied	on	residents.	 Thus,	 the	 majority	 of	 revenue	 was	 derived	 from	 real	 estate	 taxes	 and	 fees	imposed	on	business	operations.	Such	licensing	taxes	were	viewed	as	regressive	by	many	of	the	small	business	owners	operating	in	the	Settlement,	with	one	arguing	in	early	1941	that	the	Council	was	blithely	ignoring	the	needs	of	the	common	businessperson:	"In	what	other	part	of	the	world	would	a	wee	little	provision	shop	be	levied	license	fees	while	the	large	importers	are	allowed	to	enjoy	their	profits	free	from	license	or	income	tax?	 ...This	plainly	shows	that	there	is	plenty	wrong	with	the	present	system	of	taxation	here	and	that	it	is	high	time	that	bold	steps	be	taken	in	order	to	make	it	possible	for	the	Council	to	levy	a	tax	on	business	profits,	which	would	not	only	give	the	administration	all	the	funds	it	needs	but	would	even	make	it	possible	to	alleviate	the	burden	of	the	public	by	reducing	housing	taxes	and	excessive	licensing	fees"	(NCDN	1	February	1941).			
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The	 relatively	 light	 tax	 burden	 on	 residents	 and	 businesspersons	 operating	 in	 the	Settlement	was	matched	by	a	relatively	light	regulatory	regime,	particularly	in	regard	to	those	 on	 business	 activity.	 The	 Settlement	 was	 for	 the	 most	 part	 "devoid	 of	 factory	regulations	except	for	a	few	building	rules	and	fire	regulations"	(Pacific	Relations	1934:	2),	with	factory	conditions	reflecting	"unbridled	exploitation"	and	frequently	using	child	labour.	As	 noted,	 the	 factory	 law	 promulgated	 by	 the	 Nanjing	 government	 in	 1929	 was	 only	implemented	in	1934,	and	even	then	only	weakly	put	into	effect.	At	the	start	of	the	1930s,	Tawney	(1932:	149)	finds	the	Settlement's	factory	conditions	"recalling	those	of	the	first,	and	worst,	phase	of	the	Industrial	Revolution	in	England...	[Working	conditions]	are	little	better	than	barns,	and	in	which	the	most	elementary	conditions	of	health	and	safety	appear	to	be	ignored."		The	lighter	tax	and	regulatory	requirements	imposed	on	business	owners	and	residents	of	the	International	Settlement	compared	to	the	outside	domestic	Shanghai	municipal	tax	and	regulation	regime	did	not	go	unnoticed	by	domestic	economic	actors.	This	is	perhaps	best	noted	by	the	vast	number	of	domestically-owned	factories	that	set	up	production	inside	the	concession	areas	over	the	years.	The	reasons	for	this	were	many—certainly	not	the	least	of	which,	 as	 discussed	 below,	 were	 in	 regard	 to	 the	 relative	 increased	 safety	 against	destruction	from	military	activity.	Yet	another	reason	can	be	gleaned	by	the	statement	made	at	the	1939	Annual	Ratepayers	Meeting	by	a	ratepayer	of	surname	Harris	submitting	an	amendment	(successfully	motioned)	to	require	the	Council	to	increase	regulations	to	curtail	pollution	and	dangerous	conditions	coming	from	newly	constituted	factories.	His	remarks	underscore	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 costs	 of	 doing	 business	 in	 the	 domestic-	 versus	foreign-administrated	sections	of	the	city	as	perceived	by	domestic	Chinese	entrepreneurs:	"I	asked	[the	owner]	of	one	factory	where	they	were	before	the	1937	outbreak,	and	they	replied	‘in	Chapei.’	I	asked:	‘Why	don't	you	go	back	?’	and	they	said	that	if	they	went	back	they	would	have	to	pay	rates	and	taxes,	and	also	levies	on	the	goods	which	they	produce,	whereas...	[on	the	outskirts	of	the	Settlement]	they	could	put	up	very	cheap	straw	huts	for	their	workers,	and	could	pay	them	very	small	wages	and	were	able	to	make	a	profit	of	200%	per	annum,	as	against	30%	in	Chapei"	(SMC	1939:	11).		Nonetheless,	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	did	pass	regulations	that	impacted	the	private	sphere	of	economic	activity	and	of	citizens'	daily	lives.	Regulations	and	civic	codes	were	enacted	 quite	 early	 in	 the	 history	 of	 the	 Settlement,	 including	 regulations	 on	 business	activity,	such	as	codes	defining	the	amount	of	space	a	transitory	vendor	must	leave	between	their	stand	and	the	doorway	of	an	established	business,	or	the	requirement	of	permits	to	be	obtained	from	the	Council	before	a	new	road	or	ditch	could	be	constructed,	large	equipment	be	transported,	or	alcohol	sold.	Codes	were	quite	specific,	detailing	for	instance	the	style	for	the	carrying	of	live	chickens	(to	be	done	only	in	cages	and	not	by	hand).	Hence,	it	can	be	argued	 that	 unlike	 the	 Qing	 or	 Beiyang	 governments	 at	 the	 same	 period,	 the	 “state”	 as	represented	by	the	Council	sought	to	impose	a	larger	presence	on	everyday	life,	seeking	to	control	 particulars	 of	 social	 and	 business	 interaction.	 This	 practice	 followed	 in	 many	aspects	 the	 expectations	 and	 norms	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state	 the	 ingrained	 in	 the	predominantly	western	leadership	of	the	Settlement—it	was	more	accepted	that	the	state	would	impose	rules	and	regulate	social	norms,	especially	in	the	commercial	sphere,	and	not	leave	resolution	of	commercial	disputes	to	custom,	as	was	the	case	in	traditional	China.		Overall,	there	appears	to	have	been	a	constant	push	for	additional	licensing	and	regulation.	This	is	perhaps	not	surprising,	as	the	incentive	structures	that	drive	the	push	for	greater	government	 involvement	 in	 the	 economy—whether	 from	 specific	 forms	 of	 regulatory	capture		(Stigler	1971,		Laffont	&	Tirole	1991),		or		a		more		generalised		process		of		growth	of	government	administrative	powers	owing	to	what	Hayek	(1944)	identified	as	inherent	in	 the	 government	 planning	 system—were	 certainly	 present	 in	 the	 Settlement's	administrative	structure.	To	begin	with,	direct	financial	incentives	existed—as	indicated	by	
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the	 financial	 statements	 provided	 in	 the	 Council's	 Annual	 Reports,	 licensing	 fees	contributed	 a	 large	 percentage	 to	 the	 municipal	 budget.	 In	 addition,	 as	 the	 Shanghai	Municipal	Council	was	comprised	of	primarily	of	the	Settlement's	wealthiest	businessmen,	and	given	that	larger	and	wealthier	business	ventures	are	better	able	to	comply	with	the	demands	of	 greater	 state	oversight	and	 regulation,	 it	 is	not	unexpected	 that	 the	Council	entertained	 continual	 suggestions	 to	 increase	 the	 regulatory	 power	 of	 the	 state.	 One	 of	many	 examples	 found	 in	 the	 Annual	 Reports	 was	 in	 1916,	 when	 several	 owners	 of	extraterritorial	businesses	urged	the	Council	begin	the	licensing	of	domestic	money	shops	operating	within	the	Settlement	(SMC	1916:	155A).	Regulations	were	also	pushed	forward	on	morality	grounds	by	groups	of	"concerned	citizens"	desirous	to	extend	their	personal	moral	mores	upon	the	rest	of	society,	leading	to	numerous	calls	by	citizens	groups	to	impose	prohibitions	on	varying	economic	activities.	In	1923,	for	instance,	over	half	the	Settlement's	brothels	were	forced	closed	over	morality	concerns	(SMC	1923:	77).	Further,	the	specificity	of	regulations	imposed	could	be	impressive:	prohibitions	on	the	sale	of	poisons	over	public	safety	 concerns	 came	 with	 many	 pages	 of	 precise	 regulations	 over	 which	 drugs	 were	considered	poisonous,	under	what	circumstances	and	who	should	be	allowed	to	buy	and	sell	or	prepare	the	drugs,	which	such	sales	could	be	take	place	as	either	retail	or	wholesale	distribution,	and	onwards	(SMC	1923:	85-94).		Regulatory	measures	were	prevalent	on	many	types	of	economic	activities	deemed	in	the	"public	interest."	Thus,	the	Tramway	Company	which	operated	transportation	tram	service	within	the	Settlement	was	subject	to	oversight	of	the	fares	it	could	charge.	That	the	company	had	been	granted	monopoly	rights	to	operate	the	Settlement's	only	tram	service	was	viewed	as	justification	for	such	oversight.	In	1923,	for	instance,	when	the	company	intended	to	raise	fares	as	a	way	to	deal	with	the	issue	of	overcrowding	of	tramway	cars,	the	Council	debated	in	a	series	of	back	and	forth	communiques	with	the	company	leadership	before	acquiescing	to	permitting	a	fare	increase,	but	only	after	acceptance	by	the	Company	of	a	change	in	their	original	proposal	(SMC	1923:	67-78).			The	degree	of	government	involvement	in	the	private	business	sphere	remained	primarily	regulatory	in	nature,	with	relatively	few	instances	of	outright	state	ownership	of	productive	resources.	One	exception	was	in	regard	to	utility	companies,	perhaps	not	surprising	given	the	 then-prevailing	 view	 of	 utilities	 as	 natural	monopolies	 necessitating	 either	 outright	public	ownership	or	heavy	regulation.	In	1893	the	Council	leadership	voted	to	municipalise	the	local	privately-run	electricity	provider,	purchasing	the	Shanghai	Electric	Company,	and	creating	 a	 new	 administrative	 unit,	 the	 Electric	 Light	 Department,	 after	 the	 purchase.	Already	by	1899,	however,	higher	than	expected	operational	costs	led	the	Council	to	put	forward	a	formal	plan	to	privatise	the	utility,	but	tenders	were	not	forthcoming	(Shanghai	
Chronicle	1906:	684).	Eventually,	 in	April	of	1929	the	Council	successfully	completed	the	sale	of	the	utility	to	the	Shanghai	Power	Company,	officially	ending	the	Council's	nearly	four-decade	experiment	with	state	ownership	of	utility	services	(SMC	1929:	22).		Private	 ownership	 of	 utilities,	 however,	 did	 not	mean	 they	 were	 not	 considered	 public	utilities;	 or,	 in	 the	 parlance	 of	 the	 day,	 as	 defined	 by	 the	 U.S.	 Supreme	 Court,	 "utilities	affected	with	the	public	interest"	(Munn	v	Illinois	1877	94	US	113).	As	described	in	regard	to	 its	 control	 over	 the	 fare	 schedule	 of	 the	 Tramway	 Company,	 the	 Council	maintained	rather	intensive	regulatory	control	over	what	it	determined	to	be	public	utilities.	In	addition,	the	Council	was	heavily	involved	in	the	formation	of	several	of	the	utility	companies;	for	instance,	 in	 1923,	 the	 Council	 undertook	 a	 series	 of	 prolonged	 negotiations	 with	 local	business	leaders	and	investors	that	culminated	in	the	creation	of	the	privately	funded	and	run	enterprise,	the	China	General	Omnibus	Company,	that	was	designated	a	public	utility	and	given	exclusive	rights	 to	operate	a	motorised	passenger	bus	service	 throughout	 the	Settlement	(SMC	1922:	285A;	SMC	1923:	79-82).			
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	Beyond	regulation	of	public	utilities,	which	included	oversight	on	the	setting	of	prices,	the	Council	mostly	avoided	direct	interference	in	the	market	process	in	other	business	matters.	The	Settlement's	oft-asserted	commitment	to	adherence	to	laissez-faire	economic	policies,	and	associated	credible	commitment	mechanisms—such	as	constitutional	constructs	that	imposed	limits	on	the	Council's	ability	to	intervene	in	the	market—were	severely	tested,	however,	following	the	outbreak	of	war	in	1937.	War	led	to	severe	shortages	in	basic	food	and	 other	 essential	 commodities;	 these	 events	 helped	 portend	 an	 upward	 spiralling	 of	prices.	 Such	 drastic	 economic	 conditions	 led	 to	 consequent	 demands	 from	 multiple	Settlement	 constituencies	 for	 the	 outright	 usurpation	 of	 the	 market	 process	 and	 the	implementation	of	 severely	 interventionist	policies,	 such	 as	price	 controls	 on	 consumer	goods	deemed	necessities.	The	response	of	the	Council	 is	suggestive	of	the	way	in	which	even	 relatively	 strong	 institutional	 safeguards	 on	private	 property	 rights	 can	 be	 swiftly	eroded	by	the	state	when	social	actors	become	complicit.		The	primary	causes	of	the	drastic	increases	in	general	price	levels	came	from	two	sources.	First	 was	 a	 general	 inflationary	 monetary	 phenomenon.	 After	 the	 currency	 reform	implemented	by	the	Guomindang	government	in	1935	banning	the	use	of	the	silver	yuan	and	introducing	a	fiat	paper	yuan,	commonly	referred	to	as	the	fapi	(),	the	ability	for	the	central	 government	 to	 utilise	 the	 power	 of	 the	 printing	 press	 to	 engage	 in	 seigniorage	greatly	increased.	Given	that	the	war	led	to	steep	increases	in	the	level	of	government	debt,	as	 well	 as	 cutting	 off	 many	 prior	 revenue	 sources,	 the	 attractiveness	 of	 such	 a	 policy	apparently	came	to	outweigh	its	long-term	costs.	From	1937	the	domestic	national	money	supply—during	a	 time	of	 unprecedented	 loss	of	 physical	and	human	 capital	and	greatly	reduced	output—rose	drastically.	Based	on	Huang	(1948),	the	money	supply	slightly	more	than	doubled	over	the	two	years	1937	to	1939,	and	then	nearly	doubled	again	each	year	from	1939	to	1940,	and	again	from	1940	to	1941.	Hence,	over	the	span	of	the	first	five	years	of	the	war,	the	total	money	supply	increased	sevenfold,	with	physical	cash	in	circulation	increasing	ninefold.	Given	such	monetary	circumstances,	the	resultant	hyperinflation	can	hardly	be	viewed	as	anything	but	expected.		A	second	factor	driving	increasing	price	levels	in	Shanghai	came	on	the	supply	side	of	the	real	economy.	Within	several	months	after	the	outbreak	of	full-scale	war	in	August	1937,	the	Japanese	military	gained	control	over	most	of	north	China	and	the	maritime	provinces,	including	Shanghai's	surrounding	areas.	Only	the	two	extraterritorial	settlements	remained	outside	 of	 the	 control	 of	 the	 Japanese	military;	 importantly,	 therefore,	 (extraterritorial)	Shanghai	theoretically	could	continue	 to	play	 its	role	as	an	open	entrepôt	port	with	 free	access	to	global	markets.	Yet	while	international	trade	flows	traditionally	served	as	one	of	the	city's	primary	economic	engines,	prior	to	the	start	of	the	war,	Shanghai	had	been	mostly	utilising	local	domestic	markets	to	supply	its	basic	food	and	commodity	needs.			As	 China's	 most	 populous	 city—and	 having	 further	 experienced	 a	 massive	 inflow	 of	refugees	 in	 the	 immediacy	of	 the	aftermath	of	 the	outbreak	of	 hostilities	 in	mid-1937—Shanghai	was	 an	 important	market	 for	 North	 China's	 and	 Jiangnan's	 producers	 of	 rice,	wheat,	soybean,	cooking	oils,	and	other	primary	crops.	Assumption	of	control	over	these	regions	by	Japanese	military	forces	brought	a	change	to	this	historical	pattern	of	interior-to-littoral	trade	flow.			Henriot	(2000:	43)	notes	that	starting	in	1939,	the	Japanese	Imperial	Army	began	to	limit	supplies	of	rice	and	other	cereal	grains	sold	to	the	settlements,	instead	conscripting	the	vast	majority	of	occupied	China's	agricultural	output	for	export	to	Japan;	by	1940,	less	than	one-			
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tenth	of	the	city's	minimum	food	supply	requirements	was	officially	supplied	by	domestic	producers.§	(Nonetheless,	as	documented	by	Henriot	&	Yeh	(2004:	5),	smuggling	became	an	active,	and	profitable,	activity	that	served	to	partly	alleviate	the	shortages	caused	by	the	restrictive	trade	prohibitions	imposed	by	the	Japanese	military.)		In	response	to	dwindling	agricultural	products	obtainable	from	the	interior,	the	settlements	turned	increasingly	to	overseas	markets	to	meet	their	needs.	Data	provided	by	Chou	(1968:	106)	and	Henriot	(2000:	43),	and	from	foreign	trade	reports	in	the	North	China	Herald	(e.g.,	26	October	1938:	149)	demonstrate	a	sharp	increase	in	rice	and	other	food	imports,	with	annual	rice	imports	increasing	from	approximately	three	hundred	thousand	to	nearly	six	million	tonnes	over	the	course	of	1937	to	1941,	representing	a	twentyfold	increase.	Similar	increases	in	imports	of	flour,	wheat	and	other	agricultural	staples	occurred.	Problematically,	the	 costs	 of	 imported	 foodstuffs	were	 considerably	 higher	 than	 those	 locally-produced,	especially	as	wartime	activities	increased	the	risks	and	associated	costs	of	transportation.	For	instance,	additional	costs	were	incurred	as	non-Japanese	and	non-German	cargo	ships	arriving	 in	 Shanghai's	 ports	 were	 subject	 to	 frequent	 detainment	 by	 Japanese	 military	inspectors	with	their	freight	occasionally	confiscated	(Cheng	Yien	Pao	21	December	1940).	As	such,	the	real	cost	of	food	staples	continued	to	increase	drastically	as	the	war	continued,	with	an	especially	sharp	spike	in	import	prices	occurring	mid-1939	and	again	in	1940.		The	Council's	initial	response	to	these	price	movements	and	supply	shortages	began	with	some	 relatively	 cautious	 actions	 that	 sought	 to	 avert	widespread	 famine	while	 avoiding	becoming	too	involved	in	the	market	process	for	food	provision.	As	early	as	a	month	after	the	outbreak	of	hostilities,	in	August	1937,	the	Council	formed	a	Material	Resources	Supply	Committee	 (colloquially	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 Rice	 Committee)	 to	 specifically	 work	 with	merchant	 guides	 to	 control	 prices	 and	 attempt	 to	 ensure	 an	 adequate	 supply	 of	 basic	foodstuffs	was	available	to	the	majority	of	Settlement	residents	(NCH	25	August	1937).	The	role	of	the	Committee	quickly	grew,	however,	to	soon	include	organising	massive	buying	of	rice	and	other	products	deemed	essentials	for	distribution	to	refugees	or	resale	to	firms	and	the	public,	regulating	"profiteering"	behaviour	by	merchants,	and	later,	outlawing	the	sale	of	imported	rice	to	the	Wang-government	municipality	(NCH	5	February	1941:	218,	Henriot	2000:	 47).	 Prices	 of	 many	 of	 these	 products	 were	 published	 daily	 in	 several	 of	 the	Settlement's	primary	newspapers	such	as	the	China	Press,	the	North	China	Daily	News,	and	the	Shun	Pao.	While	the	prices	of	other	goods	could	be	set	and	adjusted	by	store	owners	and	other	sellers	of	goods	to	the	public—and	were,	primarily	and	significantly	to	the	upside—a	select	list	of	products	were	required	to	sell	at	fixed	prices	(NCH	26	October	1938:	149).		
		That	the	public	was	concerned	about	the	costs	of	such	interventionist	polices	is	indicated	by	frequent	"letters	to	the	editor"	published	in	local	newspapers	demanding	greater	trans-parency	of	 the	Committee's	work	 and	 suggesting	 the	undertaking	of	more	 cost-effective	procedures	in	the	Council's	price-purchasing	strategies.	One	such	letter	demanded	that	the	large-scale	orders	of	rice	imports	by	the	Rice	Committee	take	place	under	an	open	bidding	procedure	 accessible	 to	 multiple	 firms	 involved	 in	 the	 importation	 of	 foreign	 rice,	 as	opposed	to	simply	utilising	the	single	merchant	house	selected	by	the	Committee	in	a	non-transparent,	non-open	bidding	process	(NCDN	22	August	1937).	In	any	event,	such	direct	purchasing	schemes	were	discontinued	by	the	end	of	1937	(NCH	5	February	1941:	218).		_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________	
§	 It	was	not	only	private	merchants	and	public	authorities	 in	the	extraterritorial	settlements	who	experienced	difficulties	procuring	rice	shipments	from	the	interior	due	to	what	essentially	amounted	to	an	unofficial	blockade	by	the	Japanese	military	and	conscription	of	agricultural	output	for	export	to	Japanese	markets.	The	Japanese-controlled	Shanghai	domestic	municipality	also	faced	shortages.	In	1940,	Chen	Kung-Po,	mayor	of	Shanghai	Special	Municipality,	engaged	in	protracted	negotiations	with	Japanese	military	authorities	to	allow	shipments	of	rice	from	the	interior.	While	able	to	secure	promises	from	military	leaders	to	allow	shipments	into	non-settlement	Shanghai,	the	amounts	were	small,	on	the	scale	of	168,000	piculs	annually	(NCDN	22	December	1940)—roughly	equivalent	to	ten	thousand	tonnes,	such	amounts	represented	less	than	one-fiftieth	typical	annual	consumption	levels.	
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	The	effectiveness	of	the	Council's	early	measures	were	relatively	limited.	Henriot	(2000:	47)	claims	the	bureaucratic	administrative	and	enforcement	structures	of	both	extraterritorial	settlement	 areas	 lacked	 sufficient	 efficacy	 to	 enforce	on	 a	 substantive	 level	 punishment	against	 offending	 merchants	 who	 flouted	 rules	 designed	 to	 limit	 profiteering	 or	 non-sanctioned	 sales.	 Further,	 the	 settlements	 continued	 to	 suffer	 from	 an	 undersupply	 of	essential	foodstuffs	sufficient	to	meet	the	minimum	dietary	needs	of	their	populaces.	The	result	was	 frequent	bouts	of	 internal	spontaneous	nonstate-sanctioned	violence.	Several	months	of	particularly	severe	rice	shortage	in	the	Settlement,	for	instance,	led	to	a	riot	in	December	 of	 1939,	 as	 mobs	 smashed	 windows	 and	 raided	 rice	 shops;	 a	 similar	 event	occurred	again	a	year	later	in	December	1940	in	response	to	the	unwillingness	of	merchants	to	sell	customers	rice	at	the	published	prices	(Henriot	2000:	48).		Calls	 from	 the	 community	 to	 impose	more	 effective	 and	 binding	 price	 controls	 on	 vital	foodstuffs	and	cooking	oil	grew.	The	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	was	exceedingly	hesitant	to	attempt	the	introduction	of	more	blatant	interventionist	policies;	to	begin	with,	there	was	no	legal	precedence	for	such	action;	Council	members	and	numerous	Ratepayers	expressly	pointed	to	the	lack	of	authority	for	the	Council	to	engage	in	such	actions	under	the	existing	Land	Regulations.	 Conversely,	 seemingly	 equally	 loud	voices	were	 found	 in	 the	press	of	continued	calls	from	readership	for	greater	action	on	the	part	of	the	Council,	even	when	such	 actions	 called	 upon	 the	 "absolute	 indispensability	 of	 circumventing	 the	 land	regulations"	(NCDN	1	February	1941).		Beyond	the	seriousness	of	disregarding	constitutional	limits	on	Council	powers,	the	Council	was	 also	 faced	 with	 the	 prospect	 of	 attempting	 to	 enforce	 strict	 price	 controls	 on	agricultural	 products	 on	 which	 it	 lacked	 any	 command	 over	 their	 production	 and	transportation	costs.	In	addition,	many	correctly	identified	that	the	economic	logic	of	price	controls	was	in	fact	counterproductive	to	achieving	the	main	goal	of	increasing	the	supply	of	 rice	 and	 other	 foodstuffs	 available—if	 prices	 were	 mandated	 on	 what	 wholesale	importers	could	receive,	they	had	little	or	no	incentive	to	import	foods	at	prices	levels	that	would	 prove	 unprofitable;	 the	 similar	 case	 was	 true	 if	 prices	 were	 mandated	 to	 final	resellers,	as	 they	would	chose	not	 to	order	products	 from	wholesalers	or	 importers	 if	 it	meant	paying	higher	prices	than	those	at	which	they	could	resell.			Under	 consideration	 of	 such	 logic,	 and	 combined	 with	 the	 prospect	 of	 potentially	administering	an	associated	system	of	rationing	 that	would	necessarily	accompany	such	price	 controls,	 the	 Council	 continued	 to	 argue	 for	 caution	 in	 terms	 of	 further	 direct	intervention	in	the	market.	At	the	1940	Annual	Ratepayer's	Meeting,	held	in	early	February	of	1941,	a	senior	member	of	the	Council,	Mr	Franklin,	discussing	the	difficulties	the	public	faced	given	the	severe	inflationary	pressures	on	commodity	prices,	expressed	the	Council's	position	 in	 regard	 to	 reasons	 for	 hesitation	 before	 implementing	 drastic	measures	 that	would	interfere	with	the	market	process	(SMC	1940:	9).	Specifically	in	regard	to	the	call	for	the	Council	to	implement	price	controls	on	certain	consumer	goods,	Mr	Franklin	noted:	"I	refer	to	the	grave	problems	we	are	faced	now	as	the	result	of	the	rapid	rise	in	the	price	of	food	and	other	essential	commodities.	We	are	not	professional	economists,	and	in	the	field	of	economics	we	must	walk	warily.	It	would	be	dangerous	for	me	to	encourage	you	to	hope	for	too	much	as	the	result	of	municipal	control	and	effort	in	the	field	of	economics.	Control	carried	to	excess	frequently	defeats	its	own	ends.	...It	follows	that	unless	there	is	a	free	flow	of	 foodstuffs	 into	 Shanghai	 from	 the	 hinterland,	 with	 no	 unnecessary	 restrictions	 or	taxation,	 there	 can	 be	 no	 substantial	 fall	 in	 the	 price	 of	 essential	 foodstuffs."	 (To	 Mr	Franklin's	statement	we	might	only	wish	to	add,	as	Hayek	(1988)	cautions,	it	would	likely	be	wise	for	professional	economists	to	also	walk	warily	in	the	field	of	economics.)		
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The	 Council	 had	 already	 begun	 to	 implement	 set	 the	 stage	 for	 increasingly	 aggressive	interventions	in	the	market	to	combat	food	shortages	and	the	potential	for	further	social	unrest	that	additional	price	increases	and	supply	declines	portended.	The	Rice	Committee	continued	to	actively	work	with	merchant	groups	to	urge	them	to	keep	prices	within	the	ranges	of	 the	prices	 set	 by	 the	Committee,	 and	 constantly	 surveyed	and	published	 food	prices	in	the	local	papers,	as	found	in	the	three	primary	market	locations—Hongkew	Market,	the	Western	District's	Seymour	Market,	and	an	average	across	various	smaller	markets	in	the	French	Concession	(NCH	5	February	1941:	216).	Yet	these	attempts	at	moral	suasion	over	economic	actors	proved	difficult,	given	the	rather	feckless	enforcement	mechanisms	the	Committee	possessed,	as	well	as	the	economic	logic	behind	the	futility	of	price	controls	in	terms	of	inducing	rational	agents	to	consistently	sell	for	less	than	their	costs.			Prior	calls	for	restraint	on	the	part	of	the	Council,	however	wisely	stated	by	Mr	Franklin	in	early	 1941,	 were	 to	 be	 ultimately	 upended	 when	 by	 mid-1941	 inflationary	 pressures	further	 intensified.	 Beginning	 in	 the	 timeframe	 after	 the	 start	 of	 the	 war,	 combined	wholesale	price	levels	over	the	latter	half	of	the	year	nearly	doubled,	rising	from	891.2	in	June	 to	 1597.8	 by	 December.	 Tensions	 in	 the	 community	 rose	 as	 rice	 shortages	 again	became	severely	acute,	and	it	became	clear	that	the	strategies	employed	by	the	Council	and	the	 Rice	 Committee	 were	 proving	 ineffective	 to	 solve	 the	 crisis.	 In	 response,	 an	extraordinary	meeting	of	the	Ratepayers	was	called	at	the	start	of	November	at	which	the	by-laws	of	the	Settlement	were	amended,	granting	the	Council	sweeping	new	powers	to	set	price	controls	on	any	commodity	or	good	deemed	as	"necessary"	to	the	overall	welfare	of	the	 Settlement,	 and	 further	 to	 impose	 criminally	 punishable	 penalties	 on	merchants	 or	other	resellers	caught	violating	mandated	prices	(NCDN	3	November	1941).			From	a	liberal	governance	argument,	while	the	willingness	of	the	community	to	agree	to	modify	the	constitution	and	grant	the	state	greater	powers	over	free	economic	activity	and	the	natural	market	process	might	have	been	concerning	 to	some	residents,	 the	majority	ultimately	gave	way	to	what	were	seen	as	more	immediate	expediencies.	In	some	sense,	albeit	by	way	of	a	different	mechanism,	we	can	find	a	parallel	to	that	situation	which	was	described	 on	 the	 domestic	 Chinese	 institutional	 environment	 landscape	 where	 the	existence	of	plausible	existential	threats	led	state	actors	to	prioritise	short-term	goals	over	long-term	costs;	similarly,	the	social	and	economic	emergency	resulting	from	the	Japanese	military	 invasion	 of	 China	 created	 the	 conditions	 for	 sentiments	 amongst	 Settlement	ratepayers	to	similarly	discount	the	potential	long-term	danger	of	increased	state	power	over	economic	activity	 in	order	 to	all	the	state	 to	provide	expected	economic	and	social	benefits	in	the	short	term.		Broader	public	 sentiment	on	 the	 issue	 can	perhaps	be	 ascertained	 from	 the	headline	of	front-page	 article	 in	 the	 North	 China	 Daily	 News,	 published	 the	 following	 month	 on	 7	December	1941,	reading,	"Shanghai	Public	Cheered	by	Continued	Price	Control".	The	article	describes	 the	 appreciation	 of	 the	 community	 for	 the	 perceived	 assistance	 that	 local	authorities	were	providing	in	the	form	of	continuing	price	control	measures:	"The	first	day	of	the	week	brought	the	glad	tidings	that	the	price	of	Hongay	coal	had	been	fixed	by	the	authorities	of	the	F.M.C.	at	$600	per	ton,	as	compared	with	$900	which	had	been	quoted	not	so	 long	 ago.	 ...Major	 coal	 companies	 in	 the	 International	 Settlement	 had	 supplied	 the	Shanghai	 Municipal	 Council	 with	 statistics	 of	 monthly	 consumption	 figures,	 and	 it	 was	expected	 in	 distributors'	 circles	 that	 the	 Settlement	 authorities	 would	 adopt	 similar	regulations."			More	recent	views	likewise	appear	to	express	equally	positive	expectations	of	the	benefits	the	 Settlement's	 formalised	 system	 of	 price	 control	 that	 it	 had	 newly	 instituted,	 with	Henriot	 (2000:	52)	 for	 one,	 lamenting	not	 that	 the	Council	 instituted	price	 controls,	 but	rather	 that	 it	 had	waited	 too	 long	 in	doing	 so:	 "The	SMC	 issued	on	9	November	1941	a	
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proclamation	laying	down	a	system	of	control	over	the	price	and	movements	of	rice	in	the	International	Settlement.	...The	regulation	prohibited	the	sale	of	rice	above	the	fixed	price	and	 threatened	 violators	 with	 fines,	 confiscation	 of	 stocks,	 and	 expulsion	 from	 the	settlements.	The	freezing	of	rice	prices,	although	it	could	not	be	enforced	perfectly,	caused	severe	damage	to	rice	profiteers.	Some	1,000,000	bags	of	rice	bought	locally	or	elsewhere	at	prices	ranging	from	160	to	200	yuan	could	only	be	sold	at	the	fixed	price	of	130	yuan.	The	local	rice	merchants	took	an	aggregate	loss	of	between	50	and	70	million	yuan.	Yet	these	measures	 came	 too	 late,	 as	 the	 SMC	 was	 about	 to	 lose	 all	 its	 powers	 under	 Japanese	occupation."		Economically,	the	benefits	anticipated	by	consumers	or	modern	commentators	were	unlikely	to	have	materialised.	Indeed,	Henriot	(2000:62-65)	later	notes	the	failure	of	a	subsequent	price	control	and	rationing	system	the	Wang	regime	implemented	in	Shanghai	after	the	fall	of	the	extraterritorial	settlements;	while	he	assigns	blame	for	the	policy's	failure	on	poor	implementation	in	light	of	weak	bureaucratic	capacity,	we	would	argue	the	underlying	lack	of	economic	rationality	of	price	control	and	rationing	systems	to	have	been	equally	culpable.	To	 begin	 with,	 the	 "profiteering"	 referred	 to	 by	 either	 contemporaneous	 or	 modern	observers—that	 is,	 making	 "excessive"	 or	 "unfair"	 profits—is	 a	 concept	 based	 on	 an	inherently	subjective	criterion	that	seems	oddly	misplaced	in	a	market	society,	for	who	is	to	say	what	is	a	"just"	price	and	what	profits	are	"excessive"?	The	very	concept	of	the	market	mechanism	 is	 that	 it	enables	market	prices	to	work	as	an	allocation	 tool	that	allocates	a	given	commodity	to	those	who	most	value	it.	In	other	words,	prices	ration	scarce	resources;	viz.,	food	and	other	essential	commodities	under	a	wartime	situation.	Trying	to	circumvent	the	market	price	mechanism	in	a	market	economy	not	only	creates	grave	distortions	to	the	economy	as	a	whole,	but	more	fundamentally,	it	disrupts	the	very	allocation	method	that	market	prices	perform	as	 they	 continually	 adjust	 to	 attempt	 to	 achieve	market	 clearing	levels.	When	there	is	an	attempt	to	keep	prices	artificially	low	in	relation	to	the	available	supply—as	in	the	case	of	foodstuffs	and	other	"essential"	commodities	in	the	Settlements—then	inherently	prices	will	be	too	low	to	induce	sufficient	numbers	of	sellers	to	procure	the	goods	so	as	to	sell	it	or	part	with	it	if	they	already	hold	the	good,	thus	further	reducing	the	available	supply;	and	further,	the	number	of	consumers	who	would	be	willing	to	purchase	the	good	at	the	artificially	low	price	are	much	greater	than	the	amount	of	goods	available,	and	those	who	would	have	been	willing	to	purchase	the	good	at	higher	prices	are	unable	to	receive	any,	as	the	good	quickly	becomes	sold	out,	while	those	who	valued	the	good	more	dearly	 end	 up	 consuming	 more	 than	 they	 would	 have	 had	 the	 price	 been	 allowed	 to	fluctuate	 to	 approach	 its	market-clearing	 level.	 That	 is,	 everyone	 is	 pleased	with	 lower	prices—to	wit,	 the	 cited	 front-page	 headline	 of	 the	North	 China	Daily	 News—except	 for	those	who	are	unable	to	acquire	the	good	at	any	price	once	supply	has	been	exhausted.			However,	our	discussion	has	ignored	the	issue	that	many	observers,	whether	they	be	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	members,	or	contemporary	academics	and	politicians,	deem	the	most	important—that	of	fairness.	Understandably,	it	appears	inherently	unjust	that	in	a	 situation	 of	 dire	 shortages	 of	 materially	 essential	 goods	 such	 as	 food	 that	 wealthy	individuals	should	be	able	 to	obtain	such	goods	while	 those	 less	economically	 fortunate	might	not	be	able	to	pay	the	demanded	price	and	hence	suffer	and	even	perhaps	starve.	This	is	 a	 noble	 albeit	 logically	 incoherent	 position.	 For,	why	 is	 it	 that	 in	 "normal"	 times,	 the	market	 price	 mechanism	 is	 viewed	 as	 the	 most	 appropriate	 to	 perform	 the	 allocation	function	 of	 goods	 to	 consumers—where	 again,	 those	 consumers	 with	 access	 to	 greater	economic	resources	can	afford	to	obtain	more	and	better	goods	can	those	with	less,	and	even	 where	 the	 most	 destitute	 amongst	 the	 populace	 might	 well	 not	 possess	 enough	resources	so	as	to	purchase	essential	resources	and	therefore	suffer	and	even	starve—but	not	during	times	of	economic	distress	and	imposed	scarcity	of	goods?	Whether	the	answer	is	simply	 the	scale	of	 the	number	who	are	made	 to	suffer,	 or	 the	potential	 for	sellers	 to	obtain	profits	higher	then	they	normally	would	have	under	"normal"	circumstances,	neither	
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argument	undermines	the	fact	that	the	market	price	mechanism	is	that	most	superior	in	not	only	allocating	goods	across	consumers	to	those	valuing	the	good	most,	but	also	to	identify	goods	 most	 valuable	 in	 society	 and	 signal	 to	 entrepreneurs	 the	 potential	 for	 future	extraordinary	profits	so	as	to	induce	actions	that	will	bring	about	an	increase	in	the	supply	of	the	desired	good	and	thereby	increase	its	supply.	Thus,	as	noted,	Henriot	&	Yeh	(2004)	find	a	variety	of	active	smuggling	operations	taking	place	throughout	the	period;	likewise,	we	 observe	 a	 surge	 in	 agricultural	 commodity	 imports	 into	 Shanghai	 replacing	 those	previously	supplied	by	central	and	north	China.	The	reasons	for	this	was	the	high	prices	that	could	 be	 obtained	 by	 selling	 foods,	 and	 the	 opportunity	 for	 extraordinary	 profits	 that	entrepreneurs	expected	from	these	activities.		Thus,	rather	than	focus	so	much	(ineffective)	effort	on	precluding	"profiteering",	the	Council	could	have	allowed	the	market	price	mechanism	to	function	unfettered	and	drive	processes	and	solutions—many	perhaps	some	unforeseeable	and	unknowable—that	could	have	been	devised	by	creative	entrepreneurs	to	bring	more	foodstuffs	and	other	essentials	into	the	settlements	to	sell	to	willing	Settlement	consumers,	thereby	increasing	the	supply	of	these	goods.	Simultaneously,	to	address	the	issue	of	potential	famine,	direct	transfers	of	foodstuffs	through	private	 charitable	organisations	 could	have	 alleviated	much	of	 the	potential	 for	suffering.	 Given	 the	 ineffectiveness	 of	 the	 policies	 the	 Council	 instituted,	 near-famine	conditions	existed	for	many	of	the	refugee	population	who	had	fled	to	the	Settlement	in	the	wake	 of	 the	 outbreak	 of	 open	 military	 fighting	 in	 1937	 that	 consequently	 swelled	 the	population	 of	 the	 Settlement	 by	nearly	 one	million.	 In	 response,	many	wealthy	 Chinese	merchants	donated	food	supplies	to	help	feed	the	refugee	population;	for	instance,	twelve	hundred	bags	of	"Saigon"	rice,	valued	at	one	hundred	thousand	yuan,	were	donated	by	a	merchant	of	surname	Yu	in	the	Settlement's	western	district	(Shun	Pao	24	December	1940).	Whether	such	private	efforts	would	have	been	sufficient	to	fully	address	the	needs	of	the	Settlement's	refugee	and	other	suffering	populations	is	unknowable,	but	what	we	do	know	is	that	the	state-sponsored	efforts	that	were	undertaken	proved	to	be	insufficient.				9.6.2		State's	Role	in	Civil	Society		The	 liberal	 concept	 of	 free	 expression	 and	 free	 association	 is	 central	 to	 the	 successful	maintenance	of	what	Weingast	(1997)	refers	to	as	"open	access"	societies,	later	defined	by	North	et	al.	 (2013:16)	as	 those	societies	 that	are	"sustained	by	 institutions	 that	support	open	access	and	competition:	political	competition	to	maintain	open	access	in	the	economy,	and	 economic	 competition	 to	 maintain	 open	 access	 in	 the	 polity."	 Such	 competition	mechanisms	help	allow	the	coordinated	actions	of	economic	actors	to	place	limits	on	state	actions.	In	order	for	these	mechanisms	to	successfully	operate,	open	societies	must	create	the	type	of	institutions	that	facilitate	"political	competition	to	maintain	open	access	in	the	economy	 and	 economic	 competition	 to	 maintain	 open	 access	 in	 the	 polity	 that	 allows	citizens	to	form	social	coalitions	that	can	overcome	social	coordination	issues	enough	to	successfully	react	 in	concert	 to	violations	of	previously	promised	limits	to	state	actions"	(Weingast	1997:	261).		Central	to	such	institutions	is	the	liberal	concept	of	freedom	of	expression	and	freedom	of	assembly.	According	to	the	expressed	sentiments	of	Council	members	and	the	Settlement's	other	 self-interested	 supporters	 and	 apologists—and	 oft	 assumed	 within	 the	 current	economic	history	literature—the	International	Settlement	well	exemplified	the	ideals	of	the	Weingastian	open	society,	operating	under	a	rule	of	law,	protecting	the	rights	of	residents	based	 on	 a	 commitment	 to	well-established	 principles,	which	 included	 commitments	 to	freedom	of	expression	and	civil	association,	thus	allowing	the	formation	of	social	coalitions	that	 could	 organise	 to	 defend	 their	 interests	 in	 regard	 to	 potential	 desired	 changes	 in	government	policy,	or	to	engage	in	other	forms	of	social	action.	However,	the	actual	often	deviated—substantially,	sometimes—from	the	ideal.	
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Contrary	 to	 the	 concepts	of	 freedom	 of	 expression	 and	assembly	underlying	 the	British	common	 law	 system	 that	 formed	 the	underlying	 legal	 framework	of	 the	 Settlement,	 the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	imposed	restrictive	limits	on	the	ability	of	local	media	concerns	to	publish	the	type	of	information	their	managers	believed	their	readership	was	interested	in	 consuming.	 There	 were	 prohibitions	 against	 the	 publication	 of	 "indecent"	 or	"blasphemous"	writing.	(Such	prohibitions	did	not	limit	blatantly	racialist	caricatures,	both	verbal	and	sketched,	of	Chinese	individuals	in	the	western	press,	which	frequently	depicted	supposed	conversation	with	domestic	Chinese	individuals	by	"humourously"	using	"Pidgin	English";	e.g.,	NCH	23	July	1921,	NCH	23	October	1940).			Much	of	 the	enforcement	of	such	provisions	was	directed	 towards	 the	Chinese-language	press.	By	 the	 turn	of	 the	 century,	 nearly	half	 of	 all	 Chinese-language	newspapers	 in	 the	country	were	published	in	Shanghai,	most	out	of	the	International	Settlement,	with	many	openly	 advocating	 for	 political	 reforms	 such	 as	 a	 parliamentary	 system	 of	 government,	institutional	reform,	and	even	the	overthrow	of	Manchu	monarchical	rule.	Ming	Li	Bao	(
),	printed	in	the	French	Concession,	became	an	unofficial	voice-piece	of	what	became	the	1911	Revolution.	It	was	one	of	the	widest	circulated	newspapers	during	the	time,	printing	over	20,000	 copies	per	day,	 and	 including	 a	 young	Mao	Zedong	amongst	 its	 readership	(SHTS	1999	v3:	358,	355;	Gu	1998:	70).	The	choice	of	domestic	newspaper	to	locate	their	offices	within	the	settlements	in	part	reflected	relatively	stronger	provisions	on	freedom	of	expression	 in	 the	press	 than	 elsewhere	 in	China.	However,	 such	protections	were	 fairly	circumscribed,	reflecting	more	an	adherence	to	process	and	standardised	penalties	than	to	full	protection	of	speech.	Given	the	authoritarian	nature	of	the	various	domestic	Chinese	governments,	the	Chinese-language	press	occasionally	contained	messages	critiquing	the	lack	of	rights	Chinese	citizens	possessed	under	the	given	current	regime,	or	discussing	the	lack	of	government	accountability,	transparency,	adherence	to	rule	of	law,	or	other	failings	attributed	to	the	domestic	state.	Such	materials	were	considered	both	in	violation	of	both	Settlement	 bye-laws	 and	 domestic	 Chinese	 government	 proclamations	 forbidding	 the	printing	 of	 seditious	 materials.	 The	 Municipal	 Police	 would	 actively	 suppress	 the	publication	of	journals	containing	such	critiques,	as	well	as	arrest	the	editors	or	authors	of	the	 journals.	 Kotenev	 (1927:	 74-76)	 details	 a	 specific	 example	 of	 the	 limits	 to	 free	expression	 in	 the	 press	 that	 defined	 the	 Settlement's	 civil	 society,	 illustrated	 by	 events	leading	 to	 the	 censorship	 of	 the	 Su	 Pao	 newspaper	 in	 1903,	 and	 the	 prosecution	 of	 its	publishers	for	acts	of	sedition	against	the	Chinese	state.	Having	published	an	article	calling	for	the	overthrow	of	the	Qing	monarchy	and	the	installation	of	a	republic,	two	of	the	six	defendants	charged	were	ultimately	found	guilty	of	sedition,	and	were	expelled	from	the	Settlement	and	sentenced	to	three	years	of	hard	labour	in	prison.		At	 times,	 the	 Municipal	 Council	 also	 actively	 sought	 to	 undertake	 legislative	 action	 to	strengthen	 the	 Settlement's	 own	 internal	 legal	 provisions	 against	 seditious	material.	 In	March	1916,	at	a	called	Special	Meeting	of	the	ratepayers,	the	Council	leadership	proposed	a	 new	 Bye-law,	 mandating	 that	 all	 newspapers	 or	 periodicals	 published	 or	 sold	 in	 the	Settlement	 must	 be	 licensed	 by	 the	 Council,	 and	 that	 the	 Council	 possessed	 the	 sole	authority	"in	its	absolute	discretion	to	refuse	or	waive	the	issue	of	any	such	license	or	permit	without	assigning	the	reason	for	such	refusal	or	waiver",	with	a	further	provision	attached	that	allowed	the	Council	to	expand	the	terms	of	the	Bye-law	"in	such	manner	as	it	may	in	its	discretion	think	fit"	(Municipal	Gazette	22	March	1916).	Such	blatant	attempted	overreach	of	 state	 power	 by	 the	 state	 leadership	 in	 this	 instance	 was	 met	 with	 relatively	 strong	resistance	by	 the	majority	of	 ratepayers,	and	 the	proposal	to	 license	 the	 local	press	was	sounded	rejected	at	the	meeting,	and	instead	subjected	to	revision	by	a	committee	created	to	redraft	the	Bye-law,	leading	to	multiple	redraftings	and	resubmissions	of	proposals	over	the	following	decade,	yet	with	no	final	ratification	to	the	Bye-laws	regarding	press	licensing	ultimately	consummated	(Kotenev	1927:	89).	
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Efforts	by	the	Council	to	control	the	local	press	continued	to	be	primarily	directed	toward	the	 Chinese-language	 press.	 This	 was	 particularly	 true	 after	 the	 rise	 in	 anti-Japanese	sentiments	 subsequent	 to	 the	 start	 of	 the	 May	 Fourth	 Movement	 in	 1919.	 A	 renewed	proposal	requiring	 licensing	of	 the	press,	which	 included	such	overly-broad	 language	as	that	prohibiting	"matter	of	a	seditious	or	scurrilous	character	or	that	is	calculated	to	incite	a	breach	of	the	peace	or	the	disturbance	of	good	order	be	printed,	lithographed	or	otherwise	published"	 again	 failed	 to	be	 adopted	(SMC	1919:	239A).	Other	 subsequent	 attempts	 at	registering	the	press	were	met	with	strong	opposition	from	members	of	the	Chinese	press,	with	 much	 of	 the	 contention	 centring	 over	 language	 that	 would	 require	 all	 published	materials	to	include	the	names	and	addresses	of	editors	and	publishers	(Kotenev	1927:	88).	The	desire	for	anonymity	on	the	part	of	some	in	the	domestic	press	likely	owed	to	their	apprehension	of	arrest	and	punishment	under	 objectively	draconian	press	 laws	enacted	under	both	Beiyang	and	Guomindang	 iterations	of	the	central	government,	given	 that	as	Chinese	citizens	they	were	subject	to	be	charged	under	such	laws,	as	the	results	of	the	well-publicised	Su	Pao	case	demonstrated.		In	later	years,	many	of	the	restrictive	measures	on	the	press	were	specifically	intended	to	limit	 the	 publication	 and	 distribution	 of	 newspapers	 and	 journals	 sympathetic	 to	 the	communist	movement	(Wakeman	1995a).	Council	policy	enabled	the	use	the	legal	system	to	suppress	"subversive"	 ideas	such	as	 those	published	 in	pro-communist	 literature.	For	instance,	 the	 Municipal	 Police	 worked	 closely	 with	 the	 domestic	 central	 government	authorities	when	it	came	to	the	suppression	of	communist	activities,	and	actively	arrested	and	enforced	bans	on	the	printing	and	distribution	of	materials	that	supported	socialism	or	communism.	Starting	in	the	1910s,	the	annual	summary	by	the	chief	of	the	Municipal	Police	in	his	report	to	the	Council	on	criminal	activity	in	the	Settlement	typically	included	updates	on	communist	activity,	including	for	instance	in	1930,	when	the	report	stated:	"The	open	activities	 in	 the	 Settlement	 [by	 communist	 supporters]	 included	 53	 demonstrations,	 of	which	6	were	attended	by	violence	in	the	form	of	stone	throwing	and	window	smashing	of	tramcars	and	other	vehicles.	The	subversive	agitation	included	a	series	of	secret	meetings	and	the	dissemination	of	propaganda	matter	of	which	no	less	than	895	kinds	came	into	the	possession	of	the	Municipal	Police.	Measures	taken	by	the	Municipal	Police	in	their	efforts	to	suppress	Communism	included	the	raiding	of	69	communistic	bases	and	the	arrest	of	570	persons	for	participating	in	demonstrations,	disseminating	literature	and	kindred	offences.	Of	these	185	persons	were	handed	over	to	the	Chinese	Authorities,	the	remainder	being	dealt	with	by	the	Special	District	Court"	(SMC	1930:	95).	Of	note	is	that	arrests	were	made	on	 the	basis	 of	 individuals	participating	 in	demonstrations	 and	disseminating	 literature	expressing	opinions	not	 in	accordance	with	 those	 in	power.	Such	actions	 indicate	police	tactics	that	fail	to	accord	with	Weingast's	concept	of	an	open	society	that	allows	for	free	association	and	exchange	of	ideas,	even	ideas	with	which	those	holding	positions	of	political	authority	might	find	strong	disagreement.		The	importance	of	such	actions	is	underscored	by	the	fact	that	not	only	communists	came	to	be	targeted	by	such	measures.	As	the	1930	report	by	the	Municipal	Police	chief	continues,	it	 is	clear	that	the	activities	of	individuals	other	than	solely	communist	sympathisers	are	additionally	 curtailed:	 "Local	 reactionary	 elements,	 other	 than	 communists,	 manifested	considerable	activity	in	the	Settlement	in	their	agitation	against	the	Nationalist	Government	and	 the	 Kuomintang.	 The	 agitation	 was	 furthered	 by	 the	 printing	 and	 surreptitious	dissemination	of	mosquito	newspapers	and	other	propaganda	matter.	In	connection	with	these	offences	the	Municipal	Police	apprehended	104	persons	and	raided	4	places	of	which	3	 were	 printing	 establishments.	 Of	 the	 prisoners	 35	 were	 handed	 over	 to	 the	 Chinese	Authorities	and	69	were	dealt	with	by	the	Special	District	Court"	(SMC	1930:	95).	Indeed,	the	Municipal	Police	actions	could	well	be	seen	as	providing	support	for	the	Guomindang's	larger	 "partyfication"	 efforts,	where	 any	 criticism	of	 the	 government	was	 interpreted	as	
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"reactionary"	and	liable	to	arrest	for	sedition	(Yi	Shih	Pao	4	February	1931).	Overall,	the	clear	 lesson	 one	 finds	 from	 a	 reading	 of	 case	details	 and	 the	 reaction	 of	 the	 Council	 to	political	pressure	by	the	authoritarian	Guomindang	state	was	that	significant	limits	on	free	expression	was	a	defining	feature	of	the	nature	of	Settlement	civil	society,	notwithstanding	the	constant	claims	by	the	Settlement's	advocates	of	its	support	of	liberal	ideals.		As	a	final	note,	it	is	important	to	provide	a	sense	of	balance	to	the	discussion	regarding	the	nature	of	the	protections	on	free	expression	and	association	existing	in	the	Settlement,	and	the	mechanisms	designed	to	enforce	such	protections.	As	described,	a	serious	lack	of	credible	commitment	mechanisms	existed	 in	support	and	defence	of	a	 free	press.	Applications	of	poorly-defined	labels	of	"indecent"	or	"seditious"	were	used	to	shut	down	publication	of	materials	deemed	offensive	on	the	part	of	state	leadership,	and	the	authors	and	editors	of	offending	pieces	could	and	did	face	punishments	that	included	prison	sentences.		Employing	a	comparative	analysis	of	this	aspect	of	the	extraterritorial	institutional	environ-ment	to	that	of	the	broader	domestic	Chinese	environment	proves	instructive.	In	this	regard,	for	all	the	problematic	issues	one	might	find	in	the	Council's	failure	to	uphold	liberal	ideals	of	free	exchange	of	information	via	an	open	and	free	press,	the	Settlement	nonetheless	was	viewed	as	offering	a	more	discriminate,	less	arbitrary	set	of	procedural	protections.	Indeed,	within	greater	Shanghai,	there	existed	many	Chinese-language	newspapers	and	periodicals,	yet	 the	 overwhelming	 majority	 of	 them	 chose	 to	 publish	 out	 of	 the	 extraterritorial	settlements,	 and	 not	 the	 domestically-controlled	municipality	 (Kotenev	 1927:	 73).	 This	further	 instance	 of	 observed	 revealed	 preference	 is	 indicative	 that	 at	 least	 in	 terms	 of	perception	by	domestic	actors	engaged	in	activities	related	to	expression	in	the	press,	the	extraterritorial	settlements'	institutional	environment	offered	superior	protection.		It	was	formality	of	legal	procedure	regarding	free	expression	that	the	institutional	frame-work	of	the	Settlement	offered,	if	not	actual	freedom	of	expression	in	execution.	A	situation	involving	a	Chinese-language	newspaper	published	out	of	the	International	Settlement,	the	
Hua	Yueh	Pao	 (!),	 is	 exemplative	 in	 this	 regard.	 In	1902	Daotai	Yan	accused	 the	paper	of	 indecency	 for	printing	an	 article	describing	visiting	houses	of	 prostitution,	and	ordered	the	paper	to	be	shut	down;	in	fact,	the	following	day	domestic	constables	boarded	up	 the	 paper's	 premises	 in	 the	 Settlement,	 attached	 with	 the	 Daotai's	 seal.	 However,	"without	 desiring	 or	 attempting	 to	 defend	 the	 publication	 of	 indecent	 literature",	 the	Council	refused	to	turn	the	editors	over	to	the	local	domestic	authorities	or	allow	the	paper	to	be	closed	without	 first	 there	occurring	a	 formal	 trial	 in	 the	Mixed	Court,	ordering	the	Municipal	Police	to	break	open	the	sealed	premises	and	remove	the	order	of	suppression.	As	the	Council	Chairman	Bayne	stated	in	a	communique	contained	in	the	Council's	Annual	Report,	"the	Council's	object	has	been	to	maintain	the	proper	and	recognised	procedure	of	justice	in	this	Settlement.	Whatever	the	facts	in	this	instance,	however	serious	the	offence	committed,	the	general	principle	that	trial	should	precede	punishment	is	one	which	cannot	be	abandoned	without	the	gravest	danger	to	the	public	interest"	(SMC	1902:	68).			Similarly,	the	Council	reaffirmed	its	commitment	to	procedural	protections	in	regard	to	the	aforementioned	Su	Pao	 case.	After	 the	Daotai	ordered	 that	case's	defendants	arrested	 to	face	 trial	 "wherever	 and	whenever	 it	 might	 please	 the	 Government	 of	 China",	 with	 the	penalty	of	death	decreed	as	the	punishment	for	the	publication	of	seditious	materials,	and	the	offending	paper's	offices	to	be	shuttered,	the	order	of	extradition	was	refused	by	the	Council	on	grounds	that	as	Settlement	residents,	and	as	the	alleged	crime	took	place	within	the	Settlement,	the	Mixed	Court	was	the	sole	responsible	adjudicating	body.	The	Municipal	Police	were	likewise	ordered	to	reopen	the	seal	on	the	paper's	premises.	The	case	against	the	defendants,	as	tried	in	the	Mixed	Court,	took	several	months	before	its	final	resolution,	finding	two	of	the	six	defendants	guilty	of	sedition.	Summarising	the	outcome	of	the	case,	Council	Chairman	Mr	Bayne	declared:	"The	Council...	adheres	to	the	general	and	necessary	
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principle,	frequently	enunciated	in	the	past,	that	the	due	protection	of	the	rights	of	residents	in	this	Settlement	necessitates	recognition	of	the	rule	that	trial	should	precede	punishment,	and	that	this	principle	cannot	be	abandoned,	even	in	deference	to	the	wishes	of	the	Chinese	authorities,	without	the	gravest	danger	to	public	interests	of	the	community.	The	Council	desires	at	all	times	to	act	in	harmony	with	the	Chinese	authorities	but	is	unable	to	depart	from	the	policy	of	its	predecessors,	sanctioned	by	the	unanimous	support	of	the	Ratepayers,	in	regard	to	the	protection	of	the	status	and	liberties	of	native	residents"	(SMC	1903:	62).	Continuing	his	statement	reviewing	the	case,	Mr	Bayne	refers	to	the	necessity	to	maintain	an	adherence	 to	 a	procedural	 interpretation	of	rule	of	 law	 in	order	 to	avoid	placing	 the	desirability	of	outcome	above	the	need	for	formalised	procedural	protections,	contrasting	this	 interpretation	with	 that	of	 the	domestic	 legal	system,	 if	albeit	 in	a	characteristically	derogatory	manner	that	often	defined	extraterritorial-domestic	relations:	"It	would	seem	unnecessary	 to	 lay	 stress	 in	 the	 readiness	with	which	 the	native	officials	 resort	 to	 such	irregular	proceedings,	and	to	point	out	how	such	a	precedent	as	this	would	inevitably	be	construed	to	justify	other	and	more	serious	irregularities"	(SMC	1903:	68).			Kotenev	(1927:	73-74)	later	underscores	Chairmen	Bayne's	contrast	between	the	domestic	and	 extraterritorial	 legal	 concepts,	 opining	 that	 "only	 in	 the	 foreign	 settlements	 and	concessions	did	the	native	press	enjoy	the	freedom	essential	to	its	growth.	In	all	other	parts	of	China	it	was	at	the	mercy	of	the	administrative	and	judicial	discretion	of	various	officials	who	 did	 not	 fail	 to	 use	 their	 privileges	 to	 strangle	 any	 semblance	 of	 free	 thought	 and	opposition...	 Protecting	 the	 native	 press	 in	 the	 Settlement	 against	 the	 administrative	pressure	of	the	Chinese	government	and	its	agents,	the	foreign	authorities	were	compelled	to	 extend	 this	 [their]	 protection...	 to	 the	 Chinese	 press.	 Practically	 speaking	 there	 was	[under	the	Qing]	no	legislation	whatever	in	China	regarding	the	press,	for	any	free	thought	regarding	the	monarchical	form	of	the	government	in	China,	any	slightest	criticism	of	its	function,	could	be	interpreted	as	lese-majest	and	the	unfortunate	editor	or	author,	and	even	their	relatives,	were	liable	to	the	penalty	of	death."			While	such	critiques	are	supportive	of	our	earlier	contentions	regarding	comparisons	of	the	domestic	and	extraterritorial	 institutional	settings,	 it	 is	 imperative	 to	read	 them	with	an	appropriate	degree	of	scepticism	as	they	are	originating	from	a	solely	western	perspective,	self-interested	in	advocating	the	superiority	of	the	extraterritorial	system,	a	system	whose	stated	 fundamental	 basis	 for	 existence	 owed	 to	 the	 supposition	 that	 the	 domestic	institutional	environment	lacked	sufficient	judicial	and	legal	safeguards.	Hence,	we	should	not	be	surprised	to	find	parties	whose	interests	were	represented	by	the	extraterritorial	system	willing	to	identify	and	colour	instances	that	would	appear	to	find	the	domestic	legal	system	 thusly	 so	 lacking.	 As	 such,	 the	 reliance	 on	more	 direct	 observed	 behaviours	 by	economic	actors,	such	as	the	choice	of	domestic	Chinese	publishers	to	locate	their	activities	within	 the	 extraterritorial	settlements	as	 opposed	 to	domestically-controlled	sections	of	Shanghai,	can	serve	as	more	objective	and	thereby	persuasive	evidences	than	simply	the	written	assertions	of	self-interested	parties,	however	compelling	they	might	appear.		Finally,	 we	 might	 also	 note	 that	 the	 numerous	 examples	 included	 above	 of	 strident	complaints	 and	 critiques	 by	 the	 residents	 and	 observers	 of	 various	 aspects	 of	 the	International	Settlement	that	are	to	be	found	in	the	contemporaneous	local	press	certainly	underscore	many	of	the	weaknesses	and	failings	of	the	overall	 institutional	environment	and	 effectiveness	 of	 those	 credible	 commitment	 mechanisms	 designed	 to	 support	 that	environment.	Yet	too,	the	publication	and	discussion	of	such	criticisms	simultaneously	are	partly	 indicative	 of	 the	 healthy	 functioning	 of	 structures	 that	 allowed	 energetic	 and	somewhat	open	criticisms	of	the	functioning	of	the	sovereign,	and	the	society	created	within	the	 political	 environment	 defined	 by	 that	 sovereign.	 Such	 ability	 by	 observers	 and	participants	reinforced	the	operation	of	credible	commitment	mechanisms,	and	provided	of	greater	accountability,	accessibility	and	oversight	to	those	governed.	
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		9.7.		Conclusions		In	 regard	 to	 the	 unique	 dualistic	 institutional	 environment	 that	 defined	 Shanghai	throughout	 the	 late-imperial	 through	 the	 early-republican	 era,	 a	 comparative	 analysis	demonstrates	 that	 the	 extraterritorial	 institutional	 environment	 and	 associated	 private	property	 rights	 framework	 appears	 to	 have	 been	 consistently	 perceived	 by	contemporaneous	economic	actors	as	relatively	stronger	than	that	which	operated	within	the	domestically-controlled	municipality.	Multiple	factors	seemed	to	have	helped	drive	such	a	 perception	 amongst	 economic	 actors,	 including	 the	 existence	 and	 development	 of	relatively	 impartial	 formal	 institutional	 legal	 structures	 designed	 to	 protect	 private	property	and	contract	rights.	While	cited	interventionist	actions	or	overreaching	economic	and	social	regulations	represented	troubling	deviations	from	a	strictly	liberal	governance	practise,	overall	such	manifestations	were	more	exceptional	than	endemic	in	quantity,	and	failed	 to	 reach	 the	 level	 represented	 by	 onerous	 taxation	 or	 outright	 expropriation	 of	private	property	in	kind.			Furthermore,	 the	 representative	 structure	 of	 the	 extraterritorial	 state	 contributed	 to	 a	greater	degree	of	accountability	and	limits	on	state	actor	behaviours	than	allowed	for	by	the	authoritarian	structure	of	the	domestic	state.	Likewise,	the	extraterritorial	legal	system	more	 explicitly	 provided	 codified	 protections	 on	 contracts,	 operating	 in	 a	 manner	ostensibly	more	committed	to	adherence	to	a	rule	of	law	as	opposed	to	rule	of	subjective	decision-maker,	 although	 in	practise	 the	degree	 to	which	 this	was	observed	 is	 certainly	open	to	debate.	Nonetheless,	those	legal	protections	that	were	afforded	were	for	the	most	part	 similarly	proved	 to	 all	 residents,	whether	domestic	 or	 foreign.	 Further,	 there	were	notably	 lower	 levels	 of	 corruption	 amongst	 Settlement	 government	 officials,	 especially	during	the	Guomindang	period.			While	relatively	professionalised,	the	extraterritorial	bureaucracy	continually	expanded	in	size	and	was	plagued	with	inefficiency;	nonetheless,	the	state	did	exhibit	a	limited	amount	of	bureaucratic	capacity.	This	was	particularly	observable	in	regards	to	budgeting,	with	the	Settlement	 running	 relatively	 small	 deficits	 financed	 by	 bond	 issuances	 that	 were	consistently	repaid,	compared	to	the	domestic	national	government	which	was	plagued	by	an	inability	to	raise	sufficient	funding,	with	large	deficits	in	the	republican	period	financed	by	debentures	upon	which	the	government	frequently	defaulted.		Likewise,	whereas	it	is	possible	to	cite	numerous	examples	of	domestic	Chinese	government	actions	which	imperilled	private	property	rights,	including	repeated	instances	of	onerous	taxation	 and	 outright	 expropriation	 of	 private	 business	 and	 investor	 assets,	 with	 such	behaviour	 easily	 creating	 distrust	 of	 government	 motives	 amongst	 entrepreneurs	 and	investors	 as	 to	 the	 strength	 and	 credibility	 of	 stated	 commitments	 to	 the	 protection	 of	private	 property	 rights,	 there	 were	 relatively	 few	 comparable	 episodes	 of	 such	 actions	undertaken	 by	 the	 extraterritorial	 settlement	 governments.	 Third,	 the	 severe	 level	 of	political	 turmoil	 and	 civil	 violence	 that	 defined	 much	 of	 the	 domestic	 institutional	environment	 of	 greater	 China	 and	 specifically	 domestically-administered	 Shanghai—symptomatic	of	the	domestic	state's	lack	of	state	capacity	 in	maintaining	a	monopoly	on	coercive	force	within	its	territorial	borders—was	relatively	absent	in	the	extraterritorial	settlements.	 Consequently,	 the	 extraterritorial	settlements	were	 largely	 spared	 from	 the	destruction	 and	 expropriation	 of	 private	 property	 assets	 from	 the	 exercise	 of	 violence	wrought	by	non-state	actors	that	the	domestic	state	was	repeatedly	unable	to	prevent.				
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Ostensibly,	therefore,	it	appears	that	the	traditional	depictions	in	the	literature—whether	evidenced	 by	 frequently	 self-congratulatory	 language	 of	 contemporaneous	 English-language	writings,	or	the	implicit	assumptions	in	more	recent	work—of	the	extraterritorial	settlements	being	defined	by	a	strong	foreign-imposed	institutional	framework	are	largely	correct.	Likewise,	 the	differences	between	the	extraterritorial	and	domestic	 institutional	environments	appear	in	many	regards	to	have	been	exceedingly	significant.	Caveats	to	such	conclusions	 are	 necessary.	 To	 begin	 with,	 these	 findings	 admittedly	 are	 the	 result	 of	 a	relatively	subjective	reading	of	the	historical	record,	and	are	undoubtedly	partly	coloured	by	my	own	personal	biases	and	assumptions.	Nonetheless,	attempts	at	identifying	objective	measures	of	differences	in	institutional	quality,	such	as	those	reflected	in	the	measure	of	violent	political	change,	seem	to	support	our	qualitative	judgements.		Second,	 as	 we	 have	 attempted	 to	 emphasise	 throughout	 the	 analysis,	 considerable	complexity	and	variability	characterises	concepts	such	as	institutional	strength	and	state	capacity.	In	fact,	the	extraterritorial	institutional	environment,	and	associated	protections	on	private	property	rights,	were	defined	by	variation—across	 time,	as	 the	nature	of	 the	protection	and	credibility	of	the	attendant	commitment	mechanisms	experienced	variation	over	time,	and	at	any	given	moment	in	time	across	the	various	vectors	that	help	to	define	the	subjective	perception	of	institutional	strength	held	by	economic	actors.			Thus,	 for	 instance,	 the	 tension	 between	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 the	 Chinese	 state	 and	 the	sovereignty	of	 the	 extraterritorial	 settlement	municipal	 governments	waxed	and	waned	over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 late-imperial	 and	 republican	 period.	 In	 general,	 one	 finds	 the	extraterritorial	municipal	governments	more	able	to	exert	their	authority	during	the	Qing	and	Beiyang	periods,	with	a	distinct	 lessoning	and	more	 conciliatory	approach	 after	 the	Guomindang	took	control	of	the	central	government,	coinciding,	not	coincidentally,	with	the	waning	 of	 British	 and	 American	 government	 support	 for	 the	 continuance	 of	 the	extraterritorial	system.	This	further	coincided	with	increasing	militarism	and	aggression	on	the	part	of	Japanese	military	authorities	operating	in	China,	with	the	ability	of	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	 to	 resist	 acquiescence	 to	demanded	 concessions	by	 Japanese	military	authorities	 in	 areas	 such	 as	 policy	 changes	 or	 its	 authority	 over	 Japanese	 residents	decreasing	over	time.		Similarly,	 while	 the	 extraterritorial	 institutional	 environment	 was	 characterised	 by	 a	relatively	 strong	 framework	 of	 procedural	 legal	 protection,	 the	 protections	 afforded	 to	domestic	Chinese	residents	deviated	substantially	from	its	claimed	impartiality,	given	the	overarching	degree	of	racial	prejudice	and	bias	that	mitigated	the	relative	power	of	non-western	 agents	 operating	 in	 a	 western-controlled	 institutional	 setting.	 Likewise,	 while	multiple	sets	of	credible	commitment	mechanisms	worked	to	provide	economic	agents	with	relative	assurance	of	the	protection	of	private	property	and	contract	rights,	much	weaker	sets	of	commitment	mechanisms	appeared	 to	exist	 for	 limits	on	state	actors'	ability	and	willingness	to	control	aspects	of	civil	society,	especially	in	regard	to	issues	related	to	free	expression	and	publication	of	differing	ideas.			Overall,	 our	 strategy	 has	 been	 to	 consistently	 look	 to	 the	 observed	 behaviours	 of	contemporaneous	economic	actors	to	understand	how	these	actors	perceived	the	relative	institutional	 quality	 and	 strength	 of	 protections	 on	 private	 property	 and	 contracts	 that	could	expect	across	the	dual	institutional	environments	that	defined	Shanghai	of	this	time	period.	The	observed	behaviour	of	these	actors—instances	of	revealed	preferences,	so	to	speak—seem	 to	 indicate	 that	 many	 domestic	 Chinese	 agents,	 when	 provided	 the	opportunity	to	choose,	consistently	chose	to	locate	their	assets	within	the	extraterritorial	institutional	environment,	rather	than	the	domestic.			
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Thus,	we	can	turn	to	using	the	simplest	of	indicators	for	such	analysis,	the	seeming	constant	desire	 for	 evermore	 numbers	 of	 domestic	 Chinese	 citizens	 to	 choose	 to	 relocate	 their	personages,	businesses	and	financial	capital	out	of	the	domestic	institutional	environment	and	 into	 those	of	 the	 foreign	settlements.	By	way	of	 illustration,	we	 turn	 to	a	statement	provided	by	Chamberlain	(1931:	151),	who	notes:	"The	settlement	is	the	most	important	banking	center	of	China.	The	most	important	Chinese	banks	have	their	head	office	there,	including	 the	 Central	 Bank	 of	 China,	 an	 exclusively	 government	 organisation.	 The	 total	amount	of	note	issue	of	these	banks	is	estimated	at	242,000,000	dollars,	Chinese	currency,	in	which	the	foreign	banks	share	only	to	a	negligible	amount.	Against	these	note	issues	are	held	huge	stores	of	silver	in	vaults	in	the	Settlement.	The	protection	and	the	order	which	the	 present	 independent	 regime	 of	 the	 Settlement,	 supported	 by	 foreign	 governments,	assures	to	the	Chinese	banks	against	the	actions,	even	of	their	own	government."		Chamberlain's	observation	underscores	two	important	factors.	First,	as	we	have	attempted	to	emphasise	throughout	our	discussion,	the	so-called	"foreign"	settlements	were	far	from	solely	foreign	enclaves—they	became	successful	economic	centres	precisely	because	they	were	able	to	attract	such	substantial	amounts	of	both	Chinese	physical	and	human	capital.	Second,	 relatedly,	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 imperfect	 nature	 of	 the	 institutional	 environment	 the	settlements	 offered,	 particularly	 to	 domestic	 Chinese	 actors,	 the	 collective	 decision	 of	domestic	actors	was	to	choose	to	relocate	large	sums	of	financial	and	physical	capital,	as	well	as	their	own	personages,	 into	the	extraterritorial	environments.	It	 is	this	fact	that	is	perhaps	 the	 strongest	 qualitative	 evidence	 we	 can	 provide	 in	 arguing	 that	 the	extraterritorial	settlements	appeared,	from	the	perspective	of	contemporaneous	economic	actors,	 to	 offer	 a	 more	 robust	 institutional	 environment,	 with	 a	 set	 of	 seemingly	more	credible	 commitment	 mechanisms	 attributed	 with	 the	 environment's	 protections	 on	private	 property	 and	 contract	 rights,	 than	 that	 available	 to	 those	 same	 actors	 in	 the	domestic	institutional	environment.	For	domestic	entrepreneurs	and	other	economic	actors	attracted	 to	 Shanghai	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 its	 business	 opportunities,	 it	 was	 the	extraterritorial	institutional	environment	they	consistently	chose	for	its	relatively	stronger	property	rights	framework	it	offered	over	the	domestic	environment	to	protect	their	assets.		
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Chapter	Ten.		Both	Roving	and	Stationary	Bandits?	
Relationship	between	Equity	Shareholders	and	Government	Actors:	Two	Cases			Various	differing	and	sometimes	contradictory	developments	contributed	to	shaping	domestic	institutional	 quality	 over	 the	 late-imperial	 and	 republican	 time	 period.	 In	 this	 chapter,	we	utilise	two	specific	examples	of	 joint-stock	companies—the	corporate	history	of	the	Bank	of	China,	and	the	evolution	of	the	China	Merchants	Steamship	Navigation	Company	shareholder	experience—to	highlight	 the	nature	of	 the	state's	relationship	with	private	domestic	equity	investors.	 These	 two	 examples	 illustrate	 many	 of	 the	 multi-dimensional	 and	 time	 variant	dynamics	 that	 helped	 shape	 contemporaneous	 economic	 actors'	 perceptions	 of	 private	property,	contract	and	investor	rights	over	the	period.			10.1.			The	Bank	of	China's	Capital	Composition		A	study	of	 the	corporate	history	of	 the	Bank	of	China	provides	a	representative	 illustration	helping	to	highlight	the	role	of	the	state	in	regard	to	its	relationship	with	private	shareholders,	and	the	ability	of	private	firms	to	exercise	control	over	decision-making	vis-a-vis	state	actors.	The	origins	of	the	Bank	of	China	are	traced	back	to	1897,	when	the	Qing	government	issued	an	imperial	decree	to	found	the	Board	of	Revenue	Bank	(,VXM),	in	order	to	create	a	centralised	issuer	 of	 paper	 currency.	 It	 took	 until	 1905,	 however,	 before	 the	 bank	 was	 officially	established	in	Beijing.	Its	authorised	capital	was	set	at	four	million	taels,	to	be	jointly	equally	owned	by	the	Ministry	of	Finance	and	private	owners;	shares	were	not	allowed	to	be	owned	by	or	transferred	to	foreigners.	Due	to	difficulty	recruiting	private	shareholders,	however,	the	Ministry	 became	 the	 initial	 sole	 funding	 shareholder	 of	 the	 Bank,	 and	 it	was	 not	 until	 the	following	 year	 that	 the	 Bank	 formally	 opened,	 with	 only	 two	 million	 in	 capital.	 Yet	 with	business	proving	 lucrative,	 the	government	was	soon	able	 to	attract	additional	capital	 from	private	subscriptions,	such	that	by	1908	subscribed	capital	had	increased	to	ten	million	taels,	divided	 into	 100,000	 shares,	 with	 equal	 portions	 held	 between	 private	 investors	 and	 the	Ministry	of	Finance	(Tang	1935:	171).	In	that	year	as	well	the	name	of	the	banks	was	formally	changed	to	Da	Qing	Bank	(:XM).				10.1.1.			Late-Qing	Period:	Government	Backing,	Government	Interference		As	the	first	bank	formed	by	the	Qing	government,	the	Da	Qing	Bank	was	granted	central	bank	functions	such	as	 issuing	currency	and	managing	the	 treasury	 funds.	Although	the	 Imperial	Bank	 of	 China	 (TXM)	 was	 first	 Chinese-owned	 modern	 bank	 and	 formed	 by	 a	 high	ranking	court	official,	Sheng	Xuanhuai,	in	May	of	1897,	it	was	directly	controlled	by	Sheng,	and	despite	its	moniker,	it	did	not	serve	as	an	official	or	central	bank	under	the	direct	control	of	the	Qing	 central	 government.	 (Given	 its	 transliteration	 in	 the	 English	 language,	 there	 remains	some	amount	of	confusion	on	this	issue	in	some	of	the	relevant	literature;	Purtle	(2014:	109)	for	instance	claims	the	Imperial	Bank	of	China	to	have	been	the	precursor	to	the	Bank	of	China,	citing,	 surprisingly,	 Chinese	 language	 sources	 (Zhao	 1977),	 but	 this	 is	 not	 correct.)	 As	 a	government	 bank	 receiving	 preferential	 treatment,	 the	 Da	 Qing	 Bank	was	 able	 to	 become	quite	 profitable.	 In	 1909,	 regulations	 were	 promulgated	 to	 forbid	 direct	 foreign	 loan	borrowing	by	provincial	governments,	requiring	all	such	borrowing	to	go	through	the	central	government	and	be	coordinated	by	the	Ministry	of	Finance	via	the	Da	Qing	Bank	(Ichiko	1980:	403-407).			
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		The	Ministry	of	Finance,	as	the	largest	shareholder,	also	became	the	Bank's	largest	client.	The	Ministry	kept	millions	of	silver	taels	deposited	with	the	bank,	and	most	of	the	Ministry’s	tax	remittances	were	also	transferred	through	the	bank.	This	service	was	highly	profitable	for	the	Bank,	 and	 via	 its	 close	 relationship	with	 the	 government,	 succeeded	 in	 securing	 nearly	 all	official	 government	 remittance	 business,	 effectively	 pushing	 the	majority	 of	 the	 Shanxi	BL	(piaohao),	an	earlier	form	of	indigenous	banks,	which	had	previously	dominated	the	official	remittance	business,	into	insolvency	(Wu	2016).	Provided	special	government	protection,	the	Bank	expanded	rapidly,	and	by	1911,	thirty-five	branches	had	been	set	up	across	the	country.	The	 Bank	 of	 China	 soon	 became	 the	 largest	 domestic	 bank	 in	 China,	 possessing	 a	 robust	business	 of	 taking	 deposits,	 issuing	 banknotes,	 and	 extending	 loans	 to	 local	 provincial	governments	and	businesses	(Yuan	2005:	89-90;	Pen	2007:	43-47).		While	the	close	relationship	with	the	Ministry	brought	the	Bank	benefits,	it	compromised	the	independence	 of	 its	 business	 decisions.	 To	 begin	 with,	 private	 investor	 rights	 were	marginalised,	with	 shareholders	meetings	 sometimes	 scheduled,	 but	never	 convened	 (Peng	2007:	84).	Further,	despite	the	intention	to	create	a	modern	banking	corporation	managed	by	merchants,	selection	of	senior	management	was	directly	controlled	by	the	Ministry	of	Finance,	which	 reserved	 the	 power	 to	 nominate	 Bank	 superintendents	 and	 top	management.	 As	 a	result,	business	decisions	could	not	be	exercised	without	government	influence.	For	example,	faced	with	requests	to	make	loans	to	local	provincial	governments,	the	bank	was	seldom	in	a	position	to	say	no,	and	as	such,	loans	to	local	governments	began	to	take	up	an	increasingly	large	portion	of	the	bank's	balance	sheet.		In	1908,	for	instance,	the	Liang-Jiang	viceroy	borrowed	4.5	million	taels	to	dreg	the	Hungpu	River,	and	then	another	400,000	taels	to	finance	military	exercises.	In	1910,	Hunan	province	borrowed	200,000	taels	to	finance	external	debts,	Anhui	borrowed	200,000	taels	to	pay	a	local	mine	 lawsuit,	 and	 Fujian	 borrowed	 800,000	 taels	 to	 fund	 its	 administrative	 expenses.	 The	Jiangxi	 provincial	 government	 also	 borrowed	 over	 800,000	 taels	 at	 the	 start	 of	 the	 Xinhai	revolution	to	finance	government	operating	expenses,	which	were	never	repaid	after	the	Qing	government	fell.	Indeed,	the	Xinhai	Revolution	brought	about	the	collapse	of	the	Bank,	as	the	Qing	central	and	local	governments	began	defaulting	on	their	loans,	with	overdue	debts	from	local	and	central	governments	on	the	Da	Qing	account	book	totalling	over	23	million	taels	(18	million	taels	 from	local	governments,	and	5	million	taels	 from	central	government),	with	an	additional	15	million	from	private	businesses	(Peng	2007:	84).					10.1.2.			Beiyang	Period:	Weakening	State	Protection,	Weakening	State	Control		With	the	establishment	of	the	Republic	of	China	in	1912,	the	assets	of	the	Da	Qing	Bank	were	transitioned	to	a	new,	related	bank,	commissioned	the	Bank	of	China	(XM),	renamed	thus	not	 only	 to	 signify	 the	new	political	 reality,	 but	 also	 to	 attempt	 to	 limit	 the	 transference	of	prior	 government-related	 liabilities	 to	 the	 new	 bank	 (Kong	 1986).	 Incoming	 government	officials	had	initially	sought	to	transition	the	Bank	into	a	fully	government-owned	state	bank	by	 converting	 outstanding	 private	 shares	 into	 deposits	 and	 retiring	 private	 shares	 in	instalments.	As	Lan	(2013:	68)	notes,	this	was	met	with	strong	resistance,	and	eventually	an	agreement	was	reached	to	continue	the	equal	ownership	structure	of	the	bank.	The	Shanghai	branch,	one	of	the	few	of	the	Da	Qing	Bank	branches	that	had	avoided	suffering	a	collapse	of	its	balance	 sheet,	 initiated	 in	 1912	 a	 reorganisation	 plan	 that	 gained	 support	 of	 private	shareholders,	with	part	of	 the	plan	 including	 for	shareholders	 to	receive	deposit	 receipts	at	five	per	cent	interest,	redeemable	within	five	years	(Tang	1935:	171).	In	April	1913,	legislation			
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	regarding	"Regulations	of	the	Bank	of	China"	(XM
)	were	authorised,	mandating	the	bank	remain	 a	 joint-stock	 limited	 liability	 company,	with	 a	 capital	 of	 60	million	 taels	 in	600,000	shares,	maintaining	an	equal	balance	between	government	and	private	investors	ownership	of	outstanding	 shares.	The	new	agreement	 further	 stipulated	 that	 if	 total	 private	 subscription	exceeded	300,000	shares,	the	government	would	sell	its	prepaid	shares	to	private	investors	on	instalment.	In	1915,	the	Bank	increased	its	authorised	capital	to	100	million	taels.			The	 continued	 heavy	 presence	 of	 government	 officials	 running	 the	 bank,	 however,	 led	 to	continued	 difficulty	 recruiting	 additional	 private	 shares.	 Further,	 despite	 the	 Beiyang	government	officially	having	subscribed	to	half	of	the	shares,	it	failed	to	make	full	payment	of	its	portion	of	the	capital,	and	the	bank's	total	paid-in	capital	was	less	than	half	the	authorised	capital	 (Yuan	2005:	102).	Thus,	 the	 government	was	unable	 to	provide	 sufficient	 capital	 to	allow	 for	 the	 bank's	 expansion.	 The	 government-owned	 shares	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	 China	were	subsequently	pledged	to	other	private	banks,	including	the	Kincheng	Banking	Corporation,	the	Continental	Bank,	and	the	Shanghai	Commercial	and	Savings	Bank	as	collateral	for	loans,	and	when	the	Beiyang	Government	was	unable	to	redeem	them	by	the	loan	maturity	date,	these	bank	creditors	became	private	shareholders	in	the	Bank	of	China.			The	Beiyang	Government,	faced	with	mounting	fiscal	difficulty,	frequently	looked	to	reach	its	hands	into	the	banking	sector	to	subsidise	its	fiscal	shortcomings.	Tang	(1935:	172)	somewhat	poetically	describes	the	situation	as	"many	trials	had	to	be	faced,	not	the	least	of	which	were	the	constant	and	insatiable	demands	of	the	Peking	Government	for	money."	Banks	such	as	the	Bank	 of	 China	 and	 the	 Bank	 of	 Communications	 were	 often	 utilised	 to	 provide	 financial	support	for	the	government.	As	Lan	(2013b:	6)	describes,	"During	the	period	of	the	Beiyang	government,	 raising	debts	 from	 banks	was	 almost	 the	most	 important	means	 to	 tackle	 the	government’s	finances."	Overdrafts	and	government	bonds	were	relied	on	as	funding	for	the	Beiyang	 government;	while	 theoretically	 the	 large	 quantities	 of	 bonds	 bought	 by	 the	 bank	could	be	resold	to	the	public,	as	these	bonds	came	with	weak	collaterals	and	low	credibility,	the	public	was	 reticent	 to	purchase,	 and	hence	banks	 ended	up	holding	most	 of	 the	public	bonds,	and	used	as	reserves	for	the	issuance	of	banknotes.			The	 suspension	 of	 the	 banknote	 exchange	 that	 took	 place	 in	 1916	 was	 illustrative	 of	 the	contested	 relationship	 between	 the	 banking	 sector	 and	 government	 officials.	 By	 1915,	 the	Beiyang	government	had	borrowed	12	million	yuan	from	the	Bank	of	China,	and	47.5	million	from	the	Bank	of	Communications.	These	borrowings	severely	exhausted	both	banks'	reserves;	in	fact,	the	12	million	borrowed	by	the	government	from	the	Bank	of	China	was	nearly	equal	to	the	 bank's	 total	 amount	 of	 its	 paid-in	 capital	 (BOC	 1995:	 74).	 The	 two	 banks	 resorted	 to	issuing	banknotes	to	solve	their	own	shortage	of	funds;	backed	by	depleted	silver	reserves,	the	situation	 was	 untenable.	 Once	 news	 of	 the	 situation	 became	 public,	 the	 Bank's	 notes	depreciated	 immensely	 and	 a	 financial	 crisis	 ensued;	 in	 response,	 on	 12	 May	 1916,	 the	Beiyang	government	ordered	the	two	banks	to	halt	their	banknote	exchange	(Peng	2007:	75).	The	announcement,	perhaps	unsurprisingly,	led	to	a	general	run	on	banks	and	market	chaos.	The	Bank's	Shanghai	branch	managers,	seeking	to	calm	the	markets	and	end	the	run	on	the	Bank,	defied	the	order	from	the	government.	Enlisting	support	from	the	local	financial	sector	as	well	as	several	of	Shanghai's	foreign	banks,	the	Shanghai	branch	declared	it	would	continue	to	honour	its	issued	banknotes	and	redeem	them	for	silver	at	face	value.	Faced	with	mounting	pressure,	 the	 Beiyang	 government	 eventually	 reinstated	 the	 banknote	 exchange.	 As	 Yuan	(2005:	103-104)	notes,	the	damage	to	the	banks'	balance	sheets	was	severe	and	the	fallout	of	the	 suspension	was	 still	 being	 dealt	with	 as	 late	 as	1921.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 defiance	 of	 the	government's	order	and	subsequent	refusal	to	take	on	additional	government	debt	over	the	near	term	seemingly	saved	the	Bank	from	bankruptcy	or	nationalisation	(Hong	2004:	139).		
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Government	control	also	resulted	in	frequent	change	in	the	senior	management	of	the	Bank.	Between	1912	and	1922,	the	president	of	the	Bank	changed	eleven	times,	with	average	term	of	 office	 only	 one	 year	 (Lan	 2013b:	 11).	 However,	 the	 banknote	 crisis	 and	 ability	 of	 the	Shanghai	branch	to	successfully	push	back	on	government	demands	helped	swing	the	power	slightly	 towards	private	shareholders	over	 the	government.	 In	1917,	as	 the	Bank	remained	desperate	for	cash,	a	new	agreement	was	reached	between	private	shareholders	and	Ministry,	which	 Tang	 (1935:	 172)	 notes	 provided	 an	 important	 signal:	 "the	 danger	 of	 government	interference	was	lessened	by	a	clause	insisting	that	the	Governor	and	Vice-Governor	must	be	chosen	 from	 directors	 appointed	 by	 the	 shareholders…	 	 This	 regulation,	 dictated	 by	 the	disturbed	political	state	of	the	country,	is	probably	one	reason	why	the	bank	sustained	so	little	damage	 during	 the	 ensuing	 years	 of	 internecine	 strife."	 The	 agreement	 also	 led	 to	 the	recruitment	 of	 private	 shareholders	 to	 be	 completed	 immediately	 thereafter	 by	 the	 end	 of	1917.	It	also	saw	the	Bank	leadership	become	more	stable,	with	the	new	manager	appointed	by	private	shareholders	in	1921	serving	for	a	full	five	years.		Also	 from	 1917	 onwards,	 the	 Bank's	 management	 undertook	 active	measures	 to	 increase	privatisation;	with	greater	private	ownership,	government	interference	in	the	operation	of	the	Bank	could	be	reduced.	This	effort	became	especially	pronounced	after	1921,	and	by	1923,	the	Bank	became	mostly	privately	owned.	Government	shares	only	constituted	50,000	shares	out	of	 a	 total	 capital	 of	 nearly	 twenty	 million	 yuan	 (Lan	 2013a:	 66-67;	 2013b:	 6-9).	 The	privatisation	 effort	 also	 allowed	 the	 Bank	 to	 attract	 significantly	 larger	 amounts	 of	 private	capital,	 thereby	 increasing	 its	capital	base	(Yuan	2005:	124).	An	 independent	shareholders'	association	was	formed	in	which	every	member	had	power	to	vote	for	the	president	and	the	general	 manager	 through	 the	 board	 of	 trustees	 (Ji	 2003:	 176).	 These	 efforts	 achieved	 a	significant	level	of	independence	from	government	interference.			However,	 the	 inability	 of	 the	 Beiyang	 government	 to	 maintain	 a	 monopoly	 over	 internal	coercive	violence	led	it	unable	to	provide	protection	to	the	Bank	of	China	from	expropriation	of	its	assets	by	powerful	quasi-state	actors,	such	as	warlords.	As	the	largest	bank	in	China	with	branches	in	various	provinces,	the	Bank	of	China	made	for	an	easy	target	to	warlord	armies,	or	susceptible	 to	 arbitrary	 and	 onerous	 taxes	 imposed	 by	 local	 governments.	 For	 example,	 in	1914,	Warlord	Zhang	Zuolin	 took	500,000	yuan	by	 force	 from	the	Bank	of	China’s	Fengtian	branch.	The	Heilongjiang	government	similarly	took	one	million	yuan	from	the	Bank	of	China	in	1915,	and	forcibly	borrowed	another	one	million.	The	Guizhou	provincial	governor	received	one	point	 three	million	yuan	as	a	 "loan"	 from	the	Bank	 in	1916	that	was	never	repaid.	The	Kulun	government	forced	a	loan	of	300,000	yuan	to	pay	military	salaries	in	1921.	Meanwhile,	from	1925	to	1927,	the	Bank	was	required	by	the	rival	southern	Guomindang	government	to	lend	it	money	to	support	funding	of	its	Northern	Expedition	Army,	including	500,000	yuan	to	Guangdong,	 800,000	 yuan	 to	 Changsha,	 1.47	million	 yuan	 to	Wuhan,	 and	 700,000	 yuan	 to	Fuzhou	(Peng	2007:	84).		Weak	state	capacity	in	regard	to	an	ability	to	maintain	a	monopoly	over	violence	on	the	part	of	the	Beiyang	government	was	accompanied	by	weak	bureaucratic	administrative	capacity.	In	this	 regard,	 government	 regulatory	 oversight	 and	 interference	partly	 subsided,	 and	private	interests	were	to	gain	more	control	of	the	Bank	and	its	direction.	This	process	of	increased	privatisation	and	control	power	residing	in	the	hands	of	private	shareholders	was	seen	across	the	banking	industry.	Notably,	at	the	start	of	the	1920s,	the	banking	industry	was	comprised	of	twenty-eight	modern	banks,	 the	majority	government-run	or	operating	under	 joint	private-government	 ownership.	 By	 the	 end	 of	 1925,	 the	 industry	 had	 expanded	 to	 include	 one	hundred	 thirty	 banks,	 the	 vast	 majority	 operating	 under	 private	 ownership;	 of	 those	 still	jointly-owned,	 private	 shareholders	 were	 the	 controlling	 segment.	 Received	 capital	 also	increased,	rising	from	76,053,000	to	93,087,000	yuan	(Xu	2010:	82).	The	rising	power	of	the	private	shareholders	is	demonstrated	graphically	in	Figure	10.1,	which	presents	the	history	of	the	relative	government-to-private	capital	composition	of	the	Bank	of	China	from	its	formation	through	the	end	of	1945.	
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Figure	10.1.		Bank	of	China	capital	composition,	percentage	ownership,	1912–1945		
	sources:	BOC	1991:	2060,	2095,	2130,	BOC	1995:	908-909;	Lan	2013:	9-10			An	overall	trend	towards	a	greater	degree	of	private	control	and	ownership	played	out	across	much	of	the	banking	industry	throughout	this	period.	For	instance,	as	late	as	1917,	Kincheng	Bank's	shareholder	composition	was	dominated	by	warlords	and	local	government	officials,	at	54	and	36	per	cent,	 respectively	(WYM.	1983:	23).	By	1927,	however,	 these	 levels	had	fallen	from	a	combined	total	of	ninety	per	cent	to	less	than	half,	allowing	much	greater	control	to	private	shareholder	interests.	The	Bank	of	Chekiang	(85XM),	founded	in	1909	under	a	joint	government	and	private	corporate	structure,	as	was	typical	of	most	banking	concerns	founded	under	the	Qing,	was	later	dissolved	in	1923	and	split	into	two	separate	entities,	one	of	which,	the	 Industrial	Bank	of	Chekiang	 (85$4XM),	was	 completely	private	 and	 therefore	 funded	solely	by	private	 investor	money,	while	 the	Chekiang	Bank	(85/XM)	became	 fully	state-owned	(BOC	1995:	1137).				10.1.3.			Guomindang	Period:	State-Led	Control	and	Expropriation		As	Figure	8.1	also	makes	clear,	the	trend	towards	greater	private	shareholder	control	began	to	reverse	itself	once	the	Guomindang	Party	assumed	control	over	the	central	state	apparatus	in	1927.	Guomindang	leaders	initially	planned	to	consolidate	the	Bank	of	China	and	the	Bank	of	Communications	into	a	Central	Bank	of	China	wholly	owned	by	the	government.	The	plan	was	met	with	strong	resistance,	and	was	eventually	discarded,	with	a	separate	government-owned	Central	 Bank	 of	 China	 formed	 in	 October	 1927.	 With	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 Central	 Bank,	however,	 previous	 central	 banking	 functions	 that	 the	 Bank	 of	 China	 and	 the	 Bank	 of	Communications	 had	 performed	 were	 significantly	 diminished,	 affecting	 the	 two	 banks'	profitability,	although	the	Bank	of	China	still	served	as	a	foreign	exchange	bank,	designated	to	issue	domestic	and	external	public	debts,	and	buy	and	sell	foreign	currencies,	gold	and	silver.		Of	greater	concern	to	the	viability	of	the	Bank	of	China	were	the	conflicts	between	the	Bank	management	and	the	government	that	soon	emerged.	Besides	monies	that	had	been	lent	in	April	1927	by	 the	Bank	to	support	 the	Northern	Expedition	military	mission,	General	 Jiang	Jieshi	requested	the	Shanghai	Branch	of	Bank	of	China	to	provide	the	new	Nanjing	government	with	one	million	yuan	in	connection	with	the	issuance	of	the	Two-Five	Surtax	Treasury	Bonds	(ZC().	The	manager	of	Shanghai	Branch,	Song	Hanzhang	( ;E),	resisted	the	request,	
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demanding	 the	 government	 provide	 a	 security	 deposit	 as	 way	 of	 collateral	 for	 the	 bonds.	Song’s	refusal	was	ill-received	by	 Jiang—the	Bank's	profit-orientated	goals,	and	indeed	such	goals	of	all	of	private	commerce,	were	to	be	treated	as	subordinate	to	the	goals	of	the	Party	(Zanasi	 2006).	 Jiang	 retaliated	 by	 increasing	 his	 demand,	 mandating	 the	 Bank	 of	 China	 to	prepay	 ten	 million	 yuan	 for	 the	 Bank's	 portion	 of	 the	 Two-Five	 Bonds.	 Jiang	 personally	threatened	Song	with	being	charged	with	‘obstruction	of	revolution’	and	‘helping	the	enemy	force’	 if	 Song	 continued	 to	 resist.	 Song	 petitioned	 the	Ministry	 of	 Finance,	 stating	 that	 the	repeated	government	requests	for	loans	had	exhausted	the	Bank's	funds,	and	that	complying	with	 Jiang's	 request	 would	 require	 the	 Bank	 to	 use	 its	 emergency	 reserve	 fund,	 causing	serious	concerns	to	the	Bank's	credit.	After	mediation,	the	Bank	of	China	eventually	agreed	to	purchase	 four	 million	 yuan,	 while	 underwriting	 another	 six	 million	 yuan	 worth	 of	 the	government	bonds.	Song	subsequently	resigned	his	position	in	July	(SMA	2012).		The	Guomindang	government	 continued	 to	 take	 active	measures	 to	 increase	 its	 ownership	and	 control	 over	 the	 banking	 industry.	 In	 1928,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Finance	 adjusted	 the	regulations	covering	the	Bank	of	China,	and	used	compulsory	means	to	increase	its	ownership	percentage	 of	 outstanding	 shares	 to	 twenty	 per	 cent;	 however,	 instead	 of	 providing	 actual	capital,	the	Ministry	paid	in	increased	capital	by	contributing	government	bonds	valued	at	par,	even	 though	 the	 bonds	 traded	 often	 more	 than	 forty	 per	 cent	 below	 par.	 Increased	government	 regulatory	 control	 brought	 on	 greater	 government-forced	 lending	 to	 local	governments.	The	Bank	was	often	caught	in	an	uncomfortable	position	of	making	knowingly	commercially	unviable	 loans.	 In	1932,	 the	Bank	of	China	Head	Office	notified	 its	 branches:	"Unless	no	alternative	exists,	try	to	avoid	all	official	borrowing"	(trans.,	BOC	1995:	250).	By	the	end	of	1933,	overdue	debts	from	local	governments	reached	17.08	million	yuan,	comprising	fifteen	per	cent	of	the	Bank's	total	overdue	government	debts	(BOC	1995:	251).		The	 Bank	 nonetheless	 still	 sought	 to	 exhibit	 a	 considerable	 degree	 of	 independence	 from	direct	 bureaucratic	 government	 control.	 After	 relocating	 its	 headquarters	 from	 Beijing	 to	Shanghai	 in	1928,	 the	Bank	 started	 a	new	 research	 institute	 that	was	designed	 to	produce	objective	economic	analysis	based	on	its	collection	of	economic	and	financial	data;	the	Bank	further	sponsored	research	of	economists	leading	to	publication	in	leading	academic	journals.	Moreover,	 the	 Bank	 produced	 its	 own	 economic	 reports,	 which	 by	 the	 early	 1930s	 were	increasingly	 critical	 of	 Guomindang	 government	 policy;	 the	 Bank's	 1932	 and	 1933	Annual	Reports	similarly	reflected	criticisms	of	Ministry	of	Finance	regulation	of	the	banking	industry,	which	the	reports	suggested	proved	detrimental	to	the	industry's	growth	prospects.			Again	 in	1935,	 the	Ministry	of	Finance	 issued	revised	banking	regulations,	 these	mandating	the	government	to	contribute	additional	capital	to	bring	it	to	at	least	sixty	per	cent	controlling	ownership	 of	 outstanding	 capital.	 Once	 again,	 the	 increase	 in	 capital	was	 to	 come	 via	 par-valued	government	debt,	with	twenty	million	yuan	worth	of	bonds	to	be	placed	in	the	Bank	of	China,	and	ten	million	in	the	Bank	of	Communications.	This	mandated	attempt	was	met	with	strong	resistance	by	private	shareholders.	A	contested	negotiation	left	a	compromise	to	create	an	equal	Bank	of	China	ownership	split	between	the	government	and	private	shareholders,	while	Bank	of	Communications	shareholders	were	unable	to	obtain	the	same	result,	with	the	government	controlling	sixty	per	cent	(Yuan	2005:	124).	In	essence,	however,	actual	decision	power	was	controlled	by	the	Ministry	of	Finance—Song	Ziwen,	the	Minister	of	Finance,	and	Jiang	 Jieshi's	 brother-in-law,	 was	 nominated	 chairman	 of	 the	 board	 of	 directors,	 and	government-nominated	 directors	 increased	 from	 three	 to	 nine,	 with	 all	 key	 managerial	positions	 becoming	 staffed	 by	 Party	 appointees	 (Yuan	 2005:	 126).	 As	 Peng	 (2007:	 82-83)	pointedly	notes,	"under	Nationalist	rule,	especially	after	Joint	Head	Office	was	established,	the	Bank	of	China	was	subject	to	the	strict	intervention	of	the	government	in	loan	practice.	Funds	were	directed	toward	inefficient	and	politically	connected	SOEs."	Many	of	these	government-mandated	loans	were	not	economically	rational—made	at	low	interest	for	long	duration,	the	prevailing	high	inflation	environment	made	such	loans	immediately	not	commercially	viable.		
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10.1.4.		Equity	Share	Price	Analysis		In	 order	 to	 supplement	 and	 advance	 the	 discussion	 regarding	 the	 relationship	 between	investors	and	the	government,	we	utilise	another	one	of	our	constructed	datasets,	this	one	of	domestic	and	extraterritorial	equity	share	prices.	By	considering	the	trading	history	of	shares	of	 the	Bank	of	China,	we	observe	how	contemporaneous	market	participants	perceived	 the	value	of	the	joint	vector	of	expected	future	cash	flows	and	the	risks	to	such	cash	flows,	which	could	include	company-specific,	 industry-specific	and	business	environment	economic	risks,	as	well	as	non-economic	risks,	such	as	those	attributed	to	the	potential	for	destruction	from	military	activity,	or	theft	or	expropriation	by	either	nonstate	actors,	or	via	government	decree.	To	provide	a	broader	view	of	the	Shanghai	banking	industry,	we	also	consider	the	share	price	histories	of	other	domestic-registered	and	extraterritorial-registered	banks.			10.1.4.1.		Bank	of	China	Historical	Share	Price	and	Trading	History		Figure	10.2	presents	the	trading	history	of	common	equity	shares	of	the	Bank	of	China,	as	listed	in	Shanghai's	local	newspapers	and	financial	journals.	Note	the	sparsity	of	listed	prices	does	not	reflect	issues	with	our	data	collection	methodology;	daily	financial	media	were	searched	for	 the	 entirety	 of	 the	 time	period,	with	 the	displayed	pricing	data	 representing	 the	 extant	quantity	contemporaneously	available.	Thus,	these	data	reflect	a	relatively	low	level	of	trading	activity.	Note	that	share	prices	of	the	stock	remain	relatively	constant	across	the	near-entirety	of	the	recorded	period	of	data	available.	This	remarkable	consistency	is	further	highlight	by	the	 fact	 that	 the	only	additional	available	pricing	data	 found	 in	 the	 financial	 literature	after	1921	was	 in	the	Chinese	Economic	Review	published	 in	1941	which	reported	Bank	of	China	shares	trading	over	the	course	of	1939	in	a	range	between	115	and	140	(adjusted	for	currency	changes);	 however,	 adjusted	 for	 inflation	 into	 constant	 1921	 values,	 the	 equivalent	 prices	represent	as	range	between	48	and	58.5,	well	below	the	share's	par	value	of	100.		Figure	10.2		Recorded	prices,	Ӿ㾴柞ᤈ	Bank	of	China,	1909-1921	(prior	to	1911,	DaQing	Bank)	
	Sources:		Shunpao,	various	issues,	1909-1921;		Bankers	Weekly,	various	issues,	1919-1921			10.1.4.2.		Comparative	Share	Price	Trading	History		We	 can	 also	 learn	 from	 observing	 the	 share	 pricing	 behaviour	 of	 similar	 companies	 that	traded	on	Shanghai's	domestic	and	extraterritorial	markets.	Consider,	for	instance,	the	trading	histories	of	two	of	the	largest	domestic	modern	banks,	the	Bank	of	Communications,	and	the	Commercial	Bank	of	China,	as	provided	in	Figures	10.3a	and	10.3b.	As	seen	in	these	figures,	shares	 of	 these	 companies	 consistently	 traded	 at	 prices	 well	 below	 par.	 Available	 data	 on	trading	 in	 1939	 from	 the	 Chinese	 Economic	 Review	 indicate	 that	 shares	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	Communications	 traded	 in	 a	 range	 similar	 to	 that	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	 China,	 from	 101	 to	 138,	adjusted	 for	 differences	 in	 currency;	 accounting	 for	 the	 substantial	 rate	 of	 inflation,	 these	share	prices	are	equivalent	to	a	trading	range	between	42	and	58	yuan	in	1921	prices.	
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Figure	10.3a		Recorded	prices,	Ի᭗ᱷᤈ	Bank	of	Communications,	1909-1921	
	Sources:		Shunpao,	various	issues,	1909-1921;		Bankers	Weekly,	various	issues,	1919-1921		Figure	10.3b		Recorded	prices,	᭗ࠟᱷᤈ	Commercial	Bank	of	China,	1909-1921	
	Sources:		Shunpao,	various	issues,	1909-1921;		Bankers	Weekly,	various	issues,	1919-1921		Finally,	 also	 by	 way	 of	 comparison,	 we	 present	 the	 trading	 history	 of	 another	 modern	commercial	bank,	the	Hongkong	and	Shanghai	Banking	Corporation	(HSBC),	which	served	as	one	 of	 the	 more	 important	 of	 Shanghai's	 foreign	 banks.	 Registered	 under	 foreign	 legal	regulations	 (Hongkong	 Company	 Ordinances),	 the	 bank	 operated	 under	 Shanghai's	extraterritorial	 institutional	 environment,	 and	 thus	 its	 investors	 were	 protected	 by	extraterritorial-defined	private	property	and	contract	rights,	as	opposed	to	those	banks	and	their	 investors	operating	under	 the	domestic	 institutional	 environment.	As	 indicated	 in	 the	trading	history	of	the	Figure	10.4,	the	differences	in	terms	of	both	trading	activity	and	share	pricing	behaviour	are	striking.	For	sake	of	comparison,	share	prices	have	been	converted	into	
yuan	over	the	course	of	the	entirety	of	the	listed	pricing	history,	and	standardised	such	that	100	yuan	is	equivalent	to	the	equity's	original	par	value.	To	provide	further	comparison	with	the	Bank	of	China	and	Bank	of	Communication	share	prices,	we	note	HSBC	share	prices	 in	1939	fluctuated	between	2153	and	5327	yuan;	adjusting	for	inflation	to	1921	prices	generates	values	of	901	and	2229,	respectively,	obviously	well	above	the	stock's	par	value.		Figure	10.4.		Recorded	prices,	Hongkong	and	Shanghai	Banking	Corporation,	1909-1937	
	Sources:		North	China	Herald,	various	issues,	1909-1937	
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Based	 on	 both	 the	 differences	 in	 share	 prices	 relative	 to	 par,	 as	well	 as	 differences	 in	 the	propensity	to	hold	these	financial	instruments	as	reflected	by	the	relative	frequency	of	price	listings	of	completed	trades,	it	is	clear	that	investors	valued	the	shares	of	an	extraterritorial-registered	 company	 more	 favourably	 than	 they	 did	 shares	 in	 similar	 domestic-registered	companies.	 Such	 findings	 accord	 with	 previous	 observations	 about	 the	 predilection	 of	domestic	 actors	 to	 choose,	when	given	 the	option,	 to	hold	 the	banknotes	of	 extraterritorial	banks	over	 those	of	domestic	banks,	as	described	 in	Section	5.2.3.3.	While	 intriguing,	 these	findings	 should	 be	 considered	 as	 more	 suggestive	 than	 definitive,	 given	 we	 are	 only	considering	a	limited	number	of	companies	and	industries.	Forthcoming	work	by	adam	Harris	&	Li	(2018)	utilises	domestic	and	extraterritorial	equity	data	from	Shanghai's	early	markets	to	produce	more	sophisticated	comparative	analyses	in	considerably	greater	detail.			10.1.5.			Summary		The	 corporate	 history	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	 China	 is	 indicative	 of	 many	 of	 the	 trends	 and	 forces	shaping	 the	 domestic	 private	 property	 rights	 environment	 discussed	 throughout	 Part	 II.	Under	the	Qing,	when	ownership	was	equally	divided	between	private	and	government	shares,	the	Bank's	private	 investors	were	happy	to	 take	advantage	of	privileged	market	access	and	limits	to	market	competition	afforded	by	the	close	relationship	with	the	Ministry	of	Finance.	However,	despite	 the	equal	ownership	share	split,	 state	officials	effectively	controlled	Bank	management.	 Thus,	 extraordinary	 profits	 obtained	 via	 privileged	 market	 access	 were	counterbalanced	 by	 government-appointed	 Bank	 managers	 controlling	 important	 lending	decisions,	leading	to	loans	for	questionable	projects	extended	to	provincial	governments	and	other	politically-favoured	clients	based	on	political	rather	than	economic	rationales.			The	 Beiyang	 period	 brought	 about	 a	 decided	 change	 in	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	government	and	private	shareholders.	Officials	seemed	no	 less	 interested	 in	controlling	 the	banking	industry—seeking	to	nationalise	the	Bank	of	China	at	the	start	of	the	Republic—but	weak	bureaucratic	capacity	and	the	poor	fiscal	position	of	the	government	limited	the	ability	of	state	actors	to	exert	control,	especially	after	government	shares	divesture.	The	rebalancing	of	 equity	 ownership	 effectively	rebalanced	the	power	relationship	between	government	and	private	shareholder,	 epitomised	 by	 the	 decision	 by	 the	 Bank's	managers—beholden	 at	 the	time	primarily	 to	private	shareholders—to	refuse	to	comply	with	a	government	directive	to	suspend	banknote	convertibility	 in	1916,	helping	preserve	 the	Bank's	reputation,	and	avoid	potential	 insolvency	 or	 forced	 nationalisation.	 However,	 increased	 private	 control	 and	shareholder	 power	 did	 not	 reflect	 stronger	 commitments	 to	 the	 protection	 of	 investor,	contract	or	property	rights	by	relevant	government	actors,	but	rather	a	result	of	ineffectual	state	bureaucratic	capacity,	which	itself	was	symptomatic	of	overall	weak	state	capacity.	Yet	given	that	weak	state	capacity	was	also	reflected	in	the	state's	inability	to	affect	a	monopoly	over	internal	violence,	state	internal	military	and	policing	 apparatuses	proved	 insufficient	 to	prevent	nonstate	actors	from	utilising	force	to	expropriate	the	Bank's	private	assets,	such	as	when	 powerful	 military	 leaders	 known	 as	warlords	 forced	 loans	 from	 the	 Bank	 that	were	rarely	repaid.	Thus,	the	Bank's	private	owners	were	subject	to	property	rights	violations,	with	assets	seized	by	"roving	bandits".		The	start	of	the	Guomindang	period	brought	new	challenges	for	private	shareholders.	While	still	facing	the	danger	of	expropriations	of	Bank	assets	by	non	state-sanctioned	actors,	such	as	warlords,	or	 local	officials	operating	outside	of	 legal	boundaries,	an	 increasingly	competent	central	state	bureaucratic	apparatus	proved	capable	of	enforcing	regulatory	measures	to	force	the	 bank	 to	 hold	 government-issued	 bonds	 that	 exposed	 the	 Bank	 to	 significant	 sovereign	default	risk.	Later,	executive	state	power	was	employed	to	forcibly	dilute	private	shareholders'	ownership	 rights,	 leading	 eventually	 to	 forced	 nationalisation,	 allowing	 state	 officials	 to	assume	more	direct	control	over	the	management	of	the	Bank	by	1935.	Under	this	scenario,	private	shareholders	as	a	group	effectively	 lost	control	rights	over	 the	managerial	decision-making	of	the	company,	including	dividend	payout	decisions.	
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10.2.			China	Merchants	Steamship	Navigation	Company		The	 history	 of	 China	 Merchants	 Steamship	 Navigation	 Company	 has	 been	 considered	frequently	 in	 the	 literature	 (Liu	 1954,	 1962;	 Feuerwerker	 1958;	Haviland	 1962;	 Lai	 1988,	1990,	1991,	2010;	Li	2001;	Cao	2002;	Zhu	2006b,	Halsey	2014;	Wang	&	Ng	2014,	Chu	&	Liu	2016).	 This	 is	 not	 surprising	 given	 that	 the	 company	 was	 the	 first	 successful	 joint	 stock	venture	incorporated	under	domestic	Chinese	law,	remaining	in	business	for	over	seventy-five	years,	 and	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 economic	 history	 of	 China.	 The	 account	 of	 the	company's	corporate	history	also	reflects	many	of	 the	changes	 that	 took	place	 in	 the	state-commerce	relationship	and	the	country's	private	property	rights	environment.	Founded	as	a	collaborative	effort	between	the	state	and	private	business	interests,	 it	reflected	the	ideal	of	state-supported	 commercialism	 and	 industrialisation.	 After	 initial	 excessive	 government	oversight	gave	way	to	more	private	sector	control,	the	enterprise	was	eventually	undermined	by	increasing	government	interference,	and	ultimately	forced	expropriation	of	all	assets.				10.2.1.			Qing	Period:	Government	Patronage	and	Interference	
	The	China	Merchants	Steamship	Navigation	Company	(RJ-%)	was	born	out	of	the	post-Opium	Wars	environment.	The	opening	of	Shanghai	as	a	treaty	port	granted	opportunities	to	foreign	companies	to	operate	steamship	transportation	business	along	China’s	coastal	lines,	as	well	as	on	the	Yangtze	River.	The	Treaty	of	Nanjing	allowed	British	merchants	the	privilege	of	re-export,	with	a	 fixed	 tariff	 rate	and	one-time	transit	 tax,	providing	cost	predictability	and	safeguarding	them	from	arbitrary	extraction	by	local	officials.	With	the	advantages	conferred	through	 use	 of	 the	 more	 advanced	 steamship,	 and	 protections	 from	 excessive	 taxation,	Western-owned	steamship	companies	began	to	dominate	the	transportation	business	in	China.			For	instance,	the	Shanghai	Steam	Navigation	Company,	founded	by	the	American	trading	firm	Russel	&	Co.	 on	27	March	1862	with	capital	of	one	million	taels,	became	one	of	 the	 largest	shipping	concerns	 in	 the	Yangzi	region	(Liu	1954:168).	Various	other	British	and	American	companies,	 including	Augustine	Heard	&	Co.,	 Jardine,	Matheson	&	Co.,	 and	Dent	&	Co.,	 also	became	 actively	 involved	 in	 the	 coastal	 and	 Yangzi	 transportation	 business.	 From	 1855	 to	1863,	the	total	number	of	voyages	made	by	foreign	commercial	vessels	into	Shanghai	ports	increased	 from	589	 to	6,947,	 and	 total	 cargo	 increased	 tenfold,	 from	157,121	 to	1,961,199	tons	(ZSJS	1988:	6).	From	1867	to	1872,	Shanghai	Steam	Navigation	exercised	a	near-monopoly	on	steam	traffic	along	the	Yangzi	River,	as	well	as	a	dominant	position	along	China's	coastal	lines,	operating	sixteen	steamships	between	Shanghai	and	Hongkong	alone	(Cao	2002).	This	business	proved	profitable;	in	the	eight	years	from	1867	to	1874,	the	company's	shareholders	received	an	average	annual	dividend	of	about	18.75	per	cent	on	capital	(Liu	1954:	155,	179).		The	traditional	Chinese	shipping	method	used	to	traverse	coastal	and	inland	waterways	was	by	sailed,	wooden	ships,	fanchuan	(&J),	or	by	larger	vessels,	shachuan	(6J).	With	the	arrival	of	 foreign	 steamships,	 .	 Prior	 to	 the	 Opium	War,	 commodities	 such	 as	 soybeans	 grown	 in	northern	China	were	transported	via	shachuan	to	Shanghai	and	then	distributed	via	fanchuan	to	 other	provinces	 in	 the	 Southeast.	With	 Shanghai	 serving	 as	 a	 regional	 trading	 centre,	 its	wharfs	along	the	Huangpu	were	filled	with	upwards	of	5000	fanchuan	and	shachuan	daily,	and	the	shipping	 industry	employed	over	100,000	workers.	As	early	as	1860,	however,	Chinese	operators	of	these	traditional	vessels	saw	their	commercial	shipping	business	replaced	with	the	arrival	of	foreign	steamship	companies.	Chinese	archives	document	that	by	the	end	of	the	decade,	tens	of	thousands	of	traditional	wooden	ships	lay	idle	and	rotting	in	docks	along	the	Yangzi	 (Halsey	2014:	87).	 In	1862,	Shanghai	 fanchuan	and	shachuan	owners	petitioned	the	Qing	 authorities	 for	 protection	 from	 competition	 by	 excluding	 foreign	 merchants	 from	engaging	in	domestic	soybean	transportation.	Despite	the	support	by	Li	Hongzhang,	the	Court	denied	 the	 request	 after	 vehement	 opposition	 applied	 by	 the	 British	 Envoy	Wade	 Giles.	 In	1864,	Chinese	merchants	once	again	petitioned	to	exclude	foreign	merchants	from	operating	the	 soybean	 transportation	 at	 the	 Shanghai	 port,	 but	 again	 this	 second	 petition	 met	 with	similar	foreign	opposition	and	ultimately	went	unanswered	by	the	Court	(ZSJS	1988:	8-10).	
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10.2.1.1.		Jiangnan	and	Fuzhou	Shipyards	as	Precursor		The	 unsuccessful	 implementation	 of	 his	 desired	 protectionist	 policies	 helped	 motivate	 Li	Hongzhang	 to	 become	 an	 advocate	 for	 the	 modernisation	 of	 China's	 economy,	 and	 in	particular	led	to	his	support	for	the	formation	of	the	China	Merchants	Steamship	Navigation	Company.	 The	 company's	 origins	 draw	 back	 to	 prior	military	 industrialisation	 efforts	 that	brought	about	the	founding	of	two	government-funded	shipyards	—the	Jiangnan	Arsenal	in	Shanghai	in	1865	by	Li,	and	the	Fuzhou	Naval	Yard	in	1866	by	General	Zuo	Zhongtang,	who,	like	Li,	was	a	strong	proponent	of	the	Self-Strengthening	Movement.	Zuo	had	secured	a	seven-year	 budget	 for	 the	 Fuzhou	 shipyard,	 with	 the	 purposes	 to	 construct	 a	 "modern	 naval	dockyard	and	academy,	to	build	sixteen	gunboats,	and	train	the	Chinese	in	all	aspects	of	naval	construction,	 marine	 engineering,	 navigation	 and	 command	 of	 the	 small	 squadron"	 (Pong	1987:121).	 These	 defence	 industry	 projects	 represented	 exactly	 the	 type	 of	 "self-strengthening"	 activity	 the	 reform	 movement	 envisioned—the	 government	 leading	 and	funding	an	effort	to	modernise	the	country's	military	arsenal	using	leading	foreign	expertise	(construction	 at	 Fuzhou	was	 directed	 by	 two	 French	 naval	 officers,	 and	 at	 Jiangnan	 by	 an	American	 chief	 engineer,	 T.	 F.	 Falls)	 to	 build	 a	 modern	 naval	 fleet,	 and	 foster	 knowledge	transfer	of	foreign	military	technology	into	the	domestic	knowledge	base.		However,	 both	 projects	 soon	 ran	 into	 serious	 cost	 overrun.	 Further,	 as	 one	 of	 the	 most	expensive	outlays	in	the	Qing	budget,	the	Fuzhou	Naval	Yards	represented	an	easy	target	for	conservative	 forces	within	 the	Court.	The	project's	administration	certainly	provided	critics	with	ample	ammunition—Fuzhou	Navy	Yard	was	originally	budgeted	to	cost	approximately	three	million	taels,	yet	five	years	into	the	project,	only	six	out	of	sixteen	projected	ships	had	been	constructed,	at	a	cost	of	three	and	a	half	million	taels.	The	reasons	for	the	cost	overruns	were	complex,	but	the	most	significant	was	the	failure	to	anticipate	large	maintenance	costs.	Of	 far	 greater	 importance,	 however,	 revolved	 around	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 central-provincial	power	relationship,	with	a	weak	central	government	unable	to	force	provincial	governments	to	take	ownership	(and	hence	responsibility	for	maintenance	costs)	of	the	built	naval	ships,	as	had	 initially	been	expected.	As	a	result,	 the	majority	of	 the	ships	remained	stationed	at	 the	naval	yard	even	after	having	been	officially	completed	(Pong	1987:	135).		Additional	criticism	came	from	within	the	military,	most	notably	by	cabinet	member	Song	Jin	( 1),	who	 complained	 that	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 equipment	 and	 ships	 built	 by	 both	 ventures	fared	poorly	compared	 to	 foreign-made	vessels.	 Indeed,	part	of	 the	reticence	on	 the	part	of	provincial	governments	in	taking	ownership	of	Fuzhou-built	steamships	was	their	perceived	poor	quality.	Hence,	 Song	 argued,	 the	 very	 rationale	 for	building	 the	 ships—to	provide	 the	nation	 with	 a	 modern	 naval	 arsenal	 that	 could	 be	 used	 to	 ward	 off	 subsequent	 foreign	aggression—was	fundamentally	flawed.	In	response	to	this	rather	pointed	criticism	levelled	at	the	 projects,	which	 by	 1872	 saw	 their	 funds	 running	 out,	 many	 of	 the	 leaders	 of	 the	 Self-Strengthening	 movement	 came	 forward	 to	 defend	 the	 ventures.	 Chief	 among	 them	 were	Generals	Zeng	Guofan	and	Li	Hongzhang,	who	justified	the	initial	production	cost	overruns	as	an	 inherent	 trait	 early	 in	 the	 industrialisation	 process.	 Using	 the	 experience	 of	 Western	nations	as	a	model,	Li	claimed	they	too	had	undergone	a	similar	learning	curve	early	on,	and	argued	that	as	production	increased,	costs	would	naturally	start	to	fall.	Hence,	he	argued,	the	only	way	forward	was	to	increase	the	government's	commitment.	His	support	also	included,	however,	 a	 recommendation	 that	 the	 Naval	 Yard	 build	 not	 only	 military	 vessels,	 but	 also	commercial	merchant	ships	(ZSJS	1988:	24-26;	Pong	1987:	138).			Eventually,	 the	 financial	 crisis	was	 resolved	 later	 that	 year,	with	 Qing	 government	 officials	reallocating	additional	funds	so	the	shipbuilding	activities	at	the	Naval	Yard	could	go	forward.	Nonetheless,	as	 the	Fuzhou	Navy	Yard	continued	to	 represent	such	a	 large	 line	 item	 in	 the	budget,	it	continued	to	generate	considerable	criticism.	The	situation	also	highlights	that	the	Qing	 central	 government	 possessed	 limited	 fiscal	 resources,	 or	 political	 will,	 to	 provide	continual	 financial	 backing	 to	quasi-commercial	 ventures,	 during	 their	 initial	 start-up,	 even	those	with	inherent	state	military	purposes.	
	 281 
10.2.1.2.		Founding	of	China	Merchants:	an	application	of	"A		In	response	to	these	pressures,	Li	and	other	Self-Strengthening	Movement	leaders	began	to	advocate	 a	 new	 formulation	 of	 the	 state-run	 mercantilism	 model,	 referred	 to	 as "A	(government-supervised,	merchant-managed).	A	corporate	governance	concept,	it	envisioned	businesses	to	be	run	as	a	partnership	between	merchants,	who	would	contribute	the	majority	of	 the	 capital,	 as	 well	 as	 supplying	 business	 acumen	 by	 way	 of	 daily	 management	 of	 the	enterprise,	and	the	state,	which	was	to	provide	the	authority	of	state	backing,	which	included	advantages	 such	 as	 favourable	 financing,	 tax	 relief,	 and	 privileged	 market	 access;	 it	 also	included	 however	 as	 final	 oversight	 on	 shaping	 the	 guiding	 direction	 of	 the	 company's	decision-making.	Writing	in	1872,	Li	expressed	his	vision	of	the	merchant-government	official	relationship	as,	"The	enterprise	will	be	under	official	supervision	and	merchant	management.	While	the	government	will	lay	down	the	general	principles	and	keep	its	eye	on	the	company’s	merits	and	demerit,	the	merchant	directors	will	be	permitted	to	propose	their	own	regulations	so	that	the	shareholders	will	be	satisfied	(Feuerwerker	1958:	277).			Li	contended	that	 the	rationale	behind	the	Self-Strengthening	Movement	was	not	simply	 to	create	a	stronger	China	that	could	compete	with	foreign	powers	on	a	military	basis,	but	also	on	a	commercial	basis.	Hence,	it	followed	that	sponsoring	of	commercial	endeavours	was	of	equal	importance	to	the	promotion	of	national	interests	as	building	military	arsenals.	To	further	this	goal,	 and	 in	 light	 of	 the	 inability	 to	 get	 provincial	 governments	 to	 accept	 the	 delivery	 of	military	steamships	from	the	Fuzhou	Naval	Yard,	Li	proposed	previously	military-intentioned	steamships	to	be	refitted	for	commercial	purposes	to	begin	a	company	that	would	be	supplied	with	commercial	steamships	built	at	the	Fuzhou	Naval	Yard.		Li's	efforts	led	to	the	formation	of	the	China	Merchants	in	1873,	authorised	to	raise	capital	of	one	million	taels.	 In	his	1872	petition	to	the	emperor	requesting	the	authority	to	create	the	company,	 Li	 argued	 the	 goal	 was	 not	 only	 to	 create	 a	 company	 to	 compete	 with	 foreign	navigation	firms,	but	given	that	the	venture	was	organised	as	China's	first	formal	joint-stock	enterprise,	one	that	could	also	attract	domestic	capital	from	Chinese	investors.	The	plan	was	for	the	government	to	provide	a	loan	to	fund	part	of	the	initial	capital,	but	for	private	investors	to	 contribute	 most	 of	 the	 capital.	 Domestic	 private	 merchants	 and	 compradors	 had	 been	actively	 investing	 their	 capital	 in	 foreign-owned	 shipping	 companies,	 and	 Li's	 plan	was	 to	solicit	 "investment	 from	Chinese	merchants	 so	 as	 to	 enable	 those	who	have	 their	 ties	with	foreign	capital	gradually	to	transfer	their	funds	to	the	official	bureau"	(Feuerwerker	1958:	99).		Operating	 as	 it	was	 under	 the	 patronage	 of	 Governor-General	 Li,	 and	 as	 the	 only	 Chinese-owned	shipping	company	with	imperial	government	backing,	the	company	could	be	expected	to	enjoy	important	privileges	in	terms	of	market	access,	beneficial	tax	treatment,	and	funding.	By	 government	 mandate,	 the	 company	 received	 monopoly	 rights	 to	 operate	 as	 the	 only	domestically-owned	steamship	enterprise;	it	was	also	granted	a	monopoly	franchise	for	the	carriage	of	tribute	rice,	designed	to	ensure	the	company’s	profitable	operation	(Liu	1959:	443).	The	 Qing	 Court	 also	 mandated	 regulations	 requiring	 local	 government	 officials	 to	 use	 the	company	for	shipping	certain	supplies	(Halsey	2014:	90).			Although	 authorised	 capital	 was	 set	 at	 one	million	 taels,	 to	 be	 divided	 into	 one	 thousand	shares	valued	at	one	thousand	taels	per	share,	the	initial	plan	was	to	raise	half	the	authorised	amount	by	issuing	five	hundred	shares.	While	Li	expected	offered	shares	to	have	been	quickly	subscribed,	the	company	faced	reluctance	from	private	investors.	Two	wealthy	silk	merchants,	Hu	Xueyan	and	Li	Zhenyu,	were	initially	expected	to	supply	the	majority	of	private	capital,	but	both	 ended	up	 backing	out.	 The	difficulty	 attracting	private	 investors	was	protracted,	with	Zheng	 Guanying,	 who	 was	 later	 nominated	 to	 be	 the	 director	 of	 the	 company	 in	 1882,	mentioning	in	his	shareholders	meeting	speech	that	 "well	over	a	year	into	the	subscription,	there	was	almost	complete	lack	of	interest"	on	the	part	of	investors	(Zheng	1883).	This	lack	of	interest	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 by	 the	 end	 of	 the	 first	 year,	 while	 the	 company	 had	subscriptions	 for	952	 shares,	 received	paid-up	 capital	 reached	only	475,000	 taels,	with	 the	majority	of	paid-in	funds	coming	from	Li	and	other	board	members.		
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Reticence	for	private	investors	to	put	capital	into	the	new	venture	is	difficult	to	identify.	Li's	first	appointee	to	run	the	company	was	Zhu	Qi’ong,	whose	prior	position	had	been	in	charge	of	
shachuan	transportation	in	Zhejiang.	Unfamiliar	with	the	steamship	industry,	Zhu's	leadership	was	characterised	by	mis-management,	and	the	company	quickly	ran	into	financial	difficulties,	having	 overpaid	 for	 outdated	 vessels,	 and	 purchased	 vessels	 not	 suitable	 for	 the	 designed	routes,	bringing	on	significant	losses	(ZSJS	1988:	42).	Hence,	the	early	financial	troubles	facing	the	company	likely	played	a	role	in	depressing	investor	interest.	Of	perhaps	greater	salience	was	 the	 operating	 philosophy	 of	 the	 company,	 that	 placed	 government	 interests	 over	merchants'.	 Although	 having	 purchased	 an	 official	 title,	 Zhu	 was	 a	 merchant;	 his	 lack	 of	knowledge	of	 the	 steamship	 industry	 an	 initially	disqualifying	 factor	 to	his	 appointment	 as	head	of	the	new	company,	Zhu	fully	recognised	he	owed	his	appointment	to	the	support	of	Li,	and	in	return,	pushed	through	corporate	regulations	that	mandated	a	system	of	tight	oversight	by	government	officials,	with	explicit	language	stating	that	the	company's	managers	needed	to	be	appointed	by	Li.			While	 the	 exact	 reasons	 for	 the	 reticence	 of	 domestic	 investors	 to	 invest	 capital	 in	 early	domestic	joint-stock	companies	remains	unclear,	most	scholars	suggest	it	was	due	to	lack	of	familiarity	 with	 the	 Westernised	 business	 form.	 Faure	 (2006:	 51)	 surmises	 that	 "Early	reluctance	 by	 Chinese	merchants	 to	 invest	 in	 [China	Merchants]	 reflects	 probably	more	 a	sense	 of	 caution	 towards	 the	 unknown	 than	 an	 assessment	 of	 the	 company’s	 business	potentials."	We	find	this	line	of	argumentation	uncompelling.	To	begin	with,	Faure	and	similar	analyses	cite	no	direct	evidence	of	a	"sense	of	caution"	amongst	entrepreneurs	and	investors,	who	 otherwise	 displayed	 by	 their	 actions	 a	 relatively	 high	 degree	 of	 risk-taking	 in	 their	willingness	to	start	and	invest	in	new	businesses	during	this	time	period.	Second,	by	this	time	there	 already	 existed	 a	 large	 class	 of	 relatively	 sophisticated	 investors,	many	of	whom	had	experience	 investing	 in	 joint-stock	 companies.	 Lui	 (1962)	 provides	 considerable	 archival-based	 evidence	 from	 the	 period	 of	 the	 relatively	 high	 levels	 capital	 invested	 in	 early	extraterritorial	 joint-stock	companies	by	domestic	 investors.	This	 included,	 for	 instance,	 the	200,000	 taels	 invested	 by	 Chinese	 investors	 in	 China	 Merchants'	 competitor,	 Shanghai	Steamship	Navigation,	operated	by	Russel	and	Company.	Similarly,	research	on	the	holdings	of	former	 and	acting	 compradors	 such	 as	Xu	Run,	 Zheng	Guanying,	 Chen	Shutang,	 and	others	indicates	 that	 large	 percentages	 of	 their	 financial	 assets	 were	 comprised	 of	 shares	 in	extraterritorial-owned	joint-stock	companies	(Wu	1974,	Lee	1991:25).			Thus,	the	argument	that	Chinese	investors	were	prevented	from	investing	in	domestic	firms	due	to	"caution	towards	the	unknown"	regarding	the	corporate	form	of	joint	stock	companies	fails	 to	hold	up	 to	empirical	analysis.	Nonetheless,	 this	argument	regarding	unfamiliarity	or	"foreignness"	of	the	joint-stock	form	remains	persistent	in	the	literature;	even	Hao	(1970:	456)	argues	compradors	were	willing	to	invest	in	these	western	forms	of	corporate	form	only	after	undergoing	 the	 "infusion	 of	 western	 values".	 Yet,	 such	 culture-based	 arguments	 fail	 to	 be	supported	 by	 the	 historical	 record,	 especially	 given	 describing	 proto-joint-stock	 corporate	forms	with	dispersed	ownership	structures	run	by	managers	who	were	not	direct	owners	of	the	 firm,	 as	 explicated	 in	 research	on	merchant	 groups	 in	Furong,	Hunan	 (Zelin	1988)	 and	Zizong,	Sichuan	(Zelin	2005a),	and	Shanxi	bankers	who	paid	managers	partly	with	non-voting	ownership	shares	as	an	early	form	of	stock	option	compensation	structure	to	help	overcome	the	principal-agent	problem	and	increase	interest	alignment	between	bank	management	and	ownership	(Morck	&	Yang	2011,	Wu	2016).	These	indigenously-developed	proto-joint-stock	corporate	forms	were	found	within	the	Chinese	economy	prior	to	the	introduction	of	the	joint-stock	form	from	outside.	Obviously,	then,	domestic	Chinese	investors	and	entrepreneurs	were	willing	 to	 engage	 in	 these	 types	 of	 corporate	 structures,	 when	 the	 incentive	 system	 was	favourable.	 As	 both	 Zelin	 and	 Wu	 argue,	 however,	 the	 lack	 of	 further	 deepening	 and	development	 of	 these	 proto-joint-stock	 corporate	 forms	 in	 the	 domestic	 economy	 can	 be	related	to	a	distinct	lack	of	sufficient	property	rights	mechanisms	that	could	have	facilitated	a	greater	 utilisation	 of	 these	 financial	 instruments	 that	 allowed	 for	 the	 separation	 between	ownership	and	control.	
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	Therefore,	a	more	plausible	rationale	for	the	willingness,	or	lack	thereof,	of	domestic	investors	to	put	capital	into	either	extraterritorial	or	domestic	joint-stock	ventures	would	be	related	to	their	 perceptions	 of	 the	 relative	 strength	 of	 private	 property	 protection	 offered	 by	 the	corporate	 governance	 systems	 that	 differed	 between	 that	 of	 extraterritorial	 and	 domestic	companies.	 This	 was	 particularly	 true	 in	 the	 case	 of	 companies	 that	 operated	 under	 the	government	 supervision-merchant	management	 corporate	 governance	 form	 such	 as	 China	Merchants.	Numerous	private	businesspersons	expressed	discomfort	with	the	state-economic	agent	relationship	under	the	government	supervision-merchant	management	concept,	one	in	which	the	government	was	the	more	powerful	side,	represented	particularly	in	its	power	to	appoint	 directors	 and	 managers	 and	 intervene	 in	 business	 operations.	 Ultimately,	 private	shareholders	had	no	effective	resources	to	protect	their	interests.	Peng	Rucong,	for	instance,	was	 an	 entrepreneur	 who	 sought	 to	 establish	 the	 first	 domestic	 Chinese-owned	 cotton	manufacturing	mill	utilising	mechanised	production	means.	After	 initially	receiving	support	from	local	business	leaders,	his	application	made	in	1878	to	establish	his	company	was	denied	by	the	government	officials,	including	Li	Hongzhang,	because	he	sought	to	set	up	the	firm	as	a	purely	private	venture,	 outside	 the	government	supervision-merchant	management	system,	to	be	run	solely	by	merchants,	not	subject	to	interference	by	government	officials'	oversight	(Wang	1994:	66).			These	concerns	were	well-founded,	as	indicated	by	the	corporate	history	of	China	Merchants	Steamship.	The	lack	of	independent	supervision	by	private	shareholders	resulted	in	a	lack	of	an	effective	mechanism	to	prevent	government	officials	from	using	its	access	to	the	corporate	coffer,	 becoming	 the	 implicit	 residual	 recipient	 of	 corporate	profits.	 Such	behaviour	 on	 the	part	of	the	government	regarding	in	its	takings	of	profits	amounted	to	expropriation	of	private	assets,	 and	 can	 help	 explain	 a	 rational	 reluctance	 on	 the	 part	 of	 investors	 to	 become	shareholders	 in	 companies	 that	 lacked	 protections	 against	 such	 actions	 on	 the	 part	 of	government	officials.	This	proved	to	be	particularly	the	case	when	it	was	possible	to	invest	in	similar	 firms	 that	 operated	 under	 a	 stronger	 set	 of	 property,	 contract	 and	 investor	 rights	protections,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 extraterritorial	 joint-stock	 companies.	Hence,	 the	 reason	 for	 the	lack	of	domestic	investor	support	for	domestic	joint-stock	firms,	vis-a-vis	extraterritorial	joint-stock	 firms,	 can	 be	 better	 ascribed	 to	 rational	 economic	 decision-making	 on	 the	 part	 of	Chinese	investors.					10.2.1.3.		Ascendency	of	Merchant	Control:	Xu	Run,	Tang	Tingshu,	and	Zheng	Guanying		However	 loyal	 he	 proved	 in	 advancing	 the	 interests	 of	 government	 officials	 backing	 the	company,	Zhu’s	poor	performance	record	prompted	Li	at	the	end	of	1873	to	remove	Zhu	and	appoint	two	Guangdong	merchants	as	the	company's	new	general	managers.	Both	Xu	Run	(*
9),	a	former	comprador	for	Dent	and	Company	and	one	of	Shanghai's	richest	businessmen,	and	Tang	Tingshu	()3),	a	comprador	for	Jardine	Matheson,	possessed	experience	in	foreign-run	 steam	 navigation	 companies,	 thus	 providing	 important	 business	 knowledge.	 They	 also	came	in	with	a	sharply	different	view	as	to	the	appropriate	corporate	governance	structure	for	the	firm,	with	Tang	insisting	that	company	posts	be	appointed	by	the	business	side,	instead	of	by	government	officials	(%??").	As	a	result,	a	moderate	reform	took	place	within	the	 company's	 management	 structure,	 solidifying	 merchant	 management	 over	 corporate	affairs.	 The	 hiring	 of	 Tang	 and	 Xu	 as	 business	 managers,	 together	 with	 their	 strong	connections	 to	 the	 business	 community—particularly	 amongst	 other	 Guangdong-based	merchants—allowed	 the	 company	 to	 gain	 credibility	 among	 Chinese	 investors	 (Goodman	1995:	141).		
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		While	 initial	 returns	 during	 the	 first	 few	 years	 of	 operation	 under	 Xu	 and	 Tang	 were	favourable,	 owing	 in	 part	 to	 the	 generous	 payments	 the	 company	 received	 from	 the	government	on	its	monopoly	agreements	for	shipping	"tribute	rice",	already	by	1875	returns	had	 dipped	 lower.	 Although	 China	 Merchants	 enjoyed	 monopoly	 rights	 preventing	competition	 from	 other	 domestic	 firms	 entering	 the	 market,	 foreign-operated	 steamship	companies	provided	serious	competition	for	business,	implying	tight	operating	margins.	The	firm's	business	model	however	operated	on	the	assumption	of	healthy	returns,	for	its	equity	shares	 carried	with	 them	 the	promise	of	 high	 fixed-interest	dividends.	As	 a	 result	 of	 these	obligatory	 dividend	 payments,	 as	 well	 as	 other	 financial	 demands,	 capital	 accumulation	proved	difficult	to	achieve,	hampering	growth	opportunities.			Nonetheless,	after	several	years	of	moderate	growth,	the	company	expanded	greatly	when	it	acquired	Russel	and	Company’s	Shanghai	Steam	Navigation	Company.	After	China	Merchants	Steamship	applied	for	and	received	permission	from	the	Court	to	undertake	the	purchase,	Li	personally	wrote	to	the	emperor	to	grant	his	permission	for	the	company	to	be	granted	a	ten-year	loan	of	one	million	taels	from	the	treasury	at	favourable	rates,	with	the	first	five	years	of	interest	 payments	 deferred,	 in	 order	 to	 complete	 the	 purchase,	 which	 was	 eventually	approved	(Li	1876	(2005:	2889-289)).			The	merger	added	another	sixteen	steamships	to	the	China	Merchants	fleet	of	fourteen;	with	thirty	 steamships	now	under	management,	 China	Merchants	became	 the	 largest	 steamship	operator	 in	 the	 country	 (Hao	 1985:	 205).	 Improved	 business	 also	 alleviated	 some	 of	 the	company's	 financing	 issues,	 and	 the	 greater	 degree	 of	 merchant	 control	 over	 business	operations	saw	paid-in	capital	begin	to	rise,	reaching	830,000	taels	by	1880,	and	finally	the	full	subscribed	amount	of	one	million	by	the	end	of	the	following	year.	Yet	hesitancy	on	the	part	of	private	investors	still	existed,	as	the	expectation	that	Chinese	shareholders	in	Shanghai	Steam	Navigation	 would	 transfer	 their	 200,000	 taels	 of	 capital	 in	 that	 firm	 to	 the	merged	 China	Merchants	company	went	unrealised,	with	records	indicating	that	none	of	the	fifteen	recorded	domestic	 Chinese	 shareholders	 of	 Shanghai	 Steam	 Navigation	 joined	 the	 new	 company	 as	shareholders	(Liu	1962).			The	 benefits	 China	 Merchants	 gained	 from	 the	 government	 supervision-merchant	management	 system	 were	 clear	 in	 terms	 of	 limiting	 market	 access	 to	 potential	 domestic	competitors,		as	well	as	access	to	favourable	government-assisted	financing,	such	as	in	the	case	of	financing	that	facilitating	the	purchase	of	the	Shanghai	Steamship	Company.	However,	on	a	larger	 scale,	 the	 domestic	 industry	 suffered	 from	 a	 lack	 of	 competition	 and	 innovation.	Government	 intervention	 in	 the	 economy	 via	 granting	 monopoly	 rights,	 or	 providing	favourable	 tax	 treatment	 to	 certain	 companies,	 directly	 inhibited	 the	 growth	 of	 private	enterprises	 that	were	not	 fortunate	 enough	to	benefit	 from	such	preferential	 treatment.	To	maximize	profit,	China	Merchants	frequently	used	its	access	government	support	to	suppress	market	competition	and	prevent	other	private	entrepreneurs	from	engaging	in	shipping	and	transportation.	In	1882,	a	private	application	to	form	a	steamship	navigation	company	made	by	 Ye	 Chengzhong	 (<N)	 ,	 leader	 of	 the	 Zhejiang	merchants	 in	 Shanghai,	was	 rejected	 by	Governor-General	Li	to	prevent	competition	to	China	Merchants	(NCH	10	September	1887).	Multiple	 other	 requests	 from	 other	 merchants	 in	 Shanghai	 (including	 one	 from	 Zheng	Guanying	 before	 he	 joined	 China	 Merchants)	 to	 operate	 steamship	 in	 inland	 and	 coastal	waterways	were	all	 repeatedly	blocked	by	China	Merchants	(ZSJS	1988:	133).	As	 the	North	
China	Herald	 noted	 at	 the	 time,	 China	 Merchants	 had	 become	 the	 biggest	 impediment	 to	private	merchants	from	engaging	in	coastal	trading	and	navigation	(NCH	15	April	1879:	349-350).	In	the	decades	following	the	founding	of	China	Merchants,	the	overall	Chinese	steamship	transportation	industry	failed	to	experience	any	private-led	growth.		
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While	having	expanded	greatly	and	now	controlling	over	a	third	of	the	country's	steamship	traffic	(Hao	1985:	206),	operational	inefficiencies	and	financial	pressures	continued	to	weigh	on	the	company,	especially	given	the	demands	imposed	by	the	company's	high	debt	levels	and	the	 fixed	 dividend	 system	 (ZSJS	 1988:	 62).	 In	 1881,	 Zheng	 Guanying	 (UO'),	 another	important	Guangdong	merchant,	was	brought	in	by	Li	to	serve	as	the	new	General	Manager,	along	with	Xu	and	Tian.	Zheng	was	the	author	of	an	outspoken	book,	@P	(Words	of	Caution	
in	a	Prosperous	Age),	which	first	appeared	in	1860’s	and	was	republished	multiple	times,	and	in	 which	 Zheng	 offered	 his	 suggestions	 for	 economic	 reforms.	 Zheng,	 a	 proponent	 for	 the	separation	 of	 government	 and	 business	management,	 pushed	 for	 to	modify	 the	 company's	charter	to	give	shareholders	the	sole	right	to	nominate	the	company's	management	without	interference	 from	 the	 government.	 Zheng	 was	 frustrated	 by	 the	 reality	 that	 under	 the	government	 supervision-merchant	management	 system,	 power	 was	 consolidated	 with	 top	government	officials,	with	the	term	"merchants-managed"	existing	in	name	alone	(Zheng	1860,	v.10).	In	his	writing,	Zheng	raises	concerns	of	inefficiency	resulting	from	government	control	over	 business,	 such	 as	 how	 officials	 frequently	 placed	 their	 friends	 and	 relatives	 on	 the	company	 payroll,	 or	 that	managers	 were	 often	 forced	 to	make	 non-economic	 decisions	 in	order	to	cater	to	official	interests.			Under	 Zheng's	 direction,	 the	 company	 became	 more	 profitable.	 The	 following	 year,	 the	company	reported	annual	profits	exceeding	one	million	taels.	Zheng	also	led	the	company	to	increase	 its	 capital	 base	 to	 two	 million	 taels,	 converting	 its	 division	 of	 equity	 to	 twenty	thousand	shares	of	100	taels	par	value	each,	with	the	lower	par	value	designed	to	increase	the	subscription	base	(Xu	1927:	31,	ZSJS	1988:	79).	The	success	enjoyed	over	the	following	two	years	increased	the	confidence	of	Zheng,	Xu	and	Tang	that	their	merchant-centric	model	was	the	 most	 appropriate;	 in	 1884,	 the	 three	 leaders	 of	 the	 company	 submitted	 a	 request	 to	Governor-General	Li,	suggesting	the	company	undertake	to	"reimburse	to	the	government	its	invested	 funds	 in	 instalments,	 and	 all	 due	 accumulated	 interests,	 upon	 the	 completion	 of	which	China	Merchants	Steamship	Navigation	will	be	run	by	businessmen,	who	shall	assume	full	 responsibility	 for	profits	 and	 losses.	 China	Merchants	 shall	 no	 longer	have	 government	involvement,	and	the	government	shall	no	longer	appoint	business	managers"	(cited	in	Yang	2000).	These	attempts	to	privatise	China	Merchants	did	not	go	well	with	Li	(Leung	1986).	In	1884	and	1885,	both	Xu	and	Tang	were	evicted	from	China	Merchants	after	accusations	by	Li	that	 the	 two	had	misappropriated	 funds,	 stripping	 them	as	well	 of	 their	 ownership	 shares;	Zheng	managed	to	retain	his	position	but	was	to	be	undermined	by	the	new	General	Manager	brought	in	by	Li	in	1885	(Lai	1988).					10.2.1.4.		Ascendency	of	Government	Control:	Sheng	Xuanhuai		Dissatisfied	with	 the	 attempt	by	Xu,	 Tang	 and	Zheng	 to	 remove	government	oversight	 and	control	 over	 the	 company,	 Li	 appointed	 his	 attendant,	 Sheng	 Xuanhuai	 (@#+),	 a	 career	government	official,	as	China	Merchants'	new	general	manager.	Sheng,	having	observed	 the	fate	 of	 Xu	 and	 Tang,	worked	 to	 push	 out	many	 of	 the	 private	 investors,	 and	 operated	 the	company	more	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 a	 directly-controlled	 government	 bureaucratic	 entity.	 All	major	managers	were	nominated	by	the	government.	Zheng,	disagreeing	with	the	direction	of	the	management	style	and	rollbacks	to	earlier	reforms	implemented	by	Xu,	Tang	and	himself,	eventually	resigned	from	his	role	in	the	company.		The	subordination	of	private	managerial	power,	accompanied	by	tighter	government	control	of	 company	 decision-making,	 failed	 to	 bring	 higher	 revenues,	 and	 the	 company's	 growth	subsequently	declined.	Corruption,	embezzlement	and	poor	management	became	particularly	serious	problems	in	the	late	1880s.	On	several	occasions	Li	was	forced	to	step	in	and	protect	the	company's	senior	management,	including	even	one	time	writing	directly	to	the	emperor	to	
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defend	Sheng	from	prosecution	for	accepting	a	bribe	(Li	1882	(2005:	61-62)).	By	1894,	China	Merchants	still	operated	the	same	number	of	steamships	as	it	had	ten	years	prior,	and	by	this	time	had	 lost	 its	 previous-dominant	position	 in	Yangzi	 transportation	 to	 foreign	 steamship	companies,	such	as	Swire	and	Jardine,	Madison.	The	deleterious	impact	owing	to	the	change	in	managerial	authority	from	private	merchants	to	government	officials	at	China	Merchants	did	not	escape	of	the	attention	of	contemporaneous	observers.	Douglas	(1895:	264),	for	instance,	notes	 of	 the	 effect	 of	 government	 officials	 running	 the	 company:	 "At	 first,	 by	 the	 careful	employment	of	official	influence	to	promote	its	welfare,	the	scheme	answered	tolerably	well,	and	in	1877	the	Company	was	in	a	position	to	buy	the	steamers	of	the	Shanghai	Steamship	Navigation	Company	with	all	the	dockyard	plant,	for	the	sum	of	2,000,000	taels.	It	is	amusing	to	see	the	efforts	which	were	made	by	Li	to	bolster	up	a	concern,	which	without	such	aid	must	have	been	inevitably	ruined	by	the	official	element	in	the	management.	Unhappily	in	China	the	presence	of	Mandarins	[government	officials]	on	a	Board	means	that	bribery	and	corruption	form	a	part	 of	 the	policy	of	 the	 undertaking,	 and	 this	Company,	which	 left	 to	 the	 hands	of	mercantile	men	might	have	 succeeded	well,	was	 constantly	 imperilled	by	 the	 very	 support	which	was	intended	to	give	it	strength."			Interference	 in	 corporate	management	 by	 government	 officials	 included	 pressure	 to	 direct	company	 funds	 to	 various	 government	 offices.	 In	 February	 1890,	 a	 government	 auditor	charged	China	Merchants	 and	 the	 Imperial	 Chinese	 Telegraph	Administration	with	making	excessive	 profits,	 demanding	 these	 firms	 pay	 increased	 distributions	 to	 the	 government.	Sheng	temporarily	succeeded	in	fending	off	the	request	by	citing	the	dependence	of	Hanyang	Ironworks	and	Ping	Xiang	Coal	Mines	on	the	support	of	China	Merchants,	pleading	that	further	demands	for	contributions	would	jeopardise	all	four	enterprises.	To	mollify	continuing	requests	for	additional	contributions,	the	following	year	China	Merchants	contributed	100,000	taels	to	famine	relief,	in	exchange	for	the	government	foregoing	the	previous	year's	interest	collection	on	an	earlier	loan	(NCH,	14	April	1892:	503).	In	1894,	China	Merchants	contributed	50,000	
taels	out	of	company	profits	to	an	"Imperial	Celebration	Fund"	for	official	celebrations	of	the	sixtieth	 birthday	 of	 Empress	 Dowager	 Cixi,	 and	 the	 company's	managerial	 staff	 personally	contributed	an	additional	50,000	taels	(Feuerwerker	1958:	173).	In	1896,	Sheng	agreed	the	company	would	make	fixed	annual	contributions	of	80,000	taels	to	go	to	various	government	education	projects.	In	1898,	the	government	issued	two	edicts	ordering	Sheng	to	draw	up	the	accounts	 of	 the	 financial	 status	 of	 China	 Merchants	 and	 the	 Telegraph	 Administration,	together	with	a	plan	for	regular	payment	of	surplus	profits	to	the	government.	Despite	Sheng's	protest	that	"the	surpluses…	were	continuously	used	to	expand	their	capital;	thus	there	is	no	ready	cash	that	can	be	transferred	to	the	government,"	the	company	was	pressured	to	agree	to	set	 aside	 twenty	 per	 cent	 of	 annual	 net	 surplus	 as	 donations	 to	 the	 government,	with	 the	minimum	amount	to	be	donated	mandated	at	60,000	taels	annually	(Feuerwerker	1958:	175).			Overall,	these	contributions,	undertaken	to	win	the	favour	of	influential	state	actors,	exerted	a	significant	 burden	 on	 the	 company's	 financial	 viability.	 Table	 10.1,	 constructed	 from	 data	based	 on	 China	 Merchants'	 financial	 statements,	 illustrates	 how	 such	 numerous	 financial	demands	on	 the	company,	 including	 fixed	dividend	obligations	and	compelled	donations	 to	the	 government,	 combined	 with	 declining	 revenues,	 eventually	 brought	 the	 company's	reserves	 into	 deficit.	 The	 constant	 demands	 from	 the	 government	 for	 large	 contributions,	acquiesced	 to	 by	 the	 company's	 government	 official-led	 management	 team,	 inhibited	 the	ability	 of	 the	 company	 from	 achieving	 significant	 capital	 accumulation,	 thereby	 adversely	affecting	the	company's	ability	to	undertake	capital	improvements	such	as	upgrading	its	fleet,	expanding	business	operations,	or	investing	in	new	technologies.	Over	time,	this	contributed	to	the	company	losing	its	competitive	advantage,	evidenced	by	the	fact	that	while	the	value	of	China's	 total	 foreign	 trade	 increased	six-fold	 from	153	million	 to	974	million	taels	 over	 the	period	 1885	 to	 1913,	 China	Merchants'	 gross	 earnings	 from	 shipping	 remained	 essentially	unchanged	(Remer	1926:	76,	125).		
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			Table	10.1.		Allocation	of	profits,	China	Merchants	Steamship	Navigation	Co.,	1895-1911	
	 Year	 Profits	 Fixed	Dividend	 Bonus	dividend	 Employee	Bonus	 Donation	to	Gov't	 Accumulated	Capital	1895	 	651,062		 	120,000		 	280,000		 	25,107		 	 			225,950		1896	 	530,756		 	120,000		 	280,000		 	13,076		 	 			117,680		1897	 	524,044		 	 	 	52,404		 	 			471,640		1898	 	690,380		 	240,000		 	240,000		 	21,038		 	 			189,342		1899	 	709,420		 	400,000		 	154,710		 	51,570		 	145,760		 			(42,620)	1900	 	637,007		 	400,000		 	118,503		 	39,501		 	140,000		 			(60,997)	1901	 	503,900		 	400,000		 	51,950		 	17,317		 	140,000		 	(105,367)	1902	 	386,994		 	400,000		 	 	 	140,000		 	(153,006)	1903	 	538,759		 	400,000		 	69,379		 	23,126		 			80,000		 			(33,746)	1904	 	715,428		 	400,000		 	157,714		 	52,571		 	105,144		 																0	1905	 	677,857		 	400,000		 	138,929		 	46,309		 			80,000		 					12,619		1906	 	559,715		 	400,000		 	79,857		 	26,619		 			80,000		 			(26,761)	1907	 	427,802		 	400,000		 	13,901		 	4,633		 			80,000		 			(70,738)	1908	 	412,207		 	400,000		 	6,103		 	2,035		 			80,000		 			(75,931)	1909	 	325,884		 	400,000		 	 	 	 			(74,116)	1910	 	51,443		 	600,000		 	 	 	 	(548,557)	1911	 (282,953)	 		 		 		 		 	(282,953)	Source:		 China	Merchants	Steam	Navigation	financial	records,	compiled	in	ZSJS	1988:	242				Faced	with	a	risk	of	losing	control	of	the	company,	the	shareholders	decided	to	register	as	a	corporation	under	the	1904	Qing	Company	Laws,	hoping	that	the	legal	system	would	provide	shareholders	a	greater	degree	of	protection.	Shortly	 thereafter,	a	shareholders'	meeting	was	held	pursuant	to	the	requirements	of	the	Company	Laws,	and	new	articles	of	association	were	drafted,	 and	 a	 nine-member	 board	 of	 directors	 elected,	 with	 Sheng	 appointed	 chairman.	Nevertheless,	 the	Ministry	 of	 Posts	 and	 Communications	 chose	 to	 disregard	 these	 changes	allowable	 under	 the	 new	 Company	 Law,	 claiming	 that	 as	 China	Merchants	 Steamship	was	designated	 a	 “government-supervised,	 merchant-managed”	 company,	 the	 government	retained	 the	 right	 to	 appoint	 the	 company's	 managing	 director	 and	 chief	 managers,	 and	required	reporting	of	major	events	to	the	Ministry	(ZSJS	1988:	271-72).			Over	the	ensuing	years,	the	company	continued	to	post	declining	profitability,	and	after	years	of	losses,	in	April	1909,	many	within	the	government,	including	General	Yuan	Shikai,	argued	for	 full	nationalisation	of	 the	company.	With	 the	support	of	 former	general	manager	Zheng	Guanying,	Sheng	was	able	to	mobilise	enough	support	from	the	primarily	Guangdong-based	shareholders	 to	 vote	 against	 the	nationalisation	plan,	 and	 to	petition	 the	 government	once	again	 for	 the	 right	 to	 incorporate	 under	 the	 Company	 Law.	 With	 the	 backing	 of	 strong	shareholder	support,	 the	company	 finally	obtained	permission	 to	remain	a	private	concern,	and	was	formally	incorporated	as	a	limited	liability	company	in	1909	(Lee	1991:	13).						
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10.2.2.		Lacklustre	performance	under	the	Beiyang		Sheng	 Xuanhuai's	 management	 of	 China	 Merchants	 Steamship	 in	 a	 manner	 that	 mostly	accorded	with	government	interests	earned	him	an	official	appointment	to	head	the	Ministry	of	Posts	and	Communications	in	early	1911,	thus	ending	his	directorship	of	the	company.	In	an	interesting	 side	 note,	 it	 was	 Shang's	 subsequent	 efforts	 in	 his	 new	 governmental	 role	 to	consolidate	state	control	over	railroad	projects,	including	the	nationalisation	of	several	private	local	railroads,	that	ultimately	sparked	major	protests	and	led	to	the	Railway	Rights	Protection	Movement	(QS),	which	served	as	a	direct	precursor	to	related	political	protest	movements	culminating	 in	 the	 Xinhai	 Revolution,	 and	 the	 eventual	 overthrow	 of	 the	 Qing	 empire	(Fairbank	1983:	211).		In	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	revolution,	China	Merchants	faced	challenges	dealing	with	the	 resultant	 political	 uncertainty.	 As	 the	 largest	 of	 the	 government	 supervision-merchant	management	companies	under	the	Qing,	the	company	occupied	an	awkward	position	after	the	1911	Revolution.	The	October	1911	Wuchang	Uprising	caused	considerable	damages	to	the	company's	 facilities	 in	nearby	Hankou	port,	 as	wharves	 and	warehouses	were	burned	and	destroyed,	resulting	in	estimated	property	losses	of	1.6	million	taels.	 In	December	1911,	the	revolutionary	 military	 force	 that	 occupied	 Shanghai	 made	 repeated	 requests	 to	 assign	 a	supervisor	to	the	company.	The	company's	board	of	directors,	unsure	of	the	permanency	of	the	new	 revolutionary	provisional	 government,	 and	 simultaneously	not	wishing	 to	 alienate	either	the	new	regime,	nor	the	embattled	but	still	officially	reigning	Qing	imperial	government,	attempted	 to	 deflect	 the	 requests	 until	 a	 resolution	 of	 the	 situation	 crystallised.	 Amid	 the	uncertainty,	by	the	end	of	the	year,	many	directors	had	resigned	from	their	posts,	while	most	of	those	that	remained	refused	to	attend	board	meetings	(Xia	1981:	238).			It	is	noteworthy	that	this	situation	aligns	quite	well	with	that	which	is	described	by	Weingast	and	his	co-authors	in	regard	to	the	conditions	that	spring	from	Violence	Trap—in	a	conditions	marked	by	high	levels	of	political	violence	where	the	overthrow	of	the	regime	is	perceived	to	be	realistic,	private	actors	who	have	aligned	themselves	with	the	existing	regime	are	often	at	risk	when	the	regime	changes,	and	can	 find	 their	property,	 including	 their	 lives,	 threatened	when	a	new	regime	takes	control.	This	explains	part	of	the	reason	existing	board	members	were	loathe	to	continue	to	serve	on	the	board	once	the	fall	of	the	Qing	seemed	possible,	and	also	underscores	why	environments	defined	by	high	 levels	of	political	violence	are	 likely	 to	achieve	lower	levels	of	realised	investment	compared	to	potential	investment.		The	initial	resistance	shown	towards	the	new	revolutionary	government,	however,	soon	gave	way	to	forced	collaboration.	In	January	1912,	faced	with	a	revenue	crunch,	the	newly	formed	provisional	Guomindang	government	in	Nanjing	under	Sun	Zhongshan’s	leadership	turned	to	the	China	Merchants	Steamship	Navigation	Company,	and	requested	the	pledge	of	the	assets	of	the	company	to	Japanese	banks	in	an	effort	to	raise	bank	loans.	General	Sun's	request	was	coercive	in	nature—shareholder	equity	(including	that	of	Sheng,	who	remained	the	company's	largest	shareholder)	was	subject	to	confiscation	by	the	new	provisional	government;	further,	refusal	by	private	shareholders	to	fulfil	the	demand	would	result	in	the	government	taking	"all	necessary	measures"	to	secure	compliance	(Shun	Pao	25	January	1912).	On	11	February,	after	attempts	by	 the	company	directors	 to	stave	off	 the	request	 failed,	China	Merchants	made	a	public	announcement	in	the	Shun	Pao	that	it	was	providing	collateral	to	back	the	provisional	government's	loan	request.	In	addition,	the	new	government	commandeered	China	Merchants	Steamship	vessels	for	military	purposes,	paying	little	compensation	in	return.	The	company	was	 able	 to	 recover	 less	 than	 fifty	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 payables	 accrued	 from	 the	 provisional	government's	use	of	its	properties,	which	totalled	200,000	taels	 in	a	period	of	less	than	two	months	in	1912	(ZSJS	1988:	289).	Somewhat	ironically,	the	Provisional	Constitution	(0H7)	enacted	by	 the	provisional	government	shortly	 thereafter	explicitly	stated	 that	 "The	people	shall	 enjoy	 the	 right	 to	 protect	 their	 private	 properties	 and	 the	 freedom	 to	 engage	 in	businesses"	(Article	VI).	
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	Efforts	to	exert	greater	control	over	China	Merchants	Steamship	continued	after	the	fall	of	the	Nanjing	provisional	government	and	move	of	 the	Republic	 to	Beijing	under	Yuan	Shikai.	 In	October	1912,	the	Department	of	Communications	nominated	a	supervisor	and	the	executive	manager	 of	 the	 company,	 announcing	 to	 restore	 the	 government	 supervision	 system.	 In	response,	twenty-nine	shareholders	of	China	Merchants	issued	a	joint	statement,	calling	on	all	shareholders	to	protest	the	government's	action	(Shun	Pao	27	October	1912).	The	fight	over	the	control	of	the	company	continued	through	November.	The	political	chaos	associated	with	the	establishment	of	the	new	Republic	under	Yuan,	particularly	that	related	to	the	dismissal	of	the	 National	 Assembly,	 and	 start	 of	 the	 failed	 Second	 Revolution	 by	 secessionist	 southern	provinces,	 temporarily	 distracted	 much	 of	 the	 bureaucratic	 efforts	 surrounding	 corporate	organisational	 issues	 of	 China	 Merchants,	 providing	 the	 company's	 management	 with	 a	temporary	reprieve.			In	1914,	in	an	effort	to	preserve	assets,	and	"avoid	unwarranted	expectations	by	outsiders,"	China	Merchants	Steamship	spun	off	its	real	estate	businesses	and	other	related	assets,	valued	at	over	five	million	taels,	into	a	separate	and	independent	company,	Jiyu	Property	Company	(D
	>4).	 Registered	 as	 an	 independent	 company,	 the	 new	 company	 issued	 separate	ownership	shares	(ZSJS	1988:	293-294).	By	then,	the	real	estate	assets	represented	the	most	profitable	parts	of	the	China	Merchants	Steamship	business.	The	move	represented	an	attempt	by	private	shareholders	 to	separate	some	of	 the	more	profitable	assets	 from	the	steamship	navigation	business,	as	it	had	often	faced	onerous	government	regulation	and	intervention.					10.2.3.		Nationalisation	of	China	Merchants	under	the	Guomindang		Western	 scholarship	 on	 the	 China	Merchants	 Steamship	 Company	 primarily	 focuses	 upon	application	of	the	government	supervision-merchant	management	system	(Feuerwerker	1958,	Haviland	 1962,	 Goodman	 1995,	 Halsey	 2014),	 with	 historiography	 related	 to	 the	 end	 of	private	 ownership	 of	 the	 company	 mostly	 neglected.	 Nonetheless,	 this	 period	 of	 the	company's	 corporate	 history	 is	 particularly	 instructive	 in	 highlighting	 the	 extreme	 actions	undertaken	 by	 state	 actors,	 represented	 by	 outright	 government	 expropriation	 of	 private	assets	without	just	restitution,	reflective	of	an	institutional	environment	that	in	many	respects	failed	to	provide	even	the	minimal	of	effective	protections	on	private	property	rights.		Shortly	 after	 the	 official	 founding	 of	 the	 Guomindang	 government	 in	 Nanjing	 in	 1927,	measures	 were	 undertaken	 by	 state	 authorities	 to	 take	 control	 of	 the	 China	 Merchants	company.	In	April	1927,	a	committee	was	appointed	by	the	Ministry	of	Finance	to	provide	an	audit	 and	 financial	 supervision	 of	 the	 company,	 with	 government-nominated	 personnel	 to	oversee	 a	 mandated	 company	 reform.	 Deeming	 this	 move	 to	 be	 a	 direct	 infringement	 of	private	 shareholders	 rights,	 the	 board	 of	 directors,	 led	 by	 its	 chairman	 Li	 Guojie	 (2),	refused	to	cooperate	with	the	Ministry's	mandated	reform.	Li	voiced	outspoken	dissatisfaction,	stating	at	the	time	that	"the	government's	interference	in	the	company's	business	rights	not	only	causes	great	panic	among	our	shareholders	and	employees,	but	also	causes	alarm	among	other	private	businesses	in	Shanghai."	Li’s	protest,	however,	produced	little	effect,	and	instead,	the	 Ministry	 increased	 pressure	 on	 the	 company	 leadership	 via	 intimidation	 tactics.	Government	actors	employed	the	strategy	referenced	in	Section	7.2.1.4	of	utilising	charges	of	traitorousness	 and	 sedition	 against	 private	 property	 owners	 to	 ensure	 compliance	 with	government	 takings	demands.	Accordingly,	 later	 the	 same	month,	 an	 arrest	warrant	 for	Fu	Zongyao	(!I),	the	company's	Managing	Director	and	Manager	of	Properties,	was	issued	on	charges	that	included	conspiracy	and	collusion	with	enemy	forces.	Facing	imprisonment,	Fu	resigned,	with	his	two	hundred	shares	confiscated	by	the	government	(ZSJS	1988:	377).			
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The	 battle	 over	 corporate	 control	 between	 the	 board	 and	 the	 government	 ended	 several	months	 later	 in	 January	 1928	 after	 the	 government	 supervisory	 office	 issued	 an	 order	 to	suspend	all	board	members,	and	place	them	under	investigation.	Subsequently,	new	rules	and	regulations	 promulgated	 on	 6	 March	 1928	 designating	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 General	Management	Office	(GF=K)	to	be	responsible	for	all	affairs	of	the	China	Merchants	Steamship	Navigation	 Company.	 Shortly	 thereafter,	 on	 18	 August	 1928,	 the	 Guomindang	 government	announced	 its	 plans	 "to	 nationalise	 China	 Merchants	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 principle,	 and	 in	 the	meantime	 to	 operate	 it	 as	 a	 joint	 government-private	 business	 enterprise	 as	 a	 matter	 of	transition"	(Bankers'	Weekly	1930,	14/10:	11-20).			Under	 the	 government's	 nationalisation	 plans,	 the	 assets	 of	 Jiyu,	 the	 real	 estate	 holding	company	spun	off	 in	1914,	were	to	be	included	in	the	government-mandated	expropriation.	Although	Li	Guojie	had	been	removed	as	the	general	manager	of	the	company,	he	continued	to	advocate	 for	 the	 interests	of	 Jiyu's	private	shareholders,	asserting	 that	 "Jiyu	was	a	property	company,	 licensed	and	registered	with	 the	Department	of	Trade	&	Commerce,	 independent	from	China	Merchants.	 Its	 assets	 are	 unrelated	 to	China	Merchants"	 (ZSJS	1988:	386).	The	advocacy	by	Li	and	other	private	shareholders	soon	ended,	however,	 once	 the	government	charged	Li	with	illegal	obstruction	of	public	service,	and	revoked	Jiyu’s	corporate	registration.		In	October	1928,	the	Guomindang	government	officially	completed	the	forced	nationalisation	of	the	two	companies,	paying	50	taels	per	set	of	shares,	with	each	set	consisting	of	two	China	Merchants	 Steamship	Navigation	 shares,	 and	 one	 Jiyu	 share.	 According	 to	 the	 government	notice,	 the	price	was	based	on	 the	average	market	price	over	 the	 last	 three	years,	with	 the	purchase	 constituting	 "a	 financial	 boon	 to	 the	 shareholders."	 The	 government	 paid	shareholders	a	little	over	two	million	(2,126,340)	taels	for	the	stock	purchase.	However,	the	paid-in	capital	of	China	Merchants	Steamship	alone	was	8.4	billion	taels.	Estimates	from	the	time	indicated	the	total	combined	assets	of	China	Merchants	Steamship	and	Jiyu	to	have	been	possibly	greater	than	fifty	billion	taels;	deducting	total	 liabilities	of	approximately	seventeen	billion,	net	assets	were	 therefore	 likely	over	 thirty-three	billion	 taels	 (ZSJS	1988:	405,	408).	Hence,	the	government's	restitution	of	just	over	two	million	taels	represented	just	0.006	per	cent	of	the	actual	value	of	the	company;	or,	in	practical	terms,	essentially	nothing.		The	 nationalisation	 of	 China	 Merchants	 Steamship	 represents	 one	 of	 the	 most	 blatant	examples	of	government	takings	of	private	business	property	without	restitution	as	one	might	identify	in	corporate	history.	The	interests	and	rights	of	the	private	owners	of	the	company	were	 marginalised,	 and	 their	 assets	 taken	 from	 them	 unwillingly,	 with	 essentially	 no	compensation	provided	 in	return.	The	 forced	nationalisation	of	 the	 company	represents	an	extreme	but	not	uncommon	example	of	 government	 expropriation	during	 the	Guomindang	period,	illustrating	a	state-commerce	relationship	defined	by	a	rather	complete	subjugation	of	private	capital	to	the	coercive	power	of	the	state.			
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Chapter	Eleven.	
Shanghai's	Early	National	and	Municipal	Bond	Markets		This	chapter	analyses	in	detail	the	issuance	histories,	market	prices,	and	trading	activity	of	the	 bonds	 of	 the	 three	 issuers	 under	 consideration:	 Chinese	 national	 governments,	Shanghai's	domestic	municipal	governments,	and	an	extraterritorial	municipal	government.	In	regard	to	the	latter,	we	focus	primarily	on	the	municipal	bond	issuances	of	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council,	 leaving	aside	for	the	most	part	the	more	limited	issuance	and	trading	history	of	French	Municipal	Council	bonds.	We	partake	in	this	strategy	for	several	reasons.	First,	we	wish	 to	avoid	duplication	and	replication	of	results	and	analysis,	as	 the	overall	averaged	price	series	of	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	and	French	Municipal	Council	bonds	performed	 remarkably	 similarly	 over	 the	 1870–1941	 time	 period,	 especially	 when	contrasted	with	that	of	the	bond	issuances	by	domestic	government	entities	we	consider.	Second,	 bond	 issuances	 by	 the	 French	 Municipal	 Council	 were	 considerably	 smaller	 in	number,	scale	and	variety	than	those	of	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council.	In	contrast	to	the	fifty-four	 issuances	 completed	by	 the	 Shanghai	Municipal	Council,	 the	French	Municipal	Council	issued	just	fifteen,	with	a	total	30	million	taels	face	value	amount	representing	only	twenty	per	cent	of	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council's	136	million	taels.	Finally,	the	financing	methodology	of	the	French	Municipal	Council	was	slightly	different,	owing	especially	to	a	considerably	different	governance	structure	as	referenced	earlier	in	Chapter	Nine.	Fiscal	budgeting	 decisions,	 including	 the	 raising	 of	 revenue,	 was	 the	 purview	 of	 French	government-appointed	officials,	 and	 funding	 for	 the	operation	of	 the	French	Concession	partly	came	from	the	French	government.	This	situation	differed	considerably	from	that	of	the	 International	 Settlement,	where	 locally-elected	officials	depended	exclusively	on	 the	ability	to	raise	funds	from	internal	revenue	sources.	To	maintain	the	focus	of	the	discussion	between	 the	 domestic	 and	 extraterritorial	 institutional	 setting	 as	 distinct	 and	 clean	 as	possible,	using	solely	an	analysis	of	International	Settlement	debenture	issuances	therefore	appears	justified.			11.1.		Central	Government	Internal	Domestic	Bonds			Historically	neither	the	Qing	nor	previous	Chinese	central	governments	borrowed	money	for	its	finances,	with	traditional	Confucian	aversion	of	debt	often	ascribed	for	the	lack	of	such	practise	(van	de	Ven	2014:	136).	However,	 for	 the	most	part,	 land	tax	receipts	had	historically	 proved	 sufficient	 for	 the	 relatively	 low	 levels	 of	 Ming	 and	 Qing	 central	government	spending,	as	much	of	the	expenditures	related	to	government	activities	were	both	undertaken	and	financed	at	the	local	levels	(Feuerwerker	1976:	90-92).	Expenditures,	including	 of	 extraordinary	 nature	 due	 to	 war	 or	 rebellion,	 were	 determined	 based	 on	available	tax	resources.	This	situation	changed	after	China	suffered	defeat	in	the	Opium	War,	incurring	significant	financial	burdens	due	to	indemnity	payments,	followed	immediately	by	 the	 mid-century	 outbreak	 of	 concurrent	 rebellions	 including	 the	 Taiping,	 Nian,	 Du	Wenxiu	 and	Miao.	 The	 government	 began	 to	 take	on	 ever-increasing	military	 expenses,	placing	a	sufficiently	heavy	strain	on	Qing	finances.			Given	the	difficulties	the	domestic	state	faced	in	raising	tax	revenues,	alternative	funding	sources	became	increasingly	important	to	the	state.	One	issue	affecting	the	fiscal	capacity	of	the	domestic	state	was	the	lack	of	developed	capital	markets	that	could	have	been	used	to	raise	funds.	As	a	result,	when	the	sudden	and	large	fiscal	needs	state	actors	perceived	as	required	in	light	of	the	multiple	internal	and	external	military	threats	of	the	mid-nineteenth	century	 could	 not	 be	 sufficiently	 met	 with	 an	 increasingly	 ineffective	 system	 of	 tax	extraction,	the	supposed	Confucian-based	"cultural	disinclination"	for	state	borrowing	was	conveniently	 put	 aside.	 As	 the	 indigenous	 banking	 system	 comprised	 of	 transmittance	banks	(piaohao),	qianzhao	and	pawnshops	that	lacked	sufficiently	large	amounts	of	capital	
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available	 for	 lending	 to	 the	 government,	 the	 government	 was	 forced	 to	 turn	 to	 debt	financing	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 its	 history.	At	 both	 the	national	and	provincial	 level,	Qing	officials	 first	 turned	 to	 overseas	 markets	 to	 raise	 capital,	 and	 began	 to	 issue	 an	 ever-increasing	amount	of	bonds	in	overseas	(especially	British)	financial	markets.	Referred	to	as	 external,	 or	 foreign-sourced,	 bonds,	 these	 issuances	 were	 typically	 well	 received	 by	foreign	investors	because	they	came	attached	with	quite	strong	collateral	guarantees,	such	as	(foreign-administered)	customs	revenues	or	salt	or	other	monopoly	tax	revenues.		Such	a	strategy,	however,	did	not	prove	to	be	a	panacea	for	the	state's	fiscal	pressures.	To	begin	with,	to	access	foreign	capital	markets,	foreign	bankers	demanded	stringent	collateral	agreements	 to	 bind	 state	 actors	 into	 honouring	 these	 loan	 commitments.	Most	 of	 these	included	not	only	the	pledge	of	specific	revenue-generating	sources,	such	as	the	Chinese	Maritime	 Customs	 receipts,	 or	 revenues	 from	 the	 salt	monopoly	 tax,	 but	 also	partial	 or	complete	foreign	control	over	the	administration	of	these	organisations	so	as	to	ensure	a	layer	of	control	over	the	distribution	of	funds	accrued	from	these	revenue	sources	whose	incentives	were	more	aligned	with	those	of	the	foreign	power	creditors	than	with	domestic	state	 actors.	 While	 such	 arrangements	 successfully	 created	 credible	 commitment	mechanisms	 that	 increased	 foreign	 investor	 confidence	 enough	 to	 lend	 to	 the	 Chinese	government	 at	 relatively	 attractive	 rates,	 it	 also	was	 accompanied	with	 the	 baggage	 of	imperialist	 overtones,	 given	 it	 involved	 significant	 foreign	 administrative	 control	 over	institutions	 such	 as	 the	 Chinese	 Maritime	 Customs	 Service	 or	 the	 Central	 Salt	Administration.		Conversely,	accessing	domestic	capital	sources	posed	its	own	challenges	given	the	lack	of	developed	internal	capital	markets.	The	lack	of	capital	markets	in	China	at	this	time	cannot	be	ascribed	to	a	lack	of	capital,	as	with	a	relatively	robust	economy	in	spite	of	the	bevy	of	problematic	 interventions	by	 the	state,	 the	merchant	and	 landed	classes	had	collectively	accumulated	great	wealth	(Ou	1947,	Ma	2008).	Instead,	the	issue	was	partly	institutional	in	nature.	Debt	formation	behaviour	requires	the	creation	of	trust	mechanisms,	for	nature	of	lending	involves	an	intrinsic	lack	of	simultaneous	exchange	between	lender	and	borrower.	Thus,	inducing	creditors	to	lend	requires	borrowers	to	create	a	perception	of	trust	that	they	will	fulfil	their	future	obligations.	As	previously	discussed,	the	authoritarian	structure	of	the	Qing	and	subsequent	domestic	Chinese	states	meant	many	typical	institutional	forms	that	could	 create	 credible	 commitment	 mechanisms	 were	 inherently	 missing.	 Unlike	 under	representative	state	structures,	the	authoritarian	rulers	of	China's	domestic	governments	could	not	easily	be	replaced	by	an	electorate	comprised	of	propertied	lenders	were	they	to	renege	on	their	promises	to	repay.	Similarly,	there	was	neither	the	existence	of	a	legislative	body	possessing	authority	over	spending	and	taxation,	nor	an	independent	judicial	system	to	 compel	 state	 actors	 to	 adhere	 to	 terms	 proscribed	 in	 financial	 contracts	 such	 as	government	bonds	representing	ex	ante	promises	to	repay.	As	such,	the	state	faced	inherent	difficulty	inducing	creditors	to	lend	money.	In	such	an	environment,	it	is	hardly	surprising	that	capital	markets	had	not	indigenously	developed.		The	Qing	government's	first	domestic	borrowing	from	civilians	took	place	in	1894	when	the	Court,	 upon	 recommendation	 from	 the	Ministry	 of	 Revenue,	 tried	 to	 raise	money	 from	wealthy	 merchants	 to	 fund	 the	 First	 Sino-Japanese	 War	 in	 a	 process	 known	 as	 "Xijie	
Shangkuan"	(-8).	The	loan	had	a	term	of	two	and	a	half	years	at	annual	interest	of	about	8.4	 per	 cent.	 To	 entice	 investors,	 the	 Court	 promised	 to	 award	 official	 titles	 to	 anyone	subscribing	 over	 10,000	 taels.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 debt	 issuance	 was	 met	 with	 lacklustre	interest,	with	total	amount	raised	about	11	million	taels,	and	the	government	eventually	ceased	the	effort	in	May	1895.	Given	the	fact	that	this	issuance	was	only	directed	at	a	limited	number	of	wealthy	merchants,	 it	 is	debatable	whether	 this	would	be	classified	as	a	 true	public	loan,	or	even	that	the	government	viewed	Xijie	Shangkuan	as	a	mandatory	sovereign	debt	obligation—officials	faced	pressure	not	only	to	subscribe	to	the	loan,	but	the	lauding	
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and	encouragement	of	loan	subscribers	who	declared	their	loan	subscription	to	be	treated	as	a	“tribute”	to	the	court	and	declined	to	claim	the	debt	certificates	suggested	the	donations	were	more	forced	than	voluntary	(Qian	1955:	5-6).			The	 first	 recognised	 internal	 debt	 issuance	more	 conceptually	 in	 line	with	 a	 true	 bond	obligation	was	the	1898	Zhaoxin	Shares	(4HB),	an	effort	to	raise	money	for	indemnity	payments	due	under	the	Treaty	of	Shimonoseki.	The	bond	was	issued	with	an	authorised	amount	of	100	million	taels	for	a	twenty	year	term	at	an	annual	interest	of	five	per	cent.	The	bond	was	guaranteed	by	land	tax	and	salt	monopoly	tax	receipts.	The	government	urged	generals,	court	and	local	officials	to	set	an	example	to	the	public	in	subscribing	to	the	loan;	however,	 less	 than	 twenty	 million	 taels	 was	 actually	 raised	 (Qian	 1955:	 6).	 Although	pledging	 and	 transfer	 of	 the	 loan	 instrument	 was	 allowed	 upon	 registration	 with	 the	relevant	bureau	under	the	Ministry	of	Revenue,	no	formalised	nor	market	trading	took	place	in	 this	 issuance.	 The	 poor	 finances	 of	 the	 Qing,	 under	 strain	 from	 multiple	 indemnity	payment	burdens,	soon	resulted	in	a	default	in	payment	of	this	bond	issuance	after	only	five	years	in	1903	(Jia	1930).		It	would	be	twelve	years	before	the	Qing	central	government	conducted	another	domestic	internal	 bond	 issuance.	 In	 1910	 the	 government	 authorised	 a	 thirty	 million	 tael	 bond	issuance	known	as	the	"Patriotism	Bond"	(.)	at	six	per	cent	annual	interest	of	a	tenor	of	nine	years.	However,	before	the	issuance	process	was	completed,	the	Qing	government	was	 overthrown;	 less	 than	 half	 the	 authorised	 amount	 (11.6	million)	 had	 been	 issued,	mostly	to	court	officials	and	royal	family	members,	with	only	a	minimal	amount—less	than	ten	per	cent—in	public	circulation.	Overall,	there	appears	to	be	no	evidence	in	the	historical	record	of	any	trading	activity	of	any	of	the	three	Qing-era	internal	government	bond-style	instruments.	As	such,	they	are	not	included	in	our	quantitative	price	analysis.		The	 provisional	 Republican	 authority	 in	 Nanjing	 began	 issuing	 debt	 in	 the	 immediate	aftermath	of	 the	1911	Revolution.	The	$100	million	1912	Military	Bond,	with	a	six	year	tenor	 at	 eight	 per	 cent	 interest,	 was	 guaranteed	 by	 treasury	 cash	 and	 grains	 receipts.	However,	many	of	 these	bonds	were	 expropriated	by	military	 generals	 in	Guomindang-controlled	regions	and	resold	at	discount,	or	used	as	payment	to	soldiers	for	army	salary.	Qian	(1955:	9)	notes	that	the	Nanjing	government	received	only	about	five	million	yuan	in	revenue	from	the	issue.			Once	the	Beiyang	government	under	Yuan	Shikai	gained	power,	it	negotiated	a	quid	pro	quo	agreement	 assuming	 all	 prior	 external	 debt	 obligations	 in	 return	 for	 the	 granting	 of	additional	funds	by	Western	lenders.	While	the	agreement	applied	to	China's	external	loans,	the	obligations	of	the	two	outstanding	internal	loans—the	Qing-era	Patriotism	Bond,	and	the	1912	Military	Bond—were	also	assumed	in	full	by	the	new	Beiyang	regime	(Straight	1913;	Qian	1955:	6,	366).		The	 Beiyang	 government	 faced	 increasing	 pressure	 by	 foreign	 lenders	 in	 regard	 to	additional	 foreign	 external	 bond	 issuances,	who	 suspected	much	of	 the	 lent	 funds	were	going	into	the	pockets	of	President	Yuan's	associates	and	local	military	leader	supporters	(Winston	1916:	775).	Furthermore,	the	government	was	running	out	of	income-generating	revenue	 streams	 that	 could	 be	 used	 as	 collateral	 pledges	 deemed	 acceptable	 to	 foreign	lenders.	As	such,	the	government	began	to	increasingly	turn	to	the	internal	domestic	market.	Public	debt	issuance	reached	a	new	phase	after	1914	when	a	formal	borrowing	institutional	framework	was	created	with	the	establishment	of	the	Bureau	of	Public	Debt	 	 (&).	Seemingly	better	controls	were	put	in	place	to	secure	repayment	of	the	debt;	for	instance,	repayment	funds	were	required	to	be	held	in	trust	with	designated	banks.	Domestic	internal	bonds'	perceived	security	level	increased,	and	the	bonds	were	often	purchased	and	held	by	domestic	banks	as	investment	(Qian	1955:	8-15).		
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	Given	the	lack	of	credible	commitment	mechanisms	deriving	from	its	authoritarian	form,	the	state	required	alternative	structures	to	induce	creditors	to	lend	it	capital.	To	access	the	foreign	capital	markets,	the	state	had	not	only	pledged	revenue	streams	to	service	the	debt,	but	had	also	acquiesced	to	outside	control	over	the	administration	of	these	revenue	streams.	The	Maritime	Customs	and	salt	gabelle	tax	receipts	represented	some	of	 the	 largest	and	most	 consistent	 of	 the	 central	 state's	 income	 streams,	 yet	 their	 initial	 use	 as	 pledged	collateral	 for	 foreign	 loans	 meant	 these	 tax	 revenue	 streams	 could	 only	 be	 assigned	subordinated	status	if	also	used	as	collateral	on	domestic	loans.			The	difficulties	 the	 central	 state	 faced	 in	 extracting	 general	 tax	 receipts	 further	 implied	difficulties	in	its	attempted	use	as	collateral	for	loans.	Potential	creditors	viewed	the	central	state's	 inability	 to	 effectively	 extract	 tax	 revenues	 as	 therefore	 indicative	 of	 lower	probability	 of	 ability	 to	 affect	 repayment.	Thus,	 domestic	 state	 actors	 found	 themselves	faced	with	another	structural	fiscal	trap,	as	the	state's	need	for	debt	financing	owed	in	large	part	 to	 its	 inability	 to	 effectively	 extract	 tax	 revenues,	 yet	 obtaining	 debt	 financing	 at	attractive	terms	required	creditors	to	anticipate	repayment,	dependant	on	the	state's	ability	to	secure	adequate	tax	revenues.		Nonetheless,	continually	high	expenditures	and	limited	tax	receipts	led	central	government	leadership	to	continually	look	to	finance	the	budget	via	domestic	and	foreign	borrowings.	The	ability	for	the	state	to	easily	access	credit	markets	was	constrained	by	a	combination	of	several	factors.	The	very	need	for	high	levels	of	bond	financing—a	poor	state	capacity	in	securing	consistent	tax	receipts—had	investors	reticent	to	lend	money	to	the	government	as	they	foresaw	problems	obtaining	tax	income	as	limiting	the	state's	ability	to	repay	its	debts.			Important	for	the	generation	of	investor	interest	in	a	domestic	internal	bond	issuance	was	the	inclusion	of	a	dedicated	funding	source	for	repayment.	Thus,	for	instance,	the	First-Year	Six	Per	Cent	Bond	 issued	 in	1913	was	 to	be	 funded	with	 residuals	 from	 the	 Stamp	Tax	receipts.	However,	although	most	of	the	bonds	issued	at	the	time	were	ostensibly	backed	by	a	collateral	device,	in	practise	these	collateral	mechanisms	proved	less	than	reliable,	given	that	as	residuals,	they	depended	on	the	existence	of	large	enough	surpluses	remaining	after	payments	were	made	on	previously-pledged	obligations.	 In	general,	most	of	 the	reliable	revenue	streams	had	already	been	pledged	as	primary	funding	sources	for	external	loan	issuances.	Internal	bond	issuances	were	in	this	sense	subordinated	debt,	given	that	their	funding	streams	were	prioritised	only	after	being	used	to	pay	off	external	debt	obligations.		Still,	 the	 attachment	 of	 specified	 funding	 sources	 was	 a	 welcomed	 feature,	 as	 was	 the	establishment	of	a	dedicated	government	agency,	the	Internal	Debts	Bureau,	in	charge	of	bond	issuances	(Wang	et	al.	2014:	30).	In	response	to	these	reforms,	a	market	for	domestic	internal	bonds	began	 to	develop,	and	what	had	been	quite	sporadic	 trading	 in	 the	early	period	turned	slightly	more	active.	Bonds	were	traded	amongst	investors	on	the	nascent	stock	trading	outlets	of	the	time.	As	such,	we	begin	to	find	information	on	market	prices	of	government	 bonds	 in	 the	 local	 financial	 press.	 From	 a	 review	 of	 the	 early	 records,	 the	earliest	period	for	which	we	find	consistent	data	on	bond	prices	was	1915.	This	coincided	with	 the	 start	 of	 Shunpao	 listing	 securities	 traded	 by	 the	 Shanghai	 Stock	 Business	Association,	established	in	1914.	Both	the	1912	Republic	of	China	Military	Bond,	and	the	Six	Per	Cent	Third-Year	Bond	originally	issued	in	1914	by	the	Beiyang	government	were	listed	in	Shunpao	during	this	time	frame,	along	with	prices	of	several	provincial-level	and	railroad	bonds.	The	combined	price	history	of	these	two	government	internal	bonds	over	the	course	of	1915	are	presented	in	Figures	11.1a	and	11.1b.			
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Figure	11.1a.		Traded	prices	of	1912	Military	Bond,	April	to	December	1915	(in	yuan)		
	Source:		Shunpao,	various	issues,	1915			Figure	11.1b.		Traded	prices	of	1914	Third	Year	Bond,	April	to	December	1915	(in	yuan)		
	Source:		Shunpao,	various	issues,	1915		 	
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From	the	Figures,	 it	 is	clear	that	both	bonds	traded	at	fairly	steep	discounts	to	their	face	values,	with	the	more	severe	of	the	two	being	the	1912	Military	Bond.	The	Military	Bond	also	 had	 a	 relatively	 sharp	 drop	 in	 its	 traded	 price	 late	 in	 August	 1915.	While	 neither	
Shunpao	or	 other	 contemporaneous	 reports	 provide	 any	 trading	 notes	 or	 news	articles	indicating	the	specific	reason	for	such	price	differential,	investors	might	have	perceived	the	risks	associated	with	 the	Military	Bond	 issuance	higher	 than	 the	Third-Year	Bond	given	their	 dedicated	 funding	 mechanisms.	 The	 Third-Year	 Bond	 funding	 was	 specified	 as	accruing	from	tax	revenue	on	the	Peking-Hankow	Railroad.	The	Military	Bond,	conversely,	had	no	specific	funding	sources,	only	the	general	revenues	of	the	central	government	(the	original	 granary	 taxes	 had	 been	 removed	when	 the	 Beiyang	 government	 subsumed	 the	obligation);	the	lack	of	a	dedicated	funding	stream	could	rationally	be	interpreted	as	more	unstable	and	susceptible	to	default	risk.	Such	potential	investor	reticence	appears	to	have	been	well	deserved,	for	while	the	Third-Year	Bond	was	repaid	on	time	in	1925,	the	Military	Bond—scheduled	to	have	been	fully	repaid	by	1918—went	through	consolidation	in	1921	and	was	only	fully	reimbursed	by	1925.		While	 the	 internal	 bond	market	 showed	signs	of	growth,	 the	Beiyang	government	 faced	continuing	rising	obligations	on	their	debt	obligations,	at	the	same	time	that	their	revenue	streams	 were	 continually	 shrinking.	 The	 collateral	 pledged	 to	 secure	 the	 issuance	 of	external	 government	 bonds	 had	 tied	 up	 customs	 and	 salt	 tax	 revenues.	 Meanwhile,	disintegration	of	central	government	control	over	an	increasing	number	of	provinces	and	regions	allowed	territories	controlled	by	military	warlords	to	keep	nearly	all	tax	revenues	collected	locally	that	could	have	gone	to	the	central	government.	Writing	at	the	time,	U.S.	diplomat	Paul	Reinsch	(1914:	893)	estimated	that	the	Beiyang	government	was	receiving	"no	 more	 than	 five	 percent	 of	 the	 tax	 revenue	 due	 from	 the	 provinces...	 [The	 central	government]	 was	 barely	 surviving	 from	 hand	 to	 mouth."	 Given	 its	 deteriorating	 fiscal	situation,	the	Beiyang	government	continued	to	turn	to	the	internal	bond	market	for	funding.			Various	measures	were	taken	early	on	to	increase	investor	appetite.	In	1915,	in	order	to	increase	investor	confidence,	officials	in	the	Finance	Ministry	turned	to	the	private	foreign	bank	the	Hongkong	and	Shanghai	Banking	Corporation	to	assist	the	domestic	banks	Bank	of	China	and	Bank	of	Communications	in	issuing	a	new	twenty-four	million	yuan	Fourth-Year	Bond,	at	six	per	cent	coupon.	As	described	by	Winston	(1916:	769),	officials	went	to	great	length	to	assure	investors	the	government	was	serious	about	honouring	its	repayment	commitments:	 "The	ministry	of	 finance	was	 to	 raise	 the	 full	 amount	of	 $1,440,000	 (one	year's	interest)	and	hand	it	to	the	Inspector	General	of	Customs	to	be	deposited	in	the	two	state	banks	as	a	guarantee	for	interest.	As	a	further	security	the	ministry	of	finance	was	to	transfer	every	month	to	the	Inspector	General	of	Customs	$120,000	which	the	Inspector	General	 would	 then	 deposit	 in	 those	 banks	 for	 payment	 of	 interest	 as	 it	 fell	 due.	 The	participation	 of	 the	 foreign	 bank	 and	 the	 foreign	 Inspector	 General	 and	 the	 elaborate	provision	 for	 interest	 payment	 showed	 a	 consciousness	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 Chinese	government	that	the	public	confidence	was	still	not	to	be	counted	on	with	entire	assurance."	As	further	inducement,	the	bond	was	offered	at	90	yuan,	at	ten	per	cent	discount.			These	 efforts	 proved	 successful,	 and	 the	 bond	was	 slightly	 oversubscribed	 at	 issuance.	Successful	 issuances	 such	 as	 the	Fourth-Year	Bond	were	 followed	by	 issuances	of	 ever-increasing	nominal	amounts.	In	1918,	the	government	brought	to	market	a	combined	one	billion	 yuan	 on	 its	 two	 Seventh	 Year	 Bond	 issuances,	 divided	 equally	 between	 separate	issuances	 of	 five-	 and	 twenty-year	 tenors.	 However,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 continuing	 financing	difficulties,	by	1920,	the	Beiyang	government	began	missing	many	of	the	payments	on	its	debt	obligations.	 In	September	of	1920,	an	attempt	was	made	to	reorganise	some	of	 the	outstanding	short-term	debt	that	had	 fallen	 into	arrears	by	 issuing	the	seven-year	 tenor	sixty	million	yuan	 Consolidation	of	Short-Term	Debt	Bond	at	 six	per	 cent.	Although	 this	bond	was	fully	subscribed,	financial	issues	continued	to	plague	the	government.		
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By	 the	 start	 of	 1921,	 an	 impending	 financial	 crisis	 loomed,	 with	 the	 Beiyang	 central	government	facing	default	on	nearly	all	its	loan	obligations,	both	external	and	internal.	In	turn,	Minister	of	Finance	Zhou	Ziqi	proposed	a	debt	restructuring	plan	to	President	Yuan,	one	that	avoided	a	complete	stoppage	of	payments	on	all	debts.	Instead,	Zhou's	plan	called	for	the	reduction	in	coupon	rates,	partial	reduction	of	outstanding	principal	to	be	repaid,	elongation	of	repayment	 tenor,	and	"temporary"	suspension	of	any	repayment	 for	some	bond	classes—in	all,	there	were	nine	strategies	based	on	different	bond	classifications	(Qian	1955:	 68-71).	 Yuan	 agreed,	 persuaded	 by	 Zhou's	 concern	 that	 a	 complete	 stop	 on	 all	principal	and	interest	payments	would	not	only	damage	the	government's	reputation	and	limit	future	borrowing	prospects,	but	given	that	so	many	banks	held	so	much	government	debt	on	their	balance	sheets,	a	complete	default	would	likely	cause	a	financial	crash	and	cripple	the	entire	banking	industry.			While	 a	 complete	default	was	 avoided,	 the	 situation	did	not	 substantially	 improve	 after	implementation	of	the	restructuring	plan.	The	government	subsequently	issued	a	series	of	consolidated	 bonds	meant	 to	 replace	 and	 reorganise	 non-performing	 internal	 note	 and	bond	debt.	Two	of	the	largest	of	these	included	the	fifty-five	million	yuan	Consolidated	First-Year	Bond	at	six	per	cent,	in	May	1921,	which	was	undertaken	to	replace	the	previous	First-Year	Bond;	and	in	January	1922	the	ninety-six	million	yuan	Consolidated	Short-term	Debt	Bond	at	eight	per	cent,	which	came	to	be	referred	to	as	the	"96	Consols".			In	 spite	 of	 the	 financial	 difficulties	 faced	 by	 the	 Beiyang	 government,	 the	 bond	market	continued	to	remain	active.	Indeed,	some	of	the	most	intense	activity	took	place	during	the	crisis,	as	banks	and	investors	looked	to	either	liquidate	positions	or	buy	at	steep	discounts,	hoping	the	repayment	situation	would	improve.	The	intensity	of	the	level	of	trading	helped	to	stimulate	the	country's	growing	domestic	financial	markets.	In	Shanghai	in	particular,	a	financial	boom	ensued,	with	many	new	exchanges	appearing	as	investors	poured	money	into	the	government	bond	market.			Investor	concerns	appear	to	have	been	well	warranted.	The	financial	crisis	that	culminated	in	the	Beiyang	government's	initial	and	then	additional	defaulting	on	debt	payments	led	to	a	general	financial	contagion	that	greatly	affected	Shanghai's	financial	industry.	Following	the	 failure	of	several	 finance	and	trust	companies,	 investors	began	to	exit	 the	market	en	
masse,	immediately	reversing	the	prior	year's	run-up	of	domestic	company	share	prices	and	government	bond	 issues.	Securities	exchanges	 in	Shanghai,	which	had	numbered	136	at	their	peak	in	mid-1921	(Bankers	Weekly	24	January	1922),	fell	to	only	two	by	the	end	of	1922	(Shunpao	3	March	1923).	Trading	activity	and	investor	interest	dried	up,	and	financial	journals	such	as	Bankers	Weekly	or	the	financial	section	of	Shunpao	had	no	domestic	bond	trade	activity	to	report	for	several	months.	While	eventually	domestic	government	bonds	began	to	trade	again,	it	appears	to	have	been	at	significantly	lower	volumes.	While	specific	volume	 traded	 data	 on	 domestic	 internal	 bonds	 were	 not	 to	 be	 reported	 again	 in	 the	financial	press	until	the	1930s,	the	decrease	in	the	number	of	exchanges	can	be	taken	as	indicative	of	the	fact	that	the	market	became	much	less	active	in	the	aftermath	of	the	bubble.		Even	several	years	after	the	crisis,	Beiyang	government	finances	were	in	little	better	shape.	Outstanding	 short-term	 debt	 issuances,	 such	 as	 Treasury	Notes,	were	 not	 being	paid.	A	review	of	China's	domestic	debt	outlook	as	described	in	the	1924	China	Year	Book	paints	a	bleak	picture	of	 the	repayment	situation.	For	 instance,	 in	 the	section	 listing	outstanding	Treasury	Notes	and	other	short-term	debt,	every	issuance	is	flagged	with	a	note	of	some	kind,	all	of	which	indicate	some	form	of	default	event	having	occurred.	Over	ten	pages	of	default	incidence	notes	on	the	outstanding	short	term	obligations	of	the	government	are	listed,	and	the	approximately	twenty-five	to	thirty	per	page	correspond	to	nearly	one	each	for	every	then-currently	outstanding	loan.	For	illustration,	we	present	the	first	five	notes	from	the	top	of	page	754:		
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(25)		The	repayment	was	due	in	June	1922,	no	payments	have	yet	been	made.	(26)		The	repayment	was	due	in	February	1921,	and	no	fund	could	be	found	to	meet	it.	(27)		The	repayment	was	originally	to	be	$100,000	in	December	1920,	and	$150,000	in						June	1921.	The	amount	paid	was	$130,000.	There	is	no	fund	to	pay	off	the	balance.	(28)		The	repayment	was	due	in	April	1921,	and	there	is	no	fund	to	meet	the	obligation.	(29)		The	repayment	was	due	in	May	1922	and	there	is	no	fund	available	for	it.			Given	that	these	default	incidence	notes	were	published	based	on	available	information	as	of	September	1924,	a	full	two	or	three	years	after	these	bonds	were	due	to	be	repaid	in	full,	the	Beiyang	government's	ability	and	 commitment	 to	 honour	 its	 loan	obligations	would	have	been	regarded	as	at	best	uncertain	over	this	period.		Considering	prior	and	continuing	repayment	performance	on	its	internal	debt,	besides	its	large	 consolidation	 bond	 issuances,	 it	 proved	 difficult	 for	 the	 government	 to	 continue	accessing	the	internal	debt	market.	To	induce	investor	participation,	the	government	was	forced	to	issue	debt	at	relatively	high	coupon	rates,	and	further	sell	the	bond	offerings	at	large	discount	rates.	The	eight	internal	domestic	bond	issuances	by	the	Beiyang	government	made	prior	to	1920	represented	a	total	face	value	of	three	hundred	thirty-three	million	yuan,	and	all	except	one	were	issued	at	a	coupon	of	six	per	cent.	After	the	financial	crisis	of	1921,	the	government	only	managed	to	bring	sixty-one	million	yuan	in	new	long-term	debt	to	the	market,	all	carrying	a	coupon	of	eight	per	cent.	To	place	short-term	issuances,	which	were	secured	with	lower-quality	subordinated	collateral,	the	government,	faced	an	inverted	yield	curve,	and	was	forced	to	issue	debt	at	interest	rates	as	high	as	twenty-four	per	cent	in	the	midst	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis.	 Even	 several	 years	 afterwards,	 the	 government's	 cost	 of	financing	with	short-term	notes	remained	high,	with	coupon	rates	around	eighteen	per	cent.			As	 the	 Beiyang	 state	 proved	 unable	 to	 limit	 local	 military	 warlords	 from	 capturing	 a	majority	 of	 the	 revenues	 intended	 for	 the	 central	 government,	 while	 simultaneously	incurring	 greater	 outlays	 to	 combat	 increasing	 Guomindang	 military	 offensives	 on	 the	faltering	 regime,	 by	 late	 1926,	 the	Ministry	 of	 Finance	 faced	 another	 financial	 crisis.	 In	response,	the	bond	markets	once	again	began	heavily	trading	off	government	internal	debt	issuances.	Trying	to	contain	the	crisis,	the	Shanghai	banking	industry,	as	primary	holders	of	government	debt,	persuaded	the	Chinese	Merchants	Stock	Exchange	to	suspend	trading	on	several	of	the	most	widely-held	bonds.	As	reported	on	page	381	of	the	18	December	1926	issue	of	the	Chinese	Economic	Bulletin,	trading	in	"96	Consols"	was	suspended	18	through	20	November	inclusive.	"The	suspension	was	agreed	upon	by	all	the	bankers	at	a	meeting	held	on	November	18	and	was	intended	(1)	to	keep	the	bonds	from	further	decline,	(2)	to	allow	sufficient	 time	to	collect	margins	due,	and	(3)	 to	prevent	 the	weak	 tendency	 from	spreading	to	other	government	bonds."	The	fall	by	nearly	a	quarter	in	value	of	the	bonds,	from	$62	to	$47,	was	cited	as	the	impetus	for	the	move.	This	move,	however,	did	not	prevent	continued	significant	downward	pressure	to	remain	on	this	bond,	and	trading	in	the	issue	was	suspended	indefinitely.			Ultimately,	we	find	investors	continually	hesitant	to	hold	the	majority	of	Beiyang	central	government	internal	debentures,	with	prices	reflecting	steep	discounts	from	par.	We	can	observe	 the	overall	 trend	 in	 investor	perceptions	on	 the	 government	 internal	 bonds	by	consideration	 of	 the	 price	 performance	 of	 several	 of	 the	 Beiyang	 debt	 issuances.	Many	bonds	 indicated	 a	 general	 downward	 trend	 in	 prices,	 as	 investors	 grew	 increasingly	concerned	about	the	sustainability	of	the	Beiyang	regime.			Figure	11.2	for	instance,	provides	an	extended	look	at	the	price	history	of	the	Third-Year	Bond,	explored	in	detail	for	1915	in	Figure	11.1b.	As	defections	by	military	warlords	and	financial	crises	mounted,	prices	fell	further	from	the	already	discounted	levels	observed	in	1915.	 Nonetheless,	 this	 bond	 was	 exceptional	 in	 that	 it	 experienced	 relatively	 few	repayment	disruptions,	and	was	successfully	repaid	in	1924	(Jia	1930).	Note	from	the	figure	that	as	 time	to	maturity	approached,	we	observe	 two	phenomena.	First,	prices	rose—as	
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previously	discussed,	as	the	maturity	date	approaches,	default	risk,	all	things	equal,	will	fall,	given	there	exists	less	time	for	default	events	to	occur.	Second,	trading	activity	lessened,	which	was	due	to	the	unique	nature	of	drawings	bonds;	the	closer	to	final	maturity	date,	the	fewer	bonds	remain	on	the	market.		Figure	11.2.		Bond	prices,	Third-Year	internal	government	bond,	1915–1924		
	Sources:		Shunpao,	various	issues,	1915-1920;		Bankers	Weekly,	various	issues,	1919-1924		Figure	11.3	presents	 the	 full	 price	 series	 for	 several	 other	bonds	 issued	by	 the	Beiyang	authorities.	These	price	series	highlight	several	aspects	of	investor	perception	in	regard	to	the	ability	or	will	on	the	part	of	the	government	to	honour	its	contract	commitments.	To	begin	with,	we	find	that	all	of	the	bonds	traded	at	discounts	to	their	face	value,	in	some	cases,	quite	steep	discounts	of	forty	to	even	sixty	per	cent.	Second,	we	observe	the	impact	of	time;	for	most	of	the	series	there	is	a	definite	upward	trend	as	the	repayment	date	approached;	as	 discussed	 above,	 the	 unique	 drawing	 feature	 contained	 in	 the	 bonds'	 repayment	structures	helped	to	draw	the	price	upwards	at	a	relatively	steep	slope.	That	investors	were	not	 confidant	 in	 the	 long-term	 commitment	 ability	 of	 the	 government	 is	 further	underscored	by	comparing	the	pricing	on	the	two	Seventh-Year	issuances,	with	the	twenty-year	bond	requiring	a	much	steeper	risk	premium	than	the	seven-year.	Note	 that	as	the	Seventh-Year	Bond	of	seven-year	tenor	bond	was	paid	off	early	in	a	consolidation	effort	in	late	1922	(Chia	1930),	it	shows	a	relatively	short	prices	series.		The	price	series	of	the	two	largest	consolidated	issuances,	the	55	million	yuan	Reorganised	First-Year	and	the	96	million	yuan	Consolidated	Short-term	Debt,	and	displayed	in	Figure	11.4	 stretch	 out	 considerably	 further,	 given	 their	 extended	 tenor	 structure.	 That	 said,	considerably	different	price	behaviour	 is	observed.	Both	reflect	recovery	after	 the	crisis,	and	 then	 a	 sharp	 fall	 with	 the	 overthrow	 of	 the	 Beiyang	 regime.	 However,	 while	 the	incoming	 Guomindang	 government	 continued	 repayment	 on	 the	 Reorganised	First	 year	Bond,	 the	 Consolidated	 Short-term	Debt	 Bond	 received	 less	 commitment	 from	 the	 new	regime	and	as	such	no	further	payments	were	made	up	through	1937,	reflected	in	the	bond	trading	at	more	than	ninety	per	cent	discount.	That	it	continued	to	trade	as	heavily	as	it	did	was	a	reflection	both	of	a	small	but	persistent	hope	that	interest	and	principal	repayments	would	be	restarted,	as	well	as	its	large	issue	amount	and	number	of	investors.		
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Figure	11.3.		Bond	prices,	selected	Beiyang	government	internal	issuances,	1918–1928		
		
		
		
	Source:	Bankers	Weekly,	various	issues,	1918-1928		
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Figure	11.4.		Bond	prices,	selected	Beiyang	government	internal	issuances,	1918–1937		
	
		Source:	Bankers	Weekly,	various	issues,	1918-1937		As	 the	 Beiyang	 government	 faced	 continuing	 deterioration	 of	 centralised	 power,	 the	competing	 Guomindang	 government	 in	 Guangdong	 issued	 a	 series	 of	 three	 domestic	internal	bonds	in	1926	in	an	effort	to	fund	the	Northern	Expedition.	Meanwhile,	in	1927,	the	Wuhan-based	branch	of	 the	Guomindang	government	conducted	 their	own	series	of	debt	 issuances.	Qian	(1955:	16-17),	using	archival	data	 from	each	of	 these	 two	separate	government	sources,	estimates	the	total	bond	amounts	issued	by	Wuhan	and	Guangdong	governments	to	be	not	insignificant,	approximating	42.5	million	yuan.		Once	the	Nanjing	branch	of	the	Guomindang	party	assumed	nominal	control	over	most	of	China	with	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	Northern	 Expedition	 in	1928,	 officials	within	 the	 new	government	were	faced	with	the	decision	whether	to	honour	the	outstanding	bonds	that	had	been	 issued	by	 the	Beiyang	government.	Backed	by	 collateral	 controlled	by	 foreign	administration,	 China's	 foreign	 bond	 issuances	 had	 fared	 better	 in	 terms	 of	 repayment	commitments;	 nonetheless,	 by	 the	 end	of	 the	Beiyang	period,	 a	 considerable	 amount	of	foreign	debt	obligations	were	in	arrears;	in	particular,	the	state	had	essentially	defaulted	on	all	borrowings	not	secured	by	the	foreign-administered	Salt	Gabelle	Tax	Administration	or	the	Chinese	Maritime	Service.	The	new	government	faced	considerable	pressure	to	continue	paying	on	the	external	bonds	issued	to	foreign	markets;	had	the	Guomindang	forsaken	such	debts,	it	would	have	been	difficult	to	gain	access	to	overseas	bond	markets	moving	forward.	Nonetheless,	 fiscal	 constraints	 meant	 repayment	 delays	 continued;	 by	 1931,	 total	
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outstanding	default	amounts	on	Beiyang-era	foreign-issued	bonds	totalled	240	million	yuan	(Maguire	1931:	70-71).	Given	 the	 lack	of	 foreign	external	pressure,	 internal	bonds	were	theoretically	more	open	to	consideration	of	repudiation,	but	in	the	end,	the	Guomindang	leadership	chose	to	honour	most	outstanding	Beiyang	internal	issuances.	Looking	to	bring	order	to	the	rather	uncoordinated	outstanding	internal	bond	issuances,	new	consolidated	bonds	were	issued	that	replaced	all	previous	internal	debt	issuances.		However,	 given	 that	 the	 Guomindang	 leadership	 proved	 unwilling	 to	 commit	 financial	resources	 to	 honouring	 such	 overseas-issued	 bonds	 secured	 by	 domestic	 general	 or	specified	 tax	 revenues—such	 as	 the	 Title-Deeds	 Tax,	 Alcohol	 Tax,	 or	 domestically-administered	 customs	 revenues—as	 opposed	 to	 foreign-administered	 revenue	 streams,	foreign	borrowers	were	reticent	 to	offer	new	financing	 to	 the	Guomindang	central	state	unless	secured	by	either	Salt	Gabelle	Tax	Administration	or	the	Chinese	Customs	Maritime	Service	revenues.	As	these	revenue	streams	had	already	been	designated	as	collateral	by	a	limited	number	of	bonds	the	Chinese	government	had	already	previously	issued	on	foreign	markets,	 additional	 funding	by	 foreign	 capital	markets	 for	 the	Guomindang	government	effectively	dried	up.	As	such,	the	central	government	was	forced	to	depend	heavily	upon	the	domestic	capital	markets	to	supply	additional	debt	financing.			From	1927	to	1931,	the	Guomindang	Government,	using	tax	receipts	as	guarantees,	issued	about	1.5	billion	yuan	of	public	debt,	with	interest	rates	varying	from	8	to	16	per	cent	per	annum.	The	debt	service	on	such	debt	levels	was	fairly	high—by	1931,	the	budget	required	to	 service	 the	public	debts	amounted	 to	approximately	300	million	yuan	annually.	Thus	from	early	on,	the	new	Guomindang	regime	leadership	was	faced	with	serious	budgetary	issues.	As	shown	in	Table	11.1,	the	government	ran	substantial	deficits	during	the	period.	In	the	last	column,	we	calculate	expenditures	as	a	per	cent	of	revenues;	on	average,	revenues	exceeded	 expenditures	 by	more	 than	 a	 quarter	 over	 the	 period,	 at	 126	 per	 cent.	With	continual	 increases	 in	 military	 outlays,	 the	 need	 for	 deficit	 financing	 via	 greater	 bond	issuance	remained	high	throughout	the	prewar	era.		Table	11.1.		Guomindang	Government	Expenditures	and	Revenues,	1928-1937	(yuan)	
	 Year	 Expenditures	 Revenues	 Deficit	 Per	cent	
1928-1929 433,000,000 334,000,000 (99,000,000) 130% 
1929-1930 585,000,000 483,000,000 (102,000,000) 121% 
1930-1931 774,000,000 587,000,000 (217,000,000) 132% 
1931-1932 749,000,000 619,000,000 (130,000,000) 121% 
1932-1933 705,000,000 614,000,000 (91,000,000) 115% 
1933-1934 853,000,000 706,000,000 (147,000,000) 121% 
1934-1935 976,000,000 780,000,000 (196,000,000) 125% 
1935-1936 1,077,000,000 808,000,000 (269,000,000) 133% 
1936-1937 1,180,000,000 889,000,000 (291,000,000) 133% 
 Sources:		Statistical	Abstract	(1935),	China	Quarterly	(1939)		Nonetheless,	as	the	turmoil	brought	about	by	the	fall	of	the	Beiyang	government	receded,	the	 domestic	 bond	 market	 began	 to	 recover,	 with	 the	 bond	 market	 during	 this	 period	relatively	active.	Yet	the	volatility	that	characterised	the	internal	bond	market	during	the	Beiyang	period	continued	for	much	of	the	Guomindang	era.	The	market	responded	sharply	to	the	1930	warlord	rebellion,	and	next	to	Japan's	annexation	of	Manchuria	the	following	year.	 The	 relatively	 poor	 perceived	 quality	 of	 the	 internal	national	 bond	 issuances	was	indicated	by	Secretary	Cai	of	 the	Shanghai	Department	of	Finance	 in	October	1932,	who	noted	that	in	the	preceding	year,	 internal	bonds	issued	by	the	government	could	only	be	placed	on	the	market	for	seventy	per	cent	face	value	(Shunpao	27	October	1932).		
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	A	cause	of	greater	turmoil	to	the	markets	was	the	Japanese	military	offensive	that	began	with	the	Shanghai	Incident	in	January	1932,	and	that	forced	the	domestic	government	bond	markets	 to	 close	 for	 three	months	 from	February	 through	April.	 Liquidity	dried	up	 and	prices	of	government	bonds	 fell	 sharply	(NCH,	Shunpao,	various	 issues,	March	and	April	1932).	 This	 event	 underscores	 the	 significant	 difference	 in	 the	 way	 in	 which	 markets	reacted	to	Chinese	national	government	internal	and	external	debt	issuances.			Internal	 bonds	were	primarily	 backed	 by	 general	 funding	 or	 junior	 collaterals;	 external	bonds,	 conversely,	 were	 primarily	 backed	 by	 senior	 claims	 to	 British-controlled	 and	collected	Maritimes	Customs	receipts	or	foreign-controlled	railway	fees.	Contemporaneous	reporting	of	the	impact	of	the	military	incursion	underscores	the	differential	perceptions	of	China's	external	and	internal	debt.	While	the	weekly	Share	Market	Report	in	the	15	March	1932	issue	of	the	North	China	Herald	noted	the	Chinese	Domestic	Bonds	Exchange	remained	closed,	 external	 Chinese	 foreign	 bonds	 continued	 to	 trade	 on	 the	 London	market,	 with	prices	 remaining	 firm.	 	Thus,	 even	 as	 the	market	 for	 internal	debt	 closed	down,	 foreign	investors	appeared	relatively	nonplussed	by	this	incidence	of	Japanese	military	assault,	and	did	not	appreciably	discount	China's	external	bonds	in	response.		The	Guomindang	government's	difficulty	to	turn	over	its	debt	and	place	new	bonds	led	to	an	impending	government	default.	In	response,	the	Ministry	of	Finance	announced	a	public	debt	restructuring.	In	February	1932,	with	the	exception	of	the	17-Year	Long-Term	National	Loan,	interest	rates	on	all	outstanding	public	loans	were	lowered	to	six	per	cent,	and	the	tenor	 of	 most	 outstanding	 loans	 were	 extended.	 Yu	 (1934)	 posits	 that	 since	 Finance	Ministry	officials	understood	the	importance	of	maintaining	access	to	credit	markets	given	the	government's	dependence	on	bond	financing,	this	created	sufficient	pressure	to	avoid	a	complete	default.	The	Ministry	worked	hard	to	present	the	restructuring	as	the	result	of	a	"voluntary"	 agreement	 with	 the	 Bondholders'	 Association	 (which	 mostly	 consisted	 of	Shanghai	banks),	to	forego	part	of	their	interest	in	light	of	the	"national	crisis"	(T).		
	As	Qian	(1955:	214)	reports,	the	Declaration	of	Domestic	Bondholders	(1B5%3$L)	reads:	"Although	the	provisions	of	public	debts	were	approved	by	Legislative	Yuan,	and	the	face	of	the	bonds	endorsed	by	the	Minister	of	Finance,	and	despite	the	fact	that	government	financial	difficulty	should	in	no	circumstance	be	used	as	a	reason	to	modify	the	terms	of	issued	debt,	the	current	national	crisis	has	caused	a	stagnation	in	business	and	a	sharp	drop	in	government	tax	revenue.	Even	if	the	government	were	to	wish	to	temporarily	honour	its	debt	 obligations,	 the	 reality	 may	 not	 allow	 it.	 Therefore,	 upon	 mutual	 consultation,	 a	restructuring	is	agreed"	(author's	translation).			The	 statement	 also	 requested	 the	 government	 to	 put	 in	 stricter	 controls	 on	 repayment	funds,	 and	 demanded	 greater	 fiscal	 transparency	 and	 better	 budget	 planning.	 Another	clause	 emphasised	 that	 in	 exchange	 for	 the	 "sacrifice"	 made	 by	 the	 bondholders,	 the	government	 should	 not	make	 any	 further	 changes	 to	 the	 terms	 of	 issued	 bonds,	 and	 to	abstain	from	attempting	to	place	more	government	debt	on	the	merchant	communities	to	support	 its	 civil	and	external	wars	 and	political	 expenditures.	Quan	 (1955:	215)	 further	cites	a	verbal	agreement	between	the	Bondholders'	Association	and	the	government	of	a	moratorium	on	public	debt	issuance	for	a	period	of	four	years.		Liu	 (2015)	 argues	 that	 such	 efforts	 by	 business	 groups	 to	 push	 back	 against	 acts	 of	government	expropriation	helped	pressure	officials	to	better	respect	the	property	rights	of	bondholders,	and	to	improve	management	of	the	funding	for	government	bonds.	While	Liu			
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is	 likely	correct	 that	 these	efforts	on	 the	part	of	 the	Bondholder's	Association	and	other	business	 groups	 such	 as	 the	 Shanghai	 Bankers	 Association	 might	 have	 influenced	government	decision	makers	to	limit	actions	such	as	employing	intimidation	tactics	to	place	bonds,	or	allowing	bond	payment	defaults,	private	economic	actors	at	this	moment	in	time	nonetheless	 found	 themselves	 in	 an	 increasingly	 weakened	 position	 in	 regard	 to	 the	coercive	power	of	the	Guomindang	state	apparatus.	For	instance,	the	1927	attempted	arrest	and	 imprisonment	 of	 the	 country's	 wealthiest	 businessman,	 Shanghai	 capitalist	 Rong	Zongjing—for	initially	refusing	to	purchase,	on	behalf	of	the	Chinese	Cotton	Mill	Owners,	the	 full	 amount	 of	 500,000	 yuan	 worth	 of	 government	 bonds	 General	 Jiang	 Jieshi	 had	"requested"	the	Association	purchase—served	as	a	clear	signal	to	the	business	community	that	state	authority	would	be	exercised	at	the	expense	of	private	interests	(Cochran	2000:	138-140).	Thus,	calls	on	the	government	to	"promise"	not	to	make	further	changes	to	bond	terms,	and	not	to	force	merchant	groups	to	buy	government	securities,	were	likely	to	have	been	perceived	as	ultimately	hollow.	As	the	statement	itself	noted,	the	issued	bonds	already	represented	 a	 promise	 by	 the	 government,	 one	 that	 was	 being	 broken;	 the	 value	 of	additional	 government	 promises	 was	 to	 be	 viewed	 with	 considerable	 scepticism	 by	investors.		Of	 further	 note	 is	 that	 the	 language	 of	 the	 Declaration	 by	 the	 Bondholders'	 Association	underscores	the	argument	advanced	in	previous	chapters	in	regard	to	the	ability	of	the	state	to	successfully	credibly	commit	to	provide	strong	private	property	rights	protections	when	the	state	is	facing	existential	threats.	Candidly	admitting	that	"Even	if	the	government	were	to	wish	to	temporarily	honour	its	debt	obligations,	the	reality	may	not	allow	it"	suggests	a	clear	recognition	that	forward-looking	investors	and	economic	agents	can	foresee	that	even	when	the	intentions	of	government	officials	to	honour	promises	to	protect	private	property	and	 contract	 rights	 are	 viewed	 as	 sincere,	 it	 remains	 understood	 that	 under	 distressed	circumstances	(such	as	when	the	state	faces	an	existential	threat),	the	state	will	 logically	undertake	necessary	actions	to	ensure	its	survival,	including	those	that	expropriate	private	property	in	express	violation	of	previous	commitments.	Hence,	as	emphasised	throughout	Part	II,	given	the	continual	series	of	existential	threats	experienced	by	successive	Chinese	national	 governments,	 it	 is	 unsurprising	were	 rational	 economic	 doubtful	 of	 the	 state's	attempts	to	credibly	commit	to	protect	private	property	and	contract	rights.		After	Shanghai's	domestic	bond	market	reopened	in	May	1932,	trading	in	domestic	national	internal	bonds	recommenced	at	relatively	robust	levels,	spurred	on	perhaps	by	the	fact	that	throughout	the	end	of	the	year,	the	Guomindang	government	kept	its	verbal	commitment	to	the	Bondholders'	Association	on	a	moratorium	of	new	debt	issuances.	By	the	middle	of	1933,	however,	public	debt	issuance	resumed.	From	1933	to	1935,	an	additional	578	million	
yuan	in	domestic	internal	bonds	were	issued.	Nonetheless,	the	markets	continued	to	absorb	the	debt	issuances,	and	responded	favourably	to	the	government's	currency	reform	enacted	in	1935.			Bond	prices	began	to	rise	and	trading	volumes	were	robust.	Even	at	the	time,	however,	there	was	 concern	 that	 rising	 prices	 were	 less	 to	 do	 about	 confidence	 in	 the	 ability	 of	 the	government	 to	meet	 its	debt	obligations,	and	more	about	a	 lack	of	viable	and	profitable	investment	 opportunities.	 As	 the	 industrial	 sector	 stagnated	 and	 economic	 growth	 in	interior	 China	 lagged,	 funds	 from	 the	 interior	 of	 the	 country	 also	 flowed	 into	 Shanghai	seeking	attractive	investment	opportunities.	Writing	at	the	time,	Yu	(1934:	80-82)	makes	note	of	a	substantial	rise	in	idle	capital,	with	the	amount	of	cash	held	in	Shanghai	banks	increasing	from	$312	million	to	$594	million	from	the	end	of	1931	to	1934.	By	1934,	daily	trading	volume	often	exceeded	thirty	million	yuan	on	active	days,	and	new	volume	records	were	continually	achieved.		
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Yet	 by	 1936,	 the	 bond	 repayment	 situation	 was	 once	 again	 in	 crisis.	 In	 response,	 the	Guomindang	government	instituted	another	debt	substitution	program.	As	Paauw	(1952:	6)	notes,	 "Intensive	 domestic	 borrowing	 during	 the	 Nanking	 period	 caused	 a	 complete	collapse	 of	 the	 domestic	 bond	 market	 in	 1932	 and	 again	 in	 1936.	 Service	 charges	 on	domestic	debt	had	become	so	costly	that	the	government	was	unable	to	cover	total	interest	and	amortization	payments...	At	the	times	of	both	crises	in	the	government	bond	market,	the	situation	was	"saved"	by	reorganization	of	the	government's	interest	and	amortization	charges.	These	reductions	in	the	cost	of	loan	service	amounted	to	partial	repudiations	of	the	government's	 financial	 obligations."	 Approximately	 1.4	 billion	 yuan	 of	 new	 bonds	were	issued	to	retire	old	bonds,	along	with	an	additional	622	million	yuan	of	new	public	debt.	This	massive	debt	reorganisation	resulted	in	the	consolidation	of	many	bonds	into	five	main	new	 issuances	 of	 consolidated	 bonds,	 named	 Twenty-Fifth	 Year	 Consolidation	 Bonds,	labelled	A		through	E		(	A through /).			Market	 price	 movements	 over	 this	 period	 reflects	 market	 perceptions	 regarding	 the	Guomindang	government's	commitment	mechanisms.	Paauw	(1952:	6)	notes	how	investor	perceptions	of	the	existential	threat	posed	by	the	Japanese	Imperial	Army	shaped	market	responses,	noting,	"The	Japanese	attack	on	Chapei...	undermined	confidence	in	the	financial	stability	of	the	government."	As	previously	observed	in	Figure	11.4,	bond	prices	fell	sharply	with	the	Japanese	military	incursion	into	Shanghai	at	the	start	of	1932.			The	 price	 histories	 of	 two	 of	 the	 bonds	 presented	 in	 Figure	 11.5,	 the	 Nineteenth	 Year	Reorganisation	 and	 Twentieth	 Year	 bonds,	 both	 of	which	 represented	 consolidations	 of	short-term	 outstanding	 bonds	 and	 notes,	 indicate	 the	 initial	 impact	 and	 recovery	 that	occurred	in	the	market	in	the	aftermath	of	the	1932	Japanese	military	actions.	After	the	fall	in	prices	in	early	1932,	there	was	slight	but	tepid	recovery,	with	neither	bond	priced	above	60	yuan,	except	very	briefly	on	the	Twentieth	Year.			Such	poor	price	performance	likely	occurred	due	to	the	fact	that	no	drawings	were	held	for	principal	payments	over	the	post-1932	period	(the	terms	of	the	original	bond	repayments	had	 been	 adjusted	 after	 the	 1932	 reorganisations	 of	 these	 two	 bonds,	 each	 of	 which	represented	previous	reorganisation	efforts),	and	only	semi-annual	coupon	payments	were	being	made,	with	those	occasionally	delayed.	Both	of	these	bonds	were	swapped	out	for	the	new	Twenty-Fifth	Year	Consolidation	Bond	C	 issuance	 in	1936.	As	observed,	 the	market	responded	rather	favourably	to	the	government's	comprehensive	1936	Consolidation	effort.	(Given	 prices	 of	 each	 of	 the	 Twenty-Fifth	 Year	 Consolidation	 Bonds	 	A	 through	 	 E	 	 all	followed	nearly	identical	price	trajectories,	only	C		is	displayed).		Interestingly,	this	positive	response	to	the	government's	bond	consolidation	efforts	came	at	a	time	of	increasing	budget	deficits,	as	previously	displayed	in	Table	11.1.	Apparently,	the	bond	market	had	gained	enough	confidence	in	the	restructuring	efforts	to	increase	demand	for	the	five	consolidated	issuances	to	nearly	ninety	per	cent	par,	before	dipping	right	prior	to	the	outbreak	of	the	Second	Sino-Japanese	War	in	August	1937.			That	 the	government	was	able	to	continue	 to	place	significant	bond	 issues	 in	 the	 face	of	rather	tumultuous	political	turmoil	in	general	might	be	viewed	as	instructive	that	the	public	had	some	faith	in	the	government's	ability	and	willingness	to	uphold	its	commitments.	Some	of	the	demand	for	these	instruments	could	be	seen	as	a	response	to	a	lack	of	other	viable	private	domestic	investments.	In	an	economic	environment	where	private	assets	could	be	expropriated	 by	 the	 government	 or	 destroyed	 due	 to	 military	 conflicts,	 diversifying	investments	 to	 include	 those	 of	 the	 government	 engaging	 in	much	 of	 the	 expropriation	might	well	have	been	viewed	as	a	prudent	investment	strategy.	The	steep	discounts	most	of	the	bonds	were	priced	at,	however,	display	the	limits	of	investor	faith.			 	
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Figure	11.5.		Prices	of	selected	Guomindang-era	bond	issuances,	1930	–	1937	
	Sources:		Bankers	Weekly,	various	issues,	1930-1937	
Figure 3.4 :  Prices of Selected Nationalist-Era Bond Issuances, 1930 – 1937
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A	history	of	prior	defaults,	 combined	with	 a	 lack	of	 efficiency	 in	 tax	 administration,	 led	investors	to	perceive	domestic	bonds	issuances	as	representing	high	repayment	risk.	Such	risks	were	repeatedly	realised	well	into	the	Guomindang	period,	as	orderly	repayment	of	domestic	 bonds	 continued	 to	 face	 issues,	 disrupting	 the	 bond	 markets.	 Further,	 the	continued	absence	of	credible	commitment	mechanisms	such	as	representative	governance	structures,	 or	 the	 foreign	 administration	of	much	 of	 the	 collateral	 on	 its	 domestic	 bond	offerings,	also	contributed	to	investor	perceptions	that	there	existed	few	devices	binding	state	 actors	 to	 honour	 the	 government	 debt	 obligations.	 As	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 Two,	unstable	political	environments	can	create	a	self-replicating	perception	trap	that	limits	the	state's	ability	to	credibly	commit	to	honour	previous	promises	to	repay.	The	presence	of	existential	 threats,	 whether	 from	 internal	 rival	 warlords	 or	 external	 armies,	 created	 a	perception	 amongst	 investors	 of	 low	 probability	 that	 state	 actors	 could	 honour	 prior	commitments	to	repay,	no	matter	how	costly	were	commitment	devices	devised;	as	such,	foreseeing	 this	 circumstance,	 state	 actors	 had	 little	 incentive	 to	 undertake	 attempts	 at	credible	commitment.		In	general,	the	combination	of	this	myriad	of	factors	had	two	main	impacts	on	the	nature	of	central	government	borrowing	from	internal	domestic	investors	and	the	workings	of	the	internal	bond	markets—a	high	cost	of	capital	on	government	borrowing,	and	a	perverse	incentive	 structure	 that	 contributed	 to	 state	 actors	 finding	 it	 to	 expedient	 engage	 in	borrowing	practises	that	continually	led	to	violations	of	investors'	private	property	rights.		
		
Domestic	Bond	Issuing—	High	Cost	of	Capital	The	 first	 main	 impact	 was	 that	 the	 government	 faced	 a	 high	 cost	 of	 capital.	 In	 those	instances	when	the	government	was	forced	to	turn	to	direct	loans	from	the	banking	sector	for	its	financing	needs,	Ting	(1935:	596)	finds	annual	effective	interest	rates	on	such	loans	averaged	 more	 than	 twenty-five	 per	 cent	 during	 the	 early	 Guomindang	 period,	 and	frequently	reached	as	high	as	forty	per	cent,	although	Jiang	(2011)	finds	rates	fell	closer	to	ten	per	cent	from	1934	to	the	outbreak	of	war	in	1937.	More	generally,	the	government	sought	 to	 finance	 its	 deficit	 through	 bond	 issuances,	 especially	 bonds	 designed	 for	 the	domestic	market.	However,	in	order	to	induce	investors	to	purchase	its	bond	offerings,	the	central	state	was	forced	to	issue	domestic	debentures	with	relatively	high	coupon	rates.	In	addition,	 effective	 interest	 rates	were	 even	 higher	 than	 nominal	 rates,	 given	 that	 those	bonds	the	government	could	place	were	mostly	done	at	steep	haircuts.	When	bonds	are	sold	to	an	investor	at	a	discount—that	is,	for	less	than	the	par	value	of	the	security—the	expected	yield	the	investor	receives	increases.	For	instance,	assuming	a	non-default	scenario,	a	one-year	note	priced	at	100	with	a	single	coupon	of	ten	per	cent	will	return	the	investor	110,	a	ten	per	cent	return;	if	the	investor	buys	the	same	note	at	a	discount	of	90,	at	maturity	she	will	still	receive	110,	and	hence	an	effective	return	of	twenty	per	cent.			As	Paauw	(1952:	6)	observes,	"In	the	periods	after	these	reorganizations	[of	1932	and	1936],	the	 government	 found	 great	 difficulty	 in	 disposing	 of	 its	 bonds.	 It	 typically	 resorted	 to	offering	its	bonds	to	banks	at	considerably	depreciated	prices.	This	policy	made	it	necessary	for	the	government	to	pay	charges	on	such	borrowing	at	the	face	value	of	the	bonds,	while	it	 received	 only	 a	 fraction	 of	 this	 value	 as	 proceeds."	 This	 necessitated	 practise	 of	discounting	 the	placement	price	of	 its	bonds	below	par	 therefore	contributed	 to	 further	increasing	the	realised	cost	of	capital	the	state	faced	when	undertaking	borrowing	in	the	domestic	 bond	 markets.	 The	 impact	 of	 such	 discounts	 was	 not	 immaterial.	 As	 Paauw	suggests,	the	discounts	could	be	considerable.	Remarks	made	in	October	1932	by	Shanghai	Finance	Secretary	Cai	 indicated	that	 internal	bonds	 issued	by	 the	central	government	 in	1931	could	only	be	placed	at	seventy	per	cent	their	face	value	(Shun	Pao	27	October	1932).				
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	Adapting	 data	 provided	 in	 Young	 (1971:	 433-435)	 allows	 us	 to	 calculate	 the	 scale	 of	discounts	 the	 government	 needed	 to	provide	 investors	 to	 induce	 voluntarily	purchases.	Young	 has	 data	 on	 annual	 income	 actually	 received	 by	 the	 government	 treasury	 from	borrowing	over	the	eight-year	period	1929	through	1936.	Combining	these	data	with	that	compiled	from	archival	fiscal	records	by	Qian	(1955)	and	Yang	(1985)	of	annual	amounts	of	bond	issuances,	we	can	compare	differentials	between	total	annual	amounts	of	issued	bonds	at	face	value,	with	total	annual	amounts	actually	received	from	borrowing.	While	data	from	Young	on	income	from	borrowing	includes	not	solely	that	of	domestic	bonds	but	also	bank	loans	and	overdrafts†,	these	additional	categories	comprised	relatively	small	amounts	of	 total	 borrowings;	 although	 as	 Paauw	 (1952:	 10)	 notes,	 direct	 bank	 financing	 rose	considerably	 after	 1932.	 This	 implies	 our	 calculations	 represent	 a	 lower	 bound	 on	 the	degree	of	discounts	at	which	the	central	government	offered	initial	placements	of	its	bonds.			Our	results	show	from	1929	through	1936,	total	income	received	by	the	central	government	from	 borrowing	was	 approximately	 1,137	million	 yuan,	 while	 the	 nominal	 value	 of	 the	domestic	bonds	issued	totalled	2,101	million	yuan.	Had	the	government	received	full	face	value	for	its	bond	issuances,	its	borrowing	income	would	have	been	at	least	2,101	million	(ignoring	 any	 additional	 amounts	 received	 from	 bank	 loans	 or	 overdrafts).	 The	 1,137	million	actually	received	represents	only	fifty-four	per	cent	of	issued	nominal	amounts.	On	average,	therefore,	the	total	difference	between	potential	and	received	income	on	national	domestic	bond	sales	was	in	the	range	of	964	million	yuan,	suggesting	that	in	order	for	the	government	 to	place	 its	 bonds	 it	was	 forced	 to	provide	 abnormally	 large	price	haircuts	averaging	forty-five	per	cent	of	face	values.	While	it	is	not	unusual	that	received	income	be	lower	than	the	issuance's	nominal	amount	due	to	fees	paid	to	underwriters	who	help	place	the	bond	offerings,	such	fees	rarely	exceed	ten	per	cent.	In	this	instance,	the	majority	of	the	observed	 differences	 between	 the	 total	 received	 and	 nominal	 values	 was	 due	 to	 price	discounts	provided	to	buyers	of	the	bonds	necessary	to	encourage	investor	interest	in	these	bond	offerings.	The	size	of	these	discounts	from	the	nominal	bond	values	is	all	the	more	striking	given	these	calculations	represent	the	lower	bound	of	discounts.		Evidence	later	provided	in	regard	to	the	prices	of	government	debt	as	sold	on	Shanghai's	secondary	 capital	 markets	 is	 indicative	 of	 the	 complex	 and	 nuanced	 relationship	 that	existed	 between	 the	 banking	 sector	 and	 the	 government,	 especially	 during	 the	 Nanjing	government	period.	We	find,	in	general,	that	secondary	market	prices	of	government	debt	frequently	were	in	the	60	to	80	yuan	range;	as	nearly	all	bonds	were	issued	at	par	value	one	hundred,	such	prices	indicate	about	a	ten	to	fifteen	per	cent	margin	between	prices	banks	paid	the	government	for	their	bonds	and	that	which	the	instruments	could	be	sold	on	the	market.	 Therefore,	while	 it	 is	 certainly	 true	 that	 the	 government	was	 forced	 to	 heavily	discount	 the	 offering	 prices	 of	 its	 bond	 offerings	 (or,	 alternatively,	 to	 have	 significantly	increased	bond	coupon	rates),	as	reflective	of	 the	high	repayment	risk	 investment	 in	 its	bonds	 brought,	 the	 initial	 offering	 prices	 it	 placed	 its	 bonds	 at	 with	 the	 banks	 were	significantly	lower	than	the	market	price	at	which	such	instruments	traded.	Thus,	as	early	evidence	 from	 Xu	 (1936)	 denotes,	 even	 with	 the	 high	 rates	 of	 default	 events	 that	characterised	internal	government	bond	issuances,	the	banking	sector	in	general	was	able	to	earn	enormous	profits	from	their	role	as	underwriters	of	domestic	government	bonds.		________________________________________________________________________________________________________		†	The	raw	data	supplied	by	Young	also	include	the	approximately	190	million	yuan	(50	million	U.S.	dollars)	China	received	by	way	of	the	1933	Cotton	and	Wheat	Loan	from	the	United	States,	but	we	subtract	this	amount	from	the	total	borrowing	amount	received.			
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Evidence	later	provided	in	regard	to	the	prices	of	government	debt	as	sold	on	Shanghai's	secondary	 capital	 markets	 is	 indicative	 of	 the	 complex	 and	 nuanced	 relationship	 that	existed	 between	 the	 banking	 sector	 and	 the	 government,	 especially	 during	 the	 Nanjing	government	period.	We	find,	in	general,	that	secondary	market	prices	of	government	debt	frequently	were	in	the	60	to	80	yuan	range;	as	nearly	all	bonds	were	issued	at	par	value	one	hundred,	such	prices	indicate	about	a	ten	to	fifteen	per	cent	margin	between	prices	banks	paid	the	government	for	their	bonds	and	that	which	the	instruments	could	be	sold	on	the	market.	 Therefore,	while	 it	 is	 certainly	 true	 that	 the	 government	was	 forced	 to	 heavily	discount	 the	 offering	 prices	 of	 its	 bond	 offerings	 (or,	 alternatively,	 to	 have	 significantly	increased	bond	coupon	rates),	as	reflective	of	 the	high	repayment	risk	 investment	 in	 its	bonds	 brought,	 the	 initial	 offering	 prices	 it	 placed	 its	 bonds	 at	 with	 the	 banks	 were	significantly	lower	than	the	market	price	at	which	such	instruments	traded.	Thus,	as	early	evidence	 from	 Xu	 (1936)	 denotes,	 even	 with	 the	 high	 rates	 of	 default	 events	 that	characterised	internal	government	bond	issuances,	the	banking	sector	in	general	was	able	to	earn	enormous	profits	from	their	role	as	underwriters	of	domestic	government	bonds.		Given	the	control	the	government	exerted	over	the	banking	system	by	way	of	regulatory	decrees	 and	 government	 officials	 within	 bank	 management,	 and	 given	 the	 systemic	expropriative	behaviour	observed	in	government	actions	throughout	many	other	avenues	of	 state-commerce	 relations,	 on	 the	 surface	 it	 appears	puzzling	why	 government	 actors	agreed	to	terms	so	favourable	to	the	banking	industry.	To	begin	with,	while	banks	could	earn	good	returns	on	the	bonds	they	sold,	banks	were	required	to	hold	large	quantities	of	government	bonds	as	reserves.	Thus,	when	such	bonds	fell	into	default,	banks	were	forced	to	 hold	 non-performing	 assets	 on	 their	 balance	 sheets,	 affecting	 their	 viability.	 Second,	while	 true	 that	 the	 state	had	access	 to	 regulatory,	 legal	and	even	police	power	over	 the	banking	industry,	particularly	during	the	Guomindang	period,	by	exercising	their	collective	power,	 the	banking	 industry	could	occasionally	successfully	bargain	with	state	actors	 to	attempt	to	prevent	the	implementation	of	onerous	violations	of	private	property	rights.	For	instance,	 in	1932	after	the	Ministry	of	Finance	initially	signalled	it	 intended	to	default	en	
masse	on	the	majority	of	central	government	internal	bonds,	intense	lobbying	on	the	part	of	the	Shanghai	Bankers	Association	brought	about	changes	in	final	policy	implementation;	instead,	interest	rates	on	all	outstanding	public	debt	were	lowered	to	six	per	cent,	while	bonds'	tenors	were	extended	Yu	(1934).	Yet	this	partial	repudiation,	while	still	negatively	affecting	 the	 banking	 industry,	 was	 a	 considerably	 more	 favourable	 outcome	 than	 had	would	have	been	the	proposed	complete	default	on	all	existing	internal	debt	obligations.			Third,	 a	 public	 choice	 viewpoint	 of	 the	 state-banking	 industry	 relationship	 highlights	attention	to	the	fact	that	state	actors	personally	benefitted	from	assisting	the	banking	sector.	The	high	levels	of	profitability	that	banks	enjoyed	from	the	issuance	of	government	debt	helped	keep	 the	banking	 industry	 invested	 in	 the	continuance	of	 the	system,	which	was	therefore	beneficial	to	government	actors	insofar	as	it	decreased	conflict	with	the	sector	while	 facilitating	 the	 continual	 flow	 of	 funds	 necessary	 to	 implement	 state-sponsored	military	 and	 development	 plans.	 Further,	 state	 actors	 also	 frequently	 also	 financially	benefitted	from	policies	favourable	to	bank	profitability,	given	the	web	of	direct	linkages	existing	between	bank	ownership	and	management	that	included	government	and	senior	Guomindang	Party	officials.	This	is	perhaps	most	strikingly	underscored	by	the	interests	Song	 Ziwen	 and	 Kong	 Xiangxi,	 both	 brothers-in-law	 of	 Jiang	 Jieshi,	 had	 in	 Shanghai's	banking	sector	at	various	times	throughout	the	1930s;	Song	and	his	brother,	for	instance,	were	both	appointed	directors	of	the	Bank	of	China	and	Bank	of	Communications	in	1935	(Peng	2007).	Paauw	(1952:	10)	provides	a	similar	critique	of	the	effect	that	ties	between	the	 state	 and	 the	 banks	 played	 on	 policy	 decisions	 by	 observing	 that	 "members	 of	 the	Ministry	of	Finance	who	held	large	banking	interests	were	willing	to	pay	high	interest	rates	[on	loans	to	finance	purchase	of	government	bonds]	for	their	private	profit."		
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Domestic	Bond	Issuing—	Degradation	of	Investor	Property	Rights	The	second	main	impact	is	that	these	factors	helped	induce	state	actors	to	further	degrade	respect	for	private	property	rights	in	order	to	raise	funds.	As	indicated	in	Figure	11.6a,	the	Beiyang	government	was	limited	in	the	quantity	of	bonds	the	market	accepted,	as	even	with	high	 interest	 rates	 and	price	discounts,	 the	 level	 of	 expected	 (and	 realised)	default	 risk	limited	the	attractiveness	of	such	bonds.	Adjusted	for	inflation,	Beiyang	government	annual	domestic	 issuances	 averaged	 61	 million	 yuan.	 With	 the	 assumption	 of	 power	 by	 the	Guomindang	military,	however,	state	actors	began	resorting	to	coercive	strategies	to	ensure	targeted	revenue	goals	were	met	by	way	of	 income	 from	sales	of	 internal	national	bond	issuances,	thereby	heavily	impacting	the	demand	for	domestic	internal	government	debt.		First,	the	ability	for	the	Guomindang	government	to	continue	to	place	its	bond	issuances	was	 a	 partly	 function	 of	 coercive	 regulations	 put	 in	 place	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Finance,	compelling	 banks'	 reserve	 requirement	 balances	 to	 be	 composed	 of	 primarily	 of	government	bonds.	In	1934,	the	Savings	Banking	Regulations	(	K:)	were	issued,	requiring	that	one	quarter	of	banks'	reserve	requirements	be	held	in	the	form	of	central	government	bonds;	other	regulations	required	that	additional	reserves	of	government	bond	holdings	were	necessary	 for	banks	 to	be	 authorised	 to	 issue	banknotes	 (Yu	1934:	82).	Thus,	 the	Ministry	implemented	regulations	creating	inherent	demand	for	its	own	bond	issuances.			Second,	to	help	enforce	the	implementation	of	such	regulations,	the	state	gained	authority	over	banking	and	other	major	industries	by	using	state	power	to	obtain	controlling	interest	in	 joint	 stock	 companies—effectively	 nationalising	 many	 of	 them	 via	 either	 outright	expropriation	 or	 by	 forcing	 firms	 to	 dilute	 existing	 share	 bases	 and	 issue	 shares	 to	 the	government—and	 by	 placing	 state	 officials	 in	 controlling	 positions	 within	 private	enterprises.	For	instance,	the	Ministry	of	Finance	issued	regulations	revising	the	charters	of	the	 Bank	 of	 China	 and	 the	 Bank	 of	 Communications	 to	 allow	 the	 state	 to	 increase	 its	ownership	 stakes—and	 hence	 control—of	 the	 two	 banks,	 which	 by	 1935	 reached	 a	controlling	fifty	and	sixty	per	cent,	respectively	(Yuan	2005:	124).	With	government	officials	effectively	dictating	bank	purchasing	policies,	it	is	not	surprising	that	banks	continued	to	serve	as	the	primary	customer	for	new	government	debt	issuances.		Another	more	direct	coercive	strategy	employed	by	the	state	to	increase	bond	sales	was	by	mandating	private	actors	such	as	leading	companies	and	business	associations	to	purchase	large	amounts	of	government	bonds.	For	instance,	as	reported	in	May	1927	in	the	North	
China	Herald,	government	officials	had	designated	mandatory	bond	purchases	totalling	five	million	yuan	to	be	divided	amongst	dozens	of	domestic	firms,	including	Nanyang	Tobacco,	Sincere	Company,	Commercial	Press,	the	Wing	On	and	Sun	Sun	department	stores,	as	well	as	 the	 Shanghai	 Bankers	 Association,	 which	 received	 the	 largest	 allocation	 of	 over	 one	million	and	a	half	yuan	(NCH	21	May	1927:	320).	Business	associations	were	often	used	to	ensure	compliance.	In	1927	a	government-appointed	committee	comprised	of	Guomindang	Party	members	 took	control	of	 the	Shanghai	Chinese	Chamber	of	Commerce	 in	order	 to	facilitate	their	commitment	to	these	policies	(Coble	1979:	9).		To	ensure	compliance	with	these	mandatory	bond	purchasing	requests,	state	police	power	was	 used	 to	 threaten	 private	 individuals	 with	 high	 personal	 costs	 for	 defiance.	 Those	business	 leaders	 who	 resisted	 demands	 to	 purchase	 specified	 large	 quantities	 of	government	bonds	were	ordered	arrested.	Fu	Zongyao	(#G),	 for	instance,	a	prominent	businessman	who	in	April	1927	was	serving	as	Chairman	of	the	Shanghai	Chinese	Chamber	of	Commerce	and	director	of	 the	Commercial	Bank	of	China,	was	ordered	arrested	after	resisting	a	command	to	buy	ten	million	yuan	worth	of	government	bonds	(Coble	1979:	8).	Song	Hanzhang	(">D),	manager	of	the	Bank	of	China	Shanghai	branch,	initially	resisted	the	Party's	request	of	one	million	yuan	in	bond	purchases;	in	response,	on	the	orders	of	Jiang	Jieshi,	Song	was	charged	with	"obstruction	of	revolution"	and	"helping	the	enemy	force,"	after	which	he	ultimately	complied	(Ji	2003:	175).	Other	similar	arrests	also	ended	with	the	
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release	 of	 the	 arrested	 individuals	 after	 sizeable	 donations	 were	made	 to	 "support	 the	Nationalist	cause",	such	as	when	the	son	of	wealthy	businessman	Si	Baoshen	was	freed	once	a	donation	of	200,000	yuan	had	been	offered	(NCDN	28	May	1927).	Even	Rong	Zongjing,	the	cotton	tycoon	recognised	as	perhaps	China's	wealthiest	businessman,	was	ordered	arrested	after	he	initially	rejected	the	state's	request	for	his	companies	to	purchase	half	a	million	worth	of	government	bonds,	to	which	he	eventually	acquiesced	(Cochran	2000:138-140).	The	authoritarian	Guomindang	military	regime's	targeting	of	some	of	Shanghai's	most	well-known	capitalists	served	two	purposes.	Not	only	did	the	strategy	effectively	extort	those	with	the	largest	stores	of	capital	so	as	to	funnel	it	into	state	coffers,	but	secondly	it	was	clear	government	 leadership	 sought	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 power	 of	 the	 state	 over	 private	interests	was	absolute.	Economic	actors	and	investors	acted	accordingly—when	given	the	option	to	conduct	business	or	hold	contracts,	 including	financial	contracts,	 in	a	domestic	institutional	 environment	 that	 so	 little	 regarded	 private	 property	 rights	 and	 contracts,	versus	 doing	 the	 same	 in	 a	 stronger	 property	 and	 contract	 rights	 environment,	 they	consistently	chose	the	latter	over	the	former.		As	 negative	 as	 such	 policies	 were	 in	 terms	 of	 violating	 private	 property	 rights,	 these	coercive	 strategies	 proved	 effective,	 at	 least	 so	 far	 as	 to	 increasing	 central	 government	domestic	 bond	placements.	As	 indicated	 in	Figure	11.6a,	 average	bond	 issuances	by	 the	Guomindang	Nanjing	government	during	the	pre-war	period	averaged	an	inflation-adjusted	231	million	yuan,	nearly	four	times	as	large	as	under	the	Beiyang	era.		Technically,	comparing	the	61	million	in	domestic	national	bonds	issued	during	the	Beiyang	period	with	the	231	million	issued	during	the	pre-war	Guomindang	could	be	considered	misleading,	given	that	the	size	of	annual	average	deficits	also	rose.	To	attempt	to	account	for	this,	using	the	same	data	sources	used	to	calculate	Figure	11.6a,	we	calculate	the	average	budget	deficit	in	the	Beiyang	years	to	have	been	139	million	yuan,	while	inflation-adjusted	deficits	during	the	pre-war	Guomindang	years	averaged	282	million,	or	about	1.8	times	as	large.	 Under	 an	 overly-simplistic	 counter-factual	 that	 assumes	 deficits	 equally	 as	 large	under	the	Beiyang	as	under	the	Guomindang	pre-war	era,	we	might	hypothesise	that	bond	issuances	would	have	averaged	113	million	yuan,	or	1.8	times	61	million.	Even	under	such	assumptions,	this	hypothesised	113	million	yuan	in	annual	bond	issuances	still	would	have	been	 less	 than	 half	 the	 actual	 annual	 average	 of	 257	 million	 issued	 by	 the	 pre-war	Guomindang	through	1937.		More	fundamentally,	this	hypothetical	113	million	incorrectly	presupposes	the	size	of	the	deficits	run	by	the	Beiyang	governments	to	have	been	independent	of	the	amount	of	debt	financing	the	government	was	able	to	obtain;	instead,	it	 is	more	accurate	to	assume	that	part	of	the	reason	the	Beiyang	governments	ran	lower	budget	deficits	is	because	they	were	limited	by	the	amount	of	debt	financing	they	could	obtain.	By	employing	coercive	tactics,	the	 Guomindang	 regime	 endogenously	 increased	 the	 amount	 of	 its	 bond	 issuances,	 and	therefore	its	ability	to	run	larger	budget	deficits.		Coercive	Guomindang	policies	designed	to	increase	bond	issuances	led	to	a	complex	set	of	interacting	impacts	on	the	bond	markets	and	investor	responses,	in	particular	regulations	requiring	banks	to	hold	government	bonds.	To	begin	with,	as	shown	in	Figure	11.6b,	the	government	was	able	to	increase	the	size	of	bond	issuances	as	measured	as	a	percentage	of	overall	incoming	revenues.	As	indicated,	the	value	of	bond	issuances	averaged	about	twelve	per	cent	of	government	revenues	during	the	Beiyang	period,	but	increased	substantially	to	average	 over	 fifty	 percent	 during	 the	 pre-war	 Guomindang	 period.	 While	 this	 likely	indicated	 a	 slight	 improvement	 in	 perceptions	 on	 the	 part	 of	 investors	 of	 the	 state's	likelihood	to	repay,	the	reduction	in	the	degree	of	civil	strife	experienced	under	parts	of	the	Guomindang	period	itself	was	slight.	As	such,	we	argue	the	difference	in	the	ability	of	the	two	 governments	 in	 placing	 their	 bonds	 is	 more	 directly	 related	 to	 each	 government's	respective	ability	to	coerce	private	actors	into	holding	such	bonds.	
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Figure	11.6a.		Value	of	Issued	Domestic	National	Bonds,	millions	of	yuan,	1913–1937		
	Sources:	Bond	values	calculated	from	Qian	(1955)	and	Yang	(1985);	inflation	adjustments	based	 on	 price	 index	 constructed	 from	 He	 (1927)	 and	 Shanghai	 Economic	 Research	Institute	(1958).			Figure	11.6b.		Issued	Domestic	National	Bonds	as	Per	Cent	of	Total	Revenue,	1913–1937		
	Sources:	Bond	values	calculated	from	Qian	(1955)	and	Yang	(1985)		Second,	 whether	 organically	 derived	 or	 forced,	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 Guomindang	 policies	increased	the	demand	for	their	bonds.	As	the	demand	for	bonds	rose,	so	too	did	pressure	on	 bond	 prices	 to	 rise,	 and	 hence	 yields	 to	 fall.	 Theoretically,	 this	works	 to	 reduce	 the	government's	cost	of	capital.	At	the	same	time,	however,	the	lower	yields	result	in	investors	receiving	lower	returns	on	the	purchase	of	such	bonds.	Given	perceived	default	risks,	lower	yields	could	trigger	a	reduction	in	the	natural	level	of	bonds	demanded,	putting	downward	pressure	on	prices.	Depending	on	the	size	of	the	willing	investor	class	vis-a-vis	the	coerced	holders	 of	 domestic	 bonds,	 the	 effects	 on	 prices,	 and	 hence	 yields,	 a	 priori	 can	 be	indeterminate.	 The	 observed	 fall	 in	 yields,	 and	 increase	 in	 the	 amount	 of	 bonds	 issued,	suggests	the	impact	of	the	government's	coercive	placement	policies	that	drove	much	of	the	increase	in	demand	phenomenon.		
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Data	from	Qian	(1955:	24)	indicates	support	for	our	contention	that	the	observed	increase	national	domestic	government	bond	issuances	was	significantly	driven	not	by	market	forces,	but	rather	by	coercive	government	mandates	and	policies.	Qian	finds	approximately	half	of	all	outstanding	public	debt	was	held	by	just	twenty-seven	domestic	banks	in	Shanghai.	Since	such	 bonds	 were	 held	 as	 reserves	 for	 regulatory	 purposes,	 a	 substantial	 supply	 of	outstanding	government	bonds	did	not	trade	on	the	open	market.	Thus,	while	individual	investor	 behaviour	 continued	 to	 shape	 the	 movement	 of	 market	 prices,	 much	 of	 the	absolute	 price	 levels	 were	 impacted	 by	 regulatory	 changes	 enforced	 by	 Guomindang	monetary	authorities.	Our	subsequent	analysis	focuses	on	these	market	prices	as	the	more	salient	of	factors	in	terms	of	evaluating	public	perceptions	of	the	default	risk	and	the	level	of	contract	rights	protections	afforded	under	the	Guomindang	government.		The	impact	regulatory	changes	had	on	the	demand	and	resulting	prices	of	domestic	national	bonds	is	not	atypical;	Cutsinger	&	Ingber	(2018),	for	instance,	report	similar	effects	on	the	demand	and	prices	of	bonds	issued	by	the	North	government	during	the	United	States'	Civil	War.	In	1863,	the	government	instituted	sweeping	regulatory	changes	under	the	National	Banking	Act	that	required	banks	wishing	to	issue	currency	to	back	such	notes	with	upwards	of	 eighty	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 North's	 government	 treasury	 bonds.	 Hence,	 not	 unlike	 the	Guomindang	government,	when	faced	with	an	extraordinary	existential	military	threat	that	was	likely	to	depress	the	natural	market	demand	for	its	bonds,	and	thereby	increase	its	cost	of	capital	and	limit	its	ability	to	borrow,	the	North	government	turned	to	coercive	tactics	to	induce	greater	levels	of	holding	of	its	debt	obligations.		Further	 indirect	 support	 for	 our	 contention	 comes	 from	 the	 fact	 that	budgetary	outlays	represented	 relatively	 low	 levels	 of	 national	 income.	Based	on	 estimates	derived	by	Liu	(1946),	 total	 central	 government	 expenditures	 as	a	percentage	of	 national	 income	 from	1931	through	1936	averaged	just	three	and	one-half	per	cent.	Given	the	apparent	desire	by	government	actors	to	increase	expenditures,	difficulties	in	placing	debt	implies,	had	there	existed	sufficient	market	demand	for	additional	government	debt	issuances,	it	is	likely	the	government	would	have	issued	more	so	as	to	finance	desired	increased	spending.		In	summary,	we	can	identify	two	main	features	that	consistently	defined	the	public	investor	response	to	domestic	central	government	internal	debt	offerings	over	the	span	of	the	late	nineteenth	through	the	early	twentieth	centuries.	First,	there	was	uneven	interest	by	the	public	for	holding	such	debt	issuances.	Investor	interest	in	regard	to	early	Qing	government	issuances	was	largely	absent.	While	both	the	Beiyang	and	Guomindang	governments	were	able	 to	 institute	 some	 reforms	 in	 the	 bond	 issuance	 process	 that	 increased	 investor	confidence	and	participation	enough	so	as	to	create	a	market	for	government	bonds,	the	liquidity	of	that	market	was	relatively	volatile,	increasing	at	certain	times	but	falling	sharply	during	other	periods.	As	noted,	much	of	the	increased	demand	observed	in	the	later	period	came	from	the	banking	sector	owing	to	regulatory	mandates	and	government-appointed	bank	officials.	Second,	various	inducements	were	necessitated	to	increase	investor	interest.	Bonds	were	frequently	floated	at	steep	discounts	in	order	to	induce	investor	interest.	Issued	as	drawings	bonds,	their	effective	maturity	dates	implied	investors	faced	lower	repayment	risk	 than	had	they	been	 issued	as	bullet	or	standard	amortised	bonds.	Third,	analysis	of	market	 pricing	 behaviour	 indicates	 that	 investors	 accepted	 these	 central	 government	debentures	 with	 a	 sizable	 degree	 of	 scepticism,	 albeit	 one	 that	 varied	 over	 time.	 As	evidenced	by	 the	price	 series	displayed	 in	Figures	11.2	 through	11.5,	 all	 of	 the	 internal	bonds	issued	by	China's	central	governments	that	traded	on	the	open	markets	did	so	below	their	 par	 values,	 in	 some	 periods	 at	 significant	 discounts.	 Overall,	 given	 a	 climate	 of	heightened	civil	and	social	strife,	and	combined	with	numerous	examples	of	government	expropriation	of	investor	monies	by	way	of	numerous	default	events,	it	appears	investors	viewed	 the	 level	 of	 investor	 and	 contract	 rights	 protection	 provided	 by	 the	 central	government	institutional	environment	to	be	considerably	tenuous.	
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11.2.		Shanghai's	Domestic	Municipal	Bonds		Utilising	archival	and	original	information	obtained	from	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Archive's	"Shanghai	Archives	 Information	Network"	 (;76-F),	 and	publications	 including	 the	
Shunpao	 newspaper,	 and	 the	 Bankers'	 Weekly	 and	 Native	 Bankers'	 Monthly	 financial	journals,	 we	 describe	 the	 local	 bond	 issuances	 undertaken	 by	 Shanghai's	 municipal	authorities	under	Qing,	Beiyang	and	Guomindang	governments.	While	we	supplement	this	history	with	pricing	and	volume	traded	data	from	our	dataset,	much	of	our	analysis	centres	on	the	issuance	process	itself,	and	the	degree	of	acceptance	by	the	market	of	these	domestic-authority	municipal	bonds.	This	strategy	is	necessitated	in	part	because,	except	for	the	later	Guomindang	 period,	 there	 is	 a	 dearth	 of	 market	 price	 data	 available	 on	 these	 bonds.	However,	this	lack	of	trading	information	owes	not	to	missing	historical	financial	records	but	rather	is	indicative	of	a	relative	disinterest	by	investors	to	hold	these	debt	issuances,	leading	to	difficulty	by	domestic	municipal	authorities	to	place	their	debt	issuances.		By	the	time	the	first	bond	issuance	by	a	Shanghai	domestic	municipal	entity	took	place	in	the	late	Qing,	representing	the	first	such	to	take	place	in	China,	the	city's	extraterritorial	municipal	entities	had	already	been	issuing	public	debt	for	over	four	decades.	This	lack	of	utilisation	of	bond	financing	by	domestic	Chinese	municipalities	owed	partly	to	a	lack	of	fiscal	need	on	 the	 local	 level.	The	role	of	a	municipal	governance	organisation	structure	requiring	revenue	and	spending	functions	necessitating	the	raising	of	funds	via	municipal	bond	 issuance	was	 a	 relatively	 recent	phenomenon	 in	 the	Chinese	 context.	 For	 the	 vast	majority	of	dynastic	China,	government	authority	was	highly	centralised—while	localities	were	administered	locally	by	local	officials,	such	officials	were	appointed	by,	and	received	their	authority	from,	the	central	government.	Indeed,	even	the	concept	of	a	"national"	or	"central"	government	was	somewhat	redundant,	in	that	all	governmental	structures	were	centrally	controlled.	All	fiscal	matters	were	centrally-controlled.	Taxes	collected	at	the	local	level	were	transferred	to	the	national	government.	Local	spending	directives	and	resources	were	provided	to	localities	by	the	central	government.		Further,	government	structures	at	the	local	levels	provided	relatively	little	in	terms	of	civic	services.	Beyond	tasks	such	as	the	collection	of	taxes	and	the	administration	of	justice	by	local	 magistrates,	 few	 social	 services	 were	 undertaken	 by	 local	 government	 structures.	Prior	to	the	Republican	era,	only	court-appointed	magistrates	and	his	staff	of	government	officials	comprised	city	leadership.	A	limited	municipal	government	role	persisted	through	the	end	of	the	early	modern	period,	and	even	until	near	the	end	of	the	Qing	rule.	Thus,	in	essence,	prior	to	the	start	of	the	twentieth	century,	in	domestically-controlled	Shanghai	as	in	other	Chinese	cities,	the	relative	lack	of	municipal	service	provision	necessitated	little	in	the	way	of	significant	local	government	outlays.	As	such,	formal	functions	such	as	planning	or	budgeting	associated	with	municipal	administration	were	absent	(Elvin	1969),	as	was	therefore	the	need	for	local	revenue	raising	such	as	bond	issuance.			Two	factors	helped	drive	an	expanded	conception	of	municipal	government	responsibilities,	and	therefore	associated	fiscal	requirements,	in	the	Shanghai	context.	One	important	factor	originated	from	the	centre.	As	reformers	both	inside	and	outside	the	government	increased	their	calls	for	a	more	representative	government	structure,	with	some	calling	for	an	end	to	imperial	rule,	the	Qing	court	sought	to	mollify	these	efforts	by	advocating	more	responsive	government	 structures.	 Some	 of	 the	 constitutional	 reforms	 undertaken	by	Qing	officials	included	a	strategy	to	create	greater	autonomy	in	local	governance	structures.	Specifically,	the 2I9N	(local	self-governance)	movement,	developing	around	the	turn	of	the	century,	culminated	in	1909	with	a	formal	edict	designed	as	part	of	an	overall	seven-year	national	plan	to	bring	about	the	conditions	appropriate	for	a	transition	to	constitutional	rule.	The	
RP2I9DC	(Regulations	for	Local	Self-Government	in	Cities,	Towns	and	Villages)	decreed	that	 greater	 authority	would	 be	 given	 to	 the	 organs	 of	 local	 government,	 including	 the	responsibility	for	planning,	collecting	and	spending	local	municipal	finances.	
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A	second	factor	motivating	the	creation	of	more	formal	municipal	governance	structures	in	domestic	Shanghai	predated	this	larger	national	movement.	Even	prior	to	the	turn	of	the	century,	a	bottom-up	process	starting	pushing	the	older	domestic	governance	structure	to	better	respond	to	domestic	residents'	needs.	The	proximity	of	the	extraterritorial	settlements	played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 this	 process.	 Residents	 living	 and	 conducting	 business	 in	domestically-controlled	 Shanghai	 observed	 the	 benefits	 received	 from	 the	 provision	 of	municipal	projects	and	services	by	 the	 formal	municipal	structures	operating	within	the	extraterritorial	 settlements,	 and	over	 time	began	demanding	 similar	 services	 from	 local	domestic	civic	authorities.	They	too	wished	for	the	building	of	more	and	better-paved	roads,	sewage	systems,	garbage	collection,	and	education	services	for	their	children.	Thus,	much	of	the	origins	for	the	foundations	of	formal	municipal	governance	developed	organically.		It	is	important	to	avoid,	however,	ascribing	all	of	the	changes	that	occurred	in	the	nature	of	the	administration	of	municipal	governance	as	indicative	of	direct	imitation	from	that	which	had	developed	 in	 the	 extraterritoriality-administered	 settlements.	 Such	 couching	 of	 any	(positive)	changes	developing	in	the	domestic	Chinese	municipality	as	implicitly	owing	to	imitation	of	the	(supposed	superior)	western	model	exemplified	in	the	city's	extraterritorial	settlements	can	be	found	throughout	the	contemporaneous	English-language	literature.	For	instance,	de	Jesus	(1909:254)	notes	how	judicial	reforms	within	the	domestic	government	are	 due	 to	 the	 integrity	 judicial	 reforms	are	 a	 result	 of	 the	model	 provided	 by	western	jurisprudence:	"just	as	its	fiscal	reform	was	due	to	the	integrity	of	foreign	administration	first	tested	at	Shanghai,	so	too	may	the	still	more	momentous	judicial	reorganisation	find	its	 initial	 stage	 through	 the	 ready	 acquiescence	 to	 the	 principles	 governing	 the	 foreign	tribunals	there."	More	troubling	are	the	similar	sentiments	that	continue	to	be	echoed	in	more	 current	 literatures,	 such	 as	Fairbank	 (1969)'s	 conceptualisation	of	 treaty	ports	as	interaction	 flashpoints	 for	 institutional	 dissemination	 in	 his	 "foreign	 impact,	 Chinese	reaction"	 thesis	 of	 domestic	 Chinese	 institutional	development.	Ma	 (2006:	19)	 similarly	suggests	a	process	of	imitation	to	have	taken	place	in	the	late	Qing,	citing	Elvin	(1996)	for	support:	 "Chinese	gentry	and	merchants	set	up	their	Shanghai	City	Council	 in	1904,	and	practiced	what	Mark	Elvin	called	“gentry	democracy”	in	the	Chinese	area,	a	direct	imitation	of	the	Municipal	Council	in	Western	Shanghai	[i.e.,	the	extraterritorial	settlements]."			Rather,	the	changes	that	occurred	administratively	in	the	domestic	sections	of	the	city	were	reflective	of	a	broader	organic	process	occurring	throughout	China	as	the	merchant	class	sought	to	utilise	their	increasing	economic	and	political	power	vis-a-vis	the	state	to	better	construct	the	institutional	landscape	in	ways	more	favourable	to	their	business	interests.	As	previously	referenced,	institutional	change	typically	results	only	due	to	a	change	in	the	relative	power	of	groups	benefiting	from	an	existing	institutional	framework	(Acemoglu	et	
al.	2005).	Changing	state-commerce	dynamics	provided	property	owners	more	opportunity	to	 reshape	 the	 institutional	 framework	 in	ways	more	 beneficial	 for	 the	 development	 of	commercial	 activities.	 This	 included	 increasing	 the	 access	 to	 and	 accountability	 of	 local	government	structures	to	allow	for	greater	empowerment	of	business	groups.	As	Ma	(2006:	19)	notes,	it	was	private	actors	in	the	merchant	and	local	landed	class	who	initiated	efforts	to	 construct	 domestic	 Shanghai's	 first	 formal	 locally-responsive	 governance	 structure.	While	local	domestic	elites	utilised	their	experiences	with	the	government	forms	found	in	the	 foreign	 settlements,	 to	 attribute	 all	 of	 these	 changes	 to	 simple	 imitation	 of	 the	settlements	 is	 overly-reductive.	Williams	 (1904:	108)'s	 observation	 as	 to	why	 domestic	Shanghai	lacked	some	of	the	same	level	of	municipal	services	is	noteworthy:	"The	Chinese	[living	in	the	extraterritorial	settlements]	are	ready	enough	to	enjoy	and	support	the	higher	style	of	living,	but	they	are	not	yet	prepared	to	adopt	and	maintain	similar	improvements	among	themselves.	The	difficulty	of	being	sure	of	the	co-operation	of	the	rulers	in	municipal	improvements	 deters	 intelligent	 natives	 from	 initiating	 even	 then	 tinniest	 sanitary	enterprise	of	their	foreign	neighbors."	While	expressed	in	a	manner	noxiously	typifying	a	sentiment	 of	 inherent	 superiority	 oft	 found	 in	 the	 period's	 western	 writings	 on	 non-
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European	places,	Williams	nonetheless	perhaps	inadvertently	underscores	how	the	lack	of	responsive	 local	 governance	 and	 other	 institutional	 mechanisms,	 particularly	 those	associated	with	 the	 provision	 of	 protections	 on	 private	 property	 rights,	 disincentivised	private	 domestic	 actors	 from	 making	 costly	 investments	 that	 could	 have	 resulted	 in	infrastructural	and	other	improvements	to	the	domestic	municipal	commercial	environment.		The	nascent	and	organic	domestic	City	Council	referenced	by	Ma	(2006:19)	reflected	a	drive	to	create	more	responsive	municipal	governance	structures.	As	he	describes,	"[The	Council]	experimented	with	the	separation	of	power	between	the	legislative	and	executive	branches,	having	 open	 debates	 and	 majority	 votes,	 standardizing	 tax	 collection	 (in	 place	 of	 tax	farming),	maintaining	and	improving	public	facilities,	developing	its	own	merchant	militia,	courts	of	justice	with	elected	judges,	and	promulgating	various	regulative	laws	and	moral	codes."	Moreover,	the	Council	was	a	driving	force	behind	further	commerce-state	efforts,	such	 as	 the	 semi-private	 entities	 created	 soon	 thereafter	 that	 undertook	 public	 works	efforts	 and	 looked	 to	 finance	 such	 projects	 through	 the	 issuance	 of	 debt	 instruments.	Nonetheless,	 the	 early	 experiments	 described	 by	Ma	 in	 terms	 of	 more	 responsive	 and	accountable	local	governance	structures	were	swept	away	once	the	authoritarian	military-led	 national	 Beiyang	 and	 Guomindang	 governments	 came	 to	 power,	 with	 the	 domestic	municipality	leadership	structure	to	be	dominated	by	appointed	military	personnel.		The	physical	structure	of	the	domestic	city	helped	shape	the	nature	of	the	municipal	state-building	process.	Prior	to	the	Treaty	of	Nanjing	and	subsequent	arrival	of	foreign	merchants	and	creation	of	extraterritorial	settlements,	Shanghai	had	primarily	consisted	of	a	walled	city,	 the	 location	of	which	was	south	of	what	would	become	the	French	Concession	and	International	Settlement.	In	the	decades	following	the	designation	of	Shanghai	as	a	treaty	port,	the	growth	of	Shanghai's	economy	led	to	significant	migration	from	the	countryside.	The	non-extraterritorial	neighbourhoods	outside	the	city	wall	grew	considerably,	ultimately	encircling	the	extraterritorial	settlements.	By	the	turn	of	the	century,	there	existed	three	main	 sections	 of	 the	 domestic	municipality—the	 original	walled	 city,	which	 came	 to	 be	referred	to	as	(	(Nanshi);	the	residential	centre	to	the	north	called S	(Chapei),	although	also	referred	to	as =	(Hupei);	and	the	northeast	section	along	the	Huangpu	known	as <	(Woosung).	These	sections,	however,	were	separated	not	only	geographically	but	also	in	terms	of	administration.	While	all	of	domestic	Shanghai	was	nominally	under	the	purview	of	the	local	magistrate	and	local	Daodai,	these	separate	sections	did	not	function	in	ways	equivalent	to	 the	"district"	division	()	of	modern	Chinese	municipal	governance.	There	existed	little	in	the	way	of	overall	city	planning	or	coordination	between	the	sections	of	the	city.	 As	 such,	 the	 processes	 driving	 the	 creation	 of	 more	 formal	municipal	 government	structures	developed	somewhat	independently	across	the	various	sections	of	the	city.		The	creation	of	a	local	public	goods	initiative	occurred	in	1895	when	a	group	of	merchants	and	 local	officials	 located	 in	Nanshi	approached	the	Daotai	 to	advocate	 the	creation	of	a	quasi-government	enterprise	known	as	a	bureau	(&)	to	construct	a	road	along	the	bank	of	the	Huangpu	River	running	south	of	the	Bund,	so	as	to	link	this	undeveloped	section	of	the	waterfront	with	the	Q	(16	Pu)	section	of	the	city.†	The	bureau	structure	referred	to	the	
shangban	guandu	(merchant-financed,	government	managed)	concept	of	quasi-government	initiatives	that	were	designed	to	promote	national	or	state-related	development	goals	by	mobilising	private	investment.	The	local	Daotai	received	approval	from	the	Qing	Court	to	set	up	the ;(VM'C&	(Road	Building	Bureau),	and	a	southward	extension	of	the	Bund	was	successfully	completed	by	the	end	of	the	ensuing	year.	After	completion	of	the	road,	the	bureau	was	reconstituted	as	(VM'C+&	(Road	Maintenance	Bureau).	________________________________________________________________________________________________________	†Q	had	served,	since	the	Northern	Song,	as	the	city's	primary	port	and	marketplace,	where	local	fishermen	and	shipping	merchants	of	the	Yangzi	commercial	route	gathered	to	trade	goods.	By	the	Qing	period,	the	area	became	an	administrative	unit	of	the	domestic	municipality,	designated	by	local	officials	to	be	divided	into	sixteen	sections,	and	hence	its	modern	name	(;(76U	2006).	
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In	 accordance	 with	 the	 bureau	 enterprise	 concept,	 the	 Road	 Building	 Bureau	 raised	investment	funds	for	the	construction	of	the	road	from	the	local	business	community.	Using	as	 a	 guide	 the	 usage	 fee	 strategies	 employed	 within	 the	 neighbouring	 extraterritorial	settlements,	the	Road	Maintenance	Bureau	was	empowered	to	coordinate	the	collection	of	a	vehicle	tax	as	a	continuing	financing	mechanism	in	order	to	obtain	return	on	investment	and	provide	for	the	maintenance	of	the	road.		Soon	thereafter,	other	areas	of	domestic	Shanghai	also	began	to	create	entities	to	undertake	capital	improvement	projects.	In	1898,	in	Woosung	(Wusong),	a	similar	bureau	responsible	for	public	works	received	approval	to	operate	from	the	central	Qing	authorities	and	started	operations.	In	1900	in	Chapei	(zhabei)	another	public	works	bureau	was	created.	As	the	region	of	the	domestic	part	of	the	city	closest	to	the	International	Settlement,	Chapei	faced	competition	 for	 customers	 base	 and	 investment	 monies,	 spurring	 a	 local	 business	association	 to	 initiate	 a	 new	 public	 works	 enterprise,	 the	 goal	 of	 which	 was,	 in	 effect,	municipal	 development	 projects,	 including	 the	 building	 and	 maintenance	 of	 roads	 and	improvement	of	the	area's	business	district.	Unlike	the	public	works	bureaus	operating	in	other	sections	of	the	city,	this	enterprise	was	originally	run	as	a	private	concern;	by	1904,	however,	given	its	a	lack	of	authority	to	impose	taxes,	management	of	the	venture	was	taken	over	by	government	officials	and	the	concern	was	restructured	as	a	formal	bureau.		These	early	beginnings	of	relatively	small-scale,	project-directed	bureaus	helped	to	both	serve	 as	 a	blueprint	and	 impetus	 for	 some	of	 the	 larger	national-level	 reforms	 the	Qing	government	was	beginning	to	inch	towards	in	promoting	local	governance	structures,	as	well	 as	 themselves	 receiving	 support	 from	 the	 national	 movement	 as	 well.	 Thus,	 for	instance,	in	1905	the	Nanshi	Road	Maintenance	Bureau	was	incorporated	into	part	of	the	Qing	government's	early	initiatives	to	create	more	formalised	and	self-financed	municipal	self-governance	 structures.	 Restructured	 as	 the ;) E'C& 	 (Shanghai	 General	Engineering	Bureau),	its	role	was	expanded	from	road	maintenance	to	also	providing	police,	new	public	works,	and	social	housing	services,	with	each	of	these	functions	having	separate	budgets	(Huang	2003).		Such	 moves	 can	 well	 be	 regarded	 as	 the	 beginning	 of	 a	 sea	 change	 for	 domestic	 local	government	finance.	The	complexity	of	the	local	municipal	government	structure	increased,	no	longer	consisting	solely	of	a	local	magistrate,	but	now	also	included	multiple	divisions	with	 specific	 designated	 functions	 associated	 with	 the	 provision	 of	 civic	 services.	 More	significant,	for	the	first	time,	local	authorities	were	responsible	for	creating	and	maintaining	a	budgeting	process,	with	an	embryonic	local	municipal	government	structure	possessing	the	responsibility	of	both	local	expenditure	determination	and	local	fund	raising	to	finance	desired	expenditures.	The	 fundamental	change	derived	 from	the	 fact	 that	no	 longer	was	local	government	to	operate	solely	on	the	basis	of	the	central	government	allocating	money,	but	rather	the	local	government	became	responsible	for	raising	and	spending	money	itself.		Not	 coincidentally,	 it	 is	 during	 this	period	 that,	 in	1906,	 in	 order	 to	meet	 the	 increased	responsibilities	 for	 social	 service	 provision,	 we	 find	 the	 Nanshi	 Shanghai	 General	Engineering	Bureau	turn	to	seeking	additional	means	for	of	raising	capital	to	finance	such	activities.	First,	the	Bureau—which	began	to	assume	the	functioning	of	a	formal	municipal	government	 entity—increased	 the	 number	 of	 taxes	 it	 imposed	 within	 its	 jurisdiction.	Besides	 the	 vehicle	 tax,	 new	 taxes	 on	 boats	 and	 real	 estate	 property	 were	 introduced.	Second,	it	is	also	at	this	time	that	the	Shanghai	General	Engineering	Bureau	undertook	the	first	domestic	municipal-level	bond	issuance	in	Chinese	history.	This	bond,	intended	to	raise	30,000	taels,	was	to	pay	eight	per	cent	interest,	with	a	term	of	only	three	years.	The	bond's	funding	source	was	designated	as	operating	proceeds	from	the	Dada	Company	(!O),	a	local	 shipping	 and	 docks	 concern	 that	 had	 been	 founded	with	 the	 support	 of	 the	 local	government.	
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While	little	information	regarding	the	subscription	or	repayment	the	1906	issuance	exists	in	the	historical	records,	apparently	it	was	enough	of	a	success	to	warrant	a	second	issuance,	taking	place	in	September	1908	with	identical	terms,	also	issued	by	the	Shanghai	General	Engineering	Bureau	and	funded	by	proceeds	from	Dada.	Although	a	Shunpao	newspaper	article,	dated	1	October	1908,	noted	the	reason	for	the	bond	was	to	"help	build	municipal	facilities",	no	other	particulars	were	given.		Two	years	later	in	1910,	a	third	domestic	municipal	level	bond	was	issued.	In	this	instance,	the	issuing	body	was	the	;I90	(Shanghai	Municipal	Authority),	a	nascent	formal	municipal	 government	 structure	 created	 in	 response	 to	 the	 local	 self-governance	movement	developed	in	the	waning	years	of	the	Qing	(Tung	1964:	13).	This	bond	issuance	was	more	optimistic,	with	an	authorised	amount	for	100,000	taels,	carrying	an	eight	per	cent	 coupon	 over	 five	 years.	 The	 funding	 source	 for	 this	 bond	was	 again	designated	 as	revenues	 of	 the	 Dada	 Company.	 However,	 the	 bond	 fell	 well	 short	 of	 its	 100,000	 tael	issuance	goal,	managing	only	to	raise	38,187	taels	(Liu	2005).		Unfortunately,	for	all	three	of	these	Qing-era	municipal	bond	issuances,	there	appears	not	to	exist	pricing	information	anywhere	within	the	historical	record.	We	found	no	listings	for	any	of	these	three	bonds	in	the	local	newspapers	that	typically	reported	prices	on	domestic	central	 or	 provincial	 government	 bonds,	 railway	 bonds,	 or	 the	 municipal	 bonds	 of	Shanghai's	 extraterritorial	 settlements.	Given	 the	 lack	of	 price	 reporting,	 it	appears	 that	little	if	any	market	trading	of	these	bonds	took	place.	Instead,	it	is	likely	these	bonds	were	more	similar	 in	many	aspects	to	syndicated	 loans,	 initially	 financed	and	held	to	 term	by	banks	and	wealthy	private	investors		While	many	of	these	early	tax	and	bond	revenue-raising	strategies	consciously	followed,	in	many	respects,	 similar	municipal	 fiscal	 techniques	utilised	by	the	councils	governing	the	extraterritorial	settlements,	there	existed	 important	differences.	To	begin	with,	unlike	in	the	 extraterritorial	 settlements,	 the	 issuing	 body	was	 a	 quasi-government	 entity.	While	Bureaus	 possessed	 some	 authority	 to	 collect	 taxes,	 they	 lacked	 the	weight	 of	 sovereign	authority	possessed	by	an	actual	sovereign	municipal	government.	Relatedly,	despite	 its	moniker,	 the	Shanghai	General	Engineering	Bureau	was	not	a	 full	municipal	 level	entity,	operating	only	within	Nanshi.	At	this	time,	there	existed	no	coordinated	formal	municipal	management	structure	with	authority	over	all	Shanghai,	and	different	areas	of	domestic	Shanghai	each	had	their	own	project-specific	local	bureaus	responsible	for	responding	to	specific	 needs	within	 their	 area	 of	 the	 city,	 a	 positive	 development	model	 that	 allowed	experimentation	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 unique	 local	 solutions	 to	 local	 issues.	 However,	potential	investors	could	well	have	felt	concern	that	these	specific	bureaus	lacked	scale	and	were	 constrained	 from	 a	 capital	 standpoint	 by	 a	 limited	 tax	 base.	 Third,	 the	 domestic	municipal	governance	structure	itself	remained	limited	in	its	ability	to	credibly	commit	to	protect	 either	 domestic	 resident	 or	 investor	 property	 rights.	 While	 some	 financing	authority	was	transferred	to	local	government,	the	city	was	still	administered	by	central	government-appointed	officials,	as	were	the	public	works	bureaus.	Decisions	were	made	by	fiat,	and	 the	 fiscal	health	of	 the	bureaus	were	neither	vetted	by	a	transparent	budgeting	process,	nor	open	to	public	debate.	While	the	impact	of	these	factors	in	creating	a	viable	market	 for	 these	bond	 issuances	 is	unknown,	 it	 is	noteworthy	 that	 the	municipal	bonds	issued	by	Shanghai's	extraterritorial	municipal	councils	were,	over	the	same	time	period,	listed	and	traded	on	the	city's	financial	markets.		The	founding	of	the	Republic	brought	with	it	the	installation	of	a	formal	municipal	authority	in	 Shanghai,	 under	 the	 authorisation	 of	 the	 Beiyang	 government.	 One	 of	 the	 first	 tasks	undertaken	by	 this	new	municipal	 administration	was	 to	seek	 to	 raise	 funds	via	a	bond	issuance,	and	in	September	1912	the	Shanghai	municipal	government	authorised	a	newly	constituted	organisation	that	was	similar	to	the	old	Qing-era	Shanghai	Authority	Bureau	to	
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issue	 a	40,000	 tael	 bond	at	 eight	per	 cent	 over	 ten	years.	As	under	 the	Qing,	 operating	proceeds	from	the	Dada	Company	were	designated	as	its	funding	source.	However,	trust	in	the	reliability	of	this	issuance	was	low,	given	the	missed	interest	payments	that	took	place	on	the	previous	bond	issuance	by	the	old	Shanghai	Authority	Bureau	(SFTR	1995:	1127).	After	one	year,	just	22,000	taels	of	the	bonds	had	been	subscribed,	representing	only	about	half	 the	 funds	 the	 city	 administrators	 sought	 to	 raise.	 As	 with	 the	 previous	 Qing-era	issuances,	there	appeared	to	be	little	trading	of	these	bonds;	at	the	very	least,	there	were	no	reports	of	such	trade	in	any	of	the	city's	newspapers	or	financial	journals,	although	its	basic	issuance	information	was	listed	in	the	1914	China	Stock	&	Share	Handbook.		The	situation	began	to	change,	however,	with	the	growth	of	the	financial	markets	and	an	associated	increase	in	trading	activity	that	occurred	at	the	start	of	1920.	Starting	in	April	of	1920,	prices	for	the	"Shanghai	First	Bond	Issue"	were	reported	in	the	Bankers	Weekly	and	occasional	issues	of	Shunpao.	From	these	we	generated	a	price	series	on	this	bond	issuance	through	December	1921,	when	the	speculative	bubble	burst	and	trading	of	most	securities	came	to	a	standstill.	The	market	prices	on	these	bonds—only	averaging	approximately	40	
taels	over	the	period—provide	a	good	indication	that	they	were	perceived	to	be	highly	risky.		The	 inability	 of	 the	 municipal	 government	 to	 honour	 previous	 bond	 obligations	undoubtedly	diminished	the	appetite	for	additional	offerings,	as	suggested	by	the	fact	that	it	was	a	full	ten	years	before	another	bond	issuance	took	place.	In	June	1922	a	100,000	tael	issuance	 took	 place	 carrying	 a	 10	 per	 cent	 coupon	with	 a	 term	 of	 10	 years.	 Similar	 to	national	bonds,	interest	was	to	be	paid	semi-annually,	with	early	repayment	made	on	ten	per	cent	of	the	bonds	based	on	annual	randomised	drawings.	The	funding	source	of	this	issuance	was	more	general,	indicated	as	general	tax	revenues.	The	issuing	body	was	again	not	 the	 official	 municipality	 but	 a	 new	 local	 quasi-government	 institution,	 the	 Zhabei	District	Industrial	Bureau.	News	reports	 in	Shunpao	at	 the	 time	state	 the	purpose	of	 the	bond	was	to	rebuild	city	roads	in	the	Zhabei	district.		The	public	response	to	the	issuance	appears	to	have	been	tepid.	The	100,000	tael	issuance	actually	represented	phase	one	of	a	planned	200,000	tael	 total	 issuance,	with	the	second	100,000	supposed	to	be	issued	in	December	1922.	However,	given	difficulties	placing	the	first	phase,	 the	planned	 second	phase	was	 shelved.	Nonetheless,	 a	 separate	 issuance	by	Zhabei	District	Industrial	Bureau	took	place	a	year	later,	wherein	which	they	tried	to	raise	an	additional	200,000	taels	to	construct	bridges	in	the	district.	This	bond	was	also	to	pay	10	per	cent	coupon	with	a	10	year	term.	The	funding	source	was	once	again	local	tax	revenues,	with	the	bond	agreement	more	specifically	requiring	approximately	1500	taels	per	month	to	be	allocated	into	a	sinking	 fund	 for	repayment	purposes.	Once	again,	however,	public	appetite	was	limited,	and	only	83,600	taels	out	of	the	desired	200,000	was	collected.			Overall,	investors	appear	to	have	been	relatively	sagacious	in	their	reluctance	to	subscribe	to	these	issuances;	the	first	bond	issuance	of	100,000	taels	ran	into	trouble	early	on,	unable	to	 fully	 repay	 principal	 to	 bondholders	 selected	 in	 the	 first	 lottery	 drawing,	 who	were	returned	only	90	per	 cent	 owed	principal.	As	with	previous	 issuances	besides	 the	brief	period	during	the	bond	market	bubble	of	1920	and	1921,	price	and	volume	data	seem	non-existent	for	either	of	these	two	municipal	bonds.			Nonetheless,	based	on	reports	surrounding	the	potential	fate	of	these	bond	obligations	that	took	place	within	the	local	press	near	the	end	of	the	Beiyang-sponsored	domestic	Shanghai	municipal	 administration	 in	1927,	we	know	 these	bonds	were	making	at	 least	 sporadic	repayments.	 The	 fate	 of	 these	 bonds	 was	 settled	 in	 line	 with	 the	 Guomindang	 central	government's	 stance	 on	 honouring	 national	 and	 provincial	 level	 bond	 issuances	 by	 the	Beiyang	government.	Officials	in	the	city's	new	Department	of	Finance	decided	in	1929	to	consolidate	and	replace	these	previous	debt	obligations	under	the	framework	a	new	bond	
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issuance.	As	reported	in	a	series	of	short	articles	in	several	issues	of	Shunpao	(16,	24,	26,	30	April	 1930),	municipal	 bonds	 issued	 under	 the	previous	 Beiyang	 city	 government	were	declared	defunct.	However,	it	was	reported	that	the	new	municipal	government	was	willing	to	honour	the	payments	implied	by	the	old	bonds,	but	that	holders	of	those	issuances	would	need	to	exchange	them	for	a	new	municipal	bond	issuance	(the	1929	issuance	described	below);	 upon	 exchange,	 the	 bonds	 would	 be	 honoured	 at	 80	 per	 cent	 their	 face	 value.	Whether	this	represented	a	fair	exchange	for	the	values	of	the	bonds	is	unclear,	given	we	have	no	market	price	data	given	their	apparent	lack	of	trading	on	the	local	bond	market.		With	the	formation	of	the	Nanjing-based	government,	the	Guomindang	leadership	set	about	consolidating	and	legitimising	its	power	by	installing	new	local	governments	loyal	to	the	Guomindang	 Party.	 In	 Shanghai,	 the	 City	 Government	 of	 Greater	 Shanghai	 municipal	administration,	 installed	 in	 late	1927,	was	 tasked	with	promoting	economic	growth	and	modernisation	within	the	domestically-controlled	areas	of	the	city.	However,	funding	issues	proved	to	be	a	major	obstacle	for	the	domestic	municipal	government	to	achieve	these	goals.			The	 Guomindang	 government's	 emphasis	 on	 developing	 a	 more	 bureaucratised	 and	professionalised	infrastructure	led	to	the	creation	of	several	new	municipal	departments,	including	the	Shanghai	Department	of	Finance,	tasked	with	restructuring	the	city's	finances.	Given	the	city's	funding	needs,	Department	officials	looked	to	bond	issuance.	However,	the	aforementioned	decision	by	the	Ministry	of	Finance	to	honour	previous	debt	obligations	of	the	Beiyang	regime	also	contained	several	new	directives	designed	to	bring	order	to	what	had	 been	 a	 highly	 disorganised	 set	 of	 outstanding	 bond	 issuances.	 New	 regulations	prohibited	all	provincial	and	local	governments	from	conducting	their	own	bond	issuances;	moving	forward,	the	Ministry	of	Finance	was	the	only	government	entity	allowed	to	issue	bonds.			In	accordance	with	the	new	regulations,	the	Shanghai	Department	of	Finance	applied	to	the	national	Ministry	of	Finance	for	the	right	to	implement	a	local	debt	issuance.	Although	the	Ministry	of	Finance	served	as	the	official	government	entity	through	which	the	bonds	were	issued,	 the	 responsibility	 for	 repayment	 was	 to	 rest	 solely	 with	 the	 local	 Shanghai	Municipality	administration.	As	such,	analysing	the	public's	response	the	bond	issuances	by	the	 Shanghai	municipality	 represents	 a	useful	way	 to	 gauge	public	perception	 as	 to	 the	credit	worthiness	and	financial	viability	of	the	domestic	Shanghai	municipal	authority.		After	 permission	 was	 granted	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Finance,	 the	 Shanghai	 Municipal	Government	authority	conducted	a	bond	issuance	in	October	1929,	for	three	million	yuan	worth	of	bonds	at	100	yuan	face	value,	coupon	rate	of	eight	per	cent	with	an	eight	year	term,	semi-annual	 coupon	 payments,	 and	 following	 the	 standard	methodology	 of	 the	 time	 of	selecting	via	random	drawing	a	percentage	of	outstanding	bonds	for	full	repayment	each	year.	The	bond	was	to	use	the	local	residential	housing	tax	as	the	designated	funding	source.	Figure	11.7	displays	a	copy	of	one	of	these	issued	bonds.		Gathering	 price	 data	 regarding	 this	 first	 issuance	 by	 the	 Nanjing-backed	 Shanghai	Municipality	 administration	proved	 to	be	unsuccessful.	Unlike	 for	 the	 internal	domestic	national-level	bonds	(or,	for	that	matter,	some	provincial-level	or	railroad	bonds)	that	were	contemporaneously	 issued,	 and	 for	 which	 price	 data	 was	 readily	 available	 during	 this	period,	 neither	Bankers	Weekly	 nor	 Shunpao	 published	market	 prices	 on	 this	 issuance.	Hence,	we	lack	a	clear	bond	price	data	series	for	this	particular	domestic	municipal	issuance.	While	preventing	construction	of	a	price	series	enabling	a	comparative	analysis,	the	lack	of	any	published	pricing	information	on	this	issuance	does	provide	us	with	some	information,	insofar	as	the	lack	of	a	market	indicates	that	investors	were	apparently	not	interested	in	holding	 it,	 instead	 preferring	 to	 hold	 alternative	 investments	 that	 were	 actively	 traded	during	the	same	period.	
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	Figure	11.7.		Copy	of	1929	Shanghai	Administration	Bond	(100	yuan	denomination)	
	Source:	Shanghai	Municipal	Archives	(319-6-2568).						Analysing	 published	 information	 in	 the	 Shun	 Pao	newspaper	 over	 this	 two-year	 period	regarding	the	1929	municipal	bond	issuance	suggests	that	the	overall	public	perception	of	the	faith	and	credit	of	the	municipal	government	authority	was	relatively	poor.	There	was	still	nearly	one	million	yuan	in	unredeemed	municipal	bond	obligations	issued	by	previous	administrations	to	be	honoured,	and	potential	investors	were	perhaps	uncertain	the	new	municipal	administration	could	raise	sufficient	tax	revenues	to	take	on	an	additional	three	million	yuan	of	new	debt	obligations	(Woodhead	1933:	664).	It	is	clear	from	the	reported	articles	that	while	significant	effort	was	put	forward	by	officials	in	terms	of	advertising	and	promoting	this	bond	issuance,	which	even	included	pressuring	government	employees	and	business	leaders	to	subscribe	to	the	bond,	there	appeared	to	be	little	appetite	on	the	part	of	most	potential	investors	to	subscribe	to	these	bonds.	The	fact	that	municipal	employees	also	showed	 such	 hesitancy	 to	 subscribe	 is	 perhaps	 most	 damning,	 as	 they	 represented	members	 of	 the	 public	 with	 the	 best	 information	 regarding	 the	 effectiveness	 and	trustworthiness	of	the	government.	In	general,	it	is	clear	that	the	risk	profile	of	the	bond	was	not	attractive	to	the	majority	of	investors	at	the	time.			The	 initial	 lack	 of	 fundraising	 success	 of	 the	 1929	 floatation	 led	 the	 domestic	 city	government	 the	 following	 year	 to	 undertake	 creative	 strategies	 to	 attempt	 to	 reach	 the	three	million	yuan	in	intended	subscriptions.	Thus	the	newly-created	City	Bank	of	Shanghai	was	assigned	over	one	million	of	the	bond	offering	as	its	initial	capital	reserves,	bringing	total	subscriptions	up	to	$2,940,000	(Woodhead	1933:	664).	However,	given	that	the	Bank	was	funded	with	taxpayer	monies,	such	purchases	of	municipal	bond	issuances	by	the	City	Bank	simply	represented	an	accounting	procedure	as	opposed	to	reflecting	an	actual	influx	of	new	funds.			
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Given	 the	 relatively	 advanced	 state	of	 Shanghai's	 financial	 press	 at	 the	 time,	 the	 lack	of	published	pricing	data	for	the	1929	issuance	is	a	fair	indication	that	this	bond	did	not	trade	in	 any	 substantial	 quantity,	 underscoring	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 public's	 perception	 of	 this	investment	 option	 was	 indeed	 quite	 poor.	 Further	 evidence	 regarding	 these	 bonds'	perceived	 value	 can	 be	 gleaned	 from	 comments	made	 by	 Secretary	 Cai	 of	 the	 Shanghai	Finance	Department	 an	official	with	 the	 Shanghai	municipal	authority,	who,	 speaking	 in	1932,	admitted	the	city	had	only	been	able	to	raise	part	of	the	1929	issuance's	intended	three	million	yuan,	while	noting	that	the	bonds	were	only	currently	worth	approximately	half	their	face	value	(Shun	Pao	27	October	1932).		We	 turn	now	 to	 a	discussion	of	 the	 final	 two	bond	 issuances	undertaken	by	 Shanghai's	municipal	authorities	up	through	1937.	As	to	be	described,	the	juxtaposition	between	the	1929	 bond	 issuance	 and	 the	 two	 subsequent	 bond	 issuances	 is	 telling	 in	 regard	 to	improvements	in	both	the	professionalisation	of	the	city's	fund-raising	strategies,	and	the	perceived	efficacy	of	local	governmental	authority.			In	the	aftermath	of	the	1932	military	battle	with	Japanese	forces	that	had	devastated	much	of	 Shanghai,	 Jiang	 instituted	new	 leadership	 structures	 in	many	of	 the	 important	urban	centres.	 In	 Shanghai,	 the	 Provisional	 Municipal	 Council	 was	 installed,	 organised	 along	corporatist	 lines	 (Lee	 1995:11).	 This	 Council	 was	 given	 more	 authority	 and	 power	 to	institute	policies,	impose	taxes,	and	raise	capital	to	undertake	work	relating	to	recovering	from	the	war	and	enhancing	economic	development.	One	of	the	first	tasks	of	the	Shanghai	Department	 of	 Finance	 after	 the	 war	 was	 to	 raise	 capital	 for	municipal	 reconstruction	projects.	As	such,	it	was	decided	soon	after	the	war	that	a	new	bond	issuance	dedicated	to	reconstruction	projects	should	be	undertaken.	It	was	clear	that	the	relative	failure	of	the	previous	bond	issuance	revolved	around	a	low	level	of	trust	by	investors	in	the	Shanghai	municipal	authority's	ability	to	coordinate	and	structure	an	effective	bond	issuance,	as	well	as	its	inability	to	institute	structures	to	assure	the	public	that	repayment	of	the	loan	was	likely.	The	1929	bonds	had	been	 issued	directly	by	 the	municipal	government	 itself;	 i.e.,	there	had	been	no	financial	underwriters	for	the	bond	issuance.	Only	the	Bond	Recruiting	Committee	was	tasked	with	the	responsibility	of	selling	and	placing	the	bond.	As	a	way	to	both	increase	the	trust	in	repayment	and	improve	the	amount	of	money	taken	in	from	the	bond	 issuing	 process,	 the	 Department	 of	 Finance	 this	 time	 turned	 to	 outside	 financial	professionals	to	serve	as	underwriters	for	the	new	bonds	to	be	issued.			As	 reported	 in	 the	 27	 October	 1932	 issue	 of	 Shunpao,	 the	 Secretary	 of	 the	 Shanghai	Department	of	Finance	indicated	in	a	speech	that	given	the	sizable	reconstruction	costs,	the	city	was	planning	on	issuing	bonds	to	raise	sufficient	capital.	The	difficulties	encountered	in	 the	past	 regarding	 the	previous	 bond	 issuance	 encouraged	 the	Department	 to	 utilise	professional	 underwriters	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	 sufficient	 capital	 would	 be	 acquired.	While	the	city	would	need	to	sell	the	bonds	to	the	underwriters	at	a	twenty	per	cent	discount	(hence	only	receiving	80	per	cent	of	the	full	issuance	amount),	it	could	receive	the	revenue	immediately	and	in	full.			The	paper	carried	a	draft	of	the	proposed	details	of	the	bond	offering:	"Six	million	yuan	of	
,J	(Revitalisation)	bearer	bonds	will	issued	in	November	1932,	with	an	annual	coupon	of	seven	per	cent,	to	be	paid	semi-annually.	The	underwriter	banks	will	only	need	to	pay	80	per	cent	of	the	face	value,	with	commission	fees	to	be	calculated	separately.	The	government	will	also	pay	0.25	per	cent	commission	fee	to	the	bond	agent	bank	chosen	to	manage	the	principal	and	interest	payment	process.	The	government	will	designate	one	of	its	income	streams	as	a	designated	funding	source,	and	will	set	up	a	fund	for	paying	back	interests	and	principals."	 As	 with	 nearly	 all	 domestic	 government	 bond	 issuances,	 the	 bond	 was	designated	to	be	in	the	form	of	a	drawings	bond,	with	regularly	scheduled	drawings	to	be	held	semi-annually.	
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	An	 updated	 article	 in	 Shunpao	 appeared	 three	 days	 later	 on	 30	 October	 reporting	 that	additional	details	of	the	bond	had	been	decided	upon	during	negotiations	between	banking	groups	and	Department	of	Finance	representatives.	"The	Rehabilitation	bond	will	use	full	tax	income	derived	from	dockyards	as	a	funding	source,	and	the	term	structure	of	the	bonds	would	 be	 set	 at	 20	 years."	 As	was	 standard	 for	 domestic	 bonds,	 repayment	 was	 to	 be	conducted	under	the	drawings	methodology,	with	full	repayment	of	outstanding	principal	to	 take	 place	 by	 August	 1952.	 Less	 than	 three	 weeks	 later,	 Shunpao	 carried	 an	 article	announcing,	 "British	 firm	Benjamin	&	 Potts	 underwrites	 the	 Rehabilitation	 bonds,"	 and	described	 the	 contract	 signed	 between	 the	 foreign	 underwriting	 firms	 and	 the	 city's	Department	 of	 Finance.	 The	 paper	 printed	 the	 following	 details	 provided	 by	 Finance	Secretary	Cai	regarding	the	agreement:				(1)		 The	 underwriter	 is	 Benjamin	 &	 Potts,	 and	 the	 agent	 bank	 managing	 payments	 of	principals	and	interest	is	the	Hongkong	&	Shanghai	Banking	Corporation	(HSBC);	(2)		 Once	Benjamin	&	Potts	pays	the	underwriting	money,	the	municipal	government	will	not	be	involved	in	selling	the	bonds;	(3)		 Benjamin	&	Potts	will	purchase	the	bonds	at	80%	face	value;	no	additional	commission	fees	will	be	paid.	(4)	 Benjamin	&	Potts	will	sell	the	bonds	to	the	public	at	85%	of	face	value;	(5)		 Benjamin	&	Potts	will	be	responsible	for	paying	all	promotional	and	advertising	fees,	and	will	cooperate	with	HSBC	in	promoting	the	bonds.			Later	reports	in	local	newspapers	and	financial	journals	provided	additional	information,	including	 that	 the	 dedicated	 funding	 source	 would	 be	 the	 city's	 Wharfage	 Dues,	 an	important	 signal	 to	 investors	 given	 the	 significance	 of	 shipping	 to	 the	 domestic	 city's	economy.	In	addition,	it	was	further	announced	that	an	agreement	had	been	reached	with	the	 foreign-operated	 Shanghai	 Stock	 Exchange	 to	 list	 the	 bonds	 on	 the	 exchange.	 It	 is	interesting	that	city	officials	saw	it	important	to	have	the	bonds	listed	on	the	foreign-run	stock	 market;	 at	 this	 time,	 both	 of	 the	 domestic-run	 stock	 exchanges	 (Shanghai	 China	Merchants	 Stock	 Exchange,	 and	 Shanghai	 Chartered	 Stock	 and	 Produce	 Exchange)	 sold	bonds,	and	had	sufficient	institutional	capacity	and	expertise	operating	in	the	bond	market.	In	 fact,	 both	of	 these	 exchanges	handled	at	 the	 time	 large	 volumes	of	 trades	 in	national	government	bonds,	as	described	in	the	previous	section.	Thus,	the	city	looked	to	the	foreign-run	exchange	not	for	its	institutional	apparatus,	but	more	likely	rather	as	a	signalling	device	as	 to	 the	 (improved)	 trustworthiness	 and	 quality	 of	 the	 bond	 issuing	 and	 repayment	mechanisms	that	had	been	put	in	place.		For	the	city,	the	agreement	proved	to	be	an	important	success,	as	they	immediately	received	4.8	million	yuan	in	bond	sales	revenue	from	Benjamin	&	Potts	(80	per	cent	of	the	six	million	total	 issued	 debt).	 Thus,	 unlike	 with	 the	 1929	 issuance,	 the	 Department	 of	 Finance	immediately	received	the	money	upfront,	removing	uncertainty	in	regard	to	the	timing	and	the	amount	they	would	ultimately	take	in	from	the	bond	sale.			In	 addition,	 the	 public	 response	 to	 the	 1932	 issuance	 proved	 vastly	 different	 than	 the	response	to	the	1929	bond	offering.	Benjamin	&	Potts	had	little	trouble	placing	the	bonds.	Indeed,	many	of	the	local	domestic	banks	quickly	agreed	to	subscribe	to	large	lots	of	the	bonds	at	82.5	yuan	(Liu	2015:	98	suggests	some	banks	paid	as	high	as	85	yuan),	enabling	the	underwriter	to	easily	earn	a	healthy	return.	The	largest	subscribers	included	the	Bank	of	China	and	Bank	of	Communications—together	they	subscribed	to	more	than	2	million	worth	of	 the	bond	 issuance.	The	domestic	banks	were	 easily	 able	 to	 resell	 the	bonds	 to	domestic	individual	investors—when	the	bonds	were	offered	for	sale	to	the	public	on	21	
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December	1932,	in	just	over	two	hours	branches	of	the	two	banks	received	approximately	3.78	million	yuan	in	subscription	orders,	after	which	sales	had	to	be	shut	off;	investors	were	subsequently	assigned	actual	bond	amounts	proportional	to	their	requested	subscriptions	(Shunpao	24	December	1932).	Figure	11.8	displays	a	copy	of	one	of	the	issued	1932	bonds.			Figure	11.8.		Copy	of	1932	Domestic	Shanghai	Municipal	7	Per	Cent	City	Loan	Bond								(100	yuan	denomination)		
	Source:	Shanghai	Municipal	Archives	(319-6-2568).	
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The	positive	response	by	the	market	to	the	1932	city	bonds	encouraged	the	Department	of	Finance	to	again	turn	to	using	a	bond	issuance	to	raise	capital	two	years	later.	In	1934,	the	City	Government	of	Greater	 Shanghai	 received	permission	 from	 the	 central	 government	authorising	 it	 to	 conduct	 another	 bond	 issuance.	 This	 time,	 the	 Department	 of	 Finance	contracted	 with	 the	 foreign-incorporated	 brokerage	 house	 Swan,	 Culbertson	 &	 Fritz	 to	serve	 as	 the	 bond's	 underwriters,	who	would	 then	 be	 solely	 responsible	 for	 selling	 the	bonds	to	banks	or	directly	to	institutional	or	individual	investors.	As	indicted	in	an	article	in	 Shunpao	 on	 1	 July	 1934,	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 new	 bond	was	 to	 collect	 funds	 for	 the	improvement	 of	 public	 works,	 including	 road	 improvements,	 bridge	 construction,	 and	building	public	structures	such	as	 libraries,	museums	and	stadiums.	The	bond's	 funding	source	would	be	from	its	vehicle	tax	(a	tax	fee	applied	to	all	cars,	whether	human-pulled	or	motorised).	The	city	would	sell	the	bonds	at	a	7	per	cent	discount	to	the	underwriter,	and	reports	 in	Shunpao	at	 the	 time	 indicated	the	city	cleared	the	 full	3.255	million	yuan	 just	seven	days	after	the	contract	was	finalised.	The	contract	agreement	represented	a	big	win	for	the	city—in	a	span	of	just	two	years,	they	were	able	to	negotiate	from	having	to	pay	a	20	per	cent	underwriting	fee,	down	to	only	7	per	cent.		On	14	July	1934,	the	city	issued	3.5	million	yuan	of	bearer	bonds,	of	face	value	100	yuan,	with	an	annual	coupon	rate	of	seven	per	cent,	paid	semi-annually,	with	a	term	of	12	years;	the	 principal	 would	 be	 paid	 back	 via	 drawings	 method	 starting	 in	 June	 1935.	 Swan	Culbertson	&	Fritz	negotiated	with	the	three	designated	agent	banks	(Bank	of	China,	Central	Bank	of	China,	and	Bank	of	Communications)	for	all	bonds	to	be	sold	to	the	public	at	98	yuan,	a	 two	per	 cent	discount	of	 its	 face	 value.	The	 appetite	by	 the	public	 for	 the	 city's	 bond	offerings	had	changed	rather	drastically	from	just	five	years	prior—indeed,	on	the	first	day	of	public	subscription,	order	for	over	20	million	yuan	came	in	only	two	hours,	more	than	five	times	oversubscribed.	It	was	reported	that	both	Chinese	and	foreigners	applied.	Given	the	extreme	over-subscription,	 the	banks	allocated	 the	bonds	proportionally,	with	 those	who	applied	for	5000	yuan	and	below	to	receive	the	full	amount	for	which	they	applied,	and	those	who	submitted	more	than	5000	yuan,	would	be	allocated	5000	yuan	worth	plus	nine	per	cent	of	the	amount	applied	for	above	5000	yuan	(Shunpao	18	and	19	July	1934).		In	particular	contrast	to	the	earlier	1929	bond	issuance,	the	1932	and	1934	issuances	were	deemed,	 certainly	 initially,	 as	 important	 successes	 for	 the	 City	 Government	 of	 Greater	Shanghai.	The	local	financial	journal	Native	Bankers'	Monthly	Shanghai	in	early	1935	wrote	favourably	 about	 the	 great	popularity	 of	 the	 bonds	 amongst	 investors,	 noting	 that	 both	Chinese	and	 foreign	 investors	were	active	 in	the	market	 for	 these	bonds,	and	attributed	some	of	the	popularity	to	their	listing	on	the	Shanghai	Stock	Exchange	(1935	vol.	15:	119).		There	are	several	factors	that	can	be	ascribed	to	the	initial	success	of	the	1932	and	1934	bond	issuances.	First,	the	outsourcing	by	the	city	to	professional	underwriters	and	bond	agents	greatly	increased	the	confidence	of	investors,	taking	away	some	of	the	uncertainty	over	 whether	 the	 procedural	 aspects	 of	 the	 repayment	 process	 would	 go	 smoothly.	Relatedly,	 the	use	of	 reputable,	professional	underwriters	such	as	Benjamin	&	Potts	and	Swan,	 Culbertson	 &	 Fritz	 also	 increased	 the	 confidence	 of	 investors.	 Having	 a	 bond	underwritten	 by	 a	 company	well-regarded	 in	 the	 financial	 community	 is	 in	 some	ways	analogous	to	receiving	a	"seal	of	approval"—the	very	fact	that	a	well-respected	underwriter	would	trust	it	could	place	a	bond	issuance	can	itself	serve	as	a	signal	to	the	market	about	the	quality	of	the	investment	opportunity	(Easterbrook	1984:	655).	Finally,	and	perhaps	most	 important,	 was	 the	 impact	 from	 the	 bonds	 being	 listed	 on	 the	 foreign-operated	Shanghai	Stock	Exchange.	Similar	to	using	well-known	bond	underwriters,	it	is	likely	that	some	amount	of	positive	signalling	effect	was	gained.	Also	significant	was	 the	 impact	on	investor's	expected	liquidity	risk.	As	described,	nearly	all	of	the	previous	municipal	bond	offerings	issued	by	domestic	municipal	authorities	saw	very	little	activity	on	the	secondary	market.	This	implies	that	an	initial	investor	in	the	bond	would	likely	be	making	a	long-term	
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commitment	 to	 holding	 the	 bond	 until	 its	 redemption,	 increasing	 liquidity	 risk	 for	 the	investor.	Conversely,	there	had	been	a	healthy	secondary	market	for	the	foreign	settlement	governments'	municipal	bonds	on	 the	Shanghai	Stock	Exchange	since	early	on,	 implying	investors	could	purchase	one	of	these	municipal	bonds	knowing	that	they	could	easily	get	out	of	 their	position	 if	they	desired	the	return	 immediately	or	 if	 they	believed	 it	was	no	longer	an	investment	in	which	they	wished	to	partake.	Hence,	the	recognition	by	investors	that	the	1932	and	1934	bonds	contained	the	ability	to	more	easily	exit	the	investment	meant	they	would	be	more	willing	to	enter	the	investment.	Finally,	it	is	also	noteworthy	that	the	Shanghai	Stock	Exchange	itself	was	an	extraterritorial	company,	and	hence	operated	under	the	jurisdiction	of	extraterritorial	legal	system,	with	all	the	associated	investors	rights	that	this	implied,	whereas	the	domestically-operated	exchange	was	a	firm	registered	under	the	Guomindang	legal	system.	The	extent	to	which	investors	viewed	legal	protections	on	their	investment	activities	to	be	better	protected	by	the	extraterritorial	compared	to	domestic	legal	system	was	also	likely	a	possible	driver	of	the	observed	increased	investor	demand	for	the	domestic	municipal	government's	bond	issuances.		Figure	11.9	presents	the	weekly	price	histories	of	these	two	domestic	municipal	issuances	for	 the	 period	 through	 1941	 (after	which	 the	 foreign-run	 stock	market	was	 shut	 down	permanently	with	the	fall	of	the	foreign	settlements).	As	is	evident	from	the	figure,	after	briefly	trading	over	par	in	1934,	demand	for	the	bonds	fell	slightly,	pushing	prices	down	below	par	back	into	the	90s	by	mid-1935.	Prices	remained	stable	until	the	outbreak	of	war	in	1937	with	 the	Battle	of	Shanghai,	 indicated	by	 the	vertical	dotted	line.	The	 fall	of	 the	Guomindang-backed	 municipal	 government	 and	 installation	 of	 a	 Japanese-backed	administration	led	to	questions	over	whether	repayment	of	the	bonds	would	continue.	Once	the	market	reopened,	prices	declined	sharply,	especially	for	the	longer-term	20-year	bond,	with	the	looming	chance	for	default	before	redemption	during	this	highly	uncertain	period	driving	 prices	 downward.	 Demand	 for	 the	 shorter-term	 12-year	 bond	 also	 mostly	evaporated,	with	little	trading	taking	place.	There	were	a	 few	submitted	sell	offers	at	all	centring	around	40,	but	no	buyers;	the	observed	apparent	price	stability	a	symptom	of	a	low-liquidity	environment	for	these	domestic	municipal	bonds	in	the	post-1937	period.		Figure	11.9.		Bond	prices:	1932,	1934	City	Bonds,	1932–1941	(Face	value	100
)		
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None	of	 the	stock	exchanges	operating	after	1941	report	any	market	prices	on	either	of	these	bonds.	Using	Shunpao	as	our	primary	source,	we	searched	the	historical	record	to	find	whether	the	collaborationist	municipal	government	honoured	the	prior	debt	obligations	of	the	Guomindang	municipal	government.	Keyword	searches	†	in	Shunpao	revealed	that	the	last	 mention	 of	 the	 1934	 bond	was	 at	 the	 end	 of	 1938	 (31	 December),	 noting	 coupon	payments	made	on	the	bond	by	the	Bank	of	China,	Bank	of	Communications,	and	Central	Bank	of	China.	Unlike	for	several	other	bonds	mentioned	in	the	notice,	there	was	no	mention	of	 principal	 repayment,	 although	 whether	 that	 was	 an	 unintentional	 omission	 or	 an	indication	 that	 none	 was	 being	 made	 is	 unclear.	 In	 any	 event,	 no	 subsequent	 report	regarding	 the	 bond	was	 found	 afterward.	 Conversely,	 coupon	 and	 lottery	 drawings	 for	principal	repayments	still	continued	up	through	1941	for	the	1932	city	bond	as	per	multiple	announcements	regarding	the	results	of	lottery	drawings	and	when	interest	and	principal	payments	would	be	conducted	by	HSBC.	Two	articles	 (7	December	1940;	31	May	1941)	describe	how	investors	respected	that	even	under	the	current	situation,	there	had	been	no	missed	scheduled	payments	on	the	1932	bond	issuance.	The	situation	changed	drastically	after	 the	 Japanese	military	 stormed	the	 foreign	 settlements	and	 imprisoned	many	of	 its	Western	residents,	shut	down	all	Western	banks	including	HSBC,	and	imposed	martial	law	throughout	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 city.	 From	 this	 time	 all	 bond	 payments	 were	 subsequently	stopped.		Interestingly,	the	article	on	7	December	1940	implies	that	the	majority	of	the	bond	holders	by	that	time	were	foreigners;	this	would	be	in	contrast	to	the	situation	that	characterised	the	initial	offerings	of	the	bonds	on	the	market	in	1932,	when	most	of	the	bonds	ended	up	being	 subscribed	 by	 domestic	 investors.	 A	 dim	 view	 of	 the	 collaborationist	 regime	 by	domestic	investors	might	have	led	to	an	exit	out	of	their	positions	in	these	bonds.	Given	the	events	occurring	at	the	end	of	1941	this	might	have	been	a	prescient	stance.	After	the	war	and	with	 the	 return	of	a	Guomindang-backed	municipal	government	 in	1946,	 there	was	pressure	by	 investors	who	still	held	 the	1932	bonds	 for	 the	new	government	 to	resume	payments.	An	article	 in	Shunpao	 from	8	 January	1946	reported	that	 in	response	 to	such	pressure,	Department	of	Finance	Secretary	Shen	Hua	indicated	his	office	was	still	looking	at	ways	to	deal	with	the	outstanding	city	bond	payments.	Municipal	finances	were	reported	to	be	very	tight,	as	17	types	of	taxes	that	used	to	be	collected	by	the	local	government	were	now	under	 control	 of	 the	 central	 government,	while	 simultaneously	 there	were	 a	 lot	 of	funding	needs	given	the	amount	of	reconstruction	work	required.	As	a	result,	current	local	tax	revenue	was	 insufficient	 to	cover	spending,	necessitating	 the	cutting	of	city	officials'	salaries	and	 the	 like.	That	 said,	 Secretary	 Shen	was	 "hopeful"	 that	 there	would	 soon	be	specific	plans	to	address	the	issue.	In	any	event,	the	pressure	on	the	city	government	was	sufficient	 such	 that	 bond	 repayments	 were	 restarted	 the	 following	 year.	 In	 a	 brief	announcement	in	the	financial	journal *0	("Credit	Reporter",	vol	258:	3),	it	was	noted	that	the	1932	City	Bond	would	resume	lottery	drawings	to	pay	back	principal	on	17	June	at	HSBC	 branches	 in	 Shanghai.	 Within	 a	 few	 short	 months,	 however,	 the	 persistent	hyperinflation	rendered	subsequent	bond	repayments	essentially	worthless,	and	therefore	future	repayments	were	discontinued.			_______________________________________________________________________________________________		
†	Difficulties	arise	when	performing	word	searches	for	financial	instruments	and	terms,	as	the	media	frequently	used	different	naming	conventions	over	the	time	period.		For	instance,	articles	referred	to	 the	1932	City	Bond	as	 "?,J",	 ";@(?,J",	 "?,J",	 and	 ",J".	However,	caution	needed	to	be	applied,	as	there	existed	several	articles	referencing	a	different	bond,	one	issued	by	the	domestic	central	government,	also	as	",J".	As	best	possible,	care	was	taken	to	avoid	 missing	 references	 by	 ignoring	 appropriate	 references	 while	 attempting	 to	 avoid	 over-counting	via	incorrectly	ascribing	a	non-municipal	bond	reference.		
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	11.3.		Shanghai's	Extraterritorial	Municipal	Bonds		In	 his	 report	 on	 the	 future	 of	 extraterritoriality	 and	 the	 International	 Settlement,	 Judge	Richard	Feetham	noted	that	the	independence	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	enjoyed	in	governing	its	own	affairs	was	both	"blessing	and	curse",	for	while	the	lack	of	funding	by	foreign	governments	alleviated	local	leadership	from	being	beholden	to	outside	control,	it	also	forced	the	Settlement	to	find	its	own	financing	sources	to	conduct	the	business	of	its	self-governance	(Feetham	1931).	The	need	for	the	residents	of	the	early	foreign	settlements	to	organise	their	own	governance	and	fiscal	matters	originated	with	the	initial	days	of	the	British	Settlement.	As	early	as	the	mid-1850s,			British	 government	 officials	 in	 the	 Foreign	 Office	 were	 stressing	 that	 the	 provision	 of	municipal	 services	 and	 upkeep	 of	 the	 such	 would	 be	 viewed	 as	 internal	 matters	 of	"voluntary	 associations"	 of	 the	 Settlement's	 inhabitants,	 and	 not	 part	 of	 official	 British	government	matters.	 The	 Foreign	Office's	 Lord	 Clarendon,	 in	 an	 official	 dispatch	 to	 the	British	 consul	 in	 Shanghai,	 Sir	 John	 Bowering,	 wrote	 "The	 comfort	 and	 safety	 of	 the	European	 residents	may	also	 require	 an	 internal	police	 and	 sanitary	Regulations,	which	cannot	 be	 supplied	 by	 the	 Chinese	 Government,	 and	 the	 residents	may	 have	 voluntary	Associations	for	the	purpose	of	supplying	these	wants;	but	I	have	to	instruct	you	carefully	to	avoid	pledging	Her	Majesty	 to	 the	maintenance	of	 the	Regulations	which	may	be	 laid	down	 by	 the	 Associations,	 by	 becoming	 parties	 to	 them	 in	 name	 of	 Her	 Majesty's	Government"	(Foreign	Office	Papers	No.	158:	1855).		In	 the	 early	 beginnings	 of	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 Settlement,	 revenue	 collected	 for	 public	projects	were	almost	exclusively	from	tax	receipts	on	real	estate.	By	the	start	of	1861,	the	Council	members	began	to	explore	the	idea	of	setting	up	a	licensing	arrangement	to	raise	additional	monies;	additional	justification	for	requiring	merchants	to	obtain	licenses	to	sell	goods	was	given	as	"	for	the	preservation	of	regularity	and	good	order	in	the	settlement"	(NCH	9	February	1861:	23).			Achieving	this	took	some	time,	however,	and	the	licensing	issue	remained	an	important	but	open	topic	of	discussion	for	several	cycles	of	ratepayers	meetings	and	Council	reports	(NCH	5	April	1862:	55-56).	Beginning	in	1862,	the	Council	started	collecting	licensing	fees	from	sampans	 (small	 boats	 carrying	 passengers	 and	 cargo	 along	 or	 across	 the	 Huangpu)	 by	issuing	each	vehicle	a	unique	identifying	number	and	charging	approximately	3.75	yuan	per	vehicle,	raising	5,292	yuan	on	1,323	registered	boats	(NCH	11	April	1863:	58).	Also	in	that	year,	the	Council	began	requiring	public	entertainment	halls	operating	in	the	Settlement	to	be	licensed,	registering	30	halls	and	collecting	200	yuan	per	hall,	or	6,000	yuan	in	total	for	the	year.		As	the	population	and	demand	for	civic	service	provision	grew	within	the	Settlement,	so	too	did	 the	need	 for	greater	 revenue	 collection	strategies	 to	meet	 its	 fiscal	 needs.	However,	under	the	power	of	the	Land	Regulations	and	its	founding	by-laws,	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	possessed	limited	authority	to	tax	residents	and	economic	activities.	Given	the	fairly	light	tax	structure	that	the	Council	could	effectively	impose	on	the	business	community	and	residents,	 it	 would	 have	 been	 difficult	 to	 fund	 large-scale	 infrastructure	 improvements	without	debt	financing.	As	such,	the	Council	turned	to	debenture	issuance	relatively	early	on.	Table	11.3	presents	the	extant	total	of	annual	bond	issuances	by	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council,	beginning	in	1872.			 	
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Table	11.3.		Municipal	bond	issuances	of	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council		 Count	 Issued	 Coupon	 Term	Years	 Call	Option	 Exercised	 Redeemed	 Currency	 Issue	Amount	1	 1872	 8.0	%	 20	 5	 Yes	 5	 Taels	 28,700	2	 1873	 8.0	%	 20	 5	 Yes	 8	 Taels	 21,000	3	 1875	 8.0	%	 20	 5	 Yes	 11	 Taels	 42,800	4	 1878	 8.0	%	 20	 5	 Yes	 10	 Taels	 24,000	5	 1882	 7.0	%	 20	 5	 Yes	 7	 Taels	 60,000	6	 1883	 7.0	%	 20	 5	 Yes	 11	 Taels	 45,000	7	 1884	 7.0	%	 20	 5	 Yes	 10	 Taels	 15,000	8	 1885	 7.0	%	 20	 5	 Yes	 11	 Taels	 30,000	9	 1888	 6.0	%	 20	 5	 Yes	 10	 Taels	 70,000	10	 1890	 6.0	%	 20	 5	 Yes	 11	 Taels	 20,000	11	 1891	 5.5	%	 20	 5	 Yes	 10	 Taels	 20,000	12	 1892	 5.0	%	 20	 5	 	–		 20	 Taels	 50,000	13	 1893	 5.5	%	 20	 5	 	–		 20	 Taels	 125,000	14	 1894	 6.0	%	 20	 5	 Yes	 17	 Taels	 105,000	15	 1895	 5.0	%	 20	 5	 	–		 20	 Taels	 115,000	16	 1896	 5.0	%	 20	 5	 	–		 20	 Taels	 140,000	17	 1897	 5.0	%	 20	 5	 	–		 20	 Taels	 268,000	18	 1898	 6.0	%	 20	 5	 Yes	 13	 Taels	 300,000	19	 1900	 5.5	%	 20	 5	 	–		 20	 Taels	 33,900	20	 1901	 6.0	%	 20	 5	 	–		 20	 Taels	 250,000	21	 1902	 6.0	%	 20	 5	 	–		 20	 Taels	 150,000	22	 1903	 6.0	%	 20	 5	 	–		 20	 Taels	 490,500	23	 1904	 6.0	%	 20	 5	 	–		 20	 Taels	 214,500	24	 1905	 6.0	%	 20	 5	 	–		 20	 Taels	 320,000	25	 1907	 6.0	%	 20	 5	 	–		 20	 Taels	 500,000	26	 1908	 6.0	%	 20	 5	 	–		 20	 Taels	 650,000	27	 1909	 6.0	%	 20	 5	 	–		 20	 Taels	 300,000	28	 1910	 6.0	%	 20	 5	 	–		 20	 Taels	 500,000	29	 1911	 6.0	%	 30	 10	 Yes	 19	 Taels	 900,000	30	 1912	 6.0	%	 30	 10	 Yes	 18	 Taels	 600,000	31	 1913	 6.0	%	 30	 10	 Yes	 17	 Taels	 850,000	32	 1913	 5.5	%	 50	 10	 Yes	 17	 Taels	 500,000	33	 1914	 5.5	%	 30	 10	 Yes	 16	 Taels	 1,203,000	34	 1915	 5.5	%	 30	 10	 Yes	 15	 Taels	 1,065,000	35	 1916	 6.0	%	 30	 10	 Yes	 14	 Taels	 1,900,000	36	 1917	 7.0	%	 5	 	–		 		 5	 Taels	 1,600,000	37	 1918	 7.0	%	 10	 	–		 		 10	 Taels	 1,800,000	38	 1919	 7.0	%	 10	 	–		 		 10	 Taels	 3,400,000	39	 1920	 7.0	%	 10	 	–		 		 10	 Taels	 2,240,000	40	 1920	 6.0	%	 30	 10	 Yes	 10	 						£				*	 750,000	41	 1921	 8.0	%	 30	 10	 Yes	 10	 Yuan	 1,000,000	42	 1921	 8.0	%	 30	 10	 Yes	 10	 Taels	 5,096,400	43	 1922	 7.0	%	 30	 10	 Yes	 10	 Taels	 8,000,000	44	 1923	 6.0	%	 30	 10	 Yes	 10	 Taels	 4,920,000	45	 1924	 6.0	%	 30	 10	 Yes	 10	 Taels	 5,000,000	46	 1925	 6.0	%	 30	 10	 Yes	 12	 Taels	 5,600,000	47	 1926	 6.0	%	 30	 10	 		 (d)		 Taels	 4,800,000	48	 1927	 7.0	%	 30	 10	 Yes	 10	 Taels	 2,187,500	49	 1928	 7.0	%	 10	 5	 Yes	 6	 Taels	 1,600,000	50	 1934	 5.0	%	 30	 10	 		 (d)		 Yuan	 10,404,700	51	 1936	 5.5	%	 10	 	–		 		 (d)		 Yuan	 5,000,000	52	 1937	 5.0	%	 30	 10	 		 (d)		 Yuan	 9,000,000	53	 1940	 6.0	%	 10	 1	 		 (d)		 Yuan	 16,000,000	54	 1941	 6.0	%	 10	 1	 		 (d)		 Yuan	 9,000,000	Averages	 6.3	%	 18.9	 7.0	 64	%	 12.8	 Total:		$	136,062,645	Source:			 North	China	Herald,	various	issues	1872–1941	Notes:			 (d)		Denotes	bond	defaulted	after	the	fall	of	the	foreign	settlement	areas	in	1941			*				Denotes	converted	at	exchange	rate	of		£1	=	$7.77	in	1921	
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11.3.1		Extraterritorial	Municipal	Bond	Issuances:	Repayment	Structures		Two	important	repayment	features	of	International	Settlement	bonds	stand	in	contrast	to	those	of	the	domestic	government	national	and	municipal	bond	issuances.	First,	while	prior	to	the	1910s	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council's	bonds	were	also	drawing	bonds,	subsequent	repayment	schedules	of	 bonds	 issued	by	Council	were	 in	 the	 form	of	 bullet	 bonds,	with	bondholders	to	receive	principal	repayments	in	full	at	the	end	of	the	term	of	the	bond.	We	look	to	emphasise	the	importance	of	this	difference.			The	effect	of	the	drawing	repayment	scheme	helps	to	"speed	up"	the	time	effect	of	expected	repayment	 risk.	 Therefore,	 if	 two	 bonds	 have	 the	 exact	 same	 features	 differing	 only	 in	repayment	schemes—where	one	exhibits	 full	 repayment	at	the	end	of	 the	 term,	and	the	other	has	an	expected	shorter	term	because	of	the	drawings	feature—the	bond	with	the	shorter	effective	term	will	exhibit	lower	repayment	risk.	Thus,	all	things	equal,	we	would	expect	domestic	bonds	with	the	drawings	repayment	feature	to	be	demanded	and	priced	at	levels	representing	lower	repayment	risk	compared	to	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	bonds	of	similar	tenor.		Second,	most	of	these	bonds	contained	a	call	option	that	gave	the	Council	the	option	to	bring	the	bond	to	maturity	at	any	date	after	the	call	date.	For	instance,	as	shown	on	the	table,	the	1872	 issuance's	 tenor	was	 twenty	 years,	with	a	 call	 option	at	 year	 five	 that	 the	Council	exercised	at	the	earliest	possible	date.	The	1873	issuance,	also	of	a	twenty-year	tenor	and	callable	after	five	years,	was	exercised	in	1881	at	year	eight.	Conversely,	the	option	on	the	1892	bond	was	not	exercised.	As	clear	from	the	chart,	the	Council	was	relatively	active	in	utilising	the	call	option,	doing	so	for	more	than	half	the	callable	bonds.			Thomas	(2001:	62)	notes	investors	were	not	fond	of	the	call	option,	as	it	exposed	them	to	substantial	reinvestment	risk.	This	is	clear	from	the	table—issuances	in	1892,	1893,	1895,	1896	and	1897	carried	low	coupon	rates	of	five	per	cent	and	were	not	exercised,	whereas	those	issued	earlier	carrying	higher	coupons	were	called	early.	As	noted,	the	addition	of	an	early	redemption	option	has	important	implications	for	bond	pricing.	As	the	issuer	is	able	to	 exercise	 the	 option	 at	 its	 discretion	 and	 hence	 will	 tend	 do	 so	 when	 refinancing	conditions	are	favourable,	the	existence	of	the	option	on	the	bond	increases	reinvestment	risk,	 implying	 investors	will	 demand	higher	 coupon	 rates	 to	hold	 such	bonds,	 all	 things	equal.	Hence,	the	call	options	imply	that—all	things	equal—International	Settlement	bonds	would	 have	 been	 demanded	 and	 priced	 as	 representing	 higher	 reinvestment	 risk	 than	similarly	constructed	domestic	national	or	municipal	government	bonds	 issued	sans	 call	options.		Thus,	both	of	these	material	differences	between	the	repayment	structures	of	the	domestic	government	and	extraterritorial	municipal	government	bonds	work	in	the	same	direction	to	increase	the	costs	of	capital	on	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council,	all	things	equal.	However,	as	described	below,	investors	appeared	persuaded	that	all	things	were	not	equal,	for	what	we	find	is	the	opposite–coupons	on	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	bonds	were	in	fact	lower	than	those	on	similarly	constructed	domestic	municipal	or	national	bonds,	and	investors	seemed	 considerably	 more	 willing	 to	 subscribe	 to	 the	 extraterritorial	 bonds	 than	 to	domestic	bonds.	Further,	when	domestic	issuances	could	be	placed	and	were	traded	on	the	bond	 markets,	 they	 did	 so	 at	 discounts	 greater	 than	 those	 at	 which	 the	 International	Settlement's	municipal	bonds	traded.	These	pricing	phenomena	are	explored	below	in	the	following	section;	first	we	present	the	history	of	the	extraterritorial	municipal	issuances.		 	
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11.3.2.		Shanghai	Municipal	Council	Bond	Issuances:	Historical	Overview		As	indicated	by	Table	11.3,	bond	issuances	proved	to	be	a	significant	source	of	funding,	with	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	typically	issuing	one	bond	per	annum	over	the	course	of	its	existence,	 the	main	 exception	 being	 1929	 to	 1933,	when	 proceeds	 from	 the	 sale	 of	 the	Municipal	Electrical	Department	to	the	Shanghai	Power	Company	proved	sufficient	to	meet	budgeting	needs	(SMC	1929:	329-331).		The	Settlement's	first	general	funded	bond	series	was	issued	in	1872,	a	30,000	tael	five-year	bond	offering	an	eight	per	cent	coupon	paying	interest	semi-annually	with	a	face	value	of	100	taels.†	The	Council	raised	28,700	of	the	authorised	30,000.	Through	1892,	the	nominal	amounts	of	 the	bond	 issuances	averaged	35,500	 taels.	As	its	population	grew,	so	did	 the	demand	for	better	services	and	infrastructure,	as	did	funding	needs.	From	1894	to	1900,	average	 bond	 issuances	 were	 on	 the	 scale	 of	 150,000	 taels,	 increasing	 to	 375,000	 the	following	decade,	and	ballooning	 to	1.5	million	 taels	 for	 the	decade	1911	to	1920.	Bond	nominal	amounts	remained	high	going	 forward,	with	 the	average	 for	the	period	1921	to	1928	 increasing	 to	2.6	millions	 taels,	 and	3.5	million	 taels	 for	 the	 period	1934	 through	1941.§				Over	 the	 course	 of	 its	 history,	 the	 International	 Settlement's	 cost	 of	 funding	 generally	trended	lower,	as	coupon	rates	fell	from	8	per	cent	in	the	1870s	to	7	per	cent	in	the	1880s,	down	to	6	per	cent	in	the	1890s;	although	it	subsequently	fluctuated	between	a	low	of	5	per	cent	to	as	high	as	8	per	cent,	the	median	rate	was	6.3	per	cent.	The	generally	low	rates	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	were	able	to	obtain	on	its	bond	issuances	reflected	the	overall	perception	amongst	investors	as	to	the	creditworthiness	of	the	Municipal	Council	's	ability	to	meet	its	debt	obligations.			There	 were	 several	 factors	 driving	 investors'	 general	 positive	 perception.	 First,	 the	budgeting	process	was	relatively	transparent	and	professionalised.	The	fiscal	affairs	of	the	International	 Settlement	 were	 handled	 by	 a	 designated	 Financing	 Committee	 and	Department	of	Finance,	created	by	the	Council	in	1897.	These	institutions	were	tasked	with	managing	 the	 Settlement's	 finances	 and	producing	both	 a	 summary	of	 each	prior	 year's	expenses	and	forecasting	a	budget	for	the	next	year.	Financial	matters	grew	increasingly	complex	over	time;	while	the	1879	accounting	Financial	Statement	published	in	that	year's	Shanghai	Municipal	 Council	 Report	 comprised	 sixteen	 pages	 defined	 by	 nearly	240	 line	items,	the	Financial	Statement	in	the	1937	Report	comprised	thirty-seven	pages,	consisting	of	 approximately	 twenty-five	major	 categories	with	 over	 nine	 hundred	 line	 items	 (SMC	1879:	122-139;	1937:	283-319).		________________________________________________________________________________________________________		
†	 Technically,	 the	 Council	 had	 authorised	 several	 small	 quasi-bond	 issuances	 starting	 in	 the	 late	1850s	as	a	way	to	raise	funds	for	specific	infrastructure	projects.	For	instance,	an	existing	4000-
tael	loan	collateralised	by	the	Municipal	Police	Building	is	referenced	in	the	notes	to	the	Council's	1860	annual	Ratepayer's	Meeting	(NCH	5	April	1861).	However,	given	that	by	the	end	of	1860	the	obligation	was	held	by	only	three	entities	(Dent	&	Co	1000	taels,	Russell	&	Co	1000	taels,	and	the	Shanghai	Library	2000	taels),	it	appears	likely	this	obligation	was	not	traded,	or	at	the	very	least	not	actively,	as	no	trading	in	these	loans	are	reported	in	the	newspapers	during	the	ensuing	years.	The	1872	issuance	is	the	first	general	obligation	bond	issued	reported	sold	to	the	public	and	had	its	prices	listed	in	the	Share	Market	reports	of	the	North	China	Herald	newspaper.		
§	The	lattermost	figure	requires	additional	explanation.	With	the	currency	reform	and	abolishment	of	 the	 tael	 in	 1933,	 subsequent	 debentures	 issued	 by	 the	 Council	 were	 done	 so	 in	 yuan,	 with	nominal	amounts	averaging	about	9	million	yuan,	equivalent	to	about	6.5	million	taels.	For	direct	comparison	purposes,	however,	we	choose	to	discount	this	amount	by	the	high	inflation	rate	of	the	latter	years	of	the	period	(1937	to	1941),	which	brings	the	figure	down	to	what	would	have	been	approximately	3.5	million	taels	in	real	terms.	
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Second,	the	budget	was	reviewed	annually	in	public	at	the	Annual	Ratepayers	meeting,	at	which	time	items	could	be	scrutinised	and	contested,	which	occasionally	happened.	Issues	relating	to	transparency	and	potential	corruption	in	regard	to	the	Settlement's	financing	were	important	issues	the	Council	was	pushed	to	address	early	in	its	existence,	as	evidenced	by	the	example	cited	in	Chapter	Nine	that	occurred	in	1861	over	the	Defence	Committee's	use	of	the	authority	of	the	Daotai	to	pressure	the	Settlement's	Chinese	residents	to	pay	an	intended	voluntary	contribution	to	domestic	collection	agents	who	had	the	opportunity	and	incentive	to	skim	off	a	majority	of	received	payments	(NCH	5	April	1862:	56).	Such	issues	existed	throughout	the	life	of	the	Council,	as	for	instance	at	the	1933	Ratepayers	Meeting,	with	a	particularly	contentious	disagreement	occurring	over	the	use	of	funds	for	proposed	construction	of	a	new	park	 that	several	Ratepayers	 felt	would	be	wasteful	 (SMC	Report	1933:	18-22).	Third,	the	elected	nature	of	the	Municipal	Council	theoretically	provided	a	check	on	the	spending	activity	of	the	Council;	were	spending	to	become	too	far	out	of	line	with	 Ratepayer's	 expectations,	 Council	 members	 could	 be	 replaced	 with	 those	 more	committed	to	tighter	budgeting.	Fourth,	the	Council	used	professional	outside	accountants	to	 audit	 the	 Finance	 Department's	 annual	 budgets	 before	 they	 were	 submitted	 to	 the	Ratepayers.	Fifth,	the	track	record	of	bond	repayments	remained	unblemished,	fostering	investors'	confidence	as	to	the	Council's	commitment	to	avoid	missing	scheduled	coupon	or	principal	payments.		Finally,	another	likely	source	of	investor	confidence	was	derived	from	the	relative	safety	and	independence	enjoyed	by	the	Settlement,	especially	in	comparison	to	the	levels	of	civil	strife	and	political	machinations	that	plagued	the	domestic	municipality,	as	described	 in	Chapters	Six	and	Eight.	This	comparative	degree	of	safety	was	in	large	part	afforded	to	the	Settlement	by	the	existences	of	an	ever-present	implicit	threat	of	western	military	force	that	could	be	brought	to	bear	on	attempts	to	interfere	with	the	political	sovereignty	and	financial	solvency	 of	 the	 International	 Settlement.	 Thus,	 while	 not	 receiving	 direct	 funding	 from	foreign	 governments,	 the	 Shanghai	 Municipal	 Council	 operated	 with—and	 investors	undoubtedly	perceived—there	 to	be	an	 implied	protective	 shield	 around	the	 Settlement	within	 which	 the	 Shanghai	 Municipal	 Council	 could	 conduct	 its	 mundane	 business	 of	providing	 an	 appropriate	 business	 and	 social	 environment	 concomitant	 with	 the	Ratepayers'	expectations.			Accordingly,	bonds	issued	by	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	proved	to	be	readily	accepted	by	the	investor	community,	being	held	by	both	domestic	Chinese	and	foreigner	individual	investors,	as	well	as	by	local	domestic	and	foreign	banks	and	other	financial	 institutions.	The	bonds	were	consistently	listed	 in	the	market	Share	Reports	compiled	by	 the	Bissett	brokerage	 and	 published	 in	 the	 local	 newspapers,	 and	 traded	 on	 the	 foreign-operated	Shanghai	 Stock	 Exchange.	 Available	 trading	 volumes	 in	 the	 Shanghai	 Municipal	 Council	bonds	were	relatively	robust,	 indicating	that	one	of	their	advantages	for	investors	was	a	relatively	low	liquidity	risk.	As	Table	11.3	indicates,	these	bonds	were	issued	for	the	local	investor	market.	All	of	the	bonds	were	done	so	in	local	currency,	denominated	in	either	taels	or	yuan,	with	a	single	exception	in	1920	when	the	Council	floated	a	£750,000	bond	for	sale	on	the	London	market.			11.3.3.		Investor	Demand	and	Price	Histories	of	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	Bonds			Before	beginning	a	more	rigorous	comparative	analysis	across	bond	categories,	we	briefly	consider	 the	 observed	 price	 histories	 of	 the	 bond	 issuances	 by	 the	 Shanghai	Municipal	Council.	 In	general,	all	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	bonds	were	 issued	with	nominal	face	values	of	100	(usually	 in	taels	or	yuan).	Utilising	the	 financial	tables	and	supplementary	fiscal	data	within	archived	copies	of	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council's	Annual	Reports,	we	calculated	exact	placement	prices	and	subscription	amounts	for	many	of	the	Council's	bond	
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issuances.	 Analysis	 of	 these	 data	 indicate	 that	 in	 general,	 the	 market	 was	 continually	receptive	 for	 the	 Council's	 planned	 bond	 issuances	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 period.	 The	overwhelming	 majority	 of	 the	 issuances	 were	 fully	 subscribed,	 with	 many	 issuances	oversubscribed.	More	 important,	 the	 Council	was	 able	 to	 receive	 excellent	prices	 on	 its	initial	 offerings.	 In	 sharp	 contrast	 to	 the	 experiences	 of	 most	 domestic	 National	 and	Shanghai	 municipal	 bond	 issuances,	 the	 Council	 placed	 its	 bonds	 with	 at	 most	 a	 slight	discount,	 never	 more	 than	 five	 per	 cent	 (Shunpao	 12	 July	 1919;	 China	 Stock	 &	 Share	
Handbook	1933:	28).	In	fact,	in	contrast	initial	offerings	could	frequently	be	placed	at	a	slight	premium,	enabling	the	Council	to	fully	raise	intended	amounts	relatively	easily.	For	instance,	both	 the	 1895	 and	 1896	 bonds	 were	 heavily	 oversubscribed,	 and	 both	 issuances	 were	placed	at	prices	that	averaged	above	par	(100.05	and	100.10,	respectively).	Average	initial	placement	prices	 fell	 slightly	below	par	as	 in	 ensuing	years,	 the	Council	 offered	 current	holders	of	issues	due	for	repayment	during	the	year	in	question	the	option	of	conversion	to	the	current	year's	issuance	at	a	slight	discount.	For	instance,	in	1916,	holders	of	the	1896	debenture	 were	 given	 the	 option	 to	 either	 receive	 full	 payout	 on	 the	 1896	 issue,	 or	 to	convert	their	holdings	into	an	equivalent	number	of	1916	bonds	at	a	discounted	price	of	99.5	(SMC	1916:	29C).	Overall,	given	that	most	of	the	Councils	bonds	entered	the	market	near	par,	the	100	tael	or	yuan	price	point	provides	a	useful	general	barometer	as	to	whether	valuations	rose	or	fell	subsequent	to	issuance.		Figure	11.10	presents	 the	price	 series	of	 three	 representative	bond	 issuances,	 for	1898,	1916	and	1926,	that	traded	over	the	time	frame	before	1941.	Overall,	we	observe	that	these	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	bonds	traded	at	prices	that	generally	did	not	stray	too	far	from	par.	Exceptions	are	notable,	and	typically	reflect	the	impact	of	on-going	civil	strife	occurring	in	the	larger	China	theatre.	Such	events	likely	led	to	investors	weighing	the	risk	that	these	outside	events	might	endanger	the	Settlement	in	ways	economic	or	existential,	and	hence	undermine	 its	 ability	 to	 uphold	 it	 repayment	 obligations.	 Relatedly,	 tumultuous	 socio-political	events	also	tend	to	push	up	interest	rates,	 leading	to	a	concomitant	fall	 in	bond	prices	on	the	secondary	market.			For	instance,	prices	dipped	into	the	mid-80s	once	the	unrest	of	the	warlord	period	began	(represented	by	 the	 shaded	 region	on	 the	 graph	of	 the	1916	 issuance).	Bond	prices	 fell	further	as	the	financial	crisis	that	hit	Shanghai	at	the	start	of	the	1920s	unfolded,	with	the	failure	of	several	native	banks	leading	to	a	drying	of	credit	and	therefore	a	sharp	rise	in	interest	rates,	and	resultant	fall	in	bond	prices.		The	year	1925	was	particularly	active	for	local	debentures,	dominated	in	large	part	by	those	issued	by	the	two	local	extraterritorial	municipalities.	As	reported	in	the	March	1926	issue	of	 the	 local	 trade	 journal	North-China	 Trade	 Review,	 demand	 for	 such	 debentures	 was	particularly	 strong:	 "The	 [Shanghai	Municipal]	 Council	 found	 itself	 extraordinarily	 well	situated	in	regard	to	the	matter	of	flotation.	On	one	occasion	an	issue	of	a	million	taels	of	municipal	 debentures	 was	 taken	 up	 within	 just	 an	 hour,	 while	 a	 second	 of	 the	 same	dimensions	within	less	than	two	hours."	The	appetite	for	what	the	report	referred	to	as	"gilt-edged	 securities"	 was	 driven	 by	 a	 perception	 amongst	 investors	 of	 a	 lack	 of	 viable	alternative	options	given	weakening	local	business	conditions	in	the	wake	of	1925's	May	Thirtieth	Movement.	The	impact	of	the	boycotts	on	foreign	imported	goods	in	the	wake	of	the	Movement	meant	 that	 monies	 typically	 employed	 in	 the	 financing	 of	 trade	 needed	alternative	 investment	options.	As	 this	 local	trade	 journal	noted,	 "Investment	companies	were	crying	aloud	for	a	medium	in	which	they	could	place	their	surplus	earnings,	and...	[n]o	better	 medium	 presented	 itself	 to	 the	 public	 than	 did	 these	 debenture	 issues"	 (NCTR	1926:11).	Hence,	 extraterritorial	municipal	 bond	 issuances	were	 viewed	as	 instruments	providing	reliable	returns	during	periods	of	uncertain	economic	conditions.			
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Figure	11.10.		Three	Selected	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	bonds	prices,	various	years		
	
	
	Source:	North	China	Herald,	various	issues,	1898–1941		
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	The	aftermath	of	the	May	Thirtieth	Movement	was	 followed	by	 intense	civil	strife	 in	 the	lead-up	of	 the	Northern	Expedition	(denoted	on	 the	1916	and	1926	graphs	by	 a	dotted	vertical	 line).	Bond	prices	again	trading	 in	 the	 low	80s	 throughout	1927	and	1928,	with	market	 reaction	 likely	 reflecting	 some	 degree	 of	 both	 issuer-specific	 increased	 investor	uncertainty	regarding	the	potential	for	civil	unrest	to	ultimately	impact	the	ability	of	the	Council	 to	 honour	 its	 debt	 issuances,	 combined	with	 the	 effect	 of	 increases	 in	 general	interest	rates	occurring	in	the	wake	of	the	conflict.				11.4.		Investor	Demand	and	Price	Histories	of	Bonds	offered	on	Shanghai's	Early	Capital													Markets:		Direct	Comparisons		In	the	prior	sections,	we	provided	a	detailed	overview	of	the	issuance	histories	for	Chinese	domestic	internal	bonds	and	Shanghai's	domestic	and	extraterritorial	municipal	bonds	up	through	the	end	of	the	existence	of	the	foreign	settlement	areas	and	the	extraterritoriality	system	 in	 1941.	 Here,	 we	 turn	 to	 conducting	 a	 more	 explicitly	 comparative	 analysis,	allowing	 us	 to	 draw	 more	 general	 conclusions	 in	 regard	 to	 contemporaneous	 investor	perceptions	as	 to	the	relative	quality	of	private	property	and	contract	rights	protections	afforded	 by	 each	 of	 the	 issuers,	 as	 represented	 by	 the	 relative	 levels	 of	 acceptance	 and	pricing	across	these	issuance	classes.				
Averaged	Bond	Prices	This	section	presents	a	more	direct	comparison	of	the	way	in	which	the	markets	priced	the	different	 types	 issuer-defined	 bonds.	 To	 conduct	 this	 analysis,	 we	 construct	 combined	averaged	price	series	for	each	of	the	different	types	issuer-defined	bonds.	Specifically,	we	calculate	a	weighted	average	price	of	all	of	the	bonds	for	which	we	have	data	across	each	of	the	issuers,	over	the	course	of	the	time	series.	Bond	prices	are	weighted	by	the	size	of	the	issuances.	Ideally,	a	more	preferable	weighting	methodology	would	be	the	value	of	volumes	traded	on	each	issuance,	as	it	would	better	represent	the	liquidity	and	market	importance	that	 we	 would	 like	 to	 capture,	 and	 for	 which	 the	 size	 of	 issuance	 is	 only	 a	 proxy.	Unfortunately,	available	data	on	the	value	of	volume	traded	cover	only	a	small	sub-set	of	the	time	period	for	which	we	have	price	data.			Care	was	taken	in	regard	to	construction	of	the	foreign	settlement	municipal	bonds	price	series,	as	some	bonds	traded	in	taels,	and	some	in	yuan,	and	one	in	sterling	pounds,	and	at	times	they	did	so	concurrently,	which	present	issues	in	trying	to	combine	them.	As	it	would	not	be	appropriate	to	price	them	in	a	single	currency	(causing	the	converted	series	to	either	appear	to	trade	greatly	over	or	under	par	in	the	new	currency),	we	averaged	all	tael-traded	and	yuan-traded	prices	 separately,	 calculated	 their	prices	as	 a	per	 cent	 of	 par,	and	 then	combined	these	values	into	a	single	category,	enabling	averaging	to	take	place	that	did	not	cause	 a	 misleading	 result.	 Another	 small	 caveat	 is	 that	 one	 of	 the	 domestic	 central	government	internal	issuances	had	a	face	value	of	five	hundred	as	opposed	to	one	hundred	
yuan,	and	so	prices	were	scaled	accordingly	to	allow	for	direct	comparison	with	other	prices.			Figure	11.11	provides	a	comparison	of	these	calculated	averaged	bond	price	series	over	the	time	frame.	To	begin	with,	the	averaged	series	follow	a	behavioural	pattern	suggested	by	previous	consideration	of	individual	bonds'	price	series.	Note	that	the	averaged	bond	price	series		of		the		extraterritorial		International	Settlement-administered		municipality		remains					
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closely	aligned	with	par	value,	compared	to	averaged	prices	of	the	other	series.	Note	further	that	for	periods	when	these	extraterritorial-issued	bonds	did	fall	in	value,	such	as	during	the	early	and	late	1920s,	these	price	falls	were	mimicked	on	a	greater	scale	by	domestic	government	issuances.			Second,	somewhat	surprisingly,	at	least	for	most	of	their	period	of	overlap,	the	averaged	bond	prices	of	the	domestic	Shanghai	municipality	are	higher	than	those	of	the	domestic	central	government.	In	theory,	the	hierarchy	of	authority	that	national	governments	hold	over	 sub-national	 governments	 would	 suggest	 that	 investors	 would,	 given	 a	 better	theoretical	risk	profile,	price	national	issuances	higher	than	subnational.			These	results	are	slightly	misleading	given	that	for	much	of	the	period,	bond	offerings	of	the	domestic	 municipality	 authorities	 could	 not	 even	 be	 placed	 to	 investors	 such	 that	 they	might	be	traded	so	as	to	indicate	a	market	price.	Such	"failures"	do	not	appear	in	the	chart,	with	 the	 telling	 exception	 of	 the	 1920	 period,	 when	 a	 small	 amount	 of	 trading	 in	 the	Beiyang-era	municipal	 offering	was	 being	 priced	 at	 levels	 far	 below	 that	 of	most	 of	 the	domestic	central	governments'	traded	bonds.			Third,	it	is	important	to	note	that	the	domestic	central	government	price	series,	although	presented	as	a	single	series,	 represents	 the	market	prices	of	debt	obligations	 issued	and	then	 assumed	 by	 multiple	 central	 governments.	 Accordingly,	 we	 observe	 sharp	 price	declines	 at	 each	 of	 the	 transitional	 events	 representing	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 governments	 in	question—in	 1911	 with	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 Qing,	 and	 in	 1927	 with	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 Beiyang	government.			Figure	11.11.	Bond	prices,	averaged	across	issuer,	1880-1941	(Standardised	face	value=100)	
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11.5		Summary	and	Conclusions		Shanghai	 was	 home	 to	 multiple	 stock	 exchanges	 that	 traded	 differing	 sets	 of	 financial	instruments,	 with	 bond	 trading	 activity	 undergoing	 several	 upswings	 and	 downturns	throughout	 the	 pre-war	 time	 period.	 The	 domestic	 stock	 exchanges	 dealt	 primarily	 in	government	bonds,	with	the	majority	of	volume	traded	comprised	of	national	government	internal	 debt	 issuances;	 offerings	 by	 Shanghai's	 domestic	 municipal	 governments	were	rarely	actively	traded.	The	extraterritorial-operated	stock	exchange	included	a	bond	market	comprised	of	more	consistently-traded	extraterritorial	municipal	bonds.		Overall,	 this	 chapter	has	provided	a	detailed	history	of	 the	 issuance	processes,	 investor	interest,	and	price	series	of	the	bonds	of	the	three	sets	of	government	issuers.	Employing	a	comparative	 approach,	 we	 have	 been	 able	 to	 explore	 the	 relative	 and	 changing	 set	 of	contemporaneous	investor	perceptions	of	the	relative	quality	of	the	underlying	institutional	environments	as	represented	by	the	differing	issuers.			The	price	histories	of	the	extraterritorial	municipal	bonds	contrast	fairly	sharply	with	those	of	the	domestic	governments'	issuances,	whose	bonds	rarely	traded	near	par	and	usually	were	 issued	 at	 sharp	 discounts.	 Nonetheless,	 as	 indicated,	 prices	 of	 extraterritorial	municipal	bonds	did	move	in	response	to	significant	political	and	economic	events	affecting	both	Shanghai	and	the	greater	China	political	landscape.	This	underscores	our	theme	that	the	private	property	rights	regimes	facing	economic	agents	including	investors	and	firms	were	not	absolutist,	either	"strong"	or	"weak",	but	rather	relative	and	variable	over	time.			To	help	resolve	the	important	debate	in	the	Chinese	economic	history	literature	centring	around	 competing	 viewpoints	 of	 domestic	 institutional	 quality,	 we	 have	 leveraged	Shanghai's	unique	dualistic	institutional	frameworks,	one	of	which	mimicked	the	broader	Chinese	 domestic	 institutional	 environment,	 and	 the	 other	 which	 operated	 under	extraterritorial	legal,	political	and	social	constructs.	Simultaneously,	we	also	leveraged	the	fact	 that	governments	and	 firms	that	operated	within	each	of	 these	distinct	 institutional	environments	issued	financial	securities,	differing	in	terms	of	the	implicit	private	property	and	 contract	 rights	 afforded	 by	 the	 institutional	 environments	 under	 which	 they	 were	issued.	 Thus,	 investors	 pricing	 these	 securities	 were	 implicitly	 pricing	 the	 associated	repayment	risks	of	these	differing	sets	of	financial	instruments.	The	creation	of	an	original	new	weekly	bond	pricing	data	series	and	related	material	has	allowed	us	the	opportunity	to	analyse	contemporaneous	investor	behaviour	in	Shanghai's	capital	markets.			Shanghai's	economic	actors	consistently	chose	to	invest	in	extraterritorial	governments	and	firms,	over	those	of	similar	domestic	governments	and	firms,	with	the	primary	difference	who	 contract	 rights	 and	 legal	 and	 economic	 rights	 were	 defined	 by	 the	 institutional	environment	 in	which	 they	were	 issued.	Given	 these	 results,	we	 are	 able	 to	draw	 fairly	definitive	conclusions	of	the	perceived	strength	and	efficacy	of	the	respective	institutional	environments.	By	measuring	relative	levels	of	investor	demand	for	financial	assets	issued	by	sovereign	governments	in	both	environments,	we	find	a	consistent	pattern	indicating	contemporaneous	 actors	 perceived	 extraterritorial	 protections	 on	 private	 property	 and	contract	 rights	 to	be	 superior	 to	 those	offered	under	 the	domestic	Chinese	 institutional	environment.	 The	 robustness	 of	 these	 findings	 is	 suggested	 by	 their	 considerable	consistency	over	time	and	across	multiple	domestic	central	and	municipal	governments.		The	 results	 robustness	 also	derive	 from	 the	 fact	 that	both	domestic	 and	extraterritorial	investors	had	the	ability	to	purchase	both	extraterritorial-	and	domestic-issued	sovereign	bonds.	 This	 implies	 that	 both	 security	 types	were	 in	 the	 portfolio	 possibility	 sets	 of	 all	investors;	 therefore,	 observed	 market	 prices	 represent	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 investment	decisions	of	both	extraterritorial	and	domestic	investors.	This	is	important,	as	it	indicates	that	differentials	 in	demand	 reflected	 the	 simultaneous	decisions	of	 Shanghai's	 investor	class	regarding	these	securities'	repayment	risks.	
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Chapter	Twelve.	
Conclusions				12.1.			Objectives	of	this	Research	Dissertation		The	primary	focus	of	this	dissertation	has	been	to	advance	and	clarify	the	existing	debate	in	the	literature	regarding	opinions	on	the	capability,	efficacy	and	strength	of	China's	late	imperial	and	republican	domestic	 institutional	environment.	To	help	advance	the	debate,	we	 looked	to	move	beyond	the	standard	approach	of	analysing	China's	past	institutional	environment	by	relying	on	current-period	interpretations	of	historical	events.	The	creation	of	an	original	new	weekly	bond	pricing	data	series	provided	the	opportunity	to	analyse	contemporaneous	investor	behaviour	in	Shanghai's	 early	 capital	 markets.	 In	 doing	 so,	 we	 could	 capture	 investors'	 contemporaneous	perceptions	of	the	strength	and	efficacy	of	Shanghai's	respective	institutional	environments.	Given	the	 similarities	 between	 the	 institutional	 environment	 of	 domestic	 Shanghai	 and	 the	 broader	institutional	 environment	 of	 domestic	 China,	 our	 comparative	 analysis	 between	 Shanghai's	parallel	 the	 institutional	 environments,	 allow	 us	 to	 make	 inferences	 about	 contemporaneous	actors'	 perceptions	 of	 China's	 domestic	 institutional	 environment.	 Thus,	 rather	 than	 relying	 on	backwards-looking	 methodologies	 to	 form	 opinions	 on	 China's	 historical	 institutional	environment,	 our	 approach	 is	 based	 on	 uncovering	 and	 utilising	 the	 perceptions	 of	contemporaneous	 economic	 actors.	 	 Sections	 12.2	 and	 12.3	 provide	 a	 detailed	 summary	 and	analytic	strategy	of	the	study's	first	main	research	goal.		The	second	main	research	goal,	discussed	in	greater	detail	in	Section	12.4,	involves	an	analysis	of	the	dynamics	of	Shanghai’s	early	capital	markets,	with	an	in-depth	analysis	of	the	operation	of	the	city's	multiple	bond	markets.	To	conduct	the	analysis	in	this	dissertation,	we	have	constructed	a	novel	dataset	 that	provides,	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 the	Chinese	 financial	history	 literature,	weekly	Shanghai	 municipal	 government	 bond	 pricing	 data.	 The	 scale	 and	 scope	 of	 the	 time	 series	collected	allow	 for	a	deeper	and	more	 robust	analysis	of	 the	performance	and	activity	of	 these	markets	than	heretofore	presented	in	the	literature.	Finally,	a	discussion	of	the	limitations	of	the	study	is	presented	in	Section	12.5.				12.2.			Analysing	China's	Domestic	Institutional	Environment		In	 light	 of	 considerable	 debate	 in	 the	 literature	 regarding	 the	 overall	 strength	 and	 capacity	 of	China's	domestic	institutional	environment	that	characterised	the	late-imperial	through	pre-war	republican	 era,	 we	 qualitatively	 examined	 the	 nature	 of	 China's	 institutional	 protections	 on	private	property	and	contract	rights,	with	an	emphasis	on	addressing	the	difficulty	 in	capturing	the	 inherent	 mutable	 complexities	 characterising	 these	 concepts.	 In	 doing	 so,	 we	 have	underscored	 the	 inherent	 multidimensionality	 of	 concepts	 such	 as	 state	 capacity,	 institutional	quality,	 and	 private	 property	 rights,	 which	 help	 drive	 the	 literature's	 competing	 findings	 that	characterise	the	domestic	Chinese	institutional	environment	as	either	strong	or	weak.		This	inherent	difficulty	in	measuring	the	strength	and	efficacy	of	China's	institutional	environment	is	 reflected	 in	 the	 scale	 and	 scope	 of	 the	 debate	 found	 in	 the	 economic	 and	 political	 history	literature	regarding	China's	institutions	over	the	late	imperial	and	republican	era,	with	different	sets	 of	 scholars	 producing	 convincing	 evidences	 in	 support	 of	 differing	 positions	 on	 China's	institutional	strength.					
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12.2.1.		China's	Domestic	Institutional	Environment	—	Contested	Viewpoints		The	discussion	provided	 in	Chapter	Three	 regarding	China's	domestic	 institutional	 environment	underscores	the	difficulty	in	succinctly	answering	what	some	regard	as	relatively	straight-forward	questions,	such	as	whether	China's	domestic	institutional	environment	for	private	property	rights	environment	 was	 either	 effective,	 or	 if	 it	 improved	 or	 deteriorated	 over	 time.	 While	 by	 all	objective	measures	it	is	clear	the	scale	of	the	state	apparatus	grew	itself	grew	over	time,	with	new	government	 bureaucratic	 organisations	 and	 offices	 created	 and	 enlarged,	 whether	 positive	outcomes	in	regard	to	a	stronger	institutional	framework	protecting	private	property	or	contract	rights	in	ways	that	could	encourage	economic	and	financial	activity	is	well	contested	within	the	literature.	Paauw	(1952,	1957),	Eastman	(1974,	1984a,	1984b,	1991),	Coble	(1980),	and	Myers	(2000)	 are	 among	 those	 who	 present	 convincing	 arguments	 indicating	 a	 weak	 domestic	 state	institutional	 environment,	 lacking	 in	 state	 capacity	 with	 poor	 tax-raising	 ability	 and	 a	 fiscal	situation	spiralling	out	of	control.			Conversely,	however,	another	set	of	researches	pushes	back	against	the	narrative	of	a	domestic	institutional	 environment	 to	 be	 depicted	 as	 uniformly	 weak.	 Zelin	 (1998)	 and	 Huang	 (2001)	provide	 examples	 of	 solid	 legal	 underpinnings	 supportive	 of	 effective	 private	 property	 and	contract	 rights.	 Strauss	 (1998,	 2008),	 van	 de	 Ven	 (2014),	 Boecking	 (2015),	 and	 Thai	 (2017)	highlight	 examples	 of	 positive	 state	 capacity	 and	 effective	 institutions	 capable	 of	 implementing	policy	goals.	Bian	 (2005a,	2005b)	provides	 arguments	 supportive	of	both	viewpoints.	 Sheridan	(1975)	and	Wakeman	(1996),	meanwhile,	describe	a	level	of	internal	and	external	violence	that	could	 only	 prove	 disruptive	 to	 effective	 economic	 development	 or	 state-building.	 Given	 such	differing	views	of	the	domestic	state	presented	in	the	literature,	it	is	logical	to	ask,	which	analyses	more	 accurately	 reflect	 the	 domestic	 institutional	 environment?	 Are	 optimistic	 analyses	 by	scholars	 more	 correct,	 or	 are	 the	 more	 negative	 evaluations	 more	 accurate?	 Somewhat	confusingly,	there	appears	to	exist	strong	evidences	supportive	of	both	positions.	Strauss	(1998)	herself	recognises	the	contradictions	within	the	Guomindang	period	as	reflected	by	the	title	of	her	work,	 Strong	 Institutions	 in	 Weak	 Polities.	 The	 question,	 and	 difficulty,	 facing	 scholars	 is	determining	the	respective	weights	and	caveats	to	place	upon	the	differing	and	competing	sets	of	evidences.		Yet	 this	 seeming	 inconsistency	 underscores	 the	 fact	 that	 concepts	 such	 as	 "institutional	environment",	 and	 "private	 property	 rights	 institutions",	 are	 inherently	 complex,	multidimensional,	and	indeterminate.	Thus,	different	scholars	have	been	able	to	identify	different	evidences	 that	 support	 their	 particular	 viewpoints	 as	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 China's	 domestic	institutional	health	as	one	of	strength	or	weakness.			The	multi-faceted	nature	of	the	domestic	institutional	environment	has	further	led	to	significantly	differing	portrayals	within	the	literature—at	the	same	time	that	we	observe	the	expanding	role	of	the	 domestic	 state	 across	 society	 and	 within	 the	 economic	 sphere,	 and	 a	 growing	 scope	 and	capacity	 of	 some	 state	 bureaucratic	 systems	 and	 formal	 legal	 institutions,	 all	 of	 which	 help	 to	strengthen	 some	 important	 features	 of	 the	 private	 property	 rights	 environment,	 we	 can	 also	concomitantly	observe	the	state	use	its	power	to	extract	economic	assets	from	private	economic	actors.	Further,	throughout	the	entirety	of	the	late-imperial	through	republican	period,	domestic	state	capacity	in	regard	to	the	ability	of	the	central	government	to	exercise	a	monopoly	of	force	appears	to	have	been	persistently	low,	with	continual	occurrences	of	 internal	and	external	non-state	 actors	 employing	 military	 force	 resulting	 in	 the	 expropriation	 or	 destruction	 of	 private	economic	agent	property.		At	any	given	time,	certain	aspects	or	measures	of	property	rights	protections	might	be	considered	strong	(for	instance,	an	effective	customs	tax	collection	administration),	while	other	aspects	might	be	viewed	as	weak	(for	 instance,	 the	existence	of	numerous	armed	paramilitary	groups	able	 to	expropriate	or	destroy	private	business	assets).	Relatedly,	given	the	multi-dimensional	nature	of	institutional	quality,	various	defining	aspects	experienced	differing	trends	over	time,	with	some	possibly	improving,	while	others	simultaneously	weakening.	
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	Understanding	 this	 complexity,	 therefore,	 allows	us	 to	 rationalise	 the	 seeming	 inconsistency	of	competing	viewpoints	of	domestic	private	property	rights	institutions,	both	over	time	and	within	a	given	time	period,	as	multiple	indicators	of	property	rights	protections—e.g.,	application	of	rule	of	 law,	 expanded	 funding	 for	 formal	 court	 system,	 effective	 administration	 of	 customs	 duties,	private	company	assets	expropriated	by	the	state,	private	banks	compelled	by	regulatory	decree	to	purchase	government	bonds,	destruction	of	economic	assets	by	internal	and	external	military	clashes—simultaneously	 suggest	 very	 different	 conclusions	 as	 to	 the	 overall	 health	 of	 the	domestic	institutional	environment.				12.3.			Addressing	the	Debate	in	the	Literature	on	China's	Domestic	Institutional	Environment		As	outlined,	there	is	an	important	and	yet	unsettled	debate	in	the	literature	regarding	the	nature	of	 China's	 late-imperial	 and	 early	 republican	 institutional	 environment,	 with	 some	 traditional	mainstream	 approaches	 characterising	 the	 environment	 as	 decidedly	 weak,	 and	 more	 recent	revisionist	 views	 suggesting	 a	 more	 effective	 and	 capable	 bureaucratic	 domestic	 institutional	environment.	We	employed	multiple	strategies	to	look	to	address	this	debate.			12.3.1.			The	Role	of	Violence		To	begin	with,	we	conducted	a	broad	yet	detailed	qualitative	analysis,	supported	by	empirical	data	where	 available,	 to	 consider	 the	 quality	 of	 private	 property	 and	 contract	 rights	 protections	afforded	 under	 the	 domestic	 national	 institutional	 environment.	 The	 analysis	 focussed	 on	 the	ways	the	domestic	institutional	environment	varied	along	differing	vectors	of	institutional	quality,	as	well	as	changes	along	such	vectors	over	the	course	of	the	time	frame	considered.		One	of	 the	most	 important	methodical	 strategies	employed	 in	our	analysis	was	 to	 consider	 the	importance	 that	 the	 role	 of	 political	 violence	 played	 in	 shaping	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 domestic	institutional	environment.	As	Weingast	and	his	co-authors	argue	in	their	research	on	what	they	refer	 to	 as	 the	 Violence	 Trap,	 the	 field	 of	 development	 economics	 has	 consistently	underappreciated	 the	 import	 of	 political	 violence	 in	 the	 economic	 growth	process	 (North	et	al.	2009,	 Weingast	 2017:	 52).	 Their	 work	 presents	 evidence	 indicating	 that	 the	 level	 of	 political	violence	 within	 society	 fundamentally	 affects	 the	 development	 process,	 primarily	 by	 way	 of	powerful	effects	on	the	incentives	of	state	actors	to	address	the	problem	of	violence,	often	in	ways	that	inherently	lead	to	poor	protections	of	property	rights	and	thereby	constrain	the	opportunity	for	sustained	economic	development.			Our	findings	both	employ	the	theoretical	approach	advanced	by	Weingast	and	his	Violence	Trap	co-authors,	and	provide	support	for	their	arguments	in	the	particular	historical	framework	of	late-imperial	and	early-republican	China	Specifically,	utilising	the	same	measure	employed	by	Cox	et	
al.	(2013,	2017),	and	supplemented	by	a	detailed	accounting	of	the	historical	record	related	to	the	period's	episodes	of	large-scale	organised	political	and	social	violence,	we	find	the	overall	levels	of	violence	 within	 the	 domestic	 environment	 to	 have	 been	 extremely	 high—during	 certain	 sub-periods	of	the	time	frame	to	have	been	on	par	with	the	level	of	political	violence	suffered	by	some	of	the	weakest	states,	experiencing	average	violent	political	regime	change	of	once	per	annum.	As	explicated	by	 the	 arguments	 contained	within	 the	Violence	Trap	 and	our	 "low-credibility"	 trap	theoretical	constructs,	such	levels	of	persistent	and	constant	political	violence	generate	conditions	wherein	which	state	actors	are	incentivised	to	act	in	ways	that	undermine	their	ability	to	create	credible	commitment	mechanisms	to	protect	private	property	rights	while	 inducing	behaviours	on	 the	 part	 of	 state	 actors	 that	 prioritise	 the	 short-term	 benefits	 accruing	 from	 violations	 of	private	property	 rights	while	discounting	 the	 long-term	expected	benefits	 that	 can	be	achieved	from	protecting	such	rights.		
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12.3.2.		Shanghai's	Unique	Institutional	Setting		The	second	major	strategy	we	employ	to	address	the	debate	in	the	literature	is	to	take	advantage	of	the	unique	historical	setting	of	Shanghai	over	the	late	imperial	and	republican	period.	To	do	so,	we	 start	 with	 a	 series	 of	 observations.	 The	 first	 is	 centred	 on	 the	 dualistic	 institutional	environment	 that	 characterised	 Shanghai	 during	 the	 timeframe,	 a	 city	 defined	 by	 concurrent,	parallel	 institutional	 environments,	 one	 domestic,	 and	 one	 extraterritorial.	 Second,	 given	 the	unitary	nature	of	the	domestic	central	government	and	its	legal	system,	we	argue	that	Shanghai's	domestic	 institutional	 environment	 can	 serve	 as	 a	 suitable	 proxy	 for	 the	 national	 domestic	institutional	environment	that	is	the	concern	of	the	debate	in	the	literature.	Third,	we	note	that	it	is	 useful,	 therefore,	 to	 compare	 Shanghai's	 two	 parallel	 institutional	 environments,	 in	 order	 to	observe	 ways	 in	 which	 contemporaneous	 actors	 behaved	 within	 and	 across	 the	 two	 parallel	environments,	 so	 as	 to	 develop	 and	 understanding	 of	 how	 these	 economic	 actors	 viewed	 the	respective	 institutional	quality	of	 the	 two	environments.	Finally,	when	undertaking	 this	 type	of	comparative	analysis,	we	focus	on	financial	market	activity	within	the	two	environments.	We	do	so	because	financial	instruments	are	particularly	sensitive	to	the	strength	of	contract	and	property	rights.	 Our	 primary	 empirical	 analysis	 utilises	 investor	 behaviours	 and	 trading	 activity	 on	 the	city's	 parallel	 bond	 markets,	 one	 a	 domestic-operated	 capital	 market,	 dealing	 primarily	 in	domestic	 national	 and	 subnational	 bonds,	 and	 the	 other	 an	 extraterritorial-operated	 capital	market,	dealing	primarily	in	extraterritorial	municipal	bonds.	Yet	while	Shanghai's	bond	markets	were	bifurcated,	the	city's	investor	class	was	not;	that	is,	the	market	participants	on	both	markets	comprised	both	domestic	and	extraterritorial	economic	actors.	This	condition	is	important,	for	it	means	 market	 prices	 reflect	 the	 joint	 revealed	 relative	 preferences	 for	 domestic	 and	extraterritorial	issuances.	We	are	thereby	able	to	observe	the	relative	levels	of	market	demand	for	the	 bonds	 of	 domestic	 governments,	 compared	 those	 of	 the	 extraterritorial	 International	Settlement	government,	as	reflected	in	the	price	and	volume	demanded	differentials			12.3.2.1.		Shanghai's	Parallel	Domestic	and	Extraterritorial	Institutional	Environments		The	debate	in	the	literature	surrounding	the	level	of	domestic	institutional	quality	in	China	over	the	 late-imperial	 through	 republican	 time	 period	 is	 accompanied	 by	 a	 similar	 if	 less	 active	consideration	 in	 the	 literature	 regarding	 the	 differences	 between	 the	 co-existing	 institutional	environments	 found	 in	 Shanghai	 over	 the	 same	 period.	 Under	 the	 imposition	 of	 the	 system	 of	extraterritoriality,	 Shanghai	was	 home	 to	 a	 section	 of	 the	 city	 that	 operated	 under	 a	 separate,	unique	 set	 of	 legal,	 political	 and	 social	 constructions	 than	 those	 defining	 the	 broader	 domestic	environment	and	by	extension	the	other	parts	of	Shanghai.	Much	of	the	limited	literature	that	does	consider	 the	 economic	 impacts	 of	 Shanghai's	 differing	 institutional	 environments	 often	makes	rather	 broad	 sweeping	 generalisations	 and	 assumptions	 that	 the	 city's	 extraterritorial	environment	 provided	 superior	 institutional	 safeguards	 on	 economic	 actors'	 private	 property	rights.	 Thus,	 a	 related	 research	 goal	 was	 to	 consider	 provide	 more	 detailed	 and	 definitive	measures	of	the	relative	quality	of	Shanghai's	parallel	institutional	environments.		We	 sought	 to	 describe	 and	 summarise	 in	 qualitative	 detail	 the	 nature	 and	 foundations	 of	 the	institutional	 environments	 that	 existed	 within	 domestic	 and	 extraterritorial	 Shanghai,	 by	analysing	 the	 degree	 of	 variation	 both	 within	 and	 between	 them	 over	 the	 time	 frame	 under	consideration.	 In	 particular,	 Part	 III	 focussed	on	 the	 institutional	 framework	 that	 characterised	Shanghai's	 domestically-administered	 areas	 contrasted	 with	 that	 of	 its	 extraterritorial	settlements.	 Overall,	 we	 find	 there	 were	 two	 primary	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 extraterritorial	institutional	environment	differed	from	that	of	the	domestic.		First,	the	role	of	the	state	did	not	fundamentally	change	over	the	course	of	the	time	frame.	From	the	start,	 the	 International	Settlement	was	 involved	 in	an	array	of	public	works,	such	as	paving	roads	and	 laying	sewer	 lines,	and	 in	 the	provision	of	policing,	military	defence,	and	 firefighting.	While	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 foreign	 municipal	 governments	 increased	 in	 line	 with	 the	 growth	 in	populace	 and	 economic	 activity,	 in	 general	 these	 governments	 continued	 to	 play	 a	 relatively	
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limited	 role.	 Many	 services,	 such	 as	 the	 delivery	 of	 tap	water,	 gas	 for	 heating	 and	 lighting,	 or	electricity,	were	supplied	via	private,	albeit	regulated,	concerns.	Overall,	 it	 is	fair	to	describe	the	municipal	 government	 of	 the	 International	 Settlement	 as	maintaining	 a	 traditional	 laissez-faire	role.	The	Settlement's	fiscal	dependence	on	tax	receipts	and	bond	issuances	played	an	important	role	in	this,	as	the	Shanghai	Municipal	Council	faced	definable,	credible	limits	in	regard	to	its	tax	policies—unlike	 the	 domestic	 state,	 it	 was	 not	 a	military-backed	 authoritarian	 regime,	 instead	receiving	 its	 fundraising	 authority	 from	 the	 Settlement's	 taxpayers,	 which	 created	 an	 inherent	effective	check	on	its	power	to	arbitrarily	raise	tax	rates.	Settlement	bonds	were	issued,	effectively,	in	 foreign	 currency	 (taels	 or	 yuan);	 thus,	 unlike	 domestic	 governments,	 the	 Council	 could	 not	engage	 in	 debasing	 the	 currency	 to	 reduce	 its	 effective	 debt	 obligations.	 Nor	 did	 the	 Council	possess	the	regulatory	or	compulsory	authority	to	force	private	banks	or	other	economic	actors	to	hold	its	bonds.	The	Council	was	dependent	upon	its	bonds	being	viewed	as	attractive	investments	in	order	to	induce	investor	interest,	which	it	accomplished	by	a	commitment	to	a	strong	private	property	 and	 contract	 rights	 environment,	 imposing	 relatively	 little	 regulation	 on	 business	activities,	and	maintaining	a	small	footprint	in	the	economic	sphere.	There	existed	no	parallel,	for	instance,	to	the	Guomindang	bureaucratic	agencies	devoted	to	economic	planning,	let	alone	state-owned	enterprises;	indeed,	the	Council	took	the	opposite	strategy,	privatising	its	ownership	of	the	Shanghai	Electric	Company	in	1929.			Second,	the	extraterritorial	settlements'	state	apparatuses	exhibited	capacity	to	protect	residents'	property	rights	from	non-state	actors;	i.e.,	to	sustain	a	monopoly	on	force	within	their	sovereign	areas.	 In	many	respects,	the	International	Settlement	and	French	Concession	served	as	effective	oases	 of	 safety	 within	 the	 relatively	 embattled	 domestic	 areas	 of	 the	 city.	 Dating	 back	 to	 the	Taiping	Rebellion	and	Small	Swords	period	up	through	to	the	1937	Battle	of	Shanghai,	the	foreign	settlements	 experienced	 relatively	 little	 impact	 from	 outside	 military	 clashes	 that	 conversely	devastated	the	domestic	areas	in	terms	of	loss	of	property	and	life.	This	relative	safety	was	well-recognised	by	the	contemporaneous	populace,	and	hence	it	is	not	surprising	that	the	populations	of	the	"foreign"	settlements	in	fact	comprised	over	90	per	cent	domestic	Chinese.	Further,	Chinese	residents	sought	out	the	extraterritorial	settlements	not	only	in	order	to	live,	but	also	to	establish	domestically-owned	 businesses	 and	 factories;	 such	 movement	 of	 economic	 activities	 were	accentuated	 during	 periods	 of	 severe	 civil	 strife,	 such	 as	 the	 outbreak	 of	 fighting	 during	 the	Northern	Expedition	in	1928,	or	by	the	Japanese	military	in	1932	and	1937.	Given	its	perception	as	a	centre	of	relative	safety,	it	is	not	surprising	that	important	domestic	business	concerns,	such	as	domestic	modern	banks	and	the	domestic	stock	exchanges,	chose	to	locate	their	head	offices	of	within	the	boundaries	of	extraterritorial	Shanghai.		Thus,	 the	 themes	 discussed	 above	 in	 regard	 to	 the	 domestic	 experience—the	 state's	 role	 in	developing	 institutions	 to	 promote	 private	 property	 rights,	 or	 conversely	 in	 either	 itself	 or	allowing	non-state	actors	 to	violate	private	property	 rights—appear	 to	have	been	considerably	more	positive	in	comparison.	However,	it	is	important	not	to	over-inflate	the	degree	to	which	the	private	 property	 rights	 environment	 of	 the	 extraterritorial	 settlements	 could	 be	 considered	 as	unequivocally	 "strong".	 While	 the	 literature	 has	 often	 assumed	 that	 Western-established	governments	are	able	to	provide	incontrovertibly	strong	private	property	rights	protections,	this	was	not	necessarily	 the	 case	on	 the	ground	 in	Shanghai's	 extraterritorial	 settlements.	To	begin	with,	 while	 not	 of	 the	 scale	 or	 scope	 to	 that	 observed	 in	 the	 domestic	 setting,	 outside—and	internally	 instigated—episodes	 of	 violence	 did	 impact	 the	 institutional	 and	 economic	environments	 of	 the	 settlements.	 Violence	 committed	 by	 organised	 crime	 occurred	within	 the	extraterritorial	 settlements.	 The	 famous	 gangster	 and	 purported	 head	 of	 the	 "Green	Gang",	 Du	Yuesheng,	 not	 only	 made	 his	 home	 inside	 the	 French	 Concession,	 but	 moreover	 arranged	kidnappings	and	assassinations	that	took	place	within	the	extraterritorial	settlements	themselves.	The	aftermath	of	1925's	May	Thirtieth	Movement	 led	 to	 the	 imposition	of	martial	 law	declared	within	 the	 International	 Settlement.	 Furthermore,	 as	 time	 went	 on,	 both	 the	 extraterritorial	settlement	councils,	similar	in	trend	to	that	of	the	domestic	Shanghai	municipal	government	if	not	in	scale,	suffered	loss	of	sovereign	control	to	Japanese	military	authority.				
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	Other	 forms	 of	 institutional	weakness	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 strict	 adherence	 to	 rule	 of	 law	 existed.	Whilst	 often	 (self-)described	 as	 an	 example	 of	 "clean"	 government,	 both	 extraterritorial	municipalities	were	 fraught	with	unscrupulous	examples	of	abuse	of	government	power	 for	personal	 gain,	 or	 simple	 incompetence	 (Bickers	 1999,	Whewell	 2015).	 Outright	 corruption	was	not	uncommon,	especially	in	the	terms	of	collusion	between	the	French	Municipal	Council	and	the	Green	Gang	leadership	(Wakeman	1978:	207,	Martin	1992).	Further,	particularly	for	domestic	 Chinese	 residents,	 bias	 and	 racism	 created	 conditions	 that	 deviated	 sharply	 from	stated	classical	liberal	doctrines	of	the	equality	of	all	in	nature	and	in	opportunity.	It	remains	noteworthy	 that	 even	 in	 the	 face	 of	 such	 bias,	 so	 many	 domestic	 actors	 viewed	 the	opportunities	and	environment	within	the	settlements	as	preferable	to	that	found	within	the	domestic	setting's	increased	exposure	to	both	violence	and	expropriation	of	property	by	state	or	non-state	elements.			Overall,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 as	 in	 the	 domestic	 setting,	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 extraterritorial	institutional	 environments,	 and	 the	 ability	of	 their	 state	 apparatuses	 to	protect	 and	enforce	private	 property	 and	 contract	 rights,	 was	 neither	 unchanging	 nor	 absolute,	 either	 when	viewed	individually	over	time,	or	in	direct	comparison	to	the	adjoining	domestic	institutional	environment.						12.3.2.2.		Utilising	Shanghai's	Institutional	Framework	to	Address	Debates	in	the	Literature		To	begin	to	resolve	the	important	debate	in	the	Chinese	economic	history	literature	centring	around	 competing	 viewpoints	 of	 domestic	 institutional	 quality,	 we	 sought	 to	 leverage	 the	existence	of	Shanghai's	unique	dualistic	institutional	frameworks,	one	of	which	mimicked	the	broader	 Chinese	 domestic	 institutional	 environment,	 and	 the	 other	 which	 operated	 under	extraterritorial	 legal,	 political	 and	 social	 constructs.	 Simultaneously,	 we	 also	 leveraged	 the	fact	 that	 governments	 and	 firms	 that	 operated	 within	 each	 of	 these	 distinct	 institutional	environments	issued	financial	securities.	The	differing	attendant	implicit	private	property	and	contract	 rights	 of	 these	 securities	 were	 distinctly	 defined	 by	 the	 differing	 legal,	 political,	credible	 commitment	 mechanisms	 and	 other	 characteristics	 shaped	 by	 the	 institutional	environment	 under	 which	 they	 were	 issued.	 Thus,	 investors	 pricing	 these	 securities	 were	implicitly	 pricing	 the	 associated	 repayment	 risks	 of	 these	 differing	 sets	 of	 financial	instruments.		Moreover,	 while	 Shanghai's	 dual	 institutional	 environments	 differed	 considerably,	 both	nonetheless	existed	within	a	 single	place,	within	 the	same	 time	 frame,	affected	by	 the	same	geographic,	 locational,	 and	 economic	 dynamics,	 and	 populated	 by	 the	 same	 singular	 set	 of	economic	 actors	 who	 comprised	 Shanghai.	 These	 economic	 actors	 were	 free	 to	 engage	 in	economic	behaviours	within	 and	 across	 the	 city's	 differing	 institutional	 environments.	 Such	behaviours	 included	the	ability	to	choose	between	investing	 in	 financial	securities	 issued	by	firms	and	governments	that	operated	under	the	domestic	institutional	environment,	or	those	that	operated	under	the	extraterritorial	environment.	The	creation	of	an	original	new	weekly	bond	 pricing	 data	 series	 and	 related	 material	 allowed	 us	 the	 opportunity	 to	 analyse	contemporaneous	 investor	 behaviour	 in	 Shanghai's	 capital	 markets.	 As	 we	 repeatedly	observed,	 the	 revealed	preferences	of	 these	 economic	 actors	 consistently	 chose	 to	 invest	 in	extraterritorial	 governments	 and	 firms,	 over	 those	 of	 similar	 domestic	 governments	 and	firms,	with	 the	 primary	 difference	who	 contract	 rights	 and	 legal	 and	 economic	 rights	were	defined	by	the	institutional	environment	in	which	they	were	issued.					
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Given	these	results,	we	are	able	to	draw	fairly	definitive	conclusions	of	the	perceived	strength	and	efficacy	of	the	respective	institutional	environments.	Rather	than	relying	on	backwards-looking	methodologies	 to	 form	opinions	on	China's	historical	 institutional	environment,	our	approach	 is	 based	 on	 uncovering	 the	 perceptions	 of	 contemporaneous	 economic	 actors.	Employing	 a	methodology	measuring	 relative	 levels	 of	 investor	 demand	 for	 financial	 assets	issued	by	governments	and	firms	in	both	environments	allowed	an	evaluation	of	the	relative	perceived	strengths	of	extraterritorial	and	domestic	Shanghai's	institutional	environments.	As	observed,	 we	 find	 a	 consistent	 pattern	 of	 reluctance	 by	 economic	 agents	 to	 hold	 domestic	financial	instruments,	absent	a	steep	discount,	when	presented	with	the	option	to	hold	similar	extraterritorial	financial	instruments.	Such	findings	imply	contemporaneous	actors	perceived	extraterritorial	 protections	 on	 private	 property	 and	 contract	 rights	 to	 be	 superior	 to	 those	offered	 under	 the	 domestic	 Chinese	 institutional	 environment.	 The	 robustness	 of	 these	findings	 is	 suggested	 by	 their	 considerable	 consistency	 over	 time	 and	 across	 multiple	domestic	 central	 and	 municipal	 governments.	 Such	 findings	 also	 suggest	 that	 revisionist	analyses	seeking	to	depict	high	levels	of	domestic	state	capacity	and	institutional	strength	are	potentially	 overweighting	 or	 misinterpreting	 evidence	 discounting	 the	 viewpoints	 of	contemporaneous	 actors	 of	 their	 perceived	 relative	 degree	 of	 domestic	 state	 capacity	 and	institutional	strength.				12.3.2.3		Methodological	Issues		The	approach	of	 this	dissertation	has	been	 to	argue	 the	standard	strategy	employed	suffers	from	 the	 fact	 that	 because	 there	 exists	 so	 much	 competing	 evidence	 suggesting	 differing	conclusions,	 attempting	 to	 parse	 and	 weigh	 their	 relative	 importance	 is	 inherently	 fragile.	Moreover,	 it	 too	 heavily	 relies	 on	 current-period	 scholars	 sifting	 through	 secondary	 or	primary	 source	 data,	 employing	 either	 qualitative	 or	 quantitative	 analysis	 techniques,	 to	present	arguments	in	support	of	one	or	another	viewpoint,	whether	traditional,	modified,	or	revisionist.	Further,	concepts	such	as	institutional	strength	are	inherently	ambiguous,	and	the	complexity	and	variation	of	data	imply	it	is	possible	to	construct	credible,	evidence-supported	conclusions	on	either	side	of	the	argument,	an	outcome	reflected	in	the	published	literature.	It	is	 for	these	reasons	that	we	argue	for	the	appropriateness	of	our	methodological	strategy	of	employing	 contemporaneous	 investor	 perceptions	 to	 evaluate	 Shanghai's	 parallel	 private	property	rights	institutions.		First,	 utilising	 contemporaneous	 investor	 behaviour	 alleviates	 the	 necessity	 of	 relying	 on	secondary	 analyses	 and	 current-period	 interpretations	 of	 historical	 events	 and	 institutional	settings.	 Researchers	 looking	 back	 at	 the	 timeframe,	 each	 with	 access	 to	 perhaps	 different	source	materials,	employing	varying	 theoretical	 frameworks	and	analytic	 tools,	can	 logically	arrive	 at	 differing,	 sometimes	 seemingly	 inconsistent	 conclusions	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 the	different	institutional	environments,	such	as	in	domestic	and	extraterritorial	Shanghai.	While	such	qualitative	researches	can	add	important	aspects	to	our	understanding	of	the	processes	shaping	 the	 institutional	health	and	complexity	defining	 late-imperial	 and	 republican	China,	they	are	necessarily	subjectively-coloured	by	the	researchers	undertaking	the	analysis.		Second,	 a	 comparative	analysis	 allows	us	 to	 eschew	absolutist	measurements.	 It	 is	 accurate	that	from	our	analysis	of	the	qualitative	financial	data,	we	are	able	to	utilise	contemporaneous	investor	behaviour	to	make	the	general	observation	that	for	investors,	private	property	rights	protections	 were	 continually	 and	 consistently	 perceived	 more	 robust	 in	 Shanghai's	extraterritorial	 institutional	 environment	 than	 in	 Shanghai's	 and	 China's	 domestic	institutional	environment.	Importantly,	however,	beyond	this	general	finding,	we	observe	that	economic	 agents'	 behaviour	 indicated	 perceptions	 in	 regard	 to	 property	 rights	 protections	were	not	 invariant	across	these	 institutional	settings,	and	viewed	more	robust	 in	some	time	periods	 than	others,	 suggesting	 the	 relative	difference	 in	quality	of	 such	 rights	between	 the	dual	institutional	environments	proved	to	be	mutable	over	time.	
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	Further,	 comparing	 market	 outcomes	 generated	 via	 the	 investment	 decisions	 of	contemporaneous	 economic	 actors	 is	methodologically	 consistent	with	 the	observation	 that	private	 property	 rights	 and	 associated	 institutional	 constructs	 are	 complex	 and	multidimensional	 nature,	 implying	 that	 seeking	 to	 capture	 their	 quality	 or	 strength	 via	construction	of	a	singular	"objective"	numerical	measure	is	a	specious	exercise.	Attempting	to	assign	 "the"	 "correct"	numerical	 value	on	 aspects	of	private	property	 rights,	 such	as	 rule	of	law	 or	 the	 level	 of	 contract	 rights	 protections,	 in	 order	 to	 create	 variables	 to	 be	 used	 in	statistical	 analyses	 can	 introduce	 both	 tautological	 and	 bias	 issues,	 as	 well	 as	 inherent	arbitrariness	 into	 the	 research	 process.	 More	 importantly,	 economic	 theory	 indicates	 that	what	is	most	important	in	determining	economic	actors'	behaviours	is	not	the	"true"	level	of	private	 property	 rights,	 or	 likelihood	 of	 expropriation,	 or	 expected	 return	 of	 any	 given	investment	opportunity;	rather,	 it	 is	 the	perceived	 levels	of	such	 factors	 that	drive	economic	decision-making.	Economic	agents	might	be	mistaken	 in	regard	 to	 their	a	priori	perceptions	and	expectations,	and	only	disabused	of	their	misconceptions	once	outcomes	are	realised	ex	
post;	 however,	what	 drives	 their	 actions	 are	 their	a	priori	 perceptions.	 Thus,	we	 argue,	 our	reliance	on	those	signals	that	reflect	investors'	a	priori	expectations	of	private	property	rights	institutions	represents	a	more	theoretically	consistent	approach.				12.4				Shanghai's	Early	Financial	Markets:	Contributions	to	Chinese	Financial	History		An	additional	contribution	of	this	research	to	the	literature	comes	from	its	construction	of	an	extensive	 financial	 data	 series	 from	 primary	 historical	 sources	 comprising	 trading	information	 recorded	 on	 Shanghai's	 early	 financial	 markets.	 This	 constructed	 data	 set	includes	 transactions	 prices	 of	 traded	 securities.	 For	 the	 analysis	 undertaken	 in	 this	dissertation,	we	primarily	 considered	 the	market	prices	of	bonds	 that	 traded	on	Shanghai's	financial	markets,	 both	 domestic	 and	 extraterritorial,	with	weekly	 pricing	 data	 gathered	 on	domestic	 national	 bonds,	 Shanghai	 municipal	 domestic	 and	 extraterritorial	 government	bonds.	This	data	set	is	valuable	because	it	allows	us	to	recreate	both	the	pricing	processes	as	well	 as	 an	 understanding	 of	 relative	 demand	 by	 investors	 of	 the	 financial	 instruments	generating	these	data	series,	and	to	describe	many	aspects	of	Shanghai's	early	capital	markets	in	a	 level	of	detail	heretofore	not	available	 in	 the	 literature.	For	 instance,	 the	 frequency	and	availability	 of	 pricing	 data	 helps	 provide	 an	 indication	 of	 investor	 demand	 for	 the	 various	instruments,	beyond	 the	actual	pricing	data	 itself.	Further	supplementing	 the	price	data	are	contemporaneous	 financial	market	 reports	 that	 describe	 the	 relative	 ease	 or	 difficulty	 that	issuing	 entities	 experienced	 in	 placing	 their	 issuances,	 again	 helping	 provide	 a	 deeper	understanding	 of	 the	 demand	 dynamics	 for	 domestic	 and	 extraterritorial	 government	securities	by	Shanghai's	contemporaneous	investor	class.				12.5	 Discussion	of	the	Dissertation's	Limitations		While	ambitious	in	its	approach	and	scope,	this	dissertation	nonetheless	suffers	from	several	important	limitations,	both	theoretic	and	methodological	in	nature,	which	must	be	considered	in	regard	to	their	implications	on	the	conclusions	obtained.	Furthermore,	these	limitations	are	suggestive	 of	 several	 potential	 extensions	 that	 might	 expand	 and	 further	 the	 scope	 of	 the	research	findings.		One	 major	 limitation	 comes	 from	 the	 methodology	 we	 employ.	 Although	 above	 we	underscored	the	advantages	of	utilising	investor	perceptions	to	measure	the	relative	strength	of	 Shanghai's	 institutional	 environments,	 we	 must	 also	 recognise	 that	 this	 approach	 also	serves	as	an	important	limitation	of	the	study.	First,	while	we	argue	ardently	that	the	correct	approach	 to	analysing	multi-dimensional	concepts	such	as	 institutional	capacity	and	private	property	 rights	 is	 best	 approached	 from	 a	 comparative	 measurement	 approach	 utilising	
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investor	perceptions,	as	opposed	to	absolutist	approach,	given	that	 investor	perceptions	are	inherently	subjective,	we	lose	the	ability	to	create	a	reference	instrument	based	on	objective	criterion.	 Relatedly,	 while	 rational	 investors	 do	 indeed	 seek	 to	 continually	 gauge	 expected	risks	facing	their	investments'	income	streams,	investors	can	misjudge	such	risks,	sometimes	badly.	 For	 instance,	 as	 Ferguson	 (2006)	 notes,	 on	 the	 eve	 of	 the	 First	 World	 War,	 bond	investors	 appeared	 quite	 sanguine	 about	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 major	 war	 breaking	 out	 in	Europe,	with	 their	 subsequent	 surprise	 generating	 significant	 abrupt	 price	 downturns	 once	the	first	cannons	were	fired.		A	 second	 limitation	 also	 relates	 to	 our	methodology	 strategy.	We	 chose	 to	 consider	market	demand	 measures,	 particularly	 by	 way	 of	 the	 pricing	 of	 sovereign	 bond	 issuances	 across	differing	property	rights	environments,	to	measure	differentials	in	the	strength	of	perceptions	of	private	property	rights	protections.	This	strategy	therefore	uses	investors'	views	of	default	risks	impacting	the	demand	and	pricing	of	bonds	as	a	proxy	for	measurement	of	such	rights.	But	while	an	important	indicator,	sovereign	default	repayment	risk	is	not	the	only	factor	that	determines	the	nature	of	a	given	property	rights	environment.	While	bond	prices	do	 indeed	provide	a	measure	of	the	price	of	risk	investors	assign	to	the	probability	of	default,	they	are	also	impacted	by	other	factors,	such	as	investors'	desire	for	liquidity.	If	investors	demand	for	holding	 fixed	 income	assets	changes	significantly	 for	reasons	outside	of	perceptions	relating	to	repayment	risk,	prices	can	change	irrespective	of	issues	pertaining	to	repayment	risk.	We	do	note,	however,	 that	 this	 issue	 is	alleviated	by	the	 fact	 that	we	are	comparing	the	relative	demand	for	similar	forms	of	extraterritorial-issued	and	domestic-issued	long-term	sovereign	bonds.	 If	 demand	 for	 fixed	 income	 assets	 rose	 or	 fell	 across	 the	 board,	 then	 relative	 prices	would	be	expected	to	remain	stable.		A	third	limitation	is	the	lack	of	detailed	analysis	on	the	composition	of	the	investor	class.	More	complete	and	detailed	evidences	of	the	nature	of	investor	participation	in	the	extraterritorial-run	 and	 domestic	 markets	 would	 add	 to	 overall	 understanding	 of	 whose	 perceptions	 in	particular	were	driving	price	differentials.	Additionally,	greater	information	of	whether	such	investors	 were	 primarily	 individuals	 or	 institutional,	 as	 well	 as	 their	 relative	 participation	levels,	 would	 allow	 us	 to	 better	 understand	 issues	 such	 as	 investor	 power	 and	 whether	market	 prices	 were	 driven	 by	 the	 actions	 of	 a	 few	 large	 institutional	 players	 such	 as	extraterritorial	 or	 domestic	 banks,	 or	 by	 the	 behaviour	 of	 atomised	 investors.	 Further	attempts	 to	 locate	 historical	 records	 providing	 such	 data	 could	 help	 fill	 in	 these	 missing	details	regarding	the	particular	make-up	of	investors.		Another	 limitation	 relates	 to	 the	 potential	 role	 that	 larger	 socio-political	 factors	 played	 in	driving	investor	decisions,	beyond	our	primary	focus	on	private	property	and	contract	rights	differentials.	The	argument	presented	in	this	dissertation	is	that	observed	contemporaneous	investor	 	 behaviour	 	 consistently	 	 indicates	 	 that	 	when	 	 presented	 	 a	 	 choice	 	 to	 invest	 	 in		financial	 instruments	 issued	 by	 extraterritorial	municipal	 governments,	 versus	 investing	 in	similar	 financial	 instruments	 issued	 by	 domestic	 municipal	 or	 national	 governments,	 all	things	 equal,	 investors	 chose	 those	 instruments	 backed	 by	 stronger	 property	 and	 contract	rights	protections.	This	conclusion	was	arrived	at	by	 focussing	our	analysis	rather	narrowly	utilising	the	contract	rights	approach	to	financial	instruments	as	originally	advanced	by	Mises	and	 later	 developed	more	 formally	 by	Hart	 (1995).	 In	 other	 settings,	 scholars	 contend	 that	understanding	 financial	market	 behaviour	 also	 requires	 consideration	 of	 securities	 issuers'	and	market	 participants'	 political	 power	 (Attard	&	Dilley	2013:	 3).	Accordingly,	 it	might	 be	that	 the	observed	 investment	decisions	we	ascribe	being	driven	by	differentials	 in	property	and	 contract	 rights	were	 instead	due	 to	 investors	 responding	 to	 colonial	 power	wielded	by	western-backed	local	governments.	Such	an	argument	is	somewhat	tempered	by	the	fact	that	Shanghai	 cannot	 appropriately	 be	 classified	 as	 a	 colonial	 state,	with	 the	 government	 of	 the	International	 Settlement	 not	 formally	 colonial,	 neither	 financed	 by	 nor	 politically	 linked	 to	any	 particular	 foreign	 government.	 As	 its	 "international"	 designation	 reflected,	 relevant	western	 states	 each	 had	 differing	 financial	 and	 strategic	 interests	 and	 were	 frequently	 at	policy	odds.	
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	Nonetheless,	 the	 extraterritorial	 settlements	 of	 Shanghai	 certainly	 mirrored	 some	 of	 the	trappings	of	more	formal	colonies	elsewhere	in	the	world.	Specifically,	the	municipal	councils	were	 backed	 by	 the	 implicit,	 and	 occasional	 explicit,	 shows	 of	 force	 by	 foreign	 powers'	gunboats	 harboured	 along	 the	 bank	 of	 the	 Huangpu.	 Whether	 in	 actuality	 or	 simply	 by	perception,	 it	might	be	 implied	 that	extraterritorial	 governments	benefitted	 from	 the	use	of	broader	 imperial	 power	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 domestic	 concerns.	 Given	 this	 interpretation,	investors	might	have	been	more	directly	responding	to	the	perception	that	municipal	bonds	issued	 by	 extraterritorial	 governments	 represented	 lower	 risk	 because	 these	 governments	had	 an	 implicit	 backing	 by	 foreign	 colonial	 powers.	 Thus,	 rather	 than	 investment	 decisions	explicitly	 influenced	 by	 perceptions	 of	 property	 and	 contract	 rights	 differentials,	 investors	might	 have	 been	 responding	 to	 an	 inherent	 "empire	 effect,"	 as	 first	 suggested	 by	 Davis	 &	Huttenback	(1986)	and	further	advanced	by	Accominotti	et	al.	(2011),	which	claims	colonial	governments	 received	 lower	 borrowing	 costs	 than	 comparable	 free	 nations	 as	 a	 result	 of	investor	 perception	 of	 such	 regimes	 as	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 colonial	 power;	 hence,	 market	prices	of	colonial	bonds	reflected	the	underlying	risk	associated	with	the	credit	of	the	colonial	power.	 Further	 research	might	 look	 to	 take	 account	 of	 these	 broader	 issues	 regarding	 the	perceived	role	of	colonial	power	so	a	more	complete	accounting	of	investor	decision-making	during	this	time	period	can	be	formed.		Additional	limitations	reflect	those	of	time	and	interest.	The	limitations	cited	here,	important	as	 they	 are,	 are	 likely	 only	 a	 subset	 that	 the	 perceptive	 reader	 might	 have	 already	 noted.	Nonetheless,	 our	 hope	 is	 that	 this	 current	 study	 has	 created	 the	 basis	 and	 impetus	 for	additional	 researches	 to	 be	 undertaken	 and	 some	 of	 these	 limitations,	 and	 the	 research	questions	 they	 imply,	 be	 explored	 in	 greater	 detail,	 all	 assisting	 in	 furthering	 our	understanding	of	the	operation	and	dynamics	that	defined	Shanghai's	early	financial	markets.	While	 the	 dataset	 we	 compiled	 on	 Shanghai's	 extraterritorial	 and	 domestic	 bond	 markets	proved	valuable	in	conducting	our	analysis	of	comparative	investor	perceptions,	its	potential	for	 further	 financial	 historical	 and	 theoretical	 research	 remains	 unrealised.	 Likewise,	 the	financial	data	utilised	in	this	research	project	represents	just	a	fraction	of	a	much	larger	and	more	detailed	dataset	we	have	collected	on	Shanghai's	early	 financial	markets,	 reflecting	an	opportunity	to	utilise	these	data	to	explore	a	host	of	additional	questions,	including	both	those	period-specific	relating	to	Shanghai's	financial	history,	as	well	as	broader	issues	pertaining	to	financial	theory,	that	we	hope	will	serve	to	further	advance	the	literature.		
 
347 
Bibliography		Accominotti,	O.,	M.	Flandreau,	and	R.	Rezzik.		2011.	"The	spread	of	empire:	Clio	and	the	measurement	of	colonial	borrowing	costs,"	Economic	History	Review,	64,	2:	385–407		Acemoglu,	Daron.		2005.		Politics	and	Economics	in	Weak	and	Strong	States.	Journal	of	Monetary	Economics,	Volume	52:	1199–1226.	Acemoglu,	Daron	and	F.	Zilibotti.		1997.	“Was	Prometheus	unbound	by	chance?	Risk,	diversification,	and	growth”.		Journal	of	Political	Economy,	Volume	105:	709–775.	Acemoglu,	Daron,	Camilo	Garcia-Jimeno,	and	James	A.	Robinson.		2015.		State	Capacity	and	Economic	Development:	A	Network	Approach.	American	Economic	Review,	Volume	105,	Number	8	(August):	2364-2409.	Acemoglu,	Daron,	Isaías	Chaves,	Philip	Osafo-Kwaako	and	James	Robinson.		2016.		Indirect	Rule	and	State	Weakness	in	Africa:	Sierra	Leone	in	Comparative	Perspective.		in	African	Successes,	Volume	IV:	Sustainable	
Growth,	eds.	Sebastian	Edwards,	Simon	Johnson,	David	Weil.		Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press:	343-370.	Acemoglu,	Daron,	Simon	Johnson	and	James	Robinson.		2005.		Institutions	as	a	fundamental	cause	of	long-run	growth.	Handbook	of	Economic	Growth,	Volume	1A:	386-472.	Adongo,	Jonathan.		2016.		Creditor	Protection	Law	Effects	on	Venture	Capital	Investment	in	Africa:	Country-Level	Evidence.	The	Journal	of	Private	Equity,	Volume	19,	Number	3	(Summer):	37-50	Aguilera,	R.	and	C.	Williams.		2010.		“Law	and	Finance”:	Inaccurate,	Incomplete,	and	Important”,	Brigham	Young	University	Law	Review.		Vol	2010	Akanbi,	Olusegun.		2018.		State	Institutions	and	Tax	Capacity:	An	Empirical	Investigation	of	Causality.		Working	Paper,	Economic	Research	Southern	Africa.	Alchian,	Armen	and	Harold	Demsetz.		1973.		The	Property	Rights	Paradigm.		Journal	of	Economic	History,	Volume	33:	16-27.	Alesina,	Alberto	and	Paola	Giuliano.	2015.	Culture	and	Institutions.	Journal	of	Economic	Literature,	Volume	53,	Number	4	(December):	898-944.	Alimov,	Azizjon.		2015.		Labor	Protection	Laws	and	Bank	Loan	Contracting.	The	Journal	of	Law	&	Economics	,	Volume	58,	Number	1	(February):	37-74	
All	about	Shanghai	and	Environs:	A	Standard	Guide	Book,	1934-35	Edition.		1935.		Shanghai:	The	University	Press.	Allen,	F.	and	J.	Qian.		2009.	"Comparing	Legal	and	Alternative	Institutions	in	Finance	and	Commcere."		Chapter	6	in	Global	Perspectives	on	the	Rule	of	Law,	ed.	J.	Heckman,	R.	Nelson,	L.	Cabatingan,	London:	Routledge-Cavendish:	250-277.	Allen,	F.,	J.	Qian	and	C.	Zhang.		2011.	"An	Alternative	View	on	Law,	Institutions,	Finance	and	Growth."		Finance	Department	Working	Paper,	Carroll	School	of	Management,	Boston	College.	Almaskati,	N.,	Bird,	R.,	&	Lu,	Y.	2018.	Corporate	governance,	institutions,	markets	and	social	factors.	Paper	presented	at	the	European	Financial	Management	Association's	Financial	Markets	and	Corporate	Governance	Conference,	2018	Annual	Meeting,	June	27-30.	Andrews,	R.,	G.	Boyne,	K.	Meier,	L.	O'Toole,	Jr.,	and	R.	Walker.		2005.		"Representative	Bureaucracy,	Organizational	Strategy,	and	Public	Service	Performance:	An	Empirical	Analysis	of	English	Local	Government".		Journal	of	Public	Administration	Research	and	Theory,	15(4):	489-504.	anonymous.		1927.		"Settlement	in	Shanghai"		Antony,	Robert.		1989.		Peasants,	Heroes,	and	Brigands:	The	Problems	of	Social	Banditry	in	Early	Nineteenth-Century	South	China.	Modern	China,	Volume	15,	Number	2	(April):	123-148.	Arbor,	Ann.		1995.	The	Green	Gang	and	the	Guomindang	State:	Du	Yuesheng	and	the	politics	of	Shanghai	1927-37.	Journal	of	Asian	Studies,	Volume	54,	Number1,	February.	Arena,	Philip	and	Nicholas	Nicoletti.		2014.		Selectorate	theory,	the	democratic	peace,	and	public	goods	provision.		International	Theory,	Volume	6,	Issue	3	(November):	391-416	Armour,	John,	Simon	Deakin,	Prabirjit	Sarkar,	Mathias	Siems,	Ajit	Singh.		2008.		Shareholder	Protection	and	Stock	Market	Development:	An	Empirical	Test	of	the	Legal	Origins	Hypothesis.		ECGI	Working	Paper	Series	in	Law,	Working	Paper	Number108/2008,	May.	Armour,	John,	Simon	Deakin,	Viviana	Mollica,	Mathias	Siems.		2009.		Law	and	Financial	Development:	What	We	Are	Learning	from	Time-Series	Evidence.		Brigham	Young	University	Law	Review,	Volume	2009,	Number	6:	1435-1500.	
 
348 
Aron,	J.		2000.	Growth	and	institutions:	A	review	of	the	evidence.	World	Bank	Research	Observer,	Volume	15:	99–135.	Arum,	R.		1996.	Do	Private	Schools	Force	Public	Schools	to	Compete?	American	Sociological	Review,	61:	29-46.	Ash,	Robert.	1976.		Land	Tenure	in	Pre-Revolutionary	China:	Kiangsu	Province	in	the	1920s	and	1930s	[Research	Notes	and	Studies	Number	1].	London:	University	of	London,	School	of	Oriental	and	African	Studies,	Contemporary	China	Institute.	Attard,	Bernard	and	Andrew	Dilley.		2013.		Finance,	Empire	and	the	British	World.	Journal	of	Imperial	and	Commonwealth	History,	Volume	41,	Number	1:		1-10	Attard,	Bernard.		2000.	“Making	a	market.	The	jobbers	of	the	London	stock	exchange,	1800-1986.”	Financial	History	Review,	Volume	7:	5-24.	Averill,	Stephen.		1981.	"The	New	Life	in	Action:	The	Nationalist	Government	in	South	Jiangxi,	1934-37".	The	China	Quarterly,	Number	88	(Dec.,	1981):		594-628	Bai	Lijian.		2000.	“)( 
&$"”	(An	Analysis	of	the	Causes	of	Modern	China	Securities	Market	Price	Fluctuations).	Nankai	Economics	Research	Volume	2000-2:	73-77.	Bank	of	China.	1995.	)%## 1912-1949	(History	of	Bank	of	China	1912-1949).	Beijing:	Zhongguo	jinrong	chubanshe.	Barnett,	R.W.		1941.	"Shanghai's	Exchange	Market."	Far	Eastern	Survey:	11-116.	Basu,	Kaishik,	Eric	Jones	and	Ekkehart	Schlicht.	1987.	“The	Growth	and	Decay	of	Custom:	The	Role	of	the	New	Institutional	Economics	in	Economic	History.”	Explorations	in	Economic	History,	Volume	24:	1-21.		Baten,	Joerg,	Debin	Ma,	Stephen	Morgan	and	Qing	Wang	2010.	“Evolution	of	living	standards	and	human	capital	in	China	in	the	18-20th	centuries:	Evidence	from	real	wages,	age-heaping,	and	anthropometrics.”	Explorations	in	Economic	History,	Volume	47:	347-359.		Beck,	T.,	A.	Demirguc-Kunt,	and	R.	Levine.	2005.	“Law	and	Firms’	Access	to	Finance.”	American	Law	and	Economics	Review,	7(1):	211–52.	Bedeski,	Robert.		1981.		State-Building	in	Modern	China:	The	Kuomintang	in	the	Prewar	Period.		Berkeley:	Institute	of	East	Asian	Studies.	Behr,	Edward.		1996.		Prohibition:	Thirteen	Years	That	Changed	America.		New	York:	Arcade	Publishing	Bell,	M.	and	H	Woodhead.		1912.		The	China	Year	Book	1912.		London:	Routledge	&	Sons.	Bencivenga,	V.	and	B.	Smith.		1991.		"Financial	Intermediation	and	Endogenous	Growth,"Review	of	Economic	Studies,	58,	p.	195-209.	Bencivenga,	V.	and	B.	Smith.		1993.	“Some	consequences	of	credit	rationing	in	an	endogenous	growth	model”.	Journal	of	Economic	Dynamics	and	Control	17,	97–122.	Bencivenga,	V.,	B.	Smith	and	R.	Starr	1995.	“Transactions	Costs,	Technological	Choice,	and	Endogenous	Growth.”	Journal	of	Economic	Theory,	Volume	67:	155-177.	Bergere,	Marie-Claire.		1998.		Sun	Yat-sen.	[Translated	by	Janet	Lloyd].	Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press	Bergere,	Marie-Claire.		2002.	Histoire	de	Shanghai		[Shanghai:	China’s	Gateway	to	Modernity,	2009,	Translated	by	Janet	Lloyd,	Stanford,	CA,	Stanford	University	Press].	Bernhardt,	Kathryn.		1992.		Rents,	Taxes	and	Peasant	Resistance:	The	Lower	Yangzi	Region,	1840-1950.		Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press	Besley,	Timothy		and	Torsten	Persson.		2008.		War	and	State	Capacity.		Journal	of	the	European	Economic	Association	Volume	6,	Nos.	2-3	(February):	522-530.	Besley,	Timothy,	and	Torsten	Persson.		2009.		The	Origins	of	State	Capacity:	Property	Rights,	Taxation,	and	Politics.		American	Economic	Review,	Volume	99,	Number	4:	1218-1244.	Besley,	Timothy,	and	Torsten	Persson.		2014.		Why	Do	Developing	Countries	Tax	So	Little?		Journal	of	Economic	Perspectives,	Volume	28,	Number	4	(Fall):	99–120.	BOC	[)%#+#,	)		(eds.)].		1991.		)%##*		(1912-1949).	Nanjing:	
	.	BOC	[)%##!'	(ed.)].		1995.		)%##	(1912-1949).	Beijing).	Bueno	de	Mesquita,	Bruce,	Alastair	Smith,	Randolph	Siverson,	and	James	Morrow.		1999.		An	institutional	explanation	of	the	democratic	peace.	American	Political	Science	Review,	Volume	93,	Number	4:	791-807.	Bueno	de	Mesquita,	Bruce,	Alastair	Smith,	Randolph	Siverson,	and	James	Morrow.		2003.		The	Logic	of	Political	Survival.	Cambridge,	MA:	The	MIT	Press.	
 
349 
Bueno	de	Mesquita,	Bruce,	James	Morrow,	Randolph	Siverson,	and	Alastair	Smith.		2013.		Testing	the	Selectorate	Explanation	of	the	Democratic	Peace.		New	York	University	Department	of	Political	Science	Working	Paper.	Bian,	Morris.		2002.		The	Sino-Japanese	War	and	the	Formation	of	the	State	Enterprise	System	in	China:	A	Case	Study	of	the	Dadukou	Iron	and	Steel	Works,	1938—1945.		Enterprise	&	Society,	Volume	3,	Number	1	(March):	80-123.	Bian,	Morris.		2005a.		Building	State	Structure:	Guomindang	Institutional	Rationalization	during	the	Sino-Japanese	War,	1937-1945.		Modern	China,	Volume	31	Number	1	(January):	35-71.	Bian,	Morris.		2005b.		The	Making	of	the	State	Enterprise	System	in	Modern	China:	The	Dynamics	of	Institutional	
Change.		Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	Univ.	Press.	Bianco,	Lucien.		1995.		Peasant	Uprisings	Against	Poppy	Tax	Collection	in	Suxian	and	Lingbi	(Anhui)	in	1932.		
Republican	China,	Volume	21,	Number	1	(November).	Bickers,	Robert	and	Isabella	Jackson	(eds).		2016.		Treaty	Ports	in	Modern	China:	Law,	Land	and	Power.	Abingdon:	Routledge	Bickers,	Robert.		1996.		Death	of	a	Young	Shanghailander:	The	Thorburn	Case	and	the	Defence	of	the	British	Treaty	Ports	in	China.		Modem	Asian	Studies	30,	2:		271-	300.	Bickers,	Robert.		1998.		Shanghaianders:	the	Formation	and	Identity	of	the	British	Settler	Community	in	Shanghai	1843-1937.		Past	&	Present,	Number	159	(May):	161-121.		Bickers,	Robert.		1999.		Britain	in	China:	Community,	Culture	and	Colonialism,	1900–1949.	Manchester	and	New	York:	Manchester	University	Press.		Bickers,	Robert.		2003.		Empire	Made	Me:	an	Englishman	Adrift	in	Shanghai.		London:	Allen	Lane.	Bickers,	Robert.		2004.		Settlers	and	Diplomats:	the	end	of	British	hegemony	in	the	International	Settlement,	1937-1945.		in	C	Henriot	&	W	Yeh	(eds.),	In	the	shadow	of	the	rising	sun:	Shanghai	under	Japanese	occupation,	1937-45.	Cambridge	University	Press:		229	-	256.	Bickers,	Robert.		2012.	The	Challenger:	Hugh	Hamilton	Lindsay	And	The	Rise	Of	British	Asia,	1832–1865		
Transactions	of	the	Royal	Historical	Society,	Volume	22:	141–169	Bickers,	Robert.		2013.	British	Concessions	and	Chinese	Cities,	1910s–1930s.	in	Billy	So,	Madeleine	Zelin	(eds.),	
New	Narratives	of	Urban	Space	in	Republican	Chinese	Cities:	Emerging	Social,	Legal	and	Governance	Orders.		Leiden:	Brill:	157–170.	Billingsley,	Phil.		1988.		Bandits	in	Republican	China.	Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press.	Billmeier,	Andreas	and	Isabella	Massa.		2009.		What	drives	stock	market	development	in	emerging	markets-institutions,	remittances,	or	natural	resources?		Emerging	Market	Review,	Volume	10:		23-35.	Bird,	Isabella.		1899.		The	Yangtze	Valley	and	Beyond.		London:	Cambridge	University	Press.	Bishop,	John.		1920.		Extraterritoriality	in	China	and	its	Abolition.		Chinese	Social	and	Political	Science	Review,	Volume	3.	Blattman,	Christopher,	Edward	Miguel.		2010.	Civil	War.		Journal	of	Economic	Literature,	Volume	48,	Number	1:	3-57.	Bloch,	Kurt.		1939.		War	Accentuates	China's	Fiscal	Disorder.		Far	Eastern	Survey,	Volume	8,	Number	11	(May):	133-134.	Bloch,	Kurt.		1941.		Social	and	Economic	Shifts	in	China.		Far	Eastern	Survey,	Volume	10,	Number	3	(February):	27-32.	Boardman,	A.	and	A.	Vining.		1989.		"Ownership	and	Performance	in	Competitive	Environments".		Journal	of	Law	and	Economics,	32	(April):	1-34	Boecking,	Felix.		2011a.		Unmaking	the	Chinese	Nationalist	State:	Administrative	Reform	among	Fiscal	Collapse,	1937–1945.		Modern	Asian	Studies,	Volume	45,	Number	2,	(March):	277-301	Boecking,	Felix.		2011b.		The	Bitterness	of	Fiscal	Realism:	Guomindang	Tariff	Policy,	China’s	Trade	in	Imported	Sugar	and	Smuggling,	1928-1937.	Harvard	Asia	Quarterly,	Volume	3,	Number	2:	3-10.		Boecking,	Felix.		2017.		No	Great	Wall:	Trade,	Tariffs,	and	Nationalism	in	Republican	China,	1927–1945.	Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Asia	Center.	Boettke,	Peter.		2009.	Institutional	Transition	and	the	Problem	of	Credible	Commitment.	The	Annual	Proceedings	of	The	Wealth	and	Well-Being	of	Nations	(1):	41-51.		Bolton,	Patrick.		2014.		Corporate	Finance,	Incomplete	Contracts,	and	Corporate	Control.		Journal	of	Law,	
Economics,	and	Organization,	Volume	30,	Issue	suppl_1,	May:	i64–i81.	
